PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT RELATING TO THE WAR.
♦1809. JANUARY.♦
♦CONDUCT OF THE OPPOSITION IN ENGLAND.♦
During the first success of the Spaniards, the enemies of Government
either were silent or joined faintly in the expression of national
feeling which was heard from all parts of the united kingdoms. No
sooner had the prospect begun to darken than their real wishes were
disclosed, and, true to their belief in the omnipotence of Buonaparte,
they expatiated upon the folly and insanity of opposing one against
whom it was impossible that any resistance could be successful. They
dwelt upon the consummate wisdom of his cabinet, the unequalled
ability of his generals, the inexhaustible numbers of his armies, and
their irresistible force; but they neither took into this account the
character of the Spanish people, nor the nature of their country,
nor the strength of moral principles and of a righteous cause, being
ignorant alike of all. That faith in English courage, by which the
fields of Cressy, and Poictiers, and Agincourt were won, and which in
our own days we had seen proved, not only upon our own element, our
empire of the seas, at the mouths of the Nile and at Cape Trafalgar,
but before the walls of Acre, and in Egypt, and at Maida, and in
Portugal; ... that faith which should ever be the first article of
an Englishman’s creed, for while it is believed, so long is it true;
... that faith these men had abjured, and substituted in its place a
political heresy, baneful as it was false, that upon land nothing could
withstand the French. The world was made for Buonaparte, and he had
only to march over it, and take possession. When they were reminded of
this Tyrant’s guilt, they thought it a sufficient reply to tell us of
his greatness, and would have had us fall down and worship the Golden
Image at the very time when the Spaniards were walking amid the burning
fiery furnace.
They began by predicting the failure of all our efforts, and the total
ruin of the Spanish cause; laying down as “a proposition too plain
to be disputed, that the spirit of the people, however enthusiastic
and universal, was in its nature more uncertain and short-lived, more
liable to be extinguished by reverses, or to go out of itself amid the
delays of a protracted contest, than the steady, regular, moderate
feeling which calls out disciplined troops, and marshals them under
known leaders, and supplies them by systematic arrangements.” That it
was in the power of England to assist the Spanish people with such
troops, such leaders, and such arrangements, they had neither heart to
feel nor understanding to perceive. They ridiculed the “romantic hopes
of the English nation;” hopes, they said, which had been raised by
“the tricks of a paltry and interested party.” Could any man of sense,
they demanded, any one “above the level of a drivelling courtier, or a
feeble fanatic, look at this contest, without trembling every inch of
him for the result?”
But the baseness of party went beyond this. Not only were ministers
blamed for what they had done in assisting Spain, and counselled to
withdraw their assistance as speedily as possible, but the Spaniards
themselves were calumniated and insulted. They had neither courage,
nor honour, nor patriotism; no love for their country, nor any thing
in their country worth defending. What mattered it to them whether
their King were called Joseph or Ferdinand, a Buonaparte or a Bourbon?
God would dispense sunshine and showers upon the peninsula, whoever
was his vicegerent there; the corn and the olive would ripen, and the
vine and the fig-tree yield their fruits. What folly then to contend
for a feeble and oppressive government, of which the loss was gain!
The Emperor of the French had rid them of this wretched government;
he had abolished the Inquisition, reduced the monastic orders, and
would suppress them and all other remaining grievances as soon as
the obstinacy of the people would allow him leisure. And indeed the
people were sensible of these benefits: ... a few chiefs, the overgrown
aristocracy of the land, had for a while misled them; but those chiefs
had only a little hour to strut and fret; and for the people, whose
detestation of the French government had been carried to a pitch wholly
unauthorized by its proceedings toward them, their eyes were opened
now; they saw that Buonaparte was doing good; while, on the other hand,
they regarded the English as heretics; and nothing could overcome the
antipathy which this feeling occasioned.
The circumstances of Sir John Moore’s retreat, and the return of his
army, were matter of triumph to the journalists of this shameless
faction. “The dismal news,” they said, “was at last arrived! the truth
of the bulletins was established to its utmost latitude! the pledge of
throwing the English into the sea was almost to its literal meaning
fulfilled! The Spanish Junta and their allies, after six months’
trifling, blundering, and vapouring, were now finally defeated! the
spirit of patriotism, both in Spain and Portugal, was extinct! the
majority of the Spaniards had all along been indifferent respecting
the dynasty by which they were to be governed; yea, many were more
attached to the Buonapartes than the Bourbons. The triumphs of France,
the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies, wherever they were
attacked, the retreat and discomfiture of the British forces, ...
these were the melancholy events which concluded the fatal campaign of
1808, the fifth year of the war, ... this most unjust and unnecessary
war, into which England, in violation of its own treaty with France,
had rushed with equal eagerness and frenzy, and which she was now
carrying on with the professed object of the preservation of the most
corrupt branch of the Romish church!” Such was the language, not of
the revolutionary propagandists alone, but of political faction and
puritanical bigotry; while the condition in which the troops arrived,
and the tale which they related, excited the feelings of the people,
♦RETURN OF THE ARMY FROM CORUÑA.♦ and rendered it easy to mislead them.
Never had such a scene of confusion and distress been witnessed at
Plymouth as on the arrival of this miserable fleet. Above 900 women
were landed, all ignorant whether their husbands were dead or living;
they were searching through the transports, and officers and men in
like manner looking after their wives, children, and friends. Of the
wounded there were some whose wounds had never been dressed: many were
brought on shore dead: some died in the streets, on their way to the
hospitals. They who had escaped from any farther evil, having lost
all their baggage, were, even the officers, covered with filth and
vermin. Letters were written from the Medical Transport Board to all
the surgical lecturers in London, requesting that their pupils would
repair to the ports, and assist during the immediate emergency. The
form of having passed the Hall was dispensed with, and nothing more
required than a certificate from the lecturer whom they had attended.
The people of Plymouth behaved on this occasion with the characteristic
activity and beneficence of the English nation. A committee of
gentlemen was immediately appointed, who sat night and day, providing
food, clothing, and assistance. The ladies of the place attended the
sick and wounded, and assisted in dressing the wounds: thus supplying
the want of a sufficient number of medical men. Many a woman gave her
only second garment to her who had none. A charitable fund was raised,
and 1400 women and children belonging to the expedition received
immediate relief. The inhabitants of Portsmouth had a less mournful
task. That part of the army which landed there had not embarked from
the field of battle; and they who were well enough to partake of
festivity ♦DR. NEALE’S TRAVELS, P. 217.♦ were feasted in the Town-Hall.
The troops brought back with them a pestilential fever, which spread
through the military hospitals, and raged for some months before it
could be subdued.
♦JAN. 19.♦
Parliament met before the issue of Sir John Moore’s campaign was
known, but it was understood that he was hastily retreating toward the
coast with the intention of embarking, and intelligence was hourly
looked for with fearful ♦THE KING’S SPEECH.♦ expectation. The King’s
speech was in a spirit suited to the times. He had given orders, he
said, that the overtures from Erfurth should be laid before both
Houses, and he was persuaded they would participate in the feelings
which he had expressed when it was required that he should consent
to commence the negotiation by abandoning the cause of Spain. So long
as the people of that country remained true to themselves, so long
would he continue to them his most strenuous assistance: and in the
moment of their difficulties and reverses he had renewed to them the
engagements which he had voluntarily contracted at the outset of their
struggle. He had called his Parliament in perfect confidence that
they would cordially support him in the prosecution of a war which
there was no hope of terminating safely and honourably except through
vigorous and persevering exertions. The various grades of opposition
were distinctly marked in the debates ♦LORD SIDMOUTH.♦ which ensued.
Lord Sidmouth said, that there prevailed among the people a feeling of
dissatisfaction which was most honourable to them, because it arose
from their zealous loyalty and generous desires. They were neither
contented with the extent of the exertions which had been made to
support the Spaniards, nor with the manner in which those exertions
had been directed. Something, he trusted, would be done to allay this
laudable discontent, while he avowed his full belief that it behoved
us to prosecute the war with vigour. Such language was consistent with
the constant tenor of Lord Sidmouth’s conduct; a man who never in a
single instance allowed either personal or party feeling to prevail
over his natural integrity. Earl St. ♦EARL ST. VINCENT.♦ Vincent
agreed in the necessity of carrying on determined hostilities against
the common enemy, but he condemned the ministers alike for what had
been done, and what had been left undone. They had brought upon us,
he said, the greatest disgrace which had befallen Great Britain since
the Revolution. It appeared as if they had not even a geographical
knowledge of the Peninsula, insomuch that they ought to go to school
again, to make themselves masters of it. Why had there been that
disgraceful delay before our troops were sent to Spain? Why had not
some of our Princes of the blood been appointed to lead our armies?
all those illustrious persons had been bred to arms, and for what
purpose, if they were not to be employed? Why had not the Portugueze
been called into action? He knew them well; they were as brave a
people as any upon the continent of Europe, and under British officers
would have presented an undaunted front to the enemy. Ministers ought
to have known their value, and if they did not, their ignorance was
inexcusable. If the House of Lords did its duty, they would go to the
foot of the throne, and there tell the Sovereign the bold truth, that
if he did not remove those ministers he would lose the country.
♦LORD GRENVILLE.♦
Lord Grenville said there was but one opinion in the country concerning
the base and treacherous, the atrocious and cruel invasion of the
Spaniards; but one opinion as to the cause wherein they were fighting
against the Tyrant who unjustly and cruelly attacked them; but there
had been no prospect which should have induced reasonable men to send a
British army into the interior of Spain, though fleets with troops on
board, to hover about the coast, and take advantage of every favourable
opportunity, might be of essential service. We had injured our allies
instead of serving them. We had forced the Junta of Seville to abandon
the excellent system of defence which they had arranged, and, by
sending an army into the heart of the country, compelled them to engage
in pitched battles with regular troops. Care must now be taken not to
waste our resources in Quixotic schemes which it was impossible to
accomplish. Our army, brave as it was, well-disciplined, and capable
of doing every thing which men could be expected to perform, would
find employment enough in securing our own defence. If the country
was to be saved, its salvation could alone be effected by maintaining
a force upon a scale commensurate with the increasing dangers of our
situation. But, said he, I have no hesitation in declaring it to be
my most decided opinion, that if the system hitherto acted upon be
farther pursued, and the whole armed force of the country sent into
the interior of Spain, the destruction of this monarchy is inevitable;
and that we shall soon be reduced to the same condition with Prussia
♦EARL OF LIVERPOOL.♦ and the conquered states of the continent. To
these speakers it was replied by the Home Secretary, who had now upon
his father’s death become Earl of Liverpool, that it would ill become
us to be dismayed by those reverses which were from the beginning
to be expected, and to renounce that system of support to which the
nation was solemnly pledged, and in which those very reverses made it
a more sacred duty to persevere. He entreated those who were inclined
to despond that they would call to mind the lessons of history. There
it would be found, that nations, after maintaining struggles for ten
or twenty years, in the course of which they had been almost uniformly
worsted in battle, had eventually succeeded in securing the object for
which they strove. It was difficult to conceive any situation which
would better warrant hopes of ultimate success than that of Spain. The
people were unanimous in their resistance to the invader; and it was
the only instance since the French revolution in which a whole people
had taken up arms in their own defence. The territory of Spain was as
large as that of France within its ancient limits, and the country
possessed many local advantages for defence, ... advantages, the
value of which the Spanish history in former times ought to teach us
duly to appreciate. The cause itself was most interesting to the best
feelings of the human mind: it offered the last chance of salvation to
the continent of Europe; and if it were considered in a selfish and
narrower point of view, our own immediate security was in some degree
involved in its fate. Was there then nothing to be risked in support of
a generous ally? ... nothing for the re-establishment of the general
tranquillity? ... nothing for our own safety and independence?
The opposition in the Lower House betrayed a wish to shake off
the Spaniards and withdraw from the contest in whatever manner we
could. ♦MR. PONSONBY.♦ Never, said Mr. Ponsonby, since Great Britain
attained its present rank, has its public force been directed with
so little skill, so little foresight, or so little success; though,
in the expenditure of public money, he believed none would accuse
his Majesty’s counsellors with ever having been wanting in vigour.
It was their duty now to examine whether they ought to risk an army
in Spain, or confine their assistance to supplies. Elizabeth, under
circumstances sufficiently like the present, took care to possess
cautionary towns, and thereby assured herself of a retreat, and gained
a safe point whither to send reinforcements, as well as a security that
the United Provinces should not abandon her in the contest wherein they
were engaged. He should not indeed think of abandoning the Spaniards
in the hour of misfortune, but he could not admit that the present
obligations were to be considered in the light of a solemn treaty; they
had been entered into in a moment of hurry and precipitation; they had
not been laid before Parliament, and were therefore unauthorized by
it, and Parliament might approve or disapprove, grant or refuse the
supplies ♦MR. WHITBREAD.♦ for carrying them into effect. Mr. Whitbread
declared that if the recent disasters should appear to have proceeded
from the misconduct of ministers, the House ought to demand condign
punishment on their heads. It was now doubtful whether we had not
been proceeding upon false information both with respect to Spain and
Portugal. Were our troops agreeable to the people of Portugal? or were
we not obliged to keep a certain force there for the purpose of keeping
that people quiet, that is, to strike terror into our friends instead
of our enemies? Were our troops, or were they not, welcome to the
people of Spain? He had reason to doubt that fact. He was fearful that
a multitude of Spaniards wished success to Buonaparte rather than to
us. Although we must condemn the injustice of Buonaparte in his attack
upon Spain, yet his measures were extremely judicious. He abolished the
Inquisition, feudal rights, and unequal taxation. This was certainly
holding out some temptation to the people to acquiesce in the changes
which he wished to introduce, and unquestionably it had produced great
effect. The government which England supported was not connected with
any thing like a promise of the reform of any of the evils of the old
system, nor with any thing like a melioration of the condition of the
Spaniards. God forbid that we should abandon their cause while it was
possible to support it with any prospect of success; but he was far
from being sure that the time might not come when we should have to
treat with France after she had totally subdued Spain. Ministers were
justified in refusing to treat on the terms offered at Erfurth; indeed
they must have been the basest of mankind if they had accepted such a
preliminary. But he could not avoid regretting that the country had
lost so many fair opportunities of negotiating a peace, and that it
had at length been reduced to so foul a one that it could not have
been accepted without eternal disgrace. Mr. William Smith said, with a
similar feeling, that though he concurred in the propriety of rejecting
the last offer of negotiation, he by no means meant to declare that the
country ought never to commence another while Spain was in the hands of
the French government.
This first debate made it apparent that the cause of the Spaniards, in
which all Britain had appeared to partake so universal and generous a
sympathy, was now regarded by a party in the state as a party question;
and that because ministers, true to the interest of their country, and
to its honour (of all interests the most important), were resolved to
continue faithful to the alliance which they had formed with Spain,
there were men who felt little concern for what Europe and liberty and
human nature would lose if Buonaparte should succeed in bowing the
Spaniards beneath his yoke, and who looked on with ill-dissembled hope
to the advantage which such a catastrophe might give them over their
parliamentary opponents. Their disposition was more broadly manifested
when the overtures from Erfurth were discussed, and an address moved
approving the answer which had been ♦DEBATES ON THE OVERTURES FROM
ERFURTH. JAN. 26.♦ returned. They admitted that the overtures were
insincere, and could not possibly have led to peace, and yet they took
occasion to carp and cavil at what they could not in common decency
oppose.
♦LORD GRENVILLE.♦
♦LORD AUCKLAND.♦
In the Upper House a feeling of utter hopelessness was expressed with
sincere regret by Lord Grenville and Lord Auckland: the former asserted
that Buonaparte went to Spain with the moral certainty of effecting
its subjugation, the most important object of any that he had yet had
in view; and that in the course of two months he actually had attained
that object. The latter affirmed, that what we called the Spanish cause
was lost, for the present at least, and without any rational hope that
it could be ♦MR. CANNING. JAN. 31.♦ soon revived. To such opinions Mr.
Canning alluded, saying, it was said that whenever Buonaparte declared
he would accomplish any measure, his declaration was to be received
as the fiat of a superior being, whom it was folly to resist! _He_
never pledged himself to any thing but what he could accomplish! _His_
resolves were insurmountable! _His_ career not to be stopped! Such,
said the orator, is not my opinion, nor the opinion of the British
people. Even were the ship in which we are embarked sinking, it would
be our duty still to struggle against the element. But never can I
acknowledge that this is our present state. We are riding proudly
and nobly buoyant upon the waves! To the argument that we ought, as
Buonaparte had done, to have held out a prospect of political reform
to the Spaniards, he replied we had no right to assume any dictatorial
power over a country which we went to assist. We were not to hold cheap
the institutions of other countries because they had not ripened into
that maturity of freedom which we ourselves enjoyed; nor were we to
convert an auxiliary army into a dominating garrison; nor, while openly
professing to aid the Spaniards, covertly endeavour to force upon them
those blessings of which they themselves must be the best judges. If
the Spaniards succeeded, they would certainly be happier and freer than
they had hitherto been; but that happiness and freedom must be of their
own choice, not of our dictation. The Central Junta was not indifferent
to this prospective good, for it called upon all literary men to
contribute their assistance in suggesting such laws as might best be
enacted for the good of the state. If the suggestion of such laws were
to accompany a subsidy, he doubted much whether it would meet with
assent: and sure he was that the Spaniards could not but dislike them,
if dictated at the point of the bayonet. In these enlightened days,
said he, the imposition of a foreign dynasty is not regarded with so
much abhorrence, as it is considered what useful internal regulations
the usurpers may introduce! So detestable a mode of reasoning is
confined to only a few political speculators; the general sense and
feeling of mankind revolt at it. There is an irresistible impulse
which binds men to their native soil; which makes them cherish their
independence; which unites them to their legitimate princes; and which
fires them with enthusiastic indignation against the imposition of a
foreign yoke. No benefit to be received from a conqueror can atone for
the loss of national independence. Let us then do homage to the Spanish
nation for their attachment to their native soil; an attachment which
in its origin is divine; ... and do not let us taunt them with being
a century behind us in civilization or in knowledge, or adhering to
prejudices in religion, in politics, or in arts, which we have happily
surmounted.
♦LORD H. PETTY.♦
The more moderate opposition members, such as Mr. Ponsonby and Lord
Henry Petty, agreed that the government had taken a proper course in
demanding an explanation with regard to Spain before any negotiation
was commenced. ♦MR. WHITBREAD.♦ But Mr. Whitbread said he lamented
that the offer had been so abruptly put an end to. Even in breaking
with France it was better to break with her in a spirit of as little
acrimony as possible, ... for let gentlemen say what they would, we
must ultimately treat with France, ... to this complexion we must come
at last; and it would not be easy to say when we might calculate
upon even as good terms as we had been offered in the late overture.
With respect to Spain, the hopes he once had were nearly gone; and
the various reports from different quarters, from some of the want of
wisdom in the government, from others of want of energy in the people,
were not calculated to revive them. Perhaps before this Portugal was
reconquered. Buonaparte was hastening to fulfil all his prophecies. If
ever we wished for peace, with this man probably we must make it, and
it was always wrong to use insulting language towards him; the least
price of peace would be for us to use something like decorous language
to a power which was perhaps the greatest that had ever existed on the
face of the world. And it was extraordinary indeed that a government
which had committed the attack upon Copenhagen should call the
usurpation of Spain unparalleled! It really carried with it an air of
ridicule. Why should we talk of atrocity? Why should we blasphemously
call on our God ... we, the ravagers of India, ... we who had voted
the solemn thanks of the House to the despoilers of that unhappy,
persecuted country?
Thus did Mr. Whitbread attempt, ... not indeed to justify Buonaparte,
few of his admirers had at that time sufficient effrontery for this,
... but to defend him by the yet viler method of recrimination; to
apologize for his crimes by the false assertion that England had
perpetrated crimes as great; to stand forth as the accuser of his
country; and to disarm it, as far as his ability and his influence
might avail, of its moral strength, and of its hope in God and a good
cause. Six months before he had prayed God to crown the efforts of the
Spaniards with success ♦VOL. I. P. 449.♦ as final as those efforts
were glorious. “Never,” he then said, “were a people engaged in a more
arduous and honourable struggle. Perish the man,” he then exclaimed,
“who would entertain a thought of purchasing peace by abandoning them
to their fate! Perish this country rather than its safety should be
owing to a compromise so horridly iniquitous!” It was now apparent
that the sympathy which had been thus strongly expressed had not been
very deep. He moved as an amendment upon the address, that though we
should have witnessed with regret any inclination to consent to the
abandonment of the cause of Spain, it did not appear that any such
disgraceful concession was required as a preliminary by the other
belligerent powers. The stipulation, therefore, on our part, that the
Spaniards should be admitted as a party, was unwise and impolitic;
an overture made in respectful terms ought to have been answered in
more moderate and conciliatory language, and immediate steps taken for
entering into negotiation on the terms proposed in that overture. The
amendment concluded by requesting that his Majesty would be graciously
pleased to avail himself of any opportunity which might offer of
acceding to, or commencing a negotiation for the restoration of the
blessings of peace, on such terms as the circumstances of the war in
which we were engaged might render compatible with the true interests
of the empire, and the honour of his Majesty’s crown.
♦MR. CROKER.♦
The proposed amendment provoked a severe reply from Mr. Croker. He
exposed the inconsistency of the mover, who in his letter to Lord
Holland, when he had stated his opinion that it became the Government
at that time to negotiate, recommended that “the complete evacuation
of Spain by the French armies, the abstinence from all interference in
her internal arrangements, and the freedom of the Royal Family, should
be the conditions of the negotiation.” Mr. Croker commented also with
just indignation upon the strain of argument which Mr. Whitbread had
pursued. “He has set out,” said he, “by doing Buonaparte the favour
of trying to find a parallel for his attack on Spain; and he boasts
of having found many. But in the registers of British discussion, in
the recollections of British feeling, I defy the honourable gentleman
to find a parallel for his own speech, ... a speech calculated
only to plead the enemy’s cause. I do not mean to represent him
as intentionally their advocate; but I will assert that, whether
intentionally or not, he has taken that course by seeking for examples
which might keep the French government in countenance. But even if he
were not so deeply to blame for ♦1809. FEBRUARY.♦ this, ... supposing
even that this course was necessary to his argument, ... even then he
had been in error: he had produced no parallel instance; the history of
the world did not furnish one; and he had fruitlessly gone out of the
path to weaken the cause of his country.”
♦MR. WHITBREAD’S SPEECH CIRCULATED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.♦
Mr. Whitbread’s amendment was so little in accord with the feelings
even of his colleagues in opposition, that it was not put to the vote.
But his speech was so favourable to Buonaparte, and so suited to
the furtherance of his purposes, that the French government availed
themselves of it. A very few omissions adapted it to the meridian of
Paris; it was translated, inserted in the provincial papers as well as
those of the capital, and circulated through France and those countries
which were under its dominion or its influence. To deceive the French
and the people of the continent by the official publication of false
intelligence was part of Buonaparte’s system; but no fabrication
could so well have served his purpose as thus to tell them that an
English statesman, one of the most eminent of the Whigs, of the old
advocates of liberty, a leading member of the House of Commons, had
declared in that House that the overtures of peace made by France were
unexceptionable, and had been unwisely, impoliticly, and unnecessarily
answered with insult; that Buonaparte, wielding the greatest power
which had ever existed, was hastening to fulfil all his prophecies;
that England must be reduced to treat with him at last, and therefore
that the King of England ought to be advised by his Parliament
to commence a negotiation as soon as possible upon such terms as
circumstances might permit!
♦DEBATES ON THE PORTUGUEZE CAMPAIGN.♦
The debates upon the campaign in Portugal and the Convention of Cintra
terminated in confirming by the sense of Parliament the opinion which
the Court of Inquiry had pronounced. Events indeed had followed in such
rapid succession, that the Convention having been regarded only as to
immediate interests, not with reference to principles which are of
eternal application, seemed like a subject obsolete and out of date.
Ministers derived another advantage from the manner in which they
were attacked. No man could blame them, except in the mere spirit of
opposition, for having sent an expedition to Portugal; the public sense
of what had been lost by the armistice sufficiently proved the wisdom
of its destination; and that the force had been sufficient for its
object we had the decisive authority of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the
complete evidence of the victory which he had gained. The discussions
upon the expedition to Spain were more frequent ♦BOTH PARTIES AGREE
IN EXTOLLING SIR J. MOORE.♦ and more angry. Both parties, however,
as soon as the subject was brought forward, agreed in voting the
thanks of Parliament to the army for their services, and a monument
to the General. It had been the intention of Government to make a
provision for the female part of Sir John Moore’s family; but upon an
intimation of their wish that it might be transferred to a male branch,
a pension of a thousand pounds was granted to his elder brother. This
was a becoming act of national generosity; but the opposition eagerly
consecrated, and as it were canonized, the memory of Sir John Moore,
that they might impute the whole misconduct of the campaign, with all
its loss and its disgrace, to Government; and the ministers, always
willing to avert a harassing investigation, were well pleased that
their opponents should thus preclude themselves from pressing it upon
military grounds.
♦INQUIRY INTO THE CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN CALLED FOR.♦
Inquiry, however, was called for, not upon that reasonable ground, but
in the avowed hope that it would prove the ministry guilty of that
utter misconduct for which their enemies so ♦LORD GRENVILLE.♦ loudly
and exultingly arraigned them. Lord Grenville said it was indeed a
sinking country if such mismanagement were suffered to continue in the
midst of our unexampled perils and difficulties. The hand of Providence
appeared to be on us. Within three years we had lost the two great
statesmen in whom the nation reposed its confidence, an admiral who
had carried our navy to a pre-eminence which it never before enjoyed,
and now a great military chieftain, whose talents were of the first
order. “Was it ♦LORD ERSKINE.♦ possible,” Lord Erskine asked, “to
deplore the loss of friends whom we loved, and of men whose lives were
precious to their country, without lamenting in bitterness that they
were literally immolated by the ignorance and folly of those who now
wished to cover their own disgrace by the just and natural feelings
of the public towards men who had died for their native land? But for
their immortal renown, it would have been better for them, certainly
much better for their country, to have shot them upon the parade of St.
James’s Park, than to have sent them, not to suffer the noble risk of
soldiers, in a practicable cause, but to endure insufferable, ignoble,
and useless misery, in a march to the very centre of Spain, where for
them to attack was impracticable, and to retreat only possible, by
unparalleled exertions: and what sort of retreat? ... a retreat leaving
upon the roads and in the mountains of Spain from 8000 to 9000 of our
brave men, dying of fatigue, without one act of courage to sweeten
the death of a soldier. What could, then, be a more disgusting and
humiliating spectacle, than to see the government of this great empire,
in such a fearful season, in the hands of men who seemed not fit to be
a vestry in the smallest parish?”
♦FEB. 24. MR. PONSONBY.♦
Mr. Ponsonby insisted that it was the duty of ministers, before they
engaged in such a contest, to have ascertained the real state of Spain.
It was not sufficient to know that monks could excite some of the
poorer and more ignorant people to insurrection. The disposition and
views of the upper classes, who from their rank and property possess
a natural influence, ought to have been ascertained; and, above all,
the inclination of that middle class which is every where the great
bond and cement of connexion between the higher and lower orders.
Some information too they might have collected from history before
they ventured upon sending an army into Spain: for, as far as history
went, they would not find much to encourage them in relying upon the
character of the Spaniards for cordial or active co-operation in such
a contest. “I am not disposed,” said he, “to speak disrespectfully of
the Spaniards; but history does not represent them as remarkable for
that daring, enthusiastic, high-spirited disposition which prompts and
qualifies men to make a great struggle for freedom and independence.
The most powerful principles to excite mankind have uniformly been
religion and liberty: have either been found materially to operate
upon the recent movements of the Spanish people? These are the only
principles which have ever served to excite the noble daring, the
heroic resolution to conquer or die; and it was necessary therefore
to inquire whether they were actuated by both, or by either, to
calculate upon the probability of their success in the war. If they
were influenced by neither of these motives, how could any reflecting
man look for energy, zeal, or perseverance among them? Let me not
be misinterpreted. I do not desire that they, or any people, should
become wild or mad, and destroy society itself in order to improve
its condition; that in order to remove abuses they should tear away
all their ancient institutions; that in order to reform religion they
should destroy Christianity itself; but I do say, while the Inquisition
existed, that if the Spaniards were not sensible of the multitude of
abuses which pressed upon them, if they felt not a wish to reform
abuses and to restore their rights, and were not willing, for that
reformation and restriction, to encounter all the dangers and endure
all the difficulties inseparable from the species of warfare in which
they were engaged; I say, that if this people were not actuated by the
wish for, and encouraged by the hope of an improved condition, it was
impossible for any statesman, for any man of common sense, to suppose
that they would fight with success. If they were insensible of the
cause of their degradation, and indifferent as to its removal, it was
in vain for England to calculate upon materially exciting the spirit,
or effectually aiding the exertions of such a people.”
Then, after intimating a belief that Sir John Moore had acted against
his own judgment, and in consequence only of Mr. Frere’s repeatedly
urging him to advance, he asked whether the Spaniards had been found
willing and cordial in their assistance to the British army? whether
they had received them as deliverers and guests, or with jealousy and
fear? “Perhaps,” he continued, “ministers may say that the Spaniards
did not discover all that cordiality which was expected. But can it
be permitted that they shall say this after they have involved the
country in such a ruinous, unproductive, and inglorious struggle? For
let us not forget this, that, although we have obtained renown for
our military bravery, England has for ever lost its character as a
military nation. Were you to propose to send your soldiers again, as
an encouragement and aid to other foreign powers, what would be the
answer? It would be, ‘No! Your troops are good; your officers are
skilful and courageous; but there is something in the councils of
England, or in the nature and manner of the application of her force,
that renders it impossible ever to place any reliance upon her military
assistance.’ When you appeared in Holland and Germany as auxiliaries,
you failed; true it is, your force in these cases was comparatively
small, and the question remained undecided. The problem is solved,
however, by what has passed in Spain. You professed to send forth the
largest army that ever went from England, for the purpose of meeting
the force of France; and what has been the result? A shameful retreat
before the armies of France, and a disgraceful desertion of the power
you wished to assist. This campaign, I say, will have an influence upon
the character of England long after all of us shall cease to live. I
ask the House, then, to institute an inquiry. I call upon the country
to seek for one, in order to show how much distress, difficulties,
dangers, and perils unexampled, our soldiers have endured in this
fruitless and inglorious struggle. I call upon you, by the gratitude
you owe to those who were thus shamefully sacrificed at Coruña, ...
by that which you owe to their companions in arms, who are still in
existence, and able and willing to defend their country; I call upon
you, by the interest you take in those who yet remain, to institute
this inquiry, in order that they may not be sacrificed by similar
misconduct upon a future occasion. I call upon you, as you value
the glory of our country, the preservation of our future power and
reputation, as well as our interest, by every thing that can excite the
exertions of brave men, to institute this investigation.”
♦LORD CASTLEREAGH.♦
Lord Castlereagh, in his reply to this speech, observed with sarcastic
truth, there could not be a greater mistake than to suppose they who
called for inquiry meant that they wanted information. It happened,
however, that by pronouncing upon facts of which he was imperfectly
♦MR. TIERNEY.♦ informed, Mr. Tierney was led into a course of argument
most unfavourable to the intentions of himself and those who acted
with him. Why, he demanded, had not the 10,000 men who were embarked
been sent forward with all speed to Sir John Moore’s assistance? On
board the transports they were, and Lord Castlereagh took them out.
Had they been sent, Sir John might have been still alive, and a real
diversion then have been effected; for our army might for some time
have maintained itself in Coruña, and have obliged the enemy to turn
their whole attention to that quarter. The loss which we had sustained
in our retreat, he said, was carefully glossed over, but he understood
that it was at least from 8,000 to 10,000 men. Such a scene of woe,
indeed, had scarcely ever been heard of. Think of blowing up the
ammunition, destroying three or four hundred waggons, staving the
dollar casks, leaving the artillery to be cast away, and the Shrapnell
shells to the French, who would thus discover their composition! He
meant not to ascribe these disasters in the smallest degree to the
General: all might have been avoided, if only 10,000 men had been sent
to his support. Inquiry, therefore, was more than ever necessary; and
by the result of that night’s debate Great Britain would judge of the
character of the House of Commons. That House ought to convince the
army that, though they might be exposed to unavailing exertions, and
useless hardships, by the mismanagement of ignorant councils, they had
protection in Parliament, who would never be slow in attending to their
interest and their comforts. Unless the officers of the army had this
support to look to, all would with them be absolute despair; for, with
the exception of some of the connexions of ministers, there was not an
officer who came home from the expedition who did not vent execrations
against the authors of it ... there was not a man engaged in that
retreat of unparalleled hardship who did not curse those who placed
them in such a situation.
The fact was as Mr. Tierney stated it; ... he was only mistaken in
imputing it to the government. Four regiments and two troops of horse
artillery were actually on board, and had been disembarked. Five more
regiments of cavalry were under orders for Spain, and would have been
dispatched as soon as the transports could return for them. Nor had
Mr. Tierney overstated the advantages which might have been expected
had they arrived at the scene of action. On the contrary, far more
important results than that of maintaining Coruña for a time must have
ensued, if the British army had found these reinforcements there, even
if it could be supposed that the retreat would have been made with such
desperate precipitance, the General knowing he had such support at
hand. He would then have retreated like one who was falling back upon
his reinforcements, not flying to his ships. Broken in strength as the
army was by severe exertion and excessive sufferings, broken in spirit
too and almost in heart by the manner of its retreat, it had beaten
the pursuers in fair battle, and 10,000 fresh troops would have turned
the tide. Galicia would have been delivered from the enemy, Portugal
saved from invasion, and Soult’s army have been cut off, unless they
could have crossed the mountains faster in flight than they had done
in pursuit. Ministers would indeed have deserved the imputation so
confidently cast on them by their opponents, if these advantages had
been lost by their misconduct. Mr. Canning stated in their defence,
that the reinforcements had been countermanded by the Generals, and
empty transports sent out in conformity to their distinct requisition.
“It was an afflicting circumstance,” said he, “to send out empty,
for the purpose of bringing off the army, those ships which had been
filled for the purpose of reinforcing it. Among all the decisions to
which I have been a party, no one has ever in the course of my life
occurred which gave me more pain than this; ... every dictate of the
understanding was tortured, every feeling was wrung by it. But his
Majesty’s ministers had no choice. They felt that it would excite
dissatisfaction in England and dismay in Spain; and yet they had no
alternative.”
♦MR. CANNING.♦
Mr. Canning then proceeded to examine the more general arguments of Mr.
Ponsonby. “It had been argued,” he said, “that before the assistance
of this country had been given to Spain, we ought to have ascertained
whether or not the Spaniards were instigated by the monks; whether
they were encouraged by the higher ranks; whether they were wedded to
their ancient institutions, or disposed to shake off the oppression of
their former government; to abjure the errors of a delusive religion;
and to forswear the Pope and the Grand Inquisitor. The policy of his
Majesty’s government was different. They felt that the Spanish nation
wanted other and more aids than lectures on municipal institutions;
they were content that a British army should act in Spain, though the
Grand Inquisitor might have been at the head of the Spanish armies;
though the people might have been attached to their ancient monarchy,
and with one hand upheld Ferdinand VII., whilst with the other
they worshipped the Lady of the Pillar. God forbid we should be so
intolerant as to make a conformity to our own opinions the price of
our assistance to others, in their efforts for national independence;
to carry the sword in one hand, and what we may choose to call the
Rights of Man in the other! But the enthusiasm of the Spaniards was
not pretended; what they had in their mouths, they felt in their
hearts: they were enthusiastically determined to defend their country
to the last extremity, or to perish under its ruins. The cause was not
desperate; the spirit of the people was unsubdued; the boundaries of
French power were confined within the limits of their military posts;
the throne of Joseph was erected on sand, and would totter with the
first blast; and Buonaparte, even should he succeed, instead of a
yielding and unreproaching ally, would have an impatient, revolting,
and turbulent nation to keep down. The cause was not therefore
desperate, because our army of 30,000 or 40,000 men had been obliged to
withdraw; and it was not just to the country, or to the army, which
he hoped would again prove the stay and bulwark of Europe, to assert
that its honour was in consequence gone for ever. All the energy of
liberty, and all the sacredness of loyalty, still survived; and the
Spanish revolution was, he trusted, destined by Providence to stand
between posterity and French despotism, and to show to the world, that,
amidst the paroxysms of freedom, a monarch might still be loved. If,
therefore, ministers could show that these were the feelings by which
they were influenced, and that they had acted up to these feelings,
their justification would be complete; and he was convinced that the
liberal and disinterested measures of his Majesty’s government towards
Spain were more congenial to British feeling, and more honourable to
the national character, than if they had set out in their career of
assistance by picking up golden apples for ourselves. For himself, as
an humble individual of the government, and having a share in these
transactions, the recollection would be a source of gratification
which he should carry with him to the grave. If we had been obliged to
quit Spain, we had left that country with fresh laurels blooming upon
our brows; and whatever failure there had been upon the whole might
still be repaired. If that was to be brought forward as the ground for
accusation, he stood there for judgement. The object of the motion was
to take the reins of government out of the hands of those who held
them; and upon that ground he desired that the present ministers
might be judged by comparison. Was it the pleasure of the House that
Spain should be abandoned? Was it a principle agreed upon, that the
direction of government should be committed to other hands? Was it then
a settled opinion, that there was something fatal in the will, and
irresistible in the power of Buonaparte? and was the world to submit to
his tyrannous resolves, as to a divine infliction? Whatever might be
the fruits of Buonaparte’s victories in other respects, the spirit of
the Spanish nation was yet unsubdued. His fortune, no doubt, had been
augmented; but still it was fortune, not fate; and therefore not to be
considered unchangeable and fixed. There was something unworthy in the
sentiment that would defer to this fortune, as to the dispensations
of Providence; looking upon it as immutable in its nature, and
irresistible by human means:--
‘Te
Nos facimus Fortuna Deam, cœloque locamus.’”
This was a triumphant reply. The arguments of the opposition had been
so misdirected, that there was no occasion of subterfuge, sophistry,
or the shield of a majority to baffle them: they were refutable by
a plain statement of facts, where they relied on facts, ... by an
appeal to principles and feelings, where they pretended to philosophy.
Mr. Canning spoke from his heart. There was nothing which he was
required to extenuate or to exaggerate; all that was needful was a
manly avowal of what had been done, and of the reasons why it had been
done. He had a good cause to plead, and he pleaded it with a force
and eloquence worthy of the occasion. The same cause was in effect
♦MR. WINDHAM.♦ pleaded by Mr. Windham, though he took his place in
the opposition ranks, and voted for the inquiry as an opposition
question. “Our expedition to Spain,” he said, “had been so managed as
to produce what was much worse than nothing. What we called our best
army had retreated from the field without striking a blow, on the mere
rumour of the enemy’s advance. We had shown them that our best troops
could do nothing, and therefore that there was little chance of their
undisciplined peasantry succeeding better. There were two courses
which might have been pursued, either that of striking a blow upon the
Ebro while the enemy were weak and their attention distracted, ... or,
if this were hopeless, of proceeding at once upon some general plan
with a view to the final deliverance of the Peninsula. The first was
a mere question on which few but those in office could have the means
of judging. But if the force sent to the Ebro had (as it ought to have
been) been chiefly cavalry (which the enemy most wanted, and we could
best spare), such a force, even if it had been found insufficient for
its immediate object, could have retired in safety to that part of
the Peninsula where, at all events, and in every view, the great mass
of our force should be collected ... the neighbourhood of Cadiz and
Gibraltar. These were the only two places from which a large body of
troops, when pressed by a superior army, could hope to get away; and
there was no other part of Spain to which a British army, large enough
to be of any use, could with propriety be trusted.
“There, therefore,” Mr. Windham continued, “I would have collected
the greatest force that this country could by any possibility have
furnished. There was no reason why we might not have had an army of
100,000. An hundred thousand men, with Gibraltar to retreat upon, was a
far less risk to the country than 30,000 in the situation in which the
ministry had placed them; nay, than 30,000 in the very situation spoken
of; because a general must be miserably deficient in knowledge of his
business, who, in such an abundant country, and with such a fortress
behind him, would, with an army of that amount, suffer himself to be
prevented from making good his retreat, by any force which the enemy
could bring against him. For when we talked of Buonaparte’s numbers,
we must recollect where those numbers were to act. To meet in the
south of Spain a British force of 100,000, Buonaparte must bring over
the Pyrenees a force of not less than 200,000; to say nothing of the
demand that would be made upon him by the Spanish army which might be
raised in that part of Spain, to co-operate with the British, and which
the presence of such a British force would help to raise. Buonaparte
would have a whole kingdom, which he must garrison, behind him, if
he would either be sure of his supplies, or make provision against
total destruction, in the event of any reverse. He must fight us at
arm’s-length, while our strength would be exerted within distance, with
an impregnable fortress at hand, furnishing a safe retreat in case of
disaster, and a source of endless supply, by means of its safe and
undisturbable communication with this country. And let it not be said,
that while the army continued in the south, Buonaparte might continue
master of the north. What mastery could he have of any part of Spain,
while such an army could keep on foot in any other? And why, in case
of success, did the security of its retreat require that it should
never advance? There was never any thing so demonstrable, therefore,
as that the only way of carrying on effectually a campaign in Spain,
whatever else you might have done, was to collect your army in the
south. A force raised to the greatest possible amount to which the mind
and means of the country, ... then elevated above itself, and exalted
to something of a preternatural greatness, ... could have carried it,
should have been placed where it would have been safe from the risk
of total loss, and would not have been kept down by the idea that the
deposit was too great for the country to hazard. This should have been
the great foundation, the base line of the plan of the campaign. On
this the country might have given a loose to all its exertions, with
the consolatory reflection, that the greater its exertions, the greater
its security, ... the more it made its preparations effectual to their
purpose, the less was the risk at which it acted.”
Mr. Windham then censured in strong terms the neglect of those
opportunities which our command at sea had offered upon the eastern
coast of Spain; “a coast,” he said, “which was placed as the high road
for the entry of troops from France, which was every where accessible
for our ships, and which was inhabited by the race of men who fought at
Gerona and Zaragoza. Total forgetfulness could alone explain this most
unaccountable neglect. But the great and pregnant source of error in
ministers,” he observed, “besides the fault of not knowing better, was
that which they had in common with many other ministers, and which he
had signally witnessed in some of his own time, ... that of mistaking
bustle for activity, and supposing that they were doing a great deal,
when they were only making a great deal of noise, and spending a great
deal of money. They looked at every measure, not with a view to the
effect which it was to produce abroad, but to the appearance which
it was to make at home.” He then spoke of the campaign in Spain more
fairly than either party had ventured to represent it. “He could not,”
he said, “help perceiving in the conduct of this war, and certainly
in much of the language held about it, a certain mixture of that error
which prevailed in many years of the last, of looking to other powers
for what ought to have been our own work. We did not set our shoulders
to the wheel, as people would who estimated truly what the exertions
of this country could do, when fairly put forth. In this point there
was a want of confidence in ourselves; ... in another there was a want,
not merely of generosity, but of common justice toward our allies.
There could be nothing more fallacious than to estimate the feelings
of a country towards any cause by the feelings excited in that part of
it which should be exposed to the immediate pressure of an army. If
the scene of war lay in England, and we had an army of allies, or even
of our own countrymen, acting for our defence, they would not be very
popular in the places where they were quartered or encamped; and there
would not be wanting complaints among the farmers whose provisions
were consumed, whose hen-roosts were plundered, whose furniture was
stolen, whose ricks were set on fire, and whose wives and daughters
might not always escape insult, that the French themselves could not do
them greater mischief. Now, if this were true, as infallibly it would
be, of English troops upon English ground, might we not suppose that
a good deal more of the same sort would happen when English troops
were on Spanish ground, where every cause of dissatisfaction must be
aggravated a thousand-fold, by difference of habits and manners, and
the want of any common language, by which the parties might understand
one another? It must be confessed, too, he was afraid, that we were
not the nation who accommodated ourselves best to strangers, or knew
best how to conciliate their good will: and when to all this was added,
that we were a retreating army, and an army compelled to retreat with
extraordinary rapidity, and much consequent disorder, it would not
be surprising if neither we appeared to the people, nor they to us,
in the most advantageous form. Nor were the inhabitants of the towns
and villages on the line of our march to be considered as a fair
representation of the feelings and sentiments of the mass of people in
Spain. On many occasions the soldiers, at the end of a long march, had
nothing provided for them to eat, and were obliged to help themselves.
The inhabitants, whether they staid or had fled, had locked up their
houses, and nothing was to be got but by breaking them open; and when
once soldiers, whether from necessity or otherwise, began to break
open houses, farther irregularities must be expected. Galicia was
probably an unfair specimen of what was to be looked for from the rest
of Spain; not so much from the character of the inhabitants, as from
the state of society there, where the gentry were few, and of little
influence; and where there was almost a total want of those classes
which might direct and methodize the exertions of the lower orders.
But to talk of the Spaniards generally, as wanting in zeal, or courage,
or determination to defend their country, was more than any one would
venture, after such examples as Zaragoza. A defence had there been
made, so far exceeding what was to be expected from a regular army,
that a general in this country would have been made a peer for having
surrendered Zaragoza, in circumstances far short of those in which its
inhabitants defended it.”
There was an English spirit in this speech, such as might have been
looked for from Mr. Windham: for if sometimes he seemed to delight in
making with perverse ingenuity the worse appear the better reason,
and treated as a sport for the intellect subjects which deserved
a serious and severe feeling, no political views or enmities ever
betrayed him into an unworthy act, or sentiment inconsistent with his
natural generosity. The motion for inquiry was rejected; but whatever
papers were called for were granted, though Lord Liverpool warned
his opponents, that if they insisted upon making ♦SIR JOHN MOORE’S
DISPATCHES.♦ some of these documents public, they would perceive the
impropriety when it was too late. They found in these papers what they
wanted, ... an assertion broadly made by Sir John Moore, “that the
Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts
for themselves. To convince the people of England, as well as the
rest of Europe, of this,” he said, “it was necessary to risk his army,
and for that reason he made the march to Sahagun. As a diversion,”
he continued, “it succeeded. I brought the whole disposable force of
the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow me,
without a single movement being made to favour my retreat. The people
of Galicia, though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of the
French through the mountains. They abandoned their dwellings at our
approach, drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing that could be
of the smallest aid to the army. The consequence has been, that our
sick have been left behind: and when our horses or mules failed, which,
on such marches, and through such a country, was the case to a great
extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, and even money, were necessarily
destroyed or abandoned.” This was a heavy charge against the Spaniards,
and it was triumphantly repeated by those who, being the opponents
of ministry, became thereby the enemies of the Spanish cause. Yet it
might have occurred to them that it was neither generous nor prudent
to reproach an undisciplined peasantry for not attempting to defend
defiles through which the finest army that had ever left England,
with a man who was supposed to be their best general at its head, was
retreating faster than ever army had retreated before. If these passes
were not defensible, why should the Galicians be condemned for not
defending them? If they were, why did the British army run through,
leaving their baggage, stores, and ammunition, their money, their
horses, their sick, their dying, and their dead, to track the way?
This accusation against our allies the opposition had expected to find;
but they had not looked for a heavier charge against the army itself
from the same authority, ... a charge too which, if any thing more than
the consternation and flight of the British force had been required to
excuse the Galicians, would have supplied it. For the General added
in this unhappy dispatch, “I am sorry to say, that the army whose
conduct I had such reason to extol on its march through Portugal, and
on its arrival in Spain, has totally changed its character since it
began to retreat. I can say nothing in its favour, but that when there
was a prospect of fighting the enemy, the men were then orderly, and
seemed pleased, and determined to do their duty.” “Of what nature,” it
was asked, “was this misconduct with which General Moore so roundly
accused a whole army, almost with his dying breath? Did the officers
behave ill, or the men, or both? Did they refuse to fight, or did they
refuse to fly? What had they done, or what had they omitted to do?”
These questions were asked by the wiser part of the public, and the
narratives of the campaign, which were afterwards published, amply
answered them. It then appeared that the army, from the hour in which
it was turned into a rout, considered themselves like sailors after a
shipwreck, released from all discipline by the common ruin; ... that
they plundered, burnt, and destroyed before them; ... that while many
of the officers murmured against the conduct of the commander, the men
cried out loudly against the disgrace of running away; ... that order,
discipline, temperance, and even humanity, were laid aside by them in
their desperation: but that they had never forgotten the honour of
England; and that whenever a hope of facing the enemy was held out to
them, order was instantaneously restored, they were themselves again,
and, in spite of all their fatigues and sufferings, manifested that
invincible courage which, happily for themselves and for their country,
they were allowed at last to prove upon the French at Coruña.
Such consequences, however, humiliating as they were, were inevitable
in a retreat so conducted. But Sir John Moore’s dispatch contained
a more startling avowal, for it was then first made known that he
had been advised to propose terms to the enemy, that he might be
permitted to embark quietly. It was indeed an unexpected shock to
learn that there were officers, and of such rank as to offer advice to
the General, who were for asking leave of the French to embark, and
purchasing by such dishonour that safety which the army, broken-hearted
as it was, without horse, and almost without artillery, won gloriously
for itself. From this incalculable evil, this inexpiable disgrace,
Sir John Moore had saved us. But who were the men who had so little
confidence in British valour, that they would not have fought the
battle of Coruña? Who were they who, instead of relying upon their
own hearts and hands, would have proposed terms to Marshal Soult, and
set the Spaniards an example to which every traitor or every coward
among them might have appealed as a precedent for any baseness? This
question was not asked in Parliament; nor was any pledge required
from Government, or given, that these men should never on any future
occasion be trusted with command. Not a single remark was made in
either House by either party upon this subject, nor upon any of the
information contained in a dispatch which had been loudly called for as
of such great importance. It furnished no matter of reproach against
the ministry, and therefore it was not the kind of information which
their opponents wanted. And ministers themselves could make no use of
it in their own justification, for, having it in their hands, they
had passed a vote of thanks to the officers and men of whose previous
misconduct they possessed these proofs; and instead of defending their
own measures by arguing that the campaign might probably have turned
out well, and beyond all doubt less disastrously, if the Commander had
acted with more vigour and more discretion, they had asserted that
every thing had been ably executed, as well as wisely planned.
♦MR. FRERE’S CORRESPONDENCE WITH SIR JOHN MOORE.♦
Some matter, however, for accusation the opposition thought they
had found in Mr. Frere’s correspondence with Sir John Moore. They
affirmed that the fatal event of the campaign had been caused by his
interference, he having been the sole cause of the army’s advance. To
have his conduct fairly and impartially considered is what no agent
of the British government expects from a party in opposition to the
government, the just and honourable feelings of private life being
so commonly cast aside in political warfare, that the wonder is when
a trace of them is found remaining. But Mr. Frere was attacked with
peculiar acrimony, as the intimate friend of Mr. Canning; this being
motive enough for virulence when a spirit of faction prevails. He
was charged in the most unqualified terms with folly, ignorance, and
presumption; it was declared that his incapacity had given Buonaparte
the same advantage as that Emperor was accustomed to derive from
corruption and treason; and it was announced that an address would be
moved for his immediate recall. That intention was not pursued when it
was understood that Marquis Wellesley would be appointed to succeed
him in the embassy; and upon every point except that of having desired
that Colonel Charmilly might be examined before a council of war,
his conduct was fully vindicated and ♦1809. APRIL.♦ approved by the
ministers. In so doing they thought he had adopted an improper course;
but they proved from the documents which had supplied the grounds of
the accusation, that Sir John Moore had not been guilty of the gross
fault which his admirers, in their desire of criminating another,
imputed to him: he had not made a forward movement which endangered
the army contrary to his own judgement, and in deference to an opinion
which he disapproved; but upon his own plans, and in consequence of the
information which he obtained from an intercepted dispatch.
♦EARL GREY. APRIL 21.♦
In the course of these debates Earl Grey complained that only 2000
cavalry had been sent to Spain, though we had 27,000, and though
that description of force was peculiarly necessary in that country;
and he contrasted the conduct of the British government with that of
Buonaparte, “the consummate general whose plans they had to oppose.
In rapidity of execution,” said his lordship, “he is only equalled by
his patience in preparing the means. He has all the opposite qualities
of Fabius and Marcellus, whether you consider the country in which he
acts, the people with whom he has to contend, or the means by which
he is to subdue them. He rivals Hannibal in the application of the
means, and is exempt from his only fault, that of not improving by past
experience. The means provided by Buonaparte for the accomplishment of
his purposes are so well combined, and his objects so ably prosecuted,
as generally to give him a moral certainty of success; and whatever
may be thought of his total disregard of the justice of those objects,
it is impossible not to admire the ability and wisdom with which he
combines the means of accomplishing them. In order to maintain against
such an antagonist the ultimate contest which is to decide for ever the
power and independence of this country, the true policy of those who
govern it must be, to pay a strict attention to economy, to be actuated
by a determination to concentrate our means, not to endanger them in
any enterprise or speculation in which the event is doubtful; but
pursuing the economical system of husbanding our resources, by which
alone we could enable ourselves to continue a contest, the cessation of
which does not depend upon us, but upon the injustice of our enemy.”
♦EARL OF LIVERPOOL.♦
The Earl of Liverpool remarked, in reply, how singular it was that
every one who censured the plan which ministers had followed with
regard to Spain had a plan of his own, and that none of those plans
should have a single principle of agreement with each other. This at
least, he said, showed the difficulty which government must have felt
in forming its measures, though it afforded a facility in defending
them. As to the accusation of not sending a sufficient force of
cavalry, he stated that as much tonnage was required for 5000 horse as
for 40,000 foot; and moreover that vessels of a different description
were necessary, of which a very limited number could at any time be
procured. Yet from 8000 to 9000 horse had been sent, and there would
have been not less than 12,000, had not the General countermanded the
reinforcements which were ready. Weak as Earl Grey might be pleased to
deem the ministers, they had not been so foolish as to expect that the
first efforts of the Spaniards would meet with uninterrupted success;
they were not yet guilty of calculating upon impossibilities; they had
not supposed that such a cause as the cause of Spain, to be fought for
with such an enemy as the ruler of France, could be determined in one
campaign. Reverses they had met; but those reverses were not owing to
the indifference or apathy of the Spaniards; they were imputable to
their want of discipline, and to an ill-judged contempt for the French,
a proof in itself of their zeal and ardour. And what would have been
the general sentiment in that country and in this if our army had
retired without attempting any thing? If, when after all her repeated
disasters, the spirit of Spain was unsubdued, and her capital bidding
defiance to an immense army at the very gates; if a British army, so
marshalled and equipped, and after a long march to the aid of their
ally, had in that hour of trial turned their backs upon her danger,
what would have been thought of the sincerity of our co-operation? “I
believe in my conscience,” he continued, “that that movement of Sir
John Moore saved Spain. There are some, perhaps, who may be startled
at the assertion: it is my fixed and decided opinion, and as such I
will avow it. After the destruction of Blake’s army, the defeat of
Castaños, and the dispersion of the army of Extremadura, ... after
the capitulation of Madrid, which promised to emulate the glory of
Zaragoza, and would have done so, had not treachery interposed; if
at that crisis Buonaparte had pursued his conquests, by pushing to
the southern provinces, the Spanish troops would never have had time
to rally there. But that time was given by Sir John Moore’s advance
in their favour. Never was there a more effectual diversion. Sir
John Moore himself said, that as a diversion it had completely and
effectually succeeded. Nor was the moral effect of thus re-animating
the spirit of the nation to be overlooked. Let the final issue of the
contest be what it may, France has not yet succeeded in subduing Spain.
I admit that Buonaparte has 200,000 men in that country; that his
troops are of the bravest, and his generals among the most skilful in
the world; and, above all, that he has been himself at their head: and
yet, with all this, he has not got possession of more territory than
he had last year: he only holds such parts as in every war fell to the
lot of whichever brought the largest army into the field. I am far from
saying, regard being had to the man and the circumstances of the case,
that the Spaniards must ultimately succeed; but, at the same time,
looking at the spirit they have evinced, and the actions that have
happened, particularly the defence of Zaragoza, I cannot feel lukewarm
in my hope that their efforts will be crowned with ultimate success. In
that fatal contest with America we gained every battle; we took every
town we besieged, until the capture of General Burgoyne; and yet the
Americans ultimately succeeded, by perseverance, in the contest. In the
present struggle, do not the extent and nature of the country afford a
hope of success? does not its population forbid despair? We have not
lost the confidence of the Spanish people; we know that every true
Spanish heart beats high for this country; we know that whatever may
happen, they do not accuse us. Submission may be the lot they are fated
to endure in the end; but they do not impute to us the cause of their
misfortunes: they are sensible that neither the thirst after commerce,
nor territory, nor security, is to be imputed to us, in the assistance
we have afforded to them upon this important occasion. Whatever may
be the result, we have done our duty; we have not despaired; we have
persevered, and will do so to the last, while there is any thing left
to contend for with a prospect of success.”
♦MR. CANNING.
MAY 9.♦
Mr. Canning also declared, that considering Sir John Moore’s advance
in a military point, in his poor judgement he could not but think it a
wise measure; but in every view which ennobles ♦1809. MAY.♦ military
objects by exalting military character, he was sure it was so. With all
its consequences and disasters, he preferred it to a retreat at that
time. Of those disasters he would not say a word: the battle of Coruña
covered every thing; but the retreat itself, and the precipitancy of
it, he could never cease to regret. This single expression was the
only hint even of censure as to the conduct of the retreat which was
heard in Parliament. In the course of the debate an extraordinary
confession was made ♦MAY 9.♦ by Mr. Canning. “During the whole time,”
he said, “that these events were passing, government had no means of
arguing from the past: the occasion was without precedent, and such
as it was impossible to lay their hand on any period of history to
parallel, either from its importance with regard to individuals, to
this happy country and to Europe, or the difficulty that arose from
there being so little knowledge to guide their steps in the actual
scene of their operations. Why should government be ashamed to say they
wanted that knowledge of the interior of Spain, which they found no
one possessed? With every other part of the continent we had had more
intercourse: of the situation of Spain we had every thing to learn.”
With what contemptuous satisfaction must Buonaparte and the French
politicians have heard such a confession from the British secretary of
state for foreign affairs! With whatever feelings the government might
make this avowal, it was heard with astonishment by the thoughtful
part of the people, and not without indignation. To them it was a
mournful thing thus to be told that their rulers laid in no stock of
knowledge, but lived, as it were, from hand to mouth, upon what they
happened to meet with! Is there a country or a province in Europe, it
was asked; is there a European possession in any part of the world,
of which the French government does not possess maps, plans, and the
most ample accounts of whatever may guide its politics, and facilitate
its invasion? Even respecting Spanish America, such a confession would
have been disgraceful, because it would have betrayed an inexcusable
negligence in seeking for information; but as regarding Spain itself,
it became almost incredible. Did there not exist faithful and copious
accounts of that kingdom, both by foreign and native writers? Had we
not still living, diplomatists who had resided for years at the Spanish
court; consuls and merchants who had been domesticated, and almost
naturalized in Spain; and travellers who, either for their pleasure, or
on their commercial pursuits, had traversed every province and every
part of the Peninsula? Was not information always to be found, if it
were wisely and[12] perseveringly sought?
The truth was, that though we had means adequate to any emergency,
troops equal to any service, and generals worthy to command them,
Government had the art of war to learn: it had been forgotten in the
cabinet since the days of Marlborough and Godolphin. The minds of men
expand with the sphere in which they act, and that of our statesmen
had long been deplorably contracted. The nation, contented with its
maritime supremacy, hardly considered itself as a military power; and
had well nigh acquiesced in what the French insultingly proclaimed,
and the enemies of the Government sedulously repeated, that we had
ceased to be so. We had been sinking into a feeble, selfish policy,
which would have withered the root of our strength; its avowed
principle being to fix our attention exclusively upon what were called
British objects; in other words, to pursue what was gainful, and
be satisfied with present safety, regardless of honour, and of the
certain ruin which that regardlessness must bring on. The events in
Spain had roused the country from a lethargy which otherwise might
have proved fatal; and ministers, as undoubtedly the better ♦1809.♦
part of their opponents would have done had they been then in office,
heartily participated the national feeling: but when vigorous measures
were required, they found themselves without precedent and without
system. They had entered, however, into the contest generously and
magnanimously, with a spirit which, if it were sustained, would rectify
the errors of inexperience, and work its way through all difficulties.
♦EARL GREY.
APRIL 21.♦
Earl Grey took occasion in one of his speeches to notice an opinion,
that it was of no consequence by which party the administration of
affairs was directed. “How can it,” he asked, “be seriously urged, that
it is the same thing whether the government be entrusted to incapable
persons, or able statesmen? I am really astonished at the absurd
extravagance of the doctrine into which men of general good sense and
good intentions have been recently betrayed upon this subject.” But
no person had ever pretended that it was the same thing whether the
government were administered by weak heads or by wise ones. What had
been maintained was, that the party out of place was in no respect
better than the party in, and in many respects worse: that they did
not possess the slightest superiority in talents; that a comparison
of principles was wholly to their disadvantage; and that the language
respecting the present contest held, even by those among them whose
attachment to the institutions of their country could not be doubted,
was such as left no hope for the honour of England if it were committed
to their hands. The existing ministry acted upon braver and wiser
principles, and, whatever errors they committed in the management of
the war, to the latest ages it will be remembered for their praise,
that in the worst times they never despaired of a good cause, nor
shrunk from any responsibility that the emergency required.
♦EXPEDITION TO THE SCHELDT.♦
An error, and one most grievous in its consequences, they committed
at this time, by dividing their force, and sending a great expedition
against the Isle of Walcheren, as a diversion in aid of Austria,
instead of bringing all their strength to bear upon the Peninsula.
It was a wise saying of Charles V. that counsels are to be approved
or condemned for their causes, not for their consequences. When the
causes which led to this unhappy resolution are considered, it will
appear imputable in part to the conduct of the Spanish government,
still more to that of the opposition in England. By refusing to put
us in possession of Cadiz as a point of retreat and safe depôt, the
Spaniards afforded their enemies in England an argument in support
of their favourite position, that these allies had no confidence in
us. The opposition writers did not fail to urge this as an additional
proof that they were unworthy of our assistance; and the impression
which they laboured to produce was strengthened by persons whose hearts
were with their country, but who thought by heaping obloquy upon the
Spaniards, and making their very misfortunes matter of accusation
against them, to excuse the manner of Sir John Moore’s retreat. To the
effect which had been thus produced on public opinion ministers in some
degree deferred. They deferred still more to the pitiful maxim that the
British government ought to direct its efforts towards the attainment
of what were called purely British objects: now there were ships at
Antwerp and at Flushing, and it was deemed a British object to destroy
the naval resources of the enemy.
Men in England regarded the commencement of the Austrian war with
widely different feelings, each party expecting a result in conformity
to its own system of opinions. Those journalists who taught as the
first political commandment that Buonaparte was Almighty, and that
Europe should have none other Lord but him, as from the commencement of
the troubles in Spain they had represented the cause of the Spaniards
to be hopeless, so they predicted now that that resistless conqueror
was only called a while from his career of conquest in the Peninsula to
win new victories upon the Danube, after which he would return to the
Guadalquivir and the Tagus, and bear down every thing before him there.
Others, who had too sanguinely expected immediate success from the
Spaniards, with equal but less excusable credulity rested their hopes
now upon Austria, ... there, they said, the battle was to be fought,
and the fate of Spain as well as of Germany depended upon the issue.
The wiser few looked for little from the continental governments,
though they knew that much was possible from the people; but from the
beginning of this new contest, it appeared to them important chiefly
because it effected a diversion in favour of the Spaniards; especially
they hoped that England would seize the opportunity, and by meeting
the enemy upon that ground with equal numbers, secure a certain and
decisive victory.
♦TROOPS SENT TO PORTUGAL.♦
Great and unfortunate as the error was of dividing their efforts, the
Government acted with a spirit and vigour which have seldom been seen
in the counsels of a British cabinet. At a time when they expected
that not Spain alone, but Portugal also, would be abandoned by our
troops, they made preparations for sending thither another army with
all speed, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, who consequently resigned his
seat in Parliament, and his office as Chief Secretary in Ireland. Sir
John Craddock, who had then the command in Portugal, being a much older
officer, was appointed Governor of Gibraltar. ♦EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE.
APRIL 10.♦ The Earl of Buckinghamshire complained of this, as being
an ill reward for those exertions in collecting the scattered British
force, and preparing it for resistance, to which it was owing that the
determination of embarking from Lisbon was abandoned. This complaint
drew from the Earl of Liverpool a just tribute to Sir John Craddock’s
merits, and some remarks not less just upon the impropriety of
bringing such a subject before Parliament, as at once trenching upon
the prerogative, and virtually destroying that responsibility which
ministers possessed.
Lord Buckinghamshire was of opinion that we had acted unwisely in
reinstating the Portugueze Regency; that it became the duty of ♦MAY
1.♦ ministers to form a provisional government in that country till
the subject could be submitted to the Prince of Brazil’s decision;
and that when Marquis Wellesley went out as ambassador to Seville, he
should take with him powers for making those changes in Portugal which
could not be delayed without most serious injury to the common cause
of that kingdom and of Spain, and to the security of Great Britain
and Ireland. To this it was replied, that what had been done was done
because it was presumed to be most in accord with the sentiments of the
government in Brazil, at the same time that due regard was paid to the
feelings and even the prejudices of the people. Lord Buckinghamshire
strongly recommended that we should avail ourselves of the strength
of Portugal as a military position, and of the excellent qualities
of the Portugueze, which, under good discipline, whenever they had
had it, made them among the best soldiers in the world. Such measures
for that great purpose had at that time been taken as the Earl of
Buckinghamshire wished. That nobleman spoke more wisely upon the
affairs of the Peninsula than any other member of the opposition, and
without the slightest taint of party spirit. There were some, of whom
it would be difficult to say whether their speeches displayed less
knowledge of facts, or less regard of them.