CHAPTER XI

RAIDS

_July to October 1918_

_Reference Map No. 4_

Very shortly after the Austrian attack the Division was relieved in the

line by the 7th Division.

The 145th Brigade remained in the mountains for a week longer than the

other two Brigades, acting as an additional reserve to the 7th Division

in case the Austrians should venture to renew their attempt. But the

situation soon became perfectly normal, and on June 30, at 12.30 in the

morning, the Battalion marched to the Centrale district in the plains.

Two days later we moved again to billets at Grumo and Cereda. Here an

intensely hot fortnight was passed, the heat during the day frequently

reaching over 90° in the shade, and we were by no means displeased when

we received orders to return to the mountains, and to relieve the 23rd

Division in the right sector of the British front.

On July 19 the Battalion reached Granezza. This tour in the line proved

to be one of exceptional activity, and ended with the astounding

collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army.

Artillery action was considerable and constant on both sides. The

Austrians, whatever their other failings may have been, were by no means

to be despised as gunners, their shooting being extremely accurate.

Raids on the enemy’s lines were of an almost nightly occurrence along

the British and French fronts, the raiding parties usually consisting of

one or more battalions. They met with a large amount of success on

nearly every occasion, chiefly owing to the fact that the more often we

raided, the more men did the enemy put into his front line, so

increasing his casualties from our barrage and providing more prisoners

for us to round up.

On August 8 and 9 raids were carried out on the enemy’s trenches along

practically the whole British and French fronts. These proved entirely

successful and several hundreds of prisoners were taken, while but few

casualties were incurred by the raiding troops.

Preparations and plans for these raids were organised with the very

greatest care, and worked out to the smallest detail. This was in all

cases the secret of success.

On the night August 26/27, the Battalion, in conjunction with the 1/4th

Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, carried out one of these raids, for

which the full orders are given in Appendix Ic, with a view to showing

the amount of detail to be dealt with. The object of the raid was to

kill or capture the garrison of the Austrian trenches in the

neighbourhood of Sec and Ave (Map No. 5). Owing to the absence of

Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O., on leave, the general plan

of the raid was worked out by Major P. A. Hall, M.C., though the former

returned in time to arrange the details.

The boundary between the 1/4th Royal Berkshire Regiment and the Bucks

Battalion was the road running through the Austrian line midway between

Sec and Ave, our Battalion’s right boundary being the Clama-S. M.

Maddalena road. We had the assistance of four 18-pounder batteries, 4·5

and 6-inch howitzers; and French ·77’s also engaged selected targets.

[Illustration:

MAP Nº. 5.

AREA RAIDED ON NIGHT 26/27 AUG. 1918.

]

At zero (10.40 p.m., August 26) the 18-pounders put down a barrage on

the enemy front line for five minutes. At zero plus five minutes the two

right batteries lifted on to the sunken road for nine minutes, while the

two left batteries first lifted for four minutes on to the group of

dugouts north-east of Lone Tree House, and then on to the dugouts about

S. M. Maddalena for five minutes, lifting again at zero plus 14 to form

a protective barrage beyond.

The two right batteries at zero plus 14 lifted on to the portion of

enemy front line facing south-east (between Sec and the Clama road) for

eight minutes, when they, too, finally lifted off the area to form a

protective barrage beyond.

The Battalion formed up behind the Midway House ridge. The point of

entry for the whole Battalion was the trenches between Lone Tree House

road and Sec, the enemy’s front trenches to the right facing south-east

being taken in reverse in the last phase.

Three platoons of A Company (Captain J. E. Firminger) were responsible

for the front line between Sec and Lone Tree House, and the fourth

platoon for the dugouts north-east of Lone Tree House.

Closely following the barrage D Company (Captain B. C. Rigden, M.C.)

passed through A Company, two platoons dealing with the remainder of the

dugouts north-east of Lone Tree House, the other two platoons those

dugouts round S. M. Maddalena.

B Company (Lieutenant A. L. Brightman) and C Company (2/Lieutenant P. T.

Herbert) had a more difficult task. C Company and two platoons of B

Company passed through A Company, and moved along the west side of a

communicator running north from Sec. Along this they formed up in two

lines facing east. The first line took the dugouts in the sunken road,

while the second line passed through the first, taking the front-line

trench between Sec and the Clama road from behind. The other two

platoons of B Company remained outside the front line until the barrage

had lifted clear, when they entered the front line just left and right

of the sunken road.

The whole attack went according to programme. The 18-pounder barrages

were perfect on all lines. The timing of “lifts” could not have been

better. The wire in front of the front-line trench proved a serious

obstacle, and the leading company had a good many casualties in getting

through it.

The front line was strongly held, the garrison putting up a good fight

with rifle and machine-gun fire. When our leading platoons, however,

closed with the bayonet, the enemy mostly surrendered.

At Sec, a machine gun was captured and the crew shot. A deep dugout,

found about fifteen yards west of the sunken road, refused to divulge

its occupants. A smoke bomb changed their ideas and no fewer than thirty

eventually swarmed out, but as they brought their arms with them, the

majority got killed.

The platoons that went to S. M. Maddalena found but few of the enemy

there.

The attack on the sunken road and front line facing south-east went

without a hitch. The former was found to be full of dugouts, and a large

number of Austrians were killed or taken prisoner.

The signal to withdraw was given at 12.30 a.m. The withdrawal was

carried out according to programme, and as far as could be then

ascertained all our casualties had been brought in.

The enemy barrage was at no time very heavy, and the Austrian

infantryman showed but little inclination to fight.

Prisoners taken amounted to about 165, while the number killed was

estimated to be at least 150, and even more if one was to judge from the

number of men who returned with bloody bayonets.

Our casualties were:

_Officers._—Wounded. Capt. J. E. Firminger.

Lieut. A. L. Brightman.

2/Lieut. L. W. G. Lorns.

2/Lieut. F. W. Blackmore.

2/Lieut. F. J. Wilcox.

2/Lieut. F. P. Bates.

_Other ranks._—Killed—4.

Wounded—75.

Wounded and prisoner—1.

Missing—4 (afterwards presumed killed).

The raid carried out by the 1/4th Royal Berks on our right was equally

successful.

The Commander-in-Chief sent the following message:

“Please convey my hearty congratulations to men of Bucks Battalion and

1/4th Royal Berks, and to Brigadier-General Watt and staff, on their

gallant, well-planned and successful raid. The results are of the

greatest importance in ascertaining the enemy’s intentions.”

Several decorations were awarded to the Battalion for this operation,

the Commander-in-Chief himself presenting the medal ribbons at Granezza.

During the next six weeks trench life, combined with a few days’

periodical rest at Granezza, continued uninterruptedly.

On August 27, Brigadier-General D. M. Watt, D.S.O., handed over command

of the 145th Brigade to Brigadier-General W. W. Pitt-Taylor, C.M.G.,

D.S.O., but the latter was shortly afterwards appointed B.G.G.S. of the

XIVth Corps and Brigadier-General G. W. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., then

assumed command of the Brigade.

About this time all brigades throughout the British Force in Italy were

reduced to three battalions. The 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire

Regiment was consequently taken from the 145th Infantry Brigade and

dispatched to France.

On October 3, Major P. A. Hall, M.C., was appointed to command the 1/7th

Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment. He had, except for short

intervals, been with the Battalion ever since mobilisation, and had

rendered it invaluable service.

Captain P. L. Wright, M.C., was now promoted to fill his place as

2nd-in-command.

In connection with these changes on the Battalion Headquarters staff, it

is worthy of record that no little success had been attained by the

officers who originally embarked with the Battalion, or joined it very

shortly afterwards. The original senior company commander, then Captain

Reynolds, had assumed command of the Battalion early in 1916, and had

commanded continuously ever since. Promotions to 2nd-in-command had

invariably been made from officers within the Battalion. In addition,

three of our officers had been appointed to command other battalions,

and two others appointed as 2nds-in-command of other units, whilst four

others had received staff appointments.

The 48th Division was now the only British Division holding the line, as

the 23rd Division had shortly before been relieved on our left by troops

of the 12th Italian Corps. It had been intended to send the 23rd and 7th

Divisions to France, but the situation changed, and finally all three

divisions remained in Italy.

[Illustration:

RESERVE BATTALION H.Q., KABERLABA N.

]

[Illustration:

THE C.-IN-C. PRESENTING MEDALS TO THE BATTALION AT GRANEZZA, AUGUST

1918.

]

At the beginning of October, the British Commander-in-Chief accepted the

command of a mixed Italian-British Army, with a view to undertaking

offensive operations on the Piave. The 7th and 23rd Divisions, being at

this time in reserve, were to form part of this new Army, while the 48th

Division, in order to make as little apparent change as possible, were

to remain on the Asiago plateau, passing temporarily under the command

of General Pennella, commanding XIIth Italian Corps.

When raids were not taking place, the sector, and more especially our

headquarters at Kaberlaba North, was peaceful enough, but raids on the

enemy lines now became more and more frequent, the French on our right

being particularly successful.

The following figures show the number of prisoners captured during

October by means of these raids:

October 3:

6th Battalion R. Warwickshire Regiment 149

October 10:

7th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment 35

French Battalion 300

Italians 10

October 23:

1/4th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment 210

3 Battalions French 700

On the night October 28/29, the Bucks Battalion raided the area Sec—S.

M. Maddalena—Cassordar, full of hope, and anxious to beat all records in

prisoners. The result was a disappointment. The whole area was found to

have been completely evacuated by the enemy, who had that very night at

dusk withdrawn to a line 3,000 yards in rear. This line was sited at the

foot of the mountains which rose from the northern edge of the plateau.

The enemy had been working on it for the past three months, and we had

learned from prisoners that it was to be their position for the coming

winter and was called the “Winter Stellung.” One wretched Austrian had

been left behind in the old line to loose off Verey lights, and he

formed our only capture.

The discovery of the retirement was, however, most important. The

following day, patrols sent out by the battalion holding the front line

gained touch with the enemy at the Winter Stellung, the town of Asiago

being occupied by the British.

The enemy’s retirement, coupled with his diminishing _moral_ and the

fact that our attack had opened successfully on the Piave, made it clear

that the time was now ripe for dealing him a decisive blow.

For this we now waited expectantly.

The First Buckinghamshire Battalion 1914-1919 · 第 11 / 14 章