“In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners
were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then
tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker,
_et cetera_. In some cases the prisoners were first given salt
herring to eat, in order to produce an especially strong and
torturing thirst.
“In the Hohnstein Concentration Camp in Saxony, prisoners had to
stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this
purpose, until the drops of water, which fell down at even
intervals, caused seriously infected wounds on their scalps.
“In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed
in the form of a cross to a grating for days, once without
interruption for 3 days and nights, once for 5 days and nights
and fed so meagerly with dry bread that they almost died of
hunger.
“These few examples show a degree of cruelty which is such an
insult to every German feeling, that it is impossible to
consider any extenuating circumstances.
“In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these
three points to you, my dear Herr Reich Minister, in your
capacity as departmental minister competent for the
establishment of protective custody, and the camps for
protective custody.”
And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by the
Minister. I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have more of this
read.
Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of that
communication by Frick?
GISEVIUS: The letter was received just at the time I left the Ministry
of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing concerning this
letter: What is described therein is really only a fraction of what we
knew. I helped prepare this letter in that I spoke to the officials
concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice could
bring up only those matters which had by chance become known legally
through some criminal record. But there can be no doubt that this
communication was merely a motive, and the cause of a very bold letter
from Heydrich to Göring, dated 28 March 1935, in which he disputed the
right of the Minister of Justice to prosecute cases of ill-treatment.
The letter, therefore does not add anything new to my descriptions, and
no doubt all have been convinced that these conditions, which started at
that time, never ceased but became worse as time went on.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when Heydrich was
assassinated in Prague, was there not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, some very brave Czechs were able to do what we
unfortunately could not achieve. That will always be to their glory.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suppose the Czechs expected, and did you
expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result in some
improvement in this condition?
GISEVIUS: We doubted—we, Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and the others of the
group—whether it was possible at all for an even worse man to be found
to succeed such a monster as Heydrich, and to that extent we really did
think that the Gestapo terror would now subside, and that perhaps we
would return to a certain amount of honesty and integrity, or that at
least the cruelties might be lessened.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did you notice any
improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner? Tell us about that.
GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner came and things became worse from day to day.
More and more we learned that perhaps the impulsive actions of a
murderer like Heydrich were not so bad as the cold, legal logic of a
lawyer who took over the administration of such a dangerous instrument
as the Gestapo.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner took an even
more sadistic attitude than Himmler and Schellenberg had done? Were you
informed about that?
GISEVIUS: Yes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, really had
something akin to a bad conscience when he committed his crimes. At any
rate, he did not like it when those things were discussed openly in
Gestapo circles. Nebe, who as Chief of the Criminal Police had the same
rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Müller, always told me that Heydrich
took care to conceal his crimes.
With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this practice
ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among the department
chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, of course. These
gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came to me from such
luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a nervous breakdown. On
two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long sick leave because he simply
could not stand the open cynicism with which mass murder, and the
technique of mass murder, were discussed.
I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the
first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this circle, as
were the experiments as to how one could remove the Jews most quickly
and most thoroughly. These were the most horrible descriptions I have
ever heard in my life. It is, of course, so much worse when you hear
them first-hand from someone who is still under the direct impression of
such discussions—and who because of this is almost at the point of
physical and mental collapse, than when you hear of them now from
documents. Nebe became so ill that actually as early as 20 July he
suffered from a persecution mania and was a mere human wreck after
everything he had gone through.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences
of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those who happened to be in
town?
GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at luncheon. This
was of particular importance to us, because we heard details of the
methods used by the Gestapo in the fight against our group.
To prove what I say, I can state here that, for instance, the order
issued for the arrest of Goerdeler on 17 July was decided upon during
such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at once. That is the
reason why Goerdeler was able to escape, at least for some time, and why
we were able to know to what extent the Gestapo were aware of our plot.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who were the regular attendants at those
luncheon conferences?
GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner presided. Then there were Gestapo Müller,
Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you know whether, at those meetings, the new
kinds of torture and the technique of killing by gas, and other measures
in the concentration camps, were discussed?
GISEVIUS: Yes. That was discussed in great detail, and sometimes I
received the description only a few minutes later.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what is the situation with reference to the
information of the Foreign Office about the conduct of the Gestapo? Will
you tell us what was done to inform the Foreign Office from time to time
of the crimes that the Gestapo were committing?
GISEVIUS: The Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier years, was
continually kept informed, as nearly every day some foreigner was half
beaten to death or robbed, and then the diplomatic missions would come
with their complaints, and these complaints were sent to the Ministry of
the Interior by the Foreign Office. These went through my office and
sometimes I had four or five such notes a day from the Foreign Office
regarding excesses by the Gestapo; and I can testify that in the course
of years there were no crimes by the Gestapo which were not set forth in
these notes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make certain reports to the Foreign Office
which were so dispatched that you are reasonably certain they would
reach Neurath?
GISEVIUS: Ribbentrop was not yet the Foreign Minister at that time...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, Neurath.
GISEVIUS: I very often discussed these matters personally with the
officials of the Foreign Office, because they were of a particularly
difficult nature, and because the officials of the Foreign Office were
very indignant, I asked them repeatedly to put these matters before the
Minister through the official channels. In addition, I gave as much
material as I could to one of the closest collaborators of the Foreign
Minister at that time, the Chief of Protocol, “Minister” Von
Bülow-Schwante; and according to the information I received from
Bülow-Schwante, he very often submitted that material to Neurath.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were certain of the collaborators close
collaborators of Von Papen? Was Von Papen subject to action by the
Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: To start with, the entire group around Von Papen was
continuously under surveillance by the Gestapo because in the earlier
years there was an impression among great masses of people that Von
Papen was a special advocate for decency and right. A large group
collected around Von Papen and that, of course, was most carefully
watched by the Gestapo. As the complaints, which Von Papen received by
the score, were carefully compiled in his office, and as no doubt Von
Papen quite often took these papers either to Göring or to the
Hindenburg palace, the closest collaborators of Von Papen were
especially suspected by the Gestapo. So it was that on 30 June 1934
Oberregierungsrat Von Bose, the closest collaborator of Von Papen, was
shot dead in the doorway of Von Papen’s office. The two other colleagues
of Von Papen were imprisoned, and the man who wrote Von Papen’s radio
speeches, Edgar Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June; and on
the morning of 1 July, he was found murdered in a ditch along the
highway near Oranienburg.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Von Papen continue in office after that?
GISEVIUS: I have never heard that he resigned; and I know that very soon
after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, he was sent to
Vienna as Hitler’s ambassador.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he ever make any protests that you know of?
GISEVIUS: I personally heard of none at the time, although, we were
naturally extremely eager to hear which minister would protest. However,
no letter from Papen arrived at the Ministry of the Interior.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were some of his collaborators murdered after the
Anschluss in Austria?
GISEVIUS: On the day of the Anschluss, when the SS entered Austria, Von
Papen’s closest collaborator, Legation Counsellor Freiherr von Ketteler,
was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We searched for him for weeks, until 3 or
4 weeks later his body was washed up on the banks of the Danube.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After that did Papen continue to serve as a part of
the Hitler Government and accept further offices from Hitler’s hands?
GISEVIUS: He was no longer a member of the Government at the time.
Immediately after the march into Austria Von Papen was disposed of by
being made envoy. However, it was not long before he continued his
activities as Ambassador at Ankara.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does the Tribunal desire to rise at this point?
THE PRESIDENT: You would like a little more time, wouldn’t you, with
this witness?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will take a little more time, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH DAY
Friday, 26 April 1946
_Morning Session_
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal:
Dr. Gisevius, yesterday you made some reference to Herbert Göring in
saying that Schacht had sent word to you about the Gestapo microphones
in Schacht’s house. Will you tell us who Herbert Göring was in relation
to the defendant?
GISEVIUS: Herbert Göring was a cousin of the Defendant Göring. I had
known him for many years. Herbert, as well as his brothers and sisters,
warned me already years ago about the disaster which would overtake
Germany if at any time a man like their cousin Hermann Göring should get
a position of even the smallest responsibility. They acquainted me with
the many characteristics of the defendant which all of us had come to
know in the meantime, starting with his vanity, and continuing with his
love of ostentation, his lack of responsibility, his lack of scruples,
even to the extent of walking over the dead. In this way I already had
some idea what to expect of the defendant.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, during the period when you were making these
investigations and having these early conversations with Schacht, and up
until about 1937, you, as I understand it, were very critical of Schacht
because he had helped the Nazis to power and continued to support them.
Is that true?
GISEVIUS: I did not understand how an intelligent man, and one who was
as capable in economics as he was, could enter into such a close
relationship with Hitler. I was all the more bewildered because, on the
other hand, this man Schacht, from the very first day and in a thousand
small ways resisted the Nazis, and the German public took pleasure in
many sharp and humorous remarks which he made about the Nazis. Great was
my bewilderment, until I actually met the man Schacht. And then...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period Schacht did have great influence
with the German people, did he not, particularly with German people of
responsibility and power?
GISEVIUS: He had great influence to the extent that many Germans hoped
to find a proponent of decency and justice in him, since they heard that
he undertook many steps in that direction. I remember his activity in
the Ministry of Economics, where officials who were not Party members...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we have covered that, and I am anxious to
get along with this, if I may interrupt you.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period you reported to Dr. Schacht
fully concerning your findings about the criminal activities of the
Gestapo, did you not?
GISEVIUS: Yes; from time to time I spoke more frankly, and it is obvious
that I...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he took the position, as I understand you, that
Hitler and Göring did not know about these things.
GISEVIUS: Yes. He was of the opinion that Hitler did not know anything
about such terrible things, and that Göring knew at most only a part.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he stood by Göring until 1937, when Göring
pushed him out of the economics office, did he not?
GISEVIUS: I believe that was at the end of 1936. I may be wrong. I
believe it would be more correct to say that he looked for support from
Göring and hoped that Göring would protect him from the Party and the
Gestapo.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, Schacht did not heed warnings about
Göring until late 1936 or 1937?
GISEVIUS: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And during this period there would be no doubt,
would there, that Schacht was the dominant economic figure in the
rearmament program until he was superseded by Göring with the Four Year
Plan?
GISEVIUS: I do not know whether everything went through like that
exactly. He was, of course, as Minister of Economics, the leading man in
German economy, not only for rearmament but for all questions of German
economy; rearmament was just one of them.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now Schacht believed, and as I understand it, you
too believed during all this period that under German constitutional law
no war could be declared except by authority of the Reich Cabinet. Is
that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, from the point of view of the
German Constitution, the war was illegal, by German law, as declared and
carried out by Hitler, in your view.
GISEVIUS: According to our firm conviction, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we found out yesterday the position you
were to have if there was a successful overthrow of the Hitler regime.
Schacht was under consideration for Chancellor, was he not, if that
movement was successful?
GISEVIUS: No. It is only correct as to the first offer that Halder made
in August of 1938, or perhaps July 1938, when he visited Schacht for the
first time. At that time, according to the information which I received,
Halder asked Schacht whether, in the case of an overthrow, he would be
ready to take over a position like that. Schacht replied that he would
be ready for anything if the generals would eliminate the Nazi regime
and Hitler.
As early as the year 1939 individual opponents formed a group, and at
the last, when Beck was the acknowledged head of all conspirators from
the left to the right wing, Goerdeler emerged in the foreground together
with Beck as the leading candidate for the position of Reich Chancellor,
so that after that time we need speak only of Goerdeler in that regard.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to ask you some questions about the
Defendant Keitel. Of course, we have heard that Hitler was the actual
head of the state, but I want to ask you whether Keitel occupied a
position of real leadership and power in the Reich.
GISEVIUS: Keitel occupied one of the most influential positions in the
Third Reich. I would like to say at this point that I was a very close
friend of four of the closest collaborators of Keitel. One was the Chief
of the Ordnance Office in the OKW, the murdered General Olbricht; the
second was the Chief of the Counterintelligence Service, Admiral
Canaris, who was also murdered; the third was the Chief of the Army
Legal Department, Ministerial Director Sack—he was also murdered—and
finally there was the chief of the armament economy department, General
Thomas, who escaped being murdered as though by a miracle. A close
friendship, I might say, bound me to these men, and thus from these men
I found out exactly what tremendous influence Keitel had over the OKW
and in all Army matters, and thereby what influence he wielded in
representing the Army in the eyes of the German people.
It may be that Keitel did not influence Hitler to a great extent. But I
must testify here to the fact that Keitel influenced the OKW and the
Army all the more. Keitel decided which documents were to be transmitted
to Hitler. It was not possible for Admiral Canaris or one of the other
gentlemen I mentioned to submit an urgent report to Hitler of his own
accord. Keitel took it over, and what he did not like he did not
transmit, or he gave these men the official order to abstain from making
such a report. Also, Keitel repeatedly threatened these men, telling
them that they were to limit themselves exclusively to their own
specialized sectors, and that he would not protect them with respect to
any political utterance which was critical of the Party and the Gestapo,
of the persecution of the Jews, the murders in Russia, or the
anti-Church campaign, and, as he said later, he would not hesitate to
dismiss these gentlemen from the Wehrmacht and turn them over to the
Gestapo. I have read the notes in regard to this which Admiral Canaris
made in his diary. I have read the notes of General Oster in regard to
this from the conferences of commanders in the OKW. I have talked with
the Chief Judge of the Army, Dr. Sack, about this, and it is my strong
wish to testify here that Field Marshal Keitel, who should have
protected his officers, repeatedly threatened them with the Gestapo. He
put these men under pressure, and these gentlemen considered that a
special insult.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whether Keitel could control Hitler
or not, he did have a very large control of the entire OKW underneath
him. Is that not true?
GISEVIUS: Did you say Hitler? No, Keitel.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whether Keitel could control Hitler or not he did
control and command the entire OKW underneath him?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whatever Hitler’s own inclinations
may have been, these men in this dock formed a ring around him which
kept out information from your group as to what was going on unless they
wanted Hitler to hear it, isn’t that a fact?
GISEVIUS: Yes. I believe that I should cite two more examples which I
consider especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to
persuade Keitel to warn Hitler, before the invasion of Belgium and
Holland, and to tell him, that is Hitler, that the information which had
been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged violation of neutrality
by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. The counterintelligence was to
produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians.
Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I ask that
this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which
were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong. That is one example
when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he should have transmitted.
The second was that Keitel was asked by Canaris and Thomas to submit to
Hitler the details of the murders in Poland and Russia. Admiral Canaris
and his friends were anxious to prevent even the beginning of these mass
murders and to inform Keitel while the first preparations by the Gestapo
were being made for these infamous actions. We received the documents,
through Nebe and others. Keitel was informed as to this in detail, and
here again he did not resist at the beginning; and he who did not stop
the Gestapo at the beginning can not be surprised if in the end a
millionfold injustice was the upshot.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I think you put your question, “Did
not these men in the dock form a ring which prevented you getting to
Hitler,” and the question was answered rather as though it applied only
to Keitel. If you intended to put it with reference to all defendants, I
think it ought to be cleared up.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is true.
[_Turning to the witness._] Each of the defendants who held ministerial
positions of any kind controlled the reports which should go to Hitler
from that particular ministry, did he not?
GISEVIUS: As far as this general question is concerned, I must reply
cautiously, for, first of all, it was a close clan which put a cordon of
silence around Hitler. A man like Von Papen or Von Neurath cannot be
included in this group, for it was obvious that Von Papen and Von
Neurath, and perhaps one or the other of the defendants, did not have
the possibility, or much later no longer had the possibility, of having
regular access to Hitler, for besides Von Neurath, Hitler already had
his Ribbentrop for a long time. Thus I can only say that a certain
group, which is surely well known, composed the close circle of which I
am speaking.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like you to identify those of the
defendants who had access to Hitler and those who were able to prevent
access to Hitler by their subordinates. That would apply, would it not,
to Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, and to
Schacht—during the period until he broke with them, as you have
testified—and to Dönitz, Raeder, Sauckel, and Speer?
GISEVIUS: You mentioned a few too many and some are missing. Take the
Defendant Jodl, for instance. I would like to call your attention to the
strange influence which this defendant had and the position he had with
regard to controlling access to Hitler. I believe my testimony shows
that Schacht, on the other hand, did not control access to Hitler, but
that he could only be glad about each open and decent report which got
through to Hitler from his and other ministries. As far as the defendant
Frick is concerned, I do not believe that he was necessarily in a
position to control access to Hitler. I believe the problem of Frick
centers in the matter of responsibility.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Should I have included Funk in the group that had
access to Hitler?
GISEVIUS: Funk, without a doubt, had access to Hitler for a long time,
and for his part Funk had of course the responsibility to see that
affairs in the Ministry of Economics and in the Reichsbank were
conducted in the way Hitler desired. Without a doubt Funk put his
surpassingly expert knowledge at the service of Hitler.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you prepare or participate in preparing reports
which were sent to Keitel as to the criminal activities of the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did others participate with you in the preparation
of those reports?
GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the work of a group. We gathered reports about
plans and preparations of the Gestapo, and we gathered material about
the first infamous acts, so that some courageous men at the front,
officers of the General Staff and of the Army, went to the scene,
prepared reports, made photographs, and this material came then to both
Canaris and Oster. Then the problem arose: how can we bring this
material to Keitel? It was generally known that officers, even highly
placed officers like Canaris and Thomas, were forbidden to report on
political matters. The difficulty was, therefore, not to have Canaris
and the others come under the suspicion that they were dealing with
politics; we employed the roundabout method of preparing so-called
counterintelligence agents’ reports from foreign countries or from
occupied countries; and with the pretext that different agents from all
countries were here reporting about these outrages, or that agents
traveling through or in foreign countries had found such infamous
photographs we then submitted these reports to Field Marshal Keitel.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Canaris and Oster participate in
submitting those reports to Keitel?
GISEVIUS: Yes. Without Canaris and Oster the working out and the
gathering of this material would have been inconceivable.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what positions did Canaris and Oster hold with
reference to Keitel at this time when these reports were being
submitted?
GISEVIUS: Canaris was the senior officer of the OKW. Formally he even
had to represent Keitel when Keitel was absent. Keitel was only
concerned that someone else should take his place at such times, usually
his Party general, Reinecke; and Oster, as the representative, Chief of
Staff for Canaris, was also in close association with Canaris. Keitel
could not have wished for closer contact with reality and truth than
through this connection with the Chief of his Wehrmacht
Counterintelligence Service.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So these reports which were sent to Keitel came
from the highest men in his own organization under himself?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what did they report to Keitel? Let me ask you
if they reported to him that there was a systematic program of murder of
the insane going on.
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. On these subjects, too, records were completed in
detail including the despairing reports of the directors of the lunatic
asylums. I recall this exactly because here, too, we had great
difficulties in giving a reason for these reports, and we actually put
them through as reports of foreign doctors who had heard of these things
with indignation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he report to him the persecution and murder of
the Jews and the program of extermination of the Jews that was being
carried out?
GISEVIUS: From the first Jewish pogroms in 1938 on Keitel was minutely
informed of each new action against the Jews, particularly about the
establishment of the first gas chamber, or rather, the establishment of
the first mass graves in the East, up to the erection of the murder
factories later.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did these reports mention the atrocities that were
committed in Poland against the Poles?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed, here I would say again that the atrocities in
Poland, too, started with isolated murders which were so horrible that
we were still able to report on single cases, and could add the names of
the responsible SS leaders. Here, too, Keitel was spared nothing of the
terrible truth.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that condition of informing Keitel also
prevail as to the atrocities against nationals in other occupied
countries?
GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all I must of course mention the atrocities in
Russia, because I must emphasize that Keitel now certainly, on the basis
of the Polish atrocities, had been warned sufficiently as to what was at
hand in Russia. And I remember how the preparation of these orders, such
as the order for the shooting of commissars and the Night and Fog
Decree, was continued for weeks in the OKW, so that, as soon as the
preparation of these orders was begun, we begged Canaris and Oster to
present a petition to Keitel. But I would like to add that I do not
doubt that other courageous men also presented a petition to Keitel in
this connection. Since I belonged to a certain group, the impression
might be created that only in this group were there persons who were
interested in these problems, and I would be withholding vital
information if I did not add that even in the High Command of the OKW
and in the General Staff there were excellent men who did everything to
reach Keitel through their separate channels, and that there were also
brave men in many ministries who tried to reach every officer whom they
saw in order to plead with him to order a stop to this injustice.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel mention the forced
enslavement of millions of foreign workers and their deportation or
importation into Germany?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those enslaved laborers are the displaced
persons, largely, of this day—that are plaguing Germany today, are they
not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. In this connection I would also like to say that
in our reports it was already mentioned just what responsibility the
Wehrmacht would have to bear if these ill-treated people should be free
some day. We had an idea of what was to come, and those who made the
reports at that time can understand what has now taken place.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel report the persecution of
the churches in the occupied countries?
GISEVIUS: Yes, they did. I would like to cite as a special example how
we even once sent leading churchmen to Norway in the guise of agents.
They established contact with Bishop Bergraf, and brought back very
detailed reports of what Bishop Bergraf thought about the persecution of
the churches in Norway and other countries. I can still see this report
before me because Keitel also wrote one of his well-known National
Socialist Party phrases on this document.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, these reports consisted both of information
furnished by Canaris and Oster and of the reports coming in from the
field under this plan?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you a few questions about the SA and
the SS organizations. In your book, which you have been asked about, I
think you have characterized the SA as a private army of the Nazi
organization. Is that a correct characterization?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During the early part of the struggle for power the
SA constituted a private army for carrying out the orders of the Nazi
Party, did it not?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They took in a good many people in the SA, and it
got pretty large, and there came a time when there was some danger it
would get away from them; wasn’t there?
GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the murder of Röhm and his associates was a
struggle for power, was it not, between Göring and Himmler and the Nazi
crowd associated with them on one hand and Röhm and his associates on
the other?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After the murder of Röhm, this SA organization,
which was very big at the time, rather lost importance, didn’t it?
GISEVIUS: Yes, completely.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS, which was a smaller and more compact
organization, came in to take its place as a private army, didn’t it?
GISEVIUS: Yes, as the decisive private army.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s go back to the SA during the period
before the struggle for power resulting in the Röhm purge. What part did
the SA play in the battle for power, the seizure of power?
GISEVIUS: As is said in the song, “It cleared the streets for the Brown
Battalions,” and without a doubt the SA played a dominant role in the
so-called seizure of power. Without the SA Hitler would undoubtedly
never have come to power.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s take up their methods. Perhaps I can
shorten this by quoting from your book. I think you say that:
“Whoever had not entirely made up his mind, had it made up for
him unequivocally by the SA. Their methods were primitive,
therefore all the more effective. For instance, one learned the
new Hitler salute very quickly when, on the sidewalks, beside
every marching SA column—and where were there no parades in
those days—a few stalwart SA men went along giving pedestrians
a crack on the head right and left if they failed to perform the
correct gesture at least three steps ahead of the SA flag. And
these Storm Troopers acted the same way in all things.”
Is that a correct account of their activities and influence?
GISEVIUS: I hope so.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you know so, don’t you?
GISEVIUS: Yes, yes, of course, for it is my own description, I cannot
criticize it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but you saw these things yourself, did you
not? You were in Germany at that time?
GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You see, it is very difficult for us, with all the
documents we have, Doctor, to get the picture of the day to day events,
and you were there and we were not.
Now, let me make another question:
“The chronicle of that private army is colorful and stirring. It
teemed with beer hall brawls, street fights, knifings,
shootings, and fist fights, altogether a mad rough and tumble
affair, where naturally there was no question of crises of
leadership or of mutinies. In this brotherhood of the wild men
of German nationalism there was undoubtedly much idealism, but
at the same time the SA was the repository for political
derelicts. The failures of all classes found refuge there. The
discontents, the disinherited, the desperados streamed to it
wholesale. The core, the paid permanent group, and particularly
the leaders, were recruited, as time went on, more and more from
the riffraff of a period of political and social decay.”
Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA at that time?
GISEVIUS: Yes, quite.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I call your attention to another question:
“The SA organized huge raids. The SA searched houses. The SA
confiscated property. The SA cross-examined people. The SA put
people in jail. In short, the SA appointed themselves permanent
auxiliary police and paid no attention to any of the principles
of the so-called system period (Weimar Republic). The worst
problem for the helpless authorities was that the SA never
returned its booty at all. Woe unto anyone who gets into their
clutches!
“From this time dated the ‘Bunker,’ those dreaded private
prisons of which every SA Storm Troop had to have at least one.
‘Taking away’ became the right of the SA. The efficiency of a
Standartenführer was measured by the number of arrests he had
made, and the good reputation of an SA man was based on the
effectiveness with which he ‘educated’”—in quotation marks, the
quotation marks being yours—“‘educated’ his prisoners. Brawls
could no longer be staged in the fight for power, yet the
‘fight’ went on, only the blows were now struck in the full
enjoyment of power.”
Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also used the term “Bunker,” and it is
a slightly technical term with which some of us are not familiar. Will
you tell the Tribunal what this Bunker system of the SA was?
GISEVIUS: Bunkers were those cellars or other dungeons with thick walls
in which the poor prisoners were locked up, where they were then beaten
and in a large measure beaten to death. They were these private jails in
which, during the first months, the leaders of the leftist parties and
of the trade unions were systematically rendered harmless, which
explains the phenomenon that the leftist groups did not act again for so
long a time, for there, at the outset and most thoroughly, the entire
leadership was done away with.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also use the expression “‘taking away’ became
the inalienable right of the SA,” and “taking away” is in quotation
marks. Will you tell us about this “taking away,” what it means?
GISEVIUS: That was the arbitrary arrest, whereby the relatives often for
periods of weeks or months did not know where the poor victims had
disappeared to, and could be glad if they ever returned home.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also make this observation in your
book:
“Every excess, pardoned as ‘overzealousness in the cause of the
National Socialist Revolution,’ was a demonstration of official
sanction and necessarily drew in its wake a new excess. It was
the bestiality tolerated during the first months that later
encouraged the sadistic murderers in the concentration camps.
The growth in brutality and insensibility of the general public,
which toward the end of the revolution extended far beyond the
domain of the Gestapo, was the unavoidable consequence of this
first irresponsible attempt to give free rein to the Brown
Shirts for their acts of violence.”
Does that, too, represent your observation of the SA?
GISEVIUS: Yes—not of the SA alone but also of general conditions in
Germany.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you tell us about—as I understand you,
after the Röhm Purge the SA was rather abandoned as the private army,
and a more reliable and smaller and more compact private army was
created under Himmler.
GISEVIUS: A guard which had been established by Himmler long before this
time now actually came into action. I do not doubt that Himmler and his
closest circle for years had worked toward this very objective so that
one day, with their Schutztruppe (protective guard), they could
establish the terror system in Germany. But until 30 June the SS had
been a part of the SA, and Göring—excuse me, Röhm was also the chief of
the SS. The road for Himmler to police chief in Germany, to police chief
of evil, was only open after Röhm had been eliminated with his much
larger SA. But the will to power of the SS and all the confused and
unscrupulous ideas connected therewith must be assumed to have existed
in the leadership of the SS already for many years previous to that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this SS organization selected its members with
great care, did it not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell us something about the qualifications
for membership? What was necessary?
GISEVIUS: The members had to be so-called Nordic types. Actually I
always considered these questionnaires as a good subject for a humorous
paper, and for that reason I am not in a position today to give you
exact particulars, except that, if I am not mistaken, the distinguishing
characteristics of men and women went so far as underarm perspiration. I
recall that Heydrich and Himmler, in selecting SS men who were to do
police duty, decided only after a picture had been submitted to them of
the future victim who would be charged with carrying out their evil
commands. I know that, for example, Nebe repeatedly saved officials in
the criminal police force (Kripo) from being transferred to the ranks of
the Gestapo by having poor photographs taken of these people so that, as
far as possible, they did not look Nordic. In that case, of course, they
were turned down immediately. But it would be going too far afield to
relate more about these dismal things in this courtroom.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was the membership of the SS recruited only
from what we may call fanatical Nazis, reliable Nazis?
GISEVIUS: I believe we have to make a distinction. In the first years of
the SS, many decent German people, especially farmers and people in the
country, felt drawn to the SS, because they believed Himmler’s assurance
that the SS was to bring order to Germany and to be a counterbalance to
the SA terror. In that way, to my knowledge, some people in the years
before 1933, and even in 1933 and 1934, entered the SS, because they
hoped that here would be a nucleus standing for order and right, and I
believe it is my duty to point out the tragedy of these people. Each and
every case should be examined before deciding whether, later on, a
member was guilty or whether he remained decent.
But from a certain period of time on—I believe I specified yesterday
1935—no one could have any doubts as to the real SS objectives. From
then on—here I would like to take up your own expression—fanatical
National Socialists, that is, “super” National Socialists, entered the
SS.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And from 1935 on, was it, in your judgment as one
who was on the ground, necessarily so, that the persons who entered it
knew what its actual activities were?
GISEVIUS: Yes; what he was entering into and what orders he had to
expect.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Tribunal wishes me to ask you in reference to
yesterday’s incident if you have anything to add. I know nothing further
on that incident, in reference to the threat made. Is there anything
that you wish to add about that incident in order to make it clear to
the Tribunal, anything that has not been told about it?
GISEVIUS: I would like to make clear that Dr. Dix did not merely inform
me about a discussion he had with Dr. Stahmer. That morning I arrived in
the room of the attorneys, and I do not wish to state further
particulars, but the atmosphere there was not exactly cordial to begin
with. Then I went up to Dr. Dix to report something else. Dr. Stahmer
approached, obviously very excited, and asked Dr. Dix for an immediate
interview. Dr. Dix refused on the ground that he was talking to me. Dr.
Stahmer said in a loud voice that he must speak to Dr. Dix immediately
and urgently. Dr. Dix took only two steps aside and the conversation
that followed was carried on by Dr. Stahmer in such a loud voice, that I
was bound to hear most of it. I did hear it and said to attorney Dr.
Kraus who was standing nearby, “Just listen how Dr. Stahmer is carrying
on.” Dr. Dix then came over to me, very excited, and after all this
fuss, in response to my questions as to what precisely was the demand of
the Defendant Göring, he told me what I had half heard anyway. I would
like to underline that if I had had the opportunity to tell the story
first in my own way, I would have emphasized that I was under the
impression that Dr. Stahmer had merely transmitted a statement, or
rather what I would call a threat, by the Defendant Göring.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in this Nazi regime, after Hitler came to
power, will you state whether there was, as far as you could see, a
systematic practice of the Nazi ministers and Nazi officials enriching
themselves by reasons of their confiscation of property of Jews and
others?
GISEVIUS: Yes. This became more cynical from year to year and we kept
lists as to which of the civil ministers and, above all, which of the
generals and field marshals participated in this system. We planned to
inquire of all the generals and ministers at a later date whether these
donations had been put into a bank account or whether they had possibly
used this money for their own personal interests.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And will you state to the Tribunal which of the
defendants were engaged in self-enrichment in the manner that you have
indicated?
GISEVIUS: I am sorry I am only able to give a negative reply since we
repeatedly inquired from the Defendant Schacht...
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a good time to adjourn for 10
minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Gisevius, I have just a few more questions
which I would like to put to you in reference to the war and the
resistance movement of which you were a part.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, there is just one question I should
like to ask the witness. You said that you kept lists of the ministers
and generals who participated in this system of spoils. What was your
source of information?
GISEVIUS: We had information from the various ministries, from
antechambers of ministries, and from the Finance Ministry. But I did not
finish the answer before. I said that I could answer the question as to
which of the defendants had enriched himself only in the negative.
Concerning the Defendant Schacht, I wanted to continue saying that I
personally did not look into these lists, and that I took part only in
the questioning of the Defendant Schacht and that he personally had not
enriched himself. I did not intend to say in any sense, therefore, that
all the defendants, especially Defendants Von Papen or Von Neurath, to
name only these two, had enriched themselves. I do not know. I wanted to
say only that about Schacht we know, or rather I know, that he did not
take part in that system.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in addition to a system of spoils from
confiscated property, there were also open gifts from Hitler to the
generals and ministers, were there not, of large sums of property and
money?
GISEVIUS: Yes. These were the famous donations with which, especially in
the years after the outbreak of the war, the top generals were
systematically corrupted.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that hold true with reference to many of
the ministers?
GISEVIUS: I do not doubt it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as I understood your testimony, whatever
doubts you may have had before 1938 when the affair Fritsch occurred,
that event or series of events convinced even Schacht that Hitler was
bent on aggressive warfare.
GISEVIUS: After the Fritsch crisis Schacht was convinced that now
radicalism and the course toward war could no longer be stopped.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was never any doubt in the minds of all of
you men who were in the resistance movement, was there, that the attack
on Poland of September 1939 was aggression on Hitler’s part?
GISEVIUS: No, no, there could be no doubt about that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that diplomatic means of righting whatever
wrongs Germany felt she suffered in reference to the Corridor and Danzig
had not been exhausted?
GISEVIUS: I can only point to the existing documents. There was no will
for peace.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in the German resistance movement, as I
understand you, there was agreement that you wanted to obtain various
modifications of the Treaty of Versailles, and you also wanted various
economic betterments for Germany, just as other people wanted them. That
was always agreed upon, was it not?
GISEVIUS: We were all agreed that a calm and a reasonable balance could
be achieved again in Europe only when certain modifications of the
Versailles Treaty were carried through by means of peaceful
negotiations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your difference from the Nazi group was chiefly, in
reference to that matter, one of method.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the very beginning, as I understand you, it
was the position of your group that a war would result disastrously for
Germany as well as for the rest of the world.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the necessary modifications, given a
little patience, could be brought about by peaceful means.
GISEVIUS: Absolutely.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was in the light of that difference of
opinion, I suppose, that your resistance movement against the regime in
power in Germany carried out these proposals for Putsche and
assassinations which you have described.
GISEVIUS: Yes, but I would like to add that we were not only thinking of
the great dangers outside, but we also realized what dangers lay in such
a system of terror. From the very beginning there was a group of people
in Germany who still did not even think of the possibility of war, and
nevertheless protested against injustice, the deprivation of liberty,
and the fight against religion.
In the beginning, therefore, it was not a fight against war, but if I
may say so, it was a fight for human rights. From the very first moment
on, among all classes of people, in all professional circles, and in all
age groups, there were people who were ready to fight, to suffer, and to
die for that idea.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question may arise here as to what your
motives and what your purposes in this resistance movement were with
reference to the German people, and I shall ask you to state to the
Tribunal your overall purpose in resisting the Government in power in
your country.
GISEVIUS: I should like to say that death has reaped such a rich harvest
among the members of the resistance movement, that it is only for that
reason I can sit here, and that otherwise more worthy and able men could
give this answer. Having said this, I feel that I can answer that,
whether Jew or Christian, there were people in Germany who believed in
the freedom of religion, in justice, and human dignity, not only for
Germany but also, in their profound responsibility as Germans, for the
higher concept of Europe and the world.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was a group which composed this resistance,
as I understand it.
GISEVIUS: It was not only just a group, but many individuals had to
carry the secret of their resistance silently to their death rather than
confide it to the Gestapo records; and only a very few persons have
enjoyed the distinction of being referred to now as a group.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Most of the men who were associated with you in
this movement are dead?
GISEVIUS: Almost all of them.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add to clarify
your position to the Tribunal, Dr. Gisevius?
GISEVIUS: Excuse me, I did not understand you.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add in order
that the Tribunal may understand your position in this, your feeling,
your very strong feeling in this matter, to understand and appraise your
own relation to this situation?
GISEVIUS: I do not like to talk of myself, but I want to thank you, Mr.
Prosecutor, for giving me an opportunity to testify emphatically on
behalf of the dead and the living.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have concluded the examination.
MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.):
Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Was not the understanding arrived at with Counsel for the
Prosecution that the witness for the Defendant Frick should only be
cross-examined by one prosecutor?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I have an agreement with the prosecutors
to the effect that the examination of the Defendant Schacht and his
witnesses will be carried out by the American Prosecution, but that, in
the presence of additional questions during cross-examination, the
prosecutor from the Soviet Prosecution could also join in the
examination. In view of the fact that the Soviet Prosecution has several
additional questions to ask the witness Gisevius, which are of great
importance to the case, I ask permission to address these questions to
the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: What are the questions which you say are of particular
importance to the Soviet Union? I do not mean the individual questions
but the general nature of them.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Questions in connection with the part played by the
Defendant Frick in the preparation for war, questions connected with the
attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards the Hitler regime, as well as
a number of other important questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn in order to consider whether
the Prosecution ought to be allowed to cross-examine this witness in
addition to the cross-examination which has already taken place.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has before it two documents which were
presented to it by the Chief Prosecutors upon the subject of
cross-examination. In the first of these documents it was provided that
the following procedure for the cross-examination of the Defendants
Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frank, Frick, Streicher, and Funk was agreed; and
that with reference to Frick the American Prosecution was to conduct the
cross-examination of the defendant and his witness. The document was
presented because of the Tribunal’s express desire that too much time
should not be taken up by the cross-examination by more than one
prosecutor.
In addition to that document there was another document, which was only
a tentative agreement, and with reference to the Defendant Schacht it
provided that the American delegation should conduct the principal
cross-examination and the Soviet and the French delegations should
consider whether either would wish to follow.
In view of those two documents, the first of which suggests that the
Prosecution have agreed to only one cross-examination of the witnesses
of the Defendant Frick, and the second of which tentatively suggests
that, in addition to the American Prosecution, the Soviet and the French
might wish to cross-examine, the Tribunal propose to allow the
additional cross-examination in the present instance, and they are loath
to lay down any hard and fast rule concerning cross-examination. They
hope, however, that in the present instance, after the full
cross-examination by the Prosecutor of the United States, the Soviet
Prosecutor will make his cross-examination as short as possible. For the
future, the Tribunal hopes that the prosecutors may be able to agree
among themselves that in the case of witnesses one cross-examination
only will be sufficient, and that in any event the additional
cross-examination will be made as brief as possible.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Witness, in order to save time, I beg you to answer my
questions as briefly as possible.
Tell me, what part did the German Ministry of the Interior and the
Defendant Frick personally play in the preparation for the second World
War?
GISEVIUS: This question is very difficult for me to answer. I left the
Ministry of the Interior as early as May 1935, and I actually cannot say
any more about conditions after that time than any other German, that
is, that the Ministry of the Interior was part of the German government
machine and doubtlessly there, as in all other ministries, those
preparations for war were made which administrations have to make in
such cases.
DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say something? The witness has just stated that
he could not say any more in answering that question than any other
German could. I believe that, under these circumstances, the witness is
not the right person to make any factual statements.
THE PRESIDENT: He has just said so himself. That is exactly what he
said. I don’t see any reason for any intervention. The witness said so.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I only meant that he could not even function as a
witness concerning these facts.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: For perfectly obvious reasons I am deprived of all
possibility to put these questions to any German, but I am perfectly
satisfied with the answers of the witness Gisevius.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know anything about the so-called
“Three Man College”? It consisted of the Plenipotentiary for the
Administration of the Reich, of the Plenipotentiary for Economy, and of
a representative of the OKW. This Three Man College was entrusted with
the preparation of all fundamental questions pertaining to the war.
GISEVIUS: I personally cannot give any information on that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the activities of the
Ministry of the Interior in territories occupied by the Germans?
GISEVIUS: As far as I know, the Ministry of the Interior sent important
officials into the military administration, but it is not clear to me
whether these officials, from that moment on, were subordinate to the
Ministry of the Interior or the OKW.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you any special knowledge as to whether the
machinery of the Reich Commission in the occupied territories of the
Soviet Union was recruited from the Ministry of the Interior or at least
with considerable help from this ministry?
GISEVIUS: I should assume so, yes. It holds good as far as help is
concerned, because the ministry for the occupied Russian territories
could take its officials only from the personnel department of the
Ministry of the Interior.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know of the visits paid by the Defendant
Frick to the concentration camps?
GISEVIUS: At the time when I was in the Ministry of the Interior I did
not hear anything about that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: And after that?
GISEVIUS: After that I did not hear anything about it either.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Could a situation arise in which the Defendant Frick,
although Minister of the Interior, would not be informed regarding the
system of concentration camps established in Germany and of the violence
and lawlessness practiced in the camps?
GISEVIUS: I believe that I have already yesterday given exhaustive
information as to the fact that we were informed about everything.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In this particular case I am interested in the
Defendant Frick. What do you know about him in this connection?
GISEVIUS: I have said yesterday that the Reich Ministry of the Interior
received numberless calls for help from all over the country, and
yesterday we even saw a letter from the Ministry of Justice. Also I have
referred...
THE PRESIDENT: This subject was fully covered yesterday.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall pass on to the next question.
[_Turning to the witness._] Are you acquainted with the secret law
issued in Germany in 1940 concerning the killing of sick persons and the
old?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Frick towards
the promulgation and enforcing of this law?
GISEVIUS: I assume that he, as Minister of the Interior, signed it.
THE PRESIDENT: The law, if there was a law, was after 1935, was it not?
What is the law that you are putting? If it was in 1935, then this
witness was not in the Ministry of the Interior.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am speaking of the law which was promulgated in 1940.
THE PRESIDENT: He would not know anything about it any more than anybody
else.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am satisfied with the answer which I have received
from the witness. Will you now allow me to proceed to questions
concerning the Defendant Schacht?
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you were in close relations with
the Defendant Schacht for a considerable period of time; have I
understood you correctly?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you were sufficiently acquainted with the state
and political activities of the Defendant Schacht?
GISEVIUS: I believe so, yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, what do you know about the part played by the
Defendant Schacht in Hitler’s seizure of power?
GISEVIUS: That was just the time when I did not yet know Schacht, and
about which I cannot give any information.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about it?
GISEVIUS: I knew only that he entered the Cabinet and that without doubt
he assisted Hitler in the preliminary political negotiations.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the meeting engineered by
Schacht between Hitler and the big industrialists, in February 1933?
GISEVIUS: No.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: As a result of this meeting a fund was created by the
industrialists with a view to guaranteeing the success of the Nazi Party
at the elections. What do you know about this meeting?
GISEVIUS: I know nothing about this meeting. In my book I wrote that to
my knowledge the largest amount for the election campaign in 1932 was
given by Thyssen at that time and Grauert, a member of the Rhein-Hessian
iron and steel industry group.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the part played by the Defendant Schacht on
this occasion?
GISEVIUS: At that time I did not see Schacht in the Ruhr district, and I
also do not know whether he was there at that time. I emphasize again
that I did not know him at all.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know that. But in your book entitled _Until the
Bitter End_, published in 1946, and in your replies to preliminary
interrogations by defendant’s counsel Dix, you favorably described the
Defendant Schacht; is that correct?
GISEVIUS: I did not understand the last words.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I repeat that you favorably described the Defendant
Schacht; is that correct?
GISEVIUS: Yes, yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You state that as from 1936, the Defendant Schacht was
in opposition to Hitlerite regime, and that he expressed these opinions
in a fairly open manner; is that true?
GISEVIUS: No, I state expressly that beginning with 1936 his suspicions
were aroused, but that he only became an opponent of Hitler during the
Fritsch crisis.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In which year do you place this crisis?
GISEVIUS: End of 1937 and beginning of 1938. The Fritsch crisis was at
the beginning of 1938.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell us, under the then existing regime in Germany,
could a situation arise where Hitler would not be informed as to these
opposite views of Schacht which, according to you, existed at the end of
1937?
GISEVIUS: You mean that Hitler was not informed after 1938?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I asked you, could it be possible, under the then
existing regime in Germany, that Hitler was not informed as to this
antagonistic attitude on the part of Schacht?
GISEVIUS: Hitler knew very well that Schacht was very critical towards
the system and that he frequently expressed disapproval. He often
received letters from Schacht and of course heard a great deal, too. But
he did not know how far that opposition went.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then how could Schacht remain in the Government of the
Reich, as Minister without Portfolio and personal adviser to Hitler,
right up to January 1943, if Hitler, as you say, was fully aware of his
critical attitude towards his, Hitler’s, policy?
GISEVIUS: Hitler always took care to let prominent individuals disappear
quietly or put them in the shade so that foreign propaganda could not
take advantage of these facts. The Schacht case is not the only one in
which Hitler tried to camouflage an open crisis.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted with a letter from Hitler of 19
January 1939, addressed to Schacht, who at that time was being relieved
of his post as President of the Reichsbank? I should like to remind you
of the contents of that letter in which Hitler writes to Schacht as
follows:
“I avail myself on the occasion of your release from the post of
President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank to thank
you most warmly, most sincerely for the services you have
repeatedly rendered while in that position, to Germany and to me
personally, during long and arduous years. Above all else, your
name will be connected forever with the first period of national
rearmament. I am happy that you will now be able, as
Reichsminister, to proceed to the solution of new tasks...”
THE PRESIDENT: This was all gone over yesterday by the witness.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please forgive me, but I have a question to put to the
witness in connection with this letter.
[_Turning to the witness._] It would appear, from the contents of this
letter, that in January 1939—and I stress the date, Witness—Hitler
expressed his appreciation of Schacht’s activities rather differently
from the manner in which you worded your evidence. How do you reconcile
this divergence of opinion with your assertion that the Defendant
Schacht was already in direct opposition to Hitler’s regime towards the
end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938?
GISEVIUS: I should like to answer that I am not accustomed to consider
any written or oral proclamation by Hitler as truthful. That man always
said only that which seemed opportune to him at the moment to deceive
the world or Germany. In this particular case Hitler intended to avoid
the impression that Schacht’s resignation would cause a difficult
economic crisis. But I am only saying now what Hitler could have had in
his mind. Yesterday I described with what indignation Schacht received
that letter. He considered it derision and debasement.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then I shall refer to another document, to a letter
from Schacht himself addressed to Hitler. This is a memorandum of 7
January 1939, in which Schacht wrote to Hitler:
“From the very beginning the Reichsbank has realized that the
fruits of a successful foreign policy can only be obtained if
this policy is founded on the rebirth of the Wehrmacht. It
therefore took upon itself, to a very large extent, the
financing of the armament program, despite the monetary and
political difficulties involved. The justification of this
consisted in the necessity, which far outweighed all other
arguments, of manufacturing arms immediately, _ex nihilo_, often
even under disguise, in order to ensure a foreign policy which
would command respect.”
Do you also consider this document as an expression of Schacht’s
attitude?
GISEVIUS: As far as I have understood, you refer to a letter from the
year 1935, is that correct?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I refer to a letter of 7 January 1939.
GISEVIUS: Please pardon me. Then I can say only what I said yesterday:
that all these letters were very carefully written so that they could
not be considered a provocation, and the factual contents of the letter
made illusory lest Hitler should simply say, “This is a personal attack
on me.” I said yesterday that the problem was to convince the other
conservative ministers, who were not so much against Hitler, about the
actual situation and neutralize any opposition.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards
the Anschluss?
GISEVIUS: The Anschluss happened right in the middle of the Fritsch
crisis, or probably at the dramatic climax, and that is why we were
firmly convinced that this was a particularly malevolent case of
camouflage, and in that sense we were indignant. We had no doubt that
the German Army was to be diverted outwards...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, wait a minute. You were asked if you knew what
the attitude of Schacht was to the Anschluss question at that time. You
are not answering that question. Do you or do you not know?
GISEVIUS: I cannot give a definite answer about that, because all of us
saw clearly that the problem of Austria had to be solved in a legal way.
There were differences of opinion with regard to this question in our
group. Most of us hoped that the independence of Austria could be
preserved. Especially from the German point of view, it was desirable
that another independent German State should exist, if at any later time
there should be a League of Nations or diplomatic negotiations. However,
I cannot state under oath whether Schacht personally was of that opinion
or whether he was for an outright annexation. He was certainly against
the method.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall quote an excerpt from a speech made by Schacht
in Vienna, in March 1938:
“Thank God, these matters could not, in the end, hinder the
forward march of the great German people, for Adolf Hitler has
created a community of German will and thought, he supported it
with the reborn strength of the Wehrmacht, and thereby gave an
outward form to this spiritual union of Germany and Austria.”
Do you qualify these statements of Schacht’s also as expressions of his
opposition to the Hitler regime?
GISEVIUS: I would have to be able to read the speech in its entirety. I
personally would not have said it, but I do not know whether pure
judgment on my part here serves any purpose. Would it not be better to
ask Schacht what he meant?
THE PRESIDENT: The speech can be put to Schacht when he goes into the
witness box, if he does.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, Witness, you are currently residing in
Switzerland? In which town?
GISEVIUS: I live near Geneva in a village called Commugny.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: How long have you lived in Switzerland?
GISEVIUS: Since the first of October 1940.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know about Schacht’s arrival in Switzerland in
1943?
GISEVIUS: No. He did not come to Switzerland in 1943.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In 1942?
GISEVIUS: He did not come to Switzerland in 1942 either.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then Schacht was not in Switzerland either in 1942 or
1943?
GISEVIUS: That is correct.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In all the time that you yourself lived in Switzerland,
did you ever meet the Defendant Schacht or not?
GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly. I was in Berlin at least every 4 weeks or 8
weeks and until 1943...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I am asking you about Schacht’s visit to
Switzerland.
GISEVIUS: During the war there was only one visit to Switzerland by
Schacht—in 1941, on the occasion of his wedding trip, and then I saw
him.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That was in 1941?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 14 January 1946, an article was published in the
newspaper _Basler Nachrichten_, entitled “What Schacht Thinks.” Do you
know anything about that article?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about that article?
GISEVIUS: Not more than I read in the paper about it. I have tried to
find out who that American was with whom Schacht had the conversation.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: The details do not interest me.
One last question: Did you know anything about a conference held at
Hitler’s house in Berchtesgaden, in the summer of 1944, when the
advisability of killing imported foreign workers was discussed, in the
case of further successful advances by the Allied Forces? Did you hear
anything about that conference?
GISEVIUS: No, at that time I could not go to Germany any more, because
there were proceedings against me, and I heard nothing about that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Then do you wish to re-examine, or does any other member
of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions of the witness?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, yesterday during the cross-examination the
American prosecutor submitted to you a letter of 14 May 1935 by the
Reich Minister of Justice to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the
Interior. In that letter there is an enclosure which mentions a copy of
a letter by an inspector of the Secret State Police. Witness, did I
understand you correctly to say that you personally assisted in writing
that letter?
GISEVIUS: We had cross-connections between the Ministry of the Interior
and the Ministry of Justice, and at times it was desirable, if a letter
of a severe nature came from another ministry, for me to present it to
my minister. And I do not doubt that Frick was also glad when he
received a sharp letter, so that he could submit a matter in a general
way and before the Cabinet. Thus I remember that the sending of that
letter was discussed in advance with several gentlemen of the Ministry
of Justice and with myself.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do I understand you correctly then that the letter was
a joint effort of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the
Interior to do something against the Gestapo terror?
GISEVIUS: As for myself, I can certainly say “yes.” I was at that time a
member of the Ministry of the Interior. Of course I did not speak to my
chief about that point.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In that letter we find on Page 5 of the German text
the following sentence—I quote:
“In the concentration camp at Hohnstein in Saxony, inmates had
to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for
that purpose, until the drops of water, falling at regular
intervals, produced serious infected injuries on the scalp.”
Do you know that the guards of that camp were heavily punished for that?
GISEVIUS: No, and if that happened it was an astounding exception.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, then I have one more question. That is in
connection with the statement which you just made, that there was an
atmosphere of hostility toward you in the room of the attorneys due to
the incident which has been mentioned. A number of colleagues are deeply
shocked by that statement of yours, and these colleagues were glad that
you described conditions in Germany so openly. Could you tell me whether
that statement you made applies to all of the Defense Counsel?
GISEVIUS: I am grateful to you that you give me the opportunity to
correct an apparent misstatement, or a misunderstanding which was
created by my statement. I meant a different incident which occurred as
I entered the counsel room, about which I do not want to speak any
further here. I wish to emphasize that I realize the difficult task of
the Defense Counsel, and that I want to apologize if in any way the
impression was created or might be created that I had reproached the
great majority of the Defense Counsel in the carrying out of their
difficult task.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you. I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gisevius, I want to ask you some questions to try and
get clear what your various positions were and where you were at various
times.
As I understand it, in 1933 you were a civil servant, is that right?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And then you became a member of the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: The first position I held as a qualified civil servant was in
the service of the Political Police. In Germany one is a civil servant
even in the training stage. Therefore I have to say that I received my
first real position as an official in August of 1933 when I entered the
Gestapo.
THE PRESIDENT: And when did you leave that position?
GISEVIUS: The end of December 1933.
THE PRESIDENT: And to what position did you go?
GISEVIUS: Then I entered the Ministry of the Interior; that is to say,
the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. In the course of the year 1934 I
also entered the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and in May of 1935 I
was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior.
Then I came into the newly created, or to-be-created, Reich Criminal
Office, which, at its beginning, was the Police Presidium in Berlin. On
the date when Himmler was appointed Reich Chief of Police, on 17 June
1936, I was finally dismissed from the police service.
I was then transferred to the Government office in Münster, worked there
in price control supervision, and, in the middle of 1937, I took an
unpaid vacation, ostensibly to make studies in economics. That vacation
was canceled by the Ministry of the Interior at the beginning of 1939,
and I was attached to the Government office in Potsdam near Berlin.
There I had to do with road building...
THE PRESIDENT: In the middle of 1937 you took unpaid service and studied
in economics, I think you said, or an unpaid vacation.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You still remained a member of the civil service then,
did you?
GISEVIUS: Yes; until the 20th of July I was continuously in the civil
service.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, in the beginning of 1939 you were posted to the
Ministry of the Interior and attached to Potsdam?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on; after that?
GISEVIUS: When war broke out the difficulty arose that I had no
mobilization order and, on the other hand, my friends wanted to have me
in the OKW. From the date of the outbreak of the war until 1 October
1940 I had only a forged mobilization order, and every day I expected to
be found out. At which time I would have had to take the consequences.
After the fall of Paris I stated to Canaris and Oster that I would have
to ask them now to release me from that somewhat complicated situation.
At that time the position of Canaris, temporarily, was so strong that he
placed me in an intelligence position with the Consulate General in
Zürich. There I received the title of a Vice Consul with the Consulate
General in Zürich, and I stayed there as a counterintelligence man,
without belonging to the Abwehr formally, until 20 July.
After 20 July I was dismissed from all posts, and I do not know whether
I was not even deprived of citizenship. I have found out nothing about
that.
THE PRESIDENT: Between the time you went to Zürich and 20 July, were you
returning to Germany from time to time?
GISEVIUS: During that time I was mainly in Germany, and only from time
to time Oster and Canaris sent me to Switzerland as a courier, on travel
orders. Schacht was still quite helpful to me at that time in getting me
a Swiss visa, through the Swiss Legation.
THE PRESIDENT: During the time that you were in the Gestapo, from August
to December 1933, what was your actual job or function?
GISEVIUS: When I received my first civil service position I was only in
training, and I was attached to the then Chief of the Executive
Department, Oberregierungsrat Nebe, for training. After the warrant for
arrest was issued, at the end of October 1933, I was sent to Leipzig as
a reporter for the Reichstag Fire trial.
THE PRESIDENT: You spoke yesterday very often of a man whose name I am
not clear about, Nebe, I believe it was.
GISEVIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What was his position?
GISEVIUS: Nebe was a well-known criminologist at the Berlin Police
headquarters before 1933. As a National Socialist he was called into the
Gestapo in July 1933 and until the beginning of 1934; he was promoted
there to Oberregierungsrat. Then we were successful, with the aid of the
Defendant Frick, in having him transferred for some time to the Ministry
of the Interior. And then he became the founder and Chief of the Reich
Office of Criminology. On the day of the appointment of Himmler as Chief
of Police of the Reich he was put into the new Reich Security Main
Office. In the course of time he was taken over into the SS; he became
an SS Gruppenführer, SS General, and, until 20 July, he was one of the
closest subordinates of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. The Defendant
Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Gestapo as well as the Criminal Police
and the Information Service. So that thereby Nebe became a subordinate
of Kaltenbrunner and received continuously official orders from him,
just like the Gestapo Chief Müller.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to ask any questions, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better do that after the adjournment
at a quarter past 2.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. DIX: The Soviet Prosecutor put a question to you in connection with
the annexation of Austria. While answering the question you were
interrupted. You had just said, I quote “But the form...” Would you
please complete your answer now?
GISEVIUS: What I wanted to say was that Schacht was undoubtedly opposed
to the Anschluss in this form.
DR. DIX: Then I have one last question, which concerns the so-called
incident of yesterday. I discussed this incident with you yesterday and
explained the situation as regards my colleague Dr. Stahmer. I also gave
you permission to make use of this explanation at any time.