THE AUSTRIAN ATTACK OF JUNE 15
_May and June 1918_
_Reference map No. 4_
One of the greatest problems when we lived in the mountains was the
question of transport and supply. The Divisional ration-dump was made in
the foothills, so it was obviously impossible for us to have all our
transport with us in the mountains and send it to the ration-dump daily,
as waggons would have been some ten hours on the roads. It was equally
impossible to have all the transport living near the ration-dump and
making daily pilgrimages up to the mountains. It was therefore decided
to leave the 2nd echelon transport in the foothills at Fara, and to have
the 1st echelon with us at Granezza. The former then brought the
Battalion’s rations each day as far as Tezze Sciessere, which lay
half-way up the mountain by road, while the 1st echelon met it there and
brought the supplies on to us.
Even this proved to be intensely hard on the horses, and it was
afterwards arranged to do much of the work by a more generous use of
Army motor lorries. There had been much discussion as to whether we
should take up the cookers, and it was eventually decided to do so. One
of these—namely, A Company’s—was the victim of the only accident which
befell us on our first journey up, as together with horses and driver it
fell over the cliff from the roadside. By a miracle neither the driver
nor the two horses were much hurt, in spite of their rolling with the
vehicle for 50 feet down the mountain-side and taking a 10-feet drop at
the end! As much cannot be said for the cooker, which was smashed beyond
hope of repair.
Our first tour in a mountain sector, although interesting, was not
eventful, and only lasted a month. This, however, was quite long enough
in view of the climatic conditions at this time of year, for the weather
had been vile, and one more often wore wet clothes than dry ones.
A complete change was experienced on arrival in the plains (May 19), for
here the heat was intense. The villages of Grumo and Cereda, which had
been allotted to us for billets, lay some thirty miles from Fara, our
marches to these places being carried out at night to avoid the heat of
the day. Khaki drill was now issued to replace the usual serge clothing,
and this, with pith helmets for headgear, made a hot life possible.
Training was carried out between six and ten o’clock in the morning, and
again in the cool of the evening. During the other hours of daylight we
lay and gasped.
We had been led to expect that the Division (less the 144th Brigade, who
were still in the mountains) would be kept in billets in the plains for
three weeks or a month, but this did not materialise, owing to receipt
of rather sudden orders to relieve the 7th Division in the line. Two
long marches, carried out in the early mornings, took us to Camisino, at
the foot of the mountains, and on June 1 the Battalion negotiated the
3,000-feet climb, which occupied close on five hours. The rough and very
steep mule-track, up which our path lay, seemed interminable, and in
spite of making the start at 4.30 a.m., the heat during the last hour of
the ascent proved very trying.
We were now in the left Divisional sector of the British front, whereas
before we had been in the right. It was strange how very similar the two
sectors were in the matter of roads, general formation of the country,
and forestry. Our front line lay towards the foot of the northern slopes
of M. Lemerle, and was sited well inside the wood, thus providing very
bad observation for the enemy. His own front trenches, on the other
hand, were right in the open, towards the other side of the plateau and
distant from us some 1,400 yards. It was indeed for us a gunner’s
paradise. He had only to install himself in a carefully concealed
observation post in one of the trees, and choose targets from the varied
assortment which the trenches, villages and farms, provided for him.
The portion of line allotted to the Battalion lay on the extreme right
of the Divisional line, and ran from a point about 700 yards due south
of the village of Roncalto, where we joined with the 23rd Division, to
the Ghelpac Fork (Map No. 4).
By night, outposts were pushed out well in front of this line, in many
cases half-way across the broad “No Man’s Land.” These posts occupied
all points of tactical importance, such as high ground on the plateau,
and guarded the main approaches to our line.
In our case the Battalion outpost line ran from Pesaventi along the
valley of the dried-up Ghelpac, with a standing patrol covering a hill
known as 1002. Fighting patrols were sent out nightly in front of this
outpost line, and reconnoitred the ground almost up to the enemy
trenches. The enemy’s style in “No Man’s Land” was thus considerably
cramped. He did, however, screw up his courage sufficiently to occupy at
night two houses called Vaister, which were situated about 1,300 yards
in front of our line and 500 yards in front of that of the enemy.
As we expected soon to undertake an offensive it was thought that his
occupation of Vaister might prove an inconvenience to us, so it was
consequently decided to turn him out of it. The scheme for this was to
attack Vaister during the night (June 8/9) with two platoons, who were
to be relieved by two fresh sections shortly before dawn. It was
inadvisable to have a larger garrison there by day, as there was very
little cover and they would become an easy target for the Austrian
gunners, should they be spotted. Two platoons of B Company, under
2/Lieutenant R. W. Grace and 2/Lieutenant W. G. Butler, were detailed
for this duty.
The artillery fired salvoes at the houses at half-hour intervals,
starting at dusk, and at 1.15 a.m. the 18-pounders put down a one-minute
barrage 150 yards north of the houses, in order to make the garrison
keep their heads down. This barrage, which was the signal for the
assault, was timed to lift 300 yards north of the houses after one
minute, and to remain there for five minutes. The two platoons, who made
a converging attack from south-east and south-west, got through the wire
without much difficulty and reached the houses. They were empty. Rifle
fire, however, came from some distance beyond, and it seemed pretty
evident that our artillery fire had driven out the enemy, who had
decided to take up a position on the spur behind.
At 1.45 a.m. the enemy suddenly assaulted the houses, but were driven
off by our rifle and Lewis-gun fire, which caused them considerable
loss. A flare, fired by our men, showed up the enemy as they retired,
carrying their casualties, and a section was sent out to pursue them,
but they only succeeded in catching one man, who stated that they had
had twenty casualties.
Between 2.30 a.m. and 3 a.m. the enemy made two further attempts to
assault from the direction of Canove, but each attempt was stopped by
our fire.
At 3.30 a.m. two sections of D Company, under 2/Lieutenant F. J. Wilcox,
relieved the two platoons of B Company, and established three posts
covering the houses. They had not been there more than a very few
minutes before the Austrians again attacked. Once more they were
stopped, and our left section was pushed forward in the hope of catching
the enemy retiring.
Later the enemy delivered a further assault from each side of the
houses, and in this case succeeded in overrunning our right post. The
position, however, was soon restored to us, and at 5.40 a.m. the section
was ordered by Battalion Headquarters to withdraw to our lines.
During this tour in the trenches, the prevailing disease, a sort of very
acute type of influenza, attacked the Battalion. Every company had some
fifteen or twenty men affected and laid out by it, but as the effects,
in the majority of cases, were felt for two or three days only, a
comparatively small number of men were sent to hospital. There was good
reason for conserving our man power as far as possible since orders were
out for an offensive by the British Army in conjunction with the French
on our right. These operations were to be undertaken with a view to
driving the enemy off the actual plateau, and forcing him back on to the
Winter Stellung, which was a trench system which he had constructed in
front of M. Catz and M. Interrotto, some one and a half miles behind his
present front line. Our positions in the event of the attack being
successful would not be as favourable to us as they were at the present
time, but it was hoped that the losses inflicted on the enemy would be
great, and that we should be so much nearer to the key of all the
Austrian positions—namely, M. Catz, M. Interrotto, and the mountains
overlooking the Val d’Assa (Map No. 4).
Thus, from June 9 to the 14th our minds and plans were concentrated on
this prospective attack. Major P. A. Hall was now in command of the
Battalion, owing to Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds having assumed temporary
command of the Brigade.
On the 9th we were relieved in the front line, moving back to Brigade
support positions in the Lemerle Switch and Polderhoek Trench. On the
evening of the 14th, at a conference at Brigade Headquarters, commanding
officers were warned of a suspected attack by the enemy in the Brenta
valley and on the Piave, which was thought likely to take place the
following morning. It was not expected that the actual attack would
affect the British, though it was probable that the enemy’s bombardment
might extend as far west, in order to mislead us as to the real point of
attack. Plans and preparations for our own attack were to continue, zero
day for which had been fixed for June 16.
Such were our information and ideas for the future on the night of the
14th. All were doomed to be frustrated by the enemy, and that within a
very few hours.
At 3 a.m. the following morning the Austrians opened an intense
bombardment, with guns of every calibre, on all our lines of defence. A
large amount of gas shell was employed. The whole wood resounded with
high-explosive shells bursting among the rocks. Ammunition dumps took
fire, and became as dangerous as the enemy’s shells. Trees crashed to
the ground on all sides, and within a few minutes death was everywhere.
The Bucks Battalion immediately took up its battle stations in the
Lemerle Switch and Polderhoek Trench, astride the Boscon road. The
orders for the battalion holding these positions, in the event of the
enemy breaking through the front line, were to hold on to the last man.
This battalion was not to be used to reinforce forward positions. For
the next four or five hours shells rained down upon and around this
line, the shooting of the enemy being exceedingly good. Although a break
through of the front line was effected, the 1/4th Battalion Oxford &
Bucks Light Infantry, who were in the front trenches, fought every yard
of ground whilst giving way, and finally succeeded in definitely holding
up the attack in the neighbourhood of Pelly Cross.
Thus the enemy never actually reached the line that the Bucks Battalion
were holding, except on the extreme right, where he attempted to work
round the Oxfords’ flank; and the effects of the Austrian attack will be
better understood if the attack is described from the Brigade point of
view.
The 48th Division had two Brigades in the line: the 143rd in depth on a
one-battalion front on the left, and the 145th on a two-battalion front
on the right, the whole divisional frontage of four kilometres extending
from Roncalto to Schulazzon. The 23rd British Division were on the
right, and the 12th Italian Division on the left. Our 144th Brigade was
in Divisional reserve, with three battalions in camps at Carriola and M.
Brusabo, and one on the plains at the foot of the mountains.
The Divisional front trench line was of a very irregular trace,
consisting of a series of acute salients and reentrants, making it
impossible for most posts to see what was occurring on either side of
them or to give each other mutual assistance. The dry bed of the Ghelpac
ran in front of the left Brigade’s line, the western part of it lying in
a deep gorge. It was between this gorge and Cesuna Wood that the maximum
weight of the Austrian onslaught fell, and this was the extreme western
limit of the whole enemy attack.
At 3 a.m. the enemy’s heavy bombardment opened. At 7 a.m. his infantry
attack was launched, following a concentrated bombardment of the front
line. Owing to the trees and irregular features of the ground, it was in
most cases impossible for our men to observe the advance, or bring
effective fire to bear on the attacking columns, until they were
actually on our wire. There was also a thick ground mist, which
prevented observation from our look-out posts.
The first real break in the Divisional line occurred about the high
ground near Perghele, where the enemy were seen advancing in large
numbers about 7.50 a.m. From here they swept down the valley behind the
5th Gloucestershire Regiment, which held the centre of the Divisional
line, and, taking this battalion in reverse, cut off all communication
forward of the Battalion Headquarters. The support company took up a
position astride the valley, but the enemy soon enveloped their left,
and the company was gradually forced to retire on to the Cesuna-Canove
road. This line they held for some time, until a heavy attack was
delivered on their right, which forced them back astride the railway and
severed their connection with the 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks Light
Infantry.
In the meantime, the Oxfords on the right had been putting up a very
fine resistance. The enemy had, very early on, succeeded in driving a
wedge between them and the Northumberland Fusiliers, who were holding
the left of the 23rd Divisional line. The latter had been driven on to
their switch line. The right flank of the Oxfords thus became exposed,
and the enemy immediately began to work round it. This, however, was
prevented by the extreme right of the Bucks Battalion in the Lemerle
Switch.
By means of Bangalore torpedoes and flammenwerfers, the Austrians did
succeed in forcing an entry about the centre of the Oxfords’ line, and
by 9 a.m. were in complete possession of the front line.
Throughout the morning, the Oxfords held up the attack in the most
determined manner, never giving ground more than 200 yards behind the
original line. By afternoon, however, the situation on their left became
so serious that they were obliged to fall back on Pelly Cross Roads,
where they linked up with the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment,
two of whose companies had been ordered forward in support of the
Gloucesters.
Later in the day the enemy attack was further reinforced, and a swaying
fight went on until night fell.
The enemy made little further ground, and at 6 p.m. the 145th Brigade
front ran from the top of Hill 1021 to Pelly Cross Roads, and thence
along Pine Avenue to the Cesuna Switch, where junction was made with the
143rd Brigade.
About 7 p.m. two battalions of the 144th Brigade commenced a
counter-attack, from the Cesuna Switch in a north-easterly direction,
with a view to clearing the “pocket” that the enemy had been held in.
This made little headway, owing to the immense number of enemy machine
guns, which were most difficult to dislodge from among the rocks and
trees. Moreover, these battalions found it hard to keep direction,
fighting through the middle of the wood, with no roads or paths to guide
them. The attack, however, had the effect of reducing the pocket, and
certainly impressed the enemy with the fact that he was firmly
contained, as he made no further attempt to advance after this.
During the night arrangements were made for a general counter-attack to
take place the next morning at 4.30. This attack was completely
successful, meeting with what then appeared to be surprisingly little
resistance. By 5.45 a.m. our original front line was entirely reoccupied
and many prisoners were taken. A message was found on the body of a dead
Austrian officer, timed 2.50 a.m., ordering a complete withdrawal to
their own original line. Thus the slight resistance met with in our
counter-attack was accounted for, as the movement had by then been
largely effected.
The enemy casualties in the attack had been very severe indeed, as was
proved by the immense number of their dead, which lay strewn over the
whole of the recaptured area. Of prisoners also we had a great number,
and these included representatives of every unit of no fewer than two
divisions, and of several units of two other divisions. A striking
feature of the attack was the quantity and surprisingly good quality of
the stores and equipment brought forward. Practically every man had
evidently been issued with a new set of equipment previous to the
attack. An enormous number of machine guns had been brought forward,
many of which were left behind on retirement. Nearly all these were of
the heavy type, and consequently most unsuited to a rapid advance over
mountainous country on the scale which they had evidently anticipated,
judging from the operation orders captured. These orders showed the
enemy to have had the most far-reaching objectives, which, to those of
us who knew the country, were almost impossible of attainment, even if
resistance had been of the weakest, and Austrian infantry the finest
soldiers in the world—which they most assuredly were not. Weight of
numbers carried them so far as they got, and it may be considered partly
due to their lack of push and enterprise that they failed to exploit a
successful initial break through into and behind the line of the centre
battalion.
Although the Bucks Battalion did not have a leading part to play in this
battle, as the line it was holding was never attacked, it nevertheless
did a great deal of important work.
C Company, on the right, stopped the enemy attempt to envelop the 1/4th
Oxfords’ right. Several large officers’ patrols were sent out to keep in
touch with the two forward battalions, and on a few occasions they found
themselves in a position to hold up parties of the enemy who had worked
their way through. Much was done to maintain communication between the
forward line and Brigade Headquarters, all the telephone lines having
been broken shortly after the bombardment commenced.
Naturally, the Battalion did not suffer casualties to the same extent as
other units in the Brigade:
_Officers._—Wounded. 2/Lieut. H. R. Pigott.
2/Lieut. W. G. Butler.
2/Lieut. P. T. Herbert.
2/Lieut. F. J. Wilcox.
2/Lieut. E. T. C. Coxon.
Capt. H. Noke, C.F.
_Other ranks._—Killed—8.
Wounded—42.
The days following the attack were fully occupied in mending our wire,
burying the dead, and generally clearing the battle-field. The enemy
himself, for the next three or four days, appeared to be in a state of
confusion and suffering from lack of _moral_. Their men were to be seen
walking about in daylight behind their trenches, having left lengths of
their line unoccupied, while other parts were crowded. Two or three
mountain guns, left out in “No Man’s Land” after the enemy’s withdrawal,
were brought in by us in broad daylight. This state of affairs was
exploited further by the 143rd and 144th Brigades, which were now
holding the line, by sending out large patrols with the object of
persuading the enemy to come back to our lines with them. This, however,
was only partially successful, and their resistance soon stiffened
again. It was evident, nevertheless, that the failure of the attack had
left its mark on the Austrian troops opposite, and that their _moral_
was thoroughly shaken by it.
On June 20, Major-General Sir Robert Fanshawe, K.C.B., gave up command
of the Division. This was a very heavy blow, and was received with the
greatest dismay throughout the Division. He had commanded it for three
years, and during this time had won the unbounded confidence and
affection of all ranks.
He was succeeded by Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., D.S.O.