THE SECRET TREATY REVEALED
Witte told me, as follows, the story of how he learned of the
existence of the secret treaty and the means he devised for the
purpose of invalidating it. "I did not know, neither did I suspect,
that the two monarchs had been treaty-making during my sojourn at
Portsmouth. It is true that the Kaiser had made an allusion to
something they had done, but he did not give me to understand that it
was an alliance or any compact of international moment. The exact
words he employed as they now come back to me were these: 'I have a
pleasant surprise for you. We--I mean your Tsar and I--have taken
measures to realise this ideal of ours. If you are again put in
charge of the government machine, are you prepared to lend us a
helping hand towards making it a practical instrument of
international politics?' 'Certainly, I am,' I replied. 'Good, very
good,' he answered, 'I am delighted. You will see exactly what is
required of you when you are in power again--when you get back to
Petersburg--and then you will frame the measures you deem adequate.
You know how high I rate your talents as a statesman.'
"That was all. I confess I never once thought of a secret treaty
between the Tsar and the Kaiser, and still less of an alliance
against France and England. I could not imagine such a thing.
"On my arrival in Russia, I received at Pskoff this telegram from the
Tsar:
"BJÖRKE, 15_th September_, 1905. Midnight.
"'To SECRETARY OF STATE WITTE,--I wish you welcome on your
home-coming from Washington[1] (_sic_) after having brilliantly
carried out the mission of first-class State importance which I
confided to you. I invite you to come to {355} visit me here at
Björke on the yacht _Polar Star_ on Friday. By my command the yacht
_Arrow_ will be sent and placed at your disposal.--NIKOLAI.'
"Before going to Björke, as I had to pass through Petersburg in any
case, I made it my business to see Count Lamsdorff, as I did not know
what might have happened while I was crossing the Atlantic. I am
always in doubt as to what the Emperor may do when left to himself.
It is his constant aspiration to be free to do as he pleases, and he
hates being guided or counselled by those whose one function is to
counsel him. So I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs and had a long
talk with him in the course of which we reviewed the recent past,
domestic and foreign, surveyed the present, and glanced despondently
at the future. I may tell you that I was full of the Morocco affair,
highly pleased at the service I had rendered the French, and anxious
that the best use should be made of the conditions I had thus helped
to create.
"We also talked of Portsmouth, Roosevelt, the Kaiser, of the
formidable difficulties that would face us when the troops came home,
of the Duma scheme, and kindred matters. But Lamsdorff never
breathed a word to me about a secret treaty. Thus initiated into
current affairs I set out for Björkesund.
"The Tsar received me with that delightful affability of his which
captivates not only all who meet him for the first time, but even
many who, like myself, know the exact worth of his gestures and
phrases. But when with me he can never entirely throw off a certain
feeling of constraint which enwraps in an atmosphere of insincerity
everything he says and does. After some desultory conversation which
consisted on his part merely of disconnected questions and on mine of
descriptions and comments, he casually turned the conversational
stream on to Rominten. 'And how did you find the Kaiser?' I
described Wilhelm's charm of manner and how confused I should have
felt if I had not attributed his exuberant cordiality to the
circumstance that I {356} represented the Tsar. 'Did he say anything
to you about working for a stable peace in Europe?' 'Yes, sire. He
never omits that topic from his conversations with me.' 'Did he ask
you for your views about his scheme?' 'He knew what my views had
been and he asked me whether they were the same. I said they were
and he expressed his satisfaction.' 'I understand that you approve
our having taken the matter up, he and I?' 'Yes, sire, fully. The
aim appeals to me powerfully. I unfolded it myself to the Kaiser
many years ago.' 'I am delighted. For it has long been my aim too,
but there were always difficulties in the way. Happily we managed to
make a good beginning and I am delighted that it has your approval.
Did the Kaiser explain to you in what the measures consisted that he
and I had taken?' 'No, sire, he merely mentioned the fact,
intimating that on my arrival in Petersburg they would be
communicated to me.' 'So you did not see the document?' 'None,
sire.' 'Hm. You shall see it.'
"That was all.[2] The next day it was Lamsdorff's turn to go to
Björkesund. The Tsar, as I afterwards learned, told him that he and
I had exchanged views on the subject of the treaty--with which
Lamsdorff himself was now acquainted--and that I had expressed my
satisfaction with the aim and the means of attaining it. Lamsdorff,
who, like a typical diplomatist, spoke without emotion or even
accent, asked what I had said. You know Lamsdorff, and how calmly he
takes things. He needed time to realise the statement that I
approved a most momentous State document, which reversed the policy
of the Empire and was drafted and signed by the Tsar without the
knowledge of his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and would bring
Russia into universal odium. It was a repetition of the Kiao Chow
business with this aggravating difference, that the issues were
incomparably more far-reaching. And yet I had brandmarked the {357}
one and praised the other. But Lamsdorff, as you know, is a
mild-mannered man who has his own theory of the rôle a minister
should play in the autocracy. And his theory dovetails with the
system--there is no doubt about that--but is incompatible with the
spirit of the age and with the further life and prosperity of the
Empire. So he once more gave gentle expression to his views on the
subject, without a word or a tone indicative of undue emotion. He
uttered his apprehension that the alliance concluded by the Tsar
could not stand, because if it did the Franco-Russian alliance would
be abrogated ipso facto. The Emperor made some feeble reply to
screen the position which he really took up and which was that the
treaty was signed, the alliance concluded, and that what he had done
could not be undone now. Some other solution must therefore be
thought out.
"Lamsdorff on his return from Björke saw me. I was never more
surprised than by his manner towards me, his intimate friend. His
coolness was deliberate and marked. He was as reserved as a
diplomatic adversary and dry, almost cutting, in his talk. To begin
with he addressed me by my brand new title of count. I felt nettled.
I could not guess what had happened to bring about this change. But
before I could articulate a question, he put one to me. 'Is it a
fact, count--I suppose it must be seeing that his Majesty affirms
it--that you approve of the transaction he concluded with the Kaiser
the other day at Björke?' 'Yes, so far as I know it. That has
always been my policy--Europe must be united somehow or else it will
go to pieces politically and socially. We must get rid of wars, at
least on this continent, and not by unworthy mystifications like the
Hague Conference, but by efficacious measures, otherwise the United
States of America to-morrow, and perhaps Asiatic States the day after
to-morrow, will beat Europe economically and therefore militarily as
well. Once Russia, France, and Germany are united...' Lamsdorff
stopped me, repeating, 'France? What are you talking about? Have we
read the same treaty or different ones?' I answered, 'I have seen no
treaty. I have only heard from each of the two Emperors; {358} that
they have taken a stride towards realising my conception of a
feasible association of all European nations for the purposes of
peaceful economic development and mutual protection.' 'Your
conception? With France left out? Did you read the treaty?' 'No.
What treaty?' 'Here, please read the treaty and see what it is that
you applaud.' And removing the document from his drawer he handed it
to me. I took out my spectacles and perused it. I felt a heaviness
at the pit of my stomach. I could hardly realise what the words
implied." Here Witte described the treaty to me, to the best of his
recollection. It was not until later that I received a copy of
it.[3] Then he went on:
"Now Lamsdorff and I were back on common ground. I was furious, and
I showed it. Even he, although always collected and deliberate,
displayed unmistakable symptoms of indignation. I said, 'That was a
low trick for the Kaiser to play, and what are we to think of the
destinies of an Empire which can be duped in that barefaced way and
led to the brink of the abyss?' 'It is a very unfortunate affair,'
Lamsdorff remarked. 'If I had known about it, I would have stopped
it at the first inception. But everything was done without my
knowledge.' 'Well, it must be undone now,' said I. 'It will lower
us all in the eyes of France, for it is irreconcilable with our
treaty obligations to the republic,' Lamsdorff went on. 'It is
worse,' I added. 'It is a piece of base perfidy on Russia's
part--for Russia is unfortunately compromised.' We then discussed
the ways and means of upsetting the treaty. This was no easy matter
because of the stand taken by the Tsar, who was prompted by the
Kaiser. He maintained that what is done is done and cannot be
recalled or abrogated; that the secret treaty did not run counter to
the Franco-Russian covenants, unless these were offensive, and
therefore pointed against Germany; and that France should be treated
not so much in accordance with those covenants as congruously with
her deserts, and that she had behaved abominably towards Russia and
Germany. In this connection it is interesting to read a telegram
from {359} his ever ready prompter who, having received a
communication containing the Tsar's scruples or misgivings, wrote in
a temper:
"'The working of the treaty does not--as we agreed at Björke--collide
with the Franco-Russian alliance--provided, of course, the latter is
not aimed directly at my country. On the other hand the obligations
of Russia towards France can only go so far as France merits that
through her behaviour. Your ally has notoriously left you in the
lurch during the whole war, whereas Germany helped you in every way
as far as it could without infringing the laws of neutrality. That
puts Russia morally also under obligations to us; _do ut des_.
Meanwhile the indiscretions of Delcassé[4] have shown the world that
though France is your ally she nevertheless made an agreement with
England, and was on the very verge of surprising Germany with British
help in the middle of peace, while I was doing my best to you and
your country her ally. This is an experiment which she must not
repeat again, and against a repetition of which I must expect you to
guard me. I fully agree with you that it will cost time, labour, and
patience to induce France to join us both, but the reasonable people
will, in future, make themselves heard and felt! Our Morocco
business is regulated to entire satisfaction, so that the air is free
for better understanding between us. Our treaty is a very good base
to build upon. We joined hands and signed before God who heard our
vows.[5] I therefore think that the treaty can well come into
existence.
"'But if you wish any changes in the words or clauses or provisions
for the future or different emergencies--as, for instance, the
absolute refusal of France, which is improbable--I gladly await any
proposals you will think fit to lay before me! Till these have been
laid before me and agreed upon, the treaty must be adhered to by us
as it is. The whole of {360} your influential press, _Nowosti,
Nowoie Wremja, Russj_, etc., have, since a fortnight, become
violently anti-Germans and pro-British. Partly they are bought by
heavy sums of British money, no doubt. Still it makes my people very
chary and does great harm to the relations newly growing between our
countries. All these occurrences show that times are troubled, and
that we must have clear courses to steer; the treaty we signed is a
means of keeping straight without interfering with your alliance as
such. What is signed is signed! and God is our testator! I shall
await your proposals. Best love to Alex. Willy.'[6]
"It was a delicate and unenviable task to argue the matter with the
Tsar on those lines. Lamsdorff was too milk-and-watery to succeed.
He conceived his function to be that of a monitor, or say rather an
oracle that uttered the forecast but took no thought of the action of
those who demanded it. With me he was explicit enough. He said that
the first clause obliged Russia to take up arms against her own ally
France as well as against England in case of war between either of
these countries and Germany. What a schoolboy ought to have
perceived was that Russia would never be assailed by either France or
England. That was as clear as the noonday sun. All that remained,
therefore, of the eventualities, to provide for which the compact was
struck up, was the case of hostilities breaking out between France or
England and Germany. Consequently it was a one-sided bargain, of use
only to the German Empire. It would bind Russia's hands leaving
those of Germany free. Then again it was a piece of revolting
disloyalty to France, to whom we were pledged. How could we redeem
the two pledges, stand by France against Germany and stand by Germany
against France? The thing was preposterous. Yet there it was in
black and white, the handiwork of the Kaiser whose respect for this
piece of paper would have been touching were it not disgustingly
hypocritical. To have induced the Tsar to put his name to this
degrading deed was an insult to all Russia. I could hardly express
myself within conventional limits. {361} The conversation between
Lamsdorff and myself ended by our resolving to leave no stone
unturned in order to invalidate or nullify the pact.
"Heaven only knows what we should have done if we had not been
actively helped by the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevitch, who was
easily convinced of the seriousness of the position and the necessity
of clearing it up. It is my conviction that neither Lamsdorff nor
myself would have succeeded in moving the Tsar had we not had the
co-operation of the Grand Duke. For when pressed hard by our
arguments the Emperor always managed to slip away on a side issue.
For example, he said, 'The contingency which would, you say, oblige
us to fight against France is so remote and improbable as not to come
into consideration.' In truth he refused to be convinced or
overruled. Now it was gall and wormwood to the Emperor to be obliged
to acknowledge as true something which he had denied as false, or to
accept as motive or aim what he had rejected as unreasonable or
undesirable. On these points he was morbidly touchy. And in this
case I could see that he was relying on his power as Emperor: _stet
pro ratione voluntas_. That is where the co-operation of the Grand
Duke came in so appositely.
"The most important exchange of views on the subject occurred a
couple of days after the first conversation. The place was the
Imperial Palace of Peterhof. Present were the Tsar, the Grand Duke
Nicholas, Lamsdorff, and myself. Lamsdorff was sulky and at first
silent, afterwards he spoke in his usual courtly way, wrapping up
hard truths in soft phraseology. What he actually said was that if
it pleased his Majesty the treaty would hold good. He was the
sovereign and it was for him to decide. Certain formalities were all
that need be observed. For instance, all pretext should be removed
for saying that the treaty annuls the alliance with France and the
accords underlying this. If the Emperor had had these accords under
his eye at the time he would, of course, have avoided even
appearances that might lend colour to such criticism. At present it
was a task for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would have to
bring the two deeds {362} into harmony, and the way to effect this
would be to obtain the assent of the French to the new
arrangement.[7] One would have to reckon with unwillingness on the
part of the French, but one could argue the matter, and if they were
obdurate, Russia would at least be acting fairly and squarely.
"But it was I who did most of the talking, and I uttered what I
thought and called things by their usual names. I said, 'It is open
to your Majesty to do much that none of your subjects may attempt.
You may even stop the hands of the clock of time for a brief while.
You can denounce existing treaties. You can make alliances and
unmake them. But there is one thing which even the Tsar of all the
Russias may not do, and I may add would never wish to do, and that is
to play your friends false. Your Majesty is incapable of an act of
baseness. It is not in you to break a solemn promise which was
binding on the entire Empire. Well, that is what the secret treaty
makes you do. Of course, your Majesty was unaware of this. But none
the less that document, if allowed to stand, would make you a party
to a deed which no self-respecting individual anywhere could defend,
much less approve. It would discredit Russia in the eyes of the
world. And for that reason it cannot be upheld. It is impossible
for your Majesty sincerely to promise to defend France against
Germany and at the same time sincerely to promise to defend Germany
against France.' The Tsar, who had already said in reply to
Lamsdorff that he would never consent to have the French government
consulted on the subject, was obviously angry with me, but did not
reply. The Grand Duke, however, spoke up and said he endorsed
Lamsdorff's judgment and mine. But he proposed--I am not sure
whether it was he or Lamsdorff--that instead of communicating with
the French cabinet it might be well to try whether sufficient
pressure could be brought to bear on the {363} German Foreign Office
to get the deed annulled. Anyhow I know that it was the Grand Duke
who helped us materially, and practically at last broke the Tsar's
resolve to maintain the treaty in vigour. When we left the Peterhof
Palace the only problem that faced us was one of ways and means. But
even that was puzzling.
"The next move was made by Lamsdorff who had representations made to
the German Foreign Office to the effect that the accord having been
arranged in the absence of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and at a moment when the Tsar had not access to the documents
defining the obligations of the Empire towards the other powers
affected, it lacked some of the essential elements that impart to
such treaties their binding force, and that the Russian minister
having now taken cognisance of the document and reported to the Tsar
has been commanded by him to adopt the needful steps to have the
treaty annulled. Would the German Foreign Office take cognisance of
this?
"The reply that came from Berlin was characteristic. The conclusion
was the same as that of the last telegram of the Kaiser to the Tsar.
The document in question, it was argued, had been duly signed by the
Emperors. It was they who had negotiated it. Therefore any question
respecting it was a matter which they must themselves discuss and
settle. Their respective Foreign Secretaries were incompetent to
deal with it. This uncompromising attitude rendered it incumbent on
Lamsdorff and myself to think of the alternative and arrange to have
the facts disclosed to the French government. But we were alarmed at
the consequences. France would not look upon the act of treason--for
it was nothing less--with indifference and indulgence, and Russia's
moral credit would vanish. We were at our wits' end when a chance
word suggested a key to the solution. I was saying to Lamsdorff, 'It
is all the more disgusting on the part of the Kaiser that it was he
who pushed Russia into the war with Japan, and now it is he who is
preventing us from establishing peace in Europe.' Those words
reminded Lamsdorff of the third clause of the {364} secret treaty and
suggested to him the idea of making that the lever of our action. It
runs: 'The present treaty receives binding force at the moment of the
conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan.' Lamsdorff had it
pointed out to the German Foreign Office that if they persisted in
their uncompromising attitude and declined to agree to the abrogating
of the secret treaty, Russia, in order to escape its provisions,
would feel bound to postpone the conclusion of peace with Japan and
would decline responsibility for the consequences.
"Then, and only then, did the answer come acquiescing in Lamsdorff's
request to annul the secret treaty. It came dished up after the
manner of diplomatic notes, and set forth that the Tsar had no access
at the time when he signed the treaty to the requisite documents, and
therefore was not aware that the terms of the compact ran counter to
those of the Franco-Russian Alliance.
"I want to draw your attention to one interesting point in this
discussion: Lamsdorff's request to the German Foreign Office was not
for the annulation pure and simple of the treaty. Convinced by me
long before that a European association, call it as you like, would
form the most stable basis for the peace of Europe, he favoured my
scheme which would have embodied this conception. What he demurred
to was the form given to it by the Kaiser--a form which left France
out and impregnated Russia's relations towards her with a deadly
hostile spirit. In his demand, Lamsdorff asked that the pristine
idea be kept in view and proposals be made for embodying it in a
treaty which would be free from the objections that proved fatal to
this one. France must be consulted from the outset of the
negotiations. But to this proposal the Berlin Foreign Office
returned no reply.
"This victory of ours over Wilhelm II. brought down upon us his
fierce hate. Nothing was left undone to oust Lamsdorff from the
Foreign Office. The Kaiser represented him as the _ame damnée_ of
Witte. At Copenhagen Izvolsky had caught the Kaiser's eye and found
favour in his sight. The long talk they had had there about the
attitude {365} of the Danes towards an eventual violation of that
country's neutrality in case of war had impressed him favourably, and
he was very desirous of having Izvolsky sent as ambassador to Berlin
to represent the Tsar, just as he was also very desirous of having
Sir Arthur Nicolson appointed ambassador to represent Great Britain
in Berlin.
"From his correspondence with Nicholas II. the Kaiser learned the
part that I had played in getting the secret treaty annulled. But he
made one mistake: he attributed my action to my partiality for
England. He thought that you had converted me into a champion of
Britain. I learned this from Mendelssohn who visited me here[8] and
told me so. Mendelssohn added that he had done what was possible to
set the Emperor right and to make it clear to him that my attitude
was free from duplicity, that I am not for an alliance or entente
with England, and that I am not an enemy to Germany. But
notwithstanding Mendelssohn's defence, the Kaiser's dislike persisted
and he intrigued with your friend Schwanebach against me. You know
how and with what results.
"When I was floating the biggest loan on record in April of the
ensuing year, at the most critical moment, the Kaiser induced
Mendelssohn to withdraw so that the success of the operation was
temporarily imperilled. You were with me at the time and you
remember how keenly I felt the blow, which I traced unhesitatingly to
the man who had dealt it.
"As you are aware I had to quit office as soon as the loan was
floated. But even without Wilhelm's intrigues I should have retired.
Lamsdorff, my friend, wanted to leave too on principle, and he
actually wrote a petition asking the Emperor's permission to resign.
I besought him not to send it. He complied with my request, and now
note the cunning of Nicholas II., who was anxious that he should
tender his resignation. When I was bidding good-bye to the Tsar and
receiving his thanks for the loan he suddenly turned to me and said
in his sweetest tones, 'Tell me, count, will you grant me another
favour?' 'Most certainly, your Majesty. {366} You have only to
command,' 'Will you serve me as ambassador?' 'With the utmost
pleasure, sire, but I should not like to have to travel very far from
Russia.' 'Oh, it won't be far. You will be accredited to a great
power in Europe. But tell me, will you object to go on the score
that your chief, the Foreign Secretary, is a younger man than
yourself?' 'No, sire, not at all. Besides, Count Lamsdorff is not
so much younger than I am.' 'Oh, I don't mean Count Lamsdorff, but
another and a younger man.' I took the hint, went at once to
Lamsdorff and reported the conversation to him, for I well knew that
it had been arranged for that very purpose. And the whole
transaction was devised by the Kaiser who wanted Isvolsky at the
Foreign Office. I then told Lamsdorff to send in his resignation,
which he did.
"In the meanwhile I made inquiries as to what had gone before the
actual drafting and signing of the document. I like to have a clear
and complete picture of such historic events in my mind's eye. I
talked to several persons who, I thought, might throw some light on
the subject, and gradually I pieced their accounts together and
reconstituted the scene. What I suspected was confirmed: that there
had been a long correspondence by messengers and by telegraph between
the two monarchs, and that their meeting had been settled in that way
with the utmost secrecy. Nobody was told of it, not even I who had
seen and talked at considerable length with the Tsar before my
departure for America, and who ought to have been primed with
information about such matters. He never breathed a word of what he
was meditating.
"When the two monarchs met and decided to sign the treaty the Kaiser
desired to have it countersigned. The Tsar who wanted to crown his
secret negotiations in a conspirative way did not see the object of
this caution and said so. But Wilhelm with his business instincts
insisted--'for the sake of the form,' he pleaded. Nicholas II. was
put out by this because he disliked confiding State affairs of this
nature to any one. He is possessed by a mania for secrecy. But he
allowed himself to be overruled by his confederate. {367} Then he
called up Admiral Birileff and spoke to him on the subject. These
and other details I hold from Birileff himself. And when I upbraided
him with having been a party to an unqualified and unpatriotic act,
he defended himself saying that if I had been in his place I would
have done the same thing, and that he himself would do it again under
like conditions. 'Could I,' he asked, 'refuse the Emperor who,
looking embarrassed and dejected, made a touching appeal to my
loyalty and devotion and asked me to help him out of a difficulty?'
Birileff gave me his word of honour that he never read nor saw a line
of the document he was signing, and that he did not know it was a
treaty with Germany, although if he had known it he would have signed
it all the same. The Tsar had begun by asking him, 'Do you trust
me?' and he answered, 'Absolutely.' 'If I were to ask you to sign a
document without reading it, or with your eyes closed, would you do
it?' 'Unhesitatingly, sire.' 'I knew you would. Well now, look.
Here is a paper which I want you to sign in that way.' 'And the
Emperor left uncovered only the space where I was to write my name.
I at once took the pen and affixed my signature.'"
Witte never wholly relinquished his ideal of a federation or sodality
of European States, nor the hope that through his agency and that of
a few kindred spirits throughout the world it might be brought
perceptibly nearer to its high consummation. The present ordering of
human society with its huge frauds, its vileness and pettiness, and
the incalculable sufferings thus wantonly inflicted upon mortals who
might be rendered content, kindled his indignation and a degree of
energy for which there was no scope. He often longed for the post of
ambassador in Paris and, as already stated, the hope was fed by the
Tsar--for a strange personal purpose while Witte's object was to work
for the achievement of his cherished aim. The unbroken sequence of
successes that had crowned his efforts in every department of public
life to which he set his hand encouraged him to think that with him
opportunity would always be attended by success. Once installed in
the Paris Embassy he would {368} be able to inaugurate the grandiose
work of European reconstruction. The Tsar on his side was equally
resolute, not only to take into his own hands the direction of the
important public affairs which interested him, but to do this as
often as possible surreptitiously. Conspirative bargaining and
clandestine machinations which clashed with the official obligations
of his government had a fascination for him which he could with
difficulty resist.
Nicholas II. had occasionally sought to win over his Foreign
Secretaries to his own petty political patchwork, but since
Lamsdorff's dismissal he had met with no success. During the
negotiations for the convention with Great Britain, for example--a
convention conceived on generous lines as a wiping out of all old
scores with a view to a settled friendship--he would insist on giving
Russia a frontier bordering on Afghanistan. This idea had been
engrafted on his mind by the Kaiser in conversation and in letters.
Evidences of the insidious untruths by which it was fed are found in
the Willy-Nicky telegrams.[9] It was exceedingly difficult for M.
Izvolsky to hold his own against the pressure put on him by the
Emperor in this direction. But the minister refused to budge and the
monarch ended by allowing him and the British government to have
their way.
In the year 1910, when visiting the German Kaiser at Potsdam,
Nicholas II. found another opportunity for modifying international
politics off his own bat, and he utilised it to the full. In spite
of the circumstance that he was accompanied by his Minister for
Foreign Affairs,[10] while the Kaiser was surrounded with advisers
like Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen-Wachter, Wilheim II. contrived to
have a quiet after-dinner talk with his guest out of the hearing of
any third person. And he made the most of it. In essentials the
official agreement which the two governments signed[11] was the same
that M. Izvolsky had found it necessary to draft after the convention
with Britain, because the {369} German government refused to be bound
by that convention. But there was a difference.
The Kaiser's ministers had long been asking Russia to undertake to
connect Persia from Khanekin with the Baghdad railway by a branch
line, but M. Izvolsky, when he was Foreign Secretary, and M. Sazonoff
who succeeded him, refused. Their tactics were to wait until
something happened to enable them to get Germany to withdraw her
claim or to accept compensation elsewhere. But this plan was upset
by the Tsar who, unknown to his minister, acquiesced in the Kaiser's
demand.
On this same occasion, and it may well be during the same
confidential "exchange of ideas," a more fateful covenant would
appear, from accounts published[12] since the Tsar's abdication, to
have been agreed to by the imperial host and guest, the upshot of
which was to authorise Germany to send General Liman von Sanders to
Constantinople at the head of a military mission. This was one of
the Kaiser's moves preliminary to the European war, and the Russian
Premier construed it as such.
On this occasion the Kaiser's method of approaching the Tsar was in
the style of his opening to the conversation which had culminated
years before in the accord about Kiao Chow. He stated that he had
been requested by the Porte to lend an army instructor to Turkey, and
that he proposed sending General Liman von Sanders to discharge the
functions if the Tsar had nothing to urge against that. And Nicholas
II., proud to be asked to decide such questions which hardly
concerned him, answered that he saw no reason why he should demur.
Thereupon the Kaiser, mindful of former experiences, expressed a wish
to have this assent in black and white, and a document embodying it
was duly signed.
The Russian ministers had no inkling of what their imperial master
had done. He seems to have informed none of them. Both the Premier
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were justly alarmed when they
learned that Germany {370} had sent a military mission to Turkey
under General Liman von Sanders, who had become commander of the
Constantinople army corps, and therefore the Kaiser's military
lieutenant in Turkey. They did the little that seemed feasible at
the moment in order to have the appointment cancelled, but in vain.
Among other steps they requested me to advocate publicly and
privately the recall of the naval instructor sent to Turkey by the
British government in the hope that the Kaiser would follow suit and
withdraw Liman von Sanders. As I had strong reasons for not sharing
this hope, I declined to comply with the request. After the lapse of
some time, the Russian Premier[13] when passing through Berlin was
asked by the Kaiser why they had made such a fuss in Petersburg about
the German military mission under von Sanders, and to the Russian's
amazement he invoked the Tsar's written assent. Seeing how surprised
the Premier looked, Wilhelm II. showed him the document. The
resourceful Russian having read it said, "Yes, but the Tsar's
acquiescence had for its object only the appointment of General von
Sanders as military instructor, not as commander of Turkish army
corps." "But that is only a mere bagatelle," retorted the Kaiser.
"Why so much ado about that?"
On his return to Petersburg the Premier informed the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of what he had seen and heard in the German capital,
and learned that this official had no cognisance of the document nor
of the accord it registered. After that M. Kokofftseff wrote a
report on the episode to the Tsar and mentioned the constructions he
had improvised and put upon it. And Nicholas II., seemingly
unconscious of the incongruity of his own conduct, annotated the
passage containing his minister's interpretation thus: "I think so,
too!"
[1] We visited Washington only for a few hours.
[2] My historical sense obliges me to state that I possess several
versions of this story narrated at various times between the years
1905-1914 by Witte himself, and that they are, as one would expect,
divergent in secondary details. They all agree, however, in the
essential point that Witte did not know of the treaty before
September.
[3] See p. 413.
[4] This refers to the statements in the press that M. Delcassé when
Minister of Foreign Affairs had obtained England's promise that she
would land a contingent of troops on the Continent if Germany went to
war against France.
[5] He would appear to have been deaf to the vows of France and
Russia.
[6] See Confidential Despatch, dated Glucksburg, 29th September.
[7] It has been affirmed that the Russian ambassador in Paris,
Nelidoff, too, was sounded on this subject and had banished any hope
that the Tsar or the Kaiser might have cherished. This was wholly
superfluous. Rouvier, who was perhaps the most venturesome minister
of the republic at that time and had joined hands with Delcassé's
Teuton adversaries, had, as we saw, declared that he had rather keep
out of a triple alliance of Germany, France, and Russia.
[8] At Biarritz.
[9] See Appendix.
[10] M. Sazonoff.
[11] Agreement of the 19th August, 1911.
[12] By the influential and widely circulated Moscow journal,
_Russkoye Slovo_.
[13] Kokofftseff.
{371}