Condition of Navy after Civil War—Admiral Case’s Fleet—“Virginius’s”
Scare—“Huron,” “Alert,” and “Ranger”—Secretary Hunt—First Advisory
Board—Secretary Chandler—“Puritan” Class—Finished—Steel—Hon. J. B.
McCreary and Appropriation Bill for New Navy—Members of Second Naval
Advisory Board—Standard for Steel for New Ships, “Chicago,” “Boston,”
“Atlanta,” and “Dolphin”—Secretary Whitney—Beginning of New Navy, by
Charles H. Cramp—“Baltimore,” “Charleston,” and “Yorktown”—Purchase of
Drawings by Navy Department—Commodore Walker—Premium System—Mr.
Whitney’s Views—Premiums Paid—Attack on System—Secretary Tracy—War
College Paper—Classifying Bids.
AFTER the Civil War the navy was neglected, being, so far as its
cruising vessels were concerned, a wooden navy of not only obsolete
types, but decayed or decaying vessels, which gradually became a
reproach to the country and a laughing-stock for other maritime powers.
At the time of the “Virginius’s” difficulty with Spain, which occurred
about five years after the close of the Civil War, a “grand fleet” was
assembled at Key West under the command of Rear-Admiral Case. This fleet
consisted of a large number of wooden cruising steamers of various types
and classes, all obsolete, many of them unseaworthy, and all incapable
of meeting an up-to-date ship of that period (1874-75) with any chance
of success whatever. To these wooden hulks were added the
double-turreted monitors “Terror,” “Amphitrite,” and “Monadnock,” which
were built at the navy-yards of wood, and a batch of old worn-out
single-turreted monitors. The bottoms of the wooden monitors were so
weakened structurally that, whenever an effort was made to wedge up the
spindles so that the turrets could revolve, the bottom went down instead
of the turret going up, the latter necessarily remaining immovable.
Unquestionably any one, or at most any two, of our first-class modern
battleships at this writing, 1903, could have annihilated and sunk the
entire fleet in two or three hours, although it consisted, all types and
classes taken together, of over forty vessels. This was an object
lesson, and it to some extent aroused the sensibilities of the country;
but the then existing administration of the Navy Department was under
the absolute control of the navy-yard rings, and all naval work of every
description was done in navy-yards. The “Spanish Scare,” as it was
called, did, however, have the effect of spurring Congress to provide
for the construction of eight (8) new vessels, the first provided for
since the Civil War. Of these, three were given out to be built by
contract; two, the “Huron” and “Alert,” small iron sloops-of-war or
gun-vessels, were given to John Roach and built at his works at Chester;
and another of the same class, the “Ranger,” was given to Harlan &
Hollingsworth, of Wilmington, and built there. The other five were built
in navy-yards, and were completed at different periods between 1875 and
1879.
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP ALABAMA]
With this exception, nothing whatever was done toward increase or
betterment of our naval force from 1865 until 1883. However, in 1881,
General Garfield, having been elected President the preceding year and
inaugurated the 4th of March, 1881, appointed Judge William H. Hunt, of
Louisiana, Secretary of the Navy. General Garfield understood the naval
needs of the country, referred to the subject vigorously in his
inaugural, and quite early in his administration, or about a month
before he was assassinated, prompted his Secretary of the Navy to take
measures looking to the modernization of our national marine. The result
of this was the convening of a board early in the summer of 1881, of
which Admiral John Rodgers was President. The instructions of this board
were to investigate the existing state of foreign navies, to inquire
into the immediate needs of our own, and to formulate a ship-building
programme on modern lines, to be carried out as soon as the resources of
the country would permit. On the 7th of November, 1881, this board,
which is commonly known to history as the “First Naval Advisory Board,”
reported in accordance with its instructions. It is not necessary here
to go into detail with regard to the ship-building programme which they
recommended. Suffice to say, that not one of the ships or types of ships
which they recommended was ever actually built; but their deliberations
and report attracted general public attention, caused the subject to be
widely and patriotically, although not very intelligently, discussed in
the newspapers, so that, while the action of this first Naval Advisory
Board did not produce any actual or visible results, it at least served
to popularize the subject of the “New Navy.”
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP MAINE]
In 1882, Mr. Hunt was appointed Minister to Russia, and was succeeded in
the Secretaryship of the Navy by William E. Chandler, of New Hampshire.
Mr. Chandler was a vigorous, active man, and lost no time in taking
advantage of the public interest which had been aroused. The result of
the further investigations and reports which he caused to be made, and
his communications to the President, and through the President to
Congress based thereon, resulted in an act, approved March 3, 1883,
providing for the construction of four new cruising vessels, and the
launching and engining of the four double-turreted monitors “Puritan,”
“Terror,” “Amphitrite,” and “Monadnock,” which at that time had been on
the stocks about eight years. These were built of iron, and took the
places in the Navy Register of the worthless wooden monitors of the same
names.
On the first lot of new vessels and engines, the bids were all
considerably below the cost estimated by the Advisory Board and the
Bureaus, and the contracts were let as follows: For the four vessels,
and the engines of the “Puritan,” monitor, to Mr. John Roach; for the
engines of the “Terror,” monitor, to William Cramp & Sons; and for the
“Amphitrite,” monitor, to the Harlan & Hollingsworth Company, of
Wilmington, Delaware. Work under all these contracts proceeded with
commendable alacrity.
Considerable difficulty was at first experienced in procuring material
for the new steel ships. The standard established by law was very high,
and the methods of test devised by the board, to say the least, did
nothing to ameliorate the rigors of the statute. The steel-makers,
however, bravely persevered, and finally overcame their difficulties in
the main, though a historical _résumé_ of the progress of the new navy
would be incomplete without the statement that none of the contractors,
under the Act of March 2, 1883, made any money, and some of them
suffered serious loss; and this statement applies equally to the
manufacturers who made the steel for the pioneer ships,—at least one old
and well established concern being wrecked by the difficulties
encountered, while others were embarrassed.
The year 1884 was signalized by a Presidential campaign of unusual
bitterness, and, notwithstanding the cordiality with which all parties
had joined hands in the inception of the new navy, the first session of
the Forty-eighth Congress developed what for a time threatened to be at
least a temporary hiatus. But wiser counsels at length prevailed, and,
though no additions were made to the list of new ships authorized,
sufficient appropriations were made to prevent stoppage of work on those
already under contract.
The results of the year 1884 were chiefly interesting because they
demonstrated, after much bitter debate and heated discussion, that the
cause of the new navy had acquired impetus sufficient to vanquish the
party passions of even so violent a Presidential campaign as that which
marked that year. That campaign over, the Forty-eighth Congress, at its
second session, took up with zeal the promotion of the new navy, and the
act approved March 3, 1885, authorized four additional vessels, toward
the construction of which $1,895,000 was appropriated with practical
unanimity. The Act of March 3, 1885, marked an epoch in the history of
the new navy. Prior to that time, the legislative practice had been to
require separate enactment to authorize the construction of new vessels
for the navy. In this case the authorization appeared in the body of the
regular Naval Appropriation Bill, and that practice has been followed
ever since. This innovation was debated in Committee of the Whole, and a
point of order made to strike out the proposed authorization. The point
of order was overruled by Hon. James B. McCreary, a Democratic member
from Kentucky, with the approval of Speaker John G. Carlisle; Mr.
McCreary being Chairman of the Committee of the Whole on the Naval Bill.
Mr. McCreary ruled: 1st. That legislation in pursuance of any settled or
established policy was germane in the annual appropriation bill which
dealt with that subject matter. 2d. That the increase of the navy was
clearly a settled and established policy, to which all branches of the
government were committed. 3d. That in view of that fact the
authorization of additional vessels of war could not be considered new
legislation in the meaning of the rules, but must be regarded as
progressive legislation in a direction previously sanctioned by
Congress; that therefore the authorization of new ships was germane to
the regular naval appropriation bill for each year, and was in order.
It is hard to overestimate the value of this ruling to the interests of
the new navy. Every one familiar with legislative processes knows the
advantage which appertains to the “right of way” enjoyed by a regular
appropriation bill as compared with the average chances of an
independent measure. These advantages are so marked, that it is quite
proper to say that Mr. McCreary’s rule on this point was of greater
importance than any other single incident in the legislative history of
naval reconstruction. In the Act of March 3, 1885, appeared another
clause prohibiting the repair of any existing wooden vessel when the
cost of such repair should exceed 20 per cent. upon the whole cost of
such vessel entirely new. This clause was adopted upon the
recommendation of Secretary Chandler, made in the previous year; its
obvious object being to render impossible the perpetuation of the old
and obsolete wooden ships. Its effect soon became apparent in a rapid
elimination of old wooden vessels from the navy, until by 1890 only
sixteen of them remained on the active list, and nearly, if not quite,
every one of these was then in her last commission. It is impossible to
overestimate the salutary effects of this clause. 1st. It “cleared the
decks” of a lot of obsolete lumber. 2d. It stimulated public opinion to
demand prompt production of new and modern ships to take the places of
the old and obsolete. 3d. It put an end to a policy of makeshifts which
was always extravagant, often wasteful, and sometimes corrupt.
The building of the four pioneer ships involved several new departures.
The Congress that authorized their construction and made an
appropriation toward it, also made provision for creating what was
termed a second “Naval Advisory Board,” which was to have charge of the
details of their building. By this expedient Congress hoped to avert the
evils of the Bureau system on the one hand, and to limit the one-man
power of the Secretary on the other. This board consisted of five
members, three naval officers and two civilians, to be selected by the
Secretary of the Navy. Of the two civilians, one was a ship-builder, the
other a mechanical engineer. The ship-builder was Henry Steers. This
gentleman was a nephew of George Steers, a somewhat celebrated naval
architect in his time, whose principal achievement was the design of the
yacht “America,” which won the cup which the English have struggled ever
since to recapture. The famous steam-frigate “Niagara,” built a short
time before the war, though constructed in a navy-yard, was designed by
Henry Steers. During the paralysis of American ship-building which
followed the Civil War, Mr. Steers became discouraged at the outlook
and, having a considerable fortune, went into the banking business.
The other civilian member, the mechanical engineer, was Miers Coryell,
of New York. This gentleman was connected in his professional capacity
with the Cromwell Line of steamships plying between New York and New
Orleans. He had shortly before the time under consideration designed an
engine for the “Louisiana” of that line, which Mr. Roach built,
involving an entirely new departure in sea-going engine construction.
Perhaps the most concise way to describe this engine would be to say
that it represented an effort to introduce the walking-beam of a
side-wheel river steamboat into the engine compartment of a screw
steamship. The advantage claimed for it was that it permitted the use of
vertical cylinders within a deck-height not sufficient to admit the
regular type of vertical inverted cylinders. This it undoubtedly did;
but there its merit stopped. For the rest it was cumbrous, complicated,
and of weight exceedingly disproportionate to its power. This
unspeakable device Mr. Coryell offered to the Advisory Board, and, to
the speechless amazement of the engineering world, it was adopted as the
propelling machinery of the most important ship then authorized for the
navy. It is worthy of remark here that these beam-engines were
subsequently taken out of the “Chicago,” and a pair of vertical inverted
or slightly inclined engines of the usual type substituted. And it might
also be observed that this work, with some alterations in the hull, was
done in the New York Navy-Yard at a cost of $1,300,000 as against an
original contract price of $889,000 for the whole ship new; or, in other
words, the cost of re-engining and overhauling the “Chicago” in a
navy-yard was 40 per cent. more than the first cost of the new ship
under contract in a private shipyard!
The Navy Bureaus were not slow to discern what the creation of the
Advisory Board meant for them. At first they tried to defeat it. Finding
that impossible, two of the Bureau chiefs besought the Naval Committees
of the Senate and House to provide that at least one of the four ships
be built in a navy-yard. No member of the Senate committee favored this
proposition, and but two members of the House committee, both of whom,
it is hardly necessary to say, represented navy-yard districts and
danced to the music of labor agitators. Thus, at the inception of the
new navy the navy-yard snake was “scotched,” if not killed.
When the contracts and specifications were drawn up in form, two facts
became evident: One was that the knowledge of the new conditions of
naval construction possessed by the authorities of the navy itself was
altogether academic; and the other was that neither naval authorities
nor civilians interested had any adequate idea of what the requirement
of the law in regard to material actually signified. The law said that
the ships must be built of “steel, of domestic manufacture, having a
tensile strength of 60,000 pounds to the square inch, and an elongation
of 25 per cent. in eight inches.”
Verbally, this was the English Admiralty standard for mild steel plates
and shapes. But the English had an elastic system of inspection which
left much to be determined by the judgment and knowledge of the
inspector. The system adopted by our earlier inspectors of material was
rigid as a rock and inelastic as cast-iron. The letter of the law, not
the spirit of it, was their guide. These requirements and the mode of
enforcing them would have been drastic had the mild-steel industry been
in a flourishing condition. But as a matter of fact it had not been
developed at all in this country; so they were formulating crucial
requirements for the product of an industry which did not exist. The
production of mild steel, or at least its use in naval construction, was
still in the experimental stage then, even in England, its native home.
The “Iris” and “Mercury,” the first all-steel ships built in England,
had not been in commission more than two years, when the requirements
for our new ships were formulated by the naval authorities and embodied
in an Act of Congress.
Bessemer steel was produced in large quantities here at the time for
making rails and tank-plates. But Bessemer could not stand the navy
tests. Nothing but open-hearth steel could do it, and at the time when
bids were asked for the first four ships there was not an open-hearth
mill in the country that could make the ingots required for the plates
and shapes of the sizes and qualities demanded. Still, American
steel-makers were found willing to undertake the task, though the sequel
soon proved that their conceptions of what confronted them were quite
vague. When one surveys the open-hearth steel industry as it exists in
the United States to-day (1901), largely exceeding that of Great
Britain, and greater than that of all the rest of the world, exclusive
of the United Kingdom, put together, it seems impossible to realize that
it is all the growth of a score of years. As late as 1887 there was no
forging-mill in this country that could forge a three-throw crank-shaft
in one piece, and the “Baltimore’s” crank-shafts of that description had
to be imported from Whitworth’s works in England.
Such were the conditions which confronted the ship-builders who made
estimates and offered bids for the construction of the four pioneer
steel ships of the new navy. When the bids were opened early in July,
1883, it became apparent that the views of bidders as to the character
of the task they proposed to undertake were quite divergent. To avoid
prolixity, we will deal only with the “Chicago,” which was, in fact, the
representative ship. For that vessel there were but two bidders worth
considering,—Mr. Cramp and Mr. Roach. Mr. Roach bid $889,000 for the
hull and machinery. Mr. Cramp bid a little over $1,000,000, or about 14
per cent. in excess of his competitor. As the sequel proved, Mr. Cramp,
conservative as his bid was, or as it appeared to be, underwent no
misfortune in failing to get the “Chicago” at $1,025,000. Whether Mr.
Cramp could have been more successful than Mr. Roach was in creating the
new open-hearth steel industry required to produce the material demanded
by the law and the specifications need not be discussed. It may,
however, be said that the excess of his bid over that of Mr. Roach was
due wholly to his misgivings on this point; because on all other points
involved, such as experience, skill, and efficiency of organization, he
had some advantage.
Mr. Roach got all the ships. The contracts were signed July 26, 1883.
The keel of the “Chicago” was laid December 5, 1883; she was launched
December 5, 1885, only fifty-two days before the contract date for
completion, which was January 26, 1886. Meantime the first of the ships,
the despatch-boat “Dolphin,” had been completed, put on trial, and had
failed to meet the requirements of the law. Here the evils of the
inflexible, inelastic, or “cast-iron” form of contract became instantly
evident. The Navy Department could not accept the ship under those
conditions without violating the law. Mr. Roach thereupon threw up his
hands, and the government, as provided in the contract, had to take
possession of the ships as they stood in his shipyard and complete them
with its own resources, at the risk and expense of Mr. Roach and his
bondsmen. This action on his part is hard to understand or explain. He
was perfectly solvent. Although, as the law and the contract stood, the
Navy Department could not accept the “Dolphin,” in view of her
deficiency in performance, Congress was soon to assemble, and Secretary
Whitney was ready to ask for an amendment or modification of the law
which would enable him to accept the ship with an equitable penalty for
her deficiency, which, by the way, was not great. It was said at the
time that Mr. Roach acted upon the advice of certain political friends
holding high rank; that a certain group of Republican politicians
believed that their party needed a martyr just at that juncture, and
they thought Mr. Roach would make a good one. Be this as it may, the
government finished all the ships in the Roach yard, and the “Chicago,”
contracted for July 26, 1883, was ready for her first commission the
middle of April, 1889,—five years and nearly nine months building. We
have dwelt with some prolixity on this branch of the subject for two
reasons: first, because it was the beginning of the most important epoch
in our naval history; and, second, because the errors, miscalculations,
and consequent disasters it developed became themselves of very great
value as object lessons for guidance or warning in subsequent
transactions.
When Mr. Whitney became Secretary in March, 1885, he found ready to his
hand authorization for four more ships, the designs of which had been
partially worked out by the Bureaus during the previous winter. He,
however, proceeded slowly; so deliberately, that the contract for the
first of the four ships built under the authorization of March 3, 1885,
and August 3, 1886, was not signed until December 17, 1886, a year and
nine months after he assumed the office. This delay was due to a variety
of causes, the most important of which are interestingly and
instructively described by Mr. Cramp himself in an account of his
personal connection with the transactions. It may be premised that when
Mr. Whitney became Secretary of the Navy, he very soon sought to avail
himself of Mr. Cramp’s experience, professional ability, and practical
knowledge. Mr. Cramp responded in the same spirit of frankness and
candor as that in which the Secretary invited him. There was no mincing
of matters in any direction. Mr. Cramp hewed to the line on all the
abuses and shortcomings of the old régime, and he also pointed out
methods by which they could be overcome or, at least, compelled to get
out of the way. Mr. Whitney was a thorough business man and an able
lawyer. Far removed both by character and by fortune from any possible
temptation, Mr. Whitney’s sole object in taking the navy portfolio was
to promote the public welfare, and thereby add lustre to his name.
But let Mr. Cramp tell his own story in his own way.
THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW NAVY.
“The practical beginning of the new navy occurred under the
Administration of Mr. Chandler, and while he was Secretary of the
Navy the ‘Chicago,’ ‘Boston,’ ‘Atlanta,’ and ‘Dolphin’ were
constructed.
“The hulls of these vessels had been designed by the Advisory Board,
and were about equal to any vessels constructed abroad at that time
so far, I might say, as the models and general designs were
concerned. Their outfit and guns were not fairly up to the
prevailing practice abroad, and their engines were very inefficient
and commonplace. They were not designed by the board, but were
principally the designs of the contractor. The ‘Chicago’ had engines
of quite a fantastic design, suggested by one of the members in the
board. The models and designs of the hulls, as compared with what
had preceded them in the Navy Department after the end of the Civil
War, were great achievements over the ridiculous specimens of the
ship-building art that we were loaded with during that time. They
were the production principally of Messrs. Steers and Fernald,
assisted by Mr. Bowles, and were up to most of the requirements of
the time.
“When the vessels were tried under the following Administration,
that is, during the Secretaryship of Mr. Whitney, it was found that
the power of the engines and the consequent speed developed were not
up to the requirements of the law, although it might be said that
they were up to the requirements of the contract.
“There was some considerable delay on the part of the Secretary, Mr.
Whitney, in receiving the ships from the contractors on that
particular account, a decision having been made by the
Attorney-General that vessels contracted for and subsequently not
coming up to the requirements and not in full accordance with the
law were worthless, and would not be accepted.
“A violent uproar pervaded the entire country at that time on
account of what they called the hesitating attitude of Mr. Whitney.
“The political administration of the government having changed, it
was asserted that it was on account of the politics of the
contractor that the vessels had not been accepted. Among the people
who argued thus, all considerations of contract requirements of law
were entirely ignored, and Mr. Whitney received untold denunciations
from these sources; but he was one of those men whom adverse
criticisms as to what he had done never disturb in the slightest
degree.
“Mr. Whitney finally accepted the vessels conditionally, after more
or less contention which consumed some little time. But no more
unfair denunciation or criticism of the actions and efforts of any
man ever occurred than fell to his lot at that time.
“The second lot of vessels was given out by Mr. Whitney, who
succeeded Mr. Chandler. Two of these vessels were built on plans
provided by Mr. Whitney, and two were on modified plans of Mr.
Chandler.
“In compliance with the provisions of the act which authorized the
‘Secretary to prepare drawings,’ Mr. Whitney purchased from
Armstrong the drawings that had been prepared for the Spanish
government, and the drawings of the ‘Naniwa Khan,’ which ship they
had built for Japan. These two vessels became the ‘Baltimore’ and
‘Charleston.’ Cruiser No. 1 of Mr. Chandler’s plans was not given
out; as the bids were above the limitation price, the smaller
cruiser was given out under modified conditions. This vessel became
the ‘Yorktown.’
“Before the advertisement was printed, Mr. Whitney invited all of
the expectant bidders to examine the plans and specifications which
he had purchased, and without exception all recorded their
indorsement, and some in extravagant terms. After Mr. Whitney’s
retirement, the contractor who had indorsed them in the most
extravagant manner was the first and only one to find fault.
“We bid on all the vessels and in accordance with the conditions of
the advertisement with the exception of that of the ‘Yorktown.’ On
that vessel we bid on the government designs, and designs of our own
which embodied a proposition to install the first triple-expansion
engines in the navy. Our bid for the ‘Newark’ being higher than the
government allowance, we did not get her. As I said before, she was
not awarded.
“When it was found that Mr. Whitney had purchased abroad the
drawings that I have already referred to,—the drawings of the
vessels that ultimately came to be the ‘Baltimore’ and
‘Charleston,’—he was fiercely assailed by certain parties in the
Navy Department, while certain others indorsed his action; but the
Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Steam
Engineering were conspicuous in their opposition. The most
conspicuous in support of the Secretary was Commodore Walker. We
received our share of adverse criticism because we had indorsed the
steps he had taken.
“The design of the ‘Baltimore’ and the ‘Charleston’ represented the
best types of vessels that were constructed up to that time. They
were far in advance of any other war-ships of that period, and in
fact they really formed the basis of future constructions in the
world’s navies.
“It was more by good luck than by good management that Mr. Whitney
secured those particular drawings which proved to be of such
superior character. They were offered to our Naval Attaché, who
happened to be abroad in England at that time, by the Armstrong
Company. They had designed the two vessels which subsequently became
the ‘Baltimore’ and ‘Charleston’ of our navy. The design of the
‘Baltimore’ was made in competition with Thompson for the Spanish
government. For certain reasons, which I need not mention here, the
designs of Thompson were accepted and the contract for the
construction of the ship was awarded to them. She was known as the
‘Reina Regente.’ It was at this point that the Armstrongs presented
their rejected drawing and the drawings for the ‘Naniwa Khan’ for
sale to our Naval Attaché there. They had already built two vessels
like the ‘Naniwa Khan’ for the Japanese navy. These vessels were
looked upon by the experts of the naval world as being the two best
specimens of their type that had ever been built up to that time.
“At the time the sale was made, the Armstrongs, knowing nothing of
the capabilities of this country and having, like most British
ship-builders and many Americans at that time, a very mean and very
poor opinion of every ship-builder in this country, they suggested
that, in awarding the contract, a condition should be inserted
providing for the payment of superintendents whom they should send
over from their works to superintend the building, and designing of
the engines, and operating them after their completion. Considering
what to them appeared a barbarian incapacity on our part, they were
loath to risk their reputation without protection.
“We accepted the condition at the time, anxious to get the
contracts, feeling sure that it would never be needed, and that we
could prevail upon Mr. Whitney and the naval people as to the
impropriety of it.
“After the contract was awarded and the work was started, Mr.
Whitney concluded that, notwithstanding the provision was there, he
would never use it, and never require it of us.
“In fact, we made a great many improvements in the boilers of the
‘Baltimore,’ and some improvements in the engines. These
improvements in the boilers of the ‘Baltimore’ formed the basis and
the standard of construction of all the Scotch boilers that have
been built for the navy since that time.
“At the beginning of our work on these ships we did not get much
co-operation on the part of some of the Bureaus, in view of the
foreign character of most of the work, and in view, too, of the fact
that some of it was of our own, both being equally obnoxious, as
they originated outside of the Bureaus. We met with a great deal of
opposition at the beginning in getting up the specifications and
plans.
“Certain subsequent changes in the _personnel_ that were made in the
Bureau of Steam Engineering—Mr. Melville having been placed at the
head of it—modified the situation, and he joined the Secretary in
his efforts with his usual vigor. A part of the trouble I refer to
in getting a start on the work was owing to lack of experience and
knowledge of contract and specification requirements which were
placed in the Law Department of the navy for the first time.
“The Law Department of the navy at that time was beginning to make a
show, and to them, under some mistake, was delegated the getting up
of the contracts and specifications. It was here where my trouble
commenced. The Law Department endeavored to provide for everything
that could possibly occur, or everything that they thought would
occur, and for many matters that could not be considered at all; and
the specifications soon began to assume enormous proportions, being
filled with impossible requirements.
“I got over most of these difficulties and minor details which they
intended to lug into the contract by having introduced at the
termination of certain paragraphs of the specifications, where
explanations were unsatisfactory, misleading, and inadequate, a
clause using the words: ‘As the Department may determine.’
“My previous experience with the Navy Department and naval officials
generally led me to believe that I could always make out my case
when it was right.
“At the beginning of the work, Mr. Whitney notified us that he
considered himself and all the naval officials as partners and
associates of the contractor, each mutually interested and
determined to get the best vessel they could for the navy. He
considered that the government ought to co-operate with the
contractors, and that the contractors should in turn co-operate with
the government; that the inspector was not an enemy, and never once
considered him so. He considered it was his duty to afford all
encouragement possible in aiding the contractors to carry out the
plans. During the close of a conversation which I had with Mr.
Whitney at one time during that period, he said to me: ‘I want you
to inform me of what you see going wrong, no matter where the fault
originated; and I will hold you personally responsible in every case
where you neglect to inform me whenever anything is not going right
or not being done right, whether it be your own fault or that of the
government.’
“Coming back to the ships and referring to the purchasing of the
drawings abroad: At the time that Mr. Whitney bought those drawings,
it occurred to us that the triple-expansion engine which was being
developed by Kirk was a marked advance over the plain compound of
Elder; and I suggested to Mr. Whitney the propriety of buying plans
of triple-expansion engines from us for the smaller ship which
afterward was the ‘Yorktown.’ Of course this was before the ships
were given out. He told us to go ahead. We went to work and made the
drawings, which we thought were much in advance of anything of that
kind in existence, and we fully expected that they would be bought
by Mr. Whitney, as he had purchased the foreign drawings. When the
drawings were finished, I took them down to Washington and showed
them to him. He was at this time so disgusted with and tired of the
great uproar that had been made about purchasing drawings abroad,
that he did not say much about it. He did not decline, however, to
buy them; but, finding that he was not enthusiastic, I accepted
promptly the situation, and simply exhibited them to him as
something we had gotten up. I then returned home and threw them
aside, and prepared for the coming opening of the bids which had
been advertised for in the papers. The day before the bids were to
be opened, I suddenly conceived the idea of giving the
triple-expansion plans another chance by making an alternative bid
on the ‘Yorktown,’ embodying engines of the triple-expansion type.
So I rushed back to Philadelphia, got the drawings that we had
previously prepared, and returned to Washington in time to put them
in with our other bid for the ‘Yorktown.’ As we were responsible for
the horse-power, weight, etc., we felt that we could get it a great
deal better, and more satisfactory results all around, with
triple-expansion engines than with uncertain and unknown performance
of the Bureau drawings. Our bid being lowest on triple-expansion
engines, being the only one, the contract was awarded to us.
“The success of these engines in the ‘Yorktown’ was of a highly
marked character, and it emboldened us to introduce them in our bids
for the new lot of construction that had been advertised for.
“It was at this time the _New York Herald_ published in large type a
paper of mine on the triple-expansion engine, and Commodore Walker
had it printed in the Reports of the Information Bureau. Walker was
always in the front when a good thing was to be promoted, and was
conspicuous in his co-operation with Mr. Whitney.
“When the ships that followed the ‘Baltimore’ were given out, we
secured the contracts for the construction of the ‘Philadelphia’ and
‘Newark.’ We bid on the ‘Newark’ a second time. A great deal of
unpleasant feeling was manifested on the part of the Bureau of
Construction when we failed to bid within the limitation price at
the time she was first advertised. We introduced in her, however,
the triple-expansion engine in place of the Department’s. We also
bid on ‘Philadelphia’ with hull duplicate of the ‘Baltimore,’ with
triple-expansion engines of the same type as the ‘Yorktown.’
“What ultimately became the ‘San Francisco’ was given to Mr. Scott,
who bid on the basis of ‘Baltimore’s’ plans of hull with the
‘Baltimore’s’ engines. After the contract was awarded to him, he
agreed to substitute the ‘Newark’s’ hull plans in place of the
‘Baltimore’ type with a design of engine that the Bureau of Steam
Engineering had made at our shipyard by some of their officers who
were on duty there and certain of our draughtsmen,—a type of engine
that they considered to be an improvement over the ‘Baltimore’s’
engines. The Department granted this substitution.
“The Bureaus that had denounced Mr. Whitney for buying foreign
drawings had been spending money very lavishly for some years in
_securing plans abroad_. The Bureau of Steam Engineering and the
Bureau of Construction were spending about $100,000 a year in the
purchase of drawings.
“The hull of the ‘Yorktown,’ which was designed by the Bureau, was
based on the design of the ‘Archer’ class.
“The ‘Newark,’ which was also designed by the Bureau at that time,
was based on the design of the ‘Mersey’ class as to specifications
and general construction, while the model was not of that class.
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP RETVIZAN—RUSSIAN]
“The Bureau of Engineering, which had been laboring for some years
with a view to a consolidation of all of the constructive
departments of the navy,—hulls, engines, guns,—under their Bureau,
bought abroad entire plans of ships, hulls, and engines combined. I
saw a complete set of plans and drawings of the ‘Polyphemus,’ which
was designed as a sort of ram by the British government, and also
the two vessels ‘Warspite’ and ‘Impérieuse,’ rather of a fantastic
design, which the British government was building. These vessels
were somewhat of a departure from previous vessels constructed in
the British navy and were very crude. They were designed by some one
in England who was not up to the capabilities of his
fellow-constructors there. They were not duplicated. They are the
poorest specimens of ships in the British navy.
“Mr. Whitney was exceedingly fortunate in the officer whom he found
at the head of the most important Bureau. This was Commodore John G.
Walker, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and unquestionably
the ablest and most forceful man of his time in the navy. American
naval officers, as a rule, are able men in the professional sense;
but Walker, while equal to the very best and superior to most of
them in that regard, possessed an additional fund of tact,
equipment, and energy in purely administrative directions seldom
equalled and never surpassed in the history of our navy. He had
enjoyed, also, considerable experience in civic responsibility,
having been for a considerable period identified with the management
of an important railway corporation prior to his appointment as
Chief of the Bureau in 1881. His term of four years was about to
expire when Mr. Whitney assumed office, but at the instance of the
latter he was immediately reappointed, and served through the entire
term until 1889. Commodore Walker was exactly the man for the place,
which was that of chief adviser to the Secretary. To a perfect
acquaintance with the _personnel_ of the service, he joined a
freedom from narrow predilections and selfish aims seldom found in
any veteran regular officer of any branch, and his sense of the
material needs of the navy was broad, keen, and practical. Moreover,
in mental character and manly temperament he was congenial to Mr.
Whitney. For these reasons, and imbued with a common purpose,
Commodore Walker and the Secretary coalesced from the first day of
their association, and remained in the most perfect accord
throughout the four most important years in the history of the new
navy. On some occasions it happened that Walker sustained the
Secretary and helped him carry out most important reforms and
policies of progress against powerful opposition in the navy itself
and in the Department.
“Commodore Walker’s influence among Senators and Representatives in
Congress, built up during his first four years in the Bureau, was
superior to that of any other officer, and occasionally it proved
equal to that of a considerable majority of them combined. His
powers were uniformly exerted in behalf of the readiest and most
practical methods of increasing the navy in number, excellence, and
force of its ships and in organization and training of its
_personnel_. Against all efforts to perpetuate the obsolete,
cumbrous, and abnormal navy-yard system of construction he set his
face with all the strength and resolution he possessed. For detailed
discussion of the questions involved in this phase of the subject,
neither the limitations of space nor the patience of scientific
readers offer opportunity. Suffice it to say, that the antique,
red-tape-ridden and muddle-brained policy of trying to build new
ships of the modern type under military methods was in the main
abandoned.
“Commodore Walker also ably supported Mr. Whitney’s policy of
purchasing modern designs and plans of hulls and machinery abroad, a
policy which a large and influential group of naval officers
vehemently opposed. On the whole, it is not too much to say that, in
the all-round importance of his usefulness to the new navy,
Commodore Walker fairly divided honors with Mr. Whitney himself.
“That Walker’s all-round ability and energy were understood and
appreciated by others besides Secretary Whitney is abundantly
attested by the fact that upon his retirement in 1897, at the age of
sixty-two, he was appointed chairman or president of the Isthmian
Canal Commission, which he still holds at this writing (1903), in
his seventieth year. Taking his career altogether from graduation at
the Naval Academy in 1856; then through the Civil War, in which he
played a distinguished part; then for some time in the civic
pursuits already mentioned; then as Chief of Bureau and principal
adviser to the Secretary for eight years; then as Admiral in command
of the ‘White Squadron’; and, finally, as president of the Canal
Commission, it is safe to say that few officers in our navy have
done more important public service than John G. Walker.”
The most important matter adjusted in the conferences of Mr. Cramp with
Mr. Whitney was the arrangement of the form of contract so that it might
be, within a narrow margin, flexible or elastic. The operation of other
contracts had clearly shown the need of such modification, and a
solution was reached without difficulty, though not without much
deliberation.
The matter under immediate consideration was the form of contract for
the “Baltimore.” The guarantee to be required was that her engines
should develop a mean of 9000 collective indicated horse-power for four
consecutive hours, a lower or minimum limit being also prescribed. They
had before them the form of contract for the Roach ships.
Mr. Cramp remarked that the guarantee for the “Baltimore” was 9000
indicated horse-power.
“Suppose, Mr. Secretary,” he said, “that we should use that form of
contract, and the engines of the ‘Baltimore’ should develop only 8999
indicated horse-power, what could you do?”
“Well, Mr. Cramp, under this form of contract, construed according to
law, I could not accept her. There ought to be a way of averting such a
possibility. What can you suggest?”
Mr. Cramp then proposed to apply to our naval contracts the principle
often recognized in agreements for construction of merchant steamships
and also in the naval contracts of foreign governments, namely, a
sliding scale of penalties for deficiency in performance, with a minimum
limit; and, in case the ship should prove unable to reach the minimum
limit after a fair number of trials, the owner (if a merchant vessel) or
the government (if a naval ship) might at will either reject her
altogether or accept her under a supplemental agreement. Mr. Cramp also
explained the usual basis upon which penalties for deficiency were
computed and imposed in our own merchant practice and in foreign navies.
The Secretary assented to this suggestion, and pronounced it the only
business-like plan for solution of the difficulty he had heard. But he
said that, in order to make the arrangement perfectly equitable, there
should be a premium for excess over and above guaranteed performance,
corresponding to or commensurate with the penalty for deficiency.
These discussions led to the adoption of what became known as the
premium system. Some time afterward, when Mr. Whitney was before the
Naval Committee, the subject came up, and one member referred to it as
“a bonus to contractors.”
“If you use the word ‘bonus’ in the sense of a gift,” said the
Secretary, “it is a misapprehension. It is part of an equitable
transaction. Performance is a prime element of value in a ship-of-war.
We stipulate in our contracts for a specific performance. We consider
the guaranteed performance as representing the normal value of the ship.
If upon trial the performance falls below the normal, it reduces the
value of the ship to that extent, and we meet it with proportionate
penalties deducted from the contract price. But if upon trial the
performance exceeds the normal, the value of the ship is increased, and
we propose to meet such cases with premium proportionate to the excess
of guaranteed performance. In either case we simply pay for as good a
ship as we get, be it above or below the normal. It is a poor rule that
won’t work both ways.”
Mr. Whitney’s terse observations embodied the whole logic of the penalty
and premium system, and his argument was so conclusive that no further
discussion seemed to be desired. The system remained in effect nearly
ten years, and was applied to every vessel built for the new navy up to
and including the “Iowa” and “Brooklyn.” Every ship built by Mr. Cramp
earned a premium for excess of either indicated horse-power or speed.
None of his ships exhibited deficiency. The list is rather interesting,
because it exhibits more graphically than any other method could do the
actual extent to which the contract requirement was exceeded in each
case.
“Yorktown” (horse-power) $39,825.00
“Baltimore” (horse-power) 106,441.00
“Newark” (horse-power) 36,857.00
“Philadelphia” (speed) 100,000.00
“New York” (speed) 200,000.00
“Columbia” (speed) 300,000.00
“Minneapolis” (speed) 414,600.00
“Indiana” (speed) 50,000.00
“Massachusetts” (speed) 100,000.00
“Iowa” (speed) 217,420.00
“Brooklyn” (speed) 350,000.00
–––––––––––
$1,915,143.00
When the administration of Mr. Whitney ended in March, 1889, he left
over to his successor the most important work in the way of new
departure yet attempted. Of his successor, General B. F. Tracy, of New
York, Mr. Cramp, speaking of the man and the task before him, says:
“Secretary Tracy entered the Navy Department under very favorable
auspices. He was himself free from entanglements, political or
personal. His previous public life, aside from service as a colonel
and brigadier-general in the Civil War, had been confined to legal
and judicial positions, his highest post having been that of Justice
of the New York Court of Appeals, the Court of last resort. To the
affairs of the Navy Department in general he applied the judicial
habits formed on the Bench. In technical matters, he enjoyed at the
outset of his administration the continuing services of
Commodore—now become Rear-Admiral—Walker, whose term extended till
December, 1889; and who, by the way, had the honor, after eight
years of service as Chief of Bureau, to command the first American
squadron of modern war-ships known to history as ‘the White
Squadron.’
“With regard to the task of rebuilding the navy, which was then, and
still is, the chief responsibility of a Secretary, Mr. Tracy had but
to carry on a programme already well begun. He was not, however,
content with following simply the lines laid out before him. He at
once proceeded to lengthen them and to widen their scope. Under his
administration was begun and carried out the ‘battle-ship and
armored cruiser programme’ which gave to the navy the fleet that
made our success in the Spanish War so swift and so easy.
“The distinguishing traits of Tracy’s administration were the
unbroken co-operation between the executive and legislative branches
of the government in everything pertaining to the new navy, and the
remarkable progress made in size, power, speed, and other prime
qualities of war-ships, together with the almost incredible
development of all contributory industries. In this connection
should also be mentioned the constant and powerful support which
President Harrison gave to the Secretary of the Navy in every
possible manner, from first to last.
“In his methods of considering propositions laid before him, Mr.
Tracy was always deliberate and cautious; but in executing a
programme once resolved upon, he was equally prompt and peremptory.
He never determined to begin anything until he could foresee the end
of it, and when he had reached a conclusion on that basis he was
wont to push practical operations with untiring energy. In some
respects, when giving preliminary consideration to subjects, he may
have been less self-reliant or more disposed to feel the influence
of his military subordinates than Mr. Whitney was; but in energy of
execution he had no superior. As a general consequence, Mr. Tracy’s
four years in the Navy Department made a history that compares
favorably with that of any predecessor from the foundation of the
Department itself in 1797 to his own time.
“One of the first and most important matters that came before
Secretary Tracy was the design of the armored cruiser ‘New York,’
the appropriation for its construction having been one of the last
acts of the Congress that went out with Mr. Whitney. This ship was
intended to be an echo to the ‘Blake’ and ‘Blenheim’ type of
protected cruisers, and they were the largest heretofore
constructed. The question was asked by the Secretary of the head of
one of the Bureaus, during the discussion of the details of the
ship, if there could not be an improvement in the salient features
of the design over the ‘Blake,’ as merely copying her was obnoxious
to him. He had heard of the ‘Dupuy de Lome,’ the first of the
armored cruisers, and he conceived the idea of adding vertical armor
on the sides of the ship in addition to the sloping armor of the
protected deck as an additional protection, and of sufficient
importance to warrant its adoption in the new design. He argued that
no projectile could penetrate the outer plates and strike the
sloping plate at the same angle in both, etc.
“Strong objections were urged by the head of the Bureau who had been
consulted about it, and the legend of weights of the ‘Blake’ as
published and the distribution of them in the ‘Blake’ were shown
with the assertion that nothing could be done. The Secretary became
more persistent as the opposition increased, and the wires between
the Department and the British Admiralty became hot from the number
of messages that passed as to the ‘Blake’ and ‘Blenheim.’
“While the Secretary was perplexed with the opposition of officers
who should have aided rather than opposed him, we happened to meet,
and he asked if I could duplicate the ‘Blake’ and her performance if
side armor of moderate thickness were added, and also asked my views
of the ‘Dupuy de Lome’ and other ships of the same kind.
“I promptly stated that I could do it, and explained the idea of
‘Dupuy de Lome,’ also giving him the names of three other armored
cruisers the French had under way. I went into the Secretary’s room
at 3 P.M. and discussed the whole subject with him till 8 P.M.; then
left, and promised to return promptly with additional information.
“At the next interview I furnished the Secretary with a complete
detail of what would be required to make an armored cruiser on the
‘Blake’s’ dimensions and performance, and stated that I would like
to bid in Class II on an alternative design with side armor.
“The Secretary handed my details and allotment of weights to the
proper officer, and the Department proceeded to get up the plans and
specifications. Frequent interviews with the Secretary occurred as
the work progressed, and I felt sure that under Class II, permitting
alternative designs, the contract would be awarded. Before the time
for awarding the contract had arrived, I found that the plans were
being developed under the conditions that I had given the Secretary;
but when the plans were exhibited before bids were sent in, it
transpired that the boilers had been placed three abreast in the
government plans, bringing them within a few feet of the side of the
ship.
“I then designed a plan for arranging the six boilers in pairs,
making the coal-bunkers on the sides of the ship. This arrangement
of coal-bunkers facilitated the prompt coaling of the ship and the
handling of it. It also permitted a liberal amount of ‘coal
protection’ for the boilers and engines, which was considered of
important value at that time, and, what was of more weight than any
other consideration, the introduction of two longitudinal bulkheads
that extended the entire length of the engine and boiler spaces on
each side of the ship. With three boilers abreast, the ship was
liable to be sunk at any time by a collision with a coal-barge or
passing schooner; any penetration of the side abreast of boiler,
besides resulting in a speedy foundering, would certainly unship the
side boiler, adding thereby an explosion to the other damage.
“With the boilers in pairs, it would be necessary for a ramming
vessel to penetrate the side and two bulkheads and enter ten feet to
do any damage, so the chances of being destroyed by ramming would be
reduced to a minimum. I also lengthened the vessel over the
Department’s plan, but kept all the conditions of specifications
intact, except as to dimensions.
“After the bids were opened, it was found that ours was the lowest
in Class II, and lower than any other bid, taking the competition as
a whole. The Secretary then called a conference, at which all the
bidders and the Chief Constructor were present, and, after thorough
discussion of all the points involved, awarded the contract to the
Cramp Company under the bid in Class II on the modified plan I had
suggested and offered as to boiler arrangement and other details
conformable to it.
“The ship was named the ‘New York,’ and on trial trip she largely
exceeded her contract speed and requirements of coal endurance and
in all other respects; while the ‘Blake’ on trial was a failure; her
engines had to be practically rebuilt, and then did not come within
the scope of reasonable competition.
“Mr. Tracy can fairly claim credit for the design of the ‘New York,’
and the project for the construction of the ‘Indiana,’
‘Massachusetts,’ and the ‘Oregon’ class of battleships was also due
to his foresight.”
It is not within the scope of this Memoir to trace the progress of the
new navy ship by ship, or even by naval programmes from year to year.
For the purpose of this work, it suffices to say that, of the total
number of battleships, armored cruisers, and first-class protected
cruisers actually in service at this writing (1903), Mr. Cramp has built
about a majority as against all other American ship-builders combined.
There are ten battleships in commission, of which Mr. Cramp has built
five; two armored cruisers, both built by him; ten protected cruisers of
the first class, of which five hail from Cramps’ shipyard: that is to
say, a total of twenty-two vessels, all first-class in their respective
types, of which Mr. Cramp has built twelve as against ten by all other
American ship-builders put together, navy-yards included.
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP RETVIZAN—DOCKING WITH SUBMARINE]
Of course, we exclude from this reckoning the two show-ships built by
Armstrong for a South American government and foolishly bought by our
Navy Department in the paroxysmal flurry incident to the outbreak of the
Spanish War. The main excuse for buying them was that, if we did not,
Spain would. So be it. Better to have let Spain buy them, if they could
not have strengthened her navy more than they did ours. At any rate, had
Spain bought them, we might have captured or destroyed them, as we did
nearly all her ships. They would probably have been worth capture or
destruction, but they were never worth buying.
Since 1887, a period of sixteen years, Mr. Cramp has completed fifteen
ships for the navy (including the “Vesuvius” and “Terror”), and is
building three more at this writing. In every case these ships embody in
plan and design more or less of his own knowledge, skill, and
experience. In some cases the designs are altogether his own. In others
the machinery is his, with important modifications of the Department’s
hull. In no case has he built a ship wholly upon the plans of the
Department. While this has redounded to the benefit of the navy, it
would be idle to say that it has been in the long run advantageous to
Mr. Cramp. On the other hand, its tendency has been otherwise: A certain
class of naval officers have chosen to consider Mr. Cramp’s constantly
recurring propositions to modify and improve their designs as having the
force and effect of criticisms, and, to say the least, they have not
been grateful to him for his pains. On the contrary, no little jealousy
and some resentment have been the results, and he has been made to feel
their consequences more than once. The chief misfortune of this state of
affairs is that it precludes the cordial co-operation which should exist
between officers of the Navy Department and a contractor engaged in
building naval vessels, and creates in its stead a sense of antagonism
which tends to augment the difficulties of naval construction, which are
great and perplexing enough at the best.
But Mr. Cramp has not concerned himself with the building of naval ships
alone. He has delved into the problems presented by the uses to which
the ships are put when completed. The results of his observations in
this direction were embodied in an address to the Naval War College read
before that institution, June 18, 1897, by invitation of the Commandant,
a little less than a year before the Spanish War. The experience of that
struggle, brief as it was, and decided almost wholly by sea power, made
this paper little short of prophetic.
Some extracts from it will serve to exhibit the trend of Mr. Cramp’s
thought in the direction of the practical uses and needs of ships-of-war
after they leave the ship-builder’s hands. Among other things he said:
“The accomplishment of the objects of sea-warfare will depend partly
upon the character of the armaments and partly on the wisdom with
which their operations are directed; nor can any one gainsay that
the wisdom of direction will depend on the conversancy of officers
with the nature and necessities of the material units of which the
armaments are composed.
“These propositions being taken for granted, it becomes clear that
there can be no effective system of teaching the art of naval
warfare which does not embrace exhaustive study of and consequent
close familiarity with the instruments by which the principles of
the art are to be carried into force and effect.
“From this point of view it must be admitted that questions within
the province of the naval architect and problems which he is best
qualified to solve form an essential part of such a curriculum in
its largest and most comprehensive aspects.
“The unvarying tendency of naval progress is to exalt the importance
of the naval architect and to augment the value of the constructor
as a factor in the sum-total of sea power.
“The naval armament of to-day is a mechanism. If we view it as a
single ship, it is a mechanical unit whose warlike value depends on
its excellence as a fighting machine. If we view it as a fleet, it
is an assembly of mechanical units, the warlike value of which will
depend alike on the excellence of each unit as a fighting machine,
and on the adaptation of each unit to its consorts to produce the
most symmetrical efficiency of the group as a whole.
“For this reason, the word seamanship, in the old-fashioned or
conventional sense, has ceased to cover adequately the requirements
of knowledge, skill, and aptness which the modern conditions of
naval warfare impose upon the officer in command or subordinate.
“By this I mean not to depreciate seamanship pure and simple, but to
point out that modern conditions require an enlargement of the
meaning of the term and a broadening of its scope of function far
beyond the exactions of any former period.
“In the old days there was no essential difference in ships except
in size. Experience in a sloop-of-war qualified an officer to
assume, at once and in full efficiency, equivalent duties in a
frigate, a seventy-four, or a three-decker. Familiarity with one
ship, irrespective of rate, was familiarity with all ships. Tactical
lessons learned in manœuvring one fleet were alike applicable to the
manœuvring of all fleets. Even the application of steam as a
propulsive auxiliary in its earlier stages did not radically alter
the old conditions. At all events, it did not practically erase
them, as the present development has done.
“This growth of complexity and elaboration, and this almost infinite
multiplication of parts and devices in modern ships, have entailed
upon the naval architect and constructor demands and difficulties
never dreamed of in the earlier days. The staff required to design
and construct an ‘Iowa’ is multiplied in number, and the complexity
of its organization augmented, as compared with that required for
the design and construction of the ‘New Ironsides,’ almost
infinitely.
“Similar conditions apply to command and management; so that, while
the building of a modern battleship entails enormous work and
responsibility on the naval architect, constructor, and staff, the
effective use of her as a tool in the trade of war presents an equal
variety and intricacy of problems to students of the art of naval
warfare in this college.
“Such questions and such problems cannot be relegated to the
category of details. Even if we consider the art of naval warfare in
the aspects only of strategy and tactics, both will be affected for
better or for worse by the behavior and performance of the units
composing the force in operation. This being admitted, it follows
that the behavior and performance of the units will be as the
knowledge and capacity of captains and their staffs, and that no
extent of skill and capacity in the admiral directing the whole can
overcome or evade the consequences of incapacity and failure on the
part of a captain commanding a part.
“As the speed of any fleet is that of its slowest ship, so will its
manœuvring power be limited by the capacity of its poorest captain.
As it might easily happen that the slowest or least handy ship and
the poorest captain would be joined, the quality of the other ships
and the ability of the other officers would go for nothing.
“In view of the complex character of the ships themselves, and the
difficulty and danger of manœuvring them under the most favorable
conditions, as pointed out, the experience of the first general
action will demonstrate the necessity of having all the battleships
in a fleet as nearly alike as possible in size, type, and capacity
of performance. Such provision would not equalize the personal
factor of different commanding officers, but it would at least give
them all an equal chance at the start.
“For this reason I have always considered it unwise to multiply
types or to modify seriously those which the best judgment we are
able to form approves.
“These considerations seem conclusive against multiplication of
types, and in favor of adhering to one that plainly meets the
requirements of our national situation and policy.
“The composition of a battleship fleet under such conditions would
minimize the tactical dangers and difficulties referred to earlier,
but they would still remain very great, and nothing can mitigate
them except frequent and arduous drill in squadron of evolution, so
that our captains may become familiar with their weapons before
being called upon to use them in actual battle. There will be scant
opportunity to drill a battleship squadron after the outbreak of
war.
“In my judgment, it is hardly possible to overvalue the importance
of homogeneity in fleet organizations, and I am sure that the very
first and perhaps greatest lesson taught by an encounter between
fleets of modern battleships will be the advantage of similarity of
type and equality of performance in the units of action.
“To this element of the art of naval warfare, then, I would invite
your most earnest and penetrating attention and study.
“Assuming this problem to be satisfactorily solved and the material
of the fleet in the most effective possible condition, so far as
relation of units to each other and to the sum-total is concerned,
we have still left for consideration the difference between men, the
lack of uniformity in _personnel_. Homogeneity of material may be
attained by adherence to a wise programme of design and
construction; but homogeneity of _personnel_, in the sense of
uniform capacity and efficiency among individuals, is beyond human
art or science to produce, because the difference between men is the
decree of a higher power. The existence of this college is itself a
devout recognition of that great fact, because its whole objective
is to mitigate or minify as much as possible this inherent human
frailty, by exhausting the resources of training and study, of
precept and example.
“I do not by any means argue that the commander of a ship should be
a naval architect or constructor. But, having familiarized himself
with the principles of that art which touch directly and immediately
his function of handling his ship under sea conditions of common
occurrence, and having gained sufficient knowledge of her traits, he
should be able to form an instant and correct judgment as to her
point of best behavior in any sea-way. It goes without saying that
sea experience is the only school in which these problems can be
worked out.
“Knowledge of that character cannot be acquired by study of the
experience of others. Close and earnest attention to this course of,
at best partial, information cannot serve as a substitute for
experience of one’s own. At most it can only provide a sound basis
on which to take quick advantage of one’s own experience, when
confronted with an actual situation.
“This brings me to the proposition that the modern battleship, with
all its complexities, weights, and peculiarities of design and
model, entails upon commanding officers a new requirement which I
can find no better terms to describe than ‘battleship seamanship.’
It is a development of the seafaring art which, as events have
proved, is by no means yet mastered in the greatest and most
actively exercised navy of the world; therefore it would be too much
to expect its mastery in navies of far less magnitude and, hence,
less means for distribution of opportunities to gain experience.
“It therefore follows indisputably that navies of the lesser
magnitude should constantly exhaust their means of enabling officers
to gain sea experience by keeping all their large ships in active
evolution all the time.
“Having thus viewed the modern battleship as a mechanical unit
herself, we may profitably pass to brief consideration of the great
number and variety of mechanisms composing her. In the strict
professional or technical sense, these mechanisms concern mainly the
engineer and the electrician. But as the foundation of all warlike
efficiency in _personnel_ is discipline, and as the foundation of
all discipline is the inevitable principle of a single head, one
commander, who is to all intents and purposes an absolute monarch,
it should follow that ‘the king can do no wrong.’
“I have already remarked that the captain need not be a naval
architect or constructor to comprehend and be able to apply the
group of principles of that art which touch his functions directly
in managing his ship as a whole; likewise, I would say here that he
need not be engineer or electrician in his relation to the numerous
and diverse mechanisms whose proper operation and control are
essential to the efficiency of his command.
“But, if he really commands, he must know enough about the
instruments that do his work to know when they are doing it well and
when not; to know whether his subordinates immediately in charge of
the several devices are operating them properly or not; to know when
defects exist and when they have been made good. If he does not know
or cannot learn these things, he must depend wholly on subordinates
immediately in charge; and their reports will be law to him, or if
not law, at least decisions from which he has no appeal. Manifestly
such a situation is utterly incompatible with the independent and
self-relying autocracy which is the essential and fundamental
principle of naval command, without which discipline must sooner or
later vanish into mere empty form or conventional myth. These facts,
even more than any other considerations, argue for uniformity of
type, previously touched upon, so that in learning the traits of one
battleship the officer acquires experience and knowledge applicable
at once to the discharge of his duties in another.
“The foregoing discussion is limited to matters affecting the unit
of action, the single ship, and the captain. Passing to
consideration of the unit of operation, the fleet and the admiral,
we find another array of problems equally within the scope of this
paper.
“Let us assume that the composition of the fleet has been made as
nearly homogeneous as possible, by carrying out the principles
previously stated for ships and their captains, and that the admiral
finds himself in command of an ideal fleet as to material and
_personnel_. Actual differences in efficiency among the several
units of action will still remain, and it will become the first duty
of the admiral to ascertain and locate these diversities with
unerring judgment and unsparing perception. He should know to a
nicety the personal equation of every captain and the effective
individuality of every ship.
“Among the captains he should be able to differentiate the traits of
relative quickness of perception, promptness of action, readiness of
responsibility, and boldness of execution.”
Among the most important services of Mr. Cramp to the new navy was his
instrumentality in bringing about the system of classifying bids. Prior
to 1885, whenever contract construction was to be done, the plans of the
Department, pure and simple, were the standard. If any bidder proposed
to deviate from them in any way,—no matter how palpable the
improvement,—his bid would be held irregular and thrown out. The issue
came on the machinery of the ships authorized by the Act of March 3,
1885. Of these four ships, the “Baltimore’s” plans had been purchased
abroad, hull and machinery, and were accepted practically without
change. But the Department’s design involved the then nearly, if not
quite, obsolete compound engine for the other three, “Newark,”
“Yorktown,” and “Petrel.” Mr. Cramp, desiring to bid on the “Newark” and
“Yorktown,” was doubtful whether he could develop the indicated
horse-power, which the form of contract required him to guarantee, with
the Department’s compound engines. He was, however, confident that he
could do it with triple-expansion engines of his own design.
To overcome the difficulty, he suggested to Secretary Whitney that, in
issuing the circular asking for proposals, a classification of bids be
provided for. This suggestion was at once adopted, and bids were
authorized to be offered in three classes: Class I, the Department’s
plans pure and simple; Class II, the Department’s plans modified by the
bidder as to hull or machinery or both; and Class III, the bidder’s
plans wholly. This arrangement broke up the embargo of the Bureaus, and
admitted the results of the study, experience, and skill of practical
ship-builders. Some of the Bureaus fought the plan with all their
energy, but the contest they made had no other result than to convince
them that Mr. Whitney was the _de facto_ as well as the _de jure_ head
of the Department,—a quite novel experience for them! Some time
afterward Classes II and III were merged, so that all departures from
the Department’s plans, whether modifications of them or complete
substitution of bidder’s plans for them, were grouped under Class II,
which has become the established practice in inviting proposals. Mr.
Cramp’s bids have usually been in Class II; involving in most cases more
or less extensive modifications of the Department’s plans, and in two
cases, the “Philadelphia” and the “Maine,” his own plans complete. The
value of this new departure lay in the fact that it gave the Navy
Department the benefit of all the progress of the country in the
ship-building art as actually practised by men who were building ships
for a living, and emancipated it from the dominion of the cloister. It
has become a part of the permanent policy of the government.
[Illustration: CRUISER VARIAG—RUSSIAN]
The history of Mr. Cramp’s contributions to the new navy must, at this
writing, be left an unfinished chapter. Having built and delivered to
the government five first-class battleships, two first-rate armored
cruisers, five first-class protected cruisers, together with a
double-turreted monitor, a gunboat and a torpedo vessel, he is yet
building three armored cruisers of the largest dimensions and most
approved type. His contributions to the literature of the subject,
ranging over a score of years, have been in their way of hardly less
importance and interest than his achievements in producing its warlike
material. Their full test, in all forms and through all
channels,—hearings before committees, communications to the Navy
Department and its Bureaus, newspaper interviews and magazine
papers,—would, if reproduced in extenso, fill two volumes larger than
this one. Suffice it to say here that there is no practical subject
pertaining to naval art or science, from the design and construction of
ships-of-war to their management in service, which he has not from time
to time discussed as opportunity offered or occasion required. If he has
at times shown a spirit approaching intolerance when dealing with
invasions of his profession by inexperienced, untrained, or incapable
men, it may be explained by the logic of a favorite quotation of his
own, “Fools rush in where angels fear to tread!” Be this as it may, it
is yet to be said that, if not always charitable in his criticisms and
not always liberal in the standard of competency which he has set so
high and maintained so vigorously, his professional motives have always
been worthy and his efforts sincere and earnest. Whatever may be the
future growth or achievements of the modern American navy, the name of
Charles H. Cramp will ever be found indelibly stamped upon its
historical origin and primary development. The ships he has built have
won battles, gained campaigns, and vanquished the enemies of the country
in war. They have held the lead in renewing the one-time waning naval
prestige of our flag, and in restoring the sea power of the United
States to its rightful rank among the nations.
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