CHAPTER II

Birth—Relatives—High School—Magnetic Observatory—Note on

Davidson—Surf-boats for Mexican War—First Propeller Tug

“Sampson”—Ship-builders of New York and Philadelphia—Clipper Ships,

1850—Zenith of American Carrying Trade—Crimean War—Cunard

Line—“Libertador”—Armored Ships—Board Appointed to Take

Charge of Appropriation to Build Them—Account of “New

Ironsides”—The “Monitor”—Speech of Bishop Simpson—Sub-Department of

Navy—Light-draught Monitors—Sinking of the First—Collapse

of Sub-Department—Rebuilding of “Yazoo,” “Tunxis,” and

others—“Miantonomah”—Origin of Fast Cruisers—Evolution of Modern

Marine Engineering in this Country.

CHARLES HENRY CRAMP was born May 9, 1828. He was the eldest son of

William Cramp and Sophia Miller. At the time of his birth his father was

a master shipwright, not yet engaged in ship-building on his own

account, or at least not the proprietor of a shipyard.

The Cramp family are of the old German descent, and they were among the

first settlers on the banks of the Delaware. The name was Krampf up to

the Revolution, when, according to the fashion at that time, it was

anglicized. They came from Baden.

The fact that the art of ship-building “ran in the blood” may be judged

from the fact that in 1788 Paul Jones, commanding the Russian Black Sea

fleet during the Turkish war of that period, under the reign of

Catherine the Great, says in his journal that among the foreign

employees of the Russian Ministry of Marine was a naval architect named

John Cramp, who held the position of secretary to the Russian Black Sea

administration and had charge of the dock-yard which had been

established at Kherson.

The Millers and Byerlys of the mother’s family were also ship-builders.

Mr. Cramp’s maternal grandfather, Henry Miller, who had become

proficient as a shipwright, at twenty-one invested his small fortune in

an interest in the cargo of a vessel in one of the earliest voyages

after the Revolution from the port of Philadelphia to the East, taking

in China, the Indies, and the Philippines. His departure was witnessed

by his fiancée, Elizabeth Byerly, who waited faithfully and patiently

his return.

These vessels were fitted out “man-of-war fashion,” with the captain and

mates, carpenter and boatswain as officers, and the latter were the

battery commanders.

They always carried a supercargo, and sold the cargoes at the various

ports and invested the proceeds in China shawls, teas, spices, and other

products of the East.

At that time the waters of the East Indies and China swarmed with

adventurers, pirates, rovers, and privateers; and the armed merchantmen

had frequent brushes with them. In fact, many merchantmen of that time

became imbued with the restless, adventurous spirit of the age and,

commanding vessels heavily armed, took possession of some of the weaker

ships they encountered, becoming veritable pirates for a time, and then

returning to their homes under peaceful guise when the profits of their

voyage had reached a satisfactory figure. The foundations of many

fortunes in our Atlantic cities were laid upon such practices.

Mr. Miller embarked again with his augmented capital, in fact, making

four voyages, each time with the profits of previous voyages in the new

one, encountering many adventures with the pirates that infested the

waters of the East and with an occasional privateer.

It was on his return from the fourth voyage when he, with the

accumulations of his original venture sufficient to secure a life of

ease and comparative luxury, and eager to meet his fiancée, who would be

patiently awaiting his arrival, was in sight of Cape Henlopen, with the

full assurance that his voyages were ended and with every anticipation

of a happy consummation of his eager wishes, a large privateer carrying

a French flag hove in sight in a position of advantage.

The privateer, carrying a heavier armament and larger crew, captured the

vessel before she could get inside of the Capes, and took the whole

party to Martinique, where the whole property was confiscated and all

the crew and officers were put in jail.

Mr. Miller, who was a Mason, was astonished to find that the French

jailer was also one, and, as a mark of kindness, took him out and made a

body-servant of him. His ingenuity and adaptability to circumstances

enabled him to escape, and he reached Philadelphia without a cent and

but little raiment. When Elizabeth Byerly was seen next day on

Point-no-Point Road in a buggy with him, she looked as happy as if

fortune was already in her hands. When they were married the next day, a

serviceable loan from a friend facilitated the marriage festivities.

His restless, adventurous spirit, augmented by his voyages at sea, now

took a different turn, and his time was taken up by trips from Pittsburg

to New Orleans in arks that he and his companions built in Pittsburg,

and with cargoes of produce and other freight they floated down the Ohio

and Mississippi, relieving each other at steering or playing the violin

and taking an occasional shot at a deer that would be found swimming

across the river. The rivers Ohio and Mississippi ran through a

wilderness at that time, and its fascinations had a wonderful effect on

him.

After the cargoes and the lumber of which the arks were built were sold

and the proceeds lost in speculation, they would make their way up to

Natchez or other river towns, where they would be sure to get a

steamboat or a flat boat or two to build, and then return to

Philadelphia for a while. Henry Miller became well known on the rivers,

and could always secure a commission to build the various craft that

were found in the waters of the West.

One of Henry Miller’s sisters married John Bennett, a ship-builder of

repute, who went to live in Bordentown while engaged with his sons at

Hoboken as shipwright and ship-builder for the celebrated Stevens

family. It was there that with other vessels they built the yacht

“Maria,” named after the wife of John Stevens. The building of the

“Maria” was an event, and Maria Stevens spent most of her spare time at

the yard in looking over her construction and finish. The Stevens

battery was begun during the Bennett period.

Mrs. Miller’s brother was John Byerly, and her sister married William

Sutton, both noted ship-builders. So when William Cramp, who had learned

his profession under Samuel Grice, married Sophia Miller, two families

of ship-builders were united.

Charles H. Cramp was two years old when his father acquired frontage on

the Delaware in Kensington and established a shipyard of his own.

This early enterprise of William Cramp, who was then twenty-three years

old, has since grown to be the great establishment known as The William

Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine Building Company.

It does not seem necessary here to recount the progress of that pioneer

enterprise. Suffice it to say that at the time when William Cramp

founded his shipyard it was one of fourteen on the Delaware at different

points on the river front between Southwark and Kensington, and it is

the only one of the fourteen that remains in existence.

Of Charles Henry Cramp’s childhood and early youth, it is not necessary

to speak here in detail. He was, it might be said, born into the

atmosphere of naval architecture and the art of ship-building, and from

his earliest activity he never practised or attempted to practise any

other profession.

When about fourteen years of age he had exhausted the educational

possibilities of the ordinary schools and entered the old Central High

School, which was then presided over by Alexander Dallas Bache, the most

consummate master of the science of applied mathematics and the physical

sciences of his time in this country, if not in the world. While at the

High School, Mr. Bache was appointed to take charge of the appropriation

of a million dollars by Congress to defray the cost of a series of

observations on terrestrial magnetism in co-operation with similar

observations along the same lines in Europe, and also for the purpose of

making certain observations in meteorology. The appropriations for the

last-named observations were made on the recommendations of Professor

Espy. This was about 1846.

While Washington was the central point of the observations, Philadelphia

was practically the head-quarters, because Professor Bache and his

associate. Major Bache, resided there.

Observations were established at Charleston, New Orleans, and Utica, and

they communicated with Toronto, the Canadian station.

Professor Bache took his observers at Philadelphia from among the pupils

of the High School for night work, and he had the day observers from the

University.

George Davidson, Charles H. Cramp, and William H. Hunter were among the

number, and the observations, after being collated at Washington, were

ultimately deposited at the Smithsonian Institute, and later on formed

the basis of the operations of the “Signal Service Bureau.” At the time

the observations were made, the magnetic telegraph had not as yet been

utilized, and the course of storms was portrayed by mail after they had

occurred.

Not long after this period, Professor Bache was appointed to succeed Mr.

Hasler as head of the Coast Survey. He invited the young men who were in

the group of the magnetic installation to accompany him in his new field

of labor, and Mr. Cramp was invited with the rest, but desiring to

engage in ship-building he pursued that art.

Mr. Davidson, who was in the magnetic observations with Mr. Cramp, and

was a school-mate and life-long friend, remained on the Coast Survey

under Mr. Bache, and spent the greater portion of his life on the

Pacific in that capacity; and it was under his direction and control

that the great Triangulation of our newly acquired possessions there

from the Rocky Mountains to the coast was made by him, and said to be by

scientists the greatest work in geodesy ever made by or under one man.

He is now Professor of Commercial Geography in the University of

California. He has filled nearly every position there that required the

highest attainments in the physical sciences. The Alaska Commission,

inauguration of Lick Observatory, expeditions for the observation of

eclipses of the sun, are a small portion of the important positions that

he has filled. His contributions to science would fill volumes.

At the end of a term of three and one-half years under the tutorship of

Professor Bache, Mr. Cramp entered the shipyard of his maternal uncle,

John Byerly. This arrangement was made, notwithstanding the fact that

his father, William Cramp, was then actively engaged in ship-building on

his own account; the idea being that it would be better, all things

considered, for him to begin his practical experience under other

tutorage than that of his own father.

About 1846, or in his nineteenth year, Mr. Cramp, having attained to a

certain point the qualifications of a practical ship-builder in his

uncle’s shipyard, went to that of his own father.

[Illustration: MONITOR TERROR]

Among the first things undertaken when in his father’s yard, Mr. Cramp

designed the pioneer propeller tug-boat ever built in the United States,

the “Sampson,” and it fixed the type now so numerous in the waters of

America. She was of a peculiar build. Her dimensions were eighty feet

long and twenty feet beam. She had as much dead rise as a pilot-boat or

“pungy,” and had a keel three feet wide at the stern-post. In getting up

the design, it was considered indispensable by the marine engineers at

that time to have the screw entirely beneath the bottom of the vessel,

and, as the screw was six feet in diameter, the engine-builders wanted

the keel six feet wide. When shown the impracticability of this, they

were content to have three feet of the screw beneath the bottom of the

ship. The propeller shaft ran on top of the floors and the bearings were

between the frames. The crank was between the frames and just cleared

the outside planking in its sweep. She proved to be a profitable

investment for the owners, Michael Molloy & Son, who ordered another

one. This was the “Bird.” She had a narrower keel, and the bearings of

the propeller shaft were secured to the top of the floors. Another one

was built a short time after, and, in view of the shallow water in which

she had to run, the keel was only ten inches wide. This was considered a

great detriment to the efficiency of the screw; but on the trial it was

found that the importance of wide keels was overestimated, and the

practice came to an end.

A considerable operation of unusual and interesting character was

undertaken by his father about that time, and in which Mr. Cramp himself

assisted. This was the design and construction of a fleet of surf-boats

intended for the purpose of facilitating the landing of General Scott’s

army at Vera Cruz. The naval and military authorities of that time were

doubtful of the capacity of the ordinary boats of the fleet itself to

land a sufficient body of troops at one time to command the shore. The

intention at first was to provide a sufficient number of boats to land

the whole army at once, and three hundred boats were contracted for upon

a design made by William Cramp.

Only a part of them was built by Mr. Cramp, but they were all built upon

his plans. They were large surf-boats of three different sizes, and were

carried to Vera Cruz on the decks of schooners chartered for the

purpose. The thwarts were taken out of the larger boats and the smaller

ones of different sizes were stowed in them.

The “Standard History of the Mexican War” shows that out of the total

number (three hundred) designed by Cramp and contracted for with

different boat-builders, only one hundred and eighty-six (186) were

actually delivered and used, and in the operations against Vera Cruz,

General Scott’s army was landed by divisions. The Regular Division

commanded by General Worth was put on shore first, then the Volunteer

Division of General Robert Patterson, and, finally, the mixed Regular

and Volunteer Division of General Twiggs.

After these boats had been used for their original purpose they were

cast adrift. Their sea-worthiness may be estimated from the fact that

some of them were picked up in mid-Atlantic months afterward.

There are stories in history about invading armies burning their bridges

behind them, but this is unquestionably the only instance where an army

deliberately cast loose the boats in which it had landed upon the soil

of an enemy. Burning bridges might mean, and doubtless would, the simple

destruction of means of recrossing a river in the case of disaster, but

the destruction or dispersion of the boats in which Scott’s army landed

at Vera Cruz meant the obliteration of any possible means they might

have had of crossing a gulf and ocean had the fortune of war been

adverse to them.

Starbuck, in his “History of the American Whale-fishery,” refers to this

incident, and says that some of these boats were picked up by

whaling-ships, whose crews highly prized them, and that they were used

for years afterward in the sperm and right-whale fisheries of the

Pacific Ocean.

At the beginning of the career of Mr. Cramp in ship-building, the

profession had arrived at its highest state of efficiency in everything

that related to the design, finish, and outfit of ships. They were with

but few exceptions all of wood, and it was in the wooden ship and during

the period between 1840 and 1860 that the art and everything belonging

to it attained its highest proficiency. Ship-building as an art,

profession, and science culminated about this time,—the great transition

from wood to iron.

From the earliest period up to that time the professional ship-builder

or “master builder,” as he has always been called, was a master in

reality. He designed, modelled, and built his own ships, and his

appreciation of the beautiful and his artistic taste were of the most

refined and cultivated character, and were everything that the term

sculptor, artist, and constructor meant. He was acutely sensitive; his

contempt for the quack and commonplace in his profession was as great as

that of the physician in regular practice for the medical quack.

The builder, the shipwright, the commander, and sailor of this period

have never been equalled in any of their professions since, and with but

few exceptions the modern steel ship is a retrograde in everything

pertaining to the real art as compared to the ship of the period we

refer to. The ships, of course, are larger now, and that is all. This

period was not only noted on account of the high character of the art,

but ship-building plants in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore turned

out the finest specimens of construction in the world. All of the

workmen—shipwrights, ship-joiners, ship-smiths, ship-painters, and

caulkers—were without equals on the planet.

The Webbs, the Westervelts, the Steers family, Jere Simonson, Smith and

Dimon and others of New York, and John Vaughan, John Byerly, the Van

Duzen family, John K. Hammett and William Cramp, of Philadelphia, were

the leaders of their profession the world over. In the navy were to be

found the Grices, the Humphreys, the Hanscoms, Delano, and others.

The introduction of the iron ship was made under very unfavorable

conditions. The first to take hold of the new material were people,

mechanically speaking, of commonplace character both here and abroad,

and the art or profession as a rule retains the original taint up to

this time. There are some exceptions; some ship-builders in Great

Britain carried their art into the Iron Age,—the Napiers, the Ingliss

family, and others in Great Britain, and the Cramps in the United

States.

Mr. Cramp’s mould loft practice and methods as carried on from the

wooden-ship period is the practice now in use in the construction of the

navy.

The great advance in the steamship of the period thence up to this time

has been in the machinery; and in marine engineering the English were

our masters. There has been no advance here in the ship-building art in

any respect.

The decade following the Mexican War and preceding that of the Rebellion

was marked chiefly by the final or ultimate development of the clipper

type of sailing-vessel, and also by the gradual surrender of sail to

steam in propulsion and of wood to iron in construction. The clipper

idea was undoubtedly of Baltimore origin, and, in fact, the name of that

city was given to the type,—the “Baltimore Clipper.” They were, of

course, sailing-vessels. In all respects of model, of structure, size of

spars and sails, dimensions of hull, etc., the type was distinctly

American. It is known, however, that the earliest clippers built in

Baltimore were intended for and used in the African slave-trade. In this

nefarious traffic they were extremely successful, because in the day of

their beginning there were no steam cruisers to enforce the laws making

the slave-trade piracy, and there was no sailing cruiser afloat which

could keep within sight of a Baltimore clipper in the slave-trading

days.

The type, though originating in Baltimore, was not developed there to

its ultimate capacity, but the idea was taken up by Philadelphia, New

York, and New England ship-builders and embodied in the famous lines

which plied between this country and the Pacific Ocean. The discovery of

gold in California also gave a great impetus to commerce in

sailing-vessels. Of course, steamships soon began to run from New York

to the Atlantic side of the Isthmus and from the Pacific side to San

Francisco, but there was no railway across the Isthmus at first, so that

very little freight traffic could be handled by these steamers. The

result was that all freights between the Atlantic coast and California

had to go around Cape Horn, and in this traffic the clipper ship fully

asserted its value.

The decade of the 50’s was really the zenith of the American carrying

trade on the ocean. Relatively to the total amount of ocean commerce,

our ships carried a larger proportion of it than ever before in time of

peace. Of course, during the Napoleonic wars, when our flag was neutral,

we carried a larger proportion of our own products than in the 50’s, but

never before in a time of general peace.

The Crimean War, which happened during this period, also helped American

commerce in the ocean carrying trade, because the French and English

took up a great deal of their tonnage for transporting troops and

military supplies during the years 1854, 1855, and 1856, and to a great

extent the places of these ships were filled by vessels under the

American flag.

All these causes combined to create marked activity in American

ship-building.

To this might be added the effort to establish a trans-Atlantic

steamship line under the American flag in opposition to the heavily

subsidized Cunard Line. This was known as the Collins Line, and while

the government aid lasted it held its own in competition with its

British antagonists, but the subsidy was soon withdrawn, and with it the

Collins Line collapsed.

On the whole, so far as American ocean commerce and ship-building are

concerned, the decade of the 50’s was one of the most interesting in our

history. During that period the Cramp concern built from the designs and

under the superintendence of Charles H. Cramp a considerable number of

important sailing merchant vessels, together with several steamers,

mostly constructed for the coasting trade between the ports on the

Atlantic and on the Gulf. Cramp also built during that period seven

steamers for Spanish or Cuban account to be used in the coasting trade

of the Spanish West Indies. They were called “Carolina,” “Cardenas,”

“Alphonso,” “Union ‘Maisi,’” “General Armero,” and “Union No. 2.” The

last one was not finished until the outbreak of the Rebellion, when she

was taken possession of temporarily by the government and converted into

a gun-boat, now in the navy list as the “Union.” An interesting incident

in Mr. Cramp’s career was his visit to Havana for the purpose of

delivering these ships. In their delivery and in making settlement for

their construction he spent several months at Havana, where his

knowledge of the Spanish language, in which he always retained

considerable proficiency, was of great service to him.

The first war vessel designed by Mr. Cramp was the “Libertador,” built

for Venezuela. She was fitted with a pair of trunk engines by Messrs.

Sutton & Smith, who were noted for their skill in building trunk and

oscillating and other marine engines. She mounted a large pivot-gun on

her quarter-deck, and when fired off on her trial trip at Market Street,

the windows there were broken and the gun nearly kicked herself

overboard.

We now arrive at the period of the Civil War, in the operations

connected with which Mr. Cramp’s genius first became conspicuous in the

broad or national sense.

The work hitherto described, although important in its time and place

and under its conditions, which were those of peace, had really served

little more than the purpose of a practical training-school to fit him

for the broader and more comprehensive duties and responsibilities which

the exigencies of the Civil War imposed.

At the outbreak of that struggle, optimistic statesmen, like Mr. Seward,

dreamed that it would be over in ninety days. Those dreams went up in

the smoke of the first Bull Run. Then the authorities at Washington

awoke to the fact that they had on their hands a long and stubborn war.

It is a fact not generally known, or usually lost sight of, that during

the first six months of the Civil War, that is to say from April to

September, 1861, inclusive, the South raised and embodied a larger

number of troops than the North did, and the scale in that respect did

not turn until the government had begun to realize the results of its

call for five hundred thousand men. But the problem that confronted our

authorities was not military alone. It soon became clear to sagacious

minds that a great sea power must be created as well as an overpowering

force by land. It was a foregone conclusion that notwithstanding the

great numerical disparity between the white population of the South and

that of the North,—the proportion being about six millions in the South

to twenty-five millions in the North,—it would be impossible to overcome

them so long as their ports remained open. If the Southern people could

continue without serious hindrance to exchange their cotton for

European, principally English, arms, ammunition, military supplies, and

munitions of war of all kinds, together with provisions and clothing of

the kind which they had habitually imported, their armies could keep the

field; their railroad system could be kept in fair running order, and

the numerical superiority of the North must thereby to a great extent be

neutralized. Therefore an effective blockade became an immediate and

absolute necessity.

The total coast-line of the Confederacy, Atlantic Ocean and Gulf

together, was three thousand six hundred miles long, measured in

straight lines. The shore-line, or sinuosities, was considerably more

than twice that length. It is a coast indented with numerous inland bays

and estuaries, affording easy access to the immediate interior and safe

refuge for their ships or the ships of those with whom they traded. Of

course, a mere blockade by proclamation would not be respected by any

foreign maritime power. Paper blockade so-called had been ruled out of

consideration years before in solemn congress or conference of the Great

Powers.

At that moment our navy was at its lowest ebb, and, of the few ships

available for immediate service, many were on foreign stations and could

not easily or quickly be recalled, as the cable system of communication

was then unknown.

The task therefore became that of immediately improvising a navy capable

of enforcing a real blockade. To accomplish this, before the end of 1861

every steamer of every description that could keep the sea or carry a

gun was pressed into the service, and our commercial fleet, so far as

steam navigation was concerned, ceased to exist.

These converted vessels served a fairly good purpose _ad interim_, or

until the government could bring its resources to build a more effective

fleet of regular men-of-war.

In addition to this necessity for the immediate improvisation of a

blockading fleet, the question of armored vessels presented itself,

because, besides the blockade, bombardment of sea-coast fortifications

which had been seized by the Confederates must be an essential part of

the general plan of operations.

[Illustration: CRUISERS BALTIMORE AND PHILADELPHIA]

The idea of armored ships was then entirely novel. In 1861 only two

efforts had been made, one by England and the other by France, to

construct an _armored sea-going vessel_. To meet this necessity of

having ships capable of attacking heavily armed forts, Congress passed

an act, approved August 3, 1861, authorizing the construction of armored

vessels. This act authorized and directed the Secretary to appoint a

board of skilled naval officers to investigate plans and specifications

that might be submitted for the construction of iron- or steel-clad

steamships or steam floating batteries; and, on their favorable report,

authorizing the Secretary to cause one or more armored or iron- or

steel-clad steamships to be built, making an appropriation of $1,500,000

to carry the act into effect. Pursuant to this act, the Secretary

appointed on August 8 a board consisting of Commodore Joseph Smith,

Commodore Hiram Paulding, and Commander Charles Davis, to examine such

plans as might be submitted, and issued an advertisement, under date of

August 7, calling for plans and prices. The advertisement stated that a

general description and drawings of the vessels’ armor and machinery,

sufficient to indicate the character and probable efficiency of the

vessel, would be required; also that the offer must state the cost and

time for completing, exclusive of armament and stores, the rate of speed

proposed, etc. Persons proposing to make offers under this advertisement

were required to inform the Department of their intention before the

15th of August, and to have their propositions presented within

twenty-five days from the date of the advertisement.

On September 16, 1861, the board reported that seventeen offers had been

laid before them. All but three, however, were ruled out, mainly on

account of insufficiency of data or lack of drawings. Several of them

were, in fact, mere suggestions.

The three selected were: First, one to be built of wood and plated with

four inches of iron; to be a full-rigged ship of about three thousand

three hundred tons displacement; price, $780,000; length of the vessel,

two hundred and twenty feet; breadth of beam, sixty feet; depth of hold,

twenty-three feet; contract time, nine months; draught of water,

thirteen feet; speed, nine and one-half knots.

The second, offered by C. S. Bushnell & Co., of New Haven, was of the

low freeboard monitor type, the invention of which is commonly ascribed

to John Ericsson; and the third, offered by same parties, which was

afterward known as the “Galena.”

The first vessel described afterward became the “New Ironsides.” Her

hull was designed entirely by Mr. Cramp. Generally speaking, her type

was that of a broadside sea-going iron-clad. She was a roomy,

comfortable ship for her officers and crew. Her fighting quarters were

well protected against the shot of that day. Although engaged with forts

and batteries a greater number of times than any other one vessel in the

service, her armor was never pierced.

Perhaps at this point a description of the vessel and the conditions

attending her construction, in the form of a paper read some years ago

by Mr. Cramp before the Contemporary Club, of Philadelphia, will be more

pointed and interesting than any other delineation.

It is as follows:

“NEW IRONSIDES”

“When the ‘New Ironsides’ was contracted for there was no white oak

timber available outside of Pennsylvania. Timber of this kind was

cleaned out in Delaware and Maryland, and Virginia was for the

time-being inaccessible. So the timber that must be used was growing

in the forests of Pennsylvania when the contract was signed.

“With the exception of pine decking every stick of timber was of

white oak, and being the largest wooden ship ever built, the frames

were very heavy,—the floor timbers were two to each frame, and,

being without first futtocks and running from bilge to bilge, they

required a tree large enough to be twenty-two inches in diameter at

a height of forty-five feet from the ground. Trees of this kind were

very scarce in Pennsylvania, and frequently only a single tree would

be found in a township, which had been preserved as an heirloom by

the owner, and it was often difficult to persuade him to sell.

“During the month of October, 1861, we advertised in the country

papers that we would pay a dollar a running foot for every tree that

was brought to us by the first of January, under the requirements

that they were to be at least twenty-two inches in diameter at

forty-five feet from the ground, and the logs were to be sided on

two sides anywhere from thirteen inches up to eighteen inches.

“At this time, the beginning of the war, farming and business in

country towns being very slack, all suitable trees in the forests of

Bucks, Berks, Delaware, and Chester counties and some counties more

remote were prospected by the country-people and farmers, who worked

very hard utilizing moonlight nights as well as daytime in cutting

and shipping this timber. These counties were traversed by the North

Pennsylvania Railroad, and the various stations from Quakertown down

were soon gorged with logs that had to be delivered at our shipyard

on or before the first of January to meet our requirements. By the

first of January we had logs sufficient to make all the floors of

the ship, and quite a number were left at the stations where they

had accumulated too rapidly for the railroad to handle them, and

they could not be delivered within our time limit. This timber was

afterward bought at a reduced price.

“Not being able to get yellow pine, the beams and water-ways were

made of white oak. Some of these pieces were sixty feet long and

were sided up to sixteen inches. But notwithstanding these

difficulties and the fact that all the frame-timber was standing in

the forest when we took the contract, yet the vessel was launched in

six months after it was signed.

“The region traversed by the North Pennsylvania Railroad in

furnishing the frames, water-ways, and beams became exhausted in its

turn, so that toward the termination of the war white oak for the

beams of the light-draught monitors had to be procured chiefly in

Columbia County, in the interior of the State of Pennsylvania.

“There was also difficulty in securing timber for the curved

futtocks, which were principally made of roots and were obtained

from Delaware.

“The frames were fitted together solidly and caulked before ceiling

or planking was secured, and the outside planking below the lower

edge of armor was twelve inches thick, tapering off to the lower

turn of the bilge to five inches. So the ship in her defensive

capabilities was a war machine of no mean type.

“If the ship had been built of steel instead of wood, she would have

been sunk when she was struck by a spar torpedo off Charleston.

“The explosion took place at the height of the orlop-deck, where the

outside planking was twelve inches thick, and where the end of a

sixteen-inch beam backed the frames. The side sprung in about six

inches at the point of contact with the torpedo, ‘brooming’ the end

of the sixteen-inch oak beam, and considerable water came in for a

short time. The side of the ship, through the elasticity of the

material, came back to its original form in a short time and the

leak stopped. A gigantic marine, who was sitting on his chest at

that part of the deck near the point of the explosion was thrown

upward against the beams above him, breaking his collar-bone, and he

was the only person injured on the ship.

“The time involved in the construction of the ‘New Ironsides,’

launching in six months from the laying of the keel, was remarkable

in view of the fact that, besides the timber difficulty, nearly all

the skilled workmen and ship-wrights here had gone into the

navy-yard, and we were compelled to scour the country for men who

were mostly indifferent mechanics. A large number of ship-carpenters

and other men came from Baltimore and Maine, who had left their

homes to avoid conscription or to secure the high rates of wages

paid here.

“An interesting incident connected with the building of the ‘New

Ironsides’ was the fact that during the first half of her

construction the progress in naval ordnance had advanced so rapidly

that the authorities concluded to enlarge the caliber of her guns

sufficiently to double the power of the original design. The ship

was at first planned to carry sixteen 8-inch smooth-bore guns, which

was at that time considered the heaviest caliber that could be

worked in a broadside mount. Having in view the fact that all

war-ships heretofore built, particularly steam-ships, exceeded their

calculated draught, I determined to avoid a similar error in this

ship. I provided against it in my calculations of displacement by

allowing a foot for a margin. The draught was not to exceed fifteen

feet; I allowed for fourteen feet. The minimum height of the

port-sills above water at load draught, to insure sea-worthiness and

ability to fight the guns in sea-way, should have been seven feet,

according to our instructions. But in getting up the plans I

arranged that the port-sills with the 8-inch battery would be eight

feet above water. My calculations having been correctly made, I had

a foot to spare.

“About three months after we began work, and when the frames were up

and the beams in, the Department decided to arm the ship with

fourteen 11-inch Dahlgrens in broadside and two 200-pounders (8-inch

Parrotts). They were all muzzle loaders. This, together with the

increased weight of ammunition for the larger guns, exactly consumed

my foot of margin and brought the port-sills down to the normal

height of seven feet above water, and the draught of ship there was

not over fifteen feet, the original design.

“It may not be improper to say that I received much credit and

congratulation from the Board and others for my foresight in

allowing the margin as I did, and for the correctness of my

calculations. But for that the modified battery would have brought

the port-sills down to six feet or less, which would have rendered

it dangerous to open the main-deck ports in much of a sea.

“During the earlier stages of the construction of this ship but

little attention was paid to it by the people of the country; the

exciting conditions of the war on land; battles won and lost; the

movement of troops, etc., occupied the entire attention of the

people; so that while the yard was left open and no fence around it

there were no visitors.

“When the battle between the ‘Monitor’ and ‘Merrimac’ took place a

short time before launching the ‘New Ironsides,’ the whole world was

aroused, and their attention was called to the fact that there were

such things as armor-clad ships.

“When the number of visitors who applied for admission was so great

that we had to build a high fence around the shipyard, and only

admitted those who secured tickets issued by us, and when the launch

took place, it was under conditions of great excitement and

enthusiasm. The completion of the ship was accomplished in a very

short time, and her first scene of operations was before Fort

Sumter, which she bombarded eleven months and two days after the

contract was signed.

“At this point the history of the contracts may be stated:

“When the appropriation was made by Congress for the purpose of

constructing iron-clads, the Secretary of the Navy, as has been

remarked, created a board on armored ships, consisting of Commodores

Paulding, Smith, and Davis, who were fully authorized to carry out

the provisions of the law and make contracts, keeping in view what

had been done by England and France in the way of iron-plated

floating batteries. These gentlemen advertised for plans and

specifications accompanied by proposals for accomplishing the

purpose of the act of Congress. There were twenty-five or thirty

proposals, embracing a great diversity of projects, the principal

features of most of which were lack of well-defined plan, type, and

character.

“After considerable investigation, the board decided to accept three

plans and award the contracts. They were the ‘New Ironsides,’ the

original ‘Monitor,’ and the ‘Galena.’ Those three vessels exhibited

a vast diversity in form, construction, and outfit.

“A number of fables have originated and have come to be believed as

truths about many of the circumstances attending the selection of

plans. Among others, it was said that Mr. Lincoln himself, being

impressed with the claims of Mr. Ericsson, had to interfere, and

ordered the board to select the ‘Monitor.’ This is entirely false,

for no such demonstration was ever made by Mr. Lincoln, and the

board was not influenced at all by any considerations of that or any

other kind except their own judgment.

“The contract for the ‘New Ironsides’ was awarded to Merrick & Sons;

the design, plans, and specifications of hull complete had been made

by me in connection with Mr. B. H. Bartol, who conceived the project

and had charge of the proposal to the government,—Mr. B. H. Bartol

was Superintendent of Merrick & Sons at that time. When the contract

was awarded to Merrick & Sons, they sub-let the hull together with

the fittings to our firm, in accordance with a previous agreement

with Mr. Bartol. The contract price was about $848,000. Merrick &

Sons furnished the engines and armor plate. The engines were

designed by I. Vaughan Merrick, and were duplicates of those which

they had completed for a sloop-of-war, and were for a single screw.

The speed was about seven knots. She was bark-rigged with bowsprit.

“After completing the ‘New Ironsides,’ I proposed to build two more

of similar type with certain modifications and improvements, that

is, sea-going iron-clads, with twin screws instead of a single one,

and in increasing the speed and the efficiency of the armor. But at

that time what was known as the ‘Monitor craze’ was in full blast,

and, notwithstanding the excellent all-around performance of the

‘New Ironsides,’ she remained the only sea-going broadside iron-clad

in the navy, and was the first to fire a gun at an enemy, and fought

more battles than all other sea-going battleships past and present

put together.

“The armor plate of the ‘New Ironsides’ was made partly at Pittsburg

and partly at Bristol, Pennsylvania, and was of hammered scrap iron.

It was four inches thick, and the plates, which could now be rolled

in many mills and be considered light work, were then looked upon as

marvels of heavy forging.

“When the contract was made for the ship, wages for shipwrights were

$1.75 per day, and in less than two months they rose to $3 per day.

We contracted for all the copper sheathing and bolts the day after

signing the contract at twenty-nine cents per pound; in four months

it was sixty cents per pound. Materials in general went up from 50

to 100 per cent. before we finished the ship.

“Great and radical changes have since occurred, but, primitive as

the ‘New Ironsides’ seems in comparison with modern battleships, it

is doubtful if any one now existing will ever see as much fighting

or make so much history as she did. Last July, in an address read

before the Naval War College at Newport, I said:

“‘I cannot better illustrate my point than by comparing the first

and the last sea-going battleships built and delivered to the

government by Cramp. The first was the ‘New Ironsides,’ built in

1862. The last is the ‘Iowa,’ completed in 1897. Each represented or

represents the maximum development of its day.

“‘The ‘New Ironsides’ had one machine, her main engine, involving

two steam-cylinders. The ‘Iowa’ has seventy-one machines, involving

one hundred and thirty-seven steam-cylinders.

“‘The guns of the ‘New Ironsides’ were worked, the ammunition

hoisted, the ship steered, the engine started and reversed, her

boats handled, in short, all functions of fighting and manœuvring,

by hand. The ship was lighted by oil lamps and ventilated, when at

all, by natural air currents. Though, as I said, the most advanced

type of her day, she differed from her greater battleship

predecessor, the old three-decker ‘Pennsylvania,’ only in four

inches of iron side armor and auxiliary steam propulsion. She

carried fewer guns on fewer decks than the ‘Pennsylvania,’ but her

battery was nevertheless of much greater ballistic power.

“‘In the ‘Iowa’ it may almost be said that nothing is done by hand

except the opening and closing of throttles and pressing of electric

buttons. Her guns are loaded, trained, and fired, her ammunition

hoisted, her turrets turned, her torpedoes, mechanisms in

themselves, are tubed and ejected, the ship steered, her boats

hoisted out and in, and the interior lighted and ventilated, the

great search-light operated, and even orders transmitted from bridge

or conning-tower to all parts by mechanical appliances.

“‘Surely no more striking view than this of the development of

thirty-five years could be afforded.’

“The battery of the ‘New Ironsides’ was mounted in broadside, and

she had eight ports of a side, out of which she fought seven 11-inch

Dahlgrens and one 200-pounder Parrott, the maximum train or arc of

fire being about 45 degrees.

“The ‘Iowa’s’ four 12-inch guns are mounted in pairs in two turrets,

and train through arcs of about 260 degrees forward and aft

respectively. Her eight 8-inch guns are mounted in pairs in four

turrets, and each pair trains through an effective arc of about 180

degrees.

“The ‘New Ironsides’ had no direct bow or stern fire.

“The ‘Iowa’ fires two 12-inch and four 8-inch guns straight ahead

and straight astern.

“The maximum shell-range of the heaviest guns of the ‘Ironsides’ was

about a mile and a quarter, that of the ‘Iowa’s’ heaviest guns is

about eight miles. The muzzle energy of the ‘Ironsides’’ 11-inch

smooth bores was to that of the ‘Iowa’s’ 12-inch rifles about as 1

to 26.

“The fate of the ‘New Ironsides’ is well known: she was destroyed by

fire at League Island in 1866, about a year after her last action.”

Judged by modern standards of construction, the time expended in

building the “New Ironsides” was marvellously brief, six months,

because, as Mr. Cramp said, she was in action against Fort Sumter within

eleven months from signing of the contract.

Of course, there can be no comparison between the methods of her

construction or the nature of her appliances and those of a modern

battleship, yet in her time and for her day she was the most formidable

and powerful sea-going battleship afloat.

Mr. Cramp, notwithstanding that he was entering upon a new and untried

field without any prior guidance of observation or experience, undertook

the design and construction of this remarkable vessel with all the

confidence that a sense of professional mastery never fails to inspire;

and so confident was he that the “New Ironsides” would prove a success

that, while she was building, he proceeded to design two other vessels

of the same type, but embodying numerous improvements which his

experience in construction of the “Ironsides” from day to day suggested

to him, and when these designs were completed he offered them to the

Department.

He then discovered that the Navy Department had become entirely under

the influence of what might be called the “Monitor craze,” which

absolutely dominated the councils of the Department and of Congress in

respect to armor-clad vessels.

A combination, or “ring,” was formed, with head-quarters in New York, to

prevent the construction of any type of iron-clad vessel except

monitors, and it had sufficient power to carry its determination into

effect.

[Illustration: CRUISER NEWARK]

A sudden halt was made in the development of the armored sea-going type

which originated during the Crimean War. France had finished the

construction of “La Courunne,” “La Gloire,” and several others, one of

which had made a voyage to Vera Cruz before our Civil War, and certain

lessons derived from that ship during the voyage were utilized in the

construction of the “New Ironsides.” Both England and France were

proceeding slowly in the development of the very complete type of

battleship of the present day. While they built several vessels of an

improved monitor type and adopted the turret on a roller base, in many

cases they adhered to the course first laid out. The late British

battleships have fixed barbettes and shields for their heavy guns.

The old Timby turret is practically a revolving barbette extending above

the guns, which had to be loaded at the muzzle and the rammer being

jointed, eleven minutes being occupied in loading and firing.

In the operations before Charleston, the Confederates would leave their

bomb proofs after a shot was fired, and prepare for the next one during

the eleven minutes and retire unharmed, ready to renew the contest.

Under these conditions, the defence became a system of guns in a

casemate connecting with a bomb proof.

The old-fashioned monitor, viewed simply as a floating battery for use

in smooth water, was serviceable. It was not in any sense a sea-going

vessel, and it was always in danger of foundering as it crept along the

coast from harbor to harbor. Besides this, it was almost intolerable to

its officers and men in the living sense. In fact, service in the

monitors developed a new and distinct disease known in the war-time

pathology as the “monitor fever.” Whenever one was torpedoed, as for

example the “Tecumseh” in Mobile Bay, she sank immediately; so quickly,

in fact, that her crew below deck were unable to escape. The torpedo

which the “New Ironsides” resisted practically without injury would have

instantly sunk any monitor then existing. The “Ironsides,” on the

contrary, was a sea-going vessel of the best and stanchest type, capable

of any length of voyage with comfort and perfect safety to her officers

and crew.

A wise administration of the Navy Department, or one not affected by the

influence of cranks and combinations, would have built at least half a

dozen vessels of that type as soon as they could be constructed.

Mr. Cramp, realizing and appreciating the value of the type, and knowing

that the influences which prevented its multiplication in the navy were

unworthy, keenly felt the sting of his repulses. However, he proceeded

to build such ships as the Department required, including a monitor, and

from that time to the end of the war gave the navy the full benefit of

his experience and skill in all directions, both in new construction and

repair.

Partly through the natural unthinking enthusiasm of the people in times

of great excitement and partly through a carefully planned campaign of

sentiment adroitly managed by the ring, the monitor became almost the

symbol of patriotism.

After the repulse of the “Merrimac” in Hampton Roads, Ericsson was

almost deified, particularly by that class of people who consider rant

synonymous with eloquence. Yet such sentiments were actually cherished

at the time by a great many people who knew nothing whatever about the

actual merits of different types of vessels. But their fanaticism made

the operations of the monitor ring easy, and at the same time made it

impossible to introduce or carry forward any other type of armored

vessel during the whole Civil War, no matter how efficient or how

desirable it might be.

Captain Ericsson is popularly credited, and doubtless will be in

history, with the complete invention of the monitor. So far as the form

and structure of the hull, which was simply “scow bottom,” and the

fantastic type of its propelling engine and the Ericsson screw were

concerned, this is probably true, at least so far as known; but the main

distinguishing feature of the monitor was not its model of hull nor its

propelling engine, but its revolving turret; and this device had been

invented and patented by Mr. John R. R. Timby several years before the

outbreak of the Civil War. Timby had proposed to use the revolving

turret system for sea-coast defence, as a primary proposition. However,

in his description, upon which his letters-patent were issued, he

suggested that it might also be applied to floating structures or

batteries. All that Ericsson did in the application of the turret system

to his monitor was to appropriate Timby’s invention and act upon his

suggestion; a fact which was abundantly demonstrated afterward when Mr.

Timby received compensation for the infringement.

But all these facts probably went for little or nothing. It seemed that

the people had determined to make a demigod of Ericsson, and there was

no gainsaying them. They would have it so, and so it is.

Mr. Cramp, in a hitherto unpublished paper, deals with the history and

operations of the monitor ring with regard to its _personnel_ and the

details of its origin and methods, the origin of the “fast cruisers of

the navy,” and the “state of marine engineering of this country as it

existed at that time.” In this paper, as will be seen, he hews to the

line.

THE “MONITOR.”

“The coming out of the ‘Merrimac’ for the last time, and her

successful repulse by the ‘Monitor’ having driven her back into

Norfolk, gave a boom to the monitor system, the extent of which had

never been witnessed in this country before.

“The enthusiasm that always greets successful combats in war-time

was on this occasion of an extraordinary character, and the whole

country was aroused to the highest pitch of excitement.

“The designer of the ship, John Ericsson, already well known as one

of the principal promoters and successful advocates of screw

propulsion, and Alban C. Stimers, who was engineer during the fight,

and some of the officers, were the recipients of the most

extravagant and hysterical demonstrations in the way of hero

worship.

“An illustration of the effect that this battle had on the popular

mind at that time may be found in an address of Bishop Simpson at

the Academy of Music in Philadelphia.

“During the war, frequent addresses were made throughout the country

by well-known orators, states-men, and ministers of the gospel,

intended to promote a patriotic spirit and encourage the doubtful.

“I was present at the Academy of Music shortly after the ‘Monitor’

had been made famous by repulsing the ‘Merrimac,’ when, in referring

to Mr. Ericsson, the Bishop stated that ‘the Almighty had directly

interposed in the contest between Captain Ericsson and Robert

Stephenson in England,’ both of whom had responded to the offer of

the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Company of a premium of £500

sterling for the most improved locomotive engine. This was at the

very beginning of the introduction of railways in Great Britain, and

the following engine entered for the prize:

“The ‘Novelty,’ by Ericsson and Braithwait; the ‘Rocket,’ by Robert

Stephenson; the ‘Sans Pareil,’ by Timothy Hackworth, the

‘Perseverance,’ by Mr. Burstall.

“Mr. Joseph Harrison states in his book, the ‘Locomotive Engine,’

that ‘the prize was easily won by the “Rocket,” built by George and

Robert Stephenson, having fulfilled, in some respects, more than all

of the requirements of the trial.’

“Bishop Simpson, in referring to this incident, said that ‘the

Almighty had interposed to prevent Captain Ericsson from succeeding

there, so that he might become disgusted with England and shake the

dust of that country from his feet and depart for America, in order

that he might be here ready to save the country.’

“In using the words ‘in saving the country,’ Bishop Simpson looked

on the fight between the ‘Monitor’ and the ‘Merrimac’ as a great

many other people did; that is to say, if the ‘Merrimac’ had

escaped, she would have bombarded Philadelphia and New York and

other cities of the North, thereby compelling the government to

submit to the South. But the ‘Monitor’ having destroyed her before

she got out, John Ericsson was therefore entitled to all the credit

due to a person who had been specially delegated by the Almighty for

saving the country. John Ericsson had already become famous on

account of conspicuous efforts in promoting screw propulsion in the

United States generally, and particularly with reference to the use

in war-ship construction. In view of his unceasing labors in this

direction his name had become inseparably associated with the screw

propeller. This added much to the enthusiasm that prevailed at that

time, and all minor considerations being overlooked. It was

discovered a very short time after the war was ended that, even if

the ‘Merrimac’ could have escaped at that time from her encounters

with the ‘Cumberland,’ ‘Congress,’ and ‘Monitor,’ it would have been

impossible for her to go as far north as Philadelphia or New York.

It was found that she was in a very badly crippled state as a result

of her ramming the ‘Cumberland’ and ‘Congress;’ and the statement

was made by those who temporarily repaired her in Norfolk that her

bow was split to a great distance below the water.

“To use the words of one of the workmen, he had ‘put more than a

bale of oakum in the opening.’

“The construction of the ‘New Ironsides,’ ‘Monitor,’ and ‘Galena’

had already been practically taken out of the hands of the

Construction Department of the Navy by the Secretary of the Navy,

who became a convert to the monitor craze after the battle with the

‘Merrimac.’ The ‘Monitor’ had become the ideal type of armored

war-ship, and a sort of sub-department of the navy was created and

located at New York for the sole purpose of building and fitting out

monitors.

“This establishment in New York was placed under the immediate

supervision of Admiral Gregory, the active head being Chief Engineer

A. G. Stimers, who had been the chief engineer of the ‘Monitor’

during her engagement with the ‘Merrimac.’ He had associated with

him Isaac Newton and Theodore Allen, the nephew of Mr. Allen of the

Novelty Works in New York. This board was in direct communication

with the Secretary of the Navy.

“The monitor party, which may be described as the executive of the

ring or the New York section of the Navy Department, soon assumed a

position of great power and responsibility; the balance of the

Department amounting to practically mere nothing in the way of new

construction.

“Mr. Stimers and Mr. Allen were autocrats. They spent money

lavishly, ordered vessels, designed them, made contracts,

sub-contracts, made purchases, and carried everything with a high

hand.

“Mr. Lenthall, the Chief Constructor of the Navy, and Mr. Isherwood,

who was on his staff as engineer, were entirely set aside, and

practically disappeared from the scene as far as new constructions

were concerned.

“A large number of monitors were built, slightly improved in

structural detail over the original, and were engaged as soon as

finished in the operations before Charleston.

“The head-quarters in New York was often called the ‘draughtsmen’s

paradise,’ on account of the great number of draughtsmen employed

there, and who were getting twenty dollars a day. The most

extraordinary displays of drawings were issued to the various

machine-shops which were building monitors at that time. They were

particularly noticeable on account of the extravagant character of

the shading of the circular form of the turrets, smoke-stacks,

conning-towers, etc.

“The inspectors of construction that were employed by the New York

party emulated their superiors in carrying things with a high hand

at the various concerns where they inspected the vessels.

“Up to that time our concern had not built any monitors. We were not

in what was called the ‘Monitor Ring,’ not having indorsed the type

nor manner of construction, besides being the authors of the ‘New

Ironsides’ type, which the ring had determined to suppress.

“Immediately after the ‘New Ironsides’ had been engaged in a small

way in the first fight at Charleston, we recommended that the

government should build other vessels like her, but with twin screws

and with other improvements.

“By request of Assistant Secretary Fox, we prepared plans of the

proposed ships, some all iron, and others of iron and wood in the

construction of the hull; but the Department in Washington refused

to listen to or recommend anything. The New York section continued

to be paramount, and we were ruled out of naval construction for a

time.”

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.

“The next development of the craze was that of the so-called

‘Light-draught Monitors.’ These were intended to operate in

Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds and various other shallow waters in the

South. Twenty of them were authorized, and we responded to the

advertisement of them by bidding for one or more.

“It was found that, with the exception of Harlan & Hollingsworth, we

were the lowest bidders. We were a little higher than Harlan &

Hollingsworth, but the time in which we offered to build them was

shorter than theirs.

“The government promptly gave us one and the Harlan yard one, and

notified eighteen other bidders that they could have one each at the

same price as ours, which amounted, as near as I can remember, to

$350,000.

“Some of the bids ran as high as $750,000, and these bidders had

some delicacy in accepting prices at one-half, because, to accept

the contract at one-half, it would be an acknowledgment that they

did not know what they were about, or that they were trying to rob

the government.

“The fact is, that none of the bidders except Harlan & Hollingsworth

and ourselves were ship-builders. They were in other lines of

mechanical construction, and of course they did not have the

slightest idea of what was to be done or what it would cost.

“The drawings on which the vessels were to be built were of the

crudest character; only a midship section and one or two vague

longitudinal sketches being furnished as a guide or basis of

construction.

“Notwithstanding, as I said before, we were the lowest bidder,

thereby saving millions of dollars to the government, only one was

awarded to us. The balance was offered to the other bidders at our

price, and the offer was accepted by most of them.

“Having received our contract, we promptly visited New York to get

the details of construction and engines in order to begin work and

procure materials. The demand for materials was greater than the

supply, and all were in a feverish state of excitement. To get our

orders out quickly, I immediately made application to Mr. Stimers

for plans, and had a long and detailed conversation with him and

Theodore Allen over what plans they had developed, and numerous

alterations were made to the plans as drawn.

“Their first plan permitted the boilers to come within three and

one-half inches of the bottom plating of the ship, practically

landing the boilers on the three and one-half inch angle-bars, which

had at that time no floors.

“I suggested in a rather strong way that this would not do, and

after considerable discussion they concluded to make the vessels a

little deeper, give the deck more spring, and put shallow floors in.

Other important alterations were made as the work progressed.

“We would have had our vessel overboard first, but the northward

march of General Lee previous to the battle of Antietem interfered

with the furnishing of materials, and also with our own working

force in the shipyard.

“Our employees, with those of the rolling-mills supplying materials

near Philadelphia, organized themselves into military companies for

the purpose of defence. Two companies were formed in our

establishment.

“While these delays affected us, they did not interfere with the

progress of the monitor which was building in Boston; but when this

vessel was launched, she sank to the bottom from lack of buoyancy,

and a halt was called on the nineteen other vessels.

“These vessels had been constructed on very vague plans and

conditions. Mistakes were made in the original design, and weights

added without investigating the correctness of the original sketch,

which, with the so-called ‘calculations,’ were furnished by Mr.

Ericsson; at least they had been examined, approved, and signed by

him. They were not furnished to bidders.

“The day after this launch, the ‘Monitor Ring’ was in a state of

collapse! Mr. Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood now reasserted their proper

authority. They ordered Mr. Stimers and Mr. Allen to reduce the

weights in the turrets, and wherever else it was possible to do so

sufficiently to make the vessels float.

“These reductions in equipment, outfit, etc., were communicated to

the builders at Chester, before they launched the ‘Tunxis’; but

these vessels, by the reductions, were rendered entirely useless for

their designed service, or any other.

“Finding that the Boston vessel and the ‘Tunxis,’ built at Chester,

notwithstanding the alterations, lacked efficiency to a serious

degree, they decided to rebuild most of the others by deepening

them, and the whole matter was placed in my hands by Chief Engineer

King, who with some others were designated by the Secretary of the

Navy to investigate and prepare plans for the deepening, and to

ascertain the cost of the alterations.

“After a careful investigation, I found it would be necessary to

increase the depth of the hulls about thirty-three inches, involving

the necessity of raising the solid oak decks to that extent with the

hull proper, and the armor backing and armor which had to be taken

off and replaced.

“A so-called expert was detailed to assist me in my calculations,

but, having no use for him, I did not avail myself of his services.

[Illustration: CRUISERS PENNSYLVANIA AND COLORADO Copyright, 1905,

by John W. Dawson]

“When I sent my plans and our price for the deepening of the vessel

to the Secretary, he immediately awarded us the contract for

deepening ours (the ‘Yazoo’), and accepted our price, and notified

the eighteen other people that he would give them the same price for

deepening theirs. The other contractors would not accept my price,

and they denounced me for not having put a ‘higher price on the

job,’ when I had the opportunity to do so. I told them that I had

estimated that we would make 30 per cent. profit, and I contended

that that was enough, notwithstanding we were under the influence of

war prices, and that I had been delegated to do what I considered

was right. In other words, I held that the Secretary had placed me

upon honor.

“These eighteen other builders ultimately got higher prices than we

did. They made all sorts of claims to the government through their

representatives, and made life a burden to the Secretary by showing,

or endeavoring to show, him that wages were higher everywhere else

in the localities where these vessels were built than they were in

Philadelphia.

“In fact, every one of the other builders ultimately received higher

prices than we did, and later on some were awarded additional sums

by act of Congress, notwithstanding that the drawings,

specifications, plans, and designs for the alterations were made by

me without pay! without even thanks!

“Subsequently the Department decided not to alter all alike, and

about one-half of them were finished without the turrets, and the

big guns were taken out, thereby relieving their builders of the

necessity of making them deeper. The decks were finished, and they

were designated as a sort of torpedo boat for harbor defence. These

vessels, as altered according to my recommendations, would have been

efficient factors in the operations in the southern waters if the

war had not ended before they were finished.

“The ‘Sub-Department’ in New York, with all its investitures and

appointments, was abandoned, and the Navy Department took up the

monitor matter from that time onward. But the mischief had been

done. The service had been debauched and the Treasury robbed of

millions, which an intelligent policy from the start might have

saved.

“During the alterations on the ‘Yazoo,’ the Chester light-draught

monitor was sent to our place to be altered. Notwithstanding she had

been finished with the reduced weights recommended by Mr. Stimers,

she still continued defective, and was sent to our yard to be

altered according to my new plan.

“As it was necessary to raise the turret in order to raise the deck,

and as we were compelled to haul the vessel out of the water, we

took the guns out of the turret and proceeded to remove it also.

Hoisting out the guns was an easy accomplishment, but the removal of

the turret was a difficult problem.

“At first sight, cutting out the rivets and bolts, taking apart and

rebuilding it, appeared the most feasible. This, however, was an

expensive transaction. After careful investigation, we concluded

that it could be hauled off the ship on to the dock on sliding-ways

if the work was done with the greatest rapidity with the best men at

it. The removal of guns and turret to the dock was successfully

accomplished.

“On account of the great cost due to occupying a dry-dock long

enough to make the change, it was determined to haul her out on

sliding-ways, reversing the process of launching, and that without

using a coffer-dam for laying the ground-ways.

“The vessel was hauled out by the use of six 12-inch falls, two of

which were attached to end of upper ways, two to a chain that passed

around the stem extending to amidships, the ends lashed to the ship

just above high-water mark, and the other two to holes in the bow

made for the purpose.

“When the six large ‘crabs’ were started with all of the men that

could be put on them, they never stopped until the vessel was

entirely out of the water, taking a day and a night for the

operation.

“This was by all odds the heaviest vessel ever hauled out on ways in

this country, and, in view of the simplicity of its preparations and

the limited cost, was one of the great achievements of the time

occupied by the Civil War. But little or no notice was taken of it

by the papers, as battles lost and won were the sensation of the

day.

“While the craze for constructing monitors had possession of the

country, the government built nothing else in the way of armored

vessels.

“Mr. Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood, who was on Mr. Lenthall’s staff at

that time, had no power to antagonize the monitor craze

successfully, and a large one of wood was ordered to be built in

each navy-yard, to be designed by the constructor of that particular

yard as far as the hulls were concerned. But little money of the

vast expenditures of the navy during the war was devoted to other

iron-clad constructions than that of the monitor class.

“The ‘Miantonomah,’ which was one of these vessels built in one of

the navy-yards and designed by the constructor at the navy-yard in

which she was built, was sent to Russia under command of Commodore

John Rodgers with Assistant Secretary Fox, as Special Envoy to

convey to the Emperor certain congratulations. The idea was that the

government of Russia would construct a number of large monitors. The

trip, so far as that was concerned, was a failure. Commodore

Rodgers, who went in command, was formerly in command of one of the

original monitors which had been engaged in the contests before

Charleston, and also in the Savannah sounds in the Civil War, and he

was one of the strongest of the captains in favor of that type. As a

rule, the captains and other officers were all adverse to them.

“While the Navy Department and Naval Committee of Congress were

favorable to the monitor type, Messrs. Lenthall and Isherwood were

against it; but they were very backward in doing or in recommending

anything else, and permitted themselves to be overlooked. In view of

this negligence on their part, it was argued that it was better to

try to do something, even if it turned out wrong, than to do nothing

at all.”

ORIGIN OF FAST CRUISERS.

“On account of the heavy loss of our ships captured by the

Confederate cruisers, and our failures to capture any of them with

the exception of the ‘Alabama,’ which was accidentally discovered

and destroyed by the ‘Kearsarge,’ our Navy Department conceived it

necessary to have constructed a number of very fast cruisers, faster

than any known afloat.

“The Department delegated Messrs. Stimers and Allen, when in the

height of their power in their ‘Sub-Department’ in New York, to

design and have them constructed.

“Not being naval architects, and not having any naval architect of

competent knowledge in connection with their ‘Sub-Department,’ but

having an exalted idea of their own abilities not only as naval

architects and engineers, and everything else in that direction,

they designed some ships of a peculiarly fantastic model, and

engines of equally fanciful character which they called, for short,

the ‘grasshopper engine.’

“Having the power to design these vessels and contract for them,

they invited me to inspect the plans and build two of them.

“On looking over these designs, I began to criticise them, and

recommended modifications.

“I was wound up suddenly by the observation that, as they intended

to give us two ships and give us what they considered a fair price

for them, we must build them exactly as they were designed.

“As the price they offered was high, and feeling that we would

practically have our own way with them, provided we adhered to the

general type of design, and having no responsibility, we thought

that we had better take them and make a handsome sum out of them

than to stand out on trifles and fight for glory alone.

“I had commenced at the beginning of the war with criticising the

monitors, and our concern got nothing, and the grass might have been

growing in our yard if we adhered to that course. So the price was

fixed for these ships, and we were about going on, when the fatal

contretemps of the launching of the Boston light-draught monitor

occurred. The ‘fast cruiser’ contracts of Stimers and Allen were set

aside, and a large sum of money saved to the government. The ring

was broken. They who had had unlimited power heretofore suddenly

found themselves without the power to contract for a dingy.

“This was really a great disappointment to us and several other

contractors, because the price they fixed for the cruisers was

liberal, and, as they would not listen to suggestions, they were

naturally expected to take the responsibility.

“After the matter of the fast cruisers was taken out of the hands of

the ‘Sub-Department of the navy’ after the sinking of the Boston

monitor, the Navy Department ordered each of the four navy-yards to

design one on a scheme of general dimensions, and giving the engines

out by contract to the various engine-builders, the engines, with

two exceptions, being designed by Mr. Isherwood. The machinery for

the ‘Madawaska’ was designed by Ericsson!

“At the same time, to encourage private enterprise, one was given to

us, hull and machinery of our own design. We awarded the engines to

Merrick & Sons, who built them on their own designs. All of these

vessels were constructed of wood. Our ship was called the

‘Chattanooga,’ and that built at the Philadelphia Navy-Yard was

called the ‘Neshaminy.’

“The engines designed by Mr. Isherwood were geared, the propellers

making two and one-half revolutions to the engine’s one. When these

engines were designed, gearing was supposed to be an indispensable

necessity in screw-engine practice.

“The engines designed for the ‘Madawaska’ by Ericsson were of the

same design as that of the ‘Dictator,’ and would be considered of

fantastic character at the present time; that, however, might be

said of most marine engines of that period.

“Much was expected of the ‘Madawaska’s’ engines by Mr. Ericsson’s

friends, but after a trial of twenty minutes it was stopped, as the

crank-pin and main-bearing brasses ran out into the crank-pit before

they had attained their required performance.

“The engines were subsequently taken out and compound engines of

poor design were put in by parties who had never built a compound

engine before. The performance of these engines was but little

better than that of the original.

“Having been eminently successful in the introduction of compound

engines in this country, by the construction of four compound

engines for the American Line and one set for the ‘George W. Clyde’

of our own design, we made application to the government to

substitute the design of compound engines in place of the first set

of ‘Madawaska,’ but our offer was not accepted, unfortunately for

the government.

“All of these vessels were of good model, and all built according to

the latest improvements of the great ship-builders and contractors,

and the devices in the way of rigging, spars, and other outfit,

besides the model and general arrangements were from the stand-point

and designs of the naval constructor and ship-builder at the yard

where they were built. No ships in modern times have been superior

to them in design, construction, and ship-building technique. The

engines, however, were not up to the standard, and, no matter what

else may be said of them, they were much too small.

“Some time after these vessels were laid up, an effort was made by

private parties in New York to utilize them in a trans-Atlantic line

to carry the mail, and a proposition was made to the government

covering certain conditions under which they could be operated. The

proposition meeting a favorable consideration, an exhaustive

examination of the engines was made by Mr. Norman Wheeler, of New

York. He found that the gearing of the driving-wheels and pinion had

been worn down five-eighths of an inch during their trials; the

project was abandoned, and the ships gradually disappeared.

“It has been stated that the ‘Wampanoag’ made her designed speed

from New York to Charleston in one trial.

“The British government was very much interested in this scheme of

building fast cruisers for our navy. Captain Bye-the-sea, who was

Naval Attaché of Great Britain, was ordered to investigate the

matter here. He decided to obtain the plans and drawings of the

‘Chattanooga,’ and applied to the Secretary of the Navy for his

approval. The Secretary sent a letter to us stating that, so far as

he was concerned, he had no objection. So we furnished Captain

Bye-the-sea with the drawings of the ‘Chattanooga’ in return for

some valuable information that he had, which we expected to utilize

in some construction of our Navy Department. We did not, however,

realize anything in that direction.

“The ‘Inconstant,’ built by the British government, was practically

the same model as that of the ‘Chattanooga,’ but with another deck

added to her, which gave her an entirely different appearance, and

which made her look a good deal heavier above the water than the

‘Chattanooga’ did, particularly as far as the stern was concerned.

“The ‘Wampanoag,’ one of the ships built at one of the navy-yards,

made what was designated as one quick trip from New York to

Charleston; but in doing so the teeth of the gearing were worn to

the extent of five-eighths of an inch, practically ruining her

usefulness for any future service. The vessel was laid up and never

sent to sea again.

“The ‘Chattanooga’ did not make a successful trial. The engines were

too small, and a long contest between the engine-builders and Mr.

Isherwood occurred over the construction of the machinery, ending in

the engine-builders making modifications, and the vessel was laid

up.

“As these ships were considered at that time too expensive to equip

for sea service in time of peace, they were laid up; being wooden

and very much neglected, they rotted at their wharves.

“The failure of these vessels to demonstrate the propriety of

building fast cruisers was due altogether to defective machinery and

to defective marine engineering as it generally existed at that date

in this country, and to the material of their construction being of

wood.”

EVOLUTION OF MODERN MARINE ENGINE.

“At that time a large majority of the marine engineers of the United

States were adherents of the paddle-wheel, walking-beam type of

engine, and nothing would do but that type of engine. That was

particularly the case in the city of New York.

“Philadelphia, at a very early period in the history of steam

propulsion, advocated the propeller engine, and as far as the

working of propeller engine was concerned, the degree of workmanship

and skill in its design attained there was never excelled in Europe

or America. These engines were generally small in power, and the

prejudices of the people were against them, particularly as all New

York ship-builders and marine engineers spoke of propeller engines

with the most profound contempt.

“Now and then some one in New York would build a propeller engine of

poor design which would prove disastrous, so in large enterprises

the walking-beam, side-wheel type of engine prevailed and was the

fashion.

“This was done to such a great extent that when the first line of

steamships was established between Philadelphia and Charleston,

side-wheel engines were put in them by parties who had a great deal

of interest with the management of the steamship company.

“In fact, it was this craze for the walking-beam engine and

side-wheels in New York which ruined us as a steamship building

country, and was one of the many causes for the supremacy in ocean

commerce that Great Britain ultimately attained.

“After the government had stopped the subsidy, the Collins Line,

which was run at an enormous expense, was withdrawn. We were

completely out of the business. The influence of Philadelphia, as we

had no large ships or large steamship companies, was not listened

to.

“Rather than adopt the propeller and go to Philadelphia to have the

engines built, steamship owners in New York permitted the whole

steamship business, together with all the foreign trade, to go to

foreign countries. The British began early to establish large

machine shops and to perfect the propeller engine. Though slow, they

were sure.

“There was not a time in the history of steam navigation that we did

not feel that we could equal or even excel the English builders of

propeller steamships that were coming to this country. But, as I

said before, we could not induce the New York merchants to embark in

the enterprise.

“I am sure that if we had abandoned the side-wheel and commenced

with the propeller at the time the British did and continued with

steadfastness, we never would have lost it.

“The ships of this country were right, of the best form and model,

and they were in advance of anything in Great Britain, as far as

hull construction and design were concerned; but, while the

ship-builders in New York were among the greatest in the world, the

builders of marine engines there were the poorest in the world.

“When it was discovered that the propeller steamship was in every

respect the best and had come to stay, it was too late to try to

recover our trade.

“The construction of monitors and machinery during the latter end of

the war was very demoralizing, and had its effect upon naval

constructions long after the war was over.

“The Construction Department, which had not shown much enterprise

during the war, had become very much deteriorated, and the system

was inaugurated, principally by Mr. Isherwood, which exists at the

present day, of dividing the executive department into many bureaus;

and, to strengthen their heads and give them power, it was also

provided that the appointment of these heads of bureaus should be

made by the President and confirmed by the Senate, thus making the

Senate a coördinate factor in their existence, and the heads of

bureaus independent of the Secretary of the Navy.

“This was started, as I said before, by Mr. Isherwood, who was on

Mr. Lenthall’s staff. He organized the Bureau of Steam Engineering

as an independent bureau, not subordinate to the Secretary, and

having its head appointed by the President and confirmed by the

Senate. Of course he was made its Engineer-in-Chief.”

That being started, other bureaus as they practically exist at present,

the heads of which are independent of the Secretary, were established

the same way. A great deal of friction occurred between the various

branches of the Navy Department at that time, the effects of which

continued for a good while. Nothing was built by the government,

although the Secretary of the Navy had full power to do practically as

he pleased with the appropriations. The appropriations in Congress at

that time were made in bulk, and the Secretary could give vessels out by

private contract or build them in the navy-yards.

Some few vessels involving antique ideas were started in the navy-yards

and were principally of wood. The engines were contracted for by the

various engine-builders of the United States. They were constructed

practically on one general design.

On account of some irregularities and misunderstandings in the way of

giving out contracts and certain favoritisms, together with the

jealousies and bickerings of the various heads of the Departments and

officers of the Navy, Congress became more and more exacting in their

appropriations, until at last nothing was done in the Navy Department

without a special appropriation for the particular purpose.

At the end of the Civil War in 1865, a large number of United States

vessels under contract were uncompleted. In some cases, notably of the

monitor type, work was immediately suspended upon them, and settlements

were made after long and tedious delays. The Cramp concern, as already

mentioned, had one vessel in hand under these conditions, the

first-class fast cruiser “Chattanooga;” but the government provided for

her completion, which was carried out, and her delivery concluded the

relations of Mr. Cramp to the navy of the Civil War.

[Illustration: CRUISER COLUMBIA]

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