“We must take care of these territories and their population. I
have found, to my pleasure and that of all of our colleagues,
that this point of view has prevailed and that everything that
was formerly said against the alleged friendship with the Poles
or the weakness of this attitude, has dwindled to nothing in
face of the facts.”
That completes Volume II of the document book—I beg your pardon, I
meant Volume III. Now I come to Volume IV of the document book.
Page 1 of the document book deals with a conversation which took place
on 25 January 1943 with the SS Obergruppenführer Krüger. I quote the
last paragraph:
“The Governor General states that he had not been previously
informed about the large-scale action to seize asocial elements
and that this procedure was in opposition to the Führer’s decree
of 7 May 1942, according to which the State Secretary for
Security must obtain the approval of the Governor General before
carrying out instructions by the Reichsführer SS and Chief of
the German Police. State Secretary Krüger states that this
concerned secret instructions which had to be carried out
suddenly.”
I ask the Tribunal to take cognizance of the fact that this is merely an
example of many similar discussions and differences of opinion.
I now turn to Page 24 of the document book. This concerns a meeting of
the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee on 22 September 1943. I
hope that the pages tally again.
THE PRESIDENT: You said Page 24, didn’t you?
DR. SEIDL: Page 24, an entry of 22 September 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: It looks as though the paging is right. Our book is Page
24 at the top, so perhaps you will continue to quote the page for a
moment or two. We will see whether it goes on right.
DR. SEIDL: This concerns an entry dated 22 September 1943, a meeting of
the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee. I quote only the first
lines:
“In the course of the past few months, in the face of the most
difficult and senseless struggles, I have had to insist on the
principle that the Poles should, at last, be given a sufficient
quantity of food. You all know the foolish attitude of
considering the nations we have conquered as inferior to us, and
that at a moment when the labor potential of these peoples
represents one of the most important factors in our fight for
victory. By my opposition to this absurdity, which has caused
most grievous harm to the German people, I personally—and many
men of my government and many of you—have incurred the charge
of being friendly or soft towards the Poles.
“For years now people have not hesitated to attack my government
of this area with the foulest arguments of this kind, and behind
my back have hindered the fulfillment of these tasks. Now it has
been proved as clear as day that it is insane to want to
reconstruct Europe and at the same time to persecute the
European nations with such unparalleled chicanery.”
I now turn to Page 34 of the document book, an entry dated 20 April
1943, concerning a government meeting. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of the final words only of the Governor General’s speech
on Page 38 of the document book and Page 41 of the diary. Then I turn to
Page 39 of the document book, a meeting of 22 July 1943; I quote from
the second paragraph, the tenth line:
“The question of the resettlement was altogether particularly
difficult for us in this year. I can give you the good news that
resettlement in general has been completely discontinued for the
duration of the war. With regard to the transferring of
industries, we have just started to work at full speed. As you
know—I personally attach great importance to it—we have to
satisfy this need of the Reich, and in the coming months we
shall install great industrial concerns of international renown
in the Government General.
“However, with regard to this question we must consider the
almost complete reconstruction of the Government General which
has consequently been forced upon us. While, until now, we have
always figured as a country supplying the Reich with labor, as
an agricultural country, and the granary of Europe, we shall
within a very short time become one of the most important
industrial centers of Europe. I remind you of such names as
Krupp, Heinkel, Henschel, whose industries will be moved into
the Government General.”
I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 41 of the document book. It is
the statement which was made by the witness Doctor Bühler on 26 October
1943, in which he states that this report dealt with 4 years of
reconstruction in the Government General on the basis of reliable
information from the 13 chief departments. The statement includes Pages
42 to 69 of the document book. I do not propose to quote from this
statement, but I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
I go straight on to Page 70 of the document book, which concerns a
government meeting dated 16 February 1944. I quote the last paragraph,
Page 4 of the document book.
“As opposed to this, the fact must be established that the
development, construction, and securing of that which today
gives this territory its importance were possible only because
it was necessary, in opposition to the ideas of the advocates of
brute force—so completely untimely during a war—to bring the
human and material resources of this area into the service of
the German war effort in as constructive a manner as possible.”
The next quotation is Page 74; an entry dated 6 March 1944. I quote the
last paragraph on Page 75, Page 5 of the diary:
“The Governor General does not, as a matter of principle, oppose
the training of the younger generation for the priesthood
because, if courses for doctors, _et cetera_, are arranged,
similar opportunities must also be created in the field of
religion.”
Page 77 deals with an order by the Governor General prohibiting the
evacuation of the population, or a part of it, which was in the fighting
zone near Lublin.
On Page 80 is an entry dated 12 April 1944. I quote the second
paragraph:
“In this connection President Gerteis spoke of the treatment of
the Poles in the Reich. This treatment, said to be worse than
that of any other foreign workers, had led to the result that
practically no Poles would volunteer any more for work in
Germany.
“There were 21 points on which the Polish workers in the Reich
were more badly treated than any other foreign workers. The
Governor General requested President Gerteis to acquaint him
with these 21 points which he would certainly attempt to have
abolished.”
I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 100 of the document book. It
concerns a conference on 6 June 1944 regarding a large-scale action
against the partisans in the Bilgoraje Forest. I quote Page 101, Page 4
of the diary:
“The Governor General wants to be quite sure that protection is
given to the harmless population, which is itself suffering
under the partisan terror.”
Page 102 deals with the views of the Governor General on concentration
camps. It is an entry dated 6 June 1944. I quote the last paragraph:
“The Governor General declared that he would never sign such a
decree, since it meant sending the person concerned to a
concentration camp. He stated that he had always protested with
the utmost vigor against the system of concentration camps, for
it was the greatest offense against the sense of justice. He had
thought there would be no concentration camps for such matters,
but they had apparently been silently put into operation. It
could only be handled in such a manner that the persons
condemned would be pardoned to jail or prison for a certain
number of years. He pointed out that prison sentences, for
instance, were imposed and examined by state institutions. He
therefore requested that State Secretary Dr. Bühler should be
informed that he, the Governor General, would not sign such
decrees. He did not wish concentration camps to be officially
sanctioned. He went on to say that there was no pardon which
would commute a sentence into commitment to a concentration
camp. The courts-martial are state legal organs of a special
character and consist of police units; actually they should
normally be staffed by members of the Wehrmacht.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, can you explain the translation of the words
at the bottom of Page 102 which are in English, “It only could be
handled in such a manner that the persons would be pardoned to jail or
prison for a certain number of years.” Can you explain that from the
point of view of meaning?
DR. SEIDL: The meaning of the words becomes clear from the statement
made by President Wille in the previous paragraph where, among others,
you will find the following statement. It is the tenth line from the
top.
“The Reprieve Commission had asked the representative of the
Chief of the Security Police, who was present at the session, in
what form this pardon was to be effected. As far as he knew,
remittance of a sentence had been allowed in one case only. In
all other cases it was customary to couple Security Police
measures with the remittance of a sentence. It was feared that
otherwise these people might disappear.”
Now the Governor General was of the opinion that, for example, to
transmute a death sentence to a term in prison or penitentiary was
possible but that he would have to refuse direct commutation of a death
penalty into a suspended prison penalty if the Police in that event were
to impose security measures.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that it meant that pardon from a death sentence
might be made by a reprieve for a sentence in prison for a certain
number of years, but not by sending to a concentration camp, which would
be for an indefinite period and under police methods?
DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the sense of it.
I now turn to Page 104 of the document book. This quotation also deals
with the general question of treatment of the population in the
Government General.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you have been very much longer than you said,
and the Tribunal thinks you might be able to cut down a great deal of
this. It is all very much on the same lines.
DR. SEIDL: Yes. In that case, I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 112 of
the document book, an entry dated 10 July 1944. This entry deals with
the official control of art treasures. I quote the second paragraph:
“The Governor General instructs the expert Palezieux to have a
complete index made of these art treasures.”
THE PRESIDENT: You have already told us and given us some evidence to
support the view that the Defendant Frank was preserving the art
treasures and was wishing them to be preserved in Poland, and it is not
necessary under those circumstances to go reading passages about it.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
that entry; and if the Tribunal agrees, I shall merely give you the
pages of the documents in the document book which appear important to
me. That is page...
[_The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in the
interpreting system._]
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if the Court is agreeable I should like to
give only the numbers of the pages of Volume IV of the document book
which seem particularly important to me. These are the Pages 115, 121,
123, 134, 139, 152, and 182. That concludes Volume IV of the document
book and I come to the last volume of the document book which will be
finished considerably faster.
Volume V deals exclusively with the accusations made by the Prosecution
of the United States against the Defendant Frank concerning his activity
as President of the Academy for German Law, as President of the National
Socialist Lawyers’ Association, and similar positions. Page 1 is a
document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution, 1391-PS.
It still has no USA number and will be Exhibit Number Frank-11. It is
the law regarding the Academy for German Law with the necessary statutes
and the tasks resulting therefrom.
I turn to page 25 of the document book. This quotation becomes Exhibit
Frank-12 (Document Number Frank-12). It deals with a sentence which has
been ascribed to the defendant: “Right is that which is good for the
people.” This quotation should prove only that the Defendant Dr. Frank
wanted to express nothing more than that which is implied in the Roman
sentence: _Salus publica suprema lex_ (The supreme law is the welfare of
the people). I ask the Court to take cognizance of this and turn to Page
26 of the document book, an excerpt from the magazine of the Academy for
German Law of 1938. That will be Exhibit Frank-13 (Document Number
Frank-13). This quotation also deals with the afore-mentioned sentence:
“Right is that which is good for the people.”
Page 30 is an excerpt from Exhibit USA-670 (Document Number 3459-PS) and
deals with the closing celebration of the “Congress of German Law 1939”
at Leipzig, where the Defendant Dr. Frank made the concluding speech
before 25,000 lawyers. I quote on Page 31, Line 10 from the bottom:
“Only by applying legal security methods, by administering true
justice, and by clearly following the legislative ideal of law
can the national community continue to exist. This legal method
which permanently ensures the fulfillment of the tasks of the
community has been assigned to you, fellow guardians of the law,
as your mission. Ancient Germanic principles have come down to
us through the centuries.
“1) No one shall be judged who has not had the opportunity to
defend himself.
“2) No one shall be deprived of the incontestable rights which
he enjoys as a member of the national community, except by
decision of the judge. Honor, liberty, life, the profits of
labor are among those rights.
“3) Regardless of the nature of the proceedings, the reasons for
the indictment, or the law which is applied, everyone who is
under indictment must be given the opportunity to have a defense
counsel who can make legal statements for him; he must be given
a legal and impartial hearing.”
I turn to Page 35 of the document book, which deals with a speech, an
address by the Defendant Dr. Frank, made at a meeting of the heads of
the departments of the National Socialist Lawyer’s Association on 19
November 1941. The speech—that is, the excerpt—becomes Exhibit Number
Frank-14 (Document Number Frank-14). I quote only a few sentences at the
top of Page 37.
“Therefore, it is a very serious task which we have imposed upon
ourselves and we must always bear in mind that it can be
fulfilled only with courage and absolute readiness for
self-sacrifice. I observe the developments with great attention.
I watch every anti-juridical tendency. I know only too well from
history—as you all do—of the attempts made to gain
ever-increasing power in general directions because one has
weapons with which one can shoot, and authority on the basis of
which one can make people who have been arrested disappear. In
the first place, I mean by this not only the attempts made by
the SS, the SD, and by the police headquarters, but the attempts
of many other offices of the State and the Reich to exclude
themselves from general jurisdiction.”
I turn to—I would like to quote the last five lines on Page 41. Those
were the last words spoken during that session:
“One cannot debase law to an article of merchandise; one cannot
sell it; it exists or it does not exist. Law is not an exchange
commodity. If justice is not supported, the State loses its
moral foundation; it sinks into the abyss of darkness and
horror.”
The next document is on Page 42. It is the first address which the
Defendant Dr. Frank made in Berlin at the university on 8 June 1942. It
will be Exhibit Number Frank-15 (Document Number Frank-15). I quote Page
44, second paragraph, seventh line:
“On the other hand, however, a member of the community cannot be
deprived of honor, liberty, life, and property; he cannot be
expelled and condemned without first being able to defend
himself against the charges brought against him. The Armed
Forces serve us as a model in this respect. There everyone is a
free, honored member of the community, with equal rights, until
a judge—standing independently above him—has weighed and
judged between indictment and defense.”
I then turn to Page 49 of the document book, the second of these four
long speeches. It was held in Vienna, and will become Exhibit Number
Frank-15.
THE PRESIDENT: We have already had Exhibit Frank-15 on Page 41.
DR. SEIDL: No, I beg your pardon, Mr. President; it will be Frank-16
(Document Number Frank-16). I quote only one sentence on Page 51.
“I shall continue to repeat with all the strength of my
conviction that it would be an evil thing if ideals advocating a
police state were to be presented as distinct National Socialist
ideals, while old Germanic ideals of law fell entirely into the
background.”
Now I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 57 of the document book to the
speech made by the Defendant Dr. Frank at the University of Munich, on
20 July 1942. This will be Exhibit Frank-17 (Document Number Frank-17).
I quote on Page 58, Line 16:
“It is, however, impossible to talk about a national community
and still regard the servants of the law as excluded from this
national community, and throw mud at them in the midst of the
war. The Führer has transferred the tasks of the Reich Leader of
the Reich Legal Office and that of the leader of the National
Socialist Lawyers’ Association to me, and therefore it is my
duty to state that it is detrimental to the German national
community if in the ‘Black Corps’ lawyers are called
‘sewer-rats.’”
I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 67 of the document book. That is the
speech which he made at Heidelberg on 21 July 1942. That will be Exhibit
Frank-18 (Document Number Frank-18). I ask the Tribunal to take official
notice of that speech. On Page 69 I quote only one sentence: “But never
must there be a police state, never. That I oppose.”
I now come to the last document which the Prosecution of the United
States has already submitted under Exhibit Number USA-607 (Document
Number 2233(x)-PS), an excerpt from the diary: “Concluding reflections
on the events of the last three months.”
In these reflections Dr. Frank once more definitely states his attitude
towards the concept of the legal state, and I ask the Tribunal to take
cognizance particularly of his basic assumptions on Pages 74 and 75 of
the document book. Here, Dr. Frank again formulated the prerequisites
which he considered necessary for the existence of any legal state. I
quote only a few lines from Page 74:
“1) No fellow German can be convicted without regular court
procedure, and only on the basis of a law in effect before the
act was committed.
“2) The proceedings must carry full guarantee that the accused
will be interrogated on all matters pertaining to the
indictment, and that he will be able to speak freely.
“3) The accused must have the opportunity, at all stages of the
trial, to avail himself of the services of defense counsel
acquainted with the law.
“4) The defense counsel must have complete freedom of action and
independence in carrying out his office in order to strike an
even balance between the State prosecutor and the defendant.
“5) The judge or the court must make his or its decision quite
independently—that is, the verdict must not be influenced by
any irrelevant factors—in logical consideration of the subject
matter and in just application of the purport of the law.
“6) When the penalty imposed by the sentence has been paid, the
act has been expiated.
“7) Measures for protective custody and security custody may not
be undertaken or carried out by police organs, nor may measures
for the punishment of concentration camp inmates, except from
this aspect, that is, after confirmation of the intended
measures by regular, independent judges.
“8) In the same manner, the administration of justice for fellow
Germans must guarantee full safeguarding of individual interests
in all relations pertaining to civil suits proper.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are there any passages in these documents
which express the opinion that the same principles ought to be applied
to others than fellow Germans?
DR. SEIDL: In this last quotation the Defendant Dr. Frank dealt
basically with questions of law without making any difference here
between Germans and people of foreign nationality. However, in his
capacity as Governor General he also fundamentally objected at all times
to the transfer of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews to concentration camps.
This can be seen from a whole series of entries in the diary.
With this I have come to the end of my evidence for Dr. Frank. There are
left only the answers to interrogatories by witnesses whose
interrogation before a commission has been approved by the Court. At a
later date I shall compile these interrogations in a small document book
and submit the translation thereof to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of interrogatories where you have not
yet got the answers; is that right?
DR. SEIDL: These are interrogatories to which the answers have not yet
been received.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, as soon as you have received them you will
furnish them to the Prosecution and to the Tribunal?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker.
DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): In presenting
evidence for the Defendant Frick, I shall forego calling the defendant
himself as a witness. The questions which require an explanation deal
mainly with problems relating to formal authority and also with problems
which differentiate between formal authority and actual responsibility.
These are problems, part of which have already been elucidated by the
interrogation of Dr. Lammers and the rest of which will be cleared up by
the submission of documents. One special field, however, cannot be
entirely clarified by documents; and that is the question of the actual
distribution of authority within the sphere of the Police; but for that
special field I have named the witness Dr. Gisevius. He is the only
witness whose interrogation seems to be necessary for the presentation
of evidence in the case of Frick. Therefore, in the meantime, I have
dispensed with other witnesses.
I ask the Court to decide whether I should call the witness Dr. Gisevius
first or whether I should submit my documents first. If documents are to
be presented first, I believe that I could finish by the midday recess.
THE PRESIDENT: You can finish your documents before the adjournment, do
you mean?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. I believe so.
THE PRESIDENT: Until 1:00 o’clock?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you indifferent whether you call the witness first or
whether you present the documents first?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that perhaps it would be more
convenient to give the documents first. They hope that you will be able
to finish them reasonably quickly.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the document book (Documents Number 386-PS, L-79,
and 3726-PS) deal with evidence concerning the question of whether the
members of the Reich Cabinet knew about Hitler’s preparation for
aggressive war. I need not read the documents; they have already been
submitted, and they show that Hitler gave information of his plans for
aggression only to those of his assistants who had to know of these
plans for their own work, but did not inform Frick who, as Minister of
the Interior, was responsible for the internal policy.
Within the scope of the war preparation, Frick was made Plenipotentiary
for Reich Administration by the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938,
which has already been submitted, Exhibit Number USA-36 (Document Number
2194-PS). This law does not indicate that this position had anything to
do with the known preparation of an aggressive war; it shows only the
participation of the Administration of the Interior in a general
preparation and organization in the event of a future war. I have
therefore included in the document book an excerpt from this law under
Number 4 of the document book, in order to correct an error. The
Defendant Frick himself stated in an affidavit on 14 November 1945, that
he had held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration
from 21 May 1935. This is the date of the first Reich Defense Law, which
has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-24 (Document 2261-PS).
The first Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, however, does not provide
for the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration; that is
contained only in the second law of 4 September 1938.
This second law has been submitted under Exhibit Number USA-36.
Following this erroneous statement which the Defendant Frick made
without having the two laws on hand, the Prosecution has also stated
that Frick held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration
from 21 May 1935, while actually he held it only from 4 September 1938,
that is, the date of the second law.
Numbers 5 and 6 of the document book have already been submitted by the
Prosecution. They also prove nothing except the participation of the
Defendant Frick in the establishment of civil administration with a view
to a possible future war. It is not necessary to read this either.
The Prosecution considers Hitler’s aggressive intentions to be so well
known and so obvious as to require no further proof. The Prosecution on
that assumption came to the conclusion that participation in the
National Socialist Government, in any field whatsoever, would in itself
imply the conscious support of aggressive war. In opposition to that I
have referred to evidence in documents from Number 7 to 10 inclusive of
the Frick document book (Documents Number 2288-PS, 2292-PS, 2289-PS, and
3729-PS) which have already been submitted by the Prosecution and which
show that Hitler in public, as well as in private conversations, from
the time he came into power followed a definite policy of declaring his
peaceful intentions—a policy, therefore, which for considered reasons,
declared to all that to keep peace was right.
I believe that these documents, which have already been submitted to the
Tribunal, must also be considered in order to decide whether or not
Hitler’s official policy, since his coming to power, indicated that he
had intentions of waging aggressive war. As evidence in that direction,
I should like to submit Number 11 and Number 12 of the document book,
which have not been presented until now, and which I will submit as
Documents Frick-1 and -2.
The first is a telegram of 8 March 1936 from Cardinal Archbishop Schulte
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at the time of the
occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. The second document is a solemn
declaration by the Austrian bishops occasioned by the annexation of
Austria in March 1938.
The first document states, and I quote:
“Cardinal Archbishop Schulte has sent to General Von Blomberg,
the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, a telegram in
which, at the memorable hour when the Armed Forces of the Reich
are re-entering the German Rhineland as the guardians of peace
and order, he greets the soldiers of our nation with deep
emotion mindful of the magnificent example of self-sacrificing
love of fatherland, stern manly discipline, and upright fear of
God, which our Army has always given to the world.”
I particularly selected these two documents because the Catholic Church
is not suspected of sanctioning aggressive wars, or of approving of
Hitler’s criminal intentions in any other way. These statements would
have been unthinkable if the accusations of the Prosecution were true,
namely, that the criminal aims of Hitler and particularly his aggressive
intentions had been known.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, the Tribunal would like to know what is
the source of this telegram from the Archbishop, Number Frick-11.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I took the telegram, Number Frick-11, from the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 9 March 1936.
THE PRESIDENT: And the other one?
DR. PANNENBECKER: The other document is from the _Völkischer Beobachter_
of 28 March 1938.
Number 13 of the document book contains only one sentence, taken from a
speech made by Frick, from which it is evident that Frick shared the
same opinion. He states in this speech, and I quote:
“The national revolution is the expression of the will to
eliminate by legal means every form of external and internal
foreign domination.”
THE PRESIDENT: You gave that the number 13, did you?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. That should be 3.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, that is what I wanted to say. I submit it as
Document Number Frick-3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. PANNENBECKER: The Defendant Frick has been accused particularly of
working for the League for Germans Abroad. The Prosecution saw in this
activity a contribution by the Defendant Frick to the preparation of
aggressive wars. Frick’s actual attitude regarding the aims of the
League for Germans Abroad can be seen from Number 14, which will be
Document Number Frick-4. In a speech made by Frick, it states, and I
quote:
“The VDA (League for Germans Abroad) has nothing to do with
political aims or with frontier questions; it is, and is
intended to be, nothing more than a rallying point for German
cultural activities...the world over.”
In Number 15, which is Exhibit Frick-5...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, I perhaps ought to say that in the
index of this document book it looks as though the exhibit numbers were
the numbers of the documents in the order in which they are put in the
book, but that will not be so.
DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it will not be so.
THE PRESIDENT: That last document which you just put in as Exhibit
Number 4 is shown in the book to be Exhibit Number 14, which is a
mistake. It is Document Number 14, but not Exhibit Number 14.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Number 14 of the document book, Exhibit Number Frick-4
(Document Number Frick-4).
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Dealing with the same subject I have entered in Number
15, Exhibit Number Frick-5 (Document Number 3358-PS), a decree of the
Reich Minister of the Interior of 24 February 1933, which also deals
with the question of the work of the League for Germans Abroad. It
states, and I quote...
THE PRESIDENT: Has that not already been put in? I see it has a PS
number.
DR. PANNENBECKER: It has a PS number, but it was not then submitted as
evidence by the Prosecution. Therefore I quote:
“The suffering and misery of the times, the lack of work and
food within Germany, cannot divert attention from the fact that
about 30 million Germans, living outside of the present
contracted borders of the Reich, are an integral part of the
entire German people; an integral part, which the Reich
Government is not able to help economically but to which it
considers itself under an obligation to offer cultural support
through the organization primarily concerned with this task—the
League of Germans Abroad.”
In the documents from Number 16 to 24 inclusive of the document book,
which I need not read in detail, I have placed together the legal
decrees which deal with the competence of the Reich Ministry of the
Interior as a central office for certain occupied territories. The tasks
of this central office, which had no authority to issue orders and no
executive authority in any occupied territories, have already been
described by the witness Dr. Lammers; and these tasks are specially
entered in Number 24 of the document book. I do not need to submit it in
evidence. It is an official publication of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and
has, in addition, already been submitted as 3082-PS. In accordance with
the fact that the central office had no authority to issue orders in the
occupied territories, there is in the diary of Dr. Frank a confirmation
that the Governor General alone had authority to issue orders for the
administration of his territory. I do not need to quote this passage as
it has already been submitted to the Tribunal.
Police authority in the occupied territories was transferred to
Reichsführer SS Himmler; but Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior had
nothing to do with this either, since that authority was vested
exclusively in Himmler in his capacity as Reichsführer SS. That can be
seen from Number 26 of the document book, which also already has been
submitted as Exhibit USA-319 (Document Number 1997-PS).
The Prosecution further considers the Defendant Frick responsible for
the crimes committed in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia since
August 1943, on the grounds that Frick had been Reich Protector in
Bohemia and Moravia since August 1943. In this connection, I refer to
Numbers 28 and 29 of the document book (Documents Number 1366-PS and
3443-PS), from which it is evident that, at the time that Frick was
appointed, the former powers of the Reich Protector had been subdivided
between a so-called German State Minister in Bohemia and Moravia—who,
under the immediate supervision of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, had
to manage all government affairs—and the Reich Protector Frick who was
given some special powers and in principle had the right to grant
reprieves on sentences passed by the local courts.
Frick has also been accused of being responsible for the Political
Police, that is, the Secret State Police, and the concentration camps.
Until 1936 police matters were the affair of the individual states in
Germany; consequently in Prussia, Göring as Prussian Prime Minister, and
Prussian Minister of the Interior, built up the Political Police and
established the concentration camps. Frick, therefore, as Reich Minister
of the Interior, had no connection with these things.
In the spring of 1934 Frick also became Prussian Minister of the
Interior. Previously, however, Göring had by a special law taken the
affairs of the Political Police out of the jurisdiction of the office of
the Prussian Minister of the Interior and placed it under the immediate
supervision of the Prime Minister, an office which Göring retained for
himself.
The corresponding decrees have already been submitted by the Prosecution
as Documents Number 2104-PS, 2105-PS, and 2113-PS.
The same is evident from Document Number 30 in the document book, which
has also been submitted as Exhibit USA-233 (Document Number 2344-PS).
Thus, in the Political Police sphere, Frick, until 1936, had only a
general right of supervision, such as the Reich had over the individual
states. He had, however, no special right of command in individual
cases, only the authority to issue general directives; and in Numbers
31-33 of the document book I have entered a few of these directives
issued by Frick.
I quote Number 31, which will be Exhibit Frick-6 (Document Number
779-PS):
“In order to correct the abuses resulting from the decree for
protective custody, the Reich Minister of the Interior, in his
directives of 12 April 1934 to the Land governments and
Reichsstatthalter anent the promulgation and execution of
decrees for protective custody, has determined that protective
custody may be ordered only: (a) for the protection of the
arrested person; (b) if the arrested person by his behavior, and
especially by activities directed against the State, has
directly endangered public security and order. Therefore,
protective custody is not permissible when the above-mentioned
cases do not apply, especially (a) for persons who merely
exercise their public and civil rights; (b) for lawyers for
representing the interests of their clients; (c) in the case of
personal matters, as for instance, insults; (d) because of
economic measures (questions of salary, dismissal of employees,
and similar cases).
“Furthermore, protective custody is not permissible as a
countermeasure for punishable actions, for the courts are
competent to deal with those cases.”
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that?
DR. PANNENBECKER: It is a document which the Prosecution has submitted
as 779-PS and which was taken from the files of the ministry. There is
no date on the document but it must have been in the spring of 1934, as
can be seen from the first sentence of the document. The _Völkischer
Beobachter_ mentions the same decree in its issue of 14 April 1934. I
have included that as Number 32 in the document book; it will be Exhibit
Frick-7 (Document Number Frick-7).
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, are you offering that as an exhibit or
has it already been put in evidence?
DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it has not, as yet, been submitted. I offer it as
Exhibit Number Frick-7.
THE PRESIDENT: I am told the date is April 12.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In the spring of 1934, yes, shortly after.
THE PRESIDENT: 12th of April, 1934.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
The _Völkischer Beobachter_ also mentions this decree in its issue of 14
April 1934. We are concerned with Document 32 of the document book,
which will be Exhibit Number Frick-7. I do not need to read it in
detail.
The same is evident from Number 33 of the book, which will be Exhibit
Number Frick-8 (Document Number I-302).
Number 34 of the book—which will be Exhibit Number Frick-9 (Document
Number 775-PS) shows that the Gestapo actually did not adhere to Frick’s
directives, and that Frick was powerless in that connection.
Nevertheless, the document appears important to me because it shows that
Frick tried repeatedly with great pains to counteract the abuses of the
Gestapo, which, however, with the support of Himmler, was stronger than
he—especially since Himmler enjoyed the direct confidence of the
Führer.
On 17 June 1936, the affairs of the Political Police came under the
jurisdiction of the Reich. Himmler was appointed Chief of the German
Police and, though formally attached to the Reich Ministry of the
Interior, he functioned, in fact, as an independent Police Ministry
under the immediate authority of Hitler; and, as a minister, he was
privileged to look after his affairs in the Reich Cabinet himself.
This can be seen from Document Number 35 of the document book—an
excerpt from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ which has been submitted as
2073-PS. I do not believe that I have to give it an exhibit number; it
is an official announcement in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_.
In this connection the Prosecution has submitted Document 1723-PS as
Exhibit USA-206. I have entered an extract from this document as Number
36 in the document book in order to correct an error. The document is an
extract from a book written by Dr. Ley in his capacity as Reich
Organization Leader. In that book Dr. Ley gives directives to the Party
offices regarding co-operation with the Gestapo, and at the end of the
extract Ley reprinted a decree by Frick which shows how Frick attempted
to counteract the arbitrary measures of the Gestapo.
However, in presenting evidence on the morning of 13 December 1945, the
Prosecution read the entire document as an order by Frick. I should
therefore like to correct that error.
Since Himmler and the chiefs of the Gestapo did not heed Frick’s general
directives, Frick tried, at least in individual cases, to alleviate
conditions in concentration camps; but generally he was not successful.
To quote an example, I have included—under Number 37 of the document
book—a letter by the former Reichstag Delegate Wulle, which he sent to
me of his own accord. This letter will be Exhibit Number Frick-10
(Document Number Frick-10). The letter states, and I quote:
“He”—Frick—“as my former counsel told me, has at various times
tried to persuade Hitler to release me; but without success as
it was Himmler who made all decisions regarding concentration
camps. However, I owe it to him that I have been treated in a
comparatively decent manner at the Sachsenhausen Concentration
Camp... He stood out from among the Nazi demagogues because of
his impartiality and reserve; he was a man who by nature
disapproved of any act of violence... Since the spring of 1925 I
have been involved in a sharp struggle against Hitler and his
party. I consider it even more to Frick’s credit that despite
this antagonism and his comparatively powerless position with
respect to Himmler, he tried in every way to help my wife and me
during the bitter years of my imprisonment in the concentration
camp...”
The Prosecution has asserted, on the basis of the statements made by the
witness Blaha before this Tribunal, that Frick knew of the conditions in
the Dachau concentration camp through having visited it in the first
half of the year 1944.
Therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal I submitted an
interrogatory to the witness Gillhuber, who accompanied Frick on all his
trips and...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Pannenbecker. The Tribunal considers
that it cannot entertain an affidavit upon oath from the Defendant
Frick, who is not going into the witness box to give evidence on oath,
unless he is offered as a witness, in which case he may be
cross-examined.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, but the last document was not an affidavit by
Frick, but by Gillhuber, a witness, who has received an interrogatory.
It is Number 40 of the document book. I am just informed that by an
oversight this exhibit has not been included in the book; I shall have
to submit it later.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, well! Tell us what it is.
DR. PANNENBECKER: It is an interrogatory of, and the answers by, the
witness Gillhuber. Gillhuber, for the personal protection of the
Defendant Frick, accompanied him on all his official travels. In
answering the interrogatory, he confirmed the fact that Frick had never
visited the camp. The interrogatory, with the answers, has still to be
submitted in translation. It is contained in my book.
THE PRESIDENT: You may read the interrogatory, unless the Prosecution
has any objection to its admissibility, or the terms of it, because the
interrogatory has already been provisionally allowed.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I read, then, from Number 40 of the Frick document
book, which becomes Exhibit Frick-11 (Document Number Frick-11), the
following:
“Question: From when until when, and in what capacity, were you
working for the Defendant Frick?
“Answer: From the 18 March 1936 until the arrival of the Allied
Troops on 29 or 30 April 1945, as an employee of the Reich
Security Service, as guard and escort.
“Question: Did you always accompany him on his travels for his
personal protection?
“Answer: From 1936 until January 1942 only intermittently, but
from January 1942 as office chief, I accompanied him on all his
trips and flights.
“Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick visited the
concentration camp of Dachau during the first six months of
1944?
“Answer: To my knowledge, Frick did not visit the Dachau
concentration camp.
“Question: Would you have known it had that been the case, and
why would you have known it?
“Answer: I would have had to know it had that been the case. I
was always close to him; and my employees would have reported it
if he had left during my absence.
“Question: Do you still have the log book of the trips you made,
and can you produce it now?
“Answer: From about 1941 log books were no longer kept. Instead
of that, monthly reports of trips were sent to the Reich
Security Service in Berlin. The copies which were kept in my
office were, according to orders, burned with all the rest of
the material in April 1945.
“Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick ever visited
the Dachau camp?
“Answer: To my knowledge Frick never visited the Dachau Camp.
“Moosburg, 23 March 1946”.—Signed—“Max
Gillhuber”—Signed—“Leonard N. Dunkel, Lieutenant Colonel,
Infantry.”
To comment on the question whether an official visitor to a
concentration camp could always get a correct picture of the actual
conditions existing there, I ask permission to read an unsolicited
letter which I received a few days ago from a Catholic priest, Bernard
Ketzlick. This letter which I have submitted as Supplement Frick
Number...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, the Prosecution makes objection to this
because it is a character of evidence that there is no way of testing. I
have a basket of such correspondence making charges against these
defendants, which I would not think the Tribunal would want to receive.
If the door is open to this kind of evidence, there is no end to it.
This witness has none of the sanctions, of course, that assure the
verity of testimony, and I think it is objectionable to go into letters
received from unknown persons.
DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say just one word on this subject? I received
the letter so late that I did not have an opportunity to ask the person
concerned to send me an affidavit. Of course, I am prepared to submit
such an affidavit later, if such an affidavit should have greater
probative value.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the letter cannot be admitted,
but an application can be made in the ordinary way for leave to put in
an affidavit or to call the witness.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. Then, at a later date, I shall submit a written
request.
I shall not read Number 38 of the document book since it concerns a
statement made by Frick; and I refer, finally, to an excerpt from the
book _Inside Europe_ by John Gunther which will be submitted as Exhibit
Frick-12 (Document Number Frick-12). The excerpt is contained under
Number 39 in the document book I quote—it concerns a book which
appeared originally in the English language, and I therefore quote it in
English:
“Born in the Palatinate in 1877, Frick studied law and became a
Beamter, an official. He is a bureaucrat through and through.
Hitler is not intimate with him, but he respects him. He became
Minister of the Interior because he was the only important Nazi
with civil service training. Precise, obedient, uninspired, he
turned out to be a faithful executive; he has been called the
‘only honest Nazi?’”
As the last document, may I be permitted to refer to an extract from the
book _To the Bitter End_ by Gisevius. I believe I do not need to quote
these passages individually, since the witness himself will be
questioned. The extract will be Exhibit Number Frick-13 (Document Number
Frick-13).
There are still left two answers to interrogatories by the witnesses
Messersmith and Seger. I ask to be permitted to read these answers
later, as soon as the answers have been submitted to me.
That concludes the presentation of documents. I believe there would be
no purpose in calling the witnesses now.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Are you prepared to call your witness, Dr. Pannenbecker?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, Mr. President, that is my request. I now ask
permission to call the witness Gisevius. He is the sole witness in
Frick’s case. I have especially selected witness Gisevius to clarify the
question of the state of the police authority in Germany, as he, from
the very beginning, has been on the side of the opposition and is best
qualified to give a picture of the state of that authority in Germany at
that time.
[_The witness Gisevius took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
HANS BERND GISEVIUS (Witness): Hans Bernd Gisevius.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, were you a member of the NSDAP or one of its
affiliated organizations?
GISEVIUS: No.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that you personally participated in the
events of 20 July 1944, and that you were also present in the OKW at
that time?
GISEVIUS: Yes.
DR. PANNENBECKER: How did you get into the police service?
GISEVIUS: In July 1933 I passed the state examination in law. As a
descendant of an old family of civil servants I applied for a civil
service appointment in the Prussian administration. I belonged, at that
time, to the German National People’s Party and to the Stahlhelm, and by
the standards of that day I was considered politically reliable.
Consequently, at the first stage of my training as a civil servant I was
assigned to the Political Police, which meant my entry into the newly
created Secret State Police. In those days I was very glad to have been
assigned to the police service. I had already at that time heard that
abominations of all kinds were going on in Germany. I was inclined to
consider these as the final outburst of the situation, akin to civil
war, which we were experiencing at the end of 1932 and the beginning of
1933. So I hoped to contribute to the re-establishment of a proper
executive organization which would provide for law, decency, and order.
But this happiness was doomed to be short-lived.
I had scarcely been 2 days in this new police office, when I discovered
that incredible conditions existed there. These were not police who took
action against riots, murder, illegal detention, and robbery; these were
police who protected those guilty of such crimes. It was not the guilty
persons who were arrested, but rather those who asked the police for
help. These were not police who took action against the crime, but
police whose task seemed to be to hush it up or, even worse, to sponsor
it; for those SA and SS Kommandos who played at being police in private
were encouraged by this so-called Secret State Police and were given all
possible aid. The most terrible and, even for a newcomer, most obvious
thing was that a system of unlawful detention was gaining more and more
ground—a worse and more dreadful system than which could not be
conceived.
The offices of the new State Police were in a huge building which was,
however, not large enough to take all the prisoners. Special
concentration camps for the Gestapo were established, and their names
will go down in history as a mark of infamy. These were Oranienburg and
the Gestapo’s private prison in Papestrasse, Columbia House, or, as it
was cynically nicknamed, “Columbia Hall.”
I should like to make it quite clear that this was certainly rather
amateurish compared with what all of us experienced later. But so it
started, and I can only convey my personal impression by describing a
brief incident I remember. After only 2 days I asked one of my
colleagues, who was also a professional civil servant—he had been taken
over from the old Political Police into the new one, and he was one of
those officials who were forced into it—I asked him, “Tell me, am I in
a police office here or in a robber’s den?” The answer I received was,
“You are in a robber’s den and you can expect to see much more yet.”
DR. PANNENBECKER: Under whom was the Political Police at that time and
who was the superior authority?
GISEVIUS: The Political Police was under one Rudolf Diels. He, too, came
from the old Prussian Political Police. He was a professional civil
servant, and one might have expected him still to retain the ideas of
law and decency: but in a brutal and cynical way he set his mind on
making the new rulers forget his political past as a democrat and on
ingratiating himself with his superior, the Prussian Prime Minister and
Minister of the Interior, Göring. It was Diels who created the Gestapo
office; he suggested to Göring the issue of the first decree for making
that office independent. It was Diels who let the SA and the SS enter
that office; he legalized the actions of these civil Kommandos. But soon
it became evident to me that such a bourgeois renegade could not do so
much wrong quite by himself. Some very important person must have been
backing him; in fact, I very quickly saw also that somebody was taking a
daily interest in everything that happened in that office. Reports were
written; telephone inquiries were received. Diels went several times
daily to give reports, and it was the Prussian Minister of the Interior
Göring who considered this Secret State Police as his special preserve.
During those months nothing happened in this office which was not known
or ordered by Göring personally. I want to stress this, because in the
course of years the public formed a different idea of Göring because he
noticeably retired from his official functions. At that time, it was not
yet the Göring who finally suffocated, in his Karinhall. It was the
Göring who looked after everything personally and had not yet begun to
busy himself with the building of Karinhall or to don all sorts of
uniforms and decorations. It was Göring still in civilian clothes, who
was the real chief of an office, who inspired it, and who attached
importance to being the “iron” Göring.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I believe you can describe some points more
concisely. As to what you have just said, do you know this from your own
experience, or where did you learn of it?
GISEVIUS: I not only heard and saw it myself, but I also learned much
from a man who in those days was also a member of the Secret State
Police, and whose information will play an important part in the course
of my statements.
At that time a criminologist had been called into the Secret State
Police, probably the best known expert of the Prussian police,
Oberregierungsrat Nebe. Nebe was a National Socialist. He had been in
opposition to the former Prussian police and had joined the National
Socialist Party. He was a man who sincerely believed in the purity and
genuineness of the National Socialist aims. Thus I saw for myself how
this man found out on the spot what was actually going on and how he
inwardly recoiled.
I can also state here, as it is important, the reasons why Nebe became a
strong opponent, who went with the opposition up to 20 July and later
suffered death by hanging. At that time, in August 1933, Nebe was
ordered by the Defendant Göring to murder Gregor Strasser, formerly a
leading member of the National Socialist Party, by means of a car or
hunting accident. Nebe was so shocked at this order that he refused to
carry it out and made an inquiry at the Reich Chancellery. The answer
from the Reich Chancellery was that the Führer knew nothing of this
order. Thereupon Nebe was summoned to Göring, who reproached him most
bitterly for having made an inquiry. Nevertheless, when he finished
these reproaches he considered it advisable to promote him, because he
thought he would thereby silence him.
The second thing which happened at that time, and which is also very
important, was that the Defendant Göring gave the Political Police
so-called open warrants for murder. At that time there were not only
so-called amnesty laws which gave amnesty for infamous actions, but
there was also a special law according to which investigations, already
initiated by police authorities and by the public prosecutor, could be
quashed, on condition, however, that in these special cases the Reich
Chancellor, or Göring, personally signed the pertinent order. Göring
made use of this law by giving open warrants to the Chief of the
Gestapo, with which all that had to be done was to fill in the names of
those who were to be murdered. Nebe was so shocked by this that from
that moment on he felt it his duty to fight against the Gestapo. At our
request he remained with us there, and afterwards in the Criminal
Police, because we needed one man at least who could keep us informed
about police conditions in case our desire for a revolution should
materialize.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, what did you do yourself when you saw all
these things?
GISEVIUS: I, for my part, tried to contact those bourgeois circles which
through my connections were open to me. I went to various ministries: to
the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, to State Secretary Grauert, and
several ministerial directors and counsellors. I went to the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, to the Ministry of Justice, to the Foreign
Office, and the Ministry of War. I spoke repeatedly to the Chief of the
Army High Command, Colonel General Von Hammerstein. Among all these
connections I formed at that time, there is one other who is
particularly important for my testimony.
At that time I met in the newly formed intelligence department of the
OKW a Major Oster. I gave him all the material which by then had already
accumulated. We started a collection—which we continued until 20
July—of all the documents we could get hold of; and Oster was the man
who from then on, in the Ministry of War never failed to warn every
officer he could contact officially or privately. In course of time, by
favor of Admiral Canaris, Oster became Chief of Staff of the
Intelligence. When he met his death by hanging he was a general. But I
consider it my duty to testify here, in view of all this man has
done—his unforgettable fight against the Gestapo and against all the
crimes which were committed against humanity and peace—that among the
inflation of German field marshals and generals there was one real
German general.
DR. PANNENBECKER: How did the work develop, according to your
observations in the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: At that time conditions in Germany were still such that people
kept their eyes open in the ministries. There was still an opposition in
the bourgeois ministries; there was still the Reich President Von
Hindenburg. Thus, at the end of October 1933 the Defendant Göring was
forced to dismiss Diels, the Chief of the State Police. At the same time
a commission of investigation was set up in order to re-organize that
institution thoroughly. According to the ministerial decree, Nebe and I
were members of that commission. But that commission never met, for the
Defendant Göring found ways and means to thwart this measure. He
appointed as Chief and successor of Diels a still worse Nazi named
Hinkler, who some time before had been acquitted in a trial because of
irresponsibility; and this Hinkler acted in such a way that before 30
days had passed he was dismissed. Then the Defendant Göring was able to
restore his Diels to the office.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything of the events which led to the
Prussian law of 30 November 1933, by which the functions of the Gestapo
were taken away from the office of the Minister of the Interior and
transferred to the office of the Prussian Prime Minister?
GISEVIUS: That was just the moment of which I am speaking. Göring
realized that it would not serve his purpose if other ministries were
too much concerned in his Secret State Police. Though he was Prussian
Minister of the Interior himself, he was disturbed by the fact that the
police department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior could look
into the affairs of his private domain; and so he separated the Secret
State Police from the remaining police and placed it under his personal
direction, thereby excluding all other police authorities. From the
point of view of a proper police system this was nonsense, because you
cannot run a Political Police properly if you separate it from the
Criminal Police and the Order Police. But Göring knew why he did not
want any other police authority to look into the affairs of the Secret
State Police.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you remain in the police service
yourself?
GISEVIUS: On that day when Göring carried out his little—and I can’t
find another word for it—_coup d’état_ by assigning to himself a state
police of his own, this Secret State Police issued a warrant of arrest
against me. I had expected this and had gone into hiding. The next
morning I went to the Chief of the Police Department of the Prussian
Ministry of the Interior, Ministerial Director Daluege—who was a high
SS general—and said that it was really not quite in order to issue a
warrant of arrest against me.
A criminal commissioner of the Secret State Police came to arrest me in
the room of the Chief of the Prussian police. Daluege was kind enough to
allow me to escape through a back door to State Secretary Grauert.
Grauert intervened with Göring, and as always in cases of this kind,
Göring was very surprised and ordered a thorough investigation. That was
the usual way of saying that such incidents were to be pigeonholed.
After that I was no longer allowed to enter the Secret State Police, but
I was sent as an observer to the Reichstag Fire trial at Leipzig, which
was just drawing to an end. During these last days of November I was
able to get some insight into this obscure affair and having already
tried, together with Nebe, to investigate this crime, I was able to add
to my knowledge here.
I assume that I shall again be questioned about that point and,
therefore, shall now confine myself to the statement that, if necessary,
I am prepared to refresh Defendant Göring’s memory concerning his
complicity in and his joint knowledge of this first “brown” _coup
d’état_ and the murder of the accomplices.
DR. PANNENBECKER: On 1 May 1934 Frick became Prussian Minister of the
Interior. Did you get into touch with Frick himself or his ministries?
GISEVIUS: Yes. Immediately after the Reichstag Fire trial was over—that
is, at the end of 1933—I was dismissed from the police service and
transferred to a Landrat office in East Prussia. I complained, however,
to State Secretary Grauert about this obvious disciplinary punishment.
As he and Ministerial Director Daluege knew of my quarrel with the
Secret State Police, they got me into the Ministry of the Interior and
assigned to me the task of collecting all those reports which were still
being incorrectly addressed to the Ministry of the Interior and of
forwarding them to the Prussian Prime Minister who was in charge of the
Secret State Police and who dealt with these matters.
As soon as Göring found out about this he repeatedly protested against
my presence in the Ministry, but the Minister of the Interior was
adamant and I succeeded in keeping that post.
When Frick came I did not get in touch with him immediately as I was
only a subordinate official. I assume, however, that the Defendant Frick
knew about my activity and my views, because I was now encouraged to
continue collecting all those requests for help which were wrongly
addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, and a large number of these
reports I submitted through official channels to Daluege, Grauert, and
Frick. There was, however, the difficulty that Göring, in his capacity
of Prime Minister of Prussia, had prohibited Frick, as his Prussian
Minister of the Interior, to take cognizance of such reports. Frick was
supposed to forward them to the Gestapo without comment. I saw no reason
for not submitting them to Frick all the same, and as Frick was also
Reich Minister of the Interior—and in this capacity could give
directives to the Länder and, therefore, also to Göring—he took
cognizance of these reports in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and
allowed me to forward them to Göring with the request for a report.
Göring protested repeatedly, and I know this resulted in heated disputes
between him and Frick.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is anything known to you about the fact that at that
time the Reich Minister of the Interior issued certain directives to
restrict protective custody?
GISEVIUS: It is correct that at that time a number of such directives
were issued, and the fact that I say that a number of such directives
were issued already implies that generally they were not complied with
by subordinate authorities.
The Reich Minister of the Interior was a minister with no personal
executive power, and I will never forget the impression it made on me,
while training as a civil servant, that we officials in the Secret State
Police were instructed in principle not to answer any inquiries from the
Reich Ministry of the Interior. Naturally, at intervals the Reich
Minister of the Interior sent reminders, and the efficiency of a Gestapo
official was judged by the number of such reminders he could show his
chief, Diels, as proof that he did not pay any attention to such
matters.
DR. PANNENBECKER: On 30 June 1934 the so-called Röhm Putsch took place.
Can you give a short description of the conditions prevailing before
this Putsch?
GISEVIUS: First I have to say that there never was a Röhm Putsch. On 30
June there was only a Göring-Himmler Putsch.
I am in a position to give some information about that dark chapter,
because I dealt with and followed up this case in the Police Department
of the Ministry of the Interior, and because the radiograms sent during
these days by Göring and Himmler to the police authorities of the Reich
came into my hands. The last of these radiograms reads: “By order of
Göring all documents relating to 30 June shall be burned immediately.”
At that time I took the liberty of putting these papers into my safe,
and to this day I do not know whether or not they survived
Kaltenbrunner’s attempts to get them. I still hope to recover these
papers, and if I do, I can prove that throughout the whole 30 June not a
single shot was fired by the SA. The SA did not revolt. By this,
however, I do not wish to utter a single word of excuse for the leaders
of the SA. On 30 June not one of the SA leaders died who did not deserve
death a hundred times—but after a proper trial.
The situation on that 30 June was that of a civil war; on one side were
the SA headed by Röhm, and on the other side, Göring and Himmler. It had
been arranged for the SA, several days before 30 June, to be sent on
leave. The SA leaders had been purposely called by Hitler for a
conference at Wiessee that 30 June, and it is not usual for people who
intend to effect a _coup d’état_ to travel by sleeping car to a
conference. To their surprise they were seized at the station and at
once driven off to execution.
The so-called Munich Putsch took place as follows: The Munich SA did not
come into it at all, and at 1 hour’s driving distance from Munich the
alleged traitors, Röhm and Heines, fell into the sleep of death
completely ignorant of the fact that, according to Hitler and Göring, a
revolt had taken place in Munich the previous night.
I was able to observe the Putsch in Berlin very closely. It took place
without anything being known about it by the public and without any
participation by the SA. We in the police were unaware of it. It is
true, however, that 4 days before 30 June one of the alleged
ringleaders, SA Gruppenführer Karl Ernst of Berlin, came to Ministerial
Director Daluege looking very concerned and said that there were rumors
going round in Berlin that the SA were contemplating a Putsch. He asked
for an interview with Minister of the Interior Frick, so that he, Ernst,
could assure him that there was no such intention.
Daluege sent me with this message to the Defendant Frick, and I arranged
for this strange conversation where an SA leader assured the Minister of
the Interior that he did not intend to stage a Putsch.
Ernst then set out on a pleasure trip to Madeira. On 30 June he was
taken from the steamer and sent to Berlin for execution. I saw him
arrive at the Tempelhof airport. This struck me as particularly
interesting, because a few hours before I had read the official report
about his execution in the newspaper.
That, then, was the so-called SA and Röhm Putsch. And because I am not
to withhold anything, I must add that I was present when on 30 June the
Defendant Göring informed the press of the event. On this occasion the
Defendant Göring made the cold-blooded remark that he had for days been
waiting for a code word which he had arranged with Hitler. He had then
struck, of course with lightning speed, and had also extended the scope
of his mission. This extension of his mission caused the death of a
large number of innocent people. To mention only a few, there were
Generals Schleicher—who was killed together with his wife—and Von
Bredow, Ministerial Director Klausner, Edgar Jung, and many others.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you were in the Ministry of the Interior
yourself at that time. How did Frick hear about these measures, and was
he himself in any way involved in the quelling of this so-called Putsch?
GISEVIUS: I was present when, at about half past 9, Ministerial Director
Daluege came back quite pale after seeing Göring and having just been
told what had happened. Daluege and I went to Grauert and we drove to
the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to Frick. Frick rushed out of the
room—it may have been about 10 o’clock—in order to go to Göring to
find out what had happened in the meantime, only to be told that he, as
Police Minister of the Reich, should go home now and not worry about
further developments. In fact, Frick did go home, and during those 2
dramatic days he did not enter the ministry.
Once during this time Daluege drove over with me to see him. For the
rest, it was given to me, the youngest official of the Reich Ministry of
the Interior, to inform the Reich Minister of the Interior on that
bloody Saturday and Sunday of the atrocious things which in the meantime
had happened in Germany.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you just told us of an instruction Frick had
received not to worry about these things. Who gave him this instruction?
GISEVIUS: As far as I know, Göring gave or conveyed to him an
instruction by Hitler. I do not know whether there was a written
instruction; neither do I know whether Frick had asked about it. I
should think that Frick, on that day, probably considered it would be
wise not to ask too many awkward questions.
DR. PANNENBECKER: After these things had been concluded, did Frick in
any way attempt to smooth matters over?
GISEVIUS: To answer this question correctly I have to say first that on
Saturday, 30 June, we at the Ministry of the Interior knew very little
about what had happened. On Sunday, 1 July, we learned much more, and
after these bloody days had passed, there is no doubt that Frick had on
the whole a clear idea of what had happened. Also, during these days he
made no secret of his indignation at the murders and unlawful arrests
which apparently had taken place. In order to stick to the truth I have
to answer your question by saying that the first reaction of the
Defendant Frick which I knew about was that Reich law in which the Reich
Ministers declared the events of June 30 to be lawful. This law had an
unprecedented psychological effect on the further developments in
Germany, and it has its place in the history of German terror. Apart
from this, many things happened in the Third Reich which a normal mortal
could not understand, but which were well understood in the circles of
ministers and state secretaries. And so, I have to admit that, after
that law, the Defendant Frick made a serious attempt to remedy at least
the most obvious abuses. Maybe he thought other ministers in the Reich
Cabinet should have spoken sooner. I am thinking now of Reich War
Minister Von Blomberg, two of whose generals were shot, and who, in
spite of that, signed this law. I intentionally mention Blomberg’s name,
and ask to be permitted to pause here to tell the Tribunal about an
incident which occurred this morning. I was in the room of the
defendants’ counsel and was speaking to Dr. Dix. Dr. Dix was interrupted
by Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Göring. I heard what Dr. Stahmer told Dr.
Dix...
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I ask whether a
personal conversation which I had with Dr. Dix has anything to do with
the taking of evidence?
GISEVIUS: I am not speaking...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, don’t go on with your evidence whilst the
objection is being made. Yes, Dr. Stahmer.
GISEVIUS: If you please. I didn’t understand...
DR. STAHMER: I do not know whether it is in order when giving evidence
to reveal a conversation which I had with Dr. Dix in the Defense
Counsel’s room.
GISEVIUS: May I say something to that?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly keep silent.
GISEVIUS: May I finish my statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you keep silent, sir.
DR. STAHMER: This morning in the room of the Defense Counsel, I had a
personal conversation with Dr. Dix concerning the Blomberg case. That
conversation was not intended to be heard by the witness. I do not know
the witness; I didn’t even see the witness, as far as I can remember,
and I don’t know whether this should come into the evidence by making
such a conversation public here.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This incident has been reported to me, and I think
it is important that this Tribunal know the influence—the threats that
were made at this witness in this courthouse while waiting to testify
here, threats not only against him but against the Defendant Schacht.
Now, the affair was reported to me. I think it is important that this
Tribunal know it. I think it is important that it come out. I should
have attempted to bring it out on cross-examination if it had not been
told, and I think that the witness should be permitted. These other
parties have had great latitude here. This witness has been subjected to
threats, as I understand it, which were uttered in his presence, whether
they were intended for him or not, and I ask that this Tribunal allow
Dr. Gisevius, who is the one representative of democratic forces in
Germany, to take this stand to tell his story.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal would like to hear first of all
anything further you have to say upon the matter. They will then hear
what Dr. Dix has to say, if he wishes to say anything; and they will
then hear whether the witness himself wishes to say anything in answer.
DR. STAHMER: I have no qualms about telling the Court exactly what I
said. Last night I discussed the case with the Defendant Göring and told
him the witness Gisevius...
THE PRESIDENT: We don’t want to hear any communications which you had
with the Defendant Göring other than those you choose to make in support
of your objection to this evidence that has been given.
DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President; but I must say briefly that Göring told
me that it was of no interest to him if the witness Gisevius did
incriminate him, but that he did not want Blomberg, who died
recently—and I assumed it was only the question of Blomberg’s
marriage—he, Göring, did not want these facts concerning the marriage
of Blomberg to be discussed here in public. If that could not be
prevented, then of course Göring, in his turn—and it is only a question
of Schacht, because Schacht, as he had told me, wanted to speak about
these things—then he, Göring would not spare Schacht.
That is what I told Dr. Dix this morning, and I am sure Dr. Dix will
confirm that, and if I may add...
THE PRESIDENT: We will hear you in a moment, Dr. Dix.
DR. STAHMER: I said—and I was not referring to Schacht, to the witness,
or to Herr Pannenbecker—I said, for reasons of professional etiquette,
that I should like to inform Dr. Dix. That is what I said and what I
did. In any case I did not even know that the witness Gisevius was
present at that moment. At any rate, it was not intended for him.
Moreover, I was speaking to Dr. Dix aside.
THE PRESIDENT: So that I may understand what you are saying: You say you
had told Dr. Dix the substance of the conversation you had had with the
Defendant Göring, and said that Göring would withdraw his objection to
the facts being given if the Defendant Schacht wanted them to be given.
Is that right?
DR. STAHMER: No, I only said that Göring did not care what was said
about himself; he merely wanted the deceased Blomberg to be spared, and
he did not want things concerning Blomberg’s marriage to be discussed.
If Schacht did not prevent that—I was speaking only of Schacht—then
he, Göring, in his turn, would have no consideration for Schacht—would
no longer have any consideration for Schacht. That is what I told Dr.
Dix for reasons of personal etiquette.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait, wait, I can’t hear you. Yes.
DR. STAHMER: As I said, that is what I told Dr. Dix, and that finished
the conversation. And I made it quite clear to Dr. Dix that I told him
that only as one colleague to another.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is all you wish to say?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
DR. DIX: I remember the facts, I believe, correctly and reliably, as
follows: This morning I was in the room of the Defense Counsel speaking
to the witness Dr. Gisevius. I believe my colleague, Professor Kraus,
was also taking part in the conversation. Then my colleague, Stahmer,
approached me and said he would like to speak to me. I replied that at
the moment I was having an important and urgent conversation with
Gisevius, and asked whether it could wait. Stahmer said “no,” and that
he must speak to me at once. I then took my colleague Stahmer aside,
probably five or six paces from the group with whom I had been speaking.
My colleague Stahmer told me the following—it is quite possible, I
don’t remember the actual words he used, that he started by saying that
he was telling me this for professional reasons, as one colleague to
another. If he says so now, I am sure that it is so. Anyhow I don’t
remember that any longer. He said to me, “Listen, Göring has an idea
that Gisevius will attack him as much as he can. If he attacks the dead
Blomberg, however, then Göring will disclose everything against
Schacht—and he knows lots of things about Schacht which may not be
pleasant for Schacht. He, Göring, had been very reticent in his
testimony; but if anything should be said against the dead Blomberg,
then he would have to reveal things against Schacht.”
That was what he meant—that he would bring things up against Schacht.
That was the conversation. I cannot say with absolute certainty whether
my colleague told me I should call Gisevius’ attention to it. If he says
he did not say so, then it is certainly true, and I believe him; but I
could only interpret that information to mean that I should notify
Gisevius of this development promised by Göring. I therefore
thought—and did not have the slightest doubt—that I was voicing
Göring’s intention, and that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer wished, and
that that was the purpose of the whole thing. What else could be the
reason for Dr. Stahmer’s telling me at that moment, immediately before
my discussion with Gisevius, even while I was in conversation with
Gisevius, that he could not wait, that I must break off my conversation?
Why should he inform me at that time, unless he meant that the mischief
hinted at and threatened by Göring might possibly be avoided—in other
words, that the witness Gisevius, on whom everything depended, should
think twice before making his statement? I did not have the slightest
doubt that what Stahmer meant by his words to me was that I should
convey them to Gisevius. As I said, even if Stahmer had not asked
me—and he was certainly speaking the truth when he said he did not ask
me to take action—I would have replied, if I had been questioned before
he made this statement, and that probably with an equally good
conscience, that he had asked me to pass it on to Gisevius. But I will
not maintain that he actually used those words. Anyway, it is absolutely
certain that this conversation did take place, and it was in the firm
belief that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer and Göring intended that I went
straight to Gisevius. He was standing only five or six steps away from
me, or even nearer. I think I understood him to say, when I addressed
him, that he had heard parts of it. I don’t know whether I understood
him correctly. I then informed him of the gist of this conversation.
That is what happened early this morning.
DR. STAHMER: May I say the following: It goes without saying, that I
neither asked Dr. Dix to pass it on to Gisevius, nor did I count upon
his doing so; but I surmised that Gisevius would be examined this
morning, and that Dr. Dix would question the witness concerning the
circumstances of Blomberg’s marriage. That is what I had been told
previously—namely, that Dr. Dix intended to put this question to the
witness. Therefore, I called Dr. Dix’s attention to it, assuming that he
would abstain from such a question concerning Blomberg’s marriage. That
was not intended for the witness in any way, and I know definitely that
I said to Dr. Dix that I was telling him this merely as one colleague to
another, and he thanked me for it. He said, “Thank you very much.” At
any rate, if he had said to me, “I am going to tell the witness,” I
would have said immediately, “For heaven’s sake; that is information
intended only for you personally.” Indeed, I am really surprised that
Dr. Dix has in this manner abused the confidence which I placed in him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, we have heard the facts, and we do not think
we need hear anything more about it beyond considering the question as
to whether the witness is to go on with his evidence.
Witness, has the explanation which has been given by Dr. Stahmer and Dr.
Dix sufficiently covered the matters with which you were proposing to
deal with reference to Field Marshal Von Blomberg? Is there anything
further that you need say about it?
GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I did not quite understand the
question.
Concerning Blomberg, at this point I did not want to say anything
further; I merely wanted, on the first occasion that Blomberg’s name
came up, to make it clear that the whole thing gave me the feeling that
I was under pressure. I was standing so near that I could not help
hearing what Dr. Stahmer said, and the manner in which Dr. Dix told me
about it—for I had heard at least half of it—could not be understood
in any other way than to mean that Dr. Dix in a very loyal manner was
instructing me, a witness for the Defendant Schacht, to be rather
reticent in my testimony on a point which I consider very important.
That point will come up later and has nothing whatsoever to do with the
marriage of Herr Von Blomberg. It has to do with the part which the
Defendant Göring played in it, and I know quite well why Göring does not
want me to speak about that affair. To my thinking, it is the most
corrupt thing Göring ever did, and Göring is just using the cloak of
chivalry by pretending that he wants to protect a dead man, whereas he
really wants to prevent me from testifying in full on an important
point—that is, the Fritsch crisis.
THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to Dr. Pannenbecker._] The Tribunal will hear
the evidence then, whatever evidence you wish the witness to give.
GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. What I have to say in connection with the
Blomberg case is finished. I merely wanted to protest at the first
opportunity when the name was mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, counsel will continue his examination and you
will give such evidence as is relevant when you are examined or
cross-examined by Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, after the events of 30 June 1934, had the
position of the Gestapo become so strong that no measures against it had
any chance of succeeding?
GISEVIUS: I must answer this in the negative. The Secret State Police
doubtlessly gained in power after 30 June, but because of the many
excesses committed on 30 June, the opposition in the various ministries
against the Secret State Police had become so strong that through
collective action the majority of ministers could have used the events
of 30 June to eliminate the Secret State Police. I personally made
repeated efforts in that direction. With the knowledge of the Defendant
Frick I went to see the Minister of Justice Gürtner and begged him many
times to use the large number of illegal murders as a reason for action
against the Secret State Police. I personally went to Von Reichenau
also, who was Chief of the Armed Forces Offices at that time, and told
him the same thing. I know that my friend Oster brought the files
concerning this matter to the knowledge of Blomberg, and I wish to
testify here that, in spite of the excesses of the 30 of June, it would
have been quite possible at that time to return to law and order.
DR. PANNENBECKER: After that, what did the Reich Minister of the
Interior do—that is, what did Frick do to steer the Secret State Police
to a course of legality?
GISEVIUS: We started a struggle against the Secret State Police and
tried at least to prevent Himmler from getting into the Reich Ministry
of the Interior. Shortly before Göring had relinquished the Ministry of
the Interior to Frick, he had made Himmler Chief of the Secret State
Police in Prussia. Himmler, starting from that basis of power, had
attempted to assume police power in the other Länder of the Reich. Frick
tried to prevent that by taking the stand that he, as Reich Minister of
the Interior, had an equal voice in appointing police functionaries in
the Reich. At the same time, we tried to prevent an increase in the
numbers of the Secret State Police by systematically refusing all
requests by the Gestapo to increase its body of officials. Unfortunately
here also, as always, Himmler found ways and means to overcome this. He
went to the finance ministers of the individual states and told them
that he needed funds for the guard troops of the concentration camps,
for the so-called “Death’s-Head” units, and he drew up a scale whereby
five SS men were to guard one prisoner. With these funds Himmler
financed his Secret State Police, as, of course it rested with him how
many men he wanted to imprison.
In other ways too, we in the Reich Ministry of the Interior attempted by
all possible means to block the way of the Gestapo; but unfortunately,
the numerous requests we sent to the Gestapo remained unanswered. Again
it was Göring who forbade Himmler to answer and who protected Himmler
when he refused to give any information in reply to our inquiries.
Finally, a last effort was made during my term of office in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior. We tried to paralyze the Secret State Police
at least to some extent by introducing into protective custody the right
of supervision and complaint. If we could have achieved the right of
review of all cases of protective custody, we would also have been able
to get an insight into the individual actions of the Gestapo. A law was
formulated, and this law was first submitted to the Ministerial Council
of Prussia, the largest of the states. Again it was the Defendant Göring
who, by all available means, opposed the passing of such a law. A very
stormy cabinet meeting on the matter ended with my being asked to leave
the Ministry of the Interior.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I have shown you a memorandum...
THE PRESIDENT: This will be a convenient time to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal wishes me to say that
it anticipates that you will put any questions which you think necessary
with reference to the alleged intimidation of the witness when you come
to cross-examine.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir; thank you.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to talk about the efforts which
were made by the Ministry of the Interior to stop the arbitrary methods
of the Gestapo, particularly with reference to the concentration camps.
I therefore ask you to look at a memorandum which originates from the
Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior. It is Document 775-PS,
which I submitted this morning as Exhibit Frick-9 when I presented the
evidence for Frick. It is Number 34 in the document book. Do you know
that memorandum?
GISEVIUS: No, I don’t. It appears that this memorandum was drawn up
after I had left the Ministry of the Interior. I assume this from the
fact that in this memorandum the Reich Minister of the Interior appears
to have already given up the fight, since he writes that as a matter of
principle it should be made clear who bears the responsibility, and, if
necessary, the responsibility for all the consequences must now—and I
quote—“be borne by the Reichsführer SS who, in fact, has already
claimed for himself the leadership of the Political Police in the
Reich.”
At the time when I was at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, we tried
particularly to prevent this from happening—namely, that Himmler should
take over the Political Police. This is evidently a memorandum written
about 6 months later when the terror had become still greater. The facts
which are quoted here are known to me.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you say anything about this? Does it not deal with
the Pünder case and the case of Esterwege, Oldenburg?
GISEVIUS: The Esterwege case can be told most briefly. It is one of
many.
So far as I can recollect, an SA or local group leader was arrested by
the Gestapo because he got excited about the conditions in the Papenburg
concentration camp. This was not the first time either. I don’t know why
the Defendant Frick picked on this particular case. Nevertheless, one
day Daluege showed me one of those customary handwritten slips sent by
Frick to Himmler. Frick had written to Himmler in the margin in large
green letters that an SA man or local group leader, or whatever he was,
had been arrested illegally, that this man must be released at once, and
that if Himmler did that sort of thing again he, Frick, would institute
criminal proceedings against Himmler for illegal detention.
I remember this story very well, because it was somewhat
peculiar—considering the police conditions which existed at the
time—that Himmler should be threatened by Frick with criminal
proceedings, and Daluege made some sneering remarks to me regarding
Frick’s action.
That is the one case.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date?
GISEVIUS: This must have happened in the spring of 1935, I should say in
March or April.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, do you know how Himmler reacted to that
threat of criminal proceedings?