THE AUSTRIAN DÉBÂCLE
_November 1 to 4, 1918_
_Reference Map No. 4_
The sole orders for the initial attack leading up to the final
operations of the war on the Italian front were received in the form of
a brief telephone message. (Appendix I D.)
The 48th British Division, in conjunction with the 24th French Division
on the right and the 20th Italian Division on the left, was to attack
and capture the line Croce di S. Antonio—M. Mosciagh, the infantry
attack to commence at 5.45 a.m. on November 1, 1918. The 48th Division
was to attack with the 145th Brigade on the right, the 144th Brigade on
the left, and the 143rd Brigade in reserve; the 145th Brigade to attack
with the Bucks Battalion on the right, the 1/4th Battalion Royal
Berkshire Regiment on the left, and the 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks
Light Infantry in reserve. The Bucks Battalion was to form up on a line
Rendela—Ferragh, and to take as its right boundary the line Ferragh—west
edge of Gallio Wood—road C. Giardini to Croce di S. Antonio. Our final
objective was to be a line of, roughly, 800 yards of front due east of
Croce di S. Antonio.
A glance at the map contours will give some idea of the mountainous
nature of country to be advanced over.
The order to attack arrived when we were in Brigade reserve in
rest-huts, just north of the Kaberlaba road. It was delivered on
November 1 at the somewhat inconvenient hour of 1 a.m., when everyone,
except telephone operators and sentries, was asleep. Companies were
scattered, and it was consequently impossible for every man to be up and
about for at least half an hour, and even more.
Zero was fixed for 5.50 a.m., at which hour we were to enter the first
objective, the Winter Stellung, which lay some seven miles distant. Not
a second must be wasted if the Battalion was to be formed up in time.
Companies were to wear fighting order; water-bottles were to be full and
haversack rations issued. Iron rations were, of course, included in
fighting order. Packs and blankets had to be left in the huts we were
vacating, and an officer with half a dozen men remained behind to
arrange with the Quartermaster as to their removal.
The transport and quartermaster’s stores being at Granezza, were too far
away to be of any immediate assistance. Lewis gunners were consequently
obliged to carry their guns and ammunition during the two-hour march to
the forming-up positions.
Great efforts were made to provide tea for the men before setting out,
but the time available was quite insufficient, and many had to start
without it. Even so, when finally the whole Battalion had been got on
the road and started off, it was evident that only if we were favoured
with good going could we arrive to time.
The road, which ran over the old “No Man’s Land” and through Asiago, had
been fairly well repaired during the last day or two, and the going was
not too bad.
It was not until the Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds,
D.S.O.) reached the northern outskirts of Asiago that we encountered
enemy shelling. From here onwards to Rendela progress became most
uncomfortable, although our casualties were wonderfully few.
The river-bed of the Ghelpac runs here between Rendela and Ferragh, on
its way from the hills above Gallio. The enemy was paying much attention
to this valley, by putting down a brisk barrage on it. It was decided,
consequently, to form up on the line of the road Rendela—Gallio, with
the Battalion’s left on Rendela, and occupying a frontage of 600 yards.
A Company (Captain N. S. Flint) formed on the left, B Company
(Lieutenant E. C. J. Allday) on the right, each on a two-platoon
frontage.
C Company (Captain G. W. Higlett, M.C.) and D Company (Lieutenant H. A.
Beaver) formed behind in depth in artillery formation.
It was 5.30 a.m. exactly when the forming-up was completed. Our hurried
departure from rest-huts had been none too much hurried, and no slower
pace could have been afforded on the road. We were just in time, with
nothing to spare.
With the opening of our very thin barrage the enemy’s barrage quickened,
and as the advance proceeded, shells whistled their way in both
directions just over our heads. Soon, sufficient daylight appeared for
the enemy to see the attack, and rifle and machine-gun fire were quickly
directed on us from Reutte, Costa, Straite and M. Catz.
The leading wave met with little difficulty in occupying the Winter
Stellung from Villa Rossi to Reutte, but, on attempting to advance from
it, met with heavy enfilade fire from Costa and M. Catz.
There was no sign of the attack on the left, from which direction this
enemy fire came.
It was obviously impossible for our men to make progress without first
silencing the enemy’s machine guns on M. Catz. A Company therefore
attacked Costa, and C and D Companies assaulted Straite and Rigoni di
Sotto, where four machine guns were captured. A Company succeeded in
rushing Costa, but then got temporarily held up by two machine guns on
the southern slopes of M. Catz. Finally, one of these was put out of
action by one of our Lewis guns, and the other was outflanked and its
crew killed.
Meanwhile, C and D Companies continued their advance, working up the
eastern side of M. Catz and assaulting the crest, where four more
machine guns were taken. By 7 a.m. M. Catz was ours, and the whole
garrison had either been killed or taken prisoner.
The enemy’s heavy gunners were not long in spotting the khaki figures
hurrying about the top of M. Catz, like ants on a mole-hill. They
directed their fire accordingly, and soon covered the hill in a black
pall of smoke, given off by the bursting of 5·9’s. The hill, however,
was ours, and it was our job to get on beyond it.
On the right, B Company had made excellent progress, but were now held
up by fire from some trenches half-way up the western side of Gallio
Wood. There were but few signs of the French blue uniforms, but it was
thought possible that they had been attracted to their right, just as we
had been forced to bear to the left on account of M. Catz. Moreover, so
long as they were working through Gallio Wood it was difficult for us to
see their progress.
It had now become necessary to send help to B Company. D Company were
therefore dispatched to the spur north of Rigoni di Sopra. This made it
too hot for the enemy holding up B Company, and they decided to go.
C Company continued their advance, and made good Roccolo N.E.
At 7.30 a.m. a company of the Royal Berkshires had come up to the
trenches on the southern slopes of M. Catz. Their arrival enabled us to
straighten out our line, preparatory to a further advance.
The enemy had now been decisively beaten, and even his heels were
nowhere to be seen. Some isolated posts and refugees from the Winter
Stellung were encountered here and there, but they soon surrendered,
several of them with machine guns.
By 10.30 a.m. the Battalion had reached a line corresponding
approximately with the 1,400 metre contour line just south-west of Croce
di S. Antonio. We were again out of touch with both the French and the
Royal Berkshires.
Companies were reorganised on their final objective, which had now been
attained, while patrols were pushed forward and to both flanks.
No sign of the enemy could be found, except a few stragglers who were
brought in. The French left was found on the east side of the Valle di
Nos, and a company of the Royal Berkshires came up on our left a little
later.
We had known, to our cost, for many months, that the enemy had gun
positions in the Valle di Nos. Reconnoitring parties were accordingly
sent out to see what could be found there. A number of guns of various
calibres were found. Some had been firing until their ammunition supply
was exhausted. Others had evidently been fired until we were almost up
to them, when their breech-blocks had been removed and the crew had
taken to their heels. Efforts had been made to get some of the guns
away, but they had all eventually been abandoned.
In all, the Battalion captured on this day some hundreds of prisoners
and a large quantity of material, including at least twenty-one guns of
all calibres, fifteen machine guns and three motor lorries, besides a
number of waggons.
Our casualties had so far been extraordinarily slight:
_Officers._—Wounded. 2/Lieut. J. W. C. Read.
_Other ranks._—Killed—8.
Wounded—30.
Missing—1.
On the left of the Divisional attack little progress had been made. The
144th Brigade were held up in front of Camporovere, and the 20th Italian
Division had been unable to get forward at all. Thus it seemed that,
whatever he was to lose elsewhere, the enemy was determined to keep his
hold on the Val d’Assa. To lose this would assuredly mean losing all.
But our progress on the right, together with that of the French, had
been so great, that even our present positions threatened the rear of
the enemy force who were holding up the 144th Brigade. The following day
was to see this put to still better advantage.
The Battalion remained on the line it had reached at mid-day on November
1 throughout the afternoon and night. Very great care was taken to
select the best defensive positions, in view of the possible
reappearance of the enemy in force to counter-attack the ground he had
lost. Officers and men were tired out, and lack of a cup of tea began to
make itself felt. The marching, fighting and general excitement of the
whole day, which had begun at 1 a.m., made us all thankful for even a
few hours’ halt, but there was little enough rest, especially for the
officers, who had to reconnoitre the ground all round them before
nightfall. Being in the middle of a wood on the top of a mountain, as we
now were, made this all the more difficult and all the more necessary.
[Illustration:
_PRE WAR PANORAMA TAKEN FROM M^T TOPLE (1295) LOOKING NORTH i.e. INTO
AUSTRIAN TERRITORY_
]
The getting forward of our rations caused us much anxiety. We had not
been in touch with the Quartermaster at Granezza since the evening
before our orders to attack arrived. He had, however, been instructed to
bring our rations up the road past Reutte. Guides were to be sent there
to bring him on. Unfortunately, but not unnaturally, in an absolutely
strange country, much of which was wooded, these guides lost their way
without finding him, and remained out all night. The darkness amongst
the woods was intense. Of mule-tracks leading down the mountain there
were several, though only one right one; when found, it was no easy
matter to keep to it. The 2nd-in-command finally set forth in an
endeavour to gain touch with the transport column. He also lost himself
for some three hours, before he eventually found the longed-for rations
towards dawn. Without further mishap, they were taken forward, but only
to reach the Battalion’s positions a good half-hour after the Battalion
had moved off. A party had been left behind to manhandle the rations
after them.
Thus, for the second day we set out without tea, and this time we were
also without water or rations.
At dawn, the 1/7th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment, who had been
concentrated during the night at Roccolo N.E., attacked and captured M.
Mosciagh from the east. This made untenable the enemy positions on M.
Interrotto, which had given so much trouble to the 144th Brigade the
previous day.
The 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks Light Infantry were at once moved
against M. Meatta, where they disposed of the enemy garrison with little
difficulty.
This turning movement on the part of the Worcesters and Oxfords
threatened the main, and indeed only, line of Austrian retirement—along
the Val d’Assa. The enemy holding out at the entrance to the valley beat
a hurried retreat, and when the 143rd Brigade (which had been in reserve
the previous day) attacked Camporovere at 10 a.m., they met with little
resistance and advanced very rapidly up the Val d’Assa. By dusk they
were in touch with the enemy, who were in prepared positions on the line
Bosson—Vezzena—Marcia di Sotto. Here the Austrians were in considerable
strength.
At 7 a.m. on the 2nd, the Bucks Battalion turned due west, and after
making good M. Dorbelle, scaled M. Mosciagh, relieving the 7th Battalion
Worcestershire Regiment there. Here, at 2 p.m., our long-lost rations
and water reached us. We were getting done up for want of them, and
never, never did tea taste so good. Even so, we had to be most careful
with both the water and the food, as at our present rate of progression
and most uncertain direction, it might be a long while before further
supplies reached us.
On M. Mosciagh were Austrian guns of all calibres; stores and equipment
left behind in all the huts testified to the hurried retreat of the
enemy, and souvenirs lay on all sides.
At 3 p.m. we received orders to move down into the Valle di Portule,
where the whole Brigade, less one company of the 1/4th Oxfords who
remained on M. Meatta, bivouacked for the night. We found a large number
of enemy huts here, but not sufficient to shelter the whole Brigade.
Many of us were consequently obliged to spend another freezing cold
night in the open, with no greatcoats and no blankets. These huts, which
the Austrians had made themselves, were well fitted up. There was no
lack of stoves, which worked well and gave out a good amount of heat.
Tables, chairs and wire beds were quite numerous, all of them having
been obviously made by the enemy on the spot. Packs, greatcoats and
small articles of equipment, together with papers, magazines, books and
orders, were strewn over the whole encampment. The clothing for the most
part was infested with vermin, which was natural, seeing the general
state of filth which had been allowed to accumulate everywhere. A fairly
well-stocked canteen was also found and promptly raided. In an adjoining
hut a cask of brandy was unearthed, but the finders gave vent to such a
shout of joy that the Adjutant took steps to ascertain the cause, and,
on learning it, decided to place a strong guard over the cask.
Evidence abounded of the extreme haste of the enemy to get clear of the
place. Judging from appearances, the flight had been considerably
hampered by our shelling. Transport waggons, motor lorries and guns had
become ditched by the roadside and so left. Horses, still harnessed to
their carts, lay across the road, dead or dying; while their drivers
had, in many instances, suffered a like fate.
It was the novelty of these sights, and the general feeling that we were
really getting on with the war, which kept us all going, tired as we
were.
At 3 a.m. the following day (November 3) the whole Division resumed the
advance.
At 4.30 a.m. the Advanced Guard (143rd Brigade, with a Brigade of Field
Artillery) commenced its attack on the Vezzena position. Considering the
strength of the enemy on this line, a very feeble resistance was
offered, and by 8 a.m. a large force, consisting of some fourteen
battalions, was surrounded and captured.
The IIIrd Austrian Corps commander and three divisional commanders, with
their staffs, were amongst the prisoners taken.
Vezzena had been their corps headquarters. The huts, of which there were
a large number, contained food and fodder sufficient to last a corps for
very many weeks. One huge hut contained nothing but flour, another dried
vegetables, another hay and straw, and so on, embracing everything which
an army in the field requires. The tale of shortage of food in the
Austrian army appeared an unlikely one when we saw a sight of this kind,
and yet shortage there must have been, or their men would not have
looked so thin and badly nourished as they did.
The march of the main body, headed by the Battalion, proved to be a most
memorable one. Abandoned guns, waggon parks, ammunition dumps, lay by
the side of the whole route; the roads were littered with articles of
Austrian equipment. In their anxiety to travel as fast and as lightly as
possible, the enemy had cast away all that encumbered him. Gas masks,
helmets, packs, haversacks, and, finally, rifles lay scattered along the
road, down which but a few hours before the routed army had passed in
their helpless, panic-stricken flight. One’s dream of the typical army
rout of history days had come true, and indeed surpassed all
imagination.
As we neared Vezzena, we met whole battalions of the enemy marching to
the rear, under the escort of a handful of British soldiers. In many
cases an Austrian battalion commander led back his battalion complete,
while in front of him walked a man with the white flag. Generals were
permitted to ride, at footpace.
It was a pathetic sight to see these thousands of men trudging their
weary way to our rear. Their spirit was broken, and tragedy was written
plain on every officer’s face.
Our Divisional commander had sent forward a car to pick up and bring
back the Austrian corps commander, doubtless with the idea of eliciting
full information from him as speedily as possible.
Just short of Vezzena we halted for a meal. We had been on the road for
seven hours, and had begun to feel the effects. Excitement had kept
every man going, and even the most sore-footed and weary held on, hoping
that round the next corner he would see the Emperor Charles, with his
hands up and shouting “Kamerad!”
On passing Vezzena, on the road towards M. Rovere, the same strange
sights continued to present themselves. As we advanced along the valley,
a party of the enemy 500 or 600 strong were seen wending their way
towards us down the side of the hill. Curiosity developed into
astonishment when it was noticed that every man of them was armed with a
rifle, while machine guns could be seen on the backs of mules which
brought up their rear. This party seemed to think little of an enemy
division marching in column of route through their country, while the
idea that a few bursts from their machine guns, fired from the
commanding position they held, would wipe us off the road, had not
apparently struck them, as it had certainly struck us. So far as we were
concerned there was no time, and apparently no necessity, to discontinue
our march. The whole situation was so entirely favourable to us, that
delay even now might mar the full fruits of what should be the most
gigantic victory. So only one officer with a platoon was fallen out to
deal with the enemy column. This officer, by means of an interpreter,
ordered the column to halt, and requested the officer in charge to come
down to him. The lieutenant-colonel who complied with this request
appeared surprised when told that his battalion must march past, and
every man lay down his arms as he did so. He was apparently under the
impression that an armistice existed. However, on our further
explanation that the rest of his corps had already performed the
trifling ceremony that was required of him, and that his corps commander
was in our hands, he decided to comply with the demand.
Advancing down the precipitous slopes of M. Rovere into the Val Sugana,
the Battalion occupied Caldonazzo at 3.30 p.m. This town turned out to
be either an Army or Corps railhead, and a large quantity of
rollingstock lay in the station and sidings. One complete train, loaded
with 200 field-guns, had failed to get away, presumably owing to
shortage of engines. Quantities of munitions, equipment and stores lay
there ready for loading, while in an adjoining field was a large park of
guns of all calibres, including one 17-inch howitzer.
On this afternoon, November 3, 1918, the G.S.O.I. of the division
proceeded to Trent, the headquarters of the Third Austro-Hungarian Army,
demanding the surrender of Trent and Pergine, with all hostile troops in
the area. This demand was complied with.
The 144th and 145th Brigades billeted for the night November 3/4 in
Caldonazzo. There was again little enough rest on that night, as some
10,000 prisoners had been collected here and guards had to be furnished
over them.
The Battalion had on this day been fourteen hours on the move, and
covered twenty-five miles. With little sleep and often short of water,
the test had been severe, and one wondered how much longer it was to
continue. Our astonishing experiences, and the knowledge that the 48th
Division was the first British Division to enter an enemy’s country on
the Western front, had done wonders towards helping us along.
It was with little surprise that, about 7 a.m. the next day, November 4,
1918, we received this message:
“Armistice with Austria-Hungary has been signed 3rd November.—Armistice
will come into effect from 15.00 hours (3 p.m.), 4th November.—Moves
ordered for 4th Nov. will take place, but all troops will halt on the
line gained at 15.00 hours exactly.—All Austrians within the line gained
this hour will be considered prisoners-of-war.—Austrians not within this
line will at 15.00 hours retire for a distance of at least three
kilometres.—The utmost care will be taken to see that these instructions
are carried out.—The contents of this wire will be immediately passed to
all units who are in touch, in case they should not receive them by
other methods.—Acknowledge.”
The Battalion took the news quietly. We were too weary to be jubilant;
besides which, our rations for the day had not arrived, and there is
never cause for joy under those conditions. Nor would these rations have
turned up before we moved, had it not been for the strenuous efforts of
the Quartermaster, Captain E. Nichol.
At 10 a.m. the Brigade (less 1/4th Battalion Oxford & Bucks Light
Infantry, who remained in charge of the prisoners) once more took to the
roads, and, after marching sixteen miles, reached by 3 p.m. the little
village of Madrano, just east of Pergine. The towns and villages through
which we passed were filthy in the extreme. Dead horses lay at intervals
along the road, while the villagers were getting to work cutting
rump-steaks off them.
Except for a few stragglers, no further signs of the enemy were seen.
The captures made by the Division since November 1 amounted to some
22,000 prisoners, 165 howitzers, 263 guns, besides uncountable small
arms, machine guns, and material of all kinds. In addition, there were
large numbers of abandoned guns in the neighbourhood of Vezzena and
along the Val d’Assa, of which no count could be made.
On the evening of November 4, the Divisional Commander issued the
following Order of the Day:
“OFFICERS, N.C.O.’S AND MEN OF THE 48TH DIVISION,
“Your achievement during the last few days of the most profound military
events deserves unstinted praise. After fourteen weeks of trench warfare
and arduous work, chiefly at night, combined with frequent raids of the
most difficult though successful nature, you have undertaken an attack
on a front originally allotted to two divisions, against what ought to
have been impregnable mountain positions; you have swept away the enemy
rearguards, and, acting as the vanguard of the Sixth Italian Army, you
have advanced so rapidly and with such resolution, that the retiring
enemy have had no time to reform and have left over 20,000 prisoners,
hundreds of guns and immeasurable booty in the hands of the Division.
“The mere performance of the march in the time, and under the conditions
you endured, would have been, even without opposition, considered a
creditable feat. You can justly claim that the favourable situation of
the Italian Armies on this front at 15.00 hours to-day, when one of the
most memorable armistices in history was signed, is largely due to your
exertions and resolution.
“As your Divisional Commander I cordially thank you.
“(_Sd._) H. B. WALKER, _Major General,
“Cdg. 48th Division._”
A few’ days later the Divisional Commander received the following
message from General F. R. Earl of Cavan, K.P., K.C.B., M.V.O.,
Commanding-in-Chief British Force in Italy:
“I have been waiting to hear from Sixth Army Commander outlines of your
great victory. I have also been waiting for the definite order for your
concentration with the XIVth Corps. To-day I have received both, and I
hasten to send all ranks my intense appreciation of their great service,
and my sincere thanks to you personally for the drive and determination
with which you conducted your arduous operations.
“The C.I.G.S. sent his special congratulations to the 48th Division
to-day by King’s Messenger. British troops may well be proud of their
actions in mountains and in plains, but the pride I feel in them exceeds
all.”
And this, incredible as it seemed, was really the end of the war for the
Bucks Battalion.
How little had we guessed, when we left that cold dark camp by the
Kaberlaba road four days before, that we were setting out on an attack
which would so swiftly complete an overwhelming disaster to Austrian
arms and Austrian Empire, greater and more fatal than Austerlitz or
Sadowa!