attack Prague in March. This new action was cynically called the “March
whirlwind.” As it was quite openly discussed in Berlin circles, we hoped
that news of this action would also reach the British and French
Embassies. We were firmly convinced that this time results would not be
achieved by surprise; but Halder had already adopted a different view.
He thought that Hitler had been given free passage to Prague by the
Western Powers. He refused to have preliminary conferences and wanted to
wait and see whether this Prague action could be achieved without a
fight. And that is what happened.
DR. DIX: In which direction? You have already spoken about the steps
with the British and French Embassies.
GISEVIUS: No, there were no steps taken with regard to the British and
French Embassies.
DR. DIX: Do you want to say anything further about it? Have you anything
to add?
GISEVIUS: No, I have said that we did not take any steps.
DR. DIX: Now, then, Prague is over; and I believe that you and Schacht
went to Switzerland together on behalf of your group. Is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Not only together with Schacht but also with Goerdeler. We
were of the opinion that Schacht in Germany—excuse me—that Prague
would have incredible psychological effects in Germany. As far as
foreign countries were concerned, Prague was the signal that no peace
and no treaty could be kept with Hitler. Inside Germany unfortunately we
were forced to see that the generals and the people were now convinced
that this Hitler could do whatever he wished; nobody would stop him; he
was protected by Providence. This alarmed us. On one side we saw that
the Western Powers would no longer put up with these things; and on the
other side we saw that within Germany the illusion was growing that the
Western Powers would not go to war. We could see that a war could be
prevented only if the Western Powers would tell not only the Foreign
Minister, not only Hitler, but by every means of propaganda tell the
German nation that any further step towards the East would mean war. It
appeared to us that the only possibility was to warn the generals and to
get them to revolt, and that was the subject of the talks which Schacht,
Goerdeler, and I conducted in Switzerland, immediately after Prague.
DR. DIX: With whom?
GISEVIUS: We met a man who had excellent connections with the British
and French Governments. This man made very exact reports at least to the
French Government. I can testify to this because later after Paris was
conquered, I was able to find a copy of his report among Daladier’s
secret papers. We told this man very clearly that in autumn at the
latest, the fight for Danzig would start. We told him that, as good
Germans, we were without doubt of the opinion that Danzig was a German
city and that some day that point would have to be peacefully discussed;
but we also warned him against having conferences now regarding Danzig
alone because Hitler did not want only Danzig but the whole of Poland,
not the whole of Poland but the Ukraine, and that that was the reason
why the propaganda of foreign countries should make it abundantly clear
to Germany that the limit had now been reached and that the Western
Powers would intervene. We said that only then would a revolt be
possible for us.
DR. DIX: And did this man who had your confidence make a report in the
way you stipulated?
GISEVIUS: Yes, he did; and I must say that very soon public statements
on the part of the British, either on the radio or in the press or in
the House of Commons, began to remove these doubts among the German
generals and the German people. From that time on everything which could
be done was done by the British to alarm the German generals.
DR. DIX: Did not Schacht meet his friend Montagu Norman in Switzerland
at that time and talk with him in the same vein? Do you know? Were you
there?
GISEVIUS: Yes. We thought that the opportunity for Schacht to talk to a
close friend of the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, should not be
allowed to pass; and Schacht had very detailed discussions with Montagu
Norman, so as to describe to him the psychological atmosphere in Germany
after Prague and to persuade him that the British Government should now
undertake the necessary clarifications.
DR. DIX: Was not your slogan in reports to foreign countries at the
time: “You must play off the Nazis against Germans”?
GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the tenor of all our discussions. We wanted it
made clear to the German people that the Western Powers were not against
Germany, but only against this Nazi policy of surprise and against the
Nazi methods of terror, within the country as well as without.
DR. DIX: And now, having come back from Switzerland, what happened next,
particularly with reference to Schacht?
GISEVIUS: We saw that things in Germany were rapidly drifting toward the
August crisis and that the generals could not be dissuaded from the view
that Hitler was only bluffing and that there would be another Munich or
another Prague. And now began all those desperate efforts which we made
in order to influence the leading generals, and particularly Keitel, to
prevent the decisive order being given to march against Poland.
DR. DIX: Let us come back to Schacht’s return from the Swiss journey in
spring of 1939. You know that Schacht left Germany then and made a
journey to India?
GISEVIUS: He went to India and hoped to stay there as long as possible
in order to go to China. But on the way Hitler’s order prohibiting him
from setting foot on Chinese soil reached him, and he had to return. As
far as I remember, he came back a few days before the outbreak of war.
DR. DIX: You said China; did Schacht have sympathies with
Chiang-Kai-Chek in spite of the pact with Japan?
GISEVIUS: Yes. He sympathized greatly with the Chinese Government, as
did our entire circle. We all had quite a number of good and dear
Chinese friends with whom we attempted to keep in touch in spite of the
Japanese pact.
DR. DIX: About when did Schacht come back from India?
GISEVIUS: I think it was the beginning of August; but I cannot...
DR. DIX: Now matters were rapidly heading toward war. Did Schacht,
before the outbreak of war, take any steps to prevent its outbreak?
GISEVIUS: He took a great number of steps, but they cannot be described
individually as that would create the impression that Schacht alone was
taking these steps. Actually the situation was such that a large group
of people were now in the struggle, and each one took those steps which
were most suited to him, and each one informed the group of what he had
done and what would be advisable for another to do. For that reason I am
afraid that it would present a completely erroneous picture if I were to
describe individually, and only with respect to Schacht, all those
desperate efforts made from August 1939 until the attack on Holland and
Belgium.
DR. DIX: The Tribunal has taken cognizance of the fact that Schacht was
not acting alone; but here we are dealing with Schacht’s case, and I
should like to ask you, therefore, to confine yourself to the
description of Schacht’s efforts.
GISEVIUS: In that case I must state first that Schacht knew of all these
other matters and was in a certain sense also an accomplice. Of Schacht
himself I can only say at this particular moment that he was co-author
of the Thomas memorandum addressed to General Keitel, or the two
memoranda, in which Schacht, together with our group, pointed out the
dangers of war to Keitel. Further, I can say that, through Thomas and
Canaris, Schacht took steps to intervene with Brauchitsch and Halder.
But I would like to emphasize expressly that all the steps taken by Beck
and Goerdeler were taken with the full knowledge of Schacht and also
with his participation. This was a very important undertaking.
DR. DIX: A collective action? Does not Schacht’s attempt at the very
last moment, at the end of August, to make representations to
Brauchitsch through Canaris at headquarters play a part in this?
GISEVIUS: Yes. After General Thomas had failed with both his memoranda
and after he had failed to persuade Keitel to receive Goerdeler or
Schacht, Schacht tried to approach Brauchitsch or Halder. For that
purpose Thomas paid frequent visits to General Halder, and it was
typical that during those critical days he could not get past the
anteroom of General Halder’s office, past General Von Stülpnagel. Halder
was not “at home,” and just said that he did not want to see Schacht.
Thereupon we took a further step on that dramatic 25 August, the day on
which Hitler had already once given the order to march. As soon as the
news reached us that Hitler had given Halder the order to march, Schacht
and I first got into touch with Thomas; and then, together with Thomas,
we went to Admiral Canaris so that both Thomas and Canaris should
accompany Schacht when he went unannounced to the headquarters in Zossen
in order to confront Brauchitsch and Halder with his presence. Schacht
intended to point out to Brauchitsch and Halder that, in accordance with
the existing constitution, the Reich Cabinet must be consulted before
waging war. Brauchitsch and Halder would be guilty of a breach of oath
if, without the knowledge of the competent political authorities, they
obeyed an order for war. That was roughly what Schacht intended to say
to explain his step. When Thomas and Schacht arrived at Bendlerstrasse,
Thomas went to Canaris. It was about 6 o’clock or...
DR. DIX: The OKW is situated in Bendlerstrasse. The Tribunal should know
that Bendlerstrasse meant the OKW or the OKH.
GISEVIUS: When we arrived at the OKW and were waiting at a corner of the
street, Canaris sent Oster to us. That was the moment when Hitler
between 6 and 7 o’clock suddenly ordered Halder to withdraw his order to
march. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that Hitler, influenced by
the renewed intervention of Mussolini, suddenly withdrew the order to
march which had already been given. Unfortunately, Canaris and Thomas
and all our friends were now under the impression that this withdrawal
of an order to march was an incredible loss of prestige for Hitler.
Oster thought that never before in the history of warfare had a supreme
commander withdrawn such a decisive order in the throes of a nervous
breakdown. And Canaris said to me, “Now the peace of Europe is saved for
50 years, because Hitler has now lost the respect of the generals.” And,
unfortunately, in the face of this psychological change, we all felt
that we could look forward to the following days in a quiet frame of
mind. So, when 3 days later, Hitler nevertheless gave the decisive order
to march, it came as a complete surprise for our group as well. Oster
called me to the OKW; Schacht accompanied me. We asked Canaris again
whether he could not arrange another meeting with Brauchitsch and
Halder, but Canaris said to me, “It is too late now.” He had tears in
his eyes and added, “That is the end of Germany.”
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we now come to the war, and I think that perhaps
we had better deal with the war after lunch.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, before the noon recess we had just come to the
outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be
understood, I must ask you first in what capacity you served during the
war.
GISEVIUS: On the day of the outbreak of war I was called to Security
Intelligence by General Oster by means of a forged order. However, as it
was a regulation that all officers or other members of the intelligence
service had to be examined by the Gestapo, and as I would never have
received permission to be a member of the intelligence, they simply gave
me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Oster and
Canaris without doing any direct service.
DR. DIX: And after the outbreak of war what were the activities of your
group of conspirators, the members of which you have already mentioned?
Who took over the leadership, who participated, and what was done?
GISEVIUS: Immediately after the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck
was at the head of all oppositional movements which could exist in
Germany at all, with the exception of the Communists with whom we had no
contact at that time. We were of the opinion that only a general could
be the leader during war, and Beck stood so far above purely military
matters that he was the suitable man to unify all groups from the left
to the right. Beck chose Dr. Goerdeler as his closest collaborator.
DR. DIX: Consequently the only civilians who worked with this group of
conspirators were Schacht and Goerdeler as before?
GISEVIUS: No, on the contrary; all the opposition groups, who had so far
had merely loose connections with each other, were now drawn together
under the pressure of war. This was especially so with the left
opposition movements, which had been greatly reduced in the early years
as all their leaders had been interned. These left groups especially now
came in with us. In this connection I shall merely mention Leuschner and
Dr. Karl Muehlendorf. However, I must also mention the Christian Trade
Unions, and Dr. Habermann, and Dr. Jacob Kaiser. Further I must mention
the Catholic circles, the leaders of the Confessional Church, and
individual political men such as Ambassador Von Hassell, State Secretary
Planck, Minister Popitz, and many, many others.
DR. DIX: What was the attitude of these left circles, especially
concerning the question of a revolt, the forceful removal of Hitler or
even an attempt on his life? Did they also consider the possibility of
an attempt at assassination, which later was actually suggested in your
group?
GISEVIUS: No, the left circles were very much under the impression that
the “stab in the back” legend had done much harm in Germany; and the
left circles thought that they ought not to expose themselves again to
the danger of having it said later that Hitler or the German Army had
not been defeated on the battlefield. The left-wing had long been of the
opinion that no matter how bitter an experience it might be for them, it
must now be proved absolutely to the German people that militarism was
committing suicide in Germany.
DR. DIX: I have already submitted to the Tribunal, a letter which you,
Doctor, smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht at about this time—the end
of 1939. It is a letter to the former president of the International
Bank at Basel, later president of the First National Bank of New York; a
man of influence, who probably had access to President Roosevelt.
In anticipation of the documentary evidence pertaining hereto I had
originally intended to read this letter to the Tribunal now. However, in
discussing the admissibility of evidence I informed the Tribunal of most
of the essential points, and as Mr. Justice Jackson could not yet have
the Schacht Document Book in hand, and as he remarked previously that he
did not like me to produce documentary evidence at this point, I will
not carry out my original intention to read this letter in its entirety.
I will come back to it when I present my documentary evidence. Just to
refresh the witness’ memory about this letter, I will give the
underlying reasons for it. Schacht suggested to President Fraser that
now the moment...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from
Schacht to Leon Fraser as one banker writing to another. If you want to
claim that Mr. Fraser was influential with President Roosevelt, I should
want you to prove it; but I have no objection to the letter.
DR. DIX: The letter is dated 14 January 1946. I will not read it in its
entirety, for there are six long pages. Its contents are...
THE PRESIDENT: What date was it?
DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16 October 1939. It will be Exhibit
Number 31 in my document book. He writes that now would be an excellent
time to give peace to the world with President Roosevelt—that would be
a victory, also a German victory...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht?
DR. DIX: From Schacht to Fraser.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter?
DR. DIX: If the Tribunal prefers, Schacht can also deal with the letter.
In that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he
smuggled this letter into Switzerland.
[_Turning to the witness._] Please answer the question, Witness.
GISEVIUS: Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there.
DR. DIX: Very well. What did your group do to bring about peace, or
prevent the war from spreading? Did you undertake further activities in
foreign politics in that direction in your opposition group, that is,
your group of conspirators?
GISEVIUS: The main thing for us was with all possible means to prevent
the war from spreading. It could only spread toward Holland and Belgium
or Norway. We recognized clearly that if a step was taken in this
direction, the consequences, not only for Germany, but for the whole of
Europe would be tremendous. Therefore, we wanted to prevent war in the
West by all means.
Immediately after the Polish Campaign Hitler decided to move his troops
from the East to the West, and to launch the attack by violating the
neutrality of Holland and Belgium.
We believed that if we could succeed in preventing this attack in
November we would in the coming winter months gain enough time to
convince the individual generals, above all Brauchitsch and Halder and
the leaders of the army groups, that they must at least oppose the
expansion of the war.
Brauchitsch and Halder evaded the question and said it was now too late,
that the enemy would fight Germany to the end and destroy her. We did
not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still
possible, and by honor I mean that we would of course eliminate the Nazi
hierarchy to the last man. In order to prove to the generals that the
foreign powers did not wish to destroy the German people, but wanted
only to protect themselves against the Nazi terror, we took all possible
steps abroad. The first attempt in that direction, or a small part of
that attempt, was the letter written by Schacht to Fraser, the object of
which was to point out that certain domestic political developments were
imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, if we could come
through the winter, we could perhaps persuade the generals to undertake
a revolt.
DR. DIX: Thank you. May I interrupt you for a moment? I would like to
call the attention of the Tribunal now to the fact that the witness is
referring to a passage, to a suggestion, contained in the letter. This
letter is in English. I have no German translation, and I must therefore
read this sentence in English. “My feeling is that the earlier
discussions be opened, the easier it will be to influence the
development of certain existing conditions.” The question is now...
Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean by the “certain
existing conditions” that were to be influenced? Did he mean your
efforts?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure
whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is
not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no
objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic
language, but I don’t think that this witness can interpret what Schacht
meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now
appears. I don’t want to be over technical about this, but it does seem
to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr.
Schacht himself.
DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is right, but this witness said
that he smuggled the letter into Switzerland, and I assume that he
discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and was therefore in a
position to explain the cryptic words.
THE PRESIDENT: He didn’t say this yet; he hasn’t said he ever saw the
letter except the outside of it. He hasn’t said he ever saw the letter.
DR. DIX: Will you please tell us whether you saw the letter and knew its
contents?
GISEVIUS: I am sorry that I did not so clearly at once, but I helped in
drafting the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and
written.
DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.
DR. DIX: Will you please answer my question; what is meant by those
cryptic words?
GISEVIUS: We wanted to suggest that we, in Germany, were interested in
forcing certain developments and that we now expected an encouraging
word from the other side. I do not, however, want any misunderstanding
to arise here. In this letter it also states very clearly that President
Roosevelt had in the meantime been disappointed many times by the German
side, so that we had to beg, to urge him to take such a step. It is a
fact that President Roosevelt had taken various steps for peace.
DR. DIX: Let us go on now. If I give you the cue “Vatican Action”?...
GISEVIUS: In addition to this attempt to enter into discussions with
America, we believed we should ask for a statement from the British
Government. Again it was our aim solely to...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this
only given from memory?
DR. DIX: The original copy, yes; that is, a copy signed by Schacht is
here. It was kept during the war in Switzerland and was brought back to
us from Switzerland by this witness.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now, let us go on to the “Vatican Action.”
GISEVIUS: We tried in every possible way to prove to General Halder and
General Olbricht that their theory was wrong, that there could be no
longer a question of dealing with a decent German government. We
believed that we should now follow a particularly important and safe
road. The Holy Father made personal efforts in these matters, as the
British Government had, with justification, become uncertain whether
there really existed in Germany a trustworthy group of men with whom
talks could be undertaken. I remember that shortly afterwards the Venlo
incident took place when, with the excuse that there was a German
opposition group, officials of the English Secret Service were kidnapped
at the Dutch border. Therefore, we were anxious to prove that there was
a group here which was honestly trying to do its best and which, if the
occasion arose, would stand by its word under all circumstances. I
believe that we kept our word regarding the things we proposed to do,
while we said quite frankly that we could not bring about this revolt as
we had said previously we hoped to do.
These negotiations began in October—November 1939. They were only
concluded later in the spring, and if I am asked I will continue.
DR. DIX: Yes, please describe the conclusion.
GISEVIUS: I believe I must add first that, during November of 1939,
General Halder actually had intended a revolt, but that these intentions
for a revolt again came to naught because at the very last minute Hitler
called off the western offensive. Strengthened by the attitude of Halder
at that time, we believed that we should continue these discussions at
the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman’s agreement, on
the grounds of which I believe that I am entitled to state that we could
give the generals unequivocal proof that in the event of the overthrow
of the Hitler regime, an agreement could be reached with a decent civil
German government.
DR. DIX: Did you read the documents yourself, Doctor?
GISEVIUS: These were oral discussions which were then written down in a
comprehensive report. This report was read by the Ambassador Von Hassell
and by Dr. Schacht before it was given to Halder by General Thomas.
Halder was so taken aback by the contents that he gave this
comprehensive report to Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was
enraged and threatened to arrest the intermediary, General Thomas, and
thus this action which had every prospect of success, failed.
DR. DIX: Doctor, you have testified...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my
notebook are these: “That we knew that if Holland, Belgium, and the
other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and
we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren’t
prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with
honor, eliminating politics. We took all possible steps.” Well, now,
since I took these notes down, I think we spent nearly 10 minutes in
details, which are utterly irrelevant, about further negotiations. If
they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these
details about it?
DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such
importance, where he as well as the defendants’ counsel must always take
into account that people who are of a different opinion may say “these
are just generalities, we want facts and particulars,” then I cannot
forego having the witness testify at least in broad outline that, for
example, a detailed action had been undertaken through His Holiness in
the Vatican. If he merely says that the result of this action was a
comprehensive report, if with Halder and Brauchitsch the above
mentioned...
THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some
negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given, but all the
rest of it were unnecessary details.
DR. DIX: Anyway we have already concluded this chapter, Your Lordship.
[_Turning to the witness._] You have already testified that the revolt
which was planned for November did not occur because the western
offensive did not take place. Therefore, we need not pursue this subject
any further. I would merely like to ask you at this point: Did your
group of conspirators remain inactive during the winter, and
particularly during the spring, or were further plans followed and acted
upon?
GISEVIUS: Constant attempts were made to influence all generals within
our reach. Besides Halder and Brauchitsch we tried to reach the generals
of the armored divisions in the West. I remember, for instance, there
was a discussion between Schacht and General Hoeppner.
DR. DIX: Hoeppner?
GISEVIUS: Hoeppner. We also tried to influence Field Marshal Rundstedt,
Bock, and Leeb. Here, too, General Thomas and Admiral Canaris were the
intermediaries.
DR. DIX: And how did the generals react?
GISEVIUS: When everything was ready, they would not start.
DR. DIX: Now, we come to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The
aerial offensive against England is imminent. Tell us about your group
of conspirators and their activity during this period and the period
following.
GISEVIUS: After the fall of Paris, our group had no influence at all for
months. Hitler’s success deluded everyone, and it took much effort on
our part, through all channels available, to try at least to prevent the
bombardment of England. Here again the group made united efforts and we
tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others, to prevent
this evil.
DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly, when you use the word “group”
you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht collaborated?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. DIX: Now, at that time did Schacht have several talks, or one talk,
along the same line in Switzerland?
GISEVIUS: That was a little later. We have now come to the year 1941,
and on this trip to Switzerland Schacht tried to urge that a peace
conference should be held as soon as possible. We knew that Hitler was
thinking about the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do
everything to avert at least this disaster. With this thought in mind
Schacht’s discussions in Switzerland were conducted. I myself took part
in arranging a dinner in Basel with the president of the B. I. Z., Mr.
McKittrick, an American, and I was present when Schacht tried to express
at least the opinion that everything possible must now be done to
initiate negotiations.
DR. DIX: In this connection I would respectfully like to remind the
Tribunal of the article in the _Basler Nachrichten_, of which I
presented the essential contents when we discussed the admissibility of
the document. It deals with a similar conversation between Schacht and
an American economist. That is the same trip which the witness is now
discussing. I will take the liberty of referring to this article later,
when presenting documentary evidences.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now, the war continued. Do you have anything
to say about Russia; about the imminent war with Russia?
GISEVIUS: I can say only that Schacht knew of all the many attempts
which we undertook to avert this catastrophe.
DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done
by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war?
GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals
to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one
when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This
catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been
predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of
1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which
could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of
Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a
military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from
Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can
only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact
was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the
West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus
capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to
plan, was to start the revolt in the East.
DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff attempt?
GISEVIUS: No, a little later.
DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have
always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by
Schacht, Goerdeler, _et cetera_, as a revolt movement, that is, a group
which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more
aim at an assassination?
GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we
realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on
we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination.
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the
German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I must object at this point to the
testimony of the witness. The witness, Dr. Gisevius, by his testimony
has incriminated the group which I represent. However, some of this
testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact.
Furthermore, he has just testified that the field marshals in the East
had “deserted” the group of conspirators. These statements are opinions
which the witness is giving, but they are not facts, to which the
witness must limit his testimony, and therefore I ask—Mr. President, I
have not yet finished. I wanted to conclude with the request for a
resolution by the Court that the testimony given by the witness, where
he asserted that the generals had “deserted” the group of conspirators,
be stricken from the record.
DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly? I cannot agree with the opinion of
my esteemed colleague Dr. Laternser that the statement “the generals
deserted us” was not a statement of fact...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to hear further argument upon it.
It certainly won’t be stricken from the record until we have had time to
consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining
this witness, and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to.
DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I make the motion for the reason
that the witness is giving testimony which is beyond his scope as a
witness, and that he is giving his opinion, then to that extent it is
inadmissible testimony which would have to be stricken from the record.
THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be
perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn’t make the evidence
inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have been misunderstood. I did not say,
and I am not basing my request to strike the testimony from the record
on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay; but I
say that it is not a statement of fact, but an opinion which the witness
is giving when he says that “the generals in the East deserted the group
of conspirators.”
DR. DIX: May I answer briefly to that? If I try to influence a group of
generals to organize a revolt and if they do not do so, that is a fact
and I can state this fact with the words, “They deserted us.” Naturally
I can also say, “They did not revolt,” but that is merely a matter of
expression. Both are facts and not an opinion. He is not appraising the
behavior of the generals in an ethical, military, or political sense, he
is merely pointing out, “They were not willing.”
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] If I recall correctly, you were
just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators’ group
changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further?
GISEVIUS: You had asked me about the first step in this direction after
Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able to win over
another general to a revolt. It was said at that time that there was now
nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world from the
tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after this decision, preparations
were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen and Lahousen furnished the bombs
from his arsenal. The bombs were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at
Smolensk, and with every possible means we tried to bring about the
assassination, which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler
was visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did
not explode. This was in the spring of 1943.
DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which as a result
of further developments, strongly affected Schacht’s further attitude
and also your remaining in Germany. Will you please describe that?
GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what was
happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General
Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was now
started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first day of
this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number of his
collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris was also
dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain in Germany and
thus this group, which until now had in a certain sense been the
directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated.
DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was also
relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did you
meet Schacht after that time?
GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter of
dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that
that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as the
letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we wondered
whether he was also going to be arrested.
DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter
into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it to him. This
letter—I mean Schacht’s letter of dismissal signed by Lammers—has
already been read into the record and is probably contained in my
document book.
[_Turning to the witness._] You were in Switzerland at that time, but on
20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen?
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944?
DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are rapidly
approaching the end now.
GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris-Oster circle
we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At that time Colonel
Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He replaced Oster in all
activities, and when after several months, and after many unsuccessful
attempts and discussions, the time finally arrived in July 1944, I
returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate in the events.
DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted
assassination?
GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw only
Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly at this
time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and myself were
to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect lives by not
burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge.
DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question.
You know that Schacht had after all held high government positions under
the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your testimony today were
an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can also be
seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How do
you explain this fact which at first sight seems to be contradictory in
itself?
GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal opinion and
I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I would like to
emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing not only to me but
to my friends as well; Schacht was always a problem and a puzzle to us.
Perhaps it was due to the contradictory nature of this man that he kept
his position in the Hitler government for so long. He undoubtedly
entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons, and I would like to
testify here that the moment his disappointment became obvious he
decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite
Schacht’s many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my
friends and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his
exceptional personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man
of strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but also
of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, why we
considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I can say that
the doubts which I often had about him were completely dispelled during
the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At that time he really fought, and
I will never forget that. It is a pleasure for me to be able to testify
to this here.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning of this
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants counsel want to
ask questions of the witness?
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday you said that you
were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for how long were you a member?
GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left that
organization in 1933.
HERR BÖHM: You know the mentality of the members of the Stahlhelm. You
know that, almost without exception, they were people who had served in
the first World War, and I would like to ask you now whether the
internal and foreign political goals of the Stahlhelm were to be reached
by its members in a legal or in a revolutionary manner?
GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the legal way.
HERR BÖHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the Treaty of
Versailles which every organization with national tendencies took up, to
be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or means of force?
GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire Stahlhelm, but
I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm organization
with whom I was acquainted, knew that the Stahlhelm wanted to take the
legal way.
HERR BÖHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 hundreds
of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the Stahlhelm
organization?
GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in Germany,
the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced this
growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at public meetings, from
1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: That those who did not
want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately entered the Stahlhelm so
that within the German rightist movement there would be a counterbalance
against the rising “brown” tide. That was the underlying reason of our
recruitment for the Stahlhelm at that time.
HERR BÖHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the Stahlhelm
organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it possible at that
time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say “no,” or to
protest against being taken over into the SA?
GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was possible also
in the Third Reich.
HERR BÖHM: What would have been the possible consequences of such a
step?
GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent discussion
with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that time I was no
longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely say that it
undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many people, particularly
those living in the country, to refuse being transferred to the SA.
After they had been betrayed by their leader, Minister Seldte, or as it
was said at that time “sold” to the SA, refusal to transfer to the SA
was naturally a sign of open distrust toward National Socialism.
HERR BÖHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former members of
the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former members of the
Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a foreign body in it and
were in constant opposition to the NSDAP and the SA. Is that correct?
GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, I can
only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm felt very
uneasy in their new surroundings.
HERR BÖHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934
and from 1934, participated in Crimes against Peace, against the Jews,
against the Church, and so forth?
GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that.
HERR BÖHM: Now I would also like to question you about the SA as far as
you are able to give information. Yesterday at least you expressed
yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I would like to ask you,
in replying to a question I shall now ask, to confine yourself to a
circle of SA members which lies between the simple SA man and the
Standartenführer or the Brigadeführer. Could you tell from the attitude
and activity of the ordinary SA man and that of the Standartenführer or
Brigadeführer—and I do not go beyond that limit because I well remember
the statements you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenführer or
Obergruppenführer—that these people intended to commit Crimes against
Peace?
GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a general
question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA men, I can only
say no.
HERR BÖHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA
men were also put into concentration camps?
GISEVIUS: I saw that many times. In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that was in
the years when it was my official duty to deal with these matters, many
SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, or at least
tortured, and put into concentration camps.
HERR BÖHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone outside for that
matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity of its members, or
from individual cases, and gather that the SA intended to commit Crimes
against Peace?
GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the High Command
of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover whether or not Hitler
was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute to a simple SA man
knowledge of something which we ourselves did not know for certain.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and
the German people to war. Did you observe anything of that nature? You
were a member of the Gestapo and such activities could not have escaped
your notice.
GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I do not know
to what extent certain songs, and other things, can be considered a
preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine that the mass of the
SA was of a different frame of mind than the mass of the German people
in the years up to 1938, and the general trend of opinion beyond a doubt
was that the mere thought of war was absolute madness.
HERR BÖHM: Was there anything that made you think that the SA intended
to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had committed such crimes?
GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must say “no”
again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could not say to
what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting all the
horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority undoubtedly
did not know of such things and were not trained for them.
HERR BÖHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were made by a
number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed for which these
people certainly should be punished.
You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary period
and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate or to give a
proportional figure as to what percentage of the numerous members of the
SA conducted themselves in a punishable manner? I call your attention to
the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Böhm. The Tribunal doesn’t think that
is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of
this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view.
HERR BÖHM: However the explanation of this question would be very
important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness who was outside
the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was perhaps one of the few people
who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into
them, and he will certainly be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly
well what criminal procedures were carried out and also—and that is
what I want to say—the number of members of the SA, and he is one of
the few who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that
if the witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given
by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this
witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such
evidence, and the question is denied.
HERR BÖHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in
opposition to the SA?
GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a number of SA
members were arrested by the Gestapo.
HERR BÖHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings were taken against
the members of the SA, and possibly how many?
GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way.
HERR BÖHM: Yes.
GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed misdeeds in the SA
and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must answer in this way.
HERR BÖHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand to the entire
SA?
GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again.
HERR BÖHM: Do you know under what circumstances one could resign from
the SA?
GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all organizations
of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision to make.
HERR BÖHM: Thank you. I have no further question.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr.
Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a
military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that
discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made,
and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the
field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators.
I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can
understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had
deserted the conspiracy group.
GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to
contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent
messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with
General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw with my own eyes General
Von Manstein’s answer of the year 1942. To Beck’s strictly military
explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply
only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost.
Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic
questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another
attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von
Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of
Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the
headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von
Manstein to our side.
At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he,
in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions reached a point
when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal
Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the
Führer’s headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special
telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel,
between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I
myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even
today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that
Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had allowed himself to be
persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed
himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic
concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I
would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: “We were
deserted.”
DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in this special
connection?
GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal Von
Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, and
therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a revolt in
the West. We had made further definite agreements with the Military
Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. In addition, as on
20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent of armored troops in
the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, those commanders of the troops who
were to participate in the action had been assembled in the OKW.
DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad?
GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt.
DR. LATERNSER: Please continue.
GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which were
necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story of the
revolts against the Third Reich.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military
revolt was not carried through?
GISEVIUS: What was that?
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was
intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through?
GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus
capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of
generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would
issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and
to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of
the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue
had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no
further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to
circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more
and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military
obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme
military command in Berlin.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you
know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to
oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler?
GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life
considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day of
his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely
taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. He told me that
he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was
announced that an oath of allegiance was to be given to the new head of
State; that unexpectedly a new form of oath was to be used. Beck could
never rid himself of the awful thought that at that time he perhaps
should not have given his oath. He told me that while he was on his way
home, he said to a comrade, “This is the blackest day of my life.”
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned that
between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, or with the
beginning of the Western campaign, a further military Putsch was to be
attempted, and that this Putsch failed because Halder and Field Marshal
Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the term “shirked” previously in
your testimony. Now I ask you to tell me on the basis of what facts did
you arrive at this opinion that both these generals shirked...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to
us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to these Putsche, and
threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was all admissible here in our
view only as bearing on the attitude of the Defendant Schacht. We are
not trying these generals for being in a Putsch or not being in a
Putsch. For all purposes it is just as well as they should not be in a
Putsch. I do not know what purposes this can have in doing it over
again. I call the Tribunal’s attention for the limited purpose for which
this historical matter was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no
purpose in this connection to review it.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this matter and
testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and I cannot
establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness with “shirked”
is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am obliged to clarify
this point. In a general sense I would like to add further that the
Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. I refer to the
contention of the French Prosecutor in which he stated that in the light
of all these circumstances it was beyond comprehension why Halder, as
well as the entire German nation, did not rise as one man against the
regime. Therefore, if I start from the viewpoint of the Prosecution,
then my question on this point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of
importance, and I, therefore, ask that this question be permitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is that they were a
criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say
that they planned an aggressive war, or that they committed War Crimes
or Crimes against Humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well,
whether or not they took part, or were planning to take part in a Putsch
to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions.
DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, Mr. President,
that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; but on the
other hand...
THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I
say that it was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not
think that any of these questions are relevant.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one final
question.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, can you tell me the names of those
generals who participated on the 20th of July?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the
High Command?
DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated in a
conspiracy. The question...
THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High
Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal
organization within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only
question with which we are going to deal as far as you are concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW are accused
of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as I am trying to do
with this question, that on the contrary, instead of participating in a
conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part in an action against the
regime, then the answer to this question on this point indicates that
precisely the opposite was the case; and, for that reason, I ask that
the question be permitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in
July 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they
were in September 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they
took part, either before or in September 1939.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of the
Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the
conspiracy continued. It cannot be inferred, from testimony by the
Prosecution or from anything that has been submitted, that the
conspiracy was to have stopped at a certain period of time. So that the
answer to this question would be of importance, I believe of decisive
importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: I would like to add that it is precisely for the members
of the group I represent that the period of time between 1938 and May
1940 is considered decisive.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group changed; therefore, they might be
different in 1944?
DR. LATERNSER: I wish to add that a particularly large number of the
members of this group only joined it in the course of 1944 because of
their official positions, and I do consider this point important.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, my question was: Can you give me the names of
those generals who participated in the attempted assassination of the
20th of July 1944?
GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Beck, General Field Marshal Von Witzleben,
General Olbricht, General Hoeppner.
DR. LATERNSER: One question: General Hoeppner was previously
commander-in-chief of an armored army?
GISEVIUS: I believe so; General Von Haase, and certainly a large number
of other generals whom I cannot enumerate offhand. Here I have mentioned
only the names of those who were at Bendlerstrasse that afternoon.
DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness: Do you know whether Field Marshal
Rommel also participated on the 20th of July 1944?
GISEVIUS: I cannot answer by merely saying “yes,” for it is a fact that
Rommel, as well as Field Marshal Von Kluge, did participate. However, it
would give a wrong picture if Field Marshal Rommel were suddenly to
appear in the category of those who fought against Hitler. Herr Rommel,
as a typical Party general, sought to join us very late, and it gave us
a very painful impression when suddenly Herr Rommel in the face of his
own military catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated,
and then, if possible, Göring and Himmler as well. And, even then, he
did not want to join in at the first opportunity, but wanted to stay
somewhat in the background in order to allow us to profit by his
popularity later on. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know
whether these gentlemen, when they joined our group, came as the fallen
might, as people who wished to save their pensions, or as people who,
from the beginning, stood for decency and honor.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you yourself ever speak to Field Marshal Rommel about
this?
GISEVIUS: No. I never considered it worth while to make his
acquaintance.
DR. LATERNSER: A further question: Did officers of the General Staff
participate in the 20th of July?
GISEVIUS: Yes, a great number.
DR. LATERNSER: About how many would you say?
GISEVIUS: I cannot give you the number, for at that time I was not
informed of how many of the General Staff Stauffenberg had on his side.
I do not doubt that Stauffenberg, Colonel Hansen, and several other
stout-hearted men had discovered a number of clean, courageous officers
among the General Staff, and that they could count on the support of
very many decent members of the General Staff, but whom they naturally
could not initiate into their plans beforehand.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that will be sufficient for this point. Another
question has occurred to me. You mentioned General Von Tresckow
previously. Did you know General Von Tresckow personally?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about the fact that, after he
learned that the commissar decree had been issued, General Von Tresckow
remonstrated with Rundstedt and that these remonstrances contributed to
the fact that the commissar decree was not passed on in General Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt’s sector?
GISEVIUS: Tresckow belonged to our group for many years. There was no
action which made us so ashamed as this one, and from the very start he
courageously called the attention of his superiors to the
inadmissibility of such terrible decrees. I remember how at that time we
learned of the famous commissar decree at first through hearsay, and we
immediately sent a courier to Tresckow to inform him simply of the
intention of such an outrage, and how after the decree had been
published, Tresckow, at a given signal, remonstrated with General Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt in the way you described.
THE PRESIDENT: You said a while ago that you were just going to ask your
last question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep to that. A
number of questions arose from the testimony of the witness, but this
was my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to
ask any questions of the witness?
[_There was no response._]
Then do the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I have a few questions
to put to you, Dr. Gisevius, and if you will answer them as nearly as
possible, “yes” or “no,” as you are capable of giving a truthful answer,
you will save a great deal of time.
The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is
it not a fact that within 2 months of the surrender of Germany I met you
at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your experiences in the conspiracy
that you have related here?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were later brought here, and after coming
here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well as by the counsel for
Frick and for Schacht?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, your attitude and viewpoint are, as I
understand you, those of a German who felt that loyalty to the German
people required continuous opposition to the Nazi regime. Is that a
correct statement of your position?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a very large experience in police
matters in Germany.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Putsche or other moves to obtain power in
Germany were successful, it was planned that you would be in charge of
the police in the reorganization, was it not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Either as Minister of the Interior or as Police
Commissioner, whatever it might be called.
GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the belief that it was not
necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps and with Gestapo
methods; is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found all of the ways of presenting your
viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo methods which were
used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that there was no way open to you to obtain any
change in German policy except through revolt or assassination, or means
of that kind?
GISEVIUS: No. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning of 1938
the position could have been changed in Germany by a majority of votes
in the Reich Cabinet or through pressure by the Armed Forces.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you fix 1937 as the time when it ceased to be
possible by peaceful means to effect a change in Germany; is that
correct?
GISEVIUS: That is how I would judge it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was not until after 1937 that Schacht
joined your group; is that not a fact?
GISEVIUS: Yes, as I said, the group was not formed until 1937, 1938; but
Schacht had already introduced me to Goerdeler in 1936, and Schacht and
Oster had known each other since 1936. And naturally Schacht had also
known a large number of other members of the group for a long time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But Schacht did not become convinced, as I
understand your statement to us, until after 1937—until the Putsch
affair—that he wouldn’t be able to handle Hitler in some peaceful way;
is that not correct?
GISEVIUS: In what manner? In a peaceful manner or...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In a peaceful manner.
GISEVIUS: Yes, until the end of 1937 Schacht believed that it ought to
be possible to remove Hitler legally.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But by the end of 1937, as you now say, the
possibility of a peaceful removal of Hitler had become impossible in
fact?
GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what we thought.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; now, there was, as I understand your view in
going to the general—there was no power in Germany that could stop or
deal with the Gestapo, except the Army.
GISEVIUS: Yes. I would answer that question in the affirmative.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, in addition to the Gestapo, this Nazi
regime also had a private army in the SS, did they not? And, for a
period, in the SA?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if you were to combat successfully the Nazi
regime, you had to have manpower which only the Army had; is that right?
GISEVIUS: Yes, only people who could be found in the Army; but at the
same time we also attempted to influence certain people in the Police,
and we needed all the decent officials in the ministries, and the broad
masses of the people altogether.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the Wehrmacht was the source of power capable
of dealing with the SS and the Gestapo if the generals had been willing?
GISEVIUS: That was our conviction.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the reason you kept seeking the help of
the generals and felt let down when they wouldn’t give you their
assistance finally?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when everybody connected
with your group knew that the war was lost.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was before these plots on Hitler’s life,
and it was apparent before the Schlaberndorff plot and before the July
20th plot, that the war was lost, was it not?
GISEVIUS: I should like to make it quite clear that there was no one in
our group who did not already know, even when the war started, that
Hitler would never win this war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it became very much more apparent as time went
on, not only that the war could not be won by Germany, but that Germany
was going to be physically destroyed as a result of the war; is that not
true?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yet, under the system which the Nazi regime had
installed, you had no way of changing the course of events in Germany
except by assassination or a revolt; is that true?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And so you resorted to those extreme measures,
knowing that Hitler could never make peace with the Allies; is that
true?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in this was to save Germany the
last destroying blows, which unfortunately she received, from the point
of view of the Germans; is that not a fact?
GISEVIUS: I should like to say that actually since the beginning of the
war, we no longer thought only of Germany. I think that I may say that
we bore a heavy share of responsibility towards Germany and towards the
world.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what you were endeavoring to do was to get
the war to an end, since you had not been able to stop its commencement,
were you not?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was impossible as long as Hitler was at
the head of the government and this group of men behind him?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there was another plot on Hitler’s life that
you haven’t mentioned. Was there not a bomb that was later found to have
been a communist bomb?
GISEVIUS: This happened on 9 November 1939, in the Bürgerbräukeller, in
Munich. It was a brave Communist who acted independently.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at none of these times when Hitler’s life was
endangered, by a strange coincidence, was Göring or Himmler ever
present; is that not true?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you attach any importance to that fact?
GISEVIUS: We sometimes regretted it. For instance, the attempt at
assassination would perhaps have succeeded, if Göring and Himmler had
been with Hitler on 17 July. But as the years went by, the members of
this clique separated to such an extent, and protected themselves so
much that they could hardly be found together anywhere. Göring, too, was
gradually so absorbed in his transactions and art collections at
Karinhall that he was hardly ever to be found at a serious conference.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the assassination of Hitler would have
accomplished nothing from your point of view if the Number 2 man had
stepped into Hitler’s place, would it?
GISEVIUS: That was a debatable problem for a long time, because
Brauchitsch, for instance, imagined that we could create a transitional
regime with Göring. Our group always refused to come together with that
man even for an hour.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you plan—if you were successful—to deal
with the other defendants here, with the exception of the Defendant
Schacht, all of whom, I understand, you regard as a part of the Nazi
government?
GISEVIUS: These gentlemen would have been behind lock and key in an
extremely short time, and I think they would not have had to wait long
for their sentences.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, does that apply to every man in this dock with
the exception of Schacht?
GISEVIUS: Yes, every man.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, you recognized them, your group recognized
them all as parts and important parts of the Nazi regime—a Nazi
conspiracy. Is that a fact?
GISEVIUS: I should not like to commit myself to the words “Nazi
conspiracy.” We considered them the men responsible for all the
unspeakable misery which that government had brought to Germany and the
world.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to ask you a few questions about the
Gestapo. You had testified generally in reference to the crimes which
were committed by that organization and I ask you to state whether that
included the torturing and burning to death of a large number of
persons?
GISEVIUS: The question does not seem to have come through correctly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you as to the crimes committed by the
Gestapo, and I am asking if it included the torturing and burning to
death of thousands of persons?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it involve the unlawful detention of thousands
of innocent people?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The throwing of them into concentration camps where
they were tortured and beaten and killed?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo engage in wholesale confiscation of
property?
GISEVIUS: Yes, to a very large extent; they called it “property of
persons hostile to the State.”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did it practice extortion against Jews and
against others?
GISEVIUS: In masses and by the million.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo hinder and molest the public
officials, who were too prominent to be murdered, until they resigned or
were driven from office?
GISEVIUS: The Gestapo used every means, from murder to the extortion
which has just been described.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question arises here as to whether the
members of the Gestapo knew what the Gestapo was doing; and will you
please tell the Tribunal what the situation was as to the membership in
that organization and its knowledge of its program?
GISEVIUS: I have already stated at the beginning of my testimony that
from the first or second day every member of the Gestapo really could
not help seeing and knowing what took place in that institution.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were some people who were taken into the
Gestapo at the beginning, who were transferred from other branches of
the civil service, were they not; who were in a sense involuntary
members of the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: Yes; these members were eliminated in the course of the first
year as being politically unreliable.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the transfer took place at the time Göring set
up the Gestapo, did it not?
THE PRESIDENT: What did the witness mean by “eliminated”?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think eliminated from the Gestapo.
GISEVIUS: Gradually they were released from the service of the Gestapo.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after the purge of the 30th of June 1934, were
special pains taken to see that no one was permitted in the organization
who was not in sympathy with its program?
GISEVIUS: These attempts started after 1 April 1934, when Himmler and
Heydrich took over affairs. Actually, from that date, no official was
allowed into the Gestapo any longer unless Himmler and Heydrich
considered that he held the opinions which they desired. It may be that
during the first months some officials, who had not yet been screened by
the SS, may have got in. The Gestapo was, of course, a large
organization and it naturally took quite a time until the SS had
educated and trained their own criminal officials.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, did there come a time, and if so, will you
fix it as nearly as possible, after which every member of the Gestapo
must have known the criminal program of that organization?
GISEVIUS: For many years I have considered that question myself and
discussed it with Nebe and my friends. The reply entails very great
responsibility, and in the knowledge of that responsibility I would say
that from the beginning of 1935, at the latest, everyone must have known
what sort of organization he was joining and the type of orders he might
have to expect.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified as to the investigations which
you made when you were connected with the police administration and you
mentioned the Reichstag fire but you did not tell us what your findings
were when you investigated that. Will you please tell us?
GISEVIUS: To speak briefly and to begin with the facts, we ascertained
that Hitler in a general way had expressed a wish for a large-scale
propaganda campaign. Goebbels undertook to prepare the necessary
proposals and it was Goebbels who first thought of setting the Reichstag
on fire. Goebbels discussed this with the leader of the Berlin SA
Brigade, Karl Ernst, and he suggested in detail how it should be done.
A certain chemical, known to every maker of fireworks, was chosen. After
spraying it, it ignites after a certain time—hours or minutes. In order
to get inside the Reichstag, one had to go through the corridor leading
from the palace of the Reichstag President to the Reichstag itself. Ten
reliable SA men were provided, and then Göring was informed of all the
details of the plan, so that by chance he did not make an election
speech on that particular evening, but at such a late hour would still
be sitting at his desk in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin.
Göring—and he gave assurances that he would do so—was to put the
police on wrong trails in the first confusion. From the very beginning
it was intended that the Communists should be accused of this crime, and
the 10 SA men who had to carry out the crime were instructed
accordingly.
That is, in a few words, the story of the events. To tell you how we got
hold of the details, I have only to add that one of these 10 who had to
spray the chemical was a notorious criminal. Six months later he was
dismissed from the SA, and when he did not receive the reward which he
had been promised he decided to tell what he knew to the Reich Court
sitting in Leipzig at the time. He was taken before an examining
magistrate who made a record of his statement, but the Gestapo heard of
it and the letter to the Reich Court was intercepted and destroyed. The
SA man, named Rail, who betrayed the plan, was murdered in a vile manner
with the knowledge of the Defendant Göring, by order of Gestapo chief
Diels. Through the finding of the body, we picked up the threads of the
whole story.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What happened to the 10 SA men who carried out the
Reichstag fire? Are any of them alive now?
GISEVIUS: As far as we are aware none of them are still alive. Most of
them were murdered on 30 June under the pretext of the Röhm revolt. Only
one, a certain Heini Gewaehr, was taken over by the police as a police
officer, and we tracked him down as well. He was killed in the war,
while a police officer on the Eastern Front.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you testified that you also investigated,
with the entire affair of Röhm, the murders that followed the Röhm
affair. Didn’t you so testify?
GISEVIUS: I cannot actually say that we carried out the investigation,
as we, of the Ministry of the Interior, had really been excluded from
the entire affair. However, matters were such that after 30 June, all
the appeals for help, and all the complaints of the people who were
affected reached us in the Ministry of the Interior; and during 30 June,
through the continual radio messages, incidental visits to Göring’s
palace, and the information received from Nebe, we discovered all the
details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, about how many people were killed in that
purge?
GISEVIUS: We have never been able to establish the number exactly, but I
estimate that no more than 150 to 200 persons lost their lives, which,
at that time, was an enormous figure.
I myself with Minister of Justice Gürtner checked the list of the number
of the dead which had been given him by Hitler and Göring, and we
ascertained that the list which contained the names of 77 dead, who had
allegedly been justly killed, was exceeded by nearly double that number
only by those names which we had received through the prosecuting
authorities, or through the appeals for help coming from relatives to
the Ministry of the Interior.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ascertain who selected the men who
were killed in that purge?
GISEVIUS: To begin with we ascertained that Himmler, Heydrich, and
Göring had compiled exact lists of those to be murdered; for I myself
heard in Göring’s palace—and it was confirmed by Daluege who was
present, and also by Nebe who was present from the very first
second—that not one of those who were killed was mentioned by name;
instead they just said: “Number so and so is now gone,” or, “Number so
and so is still missing,” and “It will soon be Number so and so’s turn.”
There is, however, no doubt that Heydrich and Himmler also had a special
list. On that special list there were several Catholics, Klausner, and
others. I cannot, for instance, say here under oath whether Schleicher
was murdered by order of Göring, or whether he was a man who was on
Heydrich’s and Himmler’s special list.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was the Defendant Frick fully informed as to
the facts which you knew about the illegal conduct of the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: Yes. I had to submit to him all the material that arrived
which was important, and I have already described that we reported all
these matters to the Secret State Police or to the Ministries of the
Interior of the Länder. Naturally I could submit only the most important
of these things to Frick personally. I estimate that I received several
hundred such complaints daily, but the most important had to be
submitted to Frick, because he had to sign them personally; for Göring
always complained as soon as he saw that such a young official signed
reports and appeals to the Ministry and to himself.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was Frick informed of your conclusions about
the Röhm purge?
GISEVIUS: Yes, because on the Sunday, while the murders were continuing,
I spoke to Frick about the murder of Strasser, Klausner, Schleicher and
the many other murders; and Frick was particularly disgusted at the
murder of Strasser, because he considered that an act of personal
revenge by Göring and Himmler. Likewise, Frick was extremely indignant
about the murders of Klausner, Bose, Edgar Jung, and the many other
innocent men who were murdered.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when Frick signed the decree, along with
Hitler, declaring these murders legitimate and ordering no prosecutions
on account of those murders, Frick knew exactly what had happened from
you; is that the fact?
GISEVIUS: He knew it from me, and he had seen it for himself. The story
of the 30th of June was undoubtedly known to Frick.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Frick ever talk with you about Himmler and
Heydrich as being bad and dangerous, cruel persons?
GISEVIUS: On that Sunday, the 1st of July, Frick said to me, “If Hitler
does not very soon do to the SS and Himmler what he has done to the SA
today, he will experience far worse things with the SS than he has
experienced now with the SA.”
I was greatly struck by that prediction at the time, and by the fact
that Frick should speak so openly to me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But notwithstanding the estimate he made of those
men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter appoint them both in his
Ministry of Interior?
GISEVIUS: Well, of course, they were actually appointed by Hitler.
However, I can only say that when I took leave of Frick, at the time I
left the Ministry of the Interior in May 1935, Frick told me literally
that the constant difficulties he had had because of me had taught him
from now on to take Party members only in his Ministry, and as far as
possible those who had the Golden Party Emblem. He said that it was
possible that in the course of events he might even be forced to allow
Himmler into his Ministry, but in no case would he accept the murderer
Heydrich. Those were the last words I exchanged with Frick.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both were put in charge of matters that were under
his legal control, were they not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of the Interior
and Frick remained their superior.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that those were the last words which you
exchanged with the Defendant Frick?
GISEVIUS: Yes. That was in 1935 and I have not met him or talked to him
since.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after 1934 Frick was the Minister in charge of
the running and controlling of concentration camps, was he not, Dr.
Gisevius?
GISEVIUS: In my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior was
responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the Reich and
therefore also for the concentration camps, and I do not believe that
one can say he had that responsibility only since 1934.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am willing to accept your amendment to my
question. I ask that you be shown Document Number 3751-PS of the United
States, which has not yet been offered in evidence.
[_The document was submitted to the witness._]
Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Gürtner, the Minister
of Justice, to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. That
would be from your friend Dr. Gürtner to Frick, would it not?
GISEVIUS: I believe I heard you say “friend.” During the time he acted
as Minister, Gürtner did not conduct himself in such a way that I could
consider him my friend.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, tell us about Gürtner. Tell us about
Gürtner’s position in this situation because we have a communication
here apparently from him.
GISEVIUS: Gürtner?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.
GISEVIUS: At that time Gürtner without doubt made many attempts to
expose the cruelty in the camps and to initiate criminal proceedings. In
individual cases Gürtner did make many attempts; but after the 30th of
June he signed that law which legalized all those dreadful things, and
also in other respects Gürtner never acted consistently with his views.
But this document which you submit to me was just such an attempt by
Gürtner and the many decent officials in the Ministry of Justice to
bring the question of the Gestapo terror to discussion. As far as I
recollect this is one of those letters which we discussed unofficially
beforehand in order to provoke an answer, so to say.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now desire to read some parts of this into the
record. It becomes Exhibit USA-828. I will offer it as such.
Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly quote:
“My dear Reich Minister!
“Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector of
the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935.
“This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental
attitude towards the question of corporal punishment for
internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have
come to the knowledge of the authorities of justice point to
three different reasons for such ill-treatment of prisoners:
“1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration camps.
“2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to
make them talk.
“3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer wantonness
or for sadistic motives.”
I think I will not take the Tribunal’s time to read his comment on
Number 1 or Number 2. About Number 3, you will find in the German text:
“The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that
the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally
lose all sense of the purpose and meaning of their action after
a short time, and permit themselves to be governed by personal
feelings of revenge, or sadistic tendencies. Thus members of the
guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow, near
Stettin, completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument
with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a
fashion that the woman 2 months later still showed two open and
infected wounds.”