OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA AND EXTREMADURA. BATTLES OF CIUDAD REAL AND
MEDELLIN.
♦1809. MARCH.♦
Marshal Soult imputed the failure of his expedition to a deviation from
the plan which Buonaparte had prescribed, in not taking possession of
Ciudad Rodrigo. Lapisse had been prevented from doing this when it
might have been done without difficulty, by the unexpected appearance
of Sir Robert Wilson in that quarter; and Victor, who might have
taken the place in spite of any resistance which could then have been
opposed, was employed in operations more likely to gratify the pride
of the French, but of much less importance to the iniquitous cause in
which they were engaged.
♦PLANS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦
Reasons, however, were not wanting for this change of plan. The danger
from the spirit of the people in Galicia and in Portugal had either
not been foreseen, or disregarded; while the French, well knowing in
how short a time men of any nation may be made efficient soldiers by
good discipline, and seeing with what celerity, after so many severe
defeats, the armies of La Carolina and Extremadura had been brought
into the field, deemed it necessary to attack those armies before
they should become formidable, and destroy them, as far as their
destruction could be effected by the most merciless carnage, ... for
such Buonaparte’s generals, to whose pleasure the government of Spain
was in fact entrusted, were determined to make. They had been trained
in the school of the Revolution, and the temper which they had acquired
there fitted them for the service of such a master; and Joseph’s
miserable ministers, who had penned their edicts of extermination in
the hope of intimidating their countrymen, had the misery of knowing
that those edicts were acted upon to the letter. Wrung with compunction
their hearts were, for some of them had begun life with good hearts,
generous feelings, and upright intentions; but having allowed
themselves to be engaged in an evil cause, they were now so far in
blood, that one deadly sin drew on another, in dreadful and necessary
series.
♦EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON THE FRENCH SOLDIERY.♦
By the letters which were intercepted at this time it appeared that
mothers and wives in France congratulated themselves if the objects of
their affection were employed in Spain, rather than in the Austrian
war, so little did they apprehend the real and dreadful character
of such a service. The armies in La Mancha were not better supplied
than those in Galicia; weeks sometimes elapsed in which they received
neither bread for themselves nor barley for their horses, having to
subsist as they could by chance and by plunder. This mode of life had
given them the ferocity and the temper of banditti, and would have
led to the total subversion of discipline among any soldiers less apt
for discipline than the French. The infantry sometimes murmured under
their privations, delivered their opinions freely, and held sometimes
towards their officers a language which might be deemed insolent; but a
jest produced more effect upon them than a reprimand, a good-humoured
reply brought them into good humour; and the prospect of action giving
them a hope of discharging their ill feelings upon the Spaniards,
always animated them, and made them alert in obedience. The cavalry had
better means of providing for themselves, and more opportunities of
plunder; they therefore were always respectful as well as submissive to
their officers, lest they should be dismounted and deprived of these
advantages. The character of the service in which they were incessantly
employed gave both to men and horse a sort of Tartar-like sagacity
which perhaps had never before been seen among the troops of a highly
civilized people. Savages could scarcely have been more quick-sighted
in discovering a pass, detecting an ambush, or descrying a distant
enemy. And the attachment between horse and rider became such, that
if a trooper waking from sleep saw by the condition of his beast that
in a fit of drunkenness he had over-ridden or any ways abused it, he
would in the first emotions of self-reproach abjure wine and shed
tears, with imprecations upon himself, go on foot whenever he could
to spare the horse, and give him the bread which should have been his
own portion. And yet this humanizing feeling did not render them more
humane toward their enemies. Since the religious wars in France no
contest had been carried on with so ferocious a spirit on both sides.
That cruelty which in the middle ages was common to all nations had
been continued among the Spaniards by the effects of the Inquisition,
and by their bull-fights, ... among the French by the inhuman character
of their old laws, and afterwards by the Revolution; on both sides it
was called into full action, retaliation provoking retaliation, and
revenge. Even the cheerfulness of the French, which is their peculiar
and happy characteristic, which if not a virtue itself, is connected
with many virtues, and without which no virtue can have its proper
grace, ... even that quality was corrupted by the dreadful warfare in
which they were engaged. Light minds go beyond the point of fortitude
in that disregard of death which the continual presence of danger
necessarily induces. That which the wise and good regard with silent
composure is to them a theme for bravados and heart-hardening mockery.
It became common ♦ROCCA, 84, 87.♦ for the French, when they recognised
a comrade among the slain, to notice him not by any expression of
natural feeling, but by some coarse and unfeeling jest. The evil here
was to themselves alone; but their oppressions were rendered more
intolerable, and their cruelties more devilish, because they were
exercised mirthfully.
♦TEMPER OF THE SPANISH GENERALS IN LA MANCHA AND EXTREMADURA.♦
The armies under Cartaojal and Cuesta were at this time in such
a state that they deserved to have been better commanded, if the
government had known where to look for better commanders. With all
Cuesta’s good qualities, his popularity among the troops, his sure
integrity, his courage, and the enterprising energy which in spite of
age and infirmities he was capable of exerting, caprice, obstinacy,
and a desperate rashness which no experience could correct, made him
a most unfit man to be trusted with such a stake in such times. All
his desire was to meet the enemy in fair battle, where he could draw
out his men in full display; and if all his men had been as thoroughly
brave as himself, the old man’s system would not have been erroneous.
Cartaojal, on the contrary, was so convinced that discipline was every
thing, and that the best thing which could be done with his troops was
to drill them, that he let slip fair opportunities of exercising them
in successful enterprise. It seems almost as if a fatality overruled
the councils of the Spaniards, both in the cabinet and in the field;
and that if these generals had merely been interchanged, Cartaojal’s
caution might have saved the Extremaduran army, and Cuesta’s enterprise
have seized the advantages which were presented to that of La Carolina.
If severe measures could have restored discipline, they were not
wanting; and they were used with such effect as for a time to stop
desertion. ♦REFORMS IN THE SPANISH ARMY.♦ One essential reform was
introduced. All the infantry officers were till this time mounted, and
this practice occasioned a great consumption of forage when forage
could hardly be obtained for the cavalry; it led also to these farther
inconveniences, that the march of the columns was never conducted
as it ought, for want of the immediate presence and attention of
the officers; and that in case of retreat the mounted officer had a
facility for expediting his escape which might operate as a dangerous
temptation upon such officers in such times. No general could have
ventured upon this needful reformation without drawing upon himself the
ill-will of those whom it affected; the Junta, however, sent orders
that no person in the infantry under the rank of major (except the
adjutant) should be allowed a horse. This was done by British advice;
and if there had been no more jealousy of the British in inferior
agents than existed in the Central Junta, the cordial co-operation of
the two nations would have met with no obstruction.
♦THE DUQUE DE ALBURQUERQUE.♦
The most efficient arm of Cartaojal’s force was the cavalry. It had
been under the Marquez de Palacios, who had the reputation of being the
best cavalry officer in Spain, and was at this time commanded by the
Duque de Alburquerque, D. Jose Maria de la Cueva. This nobleman, then
in his thirty-fifth year, united in his own person many of those names
which are most illustrious in Spanish history, and he had inherited
also in no diminished portion the best and noblest qualities of that
proud ancestry. His education had been neglected, so that his mind was
not stored like Romana’s, neither was it equally under self-government.
But his military talents were such as to impress upon all who knew
him the belief that if experience and opportunity had been afforded,
he would have ranked among the great captains of the age: for he
was ardent without being incautious, capable alike of planning with
clear forethought and executing with celerity, far-sighted, prompt in
decision, and above all endowed with that true and rare nobility of
soul which is essential to true greatness.
♦HE PROPOSES OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.♦
A man of this stamp wins the love of the soldiery as certainly as
he obtains their confidence. Hope became their ruling passion when
Alburquerque was present; and their success in some enterprises, and
the skill with which their commander baffled the movements of the
enemy in others, gave the fairest prospect of success if the system of
enterprise were persevered in. In pursuance of that system, and with
the intention of making a diversion in favour of Cuesta, against whom
there was reason to believe that the French were preparing a serious
attack, the Duke proposed to advance upon Toledo, where they had 4000
foot and 1500 horse, with 12,000 or 15,000 infantry, 4000 horse, and
twenty pieces of horse artillery; and perceiving but too well that
his reputation and popularity were regarded with jealous eyes, he
advised that the expedition should be not under his own command, but
that of a superior officer; and he represented to Cartaojal that the
object of forming and disciplining the raw troops would be carried on
more certainly and securely while that part of the army which was fit
for service occupied the enemy by harassing and keeping them on the
alarm. The plan was too bold for one of Cartaojal’s temper; he saw the
necessity of training the army, and did not consider that enterprise is
the best training, and the only, that can be carried on within reach of
an active enemy. He ordered him, however, to advance with 2000 horse
and four pieces of artillery; and the Duke felt that, as an attempt
made with such a force could only end in a precipitate retreat, the
intention must be to wreck his reputation by exposing him to certain
failure.
♦THEY ARE UNDERTAKEN WHEN TOO LATE.♦
His representations, however, to the Junta were so well seconded, that
instructions came for advancing upon Toledo with all the disposable
force of the army. But when Cartaojal communicated this to the Duke,
he ordered him to deliver up the command of the vanguard to D. Juan
Bernuy, and march himself immediately with Bassecourt’s and Echavarri’s
divisions of 3500 men and 200 cavalry for Guadalupe, to reinforce
Cuesta. It was sufficiently mortifying ♦THE DUKE SENT TO JOIN CUESTA.♦
for the Duke to be removed from the cavalry which had acquired credit
and confidence while he was at their head, and this too at the moment
when the measure which he had so strenuously urged was about to be
undertaken; but it was more painful to know that the attempt had been
delayed till there was no longer any reasonable prospect of success.
With the little body of new-raised infantry which was now placed under
his command he began his march for Extremadura, and the ill-fated army
of La Carolina commenced its operations at a moment when it was thus
deprived of the only General who possessed its confidence.
♦CARTAOJAL ADVANCES AGAINST THE FRENCH.♦
The head-quarters of that army were at Ciudad Real, the cavalry
occupying a line from Manzanares to that city through Damiel, Torralva,
and Carrion, and the infantry in the towns to the left and in the rear
of Valdepenas. Cartaojal thought this a most advantageous position,
having the Sierra Morena behind him as a sure refuge if he were
defeated, whereas the enemy, were they to be repulsed in an attack,
would be exposed in the open plains, and have to cross the Zeucara
and the Guadiana in their flight. Having advanced to Yebenes, and
found the French ready to advance themselves, Cartaojal retreated upon
Consuegra; that place, to his surprise, was occupied by the enemy in
great strength: he fell back, therefore, to his former position, in the
advantage of which he trusted, ... and there, eight and forty hours
after he had commenced this useless and harassing movement, the French
appeared in pursuit, drove in his cavalry, and prepared to attack him
in force on the following morning. They were commanded by General
Sebastiani, who had superseded Marshal Lefebvre. The action which
♦ROUT OF THE CAROLINA ARMY AT CIUDAD REAL.♦ ensued is, even upon their
own accounts, disgraceful to both parties; to the Spaniards, because
♦MARCH 17.♦ they were successively driven from every point where they
attempted to stand, and pursued to the entrance of the Sierra; to the
conquerors, because Sebastiani stated in his official report that the
Spaniards fled on the first charge without resistance, and that he
had sabred more than 3000 of them in their flight. Eighteen pieces
of cannon, and 4000 prisoners, including nearly 200 officers, were,
according to the same report, taken. The fugitives felt a confidence
in the Sierra which they had not done in their General, and collected
in considerable numbers at Despeñaperros, Venta Quemada, and Montizon;
head-quarters were established in the village of S. Elena, two leagues
in advance of Carolina, and the French, without pursuing them into the
mountains, halted at Santa Cruz, awaiting there the success of Victor’s
operations against Cuesta.
♦OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL VICTOR.♦
Marshal Victor’s corps, leaving La Mancha about the middle of the
preceding month, occupied a line upon the Tagus from Talavera to
Almaraz; his head-quarters were at the latter place, where he was
preparing materials for a floating bridge, Cuesta having blown up the
arches of the Puente de Almaraz. A bridge was necessary here, because,
though they could have crossed the river at two other points, there
was no road from either of those points practicable for artillery.
But the bridge could not be constructed while the Spaniards occupied
a post which effectually commanded the passage. Cuesta was aware of
these preparations, and also that there was an intention of passing
over a detachment higher up to attack him on that flank; accordingly he
reinforced it, and removed his head-quarters from Jaraicejo to Puerto
de Miravete, that he might be near the scene of operations.
♦THE FRENCH CROSS THE PUENTE DEL ARZOBISPO.♦
The French detachment, as he had foreseen, effected their passage
at Puente del Arzobispo, or the Archbishop’s Bridge, so called from
its founder, D. Pedro Tenorio. A wooden bridge ♦MARCH 16.♦ which
existed in his days had been swept away by a flood; and as it was
there that pilgrims from the western side of the river passed to pay
their devotions to the famous image of our Lady of Guadalupe, he
built the present edifice of stone, and founded an hospital for their
accommodation, and a town, which he named Villa Franca, but which soon
took its appellation more conveniently from the bridge. It became
a point of considerable importance in the campaigns of this year.
The enemy crossed ♦MARCH 17.♦ with little or no resistance, and the
advanced parties of the Spaniards fell back upon the division which
was stationed at La Mesa de Ibor, and thence, after an unsuccessful
stand, to the village of Campillo, but in good order; their whole
conduct having been such as to satisfy the Commander-in-chief, who
occupied a strong position, and expected that he should well be able to
repel this division of the enemy, while Camp-Marshal Henestrosa, with
the vanguard, would prevent their main body from establishing their
bridge at Almaraz.
♦CUESTA RETREATS FROM THE PUERTO DE MIRAVETE.♦
But the French, who had crossed at Arzobispo, after dislodging the
Spaniards from their positions at Mesa de Ibor and Fresnedoso, divided
into two columns; the one proceeded by the circuitous way of Deleitosa
and Torrecillas, with the intent of getting into Cuesta’s rear, between
Jaraicejo and Miravete, and thus to cut off his communication and
supplies; the other marched by Valduaña toward the bridge of Almaraz,
to dislodge Henestrosa, and thereby free the passage of the river.
Cuesta’s army consisted of about 16,000 men; the French were little
if at all superior in numbers, but he believed that they had 20,000
foot and 3000 cavalry; and learning that Henestrosa, under the belief
that his right was threatened by a superior force, had withdrawn from
his post, and that the enemy had already begun to cross the Tagus,
he determined to retreat toward Truxillo, lest he should be attacked
at the same time both in the front and in the rear. This ♦MARCH 18.♦
brave old man was cautious when he ought to have been bold, and rash
in enterprise when he ought to have been cautious. Had Henestrosa been
supported in time (for there had been time enough to support him),
the ground was so strong, and the Spaniards in such a temper, that
the French could hardly have reached the position at Miravete without
sustaining a loss severe enough to have crippled them. In pursuance of
this unwise resolution, on the night of the 18th he began his retreat,
with the intention of forcing his way through the French corps, which
he expected to fall in with, and of taking up the best position he
could find for his own subsistence, and for covering the frontiers
of Andalusia. But by thus abandoning an excellent position, he left
Extremadura open to a hungry enemy.
♦SKIRMISHES AT TRUXILLO AND MIAJADAS.♦
When the Central Junta were informed of these movements, they imputed
the disastrous measure to Henestrosa’s abandonment of his post, and
ordered Cuesta to proceed against him with all the rigour of the law.
But the old General, though disposed at first to condemn him, was too
generous to do this. He replied that the Camp-Marshal had in all other
cases behaved well, and with a courage amounting to rashness, and that
in this he had acted only under an error of judgement. He met with no
enemies on his night march, and halting in the morning beyond the Rio
Monte, learnt that the detachment which he had expected to encounter
was taking a direction for Truxillo. To Truxillo he proceeded on his
retreat, and, leaving Henestrosa to cover that city, took up a position
at the Puerto de Santa Cruz, forty miles from the stronger pass whence
he had retreated. There it was his intention to wait till it should
be seen whether Alburquerque’s division could effect its junction,
and whether it ♦MARCH 20.♦ would make him equal to the enemy. On the
following morning Henestrosa was attacked, and driven to a little
bridge on the other side of Truxillo: there he repulsed the enemy, and
the skirmishing continued all day, with equal loss on either side,
the Spaniards behaving in such a manner as to increase the General’s
confidence in his troops. Cuesta expected now to be attacked on the
morrow, either in front or on his left toward the village of Abertura,
and had made up his mind to abide an action. But Cuesta’s resolutions
were sometimes changed with as little consideration as they had been
taken, for he was a man who acted more frequently upon the impulse
of the moment than upon reflection. The whole of Victor’s force was
collected at Truxillo; his advanced parties kept the Spaniards upon
the alarm as well as the alert, and Cuesta then began to apprehend
that the Puerto de S. Cruz was not defensible against the superior
force that would be brought against him, especially as the ground was
not favourable for cavalry. In the morning, therefore, he recommenced
his retreat, evidently not knowing whither, and with no determined
purpose, but in good order and in good heart, for, injudicious and
ruinous as all the late movements had been, the men were not yet
dispirited. While he was halting near Miajadas to refresh the troops,
the _chasseurs_ of the enemy’s advanced guard approached near enough to
expose themselves; the advantage was well taken, and the French Colonel
tore his hair in an agony of grief when he saw some hundred and fifty
of his ♦ROCCA, 93.♦ finest men cut down. This success was obtained by
the regiments of Infante and Almanza. It raised the spirits of the men,
a feeling of useful emulation was showing itself, and Cuesta formed the
wise resolution (if he had been steady enough in his purposes to have
kept it) of exercising them in various movements from one position to
another, without exposing them in battle, and thus detaining the enemy
till Cartaojal’s advance upon Toledo should operate as a diversion
in his favour. That same evening, therefore, he retired to Medellin;
and the next day, thinking it probable that if he remained the French
would attack him on the morrow, he marched for Campanario, to join
Alburquerque, who with his little division was coming by way of Aguda
and Garbayuela. He did not, however, remain there till the junction
was effected, but moved to Valle de la Serena, chiefly for the sake of
facilitating his supplies. Some magazines had fallen into the enemy’s
hands at Truxillo, one of the ill consequences arising from his rash
retreat; there was no want of food in that as yet unravaged country,
but he complained to the government of the incapacity and irregularity
of all the persons employed in that department, and protested that
unless this evil was remedied it would be impossible for him to
maintain discipline, or prevent dispersion.
♦JUNCTION WITH ALBURQUERQUE’S DIVISION.♦
The information which Cuesta received at this time, that a train of
heavy artillery had been sent from Madrid toward Extremadura, made
him apprehend the chief object of the enemy was to lay siege to
Badajoz. The possession of that fortress was so important toward the
success of their operations against Portugal, that this design had
been apprehended as soon as they became masters of the field, and the
Governor had been repeatedly charged to omit no means for putting it
in a good state of defence. Forming a new plan in consequence of this,
Cuesta informed the Central Junta that he should annoy the besiegers,
and cut off their communication with Madrid. But he had no sooner
effected his junction with Alburquerque than he determined upon seeking
the enemy, and offering battle in the first favourable situation. It
was not the addition of strength which induced him to this measure,
for he had expected to meet 6000 men, and had found little more than
half that number; ... but long irresolution usually ends in some rash
resolve.
♦CUESTA OFFERS BATTLE AT MEDELLIN.♦
Having forsaken that strong ground, which, if it had been defended
as well as it was wisely chosen, would have covered Extremadura,
it was as much Cuesta’s policy to have avoided an action now as it
had been then to have stood an attack, for he knew that he might
expect a British army to co-operate with him. Sometimes as facile and
vacillating as he was obstinate and impracticable at others, no man was
more unfit to command an army in critical times; and yet the honest
originality of his character, his fearless and buoyant spirit which
nothing could cast down, his energy which neither age nor infirmity
had abated, and the warmth of his heart as well as his temper, had won
for him in no common degree the attachment not of the soldiers alone,
but of those even who perceived and lamented his errors. The enemy at
this time occupied Merida and Medellin: the latter town, memorable as
having been the birth-place of Hernan Cortes, stands on the left bank
of the Guadiana, in a wide and open plain, without tree or cover of
any kind. ♦MARCH 28.♦ On that plain Cuesta formed his whole force in
one line, of about a league in extent, without any reserve, disdaining
all advantage of ground, as if he had desired nothing but a fair field
and mere individual courage were to decide the day. His army consisted
of 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. The vanguard, under Henestrosa,
and the Duque del Parque’s division, formed the left, which Cuesta
took under his own charge, as being placed on the highest ground, from
whence he could overlook the field. The centre was under D. Francisco
de Trias. D. Francisco de Eguia, who was second in command, was with
the right wing, which consisted of the Marques de Portago’s division
and Alburquerque’s, the Duke having with him his own horse. The cavalry
were on the left, that being the point where the French presented the
greatest force.
♦BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.♦
Victor’s army consisted of about 18,000 foot and 2500 horse. He had
collected his whole force there, for the purpose of striking an
efficient blow, and destroying, if that were possible, the Spanish
army, in pursuance of the murderous system upon which he had been
instructed to act. They were formed in an arc between the Guadiana
and a cultivated ravine which extends from Medellin to the village
of Mengabril; Lasalle’s division of light cavalry on the left, the
division of German infantry in the centre, in large close columns; the
dragoons under General Latour-Maubourg on the right, the divisions
of Villate and Ruffin in reserve; their front was covered by six
batteries of four guns each. The action began about eleven o’clock.
These batteries opened on the Spanish infantry, who were ordered
by Cuesta to charge with the bayonet and take them. The order was
bravely obeyed; two regiments of French dragoons charged the foot,
and were repulsed with loss: the German division formed itself into
a square, and resisted with such difficulty the resolute attack of
the Spaniards, that Cuesta was in full hope of a complete victory,
and Victor not without apprehensions of a defeat, till part of his
reserve succeeded in enabling his infantry to keep their ground. The
Spaniards on the left had taken the first battery; a strong body of
horse, protected by a column of infantry, advanced to recover it, and
at that moment the whole of the Spanish cavalry on the ♦Misconduct of
the Spanish cavalry.♦ left took panic, and without facing the foe,
without attempting to make the slightest stand, fled in the greatest
disorder from the field, most of them to the distance of many leagues.
Instances of such scandalous panic were but too frequent in the Spanish
armies during the war, but in no instance was it more fatal or more
unaccountable than in this; for the day was going on well, the infantry
were in good heart, the advantage was on their side; and the regiments
which at that crisis disgraced themselves, and betrayed their country,
had displayed both skill and courage during the retreat from the Tagus,
and had distinguished themselves in the affair near Miajadas.
Cuesta, who was at the other end of the wing when he saw this shameful
abandonment, clapped spurs to his horse in the hope of rallying them;
his staff followed, ... but in vain; the enemy, quick in seizing
opportunity, turned the left, which was thus exposed, and as there
was no second line or reserve, defeat then became ♦CUESTA THROWN, AND
WOUNDED.♦ inevitable. The old General was thrown, and wounded in the
foot, and not without great difficulty rescued and saved from capture
by the exertion of his two nephews and some other brave and faithful
officers. But the day was irrecoverably lost; and the French, having
routed the left wing, turned upon the centre and the right.
♦DISPERSION OF THE SPANISH ARMY.♦
The right wing of the Spaniards, meantime, had made the enemy give
ground, and were following up their success; but Alburquerque, seeing
what had occurred in the other flank, proposed to form in close columns
of battalions, and begin their retreat. Eguia overruled this, saying he
had no instructions to that effect, and not daring even in this evident
emergence to act upon his own responsibility. Indeed it is affirmed,
that not one of Cuesta’s officers knew his intention of giving battle
an hour before the action began. Affairs were every moment growing
worse, and Eguia having left the right of the line, the Duke gave the
necessary command; but it had been delayed too long; the whole force of
the French artillery was concentred upon these columns, who were now
the only troops that remained unbroken; a total dispersion took place;
and the enemy, forming a chain of cavalry all round the routed army,
executed their orders, which were to give no quarter. They had suffered
enough in the action to make them obey this atrocious command with
good will. They had themselves 4000 men killed and wounded, ... nearly
a fifth of their whole force; their official statement of the Spanish
loss made it 7000 killed; other accounts carried it to 12,000. Cuesta
could only state that it was very great, and ascertain that a hundred
and seventy officers of infantry and ten of cavalry were killed,
wounded, or missing.
♦NO QUARTER GIVEN.♦
Weariness, rather than compunction, on the part of the French, at
length put a stop to the carnage, and the account of prisoners is
variously stated from three thousand to seven; but it is certain that
not two ever reached Madrid. A wounded Spanish officer was brought
into the room where Victor was at supper, and the French Marshal said
to him, “If my orders had been obeyed, sir, you would not have been
here.” Those orders had been obeyed too well. The dragoons that night
in the French camp were rubbing their sword arms with soap and spirits,
to recover the muscles from the strains of that day’s slaughter. Their
cruelty was not satiated even with this success. A peasant in one of
the near villages had a son who was in Cuesta’s army, where he had
served for some time. When the army drew near Medellin, this Juan went
to his father’s house, and his conversation induced his two brothers,
Antonio and Carlos, to go with him as volunteers. Juan was never
seen after the battle; but the father upon searching the field found
Antonio’s body, and the other brother, wounded, and weeping over it. He
removed the dead son and the living one to his cottage, that the one
might receive Christian burial, and the other such help as might have
restored him. A party of the French, in their work of pillage, entered
the house, and finding a wounded Spaniard there, deliberately shot him,
before his father’s face.
♦ESCAPE OF ALBURQUERQUE.♦
When the dispersion of his columns took place, the Duke of Alburquerque
found his retreat completely cut off. Four officers were with him; with
these he advanced upon the French cordon of cavalry, and when at the
distance of about an hundred yards, turning to one of his companions,
he said, “You see that officer of chasseurs so gaily caparisoned? I
will have him down in a moment.” He then spurred his horse, and rode
at him full speed: of course his companions followed; ... the French
officer was startled, and moved rapidly on one side, several of the
chasseurs imitated his movement, and Alburquerque with his friends got
through the opening they had thus made. D. Miguel de Alava was one of
those friends; he had behaved with distinguished gallantry that day,
and just before the dispersion of the last battalions, sword in hand,
singly retook a Spanish nine-pounder from two French dragoons who had
taken possession of it. Soon after they had broken through, and were
still hotly pursued, a wounded artilleryman besought Alava to save him
from the general massacre. “Get up behind me,” was the answer, “and I
will carry you off, or we will perish together.” This little party,
happily for Spain, effected their escape. About midnight they arrived
at a lone farm-house, far enough from the field to feel themselves in
safety; and having got some wood upon the fire, and lighted their
cigars, they agreed unanimously that the loss of the battle was of
no[11] importance. Such was the spirit of the Spaniards; a spirit which
no misfortunes could abate, which no defeats could subdue.
♦THE REMAINS OF THE SPANISH ARMY COLLECT.♦
The battle itself, most unfortunate as it was, afforded Cuesta some
vindication for the error which he had committed in risking it. It
had been fought so well by the infantry, that they had obtained, and
that for a considerable time, a decided advantage, till the horse
took fright, and abandoned them. But it was after the defeat that
the strength of the old man’s character appeared with full effect;
and certainly on that memorable occasion both the General and the
government proved themselves worthy of their country and their cause.
The advance of the French was impeded by the weather, a storm of wind
and heavy rain having raged uninterruptedly for three days after the
battle, and swollen the brooks so as to render them like rivers. A
mishap also had befallen them at Almaraz, where their bridge gave way
while some ammunition carts were passing: many lives were lost, and the
operations of the army were delayed in consequence. They collected,
however, in and about Merida, and their advanced parties appeared at
Almendralejo and Villa Franca. This seemed to indicate an intention of
entering Andalusia; and Cuesta was of opinion, that, knowing the total
dispersion of his army, they would not hesitate at dividing their own
force, and execute this design with one part, while they laid siege
with the other to Badajoz, which was not in a state for making a long
military defence. He urged the government to send all the disposable
force in Andalusia to S. Olalla without delay; between that place and
Ronquillo, he said, was the only position where they could resist the
enemy with good probability of success, provided there were troops, and
artillery and subsistence.
♦CUESTA DISGRACES THOSE WHO HAD BEHAVED ILL.♦
He had appointed Llerena as the rallying point for the fugitives. The
infantry came slowly in, but when Cuesta arrived he found that the
cavalry had collected there with little diminution. He thanked the army
in his general orders for their good conduct at Medellin, excepting by
name the horse regiments which had so disgracefully taken flight, and
thereby occasioned that to be a defeat, which, if they had done their
duty like the foot, would have proved a most glorious and important
victory. For this offence he suspended three Colonels from their rank.
It does not appear that any heavier punishment was inflicted: ... the
fault had been too general to fix it upon individuals; ... and if
recourse had been had to lot, it might have fallen upon men who, with
the best heart and will, had not been able in that precipitate ♦1809.
APRIL.♦ movement to check either their companions or their horses. The
privates were disgraced by having one of their pistols taken from them,
till by some good service they should regain the honour which they had
lost.
♦THE JUNTA ACT WISELY AND GENEROUSLY UPON THESE DEFEATS.♦
It was reported that the Central Junta upon the first intelligence
of the defeat had fled from Seville. The danger was considered so
imminent, that they had deliberated concerning their removal; and the
Junta of Seville, who had been consulted, proposed that if such a
measure were adopted, absolute power should be left in their hands. But
the government did nothing precipitately, and on no occasion throughout
the war did it display more magnanimity or so much energy as at this
time of trial. The same day brought them tidings of the defeat at
Ciudad Real and of that at Medellin; the same gazette communicated
both to the people. There was nothing to qualify the disgrace and loss
which Cartaojal had sustained; he was therefore quietly removed from
the command. Whatever errors the Central Junta may have committed, no
other government ever exercised its power with such humanity in such
times, no other government ever made such just and humane allowances
for inexperience and weakness, nor dealt so generously with the
unfortunate. They decreed pensions to the widows and orphans of all who
had fallen at Medellin, in proportion to their rank and circumstances,
and a badge of distinction to those corps which the General should
commend; and they promoted all the officers who had distinguished
themselves. They pronounced that the General and the body of the army
had deserved well of their country. Knowing that Cuesta had been lamed
by his fall, they required him in all his dispatches to report the
state of his own health; and though they appointed D. Francisco de
Venegas to succeed Cartaojal, they placed both armies under Cuesta’s
orders, giving him the rank of Captain-general. In the preamble to
this decree they said that all the details of the battle tended to
console them for its loss, and that the spirit of Hernan Cortes might
have beheld with joy the courage which his countrymen had manifested
upon the scene of his childhood. The example of that day, they said,
might make them hope that with perseverance they might form an infantry
capable of defending the national independence; an infantry that should
be the worthy rival and successor of those famous _Tercios_ which under
the best captains in the world had supported the glory of Spain in
Flanders and in Italy and in Germany.
♦THEIR APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE.♦
The Junta felt it necessary to defend themselves at this time
against the base enemies who charged the late calamities upon their
misconduct, and who were agitating the people of Seville by false
alarms, reporting that the French were within five leagues of that
city, and that the nation was betrayed and sold by its Government. In
reply to these senseless accusations the Junta appealed to the fact,
that in the course of two months it had set on foot two armies for
the defence of the Andalusias, consisting of 50,000 men and nearly
12,000 horse. This they had done beside the assistance which they had
afforded to other provinces; and when was it known that the injuries
which the ship sustains in a storm had been imputed to the pilot? The
Junta had issued an abominable edict, whereby, after denouncing the
punishment of death against all persons who should endeavour to raise
distrust of the existing Government, or to overturn it by exciting
popular commotions, they invited informers to denounce such persons
to ♦TRIBUNAL OF PUBLIC SAFETY.♦ the Tribunal of Public Safety which
they had instituted, holding out the promise of secresy and reward.
When this decree appeared Mr. Frere saw to what an atrocious system
of tyranny it might lead. Judging of the Junta by their individual
characters, he felt assured that they would each have shrunk from
carrying such measures into effect; but he was well aware how little
the personal characters of any men placed in such circumstances are to
be relied on, and apprehended that after some natural hesitation the
majority might either yield to the guidance of one or two members, more
violent and less scrupulous, or abandon themselves to the direction of
this Tribunal of Public Safety; the very name of which, he said, must
remind us of the worst revolutionary horrors. But though the State
Papers of the Junta were on most occasions wiser than their actions,
in this instance their conduct was better than their language; and
it now appeared, most honourably for the national character, that,
notwithstanding this public encouragement to the nefarious practice of
delation, not a single secret information had been laid. If any person,
said the Junta, had complaint to make, or suspicion to allege against
any of the public functionaries, let him lay his proofs before this
Tribunal. But this has not been done, and all the processes which that
Tribunal has instituted have been public prosecutions, not one upon the
accusation of an individual.
♦CORRESPONDENCE ON THE INTRUDER’S PART WITH THE JUNTA.♦
The Intruder and his partizans hoped at this time that the defeat and
dispersion of two armies on two succeeding days would break the spirit
of the Government, if not of the nation, and that the Junta might be
induced to secure themselves and their own possessions by submission.
Accordingly a Spanish traitor, by name Joaquim ♦APRIL 12.♦ Maria
Sotelo, addressed a letter from Merida to the vice-president, saying,
that the greater number of the provinces of Spain had sufficiently
suffered from the effects of war and conquest, and now the rest were
threatened with the same calamities. Filled with consternation, he
said, at the defeats of Cartaojal and Cuesta, the honourable Spaniards
at the court of Madrid, who could not contemplate without the most
poignant grief the desolation of their country, had implored the King
to alleviate the distresses of such provinces as were occupied by the
French troops, and to prevent them in those which were not yet in their
possession. To these prayers the King had attended, had ordered him
to announce his compliance to the Junta, and authorized him to confer
with such deputies as the Junta might appoint, on the best means of
fulfilling his wishes. He could not suppose that they would refuse to
take steps on which the salvation of Andalusia and the happiness of
the whole kingdom depended. And, as the business was most important
and most urgent, Sotelo represented, that it would be improper to
conduct it in writing, but that all the disputes and irregularities and
doubts which it would otherwise cause might be obviated by a personal
conference. On this ground, he hoped that deputies would be named to
confer with him.
The Junta replied, not to this traitor himself, but to Cuesta. “They
had not forgotten,” they said, “the character with which they were
invested, and the oath which they had taken, in unison with the wishes
of the nation. If Sotelo were the bearer of powers sufficiently
extensive to treat for the restitution of their King, and for the
immediate evacuation of the Spanish territory by the French troops,
let him publish them in the usual form, and they would be announced
to the allies of Spain. The Junta had no authority to listen to any
treaty, or terminate any transaction, which was not founded on the
basis of eternal justice. Any other principle of negotiation, without
benefiting the empire, would only tend to degrade the Junta, which
had entered into the most awful engagements to bury itself beneath
the ruins of the monarchy, rather than sanction any proposition which
should diminish the honour and independence of the Spanish people.”
This answer they desired Cuesta to transmit to the Intruder’s agent,
and they published the proposal and the reply. Perceiving, however,
of what importance the safety of the government was to the national
cause, and the danger therefore of associating it in the minds of
the people with any particular place of residence, in times when no
place was secure, they published a decree upon this subject. It began
by an avowal, that in their anxiety to provide immediate remedy for
the calamities which had befallen the armies of La Mancha and ♦APRIL
18.♦ Extremadura, they had imprudently hazarded their own safety by
remaining at Seville. But having provided for the reinforcement and
equipment of the troops, and furnished all the supplies which were
requisite for the defence of Andalusia, they had in cool consideration
reflected, that their security was inseparable from that of the state;
that the preserval of the deposit of the sovereignty entrusted into
their hands was the first of their obligations; and that they could not
again expose it to the danger of being destroyed, without doing wrong
to the nation which had confided it to them. The Speed with which the
tyrant of Europe advanced against Madrid in November, and sent troops
towards Aranjuez, made it apparent that a principal object of his
policy was to strike a blow at the government, and, seizing the body
which administered it, cut all the bonds of political association, and
thus throw the nation into confusion. These were still his objects:
trusting more to his cunning than his force, he still pursued the
government, hoping to get its members in his power, and then renew
the infamous scenes of Bayonne, by compelling them to authorize his
usurpation, or sacrificing them to his rage if they resisted his
seductions and his menaces. Thus to degrade the government in the eyes
of the nation itself would, he thought, be the best means of degrading
the nation also, and reducing it to that servitude, which, in the
insolence of his fortune, this tyrant designed to inflict upon Spain.
To frustrate these aims, they decreed, that, whenever the place of
their residence might be threatened, or when any other reason should
convince them of the utility of so doing, they would transfer the seat
of government elsewhere, where they might preserve the august deposit
of the sovereignty, and watch over the defence, the well-being, and
the prosperity of the nation. And they declared, that, whatever the
accidents of the war might be, the Junta would never abandon the
continent of Spain, while a single spot could be found in it where they
could establish themselves for defending the country against the force
and fraud of its perfidious enemy, as they had solemnly sworn to do.
♦MEASURES FOR SECURING BADAJOZ.♦
When the news of Cuesta’s defeat at Medellin reached Paris, it was
affirmed in the Moniteur, that by this battle Seville was laid open to
the French armies, and that probably by that time Lisbon also was once
more in their possession, ... so confident was the French government
of speedy and complete success. In the same confidence, and with the
hope of subduing the spirit of the Aragoneze, the French Governor of
Zaragoza ordered mass to be celebrated in the Church of the Pillar, for
the capture of Lisbon and Seville, as events which had taken place.
Soult would undoubtedly have advanced upon the Portugueze capital,
if he could have relied upon Victor’s movements; but that General
found that the battle of Medellin had rather raised the hopes of the
Spaniards than depressed them. His views were upon Badajoz. Aware
of this, the Government, with that promptitude which characterised
all their measures at this crisis, supplied the place with money and
arms, and addressed public letters to the Junta of that city and the
Governor, reminding them that Zaragoza had held out two months not
against the enemy alone, but against hunger and pestilence; and that
her defenders would be held in grateful and everlasting remembrance,
while the names of those who had so basely delivered up Coruña would be
handed down for lasting infamy from generation to generation. To the
General, D. Antonio Arce, they said, that true glory was to be gained
by overcoming great dangers, and an opportunity for such glory was now
afforded him. The Extremadurans were not less brave than the Aragoneze,
and Badajoz possessed a defence in her fortifications which had not
existed at Zaragoza. The soldier fought with best hope, and sacrificed
himself with most alacrity, when he saw his commander set the example;
and such an example would not be wanting in one whose ancestors filled
a distinguished place in the annals of their country. At all times
Extremadura had produced heroes. There had the Pizarros, and there had
Cortes been born, to be examples now for their countrymen.
♦A CRUSADE PROCLAIMED THERE AGAINST THE INVADERS.♦
Marshal Victor sent to summon Badajoz, though he was not prepared to
lay siege to it; but the pitiable state of the country rendered it
always possible that a governor might be found weak enough in principle
or in mind to betray his trust. A spirit however such as the time
required prevailed there, and the parties which he sent out in that
direction were attacked at advantage and driven back with loss. The
Junta informed the Government, that, in consideration of the sacrileges
which the enemy committed wherever they went, they were enlisting the
peasantry under the banner of the Crusade with which the misbelievers
in old times had been pursued and conquered. The Government approved
this measure, saying that if their forefathers had proclaimed crusades
for the recovery of the Holy Land, with much more reason now might they
have recourse to the same means for defending their religion in the
bosom of their own country against profanations more impious than had
been heard of in the darkest ages or among the most barbarous people.
And they directed that the persons who should be embodied in these new
corps should be distinguished by wearing a red cross on the breast.
The Central Junta entertained a thought that this might be extended
with good effect; but it did not spread; the feeling and the enthusiasm
denoted by such a badge would not have been partaken by the officers,
and it might have raised a temper in the men unfavourable to any
expected co-operation with their British allies.
♦REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE EJECTED RELIGIONERS.♦
Another measure which the Government adopted at this time was intended
to lessen the ill effect that the dispersion of so many monks and
friars was likely to produce. The same calamities which had set them
loose in every part of the country which the enemy had overrun,
deprived them also of their accustomed means of subsistence; and it was
but too probable that among those who took arms, as was very generally
done by those who were able to bear them, the licence of a military
life might lead to scandals which on every account it was desirable
to prevent. A Junta therefore was formed of persons holding high
stations in the different Religious Orders, the Prior of Zamora, who
was one of the members of the Government, being appointed President.
The business of this Junta was to dispose of those Religioners who,
having been driven from their cloisters (the edict said), were crying
night and day before the throne of a terrible God to revenge the blood
of their innocent brethren, which had so wantonly been shed. They were
to be distributed in towns, hospitals, and armies, as they might be
deemed most qualified; and the Generals were instructed not to receive
any persons of their profession unless they produced credentials or
commissions from this board.
♦PLANS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦
Six thousand men had been detached from La Mancha to reinforce Victor
after the battle ♦APRIL 9.♦ of Medellin. His instructions were to
remain between Merida and Badajoz till he should receive advices of
Soult’s movements, and till Lapisse should join him. The Intrusive
Government persuaded themselves that the struggle would soon be
over, and Joseph waited only to hear from Marshal Ney of the total
destruction of Romana’s army, to give orders for marching against
Valencia. But the tide had now turned in Galicia; there came no
intelligence from Ney but what was disastrous; and Soult could neither
communicate with Victor nor with Lapisse, neither could they at this
time communicate with each other. Soult’s communication was cut off
by Silveira on the Tamega, by Trant on the Vouga, ... and Sir Robert
Wilson, by his position at Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off Lapisse equally
from co-operating with his countrymen in Portugal or in Extremadura.
♦SIR ROBERT WILSON’S CONDUCT AT CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦
Of how great importance that position was likely to become Mr.
Frere had perceived as soon as Sir John Moore’s army began their
dolorous retreat; and he had obtained from the Spanish Government
such reinforcement for the garrison as could be spared at a time when
demands for aid came upon them from all quarters. The command which
they conferred upon Sir Robert Wilson, disposed as the Spaniards were
to act heartily with him, was of more consequence than any succour
which they could then afford. He meantime had spared no exertions for
increasing his little force, and continuing to impose upon the enemy
that useful opinion of its strength which they were known to entertain:
for it was seen by their intercepted letters that they had applied for
reinforcements under the fear of being attacked by him in Salamanca,
where, they said, the inhabitants were as much to be dreaded as the
enemy. Sir Robert circulated addresses inviting the Germans and Poles
and Swiss in the French service to abandon an iniquitous cause into
which they had been forced, and in which they had no concern. There
was no press in the city, but the parochial clergy throughout the line
of country which he occupied multiplied copies by transcription: many
men were brought over by these means, and the enemy suffered not only
from this continual drain, but from the suspicion and inquietude which
was thus produced. Some stragglers from Sir John Moore’s army, and some
prisoners from it who had effected their escape, joined him, having
every where received from the peasantry every possible assistance and
kindness; for that retreat had not lessened in the Spanish people
their sense of gratitude towards Great Britain, nor their respect
for the British character. Some convalescents also from Almeida were
added to his numbers, and he obtained two reinforcements, each of a
more extraordinary kind. A captain of banditti, with five-and-twenty
followers, who had exercised their vocation in the country about
Segovia, repaired to him, as men who preferred risking their lives in
a legal and honourable way, and were desirous of doing good service
in a good cause. The other party told a sadder tale. They were South
Americans from the Plata, who having been made prisoners at Montevideo
in the ill-advised and worse conducted expedition of the English to
that province, had been landed in Spain, there to be neglected and left
destitute by their own government. More than 200 had perished through
want and misery, and the survivors were almost naked and pitiably
emaciated with the privations and sufferings which they had endured.
There were seven officers among them, who were all men of polished
manners; and the soldiers were willing and well disposed, though
deeply sensible of the cruelty and injustice with which they had been
neglected.
♦ATTEMPT TO SURPRISE THAT FORTRESS.♦
Suspecting that the enemy would endeavour to reach Extremadura, get in
Cuesta’s rear, and menace Portugal on that side, Sir Robert occupied
the Puerto de Baños with a small force under Colonel Mayne. This was
effected just in time, Lapisse having marched the greater part of his
force to Alva de Tormes on the way thither, but finding it occupied,
and not knowing in what strength, the French returned. This was a
month before the battle of Medellin, at which time Sir Robert had gone
to confer with General Cuesta, no one except the Governor of Ciudad
Rodrigo being informed of his absence. Immediately after his return the
French, having been reinforced at Salamanca, attempted to ♦MARCH 2.♦
surprise Ciudad Rodrigo. A plan had been concerted with some traitors
in the town, who, from an outwork that might easily be stormed, had
thrown a bridge to the body of the place, so solidly constructed
that Sir Robert had remonstrated against it as promoting their own
destruction in case of an assault. Timely advice, however, came from
the Corregidor of Salamanca; and the enemy, apprehending from the
movements of Sir Robert’s troops that a counterplot had been formed
with the intent of attempting Salamanca, and cutting off their retreat,
fell back hastily, and not without loss. Treachery there had been;
but as there was no proof who had been the traitors, Sir Robert took
measures for removing the suspected persons without discrediting them.
♦THE FRENCH SUMMON IT.♦
After it was known that Cuesta had fallen back from the Tagus to the
Guadiana, and before tidings of his defeat had arrived, Sir Robert, who
had been urging him to form a corps on the Tietar, and thereby preserve
from the enemy a fertile part of the country which had not yet been
overrun, withdrew his troops from the Puerto de Baños to collect them
at Ciudad Rodrigo. Lapisse now brought together the whole remaining
force under his command, which had been reduced to about 7000 men,
advanced against that city, and summoned it. The officer by whom the
summons was sent wished to enter the place with it, but a detachment of
the Lusitanian Legion with four guns, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant,
had been stationed outside the works, and he was not permitted to
proceed. Before the Governor’s answer could be given, the French, in
disregard of the custom of war, continued advancing toward the gates,
upon which a fire was opened upon them, and continued with effect
till they halted. The Governor’s reply was, that he should not think
of surrendering, even under a greater necessity than then appeared to
exist. Some skirmishing took place, to the advantage of the garrison,
and on the following day the enemy retreated, with some loss both in
men and in reputation.
This movement of the French had been so little serious, that it was
supposed they had expected some co-operation from Soult’s army. Soon
afterwards, however, a second summons came in the name of the Intruder,
holding out ♦MARCH OF LAPISSE TO UNITE WITH VICTOR.♦ threats to the
garrison and inhabitants if they suffered themselves longer to be
misled by a few British officers, and promising them King Joseph’s
favour if they would open their gates. A verbal reply was returned,
stating that the proper answer to such a summons was from the cannon’s
mouth, and there the enemy would receive it if they chose to advance.
At this time the peasantry, encouraged by the example of this brave
garrison, had risen throughout a wide extent of country; and the
situation of Lapisse was becoming critical, when by a movement ♦APRIL
7.♦ which ought not to have been unexpected, he moved rapidly toward
the Puerto de Perales. That pass he could hardly have forced, if it
had been occupied; but Colonel Mayne could not reach it in time after
the intention of the enemy was ascertained, and all that Sir Robert
could do was to dispatch advices into Portugal, and harass their march
by pursuing them with all speed, in the hope that when they arrived at
Alcantara, where they must cross the Tagus, they would find it occupied
by a sufficient force of Portugueze.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER ALCANTARA.♦
The bridge at that point, which was then one of the durable monuments
of Roman magnificence, has given name to a city of some renown, as
the chief seat of one of the military orders famous in old times.
The town is on the left bank, and the inhabitants, aware of danger,
thought to avert it by defending the entrance of the bridge with a
kind of _abbatis_, and breaking up the road to a depth of eighteen
or twenty feet. These rude works not being defended by any regular
force, nor with any skill or military means, were soon forced, and
the town was entered. Lapisse had marked his whole route by the most
wanton cruelties, in return for which every straggler who fell into
the hands of the peasantry was put to death. He remained only during
the night in Alcantara; but that night was employed in plunder, and in
the commission of every crime by which humanity can be disgraced and
outraged. Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Don Carlos d’España (officers
whose names appear often during the war, and always honourably),
arrived near the town with a small body of cavalry in pursuit during
the night, and entered it in the morning just after the enemy had
left it. They found the houses in flames, and the streets literally
obstructed with mutilated bodies, some lying in heaps, and others
thrown upon piles of furniture and valuable goods, which the ruffians,
having no means of removing, had brought out in front of the houses and
set on fire. Dogs had been murdered like their masters, swine butchered
for the mere pleasure of butchery, and their bodies heaped together in
mockery with those of the human victims. The churches ♦CAMPAIGNS OF
THE LUSITANIAN LEGION, 65–68.♦ had been polluted as well as plundered,
images mutilated, pictures, the value of which was not suspected by
these destroyers, cut to pieces, graves opened in the hope of finding
money or plate concealed there, even the very coffins violated, and the
dead exposed.
♦JUNCTION WITH VICTOR.♦
Victor’s force, after he had been joined by this division, amounted to
23,000 foot and 5800 horse. It was apprehended from some intercepted
letters that he would immediately make for Seville, and Cuesta had
formed his plan of defence accordingly. Portugal, however, was the
object of the French, as a point of more importance at that time; but
they had let the hour go by, and the English were now once more in the
field.