THE SECRET TREATY OF BJÖRKE--II
Turning to me Witte said, "I had in my mind at the time, but I did
not mention it to Bülow, a much more striking instance which had made
very bad blood at the Tsar's court. It was an incident--a
characteristic one--which had happened at military manœuvres
presided over by the Kaiser. The Grand Duke of Hesse, who took part
in them, was being caustically criticised by his war-lord who said,
'So you want to have the Black Eagle conferred on you, I understand?
Very well. Show that you deserve it. Answer me a question, but
answer it at once and without hesitation. When a hussar mounts his
charger which foot must he raise first, the right or the left?
Quick!' The Grand Duke did not rise to the occasion. He remained
silent. Then the Emperor said, 'You want the Black Eagle and yet are
unable to answer a simple question like that,' and with a sneer he
left the parade ground. That monologue found its way to Peterhof
very shortly afterwards. And it was brooded over. But I kept that
to myself." About six months later Bülow thanked Witte fervidly for
his advice, which he said was most wise and efficacious. "The Tsar,"
he added, "has, as you told me, a great store of _amour propre_."
"After that," Witte went on, "I must say that the Kaiser's manner
towards Nicholas II. was much less overbearing than before. He
evidently remembered my recipe. He advised the Tsar not to give way
during the Japanese war, but he gave the advice in an acceptable
form. But after all he was knocking at an open door. For Nicholas
II. hated England then, and for three reasons: first, because of the
treaty she had made with Japan which ruined his own political
schemes; second, because of English liberalism which sympathised with
Russian liberalism and gave asylum to Russian revolutionaries; and
third, because of the growing {330} influence of the Jews in Britain.
He sometimes spoke as though all the English were Jews.
"Before I left Norderney I received a letter from the Russian
commercial attaché in London, Rutkoffsky, asking me whether I could
meet the Japanese minister, Hayashi, with a view to talking over the
ways and means of ending the war. Without mentioning this letter, I
casually asked Bülow what Germany would think and say if peace were
concluded at this conjuncture. He had just received one of the daily
communications from the Kaiser. He answered, 'If I were only a
friend of Russia's, I would say without hesitation or reserve, "make
peace." But Germany is not merely a friend--she is a devoted, a
sincere, an intimate, a unique friend of Russia's, and for that
reason she cannot give such poisonous advice to her. Make peace
indeed!'
"Months passed. As you remember I went to Paris, on my way to
Portsmouth, and you went to London to carry my proposals to Hayashi
for the Japanese government. France was full of her own troubles
just then, of which the source was Berlin and the pretext Morocco.
Delcassé had already been dismissed. I saw Rouvier and Loubet. They
both counselled me to make peace. I needed no stimulus, however, to
move me in that direction. You know what I felt and thought of that
accursed war which may yet bring others in its train and ruin some of
the cultural achievements of generations. I saw it coming and my
exertions to stave it off cost me my post of Finance Minister. When
I passed through Paris in 1903 I knew it was imminent and I felt
impelled to call on Delcassé, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
apprise him. But on reflection I gave up the idea because Delcassé
would not have believed me. But, instead, I called on Alphonse
Rothschild and told him what my forecast was. Rothschild queried,
'Are you quite sure? The reason I ask you is because Delcassé is of
the opposite opinion and I should like to have something more than
one opinion balancing another. He swears there will be no war.' I
answered that I had unfortunately no doubt.
"France, were she better informed, might have prevented {331} that
wanton slaughter--almost without an effort. And she ought to have
prevented it in her own interests, for of all the non-belligerent
nations she had most to lose by it. To England it seemed rather a
gain because it would weaken her old enemies and render them both
more amenable to reason in the future. To Germany it would bring no
loss and some important advantages, such as the commercial treaty.
It would also relieve her of the necessity of preparing for a war on
two fronts which was the constant fear before the eyes of the Berlin
statesmen. Austria considered it a boon, the like of which would
probably never return for centuries. And Aehrendial's merit lay in
his clear perception of that fact and the promptitude with which he
acted on it. France alone stood to lose tremendously by Russia's
defeat. Her savings were invested in Russian enterprises. Her
prestige and international status depended largely on our military
strength. But the statesmen of the republic saw nothing, felt
nothing, suspected nothing. By the beginning of 1905 the upshot was
outlined with painful distinctness. Russia was worsted, the balance
of European power was upset, and France's specific gravity had fallen
low.
"France had to find a substitute for what she had lost in the
Japanese war, and she turned towards England. This was a good enough
move in the circumstances. My criticism of it is that Delcassé
allowed himself to be dictated to by circumstances instead of taking
them in hand and directing them. The Anglo-French understanding,
which you had so often advocated, was at last realised and the Kaiser
was incensed to find himself confronted with an accomplished fact
instead of being told all about it at the outset. A friend of mine
and of his said to him, 'There is nothing in it except what everybody
knows. And that is harmless enough.' But the Kaiser replied, 'If
that be so, why was it hidden from me? The concealment makes me
suspect something that has not emerged into the light. And whether
or no it is there I am warranted in suspecting it.'
"Then Wilhelm devised the Morocco incident in order to punish France
and test England's loyalty to the republic. {332} I know that he did
not believe that the English would stand by their late opponents so
soon after Fashoda, and he was not alone in his estimate. But events
belied it. That was his first mistake. Holstein, the spider who
spun his webs in the Berlin twilight, held the opposite view and left
no stone unturned to move his government to act upon it. But the
Kaiser went his own way, as he so often does. His visit to Tangier
and all that came of that is universally believed to have been the
execution of a plan drawn up with deliberation and neatness. But
although his ultimate aims were definite and can be reconstructed
to-day without fear of error--I have amused myself by putting them in
sequence--the details were often left to chance, and his fateful
visit to Tangier was one of these details. It may be said that these
particulars possess meagre historic interest, but they characterise
the man and help one to appreciate his policy. Well, I can tell you
that he never intended to make that extraordinary visit until his
yacht had actually left Lisbon, and he did not intend to land even
when the yacht was in the roadstead opposite Tangier until a French
marine officer, very innocently, encouraged him by giving a sanguine
view of the state of wind and wave and weather. That is an absolute
fact....[1]
"The Kaiser's visit became a landmark of history, however, and Europe
had to reckon with its consequences. These might have been less
painful for the republic if its statesmen had displayed more
self-discipline and less levity. But we must take people as they
are, and Clemenceau was true to himself when he unburdened his mind
and stated that France, according to the War Minister, was not
prepared for war. No doubt it was a rash course to run the risk of a
war with no allies except a prostrate Russia and an England who could
help France only with her ships and, as the Kaiser brutally put it,
'could not save Paris.' Still bluff was a possible game, but that
was not exactly the way to play it.
"When I reached Paris, on my way to the United States, {333} the
people there were engrossed by the Morocco business and by Germany's
daring and successful intervention in the internal politics of
France. And undoubtedly it was an amazing spectacle. The removal of
Delcassé, then a popular minister, in a country which was proud of
being democratic in spirit and a republic in form, was a marvellous
achievement. True, it was effected only with the co-operation of the
French themselves. But they co-operated with zeal and perseverance.
Rouvier hated Delcassé and wholly disapproved his policy as
chauvinistic, and the Germans, who are single-minded and united,
played off the one politician against the other, and gained their
ends without changing or even modifying their own plans for either.
The only modification they made came later, after my return from the
Peace Conference at Portsmouth, and then it was brought to pass by my
intervention. I may say that my short-lived friendly relations with
the Kaiser enabled me to ward off a European war. The play of
democratic institutions in France and Italy--I know England far too
little to be able to speak with first-hand knowledge on the
subject--is a comedy and will continue to be a comedy until it
becomes a tremendous tragedy. It is a repetition on a more moderate
scale of the unedifying doings that went on in Poland shortly before
the first partition. Or look at it if you will in this way: The
Germans are aiming at the same kind of influence over so-called
democratic countries of Europe that Russia and England are actually
exercising in Persia--they hope for a victory to be scored by
intelligence, system, and organisation over ignorance, incompetence,
and lack of cohesiveness. If the conditions continue unchanged the
odds are big in favour of Germany. Cannot your statesmen be got to
realise that? ... Or has Fate taken the matter out of their hands?
"The newspapers in Paris published a telegram somewhere about
24th-25th July, I don't remember the exact date, announcing that the
Kaiser had gone in his yacht on a visit to the Tsar to Björke.
Rouvier was very disquieted at the news and asked me what it meant.
'How is it possible,' {334} he exclaimed, 'that our ally can
demonstrate his friendship, private or public, for the man who is
playing havoc with France's policy and her peace of mind, and is
behaving as an enemy who has not yet declared war against us only
because he is not sure that all the circumstances are auspicious?' I
quieted Rouvier as best I could, saying that the Tsar is not merely
loyal but is punctiliously so, that I felt certain the visit was one
of courtesy and that it was imposed on him by the Kaiser--as it
really turned out to be--and that if he had declined it the
consequences would probably be as unpleasant to France as to Russia.
I talked for some time in this conventional style, but I did not feel
assured myself. I resembled a lawyer pleading from a brief sent by a
shady solicitor. While I was talking to the Premier, all the
circumstances of the Kiao Chow incident unrolled themselves before my
mind's eyes: I saw the two monarchs with important mien playing with
the lives of a multitude of men, and one of them hardly conscious of
his responsibility, but both deeming themselves to be beings of a
different species from their fellow-mortals. I also remembered the
Kaiser's question, which Bülow put to me at Norderney, as to how he
should tackle the Tsar, and I wondered whether the Tsar had again
allowed himself to be duped. On reflection, however, I persuaded
myself that that could hardly be, because there was nothing
mischievous left for him to do--so far as I could then see. But
Rouvier, whose thoughts ran on other lines, was excited, and raising
his voice exclaimed, 'How could such a thing be possible? When you
were leaving Petersburg was it arranged? Did the Tsar tell you
anything about it?' 'No, it was not arranged. If it had been I
should most certainly have known from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. But I will telegraph to him at once.'
"I telegraphed to Lamsdorff, and received a statement from him by
letter which, as well as I remember, was written before he could have
received my telegraphic inquiry. You can verify the dates in my
papers."[2]
{335}
Witte received Lamsdorff's letter from Professor Martens. It
enclosed a copy of the government instructions to Baron Rosen and
contains the following characteristic reference to the famous
interview at Björke. I translate it literally: "In the evening of
the 6th/19th July, his Majesty the Emperor received a telegram from
Kaiser Wilhelm, from the eastern coast of Sweden, with contents of a
most obliging character. At the end of it[3] the German Kaiser
added, 'I should be happy to have the possibility of meeting the
Emperor _unceremoniously_!'[4] Considering that such an interview
would be most useful and important at the conjuncture through which
we are passing, his Majesty gladly consented and proposed to Wilhelm
that he should repair to Björkesund, not far from Vyborg. The
meeting will take place on Sunday, 10th/23rd July, towards evening,
and will probably extend over a day and a half. It is unnecessary
that I should accompany the Emperor because Bülow is not cruising
with the Kaiser Wilhelm.
"I am of opinion that this event can produce only a good impression
and one that is advantageous to us. Provided always that Wilhelm
does not contrive to elicit one or other of those assurances and
amicable promises which he afterwards knows how to exploit in such a
masterly way.
"I hope that you will have an opportunity of explaining to the French
that the coming together of the two emperors has an exclusively
friendly and family character. One among other evidences of this is
the absence of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In any case, for
France the impending conversations of the two monarchs cannot be
other than helpful."
How helpful they were the public knows by this time. It may not be
amiss to reproduce here the exact text of the telegram in which the
Kaiser practically invited himself to the Tsar's dominions. It is in
the Emperor's English which diverges occasionally from the King's:
{336}
"I shall shortly be on my return journey[5] and cannot pass across
entrance of Finnish sea without sending you best love and wishes.
Should it give you any pleasure to see me either on shore or your
yacht of course am always at your disposal. I would come as simple
tourist without any fêtes."
The Tsar replied at once as follows: "Delighted with your
proposition. Would it suit you to meet at Björkesund near Vyborg, a
pleasant quiet place, living on board our yachts? In these serious
times I cannot go far from the capital. Of course our meeting will
be quite simple and homely. Looking forward with intense pleasure to
see you. Nicky." From Nyland the Kaiser replied on 7th/20th July as
follows: "Most happy. Would it suit you if I arrived at your
anchorage--Björkesund--on Sunday, 10th/23rd, evening? My yacht draws
six and half metres water, would be thankful for a trustworthy pilot
to lead us through the entrance. Please to communicate where you
will anchor. Have kept the whole matter quite secret, so that my
gentlemen on board even know nothing; also at home nobody
informed.[6] Am so delighted to be able to see you. Hope you will
not be disturbed by my Nordland's Gessellschaft who always accompany
me since fifteen years. Best love. Willy." After that the
following three despatches passed between the pair before they came
together on the historic evening of the 23rd: "Shall be Sunday,
10th/23rd, afternoon, at Björkesund. Have given orders about
trustworthy pilot. Place of anchorage will be between the islands of
Björke and Kavitza. Till now have kept our planned meeting secret.
So happy to see you. Wish you a smooth passage. Best love. Nicky."
"Most obliged, expect to arrive on 23rd (10th) at seven evening.
Please let pilot meet us off Hochland. Nobody has slightest idea of
meeting; only my captain, who is {337} ordered to keep absolute
secrecy. All my guests under impression of going to Visby in
Gothland. I am overjoyed at seeing you again. Have most important
news for you. The faces of my guests will be worth seeing when they
suddenly behold your yacht! A fine lark! Tableaux! Which dress for
the meeting? Willy."
"Steamer with pilots shall await your arrival at south end of island
Hochland 10th/23rd July at sunrise. Micha will accompany me. Best
love. Nicky."
Before touching upon the correspondence that had gone before, and of
which the meeting and the work accomplished thereat were but the
climax, it will be well to quote two more allusions to the interview
which Witte received during his absence from Russia. The Finance
Minister, Kokofftseff, telegraphing to him about the scheme for a
consultative chamber, to be called the Duma, adds: "All the time the
Emperor is in good humour, being manifestly cheered up after his
meeting with the German Kaiser."[7]
Count Lamsdorff in a letter dated 16th/29th July, which he sent to
Witte through the intermediary of the naval officer Russin, writes:
"The Emperor was extraordinarily pleased with his interview with
Kaiser Wilhelm, who in reality, however, talked little about the war,
but expressed himself in favour of concluding peace with a view to
restoring order in the interior of Russia. What seemingly touched
the Tsar was Wilhelm's proclaiming his firm confidence in the
invulnerability of Russia's might. He considers the present ferment
superficial, and believes that it can easily be made to subside. I
do not know how far this optimism is sincere, but by means of it an
excellent impression was made on the Emperor.
"They talked of the affairs of Norway-Sweden and of the relations
with France, with whom the Emperor Wilhelm considers it possible to
establish closer intercourse after the removal of Delcassé", etc.,
etc. It is my opinion that these friendly assurances will lead up to
more or less definite {338} demands, on which it behoves us to look
with the utmost circumspection."[8]
How the French government professed to look upon the Björke interview
appears from a confidential report that lies before me from an
eminent diplomatist who will recognise the words of his own telegram
to his government.[9] "With regard to the visit of the German to the
Russian Emperor the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
told me that the Russian government had not notified it, and that M.
Witte was not informed of it before quitting St. Petersburg, and that
it was only after the meeting of the two emperors that the French
government was apprised that the Kaiser had requested the Tsar to be
allowed to pay him a visit of cordial amity. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs assured me that M. Witte had called on him to explain on
behalf of Count Lamsdorff that the interview of the two emperors was
devoid of political character, and that nobody could pretend to know
the particulars of the conversation that had taken place between the
two sovereigns, although the rumour had been spread that Germany was
aiming at getting France to strike up an understanding with her in
order to act together in concert on the Far Eastern question.
"I availed myself of the opportunity to ask the Minister of Foreign
Affairs for some information on this subject. He assured me
categorically that no advances had been made to the French
government, and that he himself was formally opposed to any such
understanding, inasmuch as he preferred to have his hand entirely
free on these questions.[10] ... Having learned that M. Witte had
seen the ambassador of Germany in France I called on him shortly
after my interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
ambassador of Germany in France told me that ... he could not {339}
understand how Russians like Witte could misunderstand the actual
situation.[11] Respecting the meeting of the monarchs he told me
that it was a visit of courtesy and that it would be a grave error on
the part of the French to ascribe real importance to it. According
to a telegram which he had received he thinks he is warranted in
saying that the Tsar was entirely satisfied with the meeting. But
the circumstance that Russia and Germany are striving to belittle as
far as possible the significance of this visit seems, to me, on the
contrary, to prove that the meeting of the two emperors possesses
some importance.... I saw the ambassador of England in France, and
he told me that the meeting of the two emperors was perhaps intended
to prepare a cooling down of the relations between France and Russia,
Germany having already had recourse to that policy in Morocco to
sunder France from England...."
The Kaiser's verbal profession of faith in the firmness of Russia's
might was repeated in a telegram he sent to the Tsar less than a week
after the interview,[12] in the course of which he wrote: "I venture
to advise promulgating (_sic_) Bouliguine Bill[13] as soon as
possible. So that the representatives be elected soon. Meanwhile,
till that has taken place, the peace conference will have been opened
and the conditions become known for both sides." How thoughtful he
was of the monarchist principle even abroad, and of the policy of
attributing all individual successes to the sovereign, may be
inferred from the following allusion to Witte's peace negotiations:
"With the actual spirit prevailing in Russia, the disaffected masses
would try to place the whole responsibility for all disadvantageable
(_sic_) consequences on your {340} shoulders and the successes as
results on Witte's personal manage (_sic_). It would be excellent as
a first task for these representatives, if you gave them the treaty
of peace after it has been formulated, to vote upon; thus leaving the
odium of the decision to the country and thereby giving the Russian
people a voice in the matter of their own prosperity, which they so
much wish for. The outcome would be their work and therefore stop
the mouths of the opposition. Best love to Alice. Willy."
In this secret meeting with the Kaiser and the extra secret doings to
which it led we again find the stream of tendency in the matter of
Russia's most momentous dealings with foreign countries canalised and
regulated, not by some far-seeing statesman or in accordance with any
general instructions attributed to Peter, but by the changing whims
of a puny whipster, of whom the best that one can say is that he knew
not what he did. Befogged with fantastic ideas fostered by his
courtiers, he worshipped himself as the source of all political
wisdom and ignored even those whom he himself had chosen to advise
him. His letters and the remarks he penned across various reports
which are in my possession depict him as a man whose mind was
affected by the mania of greatness. He resented every human
endeavour to enlighten him. From the viewless spirits, indeed, he
was willing enough to accept lessons whether they came through a
table, a planchette, a medium, or a hypnotiser like Rasputin, but
from a mere mortal, however experienced and clear-eyed, he would
brook nothing short of acquiescence and obedience. A man of Witte's
vehement pulsing force he could not tolerate in his environment, and
even the meek and mild Lamsdorff, who felt himself exalted "in bowing
down before the Lord's anointed," however he might counsel and plead
and expostulate,[14] was not even {341} listened to. He was the
Emperor's tippet. Nicholas II. had no minister, Russia no leader.
And his schemes were secret, his plans mysterious, his State actions
clandestine. His very glance was furtive. Although most people
around him had sounded his intelligence and plumbed his character,
nobody whom I met understood him so perfectly as Witte. Not only
could he describe graphically the workings of the Emperor's mind from
their manifestations in his looks, words, gait, gestures, and voice,
but he could often foretell his attitude in circumstances which were
about to occur for the first time. The greatness, physical, mental,
and moral, of Witte added the element of the grotesque to the
smallness, the pettiness, and the pithlessness of his sovereign. "He
has the slyness of the maniac, and also the method and the
stubbornness," he used to say to me. "There is no trace of high
spirit in anything he undertakes. His best actions are done as
though his conscience pictured them as shameful crimes." But this
solvent analysis did not impair the statesman's loyalty or sense of
duty.
One day Witte and I stood on the captain's bridge on the steamer that
was conveying us to New York looking down upon a crowd of Czechs,
Hungarians, Italians, Norwegians, Swedes, and Germans sprawling about
on the third-class deck. "Look at these people," Witte said. "There
must be, there certainly is, something radically wrong in the
civilisation that throws them up as scum to its surface. You may say
that they are not the dregs of that society. True, but that only
darkens the colours in which I behold the sinister phenomenon. If
the nations of the earth would only consent to abandon war as a means
of settling international disputes, what a spring-tide of improvement
we should experience! I don't claim that you can do away with
violence once for all in this imperfect world of ours. But you can
narrow its sphere surprisingly." "By another Hague Conference?" I
inquired. "Don't mention that ignoble sham, I loathe the name of
it," he exclaimed. "But listen and tell me what you think of what I
am going to say.
"When Kaiser Wilhelm paid his first visit to Petersburg {342} after
his accession to the throne I saw him and we talked, as you and I are
talking now, feeling after some solution to the great social problems
which are far more pressing than most of our trumpery issues. I
remember one occasion in particular on which we discussed the
differences between Europe and America with a view to examining the
source of the advantages which the United States enjoy. It was in
the German Embassy. The Kaiser said:
"You, M. Witte, are a European authority on tariff and railway
matters. Have you, in the course of your researches, ever gone into
the subject of what should be the normal economic relations between
the two continents, Europe and America?' 'No, sire. But I am not
sure that I have seized the drift of your question.' 'Well, I'll put
it more concretely. Did you never reflect that America is living on
Europe, drawing the life-sap from its peoples, and that the process,
unless it be stopped in time, may end in prostration?' Now how can
you stop it? There is only one effectual way, by checking the influx
of agricultural produce and manufactured wares from the United
States. I don't, of course, mean a complete and formal boycott, but
a high tariff that would cause the importation curve to drop
heavily.' 'No, sire. I never thought of that, and now that you
speak of it I am afraid it may prove difficult to find a suitable
place for it among the ideas that lodge in my brain. For with the
people of the United States we in Russia are on friendly terms.
Interest as well as sentiment impel us to remain on this good
footing. If we were to wage a tariff war against them I realise what
we should lose, but I cannot see what we should gain. So far as
Russia is concerned, there would be neither motive nor aim in the
measure.' 'You are mistaken in thinking that it should be directed
against the United States in particular. What I have in mind, and
what could and should be done in the interests of all our continental
peoples, is to levy a high tariff on all non-European wares. The
American would then be liable as well as those of the other
continents.'
"'That strikes me,' I objected, 'as primarily a political {343}
rather than an economic scheme, and it would, I feel convinced, make
bad blood between the peoples affected. Our aim it has always seemed
to me ought to be to bring together not to estrange. Ever since
England's war against the people of the United States that people and
we have been fast friends. And we wish to remain their friends in
the future. If I am right in assuming that at the root of your
Majesty's suggestion lies the sundering of the economical from the
political question, then I am with you. Thus while I see no harm in
our eating American bread, fruits, and other foods, I see no good in
our spending so much European money on preparations for war that too
little remains for these necessaries and for cultural purposes!
"'It may be true,' I went on, 'that the importation of American corn
challenges and deserves attention. The budgetary estimates appear to
point in that direction. But even so, that to my thinking is only an
imaginary danger or, at the worst, a very overrated one. The real
peril lies in Europe itself and consists in the never-ending strife
and feuds and wars, and worse than all in the noxious atmosphere of
militarism which is asphyxiating the foremost peoples of the world.
Militarism brings socialism in its train, and socialism breeds
anarchism. The fact is that the armed peace of to-day is a thinly
disguised war--but a war against civilisation. That is the cancer
which is eating away the vital organs of the nations. So appalling
are the sacrifices it necessitates that war itself would hardly be
worse.' I remember suddenly thinking that my words would sound like
a sermon in the Kaiser's ears and I stopped short, but he said,
'Please complete your thought.' I went on:
"'Against whom are we making ready for war? Not against America, but
unhappily against one another. Do we gain anything by these wars?
Nothing. In the meanwhile America and other overseas countries
profit by these our intestine feuds. And by dint of thus losing the
best of what she has and is, Europe will, in time, resemble an
elderly lady who once was beautiful as well as young, and is now
esteemed only for her past. And if this anarchism is {344} allowed
to continue long enough, Europe as an aggregate of political
communities will have ceased to exist. It cannot be otherwise.'
"'Then you don't approve the idea of our agreeing about a European
tariff against America, or say rather non-European produce and
manufactures?' 'No, sire. If we cannot agree to strive after real
and accessible boons we shall not unite on the more difficult problem
of making sacrifices for imaginary or inaccessible advantages. What
strikes me forcibly is the wonderful transformation that union or
association would effect in the political and economic ordering of
Europe. If our continent were one empire or one republic'--the
Kaiser looked sharply at me when I pronounced the word republic, but
he probably saw that in my thought it contained no application to
actual politics--'her voice would be respectfully hearkened to
throughout the world. The heavy taxes that are waxing heavier every
year would become very perceptibly lighter or else would purchase
invaluable boons in lieu of shells and guns. Europe would be a
syndicate run for the benefit of the whole community. And what is
more, that syndicate could govern, or let us say guide, the world.
But instead of realising that bright perspective, we in Europe are at
the mercy of each other to-day and may be at the mercy of America
to-morrow and of Japan the day after. For while Europe is decaying
new States are springing up. The United States was but an English
colony a brief while ago. Now she is a world-power. Japan was a
tiny island State quite recently. She is still very weak, but is
growing and may become much stronger and even very strong in time.'
"The Kaiser said, 'I am delighted to hear you unfold such excellent
ideas because I agree with them in essence. But schemes are tested
by their execution and their working. How do you count on realising
yours? Look around upon Europe. You know how precarious the
equilibrium is and how far we still are from stability. Propose a
workable scheme. Mine is to make the continent strong by keeping out
ruinous American exploitation. But I want to hear {345} yours.' 'I,
sire, would make all Europe one.' 'All Europe?' 'I mean continental
Europe. England would have to be left out. She cannot become a
member of the federation so long as she is a purely maritime power.
Her geographical situation separates her from the continental States.
If she had constructed the tunnel under the Channel and were thus
joined with France her status would be different. Then she, too,
would be a member of the United States of Europe. To-day she is not
European. The sea severs while it defends her from the Continent.'
"'There,' exclaimed the Kaiser--who at that time was an ardent
champion of an understanding with England--'you and I are no longer
at one. England is quite as much European as any continental State
and may think herself more so than some; anyhow she must be got to
join. Her adherence is a necessity. A United States of Europe with
England left out would never do.' 'I do not insist, sire. All that
I aspire after is the cessation of armaments by eradicating their
causes. And that could be accomplished by the strenuous co-ordinated
endeavour of the foremost minds of civilised nations.' 'That is
precisely what I am trying to bring about. I want to do away with
wars between European States and I think I see my way. But, as you
say, the co-operation of the leading spirits of all countries is
desirable. May I count on your help when the time comes?' 'Yes,
sire. I shall esteem myself happy to contribute in any degree to the
attainment of such a desirable end. But I think time is needed. A
social organism cannot be transformed in a hurry otherwise than
superficially. And we need something more than that.' 'Truly, time
is requisite to weld the nations of Europe into a federation. But we
cannot make too great haste to take the first step. Afterwards no
power or continent will dare to question the behests of Europe.
Economically and politically we shall lead the human race. Do you
agree?' 'Yes, sire, I agree to everything except the boycotting of
America. I also hold that economic and political measures must be
studied apart. My idea is to begin the work by trying a political
experiment, {346} not an economic one, to bring together Russia,
France, and Germany with as little laboured effort as possible, and
that done we shall have gone far towards achieving the high purpose
for which you are working. France's adherence, however, is a
necessity. With her partnership and co-operation we cannot dispense.
Your Majesty adds England. All the better if that be possible. I
even go further and say that the first aim must be the establishment
of a United States of Europe. But if we were to begin by what would
be considered a tariff war on America, I doubt whether we should make
much headway.'
"That was our conversation, as far as I can recall it now. But I
have it in writing somewhere and if you remind me on our return home
I will show it to you, It made a profound impression on me at the
time. But let me add a curious detail which is worth remembering
because characteristic. The conversation must have made a deep dent
on the Kaiser's mind or else he wanted to make capital out of it, for
he at once wrote out an account of it--a one-sided account in which
my objections were slurred over or omitted, some of my views
weakened, my plea for bringing France into the federation not
mentioned, and worst of all a series of sophisticated arguments put
forward for inaugurating an economic boycott of America. And this
memorandum he presented to the Tsar. At that time the Kaiser was
bitten with a mania for eliminating America from the European
markets. Is it not odd that in his memorandum to the Tsar he should
have passed over in silence my objections to his plan, and also
everything I had uttered about France?
"The Tsar smiled as he handed me the Kaiser's memoir, and said, 'Read
it at your leisure and tell me what you think of it. The Kaiser is
full of it and wants to indoctrinate me. Jot down your views briefly
when you have time. I don't agree with him.' Of course I had time.
Having read the paper carefully I went over the ground and with ease
demolished the sophisms with which Wilhelm bolstered up his plea for
boycotting the United States. When I next {347} went to the palace
to report to the Tsar I put the case in a nutshell and he accepted my
view and thanked me. He smiled when I grew animated in arguing and
said that he was already convinced.
"The fact is that at this period of his reign the Kaiser was visibly
drawn towards England and earnestly desired an accord with that
country. That explains why he reacted the moment I remarked that
England being an island and having purely maritime interests to
further and safeguard would hardly be qualified for membership of the
League of European States until her territory was linked by a tunnel
under the Channel to the Continent. He stopped me at once and fired
off his objections one after the other until I gave way and said that
the aim was of greater importance than the means. In later years he
vacillated between England and Russia, uncertain with which one of
the two he had better strike a bargain. As soon as he decided to
weaken Russia he pushed her into the Far Eastern swamp. Of this I am
absolutely sure. It was he who laid the snare into which the Tsar
fell. It was he who countered and thwarted my policy of peaceful
penetration and no annexation. It was he who during this very visit
duped the Tsar and got him to agree to the virtual annexation of Kiao
Chow. Nay, only think of it, at the very time when I was gravely
discussing with him the ways and means of setting Europe on a
platform from which she could move towards a higher plane of
progress, in the belief that this ennobling care was engrossing his
thoughts, the unscrupulous schemer was victimising the Tsar behind my
back, pulverising the groundwork of my policy, and sowing the seed
that has since sprung up as armed men. Wilhelm II. is the author of
the war which we are on our way to America to terminate. That man
has a heavy load on his conscience, but let us hope that he, at
least, believes he is doing the best he can under difficult
circumstances...."
That monologue of Witte's, as he stood beside me on the captain's
bridge, made a deep impression on me. I wrote it down and had it
typed by my secretary, and I told Witte {348} that he would do well
to bring forward these ideas of his from time to time in his public
utterances. "I am afraid," he objected, "they would do more harm
than good. Being too early is as harmful as being too late.
Everything has its season. People do not take the time to reflect,
they most often label a man erroneously. Your people in England, for
example, regard me as anti-English. And that is wholly false." I
said that perhaps a few might be under this wrong impression, but
only a few. He answered, "Only the few that matter. I know for
certain that all the crowned heads who are relatives or friends of
the Tsar have been assured by him that I am a man not to be trusted.
Those are the exact words used by him and repeated by them. In
England they have been amplified and I am set down as a friend to
Germany and an enemy to your country. That is false, as you know.
You and I may and do differ in our ideas about the way to reconstruct
Europe, socially and politically, but we are at one as to the final
aim. And you have never taken me for an enemy to the British people.
You often say that I am mistaken in my judgment of British policy.
And you are probably right. But I greatly admire English ideas and
methods. What I want, however, is to solve a certain problem
practically. And my way of doing it is by grouping the great powers
of the Continent together. The most difficult aspect of it is to
obtain the adhesion of France. This could be effected if Germany
were wise even to the extent of discerning her own interests and
behaving in the political domain as a farmer does in the
agricultural. When he drops the seed into the earth he resigns
himself to see nothing more of it for a season. And he reaps the
harvest in the fulness of time. If I were in the Kaiser's place, it
is not the question of Alsace and Lorraine that would keep me from
knitting Europe into a federal State. And yet I am not blind to the
difficulties in the way."
Once or twice again during our absence from Europe Witte reverted to
this theme, and then it faded from my vision until after our return.
When we were on our way home and nearing Portsmouth I renewed the
request I had {349} often made to him that he would land in England
and make himself acquainted with persons and institutions there,[15]
especially as he would probably be entrusted with the government of
Russia and could not but profit by a personal knowledge of the
country and the people with whom the Tsar's ministers would of
necessity have to come into frequent contact. He agreed with my
proposal in the abstract, but regretted that for purely formal
reasons it could not be carried out. Despatched by the Emperor on a
special mission it was, he said, his duty, having performed it, to go
straight back to Russia and report to his sovereign. Only the Tsar
could dispense him from that duty, and he himself could not fitly ask
for a dispensation. He promised, however, to visit England with me
later if the internal condition of Russia, which disquieted him
greatly, left him free to do so.
At Portsmouth I took leave of Witte who continued his journey to
France. What he saw, heard, and undertook to do there, and the
nature of the services which he rendered to the republic, will one
day be confided in detail to the historian. On learning Witte's
attitude in all these and kindred transactions, and the zeal with
which he always threw himself into the service of France, the reader
will be inclined to admit that some of the cut-and-dried stock labels
which had been hastily affixed to the one statesman Russia has
possessed since Peter the Great are but tokens of the ignorance and
incompetence of those who employ them. Witte was above all things
else a Russian and one of the nation's most perfect types.
Returning to the origins of the secret treaty and the curious way in
which it came to light, I shall endeavour to reproduce the story as
far as possible in Witte's own words.[16] {350} His success at
Portsmouth (U.S.A.) had made his name famous throughout the world.
Every country was anxious to have him as its guest, and every cabinet
desirous of winning his friendship. But as usual the British Foreign
Office, true to its hallowed traditions, approached him along the old
diplomatic road which he cordially detested. The cabinet knew that I
was Witte's intimate friend and adviser, that it was I whom he chose
to open negotiations with Japan, and later on to request King Edward
to visit the Tsar at Reval or elsewhere, and to help him in all his
undertakings, home and foreign, but never once did they apply to me
for any assistance or advice. Over and over again I listened with
pain to his severe and merited strictures called forth by some of
their ill-advised acts, but I did not venture to tread on ground that
was holy.[17]
"At Portsmouth," Witte said, as soon as I rejoined him in Petersburg,
"I received two invitations which I deeply appreciated. One tended
towards the fulfilment of your wish that I should disembark in
England, repair to London, and see your men of light and leading. It
was issued on behalf of King Edward and was presented by that
sovereign's friend, the Councillor of the Russian Embassy in London,
Poklevsky-Kozel.[18] This diplomatist also brought a series of
proposals respecting a projected agreement between Russia and England
which, he told me, {351} had the approval of the King and the Foreign
Office. It dealt with the various countries in which the political
interests of the two empires do not run parallel and with designs
which are resented by one side and more or less sincerely repudiated
by the other. In a word it was, or might have been, the practical
outcome of your articles on the possibility of an accord between the
two empires.
"I told Poklevsky that I felt highly honoured by the invitation which
the King had so graciously sent me and deeply grieved that I could
not avail myself of it, because being the State Secretary of the Tsar
I am bound to go straight home, unless his Majesty ordains otherwise.
Perhaps I may be fortunate enough to see England and her King at a
later date. Thereupon Poklevsky asked me to read and to give him my
opinion about the project of an accord between Russia and Great
Britain which he laid before me. He said that I was the Premier
designate of the new dispensation. I read it through very quickly.
It reminded me of your own written and verbal proposals for an
Entente, the part about Persia was, I believe, almost the same. It
turned upon the East, Tibet, Persia, Afghanistan, and other places.
Well, I had to tell Poklevsky what I had so often repeated to you
about these plans. I said, 'I am not a diplomatist, at least not a
professional one, and my views will not help you. I had much rather
you submitted the scheme to Count Lamsdorff. It is he who will have
to report on the subject to the Tsar as soon as the question has
ripened. Still, if you insist on my judgment, you are welcome to it.
The provisions made here for removing the causes of friction between
Russia and England are, I should say, most moderate and do credit to
their distinguished author. Personally I should be disposed to give
Great Britain considerably more than she demands in this paper, at
any rate, when working out the details. I would certainly make
larger concessions in Persia.[19] The English sense of measure is
most {352} commendable. But I am opposed to alliances. Don't
misinterpret me. I am fond of England. The character, the
temperament of that people appeal to me strongly perhaps by contrast
with my own, and I am penetrated with the conviction that the two
nations must live and work in peace and amity. Those, therefore, who
hallmark me as Anglophobe are maligners. It is false that I approve
any design, any policy, calculated to cause friction between London
and Petersburg. What is true is that I favour a different method
from yours. That is all. But unhappily mischief-makers have built
upon that fact the fiction that I am an enemy of Great Britain.
"'The truth is I have always pleaded for freedom from entanglements
in our relations with foreign countries. In that we ought, I hold,
to imitate the United States. On principle I would not bind our
hands unless constrained by necessity. No close relations, no
Entente for me, with any country whatever for the moment. Nothing
piecemeal. Abstinence from patchwork alliances would strengthen
Russia incalculably.[20] I inculcated this principle on Alexander
III. who told me that he endorsed every word I had said on the
subject. And he made it an axiom of his policy. So, too, did
Nicholas II. when he first ascended the throne. I know for a fact
that the Kaiser let him understand that he would like a formal
treaty, but the Tsar, mindful of his father's line of action, fought
shy of it. And I hope he will continue faithful to this avoidance of
complications. You may ask, if that be so, how I can uphold the
alliance with France. My answer is, I did not make it. I found it
ready-made. I will go further, however, and say that it was an
historic necessity, just as our commercial treaty with {353} Germany
was a necessity. It had to be accepted. It had grown slowly until
at last it forced itself upon the two peoples and took the form of a
military convention. And now it is part of the foundation of the
loose international State-system of Europe. Let it stand, therefore,
as an unquestionable postulate. But let it be the only tie of the
kind until Europe is transfigured. Even with France our relations
are not what they might and should be. They are too casual, too
little organic, not properly adjusted to the ends. That is a defect
that I should like to see remedied. But the alliance with France was
a necessity and for the time being no other alliance is.
"'Please assure King Edward that among Russian statesmen in and
outside the cabinet England has no more sincere friend than myself.
For my country I desire a close and excellent working understanding
with the British people, and I am certain we shall achieve that in
the near future. But no political partnerships. I cannot second any
effort to bring them about. On principle I will discountenance them
all.'
"That was the tenor of my answer. King Edward when he received it
misunderstood it, as I feared he would. He did not believe in my
friendly sentiments towards his country."
Witte's notions on all these subjects were a mixture of genuine
wisdom and childish simplicity. His want of knowledge about some
aspects of international law, custom, and political intercourse was
amazing, as were also the serenity and dogmatism with which he would
discourse upon these as though he were perfectly familiar with them.
[1] I have had this story, together with all the details, from two
other independent and absolutely trustworthy sources.
[2] Witte's surmise was correct. Lamsdorff's letter bears the date
of the 8th/21st July, 1905.
[3] As a matter of fact the telegram is much shorter than Lamsdorff's
reference to it would lead one to infer.
[4] In Lamsdorff's letter this word is also underlined.
[5] This message was sent from a little Swedish port on the Gulf of
Bothnia to the north of Stockholm.
[6] Exactly as when he was on his way to Tangier, with this
difference, that on that occasion he had not made up his own mind
until the very last minute.
[7] The date of this message is 23rd July (5th August), 1905.
[8] As yet Lamsdorff knew nothing about the secret alliance concluded
by the two emperors.
[9] I withhold as irrelevant the name of the statesman, merely
affirming that his report was laid before me at a time when I had not
the honour of his acquaintance.
[10] This was so obvious that I wonder the Russian ambassador in
Paris should have had to announce it formally to Lamsdorff.
[11] _i.e._, in its bearings on the necessity of concluding peace
without delay. I omit the passages irrelevant to the meeting of the
monarchs. I need hardly say that the diplomatist whose words I am
quoting was and is unaware that I was put in possession of his
despatch soon after he had sent it.
[12] On the 16th/29th July.
[13] This was a project for the introduction of a representative
assembly with a consultative voice in legislation. It held the field
until Witte and the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevitch wrested the
legislative Duma from the Tsar in October, 1905. It is to
Bouliguine's scheme that the Kaiser alludes in his telegrams when he
writes of "The Great Duma."
[14] Only once, so far as I know, did Lamsdorff venture on anything
resembling an expostulation. It was after Nicholas II. had plunged
his country into war and it took the form of a most loyal submission
respecting a series of "justificative" documents which the
Bezobrazoff gang had printed, and from which the minister learned for
the first time how cunningly and wickedly he had been deceived by his
imperial master. I possessed all these documents since the year 1905.
[15] Later on I repeated the suggestion and once I was on the point
of succeeding. I wrote to friends in England, some of whom kindly
promised to entertain him, but one of them--the one from whom I had
expected most--showed symptoms of hesitation, and the matter dropped.
[16] I possess everything in writing, but not every document is
actually accessible to me now. I kept them in safe places during my
travels, and I could not always lay my hands on them at a moment's
notice. It is a remarkable fact that a few years later Witte's
memory played him false in certain matters with which he was never
really conversant. I have some curious examples of this. In one
case I showed him published accounts of a political transaction in
which he had played a prominent part--accounts incompatible with his
own. He declined to accept them. I then told him an official
statement had appeared which ran counter to his. He at once
exclaimed: "Please write to my dictation a full account of what took
place from start to finish." I did. But although correct in every
other particular, it is absolutely wrong in that important one. His
memory was at fault.
[17] Once only I was requested by a diplomatist, who was a personal
friend of mine, not by the Foreign Office, to induce the Russian
government to appoint a certain individual to the post of minister
plenipotentiary to a country where diplomatic disputes were frequent.
I asked Witte to get Lamsdorff to appoint the man and he did so. If
my friend had foreseen what would come of it, he would not have made
the request. He and the Russian diplomatist whom I had had sent as
minister quarrelled hopelessly and the latter had to be recalled by
M. Izvolsky.
[18] A diplomatist of real worth whose career in Teheran and
Bucharest was brilliant and useful.
[19] The same or similar language was addressed to the British
ambassador by the Tsar's Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Izvolsky,
when the scheme finally came up for discussion. But the British
government on behalf of the Indian government declined to take all
that Russia was willing to offer. This sounds incredible, but it is
true. They might have had Ispahan in the British sphere of
influence. I do not mention this refusal by way of reproach. What
is, however, blameworthy is the fact that a couple of years after the
convention was ratified, the British government asked for some of the
things which it had rejected. And it received a refusal....
[20] Witte, as I pointed out before, was always preoccupied lest his
country should be drawn into war, because he realised how badly
prepared it was and also how deep its fall after a defeat would be
owing to the high position which it occupied in consequence of its
unmerited prestige.
{354}