Officers attending._
_First Cabinet Minister._ We now are met in grave deliberation
Upon the plan for Antwerp’s subjugation,
That we may not despatch this expedition
Without due caution, knowledge and precision.
Ye officers of military fame,
We wish for your opinion of the same.
_1st Mil. Officer._ I wrote before my reasons in detail,
Why I esteem your plan quite sure to fail.
_Lord C--gh._ You think ’twill fail?
_2nd Mil. Officer._ And so do I.
_3rd Mil. Officer._ And I.
_Lord C--gh._ All of you think so: better go and try.
But, ere our army sails, ’tis fit we know
Something about the place to which they’ll go.
Pray, sirs, is Antwerp fortified or no?
_1st Mil. Officer._ Rumour reports it fortified full well,
But I, not having been there, cannot tell.
_2nd Mil. Officer._ I know no more.
_3rd Mil. Officer._ Nor I, I do declare.
_Lord C--gh._ Well, well--they’ll see directly they get there.
_Lord M--ve._ But as the chief design of this great feat,
Captain, will be to take the Antwerp fleet;
Say, can the frigates, or can any ship,
Sail up above, and so give us the slip?
_Naval Officer._ Had I been there, I could have told you what
The water’s depth; but having ne’er, cannot.
_Lord M--ve._ This is no cause our plan should be forsaken,
It will be known as soon as Antwerp’s taken.
_Lord E--n._ But shan’t we lose the fleet? Then there’ll be laughter.
_Lord M--ve._ Lose it? If they go up, mayn’t we go after?
_Lord E--n._ Our friend the smuggler says the troops are few;
And then the garrison--Pray what think you?
_1st Mil. Officer._ Few on the coast may be, and in the town;
But from the country they can soon bring down
A force too large for us to hope to lick;
And all that’s done must be done very quick.
_Lord Ch--m._ Fear not: delay was ne’er a fault of mine;
And every morning I’ll get up at nine--
Dressed, breakfast done by twelve--no speed I’ll lack,
And do it all completely in a crack.
_1st Cab. Min._ Brave warriors, your advice and information
Has now received our full consideration.
[_Exeunt Mil. and Naval Officers._
_Lord C--gh._ As secrecy’s the soul of expeditions,
I see no use in telling the physicians
Whither it’s going; but desire they would
Send plenty of what physic they think good.
_Enter_ SIR LUCAS PEPYS.
(_To Sir L. P._) Prepare (I can’t tell rightly against when)
Physic enough for forty thousand men,
But do it quick; what’s proper you can tell.
[_Exit_ SIR L. P.
_Mr. P--l._ Now there’s no fear but all will answer well;
So excellent we’ve made each preparation,
And all so accurate our information.
When Parliament meets next how fine a story
Shall we not have to tell of wars and glory.
[_Exeunt._
_Manet_, MR. C--G, _Solus_.
_Mr. C--g._ Most of this plan is gibberish to me,
But I shall quietly lie by and see
How it goes on; and then, if all succeeds,
I share the praise; but if it ill proceeds
I’ll try what, leaving this ungoverned crew,
Setting up statesmen for myself will do.
[END OF ACT FIRST.]
The rest of the play is of so very tragic and horrible a cast, that we
think the author will not be justified in bringing it forward, and we
decline publishing any further extracts at present.
B.--DEBATE ON THE EXPEDITION.
=Source.=--_Diary of Lord Colchester_, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 243.
_[March] 30th._--House of Commons. Resumed Walcheren debate. At four in
the morning divided four times.
I. To censure the policy, 227; against it, 275.
II. To justify it, 272; against it, 232.
III. To censure the retention, 224; against the censure, 275.
IV. To excuse the delay in evacuating it, 253; against that, 232.
Adjourned after seven o’clock.
The second division, the largest in this Parliament except that of June
1807, upon the address of the change of Ministry.
N.B.--It was the general opinion that the only resolution upon this
business which was _indisputably untrue_ was the _unanimous vote_ that
the failure was not imputable to any misconduct of the officers by sea
or land.
My own opinion certainly was contrary to any such resolution. For,
first, it was in evidence that the wind and weather did not prevent Lord
Huntley from landing in Cadsand, in good time to have destroyed the
batteries of Breskens, and opened a passage for the fleet up the Wieling
Channel, clear of Flushing. And, secondly, there was no evidence to
prove that the whole fleet might not have gone up that channel with
Lord Gardner’s squadron, instead of going originally into the Stonediep:
the further deviation into the Roompot, which ruined the whole prospect
of getting to Antwerp up the West Scheldt, was probably inevitable after
the fleet had once missed their entrance by Cadsand and the Wieling
Channel.
It suited the Opposition to exculpate the land and naval service,
_because_ then the failure (by their reasoning) exclusively followed
from _the plan_, and the plan only. It also _suited the Ministers_,
partly because they had advised the King to tell the City of London that
there was no ground for military inquiry (they then not knowing of Lord
Chatham’s narrative); and partly from a proper desire to avoid throwing
blame upon those who served under them by their own appointment.
WELLINGTON’S DIFFICULTIES IN SPAIN (1810).
=Source.=--_Selections from the Wellington Despatches._ Gurwood. P. 409.
I. _To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley._
CARTAXO,
_2nd Dec., 1810_.
I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is
scandalous that in the third year of their war, and having been more
than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of
importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for
the safety of Cadiz, the seat of their Government, upon having one or
two more or less British regiments; and that after having been shut in
for 10 months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their
defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham
and the British officers on the danger of omitting them. The Cortes
appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the
other authorities, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the
Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced they are in no
danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national
indolence.
II. _To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley._
CARTAXO,
_16th Dec., 1810_.
I have had some difficulties lately with the Spanish muleteers attached
to the British army, in consequence of the general requisition which is
said to be made of all individuals of the military ages for the army.
I doubt very much whether this requisition is or can be enforced; and I
believe that the magistrates in the different districts are very glad to
show the activity and steadiness with which they execute the law, by
calling for these people who they know will quit with reluctance the
lucrative business in which they are engaged, to serve as soldiers.
However, I cannot encourage them to stay away when they are called for;
and I very much apprehend that the army will be reduced to the greatest
distress if they should leave us, notwithstanding the pains which I have
taken, and the expense which I have incurred, to have it equipped as it
ought to be with the means of transport.
It appears to me that the production of a certificate from me, or
Colonel Alava, or Colonel O’Lawlor, that a man is employed as a muleteer
with the British army, might exempt him from service as a soldier,
without any great violation of principle or any inconvenience. I do not
believe that the whole number of persons of this description exceeds
500; and of these many cannot be of the military ages.
I hope some arrangement will be adopted upon this subject; and I can
only say that if something is not done, and I am to be deprived of all
those persons of this description who have until now been attached to
this army, I shall be entirely crippled, and it will be a question
whether we ought not to quit the Peninsula entirely. I doubt that even
here we could exist one day without their assistance.
III. _To the Earl of Liverpool._
CARTAXO,
_21st Dec., 1810_.
I did not know what to say about the reduction of the number of our
transports in the Tagus: I have no apprehension that we shall be obliged
to embark, and no idea that the enemy will for a length of time be in a
situation to oblige us to think of such an operation; but I cannot, as
an Officer, be so certain of the course of events as to tell you that
the transports may be withdrawn.
It may be necessary to request your attention for a few moments to
explain our situation in reference to that of the enemy, and the general
state of affairs in the Peninsula as affecting this question. I have no
doubt that the enemy is not, and does not consider himself, able to
force the position of the allies in this country. Indeed, I believe I
have the means of beating the force now opposed to me, in their own
position, of course with the sacrifice of a certain loss of men.
I think that the paper published in the _Moniteur_ of the 23rd November
shows that our position in front of Lisbon is considered so strong, that
it ought not to be attacked in front; and, from the perusal of that
paper, I am of opinion that the enemy will endeavour to maintain a
position in this country with the troops now in it, probably reinforced
by some of those now on the frontier, and will endeavour to dislodge us
by occupying the countries north of the Douro and south of the Tagus,
and thus distress us for supplies. The accomplishment of this plan will
require an enormous force and some length of time; but when I recollect
that in the last year the whole of the north of Spain, and of Old
Castille, were abandoned by the enemy, even before the battle of
Talavera, I cannot doubt that they will abandon those countries likewise
upon the existing emergency, which will give them a part of the force
they require.
I am also certain that, if the British army should not be obliged to
evacuate Portugal, the French army must withdraw from Andalusia. I
think it not improbable, therefore, that a large part of it, if not the
whole of the French army in Andalusia, will be introduced into the
southern parts of this kingdom.
I do not despair of holding my ground against this accumulation of
force, and I have taken measures to prevent the only inconvenience which
it can produce, viz., a deficiency of supplies. But as these troops are
all within a few marches of me, and an order from Paris would not only
put them in motion, but they could be in this country almost before the
transports could arrive in England, I cannot think it advisable, in the
existing situation of affairs, to send them out of my reach.
The question whether I should attack the enemy in the position which he
now occupies has been well considered by me. I have a superior army, I
think, by 10,000 men, or one sixth, including the Spaniards; and,
notwithstanding some defects in its composition, I think I should
succeed. But the loss must necessarily be very great in killed and
wounded; and the necessity which would exist of exposing the troops to
the weather for some days and nights would throw a great proportion of
this convalescent army into the hospital. Then what is to be gained in
this action, in which failure would be the loss of the whole cause?
Nothing at present that I know of, excepting to relieve the northern
provinces and Andalusia from the presence of the enemy; which relief it
is probable that the course of events will bring about, without the risk
and loss of an action.
But there is another view of this question, which is a very serious one,
and has made much impression upon my mind. If the northern provinces of
Spain and Andalusia should be relieved from the pressure and presence of
the enemy by the course of events, or by exertions in Portugal, what
will the cause gain by this relief? In the last year I cannot forget
that I brought upon myself and General Cuesta not less than 5 _corps
d’armée_, and the King’s guards and reserve, more than equal to a 6th
corps; and that when the whole of Castille and the north of Spain was
cleared of the enemy, not a man was put in the field by those
provinces, nor even one raised!
In this year I have had 3 _corps d’armée_, the most numerous and
efficient in Spain, upon my hands for 8 months. The kingdom of Galicia
has been entirely free from the enemy, and Castille partially relieved.
The Spanish army in Galicia have made no movement whatever, as General
Mahy says, for want of great coats; but in fact, because they want pay,
clothing, means of subsistence, transport, discipline, and every thing
which can keep a body of men together in an operation. In Castille
nothing has been done, excepting that the guerrillas have been more
daring and successful in their robberies.
The relief of Andalusia would, I fear, make no difference in the
situation of affairs there. I do not think it quite certain that the
enemy would be obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz, although it is
probable that he would. But if the siege of Cadiz were not raised, the
general cause would derive no advantage from the relief of Andalusia;
and even if the raising the siege of Cadiz were the consequence of the
relief of Andalusia, I doubt that there are means at Cadiz of putting
into the field the troops now composing the garrison of that place, so
as to render them a disposable force for the cause of their allies, or
that any benefit would be derived from that event, excepting that it
would place at the disposal of the allies the means which the enemy have
collected for the siege of Cadiz, and retard, and probably prevent, the
operation.
Your Lordship will probably deem this a melancholy picture of prospect,
in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth. This state of affairs
in Spain is the result of some defects in the national character,
aggravated by the false principles on which all the affairs of the
country have been conducted since it attempted to shake off the yoke of
France. The Spaniards have consequently no army; no means of raising
one; no authority to discipline an army if they could raise one; no
means to arm, equip, clothe, or feed anything which could be collected
under that name. The war in the Peninsula, therefore, as far as the
Spaniards are concerned in it, cannot take a regular shape. It must be
confined to the operations of the guerrillas, upon which the
calculations are very different from those which would be made in
respect to the operations of a more regular force.
If all this be true, our business is not to fight the French army, which
we certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but to give occupation to
as large a portion of it as we can manage, and to leave the war in Spain
to the guerrillas. As long as the French do not interfere with our
supplies, or the resources of the Portuguese Government, or any point of
our security, I think it very immaterial whether they are in Spain or
Portugal. Indeed, adverting to the greater difficulties they have in
subsisting in the latter country and in keeping up their communications,
I believe it is more advantageous that they should be where they are.
Their numbers are certainly diminishing daily, while they do us no
mischief; on the contrary, we are nearer to our resources than ever we
were, and they leave the whole of the north of Spain open to the
operations of the guerrillas.
But if the army now in Portugal is to be assisted by other corps,
operating north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, before I can have
secured the supplies of provisions I require, I must then seek to
dislodge them by more determined means than I have tried hitherto. These
means, God knows, may fail; or I may be prevented from trying them by
the weather, or by other circumstances over which I can have no control.
In all these cases it would be terrible not to have transports at hand,
and I cannot advise they should be sent away.
It is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in
this country so long; and it is an extraordinary instance of what a
French army can do. It is positively a fact that they brought no
provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since
they entered Portugal. With all our money, and having in our favour the
good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could not
maintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not
less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals for more than 2 months. This
time last year I was obliged to move the British cavalry only from the
district which they now occupy with their whole army, because it could
not be subsisted. But they take everything, and leave the unfortunate
inhabitants to starve.
THE REGENCY (1811).
=Source.=--_Diary of Lord Colchester_, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 316.
[_Feb._] _5th_.--Perceval showed me the following letter which he had
just received from the Prince of Wales:
CARLTON HOUSE,
_Feb. 4th, 1811_.
The Prince of Wales[12] considers the moment to be arrived which calls
for his decision with respect to the persons to be employed by him in
the administration of the executive government of the country, according
to the powers vested in him by the Bill passed by the two Houses of
Parliament, and now on the point of receiving the sanction of the Great
Seal.
The Prince feels it incumbent upon him at this precise juncture to
communicate to Mr. Perceval his intention not to remove from their
situations those whom he finds there as His Majesty’s official servants.
At the same time the Prince owes it to the truth and sincerity of
character, which, he trusts, will appear in every action of his life, in
whatever situation he may be placed, explicitly to declare that the
irresistible impulse of filial duty and affection to his beloved and
afflicted father, leads him to dread that any act of the Regent might,
in the smallest degree, have the effect of interfering with the progress
of his sovereign’s recovery.
This consideration alone dictates the decision now communicated to Mr.
Perceval.
Having thus performed an act of indispensable duty, from a just sense of
what is due to his own consistency and honour, the Prince has only to
add that, among the many blessings to be derived from His Majesty’s
restoration to health, and to the personal exercise of his royal
functions, it will not, in the Prince’s estimation, be the least, that
that most fortunate event will at once rescue him from a situation of
unexampled embarrassment, and put an end to a state of affairs, ill
calculated, he fears, to sustain the interests of the United Kingdom in
this awful and perilous crisis; and most difficult to be reconciled to
the general principles of the British Constitution.
MR. PERCEVAL’S ANSWER.
DOWNING STREET,
_Feb. 5th, 1811_.
Mr. Perceval presents his humble duty to Your Royal Highness, and has
the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Royal Highness’s letter of
last night, which reached him this morning.
Mr. Perceval feels it his duty to express his humble thanks to Your
Royal Highness for the frankness with which Your Royal Highness has
condescended explicitly to communicate the motives which have induced
Your Royal Highness to honour his colleagues and him with your commands
for the continuance of their services in the stations entrusted to them
by the King. And Mr. Perceval begs leave to assure Your Royal Highness
that in the expression of Your Royal Highness’s sentiments of filial and
loyal attachment to the King, and of anxiety for the restoration of His
Majesty’s health, Mr. Perceval can see nothing but additional motives
for their most anxious exertions to give satisfaction to Your Royal
Highness, in the only manner in which it can be given, by endeavouring
to promote Your Royal Highness’s views for the security and happiness of
the country.
Mr. Perceval has never failed to regret the impression of Your Royal
Highness with regard to the provisions of the Regency Bill which His
Majesty’s servants felt it to be their duty to recommend to Parliament.
But he ventures to submit to Your Royal Highness that, whatever
difficulties the present awful crisis of the country and the world may
create in the administration of the executive government, Your Royal
Highness will not find them in any degree increased by the temporary
suspension of the exercise of those branches of the Royal prerogative
which has been introduced by Parliament, in conformity to what was
intended on a former similar occasion. And that whatever Ministers Your
Royal Highness might think proper to employ, would find in that full
support and countenance which, as long as they were honoured with Your
Royal Highness’s commands, they would feel confident that they would
continue to enjoy, ample and sufficient means to enable Your Royal
Highness effectually to maintain the great and important interests of
the United Kingdom.
And Mr. Perceval humbly trusts that, whatever doubts Your Royal Highness
may entertain with respect to the constitutional propriety of the
measures which have been adopted, Your Royal Highness will feel assured
that they could not have been recommended by His Majesty’s servants, nor
sanctioned by Parliament, but upon the sincere, though possibly
erroneous conviction, that they in no degree trenched upon the true
principles and spirit of the Constitution.
Mr. Perceval feels it his duty to add that he holds himself in readiness
at any moment to wait upon Your Royal Highness, and to receive any
commands with which Your Royal Highness may be graciously pleased to
honour him.
FÊTE AT CARLTON HOUSE (1811).
=Source.=--_Diary of Lord Colchester_, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 336.
[_June_] _19th_.--Went to the fête at Carlton House. By previous inquiry
I managed both going and coming without the smallest difficulty; I drove
up Warwick Street to within a few paces of the small gate at which the
chairs come _out_, and by walking that length I was in the house in a
few moments. I went in at ten minutes past nine, and came away by the
same road at about twenty minutes past four in the morning.
At the top of the hall steps I found Colonel Palmer and other
aides-de-camp, waiting to receive the company. They took my ticket, and
Lord Moira, who was close by, told me in which way I could best see the
apartments before the company filled them; and he would have gone with
me, but was in waiting at the head of the first steps to receive the
royal family of France.
The great rooms lie all on the right side of the building; the smaller
apartments on the left; and in them the Prince waited to receive the
King of France, etc.
About ten they arrived; and the Prince, after seating the King of France
in one of the small rooms, hung with _fleur de lys_ furniture; and
paying his compliments to him _as King_, released his French Majesty
from all further ceremony, and conducted him as a private person with
the rest of the French court, through the different apartments. Having
done this once he left them to themselves, and for the rest of the
evening walked about alone, in every direction, and into every room.
He passed me several times; and I think once made a slight
acknowledgment of me by look. At other periods during the evening I had
long and marked conversations with the Duke of York and Duke of
Cumberland; also with the Duke of Clarence and Duke of Gloucester.
The Duchess of York and Princess Sophia of Gloucester also recognized
and talked to me.
Lord Yarmouth, upon finding that I had no ticket for supping at the
Regent’s table, gave me one, as a person who ought to be of that party
(viz. one of that 200), from which, however, many of the highest rank
were excluded.
At a quarter to two the card marked that we were to assemble in the gilt
room; and so did 500 other persons who had nothing to do with the
Regent’s party. This was the only thing ill managed, for with this
enormous crowd, and waiting there one hour before the doors were opened
to go down to supper, everybody was heartily tired; and the King of
France, who (as Lord St. Helens says all kings do) must have been
heartily tired of _swinging from one foot to the other_.