GISEVIUS: Yes. There was a second case. That is this Pünder affair which

is mentioned here. He reacted similarly to both, and therefore it might

be better if I first relate the Pünder affair in this connection. It

concerned a Berlin attorney, who was a lawyer of high standing and legal

adviser to the Swedish Embassy. The widow of the Ministerial Director

Klausner, who had been murdered on 30 June, approached Pünder, as she

wanted to sue the life insurance companies for payment of her annuity.

But as Klausner had allegedly committed suicide on that day, no director

of any insurance company dared pay the money to the widow. Consequently,

the attorney had to sue. But the Nazis had made a law according to which

all such awkward cases—awkward for the Nazis—were not to be tried in

court: they were to be taken to a so-called Spruchkammer in the Reich

Ministry of the Interior. If I am not mistaken, this law was called “Law

for the Settlement of Civilian Claims.” They were never at a loss for

fine-sounding names and titles at that time. This law forced the

attorney to submit his claim to the court first. He was apprehensive. He

went to the Ministry of the Interior and told the State Secretary, “If I

comply with the law and sue, I shall be arrested.” The State Secretary

in the Ministry of the Interior forced him to sue. Thereupon the very

wise attorney went to the Ministry of Justice and told State Secretary

Freisler that he did not want to sue as he would certainly be arrested

by the Gestapo. The Secretary in the Ministry of Justice informed him

that he would have to send in a claim in any case, but that nothing

would happen as the courts had been instructed to pass such cases on

without comment to the Spruchkammer in the Ministry of the Interior.

Thereupon, the attorney sued and the Gestapo promptly arrested him for

slander because he had stated that the Ministerial Director Klausner had

not met his death by suicide. This was for us a classical example of

what we had come to in Germany as far as protective custody was

concerned.

I had taken the liberty of selecting this case from among hundreds, or I

should say thousands of similar cases and of suggesting to Frick that

this matter should be brought to the notice not only of Göring, but of

Hitler as well this time. Then I sat down and drafted a letter or a

report from Frick to Hitler, which also went to the Ministry of Justice.

There were more than five pages, and I discussed from every angle the

facts concerning Ministerial Director Klausner’s suicide, with the

assistance of the SS, and the ensuing lawsuit. This report to Hitler

concluded with Frick’s remark that the time had now come to have the

problem of protective custody settled by the Reich and by lawful means.

And now I answer your question regarding what happened. It roughly

coincided with Frick’s letter to Himmler regarding deprivation of

liberty. Himmler took these two letters to a meeting of Reichsleiter,

that is, the so-called ministers of the movement, and he put the

question to them, whether it was proper to allow one Reichsleiter,

namely Frick, to write such letters to another Reichsleiter, that is, to

Himmler. These worthy gentlemen answered this question in the negative

and reprimanded Frick. Then Himmler went to the meeting of the Prussian

cabinet where the protective custody law, which I mentioned, was being

discussed.

Perhaps I may draw your attention to the fact that at that time it was a

rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting of Prussian

ministers. There was a time in Germany—and it was quite a long

period—when Himmler was not the powerful man which he afterwards became

because the bourgeois ministers and the generals were cowards and gave

way to him. Thus, it was a rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to

attend a meeting of the Prussian Ministerial Council at all, and that

particular meeting ended by my being discharged from the Ministry of the

Interior.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to quote to you two sentences

from the memorandum which I have just shown to you—that is, 775-PS—and

ask you to tell me whether the facts are stated correctly. I quote:

“In this connection, I draw your attention to the case of the

attorney Pünder, who was taken into protective custody together

with his colleagues, merely because, after making inquiry at the

Reich Ministry of the Interior and at our ministry, he had filed

a suit, which he was obliged to do under a Reich law.”

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.

DR. PANNENBECKER: And then the other sentence. I quote:

“I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at

Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days

because...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, where is that sentence which you have

just read?

DR. PANNENBECKER: In the Frick Document Book under Number 34, second

sentence.

THE PRESIDENT: Which page?

DR. PANNENBECKER: In my Document Book it is Page 80.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Paragraph 3 on Page 70?

DR. PANNENBECKER: No, Mr. President, I have just discovered that this

particular sentence in the document has not been translated. Perhaps I

may read one more sentence which apparently has been translated. It can

be found in Paragraph 3 of the same document.

“I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at

Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days because,

as it turned out afterwards, he had sent a correct report to the

head of his district concerning abuses by the SS.”

GISEVIUS: Yes, that corresponds to the facts.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you yourself have any support from Frick

for your personal protection?

GISEVIUS: Yes. At that time, of course, I was such a suspect in the eyes

of the Secret State Police that all sorts of evil designs were being

made against me. Frick gave an order, therefore, that I should be

protected in my home by the local police. A direct telephone from my

home to the police station was installed, and I had only to pick up the

receiver and someone at least would know in case I had surprise

visitors. Furthermore, the Gestapo used their usual methods against me

by accusing me of criminal acts. Apparently the files were taken to

Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, and Frick intervened, and it was soon

discovered that this concerned a namesake of mine! Frick said quite

openly on the telephone that these fellows—as he put it—had once more

lied to the Führer. This was the signal for the Gestapo, who were, of

course, listening in on this telephone conversation, that they could no

longer use these methods.

Then we advanced one step further through Heydrich. He was so kind as to

inform me by telephone that I probably had forgotten that he could

pursue his personal and political opponents to their very graves. I made

an official report of that threat to Frick, and Frick, either personally

or through Daluege, intervened with Heydrich, and there is no doubt that

he thereby rendered me a considerable service, for Heydrich never liked

it very much when his murderous intentions were talked about openly.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, would then, at least a minister of the Reich

have no cause for alarm about his own personal safety if he tried to

fight against the terror of the Gestapo and Himmler?

GISEVIUS: If you ask me that now, I must say that Schacht was the only

one who was put into a concentration camp. But it is true that we all

asked ourselves just how long it would take for a Reich Minister to be

sent to a concentration camp. As regards Frick, he told me

confidentially, as far back as 1934, that the Reich Governor of Bavaria

had given him reliable information, according to which he was to be

murdered while taking a holiday in the country, in Bavaria, and he asked

me whether I could find out any details. At that time I went with my

friend Nebe to Bavaria by car, and we made a secret investigation which,

at any rate, proved that such plans had been discussed. But, as I said,

Frick survived.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I have no further questions.

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): May I ask you to decide

on the following question? I have called Gisevius. He is a witness

called by me, and this is, therefore, not a subsequent question which I

am putting, but I am examining him as my witness. I am of the opinion,

therefore, that it is right and expedient that I should now follow up

the examination by my colleague Pannenbecker, and that my other

colleagues who also want to put questions follow the two of us. I ask

the Tribunal to decide on this question.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you the only defendants’ counsel who asked for this

witness to be called on behalf of your client?

DR. DIX: I called him.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; but are you the only defendants’ counsel who

asked to call him?

DR. DIX: I believe, Sir, I am the only one who has called him.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may examine him next.

DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, Dr. Pannenbecker has already mentioned the fact

that you have published a book entitled _To the Bitter End_. I have

submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as evidence, and

they have been accepted as documentary evidence by the Tribunal. For

this reason I now ask you: Are the contents of that book historically

true; did you write it only from memory, or is it based on notes which

you made at the time?

GISEVIUS: I can say here to the best of my knowledge, and with a good

conscience, that the contents of the book are historically true. In

Germany I always made personal notes as far as it was possible. I have

said here that my dead friend Oster had in the War Ministry a

considerable collection of documents to which I had access at all times.

In writing about any important matter in which I made reference to

friends in the opposition group, I never did so without having first

consulted them many times about it. And since 1938 I have been in

Switzerland, first as a visitor and later on for professional reasons,

and there I was able to continue my notes undisturbed. The volume which

has been submitted to the Tribunal was practically completed in 1941,

and in 1942 had already been shown to several friends of mine abroad.

THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is enough.

DR. DIX: Since when have you known the Defendant Schacht?

GISEVIUS: I have known the Defendant Schacht since the end of 1934.

DR. DIX: On what occasion and in what circumstances did you meet him?

GISEVIUS: I met him when I worked in the Reich Ministry of the Interior

and was collecting material against the Gestapo. I was consulted by

various parties, who either feared trouble with the Gestapo or who had

had trouble. Thus, one day Schacht, who was then Minister for Economy,

sent a man to me whom he trusted—it was his plenipotentiary Herbert

Göring—to ask me whether I would help Schacht. He, Schacht, had for

some time felt that he was being watched by Himmler and the Gestapo and

lately had had good reason to suspect that an informer, or at least a

microphone, had been installed in his own house. I was asked whether I

could help in this case. I agreed to do so and, with a microphone expert

from the Reich post administration, on the following morning I visited

Schacht’s ministerial residence. We went with the microphone expert from

room to room and—did not have to search very long. It had been done

very badly by the Gestapo. They had mounted the microphone all too

visibly and, moreover, had engaged a domestic servant to spy on Schacht.

She had a listening device attached to the house telephone installed in

her own bedroom, which was easy to discover, and so we were able to

unmask the whole thing. It was on that occasion that I first spoke to

Schacht.

DR. DIX: And what was the subject of your conversation? Did you at that

time already speak about political matters to him?

GISEVIUS: We spoke about the matters and the somewhat peculiar situation

which had brought us together. Schacht knew that I was very active in

opposing the Gestapo, and I, for my part, was aware that Schacht was

known for his utterances against the SS and the Gestapo on numberless

occasions. Many middle class people in Germany placed their hopes in him

as the only strong minister who could protect them if need be.

Particularly the industrialists and business men, who were very

important at the time, hoped for, and often found his support. So that

it was quite natural that immediately during the first conversation I

told him everything that was troubling me.

The main problem at that time was the removal of the Gestapo and the

removal of the Nazi regime. Therefore our conversation was highly

political, and Schacht listened to everything with an open mind, which

made it possible for me to tell him everything.

DR. DIX: And what did he say?

GISEVIUS: I told Schacht that we were inevitably drifting towards

radicalism, and that it was doubtful whether, the way things were going,

the end of the present course would not be inflation, and, that being

so, whether it would not be better if he himself were to bring about

that inflation. That would enable him to know beforehand the exact date

of such a crisis, and together with the generals and anti-radical

ministers make timely arrangements to meet the situation when it became

really serious. I said to him, “You should bring about that inflation;

you yourself will then be able to determine the course of events instead

of allowing others to take things out of your hands.” He replied, “You

see, that is the difference which separates us: You want the crash, and

I do not want it.”

DR. DIX: From that, one might draw the conclusion that at that time

Schacht still believed that the crash could be averted. What reasons did

he give for this view?

GISEVIUS: I think that at the time the word “crash” was too strong for

him. Schacht was thinking along the traditional lines of former

governments, but he saw that here and there a change had come

about—especially since Brüning’s time—by emergency laws and certain

dictatorial measures. But as far as I could see at the time, and during

all our subsequent conversations, uppermost in his mind was still the

idea of a Reich government which met and passed resolutions, where the

majority of ministers were bourgeois, and where at a given moment—which

might be sooner or later—one might steer a radically changed course.

DR. DIX: What was his attitude towards Hitler at that time?

GISEVIUS: It was quite clear to me that at that time he still thought

very highly of Hitler. I might almost say that at that time Hitler was

to him a man of irreproachable integrity.

THE PRESIDENT: What time are you speaking of?

GISEVIUS: I am now speaking of the time of my first meetings with

Schacht, at the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935.

DR. DIX: What was your profession at that time? Where were you? Where

did you work?

GISEVIUS: I had succeeded in leaving the Reich Ministry of the Interior

in the meantime and had been transferred to the Reich Criminal Office,

which was in the process of being formed. When we realized that the

Gestapo were extending their power, we believed we could establish some

sort of police apparatus side by side with the Gestapo—that is, purely

criminal police. My friend Nebe had been made Chief of the Reich

Criminal Department to build up a police apparatus there which would

enable us to resist the Gestapo if need be. The Ministry of the Interior

gave me the task of organizing and sent me to this government office

about to be formed, to give advice for its establishment.

DR. DIX: We now slowly approach the year 1936—the year of the Olympic

Games. Did you have a special assignment there?

GISEVIUS: Yes. At the beginning of 1936 it was decided to make me Chief

of Staff of the police at the Central Police Department on the occasion

of the Olympic Games in Berlin. That was an entirely nonpolitical and

technical affair. Count Helldorf, who was then Commissioner of the

Police, thought that because of my connections with the Ministry of the

Interior and the Ministry of Justice this would be useful. But I was

quickly removed from this position. Heydrich discovered it and

intervened.

DR. DIX: Your book contains a letter from Heydrich, which I do not

propose to read in its entirety. It is addressed to Count Helldorf and

calls his attention to the fact that, during the time of your office at

the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, you always put every possible

difficulty in the way of the Secret State Police, and that relations

with you had been extremely unpleasant. He continues:

“I fear that his participation in the police preparations for

the Olympic Games, even in this sphere, would not promote

co-operation with the Secret State Police, and it should,

therefore, be considered whether Gisevius should not be replaced

by another suitable official. Heil Hitler. Yours, Heydrich.”

Is that the letter which affected your position?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the reason why I was also dismissed from that

job. I had to wait only a few more weeks and Himmler became the Chief of

Police in the Reich. And on the very day that Himmler became the Reich

Police Chief I was definitely removed from any kind of police service.

DR. DIX: And where did you go?

GISEVIUS: After my discharge from the police service I was sent to the

government in Münster, where I was assigned to the price control office.

DR. DIX: Could you, while in the price control office in Münster,

continue your political work in any way and make the necessary contacts?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I had plenty of opportunity to make official journeys. I

made a thorough study not only of prices, but also of the political

situation, in the Rhineland and in Westphalia, and went to Berlin nearly

every week so as to keep in touch with my friends.

DR. DIX: Were you in touch with Schacht?

GISEVIUS: From that time on I met him very nearly every week.

DR. DIX: Did you, from Münster, make contacts with other persons in

prominent positions to further the work you were doing?

GISEVIUS: Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Münster was that the

president of the province, Freiherr Von Luening, was a man of the old

school—clean, correct, a professional civil servant, and politically a

man who upheld law and order. He, too, ended on the gallows after 20

July 1944. I also got into touch in Düsseldorf with Regierungspräsident

State Secretary Schmidt, and immediately upon my arrival in Münster I

did everything to get into touch with the commanding general there, Von

Kluge, who later became Field Marshal. In this I succeeded. There, too,

I tried at once to continue my old political discussions.

DR. DIX: We shall revert to General Kluge later on. I now ask you this:

At that time when you were working in Münster, did you perceive a change

in Schacht’s attitude towards the regime, and in his attitude towards

Hitler, as distinct from what you described to the Tribunal as existing

in 1934?

GISEVIUS: Yes. By a steady process Schacht withdrew himself further and

further from the Nazis. If I were asked to describe the phases, I would

say that in the beginning—that is to say, in 1935—he was of the

opinion that the Gestapo only was the main evil and that Hitler was the

man who was the statesman—or could at least become the statesman—and

that Göring was the conservative strong man whose services one ought to

use, and could use, to oppose the terror of the Gestapo and the State by

establishing orderly conditions. I contradicted Schacht vehemently

regarding his views about the Defendant Göring. I warned him. I told him

that in my opinion Göring was the worst of all, precisely because he was

hiding under the middle class, conservative cloak. I implored him not to

effect his economic policy with Göring, since this could only come to a

bad end.

Schacht—for whom much may be said, but not that he is a good

psychologist—denied this emphatically. Only then in the course of 1936

he began to realize more and more that Göring was not supporting him

against the Party, but that Göring supported the radical elements

against him, only then did Schacht’s attitude begin to change gradually,

and he came to regard not only Himmler but also Göring as a great

danger. For him Hitler was still the one man with whom one could create

policy, provided the majority of the cabinet could succeed in bringing

him over to the side of law and order.

DR. DIX: Are you now talking approximately of the time when Schacht was

handing over the foreign currency control to Göring?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the moment when I warned him and, as I said, he

became apprehensive about Göring and realized that Göring was not

supporting him against the radical elements. That was the time I meant.

DR. DIX: By handing over the foreign currency control to Göring he

showed a negative, a yielding attitude. But now that he was gradually

changing his views, did he not have any positive ideas as to how to

bring about a change?

GISEVIUS: Yes. He was entirely taken up with the idea, like many other

people in Germany at that time—I might almost say the majority of the

people in Germany—the idea that everything depended on strengthening

the middle class influence in the cabinet, and above all, and as a

prerequisite, that the Reich Ministry of War, headed by Blomberg, should

be brought over to the side of the middle class ministers. Schacht had,

if you want to put it like that, the very constructive idea that one

must concentrate on the fight for Blomberg. That was precisely where I

agreed with him for it was the same battle which I, with my friend

Oster, had tried to fight in my small department, and in a far more

modest way.

DR. DIX: Had he already done anything to achieve that end at that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: As a cue I mention the steps taken by Dreyse, the Vice

President of the Reichsbank.

GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all, he tried to establish close contact with

the competent expert in the Ministry of War, General Thomas, who later

on became Chief of the Army Economic Staff. Thomas was a man who, right

from the beginning, was skeptical about National Socialism, or even

opposed it. As by a miracle, he later on emerged from the concentration

camp alive.

Schacht at that time began to fight for Blomberg through Thomas. I took

part in that fight because Schacht used me as an intermediary through

Oster, and I was also informed about these connections through Herbert

Göring. Moreover, I learned about these things from many discussions

with Thomas. I can testify here that, even at that time, it was

extraordinarily difficult to establish connection between Schacht and

Blomberg, and I was naïve enough to tell Schacht repeatedly simply to

telephone Blomberg and ask him for an interview. Schacht replied that

Blomberg would certainly be evasive and that the only way was to prepare

the meeting via Oster and Thomas. This was done.

I know how much we expected from the many discussions Schacht had with

Blomberg. I was, of course, not present as a witness, but we discussed

these conferences in great detail at the time. I took notes and was very

pleased when I found that these recollections of mine tallied absolutely

with the recollections of Thomas, whose handwritten notes I have in my

possession. Thomas was repeatedly reprimanded by Blomberg and was told

not to bother him with these qualms on Schacht’s part. He was told that

Schacht was querulous, and that he, Thomas, should...

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into all this detail, Dr. Dix?

DR. DIX: Yes, I believe, Your Lordship, that it will be necessary. This

change from a convinced follower of Hitler to a resolute opponent and

revolutionary, even a conspirator, is of course so complicated a

psychological process that I believe that I cannot spare the Tribunal

the details of that development. I shall certainly be economical with

nonessential matters, but I should be grateful if the witness could be

given a certain amount of freedom during this part of the testimony, as

he is the only witness I have on this subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks that you can give the essence

of the matter without giving it in this great detail. You must try, at

any rate, to give as little unnecessary detail as possible.

DR. DIX: I shall be glad to do that.

Well, then, Dr. Gisevius, you have heard the wish of the Tribunal and

you will no doubt bring out only the essential facts.

Is there any other essential fact in the affair of Blomberg via Thomas

that you wish to state, or can we conclude that chapter?

GISEVIUS: No, I shall now try to give a brief description of the other

channels which were tried. I do not know how much the Tribunal wishes to

hear about it, but I will say that Schacht tried to approach Baron Von

Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As, however, he was very

difficult to approach, he sent his Reichsbank vice president, Dreyse, to

establish the contact. We also made one big attempt to approach Fritsch

and Blomberg through General Von Kluge.

DR. DIX: And, briefly, what was the object of that step? What were the

generals supposed to do—I mean these generals mentioned by you?

GISEVIUS: This step had as its object to make it clear to Blomberg that

things were taking a more and more extreme turn, that the economy of the

country had deteriorated, and that the Gestapo terror must be stopped by

all possible means.

DR. DIX: So that at the time there were only misgivings about the

economy and the terror which reigned—not about the danger of war, not

yet?

GISEVIUS: No, only the fear of extremism.

DR. DIX: We now turn to 1937. You know that was the year of Schacht’s

dismissal as Reich Minister of Economy. Did Schacht say anything to you

as to why he remained in office as President of the Reichsbank?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I witnessed in detail the struggle for his release as

Reich Minister of Economy. On the one side there was his attempt to be

released from the Ministry, and I think I am right in saying that this

was not so easy. Schacht told Lammers one day that if he did not receive

the official notification of his release by a certain date, he would

consider himself dismissed and inform the press accordingly. On that

occasion scores of people implored Schacht not to resign. Throughout

those years, whenever a man wanted to resign from his post, there was

always the question whether his successor might not steer an even more

radical course. Schacht was implored not to leave, lest radicalism

should gain the upper hand in the economic field also. I only mention

here the name of Ley, as head of the labor front. Schacht replied that

he could not bear the responsibility, but that he hoped he would be able

as President of the Reichsbank to keep one foot in, as he expressed it.

He imagined that he would be able to have a general view of the overall

economic situation and that through the Reichsbank he would be able to

conserve certain economic-political measures. I can testify that many

men, who later became members of the opposition, implored Schacht to

take that line and to keep at least one foot in.

DR. DIX: Was that decision of his not influenced by his attitude to, and

his judgment concerning some of the generals particularly Colonel

General Fritsch?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is quite right. One of the greatest disasters was

the fact that so many people in Germany imagined that Fritsch was a

strong man. I remember that not only high-ranking officers but also high

ministerial officials told me over and over again that there was no need

to worry: Fritsch was on the march; Fritsch was only waiting for the

right moment; Fritsch would one fine day bring about a revolt and end

the terror. General Von Kluge, for instance, told me this as a fact—and

he was a close friend of Fritsch. And so we all lived in the completely

mistaken belief—as I can now say—that one day the great revolt would

come of the Armed Forces against the SS. But instead of this, the exact

opposite occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, the famous

Fritsch crisis, the result of which was that not only Fritsch was

relieved of his post but that the entire Armed Forces leadership was

beheaded, politically speaking, which meant that now all our hope...

DR. DIX: Forgive me if I interrupt you, but we shall come to the Fritsch

crisis later, which was in 1938...

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: I should like now to finish speaking about Schacht’s efforts

and actions in 1937 and to ask you—it is mentioned in your

book—whether some unsuccessful attempt to approach General Von Kluge

and a journey by Schacht to Münster did not play a part?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I thought that I was supposed to be brief about that.

Although Schacht made a great effort to get in touch with Fritsch, it

was not possible to arrange a conversation in Berlin. It was secretly

arranged that they should meet in Münster, as General Von Kluge was too

scared to meet Schacht publicly at the time. There was a lot of beating

about the bush, the net result was that the two gentlemen did not meet.

It was not possible to bring together a Reich minister and a commanding

general. It was all most depressing.

DR. DIX: Where were you at the time? What were you doing? Were you still

at Münster, or was there a change?

GISEVIUS: I was still in Münster at that time, but in the middle of 1937

Schacht wanted me to return to Berlin. The greater his disappointment,

the more he was inclined to take seriously my warnings against an

increasing radicalism and an SS revolt.

By the autumn of 1937 things in Germany had reached such a point that

everybody in the opposition group felt that evil plans were being made.

We thought at that time that there would be another day of blood like 30

June, and we were trying to protect ourselves. It was Schacht who got in

touch with Canaris through Oster and expressed the wish that I should be

brought back to Berlin in one way or another. At that time there was no

government office which would have given me a post. I had no other

choice but to take a long leave from the civil service, alleging that I

wanted to devote myself to economic studies. Schacht, in agreement with

Canaris and Oster, arranged for me to be given such a post in a Bremen

factory, but I was not allowed to show myself there, and so I came to

Berlin to place myself completely at the disposal of my friends for

future happenings.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we are now coming to January 1938 and the

Fritsch crisis. I do not think that it would be helpful to interrupt

that part of the witness’ testimony. If I may, I would suggest that Your

Lordship now adjourn the session, or else we would have to go on at

least another half hour.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we’ll adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH DAY

Thursday, 25 April 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius! Yesterday we got as far as the year 1938. You had

returned to Berlin to a fictitious position which Schacht had arranged

for you and you were now in continuous contact with your political

confidants, Schacht, Oster, Canaris, and Nebe. You testified last that

within your circle, at that time, you all had the impression that a coup

was imminent.

Now, we really come to the so-called Fritsch crisis; in my opinion the

decisive, inner-political first step toward the war. Will you please

describe the entire course and the background of that crisis, especially

bearing in mind the fact that while that crisis was taking place the

march into Austria was made and always remembering, of course, Schacht’s

position and activities which are the main concern.

GISEVIUS: First, I shall describe the course of the crisis as such; and

it is correct that all my friends considered it the first decisive step

toward the war. I shall assemble the facts one by one. I consider it

advisable, in order not to confuse the picture, to leave Schacht out for

the time being, because the facts as such are extensive enough.

Furthermore, I will not indicate in the beginning the source of our

information or describe my own experiences; rather I shall wait until I

am questioned on those subjects.

On 12 January 1938 the German public was surprised by the report that

Field Marshal Von Blomberg, at that time Reich Minister for War, had

married. No details about his wife nor any photographs were published. A

few days later one single picture appeared, a photograph of the Marshal

and his new wife in front of the monkey cage at the Leipzig Zoo.

Malicious rumors about the past life of the Marshal’s wife began to

circulate in Berlin. A few days later there appeared on the desk of the

Police Commissioner in Berlin a thick file which contained the following

information: Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife had been a previously convicted

prostitute who had been registered as a prostitute in the files of seven

large German cities; she was in the Berlin criminal files. I myself have

seen the fingerprints and the pictures. She had also been sentenced by

the Berlin courts for distributing indecent pictures. The Commissioner

of the Police in Berlin was obliged to submit this file, by official

channels, to the Chief of the Police, Himmler.

DR. DIX: Excuse me, please; who was the Commissioner of the Police in

Berlin at that time?

GISEVIUS: The Commissioner of the Police in Berlin was Count Helldorf.

Count Helldorf realized that if that material were transmitted to the

Reichsführer SS it would place the Wehrmacht in a very embarrassing

position. Himmler would then have in his possession the material he

needed to ruin Blomberg’s reputation and career, and strike a blow at

the leadership of the Armed Forces. Helldorf took this file to the

closest collaborator of Marshal Blomberg, the then Chief of the Armed

Forces Department, Keitel, who at that time had just become related to

Marshal Blomberg through the marriage of their respective children.

Marshal Keitel, or Generaloberst Keitel as he was at that time, looked

through the file carefully and demanded that Police Commissioner

Helldorf should hush up the entire scandal and suppress the file.

DR. DIX: Perhaps you will tell the Tribunal the source of your

information.

GISEVIUS: I got my information from Count Helldorf, who described the

entire affair to me, and from Nebe, Oberregierungsrat of the police

headquarters in Berlin at that time, and later Reich Criminal Director.

Keitel refused to let Blomberg bear any of the consequences. He refused

to inform the Chief of the General Staff Beck, or the Chief of the Army

Generaloberst Von Fritsch. He sent Count Helldorf to Göring with the

file. Helldorf submitted the entire file to Defendant Göring. Göring

asserted he knew nothing about the various sections of the criminal

records and the previous sentences of Von Blomberg’s wife. Nevertheless

in that first conversation, and in later discussions, he admitted that

he already knew the following:

First, that Marshal Blomberg had already asked Göring several months ago

whether it was permissible to have an affair with a woman of low birth,

and shortly thereafter he had asked Göring whether he would help him to

obtain a dispensation to marry this lady “with a past” as he put it.

Later Blomberg came again and told Göring that this lady of his choice

unfortunately had another lover and he must ask Göring to help him,

Blomberg, to get rid of that lover.

DR. DIX: Excuse me. Göring told that to Helldorf and you learned it from

Helldorf?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what Göring said, and in the further course of

the investigation we learned of it from other sources too. Göring then

got rid of that lover by giving him foreign currency and sending him off

to South America. In spite of that, Göring did not inform Hitler of this

incident. He even went with Hitler, as a witness, to the wedding of

Marshal Blomberg on 12 January. I should like to point out here...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal would wish to know how you suggest

that these matters, which appear to be personal, are relevant to the

charges and in what way they affect the Defendant Schacht or the

Defendant Göring or the Defendant Frick?

DR. DIX: I am here only to serve the interests, the rightful interests,

of the Defendant Schacht. It is necessary to present that crisis in all

its horribleness in order to conceive what an effect, what a

revolutionary effect, it had on Schacht and his circle as far as the

regime was concerned, I have already said earlier that the Fritsch

crisis was the turning point in the transformation of Schacht from a

follower and, to a certain extent, an admirer of Hitler to a deadly

enemy who had designs on his life. The Tribunal cannot understand this

revulsion if the Tribunal does not receive the same impression as

Schacht had at that time. Indeed, I in no way desire to wash dirty linen

here unnecessarily. My decision to put these questions and to ask the

witness to describe the Fritsch crisis in full detail is only motivated

by the fact that the further development of Schacht, and of the Fritsch

crisis, or let us say, the Oster-Canaris circle to which Schacht

belonged, cannot be understood if one does not realize the monstrous

circumstances of that crisis. In the face of these facts, however

disagreeable, one must decide to bring these sometimes very personal

matters to the attention of the Tribunal. Unfortunately I cannot

dispense with it in my defense. It is the alpha and omega of my defense.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, it might be helpful at this

time to know our position in reference to this line of testimony, if it

is to be considered whether admissible or not now.

I should desire, if this incident were not brought out, to bring it out

upon cross-examination upon several aspects. One is that it shows the

background of the incident of yesterday, which I think is important in

appraising the truthfulness of testimony in this case.

Another thing is that it bears upon the conspiracy to seize power. There

were certain men in Germany that these conspirators had to get rid of.

Some of them they could kill safely. Some of them, as we see from the

Röhm Purge, when they went to killing they aroused some opposition. They

had to strike down by other means, and the means they used against

Fritsch and Blomberg show the conspiracy to seize power and to get rid

of the men who might stand in the way of aggressive warfare.

It will appear, I think, that Fritsch and Blomberg were among the

reliants of the German people in allowing these Nazis to get as far as

they did, believing that here at least were two men who would guard

their interests; and the method by which those men were stricken down

and removed from the scene we would consider an important part of the

conspiracy story, and I would ask to go into it on cross-examination.

That might perhaps be material to the Court in deciding whether it

should proceed now.

DR. DIX: May I add one more thing?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix.

The Tribunal thinks, in view of what you have said and what Mr. Justice

Jackson has said, that your examination must continue and you will no

doubt try to confine it as much as you can to the political aspects of

the matter.

DR. DIX: Of course. But the personal matters are of such political

importance in this case that they cannot be omitted.

Well then, Dr. Gisevius, you understand the difficulties of the

situation. We want only to give evidence, and not to bring in anything

sensational as an end in itself. However, when it is necessary to speak

on such subjects in order to explain the development to the Tribunal, I

ask you to speak quite frankly.

GISEVIUS: I ask the Tribunal also to realize my difficulties. I myself

do not like speaking about these things.

I must add that Göring was the only head of the Investigation

Department. That was the institution which took overall telephone

control in the Third Reich. This Investigation Department was not

satisfied, as has been described here, with merely tapping telephone

conversations and decoding messages; but it had its own intelligence

service, all the way down to its own employees, for obtaining

information. It was, therefore, also quite possible to obtain

confidential information about Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife. When

Helldorf gave the file to Göring, Göring considered himself compelled to

give that file to Hitler. Hitler had a nervous breakdown and decided to

dismiss Marshal Blomberg immediately. Hitler’s first thought, as he told

the generals later at a public meeting, was to appoint Generaloberst Von

Fritsch as Blomberg’s successor. The moment he made his decision known,

Göring and Himmler reminded him that it could not be done as according

to a file of the year 1935 Fritsch was badly incriminated.

DR. DIX: Excuse me, Doctor. What is the source of your information

regarding this conversation between Hitler and the generals and also

Göring’s statement?

GISEVIUS: Several generals who took part in that meeting told me about

it, and I have said already that in the course of events, which I have

yet to describe, Hitler himself made many statements. We also had in our

possession until 20 July the original documents of the Supreme

Court-Martial which convened later.

The file of 1935, which was submitted to Hitler in January 1938,

referred to the fact that in 1934 the Gestapo conceived the idea of

prosecuting, among other enemies of the state, homosexuals as criminals.

In the search for evidence the Gestapo visited the penitentiaries and

asked convicted inmates, who had blackmailed homosexuals, for evidence

and for the names of homosexuals. One of the inmates reported a terrible

story, which was really so horrible that I will not repeat it here. It

will suffice to say that this prisoner believed the man in question had

been a certain Herr Von Fritsch or Frisch. The prisoner could not

remember the correct name. The Gestapo then turned over these files to

Hitler in 1935. Hitler was indignant about the contents. Talking to the

generals, he said he did not want to know about such a disgusting

affair. Hitler ordered the files to be burned immediately.

Now, in January 1938, Göring and Himmler reminded Hitler of these files;

and it was left to Heydrich’s cleverness to submit to Hitler again these

files, which had allegedly been burned in 1935 and which had been

completed, in the meantime, by extensive investigations. Hitler

believed, as he said to the generals at the time, that after having been

so disappointed in Blomberg, many nasty things could be expected from

Fritsch also. The Defendant Göring offered to bring the convict from the

prison to Hitler and the Reich Chancellery. At Karinhall, Göring had

previously threatened this convict with death if he did not abide by his

statements.

DR. DIX: How do you know that?

GISEVIUS: That was mentioned at the Supreme Court-Martial. Then Fritsch

was summoned to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler told him of the

accusations which had been made against him. Fritsch, a gentleman

through and through, had received a confidential warning from Hitler’s

adjutant; but it had been so vague that Fritsch came to the Reich

Chancellery extremely alarmed. He had no idea of what Hitler was

accusing him. Indignantly he denied the crime he had allegedly

committed. In the presence of Göring, he gave Hitler his word of honor

that all the accusations were false. But Hitler went to the nearest

door, opened it, and the convict entered, raised his arm, pointed to

Fritsch and said, “That is he.”

Fritsch was speechless. He was only able to ask that a judicial

investigation should be made. Hitler demanded his immediate resignation;

and on condition that Fritsch left in silence, he agreed to allow the

matter to rest where it was. Fritsch appealed to Beck, the Chief of the

General Staff. Chief of the General Staff Beck intervened with Hitler. A

hard struggle ensued for a judicial investigation of these terrible

accusations against Fritsch. That struggle lasted about a week. There

were dramatic disputes in the Reich Chancellery. At the end came the

famous 4 February when the generals, who until that day—that is to say,

10 days after the dismissal of Blomberg and the relief of Fritsch—were

completely unaware of the fact that both their superiors were no longer

in office, were ordered to come to Berlin. Hitler personally presented

the files to the generals in such a way that they also were completely

confused and said they were satisfied that the affair should be

investigated by the courts. At the same time Hitler surprised the

generals...

DR. DIX: You know of this only through the participants of that meeting?

GISEVIUS: From the participants of the meeting, yes.

At the same time Hitler surprised the generals with the announcement

that they had a new Commander-in-Chief, Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch.

Some of the generals had, in the meantime, been relieved of their posts;

and also on the evening previous to that announcement, a report appeared

in the newspapers according to which Hitler, under the pretense of

drawing together the reins of government, had dismissed the Foreign

Minister, Von Neurath, effected a change in the Ministry of Economics,

relieved a number of diplomats of their posts, and then, as an appendix

to that report, announced a change in the War Ministry and in the

leadership of the Army.

Then a new struggle arose, which lasted several weeks, regarding the

convening of the court-martial which should decide as to the

reinstatement of Generaloberst Von Fritsch. This was for all of us the

moment when we believed we would be able to prove before a German

supreme court the methods the Gestapo used to rid themselves of their

political adversaries. This was a unique opportunity of being able to

question witnesses under oath regarding the manner in which the entire

intrigue had been contrived. Therefore we set to work to prepare for our

parts in this trial.

DR. DIX: What do you mean by “we” in this case?

GISEVIUS: There was above all one man, who as an honest lawyer and judge

was himself a participator of this Supreme Court-Martial. This was the

Judge Advocate General at that time, and later Chief Judge of the Army,

Ministerial Director Dr. Sack. This man believed that he owed it to the

spirit of law to contribute in every possible way toward exposing these

matters. This he did, but he also paid with his life after 20 July.

In the course of this investigation the judges of this Supreme

Court-Martial questioned the Gestapo witnesses. They investigated the

records of the Gestapo; they made local investigations; and, with the

aid of the criminologist Nebe, it was not long before they discovered

definitely that the entire affair had concerned a double; it was not

Generaloberst Von Fritsch but a retired Captain Von Frisch who had been

pensioned long before.

In the course of that investigation the judges established another fact;

they were able to prove that the Gestapo had been in the residence of

this double Von Frisch as early as 15 January and had questioned his

housekeeper. May I compare the two dates once more. On 15 January the

Gestapo had proof that Fritsch was not guilty. On 24 January the

Defendant Göring brings the convict and witness for the prosecution into

the Reich Chancellery in order to incriminate Fritsch, the

Generaloberst. We believed that here indeed we were confronted with a

plot of incredible proportions, and we believed that now even the

skeptical general must see that it was not only in the lower ranks of

the Gestapo that there was scheming and contriving, invisible and

secret, without the knowledge of any of the ministers or of the Reich

Chancellery and which would compel any man of honor and justice to

intervene. This was the reason why we now formed into a larger group and

why we saw that we now no longer needed to collect material about the

Gestapo in secret. That, precisely, was the great difficulty we had had

to deal with. We heard a great deal; but if we had passed on that

evidence, we would in every case have exposed to the terror of the

Gestapo those men who had given us the evidence.

Now we could proceed legally, and so we started our efforts to persuade

Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch to submit the necessary evidence to the

Supreme Court-Martial.

DR. DIX: Whom do you mean by “we”?

GISEVIUS: At that time there was a group, among whom I must mention Dr.

Schacht, who was then extremely active and who went to Admiral Raeder,

to Brauchitsch, to Rundstedt, and to Gürtner, and tried to explain

everywhere that the great crisis had now arisen; that we now had to act;

that it was now the task of the generals to rid us of this regime of

terror.

But I must mention one more name in that connection. In 1936 Schacht had

already introduced me to Dr. Goerdeler. I had the honor of traveling the

same road with that brave man from then on until 20 July. And now I have

mentioned here for the first time, in this room where so many terrible

things are made known, the name of a German who was a brave and fearless

fighter for freedom, justice, and decency and who, I believe, will one

day be an example, and not only to Germany, to prove that one can also

do one’s duty faithfully until death, even under the terror of the

Gestapo.

This Dr. Goerdeler, who had always been a fearless and untiring fighter,

had in those days unequaled courage. Like Dr. Schacht he went from one

ministry to another, from one general to the next, and he also believed

that now the hour had come when we could achieve a united front of

decent people led by the generals. Brauchitsch did not refuse then. He

did not refuse to act at Goerdeler’s request. In fact he assured

Goerdeler of his co-operation in a revolt with almost religious fervor.

And as a witness I may mention that Brauchitsch also solemnly assured me

that he would now use this opportunity to fight against the Gestapo.

However, Brauchitsch made one condition, and that condition was accepted

by the generals as a whole. Brauchitsch said, “Hitler is still such a

popular man; we are afraid of the Hitler myth. We want to give to the

German people and to the world the final proof by means of the Supreme

Court-Martial and its verdict.” Therefore Brauchitsch postponed his

action until the day when the verdict of the Supreme Court-Martial

should be given.

The Supreme Court-Martial met. It began its session. The session was

suddenly interrupted under dramatic circumstances. I must add that

Hitler appointed the Defendant Göring as president of that Supreme

Court-Martial. And now the Supreme Court-Martial, under the chairmanship

of Göring, convened. I know from Nebe that Göring during the preceding

days had had consultations with Himmler and Heydrich. I know that

Heydrich said to Nebe, “this Supreme Court-Martial will be the end of my

career.”

DR. DIX: Did Nebe tell you that?

GISEVIUS: Yes, on the same day. The Supreme Court-Martial would be the

great danger for the Gestapo. And now the Supreme Court-Martial sat for

several hours and was adjourned under dramatic circumstances, for that

was the day chosen for the German armies to march into Austria. Even at

that time we knew without any doubt why the chairman of that

court-martial was so unusually interested in having the troops on that

day receive the order to march, not to a goal within but outside the

Reich. Not until one week later could the Supreme Court-Martial

reconvene, and then Hitler was triumphant. The generals had their first

“campaign of flowers” behind them, a plebiscite had been proclaimed, the

jubilation was great, and the confusion among the generals was still

greater. So that court-martial was dissolved. Fritsch’s innocence was

definitely established, but Brauchitsch said that as a result of the

changed psychological atmosphere created by the annexation of Austria,

he could no longer take the responsibility for a revolt.

That is roughly the story of how the War Ministry was practically

denuded of its leading men, and how the generals were thrown into

unequaled confusion. From that time on we took the steep downward path

to radicalism.

DR. DIX: Perhaps I may ask the Tribunal to be permitted to read in this

connection one sentence from a document which I will submit as Exhibit

Number Schacht-15. My document book is still in the process of

translation, but I hope that it will be here on the day of the hearing

of Schacht. There is only one sentence which is of interest in this

connection. It is from the biannual report of the General Staff...

THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been submitted to the Prosecution and

to the Tribunal at all?

DR. DIX: The documents have been discussed with the Prosecution twice in

detail, once with regard to the question of translation, and then on the

question of their admissibility as evidence; and Mr. Dodd discussed them

in open court. I am firmly convinced that the Prosecution is thoroughly

acquainted with the document. It is only one sentence and I do not

believe that the Prosecution would object to the reading of this one

sentence, since otherwise the connection with the documentary evidence

might be obscured. I will introduce a document now and then, wherever it

seems practical. This is only one sentence from the biannual report of

the General Staff of the United States...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not know what this document is, Your Honor. I

should like to know because we may want to ask some questions about it.

I do not want to delay Dr. Dix, but I do not have a copy of it and I do

not know just what it is yet.

DR. DIX: I just wanted to shorten the proceedings; but as I see that

difficulties may arise, and that a long discussion may be needed, I will

omit it, and will present it later with my documentary evidence. It

would not serve my purpose otherwise.

[_Turning to the witness._] For the additional information of the Court,

perhaps you will describe the position of the chairman in German

court-martial proceedings; that the control of the examination is in his

hands—that, as a matter of fact, the entire case is in his hands.

GISEVIUS: Dr. Dix, I do not doubt that you could describe the authority

of such a chairman better and more clearly from the legal point of view.

I would, however, like to say the following:

I read the minutes of that session, for it is one of those documents

which we thought we would one day submit to the public. This, too, I

hope we will find again. From the minutes it can be seen that the

Defendant Göring, as president, determined the tenor of the entire

proceedings and of the questions.

He questioned the witnesses for the prosecution, and he took care that

no other questions were put which might have proved embarrassing. I must

say, from these voluminous minutes, that Göring knew how to cloak the

true facts by the manner in which he led the proceedings.

DR. DIX: In my introductory words at the beginning of the session, I

called the Fritsch crisis the first decisive inner-political step of the

war; and you, Doctor, have adopted that term. After concluding the

description of the Fritsch crisis, will you give the reason for the

views you adopted, and what the effect was upon your group in this

connection, especially upon Schacht?

GISEVIUS: I must point out again that until this Fritsch crisis it had

been difficult in the ranks of the German opposition to consider even

the possibility of war. That was due to the fact that in Germany the

opposition groups were so sure of the strength of the Army, and of the

leading men, that they believed it sufficed to have a man of honor, like

Fritsch, at the head of the German Army. It seemed inconceivable that

Fritsch would tolerate a sliding into terror or into war. Only a few

persons had pointed out that it was in the nature of every revolution

some day to go beyond the frontiers of a nation. We believed from

history that this theory should be pointed out as a danger threatening

the National Socialist revolution, and therefore we repeatedly warned

those who were convinced that they were faced with a revolution, not

only with a dictatorship, that one day those revolutionaries would

resort to war as a last recourse. As it became more evident in the

course of the Fritsch crisis that radicalism was predominant, a large

circle became aware that the danger of war could no longer be ignored.

DR. DIX: And did the Defendant Schacht also belong to that circle?

GISEVIUS: Yes. During those days of the Fritsch crisis, Schacht said, as

did many others: “That means war,” and that was also said plainly to the

then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Von Brauchitsch.

DR. DIX: Now the question arises why Schacht had previously financed the

rearmament program, at least in the beginning?

GISEVIUS: Schacht always told me that he had financed the rearmament

program for purposes of defense. Schacht was convinced for many years

that such a large nation in the center of Europe should at least have

means of defense. I may point out that at that time large groups of the

German people were possessed of the idea that there was a possible

danger of attack from the East. You must not forget the type of

propaganda with which the German people were inundated at that time, and

that the reasons given for this particular danger from the East were

based upon Polish aspirations concerning East Prussia.

DR. DIX: Did Schacht also discuss with you at that time the fact that

this rearmament was serving his political purposes, as through it he

might be able to start discussions on general disarmament again?

GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Unfortunately I forgot to emphasize this

point myself. Schacht was of the opinion that all means should be used

to bring about discussions on rearmament again. He had an idea that very

soon—I think he had held that opinion since 1935—the attention of

opponent countries should be drawn to German rearmament; and then

Hitler, because his rearmament was now known, would be forced to resume

discussions at the disarmament conference.

DR. DIX: Was that which you have just said the subject of your

conversation with Schacht at that time, or is that your judgment now?

GISEVIUS: No, I remember this conversation very well, because I thought

Hitler’s inclinations lay in other directions than in attending a

disarmament conference. I thought Hitler to be of an entirely different

mentality, and was somewhat surprised that Schacht considered it

possible that Hitler might harbor such thoughts.

DR. DIX: Did you have the impression from your conversations with

Schacht that he was informed in detail of the type, speed, and extent of

the rearmament?

GISEVIUS: I well remember how often Schacht asked me and friends of mine

whether we could not help him to get information about the extent of

rearmament by inquiring at the Reich War Ministry. I have already

described yesterday the efforts he made to get details through Oster and

Thomas.

DR. DIX: Could you tell the Tribunal whether Schacht made any attempt to

limit armament expenses, and thus limit the extent and speed of the

rearmament; and, if so, when he made these efforts?

GISEVIUS: To my knowledge, he started to attempt this as early as 1936.

In the heated debates about Schacht’s resignation as Minister of

Economics in 1937, his efforts in this direction played a very important

part. I recall that practically every conversation was concerned with

that point.

DR. DIX: Now, it is said—and quite understandably also by the

Prosecution—that the reasons Schacht gave, even in official reports and

so on, for the necessity of these limitations were primarily of a

financial-technical nature, that is to say, he spoke as an anxious

economic leader and an anxious president of the Reichsbank and not as an

anxious patriot afraid that his country might be plunged into war.

Do you know of any discussions with Schacht, of which you can remember

anything, concerning the foregoing which might be useful to the

Tribunal?

GISEVIUS: In all these preliminary discussions there were dozens of

drafts of the communications Schacht wrote. They were discussed in

friendly circles. To mention but one example, Schacht repeatedly

discussed these drafts also with Goerdeler. It was always one question

that was concerned: What could one say, so that such a letter should not

be considered a provocation but would serve rather to draw the other

non-Party ministers, and particularly the War Minister Blomberg, to

Schacht’s side? That was just the difficulty, for how could such

ministers as Blomberg, Neurath, or Schwerin-Krosigk, who were much more

loyal to Hitler, be persuaded to join Schacht rather than to say that

Schacht had once again provoked Hitler and Göring with his notoriously

sharp tongue. All these letters can only be understood by their tactical

reasons which, as I have said, had been discussed in detail with the

leading men of the opposition.

DR. DIX: Now, after the Fritsch crisis, how did the political conspiracy

between you and your friends and Schacht take form?

GISEVIUS: I want to deal with that word “conspiracy.” While up to that

moment our activity could only be called more or less oppositional, now

a conspiracy did indeed begin; and there appeared in the foreground a

man who was later to play an important part as head of that conspiracy.

The Chief of the General Staff at that time, Generaloberst Beck,

believed that the time had come for a German general to give the alarm

both inside and outside the country. I believe it is important for the

Tribunal to know also the ultimate reason which prompted Beck to take

that step.

The Chief of the General Staff was present when Hitler, in May 1938,

made a speech to the generals at Jüterbog. That speech was intended to

reinstate Fritsch. A few words were said about Fritsch, but more was

said—and for the first time quite openly before a large group of German

generals—about Hitler’s intention to engulf Czechoslovakia in a war.

Beck heard that speech; and he was indignant that he, as Chief of the

General Staff, should hear of such an intention for the first time in

such an assembly without having been informed or consulted previously.

During that same meeting, Beck sent a letter to Brauchitsch asking him

for an immediate interview. Brauchitsch refused and deliberately kept

Beck waiting for several weeks. Beck became impatient and wrote a

comprehensive memorandum in which as Chief of the General Staff he

protested against the fact that the German people were being drawn into

war. At the end of that memorandum Beck announced his resignation, and

here I believe is the opportunity to say a word about this Chief of the

General Staff.

DR. DIX: One moment, Doctor. Will you tell us the source of your

knowledge of what Beck thought, and the negotiations between Beck and

Brauchitsch?

GISEVIUS: Beck confided in me, and during the latter years I worked in

very close collaboration with him, and I was by his side until the last

hour of his life on 20 July. I can testify here—and it is important for

the Tribunal to know this—that Beck struggled again and again with the

problem as to what a chief of the General Staff should do when he

realized that events were driving toward a war. Therefore I owe to his

memory, and to my oath here, not to conceal the fact that Beck took the

consequences of being the only German general to relinquish his post

voluntarily, in order to show that there is a limit beyond which even

generals in leading positions may not go; but at the sacrifice of their

position and their life, must resign and accept no further orders. Beck

was of the opinion that the General Staff was not only an organization

of war technicians; he saw in the German General Staff the conscience of

the German Army, and he trained his staff accordingly. He suffered

immensely during the later years of his life because men whom he had

trained in that spirit did not follow the dictates of their conscience.

I owe it to this man to say that he was a man of inflexible character.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think we might get on to what Beck actually

did.

DR. DIX: Yes, Your Honor, but...

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it would be a convenient time to break off. What

I mean is, the witness said that Beck protested in a memorandum and

offered to resign, and that was some minutes ago, and since then he was

talking and had not told us what Beck actually did.

DR. DIX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session on Saturday

morning, but will be sitting in closed session.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] You were saying that Generaloberst

Beck carried out his decision to tender his resignation after the speech

at Jüterbog. What did he do then?

GISEVIUS: Hitler and Brauchitsch urgently pressed him to remain in

office, but Beck refused and insisted upon resigning. Thereupon Hitler

and Brauchitsch urged Beck at least not to make his resignation public,

and they asked him if he would not formally defer his resignation for a

few months. Beck, who had not yet gone the way of high treason, thought

that he should comply with this request. Later he most deeply regretted

this loyal attitude. The fact is that as early as the end of May or the

beginning of June his successor, General Halder, took over the office of

Chief of General Staff; and from that moment Beck was actually no longer

in charge.

DR. DIX: May I ask you once more, from what observations, and

conversations with whom, do you base the knowledge of these facts?

GISEVIUS: From constant discussions I had with Beck, Oster, Goerdeler,

Schacht, and an entire group of people at that time; later, the question

why Beck did not make his retirement public depressed him to such an

extent that it was a continual subject of discussions between him and me

up to the end.

DR. DIX: That was Beck’s resignation; but then the problem of the

possible resignation of Schacht was probably also brought up in

deliberations. To your knowledge, and from your observation, was the

question of the necessity or the opportuneness of Schacht’s resignation

discussed between Schacht and Beck?

GISEVIUS: Yes, it was discussed in great detail.

It was Beck’s opinion that his resignation alone might not be

sufficiently effective. He approached Schacht therefore and asked him

whether he would not join him, Beck, and resign also. This subject was

discussed in great detail, on the one hand between Beck and Schacht

personally, and on the other between Oster and myself, who were the two

intermediaries. During these conferences, I must confess that I, too,

was of the opinion that Schacht should resign under all circumstances;

and I also advised him to that effect. It was Oster’s opinion, however,

that Schacht must definitely remain in office and he asked him to do so;

in order to influence the generals Schacht was needed as an official

with a ministerial title. In retrospect I must say here that my advice

to Schacht was wrong. The events which I have yet to describe have

proved how important it was to Oster and others that Schacht should

remain in office.

DR. DIX: That, of course, was a serious question for Schacht’s own

conscience. You have informed the Tribunal of your opinions and of

Oster’s opinions. Did Schacht discuss his scruples with you, and the

pros and cons of his deliberations in making his final decision?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t object to the defendants trying their case

in their own way, but I do think we are passing beyond the limits of

profitable inquiry here. Schacht is present; he is the man who can tell

us about his conscience, and I know of no way that another witness can

do so, and I think it is not a question to which the answer would have

competent value, and I object respectfully.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better tell us what Schacht

did—not tell us—but get from the witness what Schacht did.

DR. DIX: If I may, I should like to make a brief remark. It is true, of

course, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, that Schacht knows his own reasons

best and can tell them to the Tribunal. On a question as difficult as

this, however, the justification of which is even subject to

argument—the Prosecution apparently is inclined to consider the train

of thought which led to Schacht’s decision to be unacceptable—it

appears to me, at least on the basis of our rules for evidence, that it

is relevant for the Tribunal to hear from an eye-and-ear witness what

the considerations were and whether they really were such at the time,

or whether Schacht, now in the defendants’ dock, is _ex post facto_,

devising some explanation, as every defendant is more or less suspected

of doing.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the witness can tell us what

Schacht said and what Schacht did, but not what Schacht thought.

DR. DIX: Certainly. Your Lordship, I only want him to tell us what

Schacht said to the witness at that time about his opinion.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need any further discussion about it.

The witness has heard what I have said and you can ask him what Schacht

said, and what Schacht did; but not what Schacht thought.

DR. DIX: Very well then, what did Schacht say to you regarding the

reasons for his resignation?

GISEVIUS: Schacht told me at the time that after all we had experienced

the generals could not be relied upon ever really to revolt. For that

reason, as a politician, he considered it his duty to think of some

possibility other than a revolt for bringing about a change in

conditions in Germany. For that reason he evolved a plan which he

explained to me at the time. Schacht said to me, “I have got Hitler by

the throat.” He meant by that, as he explained to me in great detail,

that now the day was approaching where the debts which had been incurred

by the Reich Minister of Finance, and thus by the Reich Cabinet, would

have to be repaid to the Reichsbank. Schacht doubted whether the

Minister of Finance, Schwerin-Krosigk, would be prepared without further

ado to carry out the moral and legal obligation of repaying the credits

which had been extended.

Schacht thought that that was the moment in which he should come out

with his resignation, with a joint step by the Reichsbank Directorate;

and he hoped that, given that situation, the other ministers of the

Reich would join him, the majority of whom were still democratic at the

time.

That is what he meant when he said to me, “I have still one more arrow I

can shoot, and that is the moment when not even a Neurath, a Gürtner, a

Seldte can refuse to follow me.”

I answered Schacht at that time that I doubted whether there would ever

be such a meeting of the Cabinet. In my opinion, the steps which would

be taken to dispose of him would be much more brutal. Schacht did not

believe me, and above all he told me he would be certain of achieving

one thing; these matters would have to be discussed in the Cabinet, and

then he would cause a situation in Germany as alarming as the one which

existed in February 1938 at the time of the Fritsch crisis. He therefore

expected a radical reformation of the cabinet which would provide the

proper psychological atmosphere for the generals to intervene.

DR. DIX: You said at the beginning that Schacht had said or hinted that

he could not absolutely rely on the generals to bring about a revolt.

Which generals was he referring to, and what did he mean?

GISEVIUS: Schacht meant at the time the first revolutionary situation

which had arisen in Germany, during the months of May to September 1938,

when we drifted into the Czechoslovakia war crisis. Beck had assured us

at the time of his resignation—by us I mean Goerdeler, Schacht and

other politicians—that he would leave to us a successor who was more

energetic than himself, and who was firmly determined to precipitate a

revolt if Hitler should decide upon war. That man whom Beck trusted, and

to whom he introduced us, was General Halder. As a matter of fact, on

taking office, General Halder immediately took steps to start

discussions on the subject with Schacht, Goerdeler, Oster, and our

entire group. A few days after he took over his office he sent for Oster

and informed him that he considered that things were drifting toward

war, and that he would then undertake an overthrow of the Government. He

asked Oster what he, for his part, intended to do to bring civilians

into the plot.

DR. DIX: Who were the civilians in question, apart from Goerdeler and

Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Halder put that question to Oster, and under the circumstances

at that time, when we were still a very small circle, Oster replied that

to the best of his knowledge there were only two civilians with whom

Halder could have preliminary political conversations; one was

Goerdeler, the other, Schacht.

Halder refused to speak personally to a man as suspect as Goerdeler. He

gave as his reason the fact that it was too dangerous for him to receive

now a man whom he did not yet know, whereas he could find some official

reason for having a conference with Schacht. Halder asked Oster to act

as intermediary for such a conference with Schacht.

Oster approached Schacht through me. Schacht was willing. A meeting was

to be arranged at a third person’s place. I warned Schacht and said to

him, “Have Halder come to your house, so that you are quite sure of the

matter.”

Halder then visited Schacht personally at the end of July 1938 at his

residence; and he informed him that matters had reached a stage where

war was imminent and that he, Halder, would then bring about a revolt,

and he asked Schacht whether he was prepared to aid him politically in a

leading position.

That is what Schacht told me at the time, and Halder told it to Oster.

DR. DIX: And Oster told it to you?

GISEVIUS: Yes, as I continually acted as an intermediary in these

discussions. Schacht replied, as he assured me directly after Halder’s

visit, that he was prepared to do anything if the generals were to

decide to remove Hitler.

The following morning, Halder sent for Oster. He told him of this

conversation, and he asked Oster whether police preparations had now

been made for this revolt. Oster suggested that Halder should talk to me

personally about these matters. I had a long talk in the darkness with

Halder about this revolt. I believe that it is important for me to state

here what Halder told me of his intentions at that time. First Halder

assured me that, in contrast to many other generals, he had no doubt

that Hitler wanted war. Halder described Hitler to me as being

bloodthirsty and referred to the blood bath of 30 June. However, Halder

told me that it was, unfortunately, terribly difficult to explain

Hitler’s real intentions to the generals, particularly to the junior

officers corps, because the saying which was influencing the officers

corps was ostensibly that it was all just a colossal bluff, that the

Army could be absolutely certain that Hitler did not want to start a

war, but rather that he was merely preparing a diplomatic maneuver of

blackmail on a large scale.

For that reason, Halder believed that it was absolutely necessary to

prove, even to the last captain, that Hitler was not bluffing at all but

had actually given the order for war. Halder therefore decided at the

time that for the sake of informing the German nation and the officers

he would even risk the outbreak of war. But even then Halder feared the

Hitler myth; and he therefore suggested to me that the day after the

outbreak of war Hitler should be killed by means of a bomb; and the

German people should be made to believe, as far as possible, that Hitler

had been killed by an enemy bombing attack on the Führer’s train. I

replied to Halder at the time that perhaps I was still too young, but I

could not understand why he did not want to tell the German people, at

least afterwards, what the generals had done.

Then for a few weeks there was no news from Halder. The press campaign

against Czechoslovakia assumed an ever more threatening character and we

felt that now it would be only a few days, or perhaps weeks, before war

would break out. At that very moment Schacht decided to visit Halder

again and to remind him of his promise. I thought it best that a witness

should be present during that conversation and therefore I accompanied

Schacht. It did not appear to me that Halder was any too pleased at the

presence of a witness. Halder once again declared his firm intention of

effecting a revolt; but again he wished to wait until the German nation

had received proof of Hitler’s warlike intentions by means of a definite

order for war. Schacht pointed out to Halder the tremendous danger of

such an experiment. He made it clear to Halder that a war could not be

started simply to destroy the Hitler legend in the eyes of the German

people.

In a detailed and very excited conversation Halder then declared that he

was prepared to start the revolt, not after the official outbreak of the

war, but at the very moment that Hitler gave the army the final order to

march.

We asked Halder whether he would then still be able to control the

situation or whether Hitler might not surprise him with some lightning

stroke. Halder replied literally, “No, he cannot deceive me. I have

designed my General Staff plans in such a way that I am bound to know it

48 hours in advance.” I think that is important, because during the

subsequent course of events the period of time between the order to

march and the actual march itself was considerably shortened.

Halder assured us that besides the preparations in Berlin he had an

armored division ready in Thuringia under the command of General Von

Höppner, which might possibly have to halt the Leibstandarte, which was

in Munich, on the march to Berlin.

Although Halder had told us all this, Schacht and I had a somewhat

bitter aftertaste of that conference. Halder had told Schacht that he,

Schacht, seemed to be urging him to effect this revolt prematurely; and

Schacht and I were of the opinion that Halder might abandon us at the

last moment. We informed Oster immediately of the bad impression we had

had, and we told Oster that something absolutely must be done to win

over another general in case Halder should not act at the last minute.

Oster agreed and these are the preliminary events which led to the later

General Field Marshal Von Witzleben first coming into our circle of

conspirators.

DR. DIX: Who won Von Witzleben over?

GISEVIUS: Schacht did.

DR. DIX: Who did?

GISEVIUS: Schacht won Witzleben over. Oster visited Witzleben and told

him everything that had happened. Thereupon Witzleben sent for me, and I

told him that in my opinion the police situation was such that he, as

commanding general of the Berlin Army Corps, could confidently risk a

revolt. Witzleben asked me the question which every general put to us at

that time: Whether a diplomatic incident in the East would really lead

to war or whether it was not true, as Hitler and Ribbentrop had

repeatedly told the generals in confidence, that there was a tacit

agreement with the Western Powers giving Germany a free hand in the

East. Witzleben said that if such an agreement really existed, then, of

course, he could not revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht with his

excellent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon mentality could no doubt give him

comprehensive information about that.

A meeting between Schacht and Witzleben was arranged. Witzleben brought

with him his divisional general, Von Brockdorff, who was to carry out

the revolt in detail. Witzleben, Brockdorff, and I drove together to

Schacht’s country house for a conference which lasted for hours. The

final result was that Witzleben was convinced by Schacht that the

Western Powers would under no circumstances allow Germany to move into

the Eastern territories and that now Hitler’s policy of surprise had

come to an end. Witzleben decided that he, on his part and independently

of Halder, would make all preparations which would be necessary if he

should have to act.

He issued me false papers and gave me a position at his district

headquarters so that there, under his personal protection, I could make

all the necessary police and political preparations. He delegated

General Von Brockdorff, and he and I visited all the points in Berlin

which Brockdorff was to occupy with his Potsdam Division. Frau Strünck

was at the wheel and traveling ostensibly as tourists we settled exactly

what had to be done.

DR. DIX: That is the witness Strünck. Please excuse me.

GISEVIUS: I believe I owe you a brief explanation as to why Witzleben’s

co-operation was absolutely necessary. It was not so easy to find a

general who had the actual authority to order his troops to march. For

instance, there were some generals in the provinces who could not give

their troops the order to march.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into the matter in such

detail as to why General Witzleben should be brought in?

DR. DIX: The reasons why Witzleben was needed are perhaps not essential

for our case. We can therefore drop this subject.

Will you please tell me, Dr. Gisevius, whether Schacht was kept

constantly informed of these military and police preparations which you

have described?

GISEVIUS: Schacht was kept informed about all these matters. We met in

the evening in the residence of Von Witzleben and I showed everything

that I had worked out in writing during the day. It was then discussed

in full detail.

DR. DIX: Apart from these military and police measures, which you have

mentioned, were there any political measures?

GISEVIUS: Yes, of course. We had to decide carefully what the German

nation was to be told in such a case from the point of view of internal

politics, just as there were certain preparations which had to be made

regarding the external.

DR. DIX: What do you mean by external—foreign politics?

GISEVIUS: Yes, of course, foreign politics.

DR. DIX: Why of course? Was the Foreign Office included or what is meant

by foreign politics in this case?

GISEVIUS: It is very difficult to give an explanation, because the

co-operation with foreign countries during the time of war, or

immediately before a war, is a matter which is very difficult to discuss

as we are touching upon a very controversial subject. If I am to talk

about it, then it is at least as important for me to state the reasons

which led these people to carry on such discussions with foreign

countries, as it is to give times and dates.

DR. DIX: I am sure that the Tribunal will permit you to do so. I think

that the Tribunal will permit that the motives...

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal thinks you are going into too great

detail over these matters. If the Tribunal is prepared to accept this

witness’ evidence as true, it shows that Schacht was negotiating with

him and General Witzleben at this time with a view to prevent the war. I

say, if the Tribunal accepts it; and that seems to be a matter you will

not prove with the details of these negotiations, which seem to me not

very important.

DR. DIX: Yes, but in my opinion the gravity and intensity of the

activities of these conspirators should be substantiated in detail. In

my opinion it is not sufficient that these plans...

THE PRESIDENT: But you have touched upon them since 10 o’clock this

morning.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now proceeding in connection with Schacht’s

point of view, as to whether a survey, a political survey of Schacht’s

part...

THE PRESIDENT: I am told that you said last night that you would be half

an hour longer. Do you remember saying that? Perhaps it was a

mistranslation.

DR. DIX: Oh no, that is quite a misunderstanding. I said that if I were

to touch upon the Fritsch crisis and complete it, it would take another

half hour—that is, the Fritsch crisis alone. Gentlemen of the Tribunal,

the position is this: We are now hearing the story of the political

opposition, in which Schacht played a leading role. If the Defendant

Göring and others had time for days to describe the entire course of

events from their point of view, I think that justice demands that those

men, represented in this courtroom by the Defendant Schacht, who fought

against that system under most dreadful conditions of terror, should

also be permitted to tell in detail the story of their opposition

movement.

I would, therefore, ask the Tribunal—and I am not in favor of the

superfluous—to give me permission to allow the witness to make a few

more remarks on the measures taken by the group of conspirators, Beck,

Schacht, Canaris, and others, which he has already touched upon. I beg

the Tribunal to realize that I consider it of the greatest importance;

and I assume, Your Lordship, that if it is not done now, the Prosecution

will take the matter up during cross-examination. Moreover, I believe

that as it is now being told in sequence, it will take less time than if

we were to wait for the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to tell you how you are to

prove your case, but hopes that you will deal with it as shortly as

possible and without unnecessary details.

DR. DIX: Please be sure of that.

Well then, Witness; you had mentioned foreign political measures, and

you were about to talk of the motives which caused some of you to enter

into relations with foreign countries for the support of your opposition

movement. Will you please continue with that?

GISEVIUS: I should like simply to confine myself to the statement that

from that time on there were very detailed and weighty discussions with

foreign countries in order to try everything possible to prevent the

outbreak of war or at least to shorten it or keep it from spreading.

However, as long as I am not in a position to speak of the motives of

such a delicate matter—in connection with which people like us would be

accused of high treason, in Germany, at least—as long as that is the

case, I shall not say more than the fact that these conversations took

place.

DR. DIX: I did not understand that the Tribunal would prevent you from

explaining your motives. You may state them therefore.

GISEVIUS: I owe it to my conscience and above all to those who

participated and are now dead, to state here that those matters which I

have described weighed very heavily upon their consciences. We knew that

we would be accused of conspiring with foreign countries.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, knows that these matters were

not conducted without danger; but we are not really here for the purpose

of considering people who have, unfortunately, lost their lives. We are

considering the case of the Defendant Schacht at the moment.

DR. DIX: I think the intention of the witness has been misunderstood. He

does not wish to speak about those men who lost their lives, and he does

not want to speak of the dangers; he wishes rather to speak of the

conflicts of conscience suffered by those who planned and undertook

those steps. I think that that privilege should be granted the witness

if he is to speak of this very delicate matter here in public. I would,

therefore, beg you to allow it; otherwise the witness will confine

himself to general indications which will not be sufficient for my

defense, and I assume that the Prosecution will ask about these things

in the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you try and get him to come to the point? We, of

course, can’t tell what he wants to talk about. We can only tell about

what he does talk about.

DR. DIX: Well, then, you will describe briefly the considerations which

swayed those who entered into those foreign relations, and also describe

the character of those relations.

GISEVIUS: Mr. President, it was not merely a question of conscience. I

was concerned with the fact that there are relatives still alive today

who might become the subject of unjust accusations; and that is why I

had to say, with reference to those conferences abroad which I shall

describe, that even our intimate circle of friends did not agree in all

respects as to what measures were to be permitted. One wanted to go

further, while another held back. I owe it to the memory of the dead

Admiral Canaris, for instance, to rectify many erroneous press

announcements and state that he refused to conspire with foreign

countries. I must guard against the possibility that anything I say now

might be applied to men whom I have mentioned earlier. That is why I

wanted to make this statement, and at the same time I wanted to say that

our friends who did these things rejected the accusation of high

treason, because we felt that we were morally obliged to take these

steps.

DR. DIX: Well then, what happened?

GISEVIUS: The following happened: Immediately after Hitler announced his

intention to invade Czechoslovakia, friends tried to keep the British

Government informed, from the first intention to the final decision. The

chain of attempts began with the journey of Goerdeler in the spring of

1938 to London, where he gave information concerning the existence of an

opposition group which was resolved to go to any lengths. In the name of

this group the British Government was continuously informed of what was

happening and that it was absolutely necessary to make it clear, to the

German people and to the generals, that every step across the Czech

border would constitute for the Western Powers a reason for war. When

the crisis neared its climax and when our preparations for a revolt had

been completed to the last detail, we took a step unusual in form and

substance. We informed the British Government that the pending

diplomatic negotiations would not, as Hitler asserted, deal with the

question of the Sudeten countries but that Hitler’s intention was to

invade the whole of Czechoslovakia and that, if the British Government

on its side were to remain firm, we could give the assurance that there

would be no war.

Those were, at the time, our attempts to obtain a certain amount of

assistance from abroad in our fight for the psychological preparation of

a revolt.

DR. DIX: We now come to September of 1938 and the crisis which led to

the Munich Conference. What were the activities of your group of

conspirators at that time?

GISEVIUS: The more the crisis moved towards the Munich conference, the

more we tried to convince Halder that he should start the revolt at

once. As Halder was somewhat uncertain, Witzleben prepared everything in

detail. I shall now describe only the last two dramatic days. On 27

September it was clear that Hitler wanted to go to the utmost extremity.

In order to make the German people war-minded he ordered a parade of the

Berlin army through Berlin. Witzleben had to execute the order. The

parade had entirely the opposite effect. The population, which assumed

that the troops were marching to war, showed their open displeasure. The

troops, instead of jubilation, saw clenched fists; and Hitler, who was

watching the parade from the window of the Reich Chancellery, had a fit

of rage. He stepped back from the window and said, “With such people I

cannot wage war.” Witzleben came home indignant and said that he would

have liked to have had the guns unlimbered in front of the Reich

Chancellery. On the next morning...

DR. DIX: One moment, Witzleben told you that he would have liked to have

had the guns unlimbered in front of the Chancellery?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: And what is the source of your knowledge regarding Hitler’s

remark when he stepped back from the balcony?

GISEVIUS: Several people from the Reich Chancellery told us that.

DR. DIX: Well then, go on.

GISEVIUS: The following morning—that was the 28th—we believed that the

opportunity had now come to carry out the revolt. That morning we also

learned that Hitler had rejected the final offer from the British Prime

Minister, Chamberlain, and had sent the intermediary, Wilson, back with

a refusal. Witzleben got that letter and took it to Halder. He believed

that proof of Hitler’s desire for war had now been produced, and Halder

agreed. Halder went to see Brauchitsch while Witzleben waited in

Halder’s room. After a few moments Halder came back and said that

Brauchitsch now had also realized that the moment for action had arrived

and that he merely wanted to go over to the Reich Chancellery to make

quite sure that Witzleben and Halder’s account was correct. Brauchitsch

went to the Reich Chancellery after Witzleben had told him over the

telephone that everything was prepared; and it was that noon hour of 28

September when suddenly, and contrary to expectations, Mussolini’s

intervention in the Reich Chancellery took place, and Hitler, impressed

by Mussolini’s step, agreed to go to Munich; so that actually at the

last moment the revolt was eliminated.

DR. DIX: You mean through Munich, don’t you?

GISEVIUS: Of course.

DR. DIX: And now the Munich conference was over. How did matters stand

in your group of conspirators?

GISEVIUS: We were extremely depressed. We were convinced that now Hitler

would soon go to the utmost lengths. We did not doubt that Munich was

the signal for a world war. Some of our friends wondered if we should

emigrate, and that was discussed with Goerdeler and Schacht. Goerdeler,

with this idea in mind, wrote a letter to a political friend in America

and asked particularly whether the opposition people should now

emigrate. Goerdeler said,

“Otherwise to be able to continue our political work at all in Germany

in the future there is only one other possibility, and that is to employ

the methods of Talleyrand.”

We decided to persevere, and then events followed in quick succession

from the Jewish pogroms to the conquest of Prague.

DR. DIX: But before we come to Prague, Witness, you mentioned the Jewish

pogroms; and obviously you mean November 1938. Do you know or can you

recollect what Schacht’s reaction was to those events?

GISEVIUS: Schacht was indignant about the Jewish pogroms, and he said so

in a public speech before the personnel of the Reichsbank.

DR. DIX: I shall submit that speech later as documentary evidence. And

then how did things go on from there? We have come to the end of 1938.

Were there new political events on the horizon which had a stimulating

effect on your group of conspirators?

GISEVIUS: First of all, there was Schacht’s sudden dismissal from the

Reichsbank Directorate. Schacht’s desire for a consultation of the

Cabinet on this matter did not materialize and our hopes of bringing

about a cabinet crisis were vain. Thus our opposition group had no

connecting point and we had to wait and see what would happen after the

conquest of Prague.

DR. DIX: One moment; you mentioned Schacht’s dismissal from his position

as President of the Reichsbank. Can you tell us anything about this,

about the circumstances leading to it and the effect it had on Schacht,

and so on?

GISEVIUS: I saw how the various letters and memoranda of the Reichsbank

Directorate were drafted, and how they were progressively toned down,

and how Schacht was then dismissed. A few minutes after the letter of

dismissal arrived from Hitler, Schacht read it to me; and he was

indignant at the contents. He repeated to me the passage in which Hitler

praised him for his participation in the German rearmament program; and

Schacht said, “And now he wants me to undertake to go on working with

him openly, and uphold his war policy.”

DR. DIX: But then Schacht remained as a Minister without Portfolio. Was

the problem as to whether he should do so or whether he could act

differently ever discussed between you and Schacht at the time?

GISEVIUS: Yes, but as far as I know it was the same type of discussion

which took place whenever he was to resign. He talked to Lammers, and I

assume that Lammers gave him the customary reply.

DR. DIX: In other words, he thought he had to remain, that he was forced

to remain?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Now, you have made several attempts to speak about Prague, but

I interrupted you. Will you please describe the effects upon your group

of conspirators, as far as Schacht was concerned?