INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY MARSHAL SOULT.
♦1809.♦
♦PORTUGAL THREATENED BY THE FRENCH.♦
The conquest of Portugal was announced by Buonaparte not less
confidently than his sentence of subjugation against Zaragoza; and no
difficulty was expected in effecting it. It was stated in the bulletins
that the rage of the Portugueze against the English was at its utmost
height; that they were as indignant at the perfidy of their allies
as they were disgusted by their difference of manners and religion,
by their brutal intemperance, and by that arrogance which made these
islanders odious to the whole continent; that bloody affrays between
them were occurring every day, and that the British garrison of Lisbon
had embarked in order to abandon a people whom they had deceived and
outraged. The real state of things gave some plausibility to these
falsehoods; for the French were well informed of the alarm that
prevailed in Lisbon, which was indeed such as seemed to justify their
vaunts, and might easily ♦PREPARATIONS BY THE ENGLISH FOR EVACUATING
LISBON.♦ enable them to accomplish their purpose. Preparations had
been made for evacuating that capital; transports were collected in
the Tagus, and notice officially given to the British merchants to
hold themselves in readiness for immediate embarkation in case the
enemy should advance towards them. These measures were taken early in
January, before it was known that Sir John Moore was retreating. As
soon as intelligence of his retreat was received, the ♦ADDRESS OF THE
REGENCY TO THE PORTUGUEZE.♦ Regency communicated it to the people.
“Portugueze,” they said, “the governors of the kingdom do not mean to
deceive you. They themselves announce that the armies of Moore and
Romana have retired to the interior of Galicia, leaving our frontiers
uncovered; that those frontiers, from their great extent, are exposed
to invasion; that the Emperor of the French is accustomed to employ
his whole force when he attacks a nation; that his rapid marches give
no time for the reunion of troops to act against him on the defensive;
and that he presses on to the capital, endeavouring to surprise the
government, and to spread anarchy and confusion. This mode of warfare
exposes some cities and towns to the ravages of invasion; but such
partial ravages are not the ruin of a state. It was in the centre of
Portugal that our ancestors sealed our independence with their blood.
Knowing this, the governors have directed their measures accordingly;
strong passes, formed by nature to be the bulwarks of our liberty, and
deep rivers, which cannot without danger be crossed, will be defended
in a military manner; and if, in spite of this, the enemy of Europe
should proceed to Lisbon, he will find around it a determined people,
who will cause the glorious deeds of those times to be remembered,
when the walls of that city were the scene of their heroism and their
triumph.”
♦STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING AT LISBON.♦
This was wise language, and though it proceeded from a government on
which they had little reason to rely, the Portugueze answered the
appeal with enthusiasm. The squares were filled, the streets lined with
volunteers, practising their evolutions with a zeal deserving better
teachers than it found. In these ranks the old man and the stripling
stood side by side, ... all pedantry of inches and proportion was
forgotten; the strength to carry arms, and the heart to use them, were
the only qualifications required. Some were armed with fowling-pieces,
some with bayonets screwed upon poles, some with pikes and halberds,
which for centuries had hung idly in the hall; bullets were piled up
in heaps at every stall, with flints and ramrods; and rusty weapons
of all kinds were brought out from the dust to answer the general
demand for arms. The children with their flags and wooden guns were
playing at soldiers, imitating the discipline of their fathers with
that spirit which, if well fostered and directed, would render any
country invincible. There was no want of courage, of enthusiasm, or of
patriotic feeling; but the people had none to direct and train them,
none to whom they could look with confidence.
It was the beginning of February before the news arrived of Sir John
Moore s death, and that his army had withdrawn from Spain. Fourteen
thousand English troops had been left at Lisbon when that army
began its march. Some regiments had advanced to the frontiers, that
they might be near the commander-in-chief if he should require to
be reinforced, or find it expedient to fall back upon them. These,
learning that he had retreated by a different route, and that superior
forces were hastening against them, returned by forced marches to the
capital. Every thing was in confusion there. One day the cavalry was
embarked, the next it was relanded. The sea batteries were dismantled,
and their guns shipped for Brazil; those at Fort St. Julien alone were
left mounted, as a defensible post if the British troops should be
forced to embark precipitately. The women belonging to the army were
sent on board. These preparations exasperated the people: they were
eager to do whatever should be required of them in the defence of their
country: that their own governors wanted courage or ability to stand by
them was nothing more than what they expected; but from the English,
the old and faithful friends of the Portugueze, they looked for that
assistance which England had never refused to Portugal in its time of
need. The feeling which this intended abandonment produced was rather
anger than fear; and they resented it more as if they felt ashamed
for allies long trusted, and always found worthy, than alarmed for
the consequences to themselves. A party of the armed populace seized
the English Ambassador’s baggage, which was ♦FEB. 24.♦ packed up for
removal. The government affected to consider this as the work of French
emissaries, though it was evidently a manifestation of the general
temper. Threats of condign punishment were denounced against any person
who should again offer insult to a British subject; and the people were
assured it was only by the powerful assistance of the British army that
their national independence could be maintained.
♦M. SOULT ORDERED TO ENTER PORTUGAL FROM GALICIA.♦
The bulletins had announced that Marshal Soult would cross the Minho
from Tuy on the 11th of February, reach Porto by the 20th, and Lisbon
by the 28th. His instructions were to march along the coast, as the
shortest and most convenient line, where, though there was no high
road, there were no mountains, and the ways every where practicable
for carriages; he was to govern the country as Junot had done, and
induce the people as soon as possible to request from Napoleon a King
of his appointment. The nominal force allotted him was 50,000 men,
and the staff might have sufficed for twice that amount; but the
efficient numbers fell far short. They had suffered much in the battle
of Coruña; they had suffered also by their rapid advance through so
difficult a country in the severest weather; and in means also they
were deficient; for though it was their system to take whatever they
required, they were now in a province where little was to be found.
Plate, jewels, indigo, Peruvian bark, whatever marketable plunder
Galicia afforded, these dealers in wholesale rapine shipped from Coruña
for France. Articles ♦DIFFICULTY OF PROVIDING FOR THE FRENCH ARMY.♦
of immediate necessity were not so readily obtained. The military
hospitals were in want of every thing, even rags for the wounded, for
linen here was a luxury not in general use. The mills of that country
(which are of the simplest construction, working by a single horizontal
wheel) were so small that ninety of them could not supply more flour
in a day than was required for the daily consumption of the invading
army; and as the invaders could find no Spaniards to serve them, they
were obliged to draw not only millers, but bakers and butchers from
the regiments. Grain was scarce, Galicia being a grazing province,
which at no time produced more than a third of what its own inhabitants
required. The summary mode of stripping them by requisitions, to which
the French as usual resorted, was in this instance impeded by their own
people: for the detachments who were stationed in different parts to
keep the communication open, finding how scanty the resources were, and
apprehending that if food were sent away they should be left without
it, suffered the ♦MÉM. SUR LES OPERATIONS DU M. SOULT, 56, 60.♦ orders
of the commissariat to be neglected, and took care of themselves alone.
♦HIS CONFIDENCE OF SUCCESS.♦
Marshal Soult, however, entered upon his expedition in full confidence
of success. He believed that a great proportion of the British troops
had perished by shipwreck during the heavy gales which had prevailed
after their embarkation; that they had determined as soon as he should
approach Lisbon to blow up the magazines and arsenals, and abandon the
place; ♦INTERCEPTED LETTER TO JOSEPH. FEB. 4.♦ that they talked of
nothing more enterprising than a landing at Quiberon; and that this was
a mere vaunt, for certainly it would be long before their army would be
again in a condition to show itself.
♦COMBINED PLANS OF THE FRENCH.♦
The plan which had been laid down for him was well concerted. Marshal
Victor was to manœuvre on the side of Badajoz, and send a column in the
direction of Lisbon to facilitate the operations against that city.
Lapisse was to threaten the frontier between the Douro and Almeida,
occupy Ciudad Rodrigo, march upon Abrantes as soon as Soult should have
reached ♦OPER. DU M. SOULT, P. 50.♦ Porto, and when that general was
master of Lisbon, Lapisse was then to join Victor, and enter Andalusia,
the conquest of the south of Spain as well as Portugal being considered
certain. Ney, meantime, was to occupy Galicia, and communicate with the
army of Portugal. Leaving him in command of this province, which was
said to be subjugated, Soult removed his head-quarters to Santiago, and
ordered General Lahoussaye from Mellid to march upon Ribadavia and
Salvatierra, obtain intelligence of Romana’s movements, and ascertain
what means might be found there for crossing the Minho. General
Franceschi at the same time was dispatched with his light cavalry to
take possession of Tuy, and examine whether the passage might not
best be effected near that city; and General Merle with a division
of infantry was sent from Betanzos to Pontevedra to support them.
Franceschi ♦VIGO AND TUY OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH.♦ fell in with a body
of Spaniards at Redondela, and took from them four guns. Profiting
by the panic which the fugitives were likely to impart, he sent a
detachment to summon Vigo, and the governor was weak or treacherous
enough to surrender a fortified and well-provided town at the first
summons of a division of cavalry. Tuy also, which in former wars had
been a place of great importance, the strongest upon that frontier, was
entered without resistance. Somewhere below this city it was resolved
to attempt the passage, and there accordingly the main body of the army
was collected.
♦PREPARATIONS FOR CROSSING THE MINHO BELOW TUY.♦
Two rivers, the Lama and Tamboga, which rise in the north-east part
of Galicia, unite and form the Minho; but the Sil, which joins it
with an equal body of waters, is believed to have been the Minius of
the ancients. It is the boundary between Spain and Portugal along a
considerable line; upon that line it is never fordable, except at one
place above Melgaço, and there only after an unusual continuance of
dry weather. There is no bridge over it below the city of Orense, and
the Portugueze had been sufficiently aware of their danger to remove
all the boats to their own side of the river. Just at its mouth it is
joined from the Portugueze side by the river Coura; each stream has
formed a bar, and upon an island between these bars the Portugueze
had a fortress and a small Capuchine convent. On the Spanish side,
immediately at the mouth of the river, Mount St. Thecla rises, a place
of great local celebrity, because of an annual pilgrimage, and known to
sailors as a sea-mark. ♦FEB. 10.♦ On the other side of this mountain is
the little port and town of S. Maria de la Guardia, and thither Soult
went with the captain of a French frigate and some seamen who had been
prisoners at Coruña, to reconnoitre and consult concerning the passage.
Means of transport were found in the fishing-boats of Guardia; but
it would have been difficult to double the point in them when laden
as they must have been for that service, and they would have been
perilously exposed to the fire of the island. He determined, therefore,
to carry the boats overland a distance of about three miles to a lake
or broad, from which the little river Tamuga issues, and enters the
Minho above the village of Campos Ancos. There was great difficulty
in removing them, and still more in conveying two pieces of artillery
to the same place. Means, however, for transporting three hundred men
at once were collected, and the troops appointed for this service
were exercised in embarking and disembarking on the lake, where it
could be done in safety. The attempt was to be made at high-water,
and under favour of the night, though little danger was apprehended
from the old frontier fortress of Caminha, in the face of ♦FAILURE OF
THE ATTEMPT.♦ which they were to cross; for the works, originally ill
planned and ill situated, had long been neglected, and the French held
in equal contempt the place and the people by whom it was garrisoned.
However, in order to deceive them, the troops were withdrawn from the
opposite shore, and a feint made of marching up the river. ♦FEB. 15.♦
The flotilla descended the Tamuga easily and in good order; but when
they came into the great stream the want of sailors was felt. The
boats separated; those that were best manned reached the shore; but
the Portugueze were upon the alert. General Bernardim Freire, who had
been appointed to the command of Porto and of that province, had sent
a detachment with two six-pounders to this point. They kept up a fire
with good effect; the tide turned; the other boats unable to stem it,
or approach the shore, where they could assist their comrades, found
it necessary to return; some were sunk, and about forty men were made
prisoners.
♦SOULT MARCHES BY WAY OF ORENSE.♦
Four days had been consumed in preparations for this vain attempt.
It was impossible to wait till the river should have fallen so as to
render the passage practicable, for the troops could not be supplied
where they were, and they were beginning to suffer from inaction.
Soult therefore left General Lamartiniere to command at Tuy, with 350
men, besides 900 who were on the sick list. Some public money had been
found in that city, and six-and-thirty field-pieces were left there,
besides some guns and ammunition which had been brought from Vigo. It
was thought a position of some importance at this time, and this force
sufficient to maintain it. He then marched for Orense, making this
long circuit to cross the river with less unwillingness because he had
received intelligence from Lahoussaye ♦OPERATIONS DU M. SOULT, 73, 80.♦
that the peasantry were in a state of insurrection in consequence of
Romana’s proclamations.
♦ROMANA ROUSES THE GALICIANS.♦
Romana indeed had not been inactive during the short respite which had
been allowed him. Had the French rightly appreciated his unconquerable
spirit, and apprehended the effect which such a man was capable of
producing upon a brave and generous peasantry, they would have deemed
his single destruction of more importance to their cause than the
capture of Ferrol ♦FEB. 13.♦ and Coruña. By this time he had collected
some 9000 men; to form an efficient army was in his circumstances
impossible, utterly destitute as he was of means; but what was of more
consequence, he had roused the country; his presence was infinitely
important there, and his name and his example hardly less so in other
parts of Spain, for in every part the people were encouraged by a
persuasion that their countrymen elsewhere were more fortunate than
themselves. Every where except upon the spot it was believed by the
Spaniards that Romana was at the head of a formidable army; when his
troops were so ♦OPINION OF HIS STRENGTH.♦ broken, a victorious enemy so
close upon him, and his condition so hopeless in all human appearance,
that he himself must have considered his escape from captivity, and
the death to which he would then have been condemned, as manifestly
providential. The Galicians at Lisbon (in which city there were always
some thousands of those industrious men) were at that time embodied for
the purpose of marching to join him; and the Spanish minister wrote to
desire that he would send officers to discipline and take charge of
them. The dispatch found him on the Portugueze frontier: he represented
in reply that his own force consisted chiefly of new volunteers, so
that none of his officers could be spared: he could only send some who
belonged to the provincial regiments of Tuy and Compostella. But of
men there was no want; for even if they had been less willing to take
arms for their country and their cause, mere desperation would have
driven them to it. Had the French been better disposed to observe what
for the last century at least had been the common humanities of war,
it would not have been possible when they were to support themselves
as they could by preying upon the countries which they invaded. Free
licence in one thing led to it in all, and when resistance was provoked
by the most intolerable outrages, it was punished with fire and sword.
The little towns of S. Miguel de Zequelinos and ♦VILLAGES BURNT BY
THE FRENCH.♦ S. Christobal de Mourentan, with their adjacent hamlets,
were burnt by the invaders, and more than 2000 persons, who were thus
reduced to ruin and deprived of shelter, fled into the Portugueze
territory, hoping to find refuge there.
♦INTENDED PLAN OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ROMANA AND SILVEIRA.♦
The Portugueze General, Francisco da Silveira, had taken the command
upon that frontier; his force consisted of 2800 regular troops, 2500
militia, and only fifty horse. Romana ♦FEB. 24.♦ had an interview with
him at Chaves, while the enemy were preparing for their vain attempt
to pass the Minho; and they had resolved upon attacking the French at
Tuy, when they learnt that Soult was advancing up the river. They then
took up a position for the defence of Chaves, the Spaniards upon the
right bank of the Tamega from Monterrey to that fortress, Silveira from
the bridge of Villaça to Villarelho. The Portugueze were elated by
the failure of the French in their attempt to cross the Minho, which
indeed had in some degree dispirited the invaders; and Romana, though
fully aware of the inefficiency of his own force, had yet an entire
reliance upon the national character and the spirit which had been
raised. The secular clergy as well as the monks were zealously aiding
him; the monks of S. Claudio, of S. Mamed, and of S. Maria de Melon,
and the parochial priest of the latter place, distinguished themselves
especially in this good work. His orders were, that all should take
arms who were capable of using them, and that the remaining part of
the population wherever the French came should abandon their houses,
and carry away all provisions.
♦DIFFERENCE BETWEEN M. SOULT AND M. NEY.♦
These orders were very generally obeyed. The small parties of the
French were harassed or cut off wherever they appeared; and when Soult
approached Ribadavia a brave resistance was made in the village of
Franzelos and before the town. The peasantry were not dispersed till
great carnage had been made among them; and the invaders upon entering
the town found only about a dozen persons remaining there. Detachments
were dispatched against the peasantry on all sides, and the greater
part of the artillery was sent back to Tuy, as much because of the
opposition which was experienced, as owing to the state of the roads.
At Orense ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 92–99.♦ part of the people remained,
and the magistrates[5] submitting of necessity, came out to meet the
French. Here Marshal Soult received dispatches from Ney; the contents
were kept secret, but it was reported that Ney advised him not to
pursue his intention of entering Portugal. The report considerably
affected the superior officers, and those especially who, having
belonged to Junot’s army, understood the horrible sort of war in which
they were again to be engaged. The two Marshals were upon ill terms
with each other, and a spirit of dissension was thus introduced into
the army.
♦ROUT OF ROMANA’S ARMY.♦
After remaining more than a week at Orense, endeavouring by force
to suppress the peasants, and by allurements to seduce the higher
classes from their duty, Soult resumed his march for Portugal, by
way of Monterrey and Chaves. In this line he expected to find a
road practicable for artillery, and he thought Romana would be so
effectually crushed, that he should meet with no enemy capable of
molesting him in that quarter. He had sent a trumpet to that general’s
outposts, requesting permission for an officer to pass with a letter
to the Marquis. It was granted. The letter merely contained an offer
of honours and employments in the Intruder’s name, if Romana would
acknowledge him as King, and bring over his troops. Romana having
glanced at the contents, bade the bearer return, and say that the only
answer to be given to such proposals was from the mouth of the cannon:
but the real object of the overture was, that the officer who had been
selected for this service might reconnoitre the position; and this the
Spaniards, unaccustomed as they were to military precautions, gave him
full opportunity of doing. On the following day General Franceschi was
ordered to attack their right, which was posted to the south-east of
Monterrey, on the heights of Orsona. The rout was so complete, that
the actual loss did not amount to more than some 300 slain, and as
many prisoners: the French considered the dispersion of the army which
ensued as its destruction, and believed that Romana had fixed upon so
remote a point as Asturias for the rallying place. While Franceschi
was thus employed on the right, Laborde attacked the vanguard of
the Portugueze at Villaça, who retired[6] at night, after a good
resistance, losing one of their two guns.
♦THE FRENCH REMOVE THEIR SICK TO MONTERREY.♦
The French had left 200 sick and wounded at Ribadavia; they had removed
them to Orense, where nearly 500 were added to the number, and now
the whole were ordered to Monterrey, in so insecure a state did Soult
consider the country which he was leaving. The old works at Monterrey,
he thought, might be so repaired as to render that place tenable,
and make it serve as a base for his line of operations. There and in
the little town of Verin, on the opposite side of the Tamega, which
contained about 2000 inhabitants, scarcely twenty persons had remained;
and the French began to doubt the saying of Buonaparte, that men with
bayonets could want for nothing. The fugitives, however, had left wine
in Verin; and in order to pay some part of his establishment, Soult
raised a few thousand pounds by a loan from the troops, ... part of
the money which had been thrown away in Sir John Moore’s retreat.
General Merle was left to collect his division there, forming the
reserve, and the rest of the army advanced down the Tamega, to enter
Portugal, before any effectual preparations could be made for resisting
them. Marshal Soult was so apprehensive ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT,
107–111, 115.♦ lest the troops should suffer in health, that when they
crossed the river by a ford little more than knee deep, he erected two
temporary bridges there for the infantry.
♦CHAVES.♦
Chaves is the frontier town of Portugal on that side, as Monterrey
is that of Spain; both are on the Tamega, a river which, rising in
the Sierra de S. Mamed, and watering the fertile vales of Monterrey
and Oimbra, enters Portugal at Chaves, turns again into Galicia among
the mountains of Barroso, and re-entering _Tras os Montes_, joins the
Douro at _S. Miguel de Entre ambos os Rios_ with a stronger and larger
volume of waters than is borne to it by any other of its tributary
streams. Chaves is known to have been the _Aquæ Flaviæ_ of the Romans,
so named because of its hot springs, and in honour of its founder
Vespasian. The baths, when flattery in course of nature was out of
date, supplanted the memory of the Emperor; and the place then obtained
the more appropriate name of _Aquæ Calidæ_, which in process of time
was abbreviated and corrupted into Chaves. The springs are said to be
more efficacious than any other in Portugal; but the buildings which
formerly served to accommodate invalids who came to seek relief from
these waters were demolished by the Conde de Mesquitella, toward the
close of the seventeenth century, in order that the guns might command
the approach on that side without impediment: he has been censured for
this as having committed a certain mischief for the sake of a frivolous
precaution. At that time Chaves was considered a place of importance.
The walls were now in many places fallen to decay, and though the
citadel was in better repair, both it and the town were commanded from
several points, and at short distances.
♦SILVEIRA RETIRES FROM CHAVES.♦
Whatever hopes Silveira might have entertained of opposing the French
with the assistance of Romana’s army, he was fully sensible after
the rout of the Spaniards that he could neither stand his ground
in the vale, nor defend the dilapidated works of the town with men
of whom the greater number were half armed and ♦MARCH 7.♦ wholly
undisciplined. On the day therefore when the enemy entered Monterrey
he gave orders for evacuating Chaves, and withdrew to ♦1809. MARCH.♦
the heights of Outeiro Joam, and S. Pedro de Agostem. Small as the
regular force was which he commanded, Portugal, he well knew, could
ill afford to lose it; opportunity for seriously annoying the invaders
was likely to occur, but to expose his men now would be vainly and
wantonly to sacrifice them. Thus he reasoned; ♦SOME MUTINOUS OFFICERS
RESOLVE TO DEFEND IT.♦ but the spirit of insubordination was abroad.
The peasantry, in ignorant but honest zeal, insisted upon defending
the place, and they were supported by certain of his officers, who
were actuated some by mere presumption, others by the intention of
ingratiating themselves with the enemy, whom they thus should serve.
To Chaves therefore these persons returned, and ♦DIARIO OFFICIAL.
CORREIO BRAZILIENSE, T. III. P. 110–11.♦ the vanguard which, having
been stationed at Villarelho to observe the French, he had ordered to
follow him, joined with this party, and prepared to defend the town,
in contempt of his authority. If Silveira’s character had been any
ways doubtful, or if he had been less esteemed and less beloved by
the soldiers, he must at this time have fallen a sacrifice to popular
suspicion.
♦SURRENDER OF CHAVES.♦
Part of the enemy’s advanced guard came in sight of Chaves the next
day. On the following Silveira went into the town, and endeavoured, but
in vain, to convince the refractory officers that it was not possible
to oppose any effectual resistance. Again on the morrow he entered it,
summoned all the superior officers to a council of war, and protested
against the resolution ♦MARCH 10.♦ which had been taken, explaining at
the same time the grounds of his opinion. All the officers agreed with
him except those who by aid of the populace had taken upon themselves
the command. By this time the place was invested on three sides, and
Soult summoned the general to surrender. Silveira returned a verbal
answer, that he had nothing to do with the defence of Chaves, but only
with the army which he commanded; he then retired to the Campo de S.
Barbara. A letter from Marshal Soult followed him, requiring him to
retain the army and govern the province in the Emperor Napoleon’s name,
and spare the effusion of blood which must otherwise follow. Silveira
replied by word of mouth, that one who had the honour to command
Portugueze could give ear to no such proposals; and that he would never
listen to any except that of Marshal Soult’s surrender. Meantime a
fire was kept up from the place with as little effect as judgement,
and the French suffered some loss from the peasantry and from small
parties who were on the alert to seize every occasion. A second summons
was now sent in; by this time the ardour of the refractory troops had
begun to cool, and the self-elected commandant dispatched a messenger
to Silveira, requesting orders. Silveira’s reply was, that he who had
taken upon himself to defend Chaves contrary to his orders must act for
himself. He desired, however, that the officers who were in the place
might be directed to bring off the troops during the night, saying
that he would cover their retreat by bringing down a greater force
upon Outeiro Joam. The movement was made on his part; but he looked in
vain for any ♦DIARIO OFF. COR. BRAZ. 112.♦ attempt on the part of the
garrison, and on the following morning they surrendered prisoners of
war.
♦THE FRENCH ESTABLISH THEIR HOSPITAL THERE.♦
It was now seen what motives had influenced the promoters of this
mock defence, for all the staff-officers offered their services to
the Emperor Napoleon; the troops of the line followed their example,
but with a very different intention, and took the first opportunity
to escape. Marshal Soult could spare no force for marching off his
prisoners, nor for securing them at Chaves; he therefore required an
oath from the militia and peasants that they would never again bear
arms against the French, and dismissed them. This conduct excited
murmurs among those who would rather, after the example of their
Emperor, have made sure work. If Junot had commanded the army, they
said, the place would have been stormed as soon as they appeared before
it. Marshal Soult was not a jot more scrupulous than his predecessor;
but at this time the treasonable disposition which had been manifested
by a few officers led him to suppose that it might be more easy
to conciliate the Portugueze than he had found it to coerce their
neighbours, and under this persuasion he established his hospital at
Chaves; accordingly the sick and wounded were once more removed, and
about 1400 were left there with a small force for their protection
under the _chef de bataillon_ Messager. The Marshal then announced his
appointment as Governor-general ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 118–124.♦ of
Portugal, ... the rank which Junot (whom the Portugueze called the Duke
_in partibus_) had held, and proceeded on his march.
♦PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE AT PORTO.♦
His effective force consisted at this time of 21,000 men, the country
through which he had to pass is one of the most defensible in Europe,
nor would it be possible any where to find a peasantry better disposed
to defend their hearths and altars, nor better able, had there been
common prudence to direct their willing strength. But the military
profession had fallen in Portugal to the lowest point of degradation;
and governments which weaken every thing for the miserable purpose
of rendering a corrupt and anile despotism secure, find themselves
powerless and helpless at the first approach of danger. The Portugueze
in these provinces were aware that invasion would be attempted, though
they knew not on what side; and the effect was to produce tumults among
the people, insubordination in the soldiers, apprehension, vacillation,
and confusion among the chief officers and rulers, and a state of
suspicious excitement which predisposed the public mind equally for
impulses of furious cruelty or of unreasonable panic. The Bishop of
Porto applied to the Regency for succours; but Lisbon at that time
was itself as likely to be attacked, nor indeed had the government
any troops upon whom the slightest confidence could be placed. How
capable the Portugueze were of becoming good soldiers, though well
understood by those who knew the people, and indeed not to be doubted
by any who had any knowledge of human nature, had not yet been tried:
with excellent qualities and the best disposition they were perfectly
inefficient now. The Bishop had been offended with Sir Robert Wilson
for having passed into Spain with a body of Portugueze troops. The
consequences of Sir Robert’s movement to Ciudad Rodrigo had been more
important than he himself could have anticipated, and yet in leaving
Porto he lost one of the fairest occasions that was ever presented to
an active and enterprising spirit. Acting as he did there with the full
concurrence of the Bishop, and possessing his confidence, there was
time to have disciplined a force which might have impeded the passage
of Soult’s army through the strong defiles it had to pass, and have
presented a resistance at Porto as successful as that of Acre, and
more fatal to the enemy. The means of defence were in abundance, order
and intelligence for directing them alone were wanting. The population
of the city may be estimated at 80,000, and there were 2000 troops of
the line there, 3000 militia, and 15,000 _ordenanças_; the latter half
armed, and the greater part without discipline. A line of batteries
was erected round the city and suburbs, extending from the Castle of
Queijo on the coast to the village of Freixo on the Douro; the line was
about three miles in extent, and between two and three hundred pieces
of artillery were mounted there in thirty-five batteries. Had it been
well constructed, a large force would have been necessary to defend it:
but there had been as little skill in the formation as in the plan; the
batteries were without parapets, and the houses and trees which might
afford cover to an enemy were not taken down.
♦ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH FROM CHAVES.♦
Soult meantime, as soon as he had entered Chaves, thought to cut off
Silveira; but that general frustrated his intent by retiring first to
the mountains of Oura and Reigaz, and then to Villa Pouca, where he
took a position with the ♦MARCH 13.♦ determination of defending it.
The French, however, did not think this little force of sufficient
consequence to delay their march; and sending out parties in different
directions, in the hope that the report of their entrance spreading on
all sides, might reach the Generals who were to co-operate with them,
but with whom they had no means of communicating, they proceeded by the
Braga road. The resistance which they found evinced the brave spirit
of the people, and the incapacity of those who commanded them. The
villages were abandoned, stragglers were cut off, they were fired upon
by the peasantry from the heights and the cover of crags or trees; any
military attempt to impede them was conducted with so little skill or
order, that it served only to confirm their contempt for the nation
upon whom they had brought and were about to bring such unutterable
miseries; but sometimes a handful of Portugueze stood their ground
with a spirit like that of their ancestors; and sometimes an individual
would rush upon certain death, so he could make sure of one ♦OPERATIONS
DE M. SOULT, 128.♦ Frenchman, knowing that if his countrymen would act
upon the same principle of life for life, the kingdom would soon be
delivered from its unprovoked invaders.
♦TUMULTS AT BRAGA.♦
Bernardim Freire, not knowing whether the enemy would take the way by
Braga or by Villareal, had given orders to secure the positions of
Ponte de Cavez and Salto on the latter road, Ruivaens and Salamonde on
the other: his head-quarters were at Braga, a city which had long been
in a state of strange confusion. The clergy with whimsical indecorum
had embodied themselves to serve as a guard of honour for the Primate
till their services should be needed for the defence of the place;
and part of the exercise of this ecclesiastical corps was with one
♦DIALOGO ENTRE BRAGA E O PORTO, 19–21.♦ hand to take off the hat at
the Ave Maria bell, and present arms with the other. Men lose their
proper influence when they go out of their proper sphere; and the
extraordinary circumstances which justified the clergy in taking arms,
and even increased their authority while they acted individually either
in the ranks or in command, did not save them from ridicule when they
thus exposed themselves to it as a body. At any time this would have
been an evil; it was especially so when the bonds of authority had been
loosened, and envy, cupidity, and hatred were under no restraint.
General Freire had neither the talents nor the character to command
respect; and on his return from inspecting ♦MARCH 15.♦ the positions at
Ruivaens and Salamonde he had been insulted and menaced by the rabble
at S. Gens. On the following day, having received intelligence that the
enemy were on the way to Ruivaens, he went to the heights of Carvalho
d’Este, with the intention of occupying a strong position there, not
indeed in any expectation of defeating the enemy, for having just
military knowledge enough to see all the difficulties of his situation,
he knew himself and the men under his command too well to entertain
any hope; but time he thought might be gained for removing the stores
from Braga, and whatever else could be saved. It was soon understood
that the pass of Ruivaens had been forced, and this intelligence was
presently followed by the fearful tidings that the French had won the
defiles of Salamonde also. His only thought now was of retiring upon
Porto; and having dispatched in the night an order written in pencil to
his adjutant-general for removing the military chest from Braga, and
advising ♦MARCH 17.♦ Parreiras, who commanded at Porto, of the enemy’s
approach, he entered the city in the morning, and found it in a state
of complete anarchy. His dispatches had been seized and opened by the
mob, and some of his messengers murdered. Conceiving that his only
course now was to provide for the defence of Porto, he gave orders
accordingly. The populace were of a different opinion; they thought
the position at Carvalho d’Este ought to be defended, and considered
it either an act of cowardice or of treason to let the French advance
without resistance. Freire, however, left the city without receiving
any injury, and took the high road ♦SENTENÇA SOBRE AS ATROCIDADES,
&C. CORR. BRAZ. IV. 521–531.♦ to Porto. At the village of Carapoa
the peasants detained him as a traitor; he was rescued by the timely
arrival of a commandant of brigade, and proceeded with a guard of
twenty men for his protection; but falling in presently with a party
of _ordenanças_, they seized him, and insisted upon taking him back to
Braga.
♦GENERAL FREIRE MURDERED.♦
Meantime the peasantry from all sides had flocked to that city, some
retreating before the French, some hastening to meet them; some armed
with pikes, those who had fowling-pieces looking for ammunition,
all demanding to be embodied and led out against the enemy. At this
juncture Baron d’Eben arrived on his retreat, in obedience to the
General’s instructions. This Hanoverian nobleman, who was then a major
in the British service, and equerry to the Prince of Wales, commanded
the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, and after Sir Robert
Wilson’s departure for the frontier had continued to train his men with
a diligence and success which won the confidence of the people. The
populace crowded round him, seized the reins of his horse, exclaimed
that they were determined to defend the city, reviled the General for
not leading them against the invaders, and insisted upon his taking
the command. Baron d’Eben promised to assist their patriotic exertions
in the best manner he could, but said it was necessary that he should
first speak with the General. By thus complying with their wishes
he hoped to obtain an ascendancy which might enable him to prevent
excesses; and for the moment he seemed to have succeeded, for they
allowed him to leave the city for that purpose with an escort of an
hundred _ordenanças_. They had not proceeded far before they met Freire
on foot between two ruffians, who held him by the arms, and followed by
a ferocious mob, who threatened to fire upon D’Eben when he attempted
to interfere. Yielding to a rabble whom he was unable to oppose, he
turned his horse toward Braga; the rabble then cheered him, and when
he reached the house where his quarters were, thither the unfortunate
General was brought. Freire called upon him for protection; but when
the Baron endeavoured to lead him into the house, one of the infuriated
multitude thrust at the General with a sword, and wounded him slightly
under D’Eben’s arm. He got, however, within the door, and D’Eben hoping
to save him by employing the people, went out and ordered the drum to
beat, and the _ordenanças_ to form in line. The mob continued to fire
upon the house where Freire was sheltered; and D’Eben then, as the
only means of saving him, proposed that he should be put in prison.
This was done: and seeing him as he thought safe there, he yielded to
the clamours of the people, who required to be led against the enemy.
Accordingly he formed them in such order as he could, and set out.
Presently a firing was heard in the city, and he was informed that
the rabble had dragged out the General from the prison, and murdered
him with circumstances of atrocious cruelty. Men, like wild beasts,
when once they have tasted blood, acquire an appetite for it. The cry
of treason, while it served as a pretext for old enmities and private
designs, deceived the ignorant and inflamed the furious; and several
persons of rank, as well as many of Freire’s officers, were butchered
in the city and in the neighbouring villages.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE ROUTED BEFORE BRAGA.♦
The command was now a second time forced upon Baron d’Eben by
acclamation, and to him the papers of the murdered General were
brought. He sealed them up, dispatched them to Porto, and prepared as
well as he could to put his tumultuary force in order. The bells from
all the churches were ringing the alarm, and the _ordenanças_ were
coming in at the call: no preparation had been made for supplying them
with food when they were ordered to their stations, nor were there
any cartridges which would fit their pieces. A single mould was at
length found of the just size, lead was taken from the churches, and
bullets were made during the night as fast as this slow process would
allow. Meanwhile the French vanguard under Generals Franceschi and
Laborde, with the brigade of General Foy, arrived before the position
of Carvalho, which a part of this tumultuary force had occupied, about
five miles in front of Braga. During three days frequent attacks
were made, ♦MARCH 20.♦ and the Portugueze kept their ground. By this
time the other divisions of the French had come up, and D’Eben had
collected about 23,000 men; 2000 consisted of regular troops, the
legion and the Braga militia; of the remainder only 5000 were armed
with fire-arms, and most of these had only three rounds of ammunition.
Such a multitude was little able to withstand the well-concerted and
well-sustained attack of a disciplined force nearly equal in numbers.
They were presently routed, and the French having found one of their
fellow-soldiers horribly mutilated by some ferocious persons into whose
♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 142.♦ hands he had fallen, showed little mercy
in the pursuit. D’Eben and some of his officers attempted in vain to
rally the fugitives, that they might defend the city; the answer to all
his exhortations was, that there was no ammunition. The last act of the
rabble was to murder those remaining objects of their suspicion whom
D’Eben had hoped to save by putting them in prison.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER BRAGA.♦
The French might impose upon the world by representing the dispersion
of this tumultuous assemblage as a splendid victory; but they could
not deceive themselves concerning the temper of the nation, when upon
entering the city they found it deserted by all its inhabitants, and
stripped of every thing which could be carried away. If their light
vanity could be elated with the vaunt that in the course of eleven days
they had won many battles, taken two towns, and forced the passage
of a chain of mountains, there was enough to abate their pleasure,
if not their pride, in the fact that empty houses were all that they
had gained; that they were masters of no more country than their
troops could cover, and only while they covered it; and in the ominous
apprehension excited by knowing how deeply and how deservedly they were
hated by the people whom they had invaded. They consoled themselves
with the thought that the rich merchants of Porto would not abandon
their property as the people of Braga had done their dwellings; and
Marshal Soult was not sparing of professions, that it was with regret
he had been compelled to employ force, when his only object in entering
Portugal was to deliver that fine country from the ruinous yoke of the
English, the eternal enemies of her prosperity. Some of the inhabitants
were induced to return, and one was found timid or traitorous enough
to take upon himself the office of Corregidor by Marshal Soult’s
appointment. The most important business which this wretched instrument
of the enemy was called upon to perform was to provide them with food;
for which purpose he was instructed to assure his countrymen that if
they did not bring in provisions, the French would take them; that in
that case the officers could not control the men; it would therefore
be for their own ♦OPERATIONS, &C. 146–8.♦ interest to act as they were
required to do, and for all which they supplied they should receive
receipts, payable in a manner afterwards to be explained.
♦THEY APPEAR BEFORE PORTO.♦
After resting his army three days, and leaving 700 sick and wounded in
the hospitals, Soult proceeded on his march. One division, which ♦MARCH
24.♦ found the bridge over the Ave at Barca da Trofa broken down, and
the ford guarded too well to be passed without loss and difficulty,
succeeded in winning and repairing the Ponte de S. Justo over the same
river, higher up. The Ponte de Ave also was forced by Colonel Lallemand
in a second attempt; and the officers who defended it were murdered by
their men, who, feeling in themselves no want of courage or of will,
imputed every reverse to treachery in their leaders. Without farther
opposition the enemy advanced upon Porto, and the Marshal sent in a
summons ♦MARCH 28.♦ to the Bishop, the magistrates, and the General, in
the usual French style, protesting that the French came not as enemies
to the Portugueze, but only to drive away the English; and that the
rulers of the city would be responsible before God and man for the
blood that would be shed, and the horrors which must ensue, if they
attempted to oppose an army accustomed to victory. It was not without
danger that the summons could be delivered; and General Foy, who either
being deceived by the gestures of a party of soldiers, or mistaking
them, advanced to receive their submission, was surrounded and carried
into the city. A cry was set up that they had taken Loison; and Foy
would have been torn to pieces, in vengeance for Loison’s ♦OPERATIONS,
&C. 159–168.♦ crimes, if he had not possessed presence of mind enough
to lift up both hands, and thus prove to the people that he was not
their old one-armed enemy.
♦OLIVEIRA MURDERED.♦
The persons in authority had sufficient influence to save his life, and
put him in confinement for security; but they were unable to protect
♦VOL. II. P. 64.♦ Luiz de Oliveira, who having been deservedly thrown
into prison in June, had been left there as if forgotten, with that
iniquitous neglect of justice which had long been usual in Portugal.
He was murdered and dragged through the streets by the rabble; and a
few other victims perished in this last explosion of popular fury. The
Bishop, who appears to have been at that time in the battery of S.
Francisco encouraging the troops, saw now what had been represented
to him vainly, though in time, that the works were too extensive, as
well as too weak. He had been advised to strengthen them by throwing
up works _en flèche_, to place 1500 of the best troops in their rear,
as a reserve for supporting the point which should be attacked,
and to throw up a second line close under the suburb, and have the
houses loop-holed, in preparation for that sort of defence which the
inhabitants were in a temper to have maintained, had there been
spirits to have directed them, as at Zaragoza. None of these things
had been done; and the Bishop, sensible when too late of ♦THE BISHOP
LEAVES THE CITY.♦ the errors which had been committed, and the value
of the time which had been lost, and perceiving also too many proofs
of that confusion which insubordination always produces, crossed to
the left bank of the Douro during the night, leaving the ill-planned
and ill-constructed works to be defended by an inadequate force and
an inefficient general. All night the bells of all the churches were
ringing the alarm; the churches were filled with supplicants, the
streets with a multitude, who wasted in furious demonstrations that
strength which should have been reserved for the defence of their
streets, and houses, and chambers. At midnight a storm of wind and
rain and thunder broke over the city, and while the lightnings flashed
above, a useless discharge of cannon and musketry was kept up by the
Portugueze along the line, at which the enemy gazed as at a spectacle,
for not a shot could reach them. Soult had given orders that the works
should be attacked at six on the ensuing morning, which was Good
Friday. Napoleon and Glory was the word. The storm ceased ♦OPERATIONS,
&C. 168–9.♦ about three, and the attack was postponed till seven, that
the soil might have time to dry, so as not to impede the troops in
their movements.
♦PORTO TAKEN.♦
General Parreiras before the attack was made had lost all hope of
opposing a successful resistance. Yet when the enemy attacked the
Prelada, a _quinta_, or country-seat, about a mile from the city,
where the lines formed an angle, they did not force it without a loss
of 500 men, including two _chefs de bataillon_. Having forced it,
they flanked the greater part of those troops who did their duty.
The right and left were attacked also; a panic soon spread: in less
than an hour after the commencement of the action, the General seeing
that all was lost, had crossed the bridge, and the French were in the
town. A tremendous carnage ensued; the cavalry charging through the
streets, and slaughtering indiscriminately all whom they overtook:
for an officer who accompanied General Foy the preceding day had
been killed, having attempted to defend himself when the General
surrendered, and the circumstance of his death was made a pretext for
this butchery. But the greatest destruction took place in the passage
of the river; the inhabitants rushed to the bridge of boats in such
numbers, that the first pontoon sank under their weight; the crowd
from behind still pressed on, forcing those who were foremost into the
stream, and themselves in like manner precipitated in their turn; the
French meantime keeping up a fire of grape-shot upon the affrighted
and helpless fugitives. From three to four thousand persons are
supposed to have perished thus; and not satisfied with this, the enemy
kept up a fire from the most commanding points upon those who were
endeavouring to cross in boats. Of the numbers who were thus killed a
large proportion consisted of women and children. But in this miserable
day neither sex, age, nor innocence could obtain mercy, nor manly and
heroic courage command respect from the inhuman enemy. The men, and
they were not few, who did their duty, singly or in small parties
where a handful of brave Portugueze had got together, were put to the
sword. About two hundred, whom the French praised in reality when they
intended to depreciate them by calling them the most fanaticised,
collected near the Cathedral, and fought till the last man was cut
down. The scenes which ensued were more odious and more opprobrious
to humanity than even the horrors of this carnage; the men, however,
were not allowed to commit enormities of every kind till they were
glutted, as they had been at ♦COL. JONES’S ACC. OF THE WAR, I. 195.♦
Evora. Marshal Soult exerted himself to check their[7] excesses with an
earnestness which, even if it proceeded from mere motives of policy,
must be recorded to his honour. And he had some officers to second him
with true good will in this good work; for though the miscreants were
with him who had disgraced their country and their profession by the
atrocities which they had perpetrated or permitted at Evora and Leiria,
there were others who abhorred the iniquitous service in which they
were engaged, and who were members of a secret society, the object of
which was to throw off Buonaparte’s yoke, and restore peace to France
and Europe.
♦SOULT REMAINS AT PORTO.♦
Complete as his success had hitherto been, and little as it had cost
him, Marshal Soult did not find it advisable to push on for Lisbon.
He now knew what was the spirit of the nation, and he was without
any intelligence from Lapisse and Victor, whose movements were to be
combined with his. He applied himself therefore to securing what he
had won, and endeavoured to conciliate the Portugueze, and raise a
party among them in favour of the ambitious designs which, like Junot,
he appears now to ♦1809. APRIL.♦ have formed. For this purpose a
newspaper was published at Porto a week only after its capture, and
the first number opened with a panegyric upon the conqueror because he
had not totally destroyed the city. While the streets were yet stained
with the blood of the carnage, and there was mourning in every house,
and bodies were every day cast up by the river and along the sea-beach,
... while it was stated officially in the Madrid Gazette that the whole
garrison had been put to the sword, ... Marshal Soult was panegyrized
for clemency! The dreadful catastrophe which Porto had suffered, said
his writers, might serve as a warning for all who undertook great
enterprises without calculating the means, or looking on to the end.
But amid the horror with which so severe an example affected every
feeling heart, there was abundant matter of consolation for minds
capable of weighing things in the balance of philosophy. Towns carried
by assault had invariably, among the most civilized nations, paid with
their total destruction the penalty of their contumacy. This was the
fate which Porto had had to apprehend; and from this it had been spared
by a hero who always listened to the voice of mercy, and in whose heart
valour and humanity contended for the ascendance!
♦DISPOSITION OF THE INHABITANTS.♦
The Portugueze are not so light a people as to be thus easily deceived.
They had seen the tender mercies of the French too recently to be
duped by their professions, and not more than a sixth part of the
inhabitants remained in Porto under their government. If this proof of
their ♦OPERATIONS, &C. 183.♦ disposition augured ill for the French, it
lessened the difficulty of providing for the city, which was an object
of no small anxiety to the captors. They who had undertaken to supply
the troops went into the country by night to make their bargains with
persons whom they could trust, ♦DO. 206.♦ and the supplies were brought
in darkness at a stated hour to a stated place; for if any person had
been seen engaged in thus administering to the enemy, his life would
have been the penalty of his treason. When the English property was
put up to sale, not a person would bid for it: an individual at last
ventured to offer about a third part of its value for certain goods,
but before four-and-twenty hours had elapsed he absconded, either for
the fear of being marked as one who had dealt with the French, or
unable ♦OPERATIONS, &C. 205.♦ to bear the shame of having been the only
Portugueze in Porto who had thus disgraced himself.
♦MARSHAL SOULT’S VIEWS RESPECTING THE LIBERALS AND THE JEWS.♦
There were, however, in Portugal, as in every country, men who have
no other principle than the determination of promoting their own
interest by any means; and there were some few who entertained that
abject and superstitious faith in Buonaparte’s fortune which his
partizans and flatterers every where endeavoured to promote. Some
also there were who, in their vehement abhorrence for the besotted
despotism and the filthy superstition which degraded their country,
had renounced their national feeling and their Christian faith. The
scheme of Soult’s policy was to make such persons (whom he supposed
more numerous than they were) stand forward as a party, engage them in
the irremissible offence of swearing fidelity to Napoleon and obedience
to his representative, and employ them in corrupting their countrymen,
and in watching and subjugating those whom they could not seduce. For
this purpose he had his emissaries in the capital and in the provinces
to spread disaffection by representing the abuses and evils both of
the civil and ecclesiastical system, ... abuses which it was hardly
possible to exaggerate, and evils which in themselves and in their
consequences were only more tolerable and less pernicious than the iron
tyranny which Buonaparte would have substituted in ♦CAMPAIGN OF 1809
IN THE PENINSULA, 15. DO. APPENDIX A.♦ their place. Marshal Soult had
also conceived the strange intention of making the Jews, whose number
in Portugal he estimated at 200,000, avow their religion under the
protection of France, and hold upon an appointed day a general feast
for the success of the Emperor’s arms. It is probable that he overrated
them as greatly as he mistook their character; but if they had been
mad enough to act in conformity to his wishes, a general massacre
would have been the certain consequence. For the old inhuman prejudice
against this persecuted race, when yielding to wiser laws and the
spirit of the age, had been revived by the manner in which Buonaparte
courted them. It was observed by some of the Spanish journalists, that
when the Turks were the terror of Christendom, they had derived their
information from the Jews, who were their instruments every where; and
the promise of Buonaparte to abolish the Inquisition provoked only from
the Spaniards the remark that this measure must have been suggested by
some Israelite of the Sanhedrim.
♦HIS HOPES OF BECOMING KING OF NORTHERN LUSITANIA.♦
Among the Portugueze who, from the perversion of good feelings, or the
original prevalence of base ones, were open to corruption, persons were
found to forward the design which Soult had now formed of becoming King
of Northern Lusitania. Buonaparte’s formation of new principalities and
kingdoms for his brothers and favourites had made the generals of this
new Alexander suppose that his conquests would be divided among them,
and a petty kingdom under this title had been carved out in the secret
treaty of Fontainebleau. A deputation of twelve principal inhabitants
of Braga, as they were represented to be, waited upon the Marshal, and
published in his gazette an account of their interview with him, and
an address in consequence to the Portugueze people. They assured their
countrymen that Marshal Soult had conversed with them at great length
upon the produce, commerce, and interests of the province between the
rivers, in a manner which formed a striking contrast to the conduct of
their old government. That government, they said, had been indifferent
about all things except the raising of its revenues. The flight of the
Prince Regent amounted to a voluntary abdication of the throne, and a
happy futurity might now be anticipated under a better dynasty. The
House of Braganza, said these traitors, no longer exists. It is the
will of Heaven that our destinies should pass into other hands; and
it has been the peculiar favour of Divine Providence to send us a man
exempt from passions, and devoted to true glory alone, who desires to
employ the force entrusted to him by the great Napoleon only for our
protection and deliverance from the monster of anarchy which threatened
to devour us. Why do we delay to assemble round him, and proclaim him
our father and deliverer? Why do we delay to express our anxiety to
see him at the head of a nation, of whose affections he has made so
rapid a conquest? The sovereign of France will lend a gracious ear to
our supplications, and will rejoice to see that we desire one of his
lieutenants for our King, who, in imitation of his example, knows how
to conquer and to pardon.
Such an address could not have been published in a journal which was
under French superintendence unless it had been in unison with Soult’s
designs. On another occasion, when he gave audience to a second
deputation from Braga, and to the civil, religious, and military
authorities of Porto, the obsequious traitors requested that till the
supreme intentions of the Emperor should be ascertained they might be
allowed to swear fidelity to his most worthy representative, who had so
many claims upon the love, respect, and gratitude of the Portugueze.
The Marshal expatiated as usual in reply upon the felicities which were
about to be showered upon Portugal under a French master: “As to what
concerns myself,” he added, “I feel obliged by the frank expressions
which you have used relating to my person; but it does not depend upon
me to answer them.” He had, however, depended so much upon realizing
this dream of ambition, that proclamations were prepared, announcing
him as King. It was fortunate for the parties concerned that they went
no farther; for one of his staff, who was supposed to be a principal
agent in the scheme, was recalled to Paris, and Buonaparte, addressing
him by name at a grand levee, said to him, “Take care how ♦COL. JONES’S
HIST. OF THE WAR, I. 199, NOTE.♦ you draw up proclamations! My empire
is not yet sufficiently extended for my generals to become independent.
One step farther, and I would have had you shot.”
♦HE VISITS THE CHURCH OF N. SENHOR DE BOUÇAS.♦
Expecting no such impediment to his hopes, the “worthy representative”
of Buonaparte proceeded, as his master had done in Egypt, to show his
attachment to the religion of the people whom he came to govern. There
is a famous crucifix, known by the name of Nosso Senhor de Bouças, in
the little town of Matosinhos, upon the coast, about a league from
Porto. According to tradition it is the oldest image in Portugal, being
the work of Nicodemus; and though the workman neither attempted to
represent muscle nor vein, it is affirmed that there cannot be a more
perfect and excellent crucifix. Antiquaries discovered another merit
in it, for there has been a controversy concerning the number[8] of
nails used in the crucifixion, and in this image four are represented,
agreeing with the opinion of St. Gregory of Tours, and the ♦D. RODRIGO
DA CUNHA, CAT. DOS BISPOS DO PORTO, PP. 393, 4.♦ revelation made to
the Swedish St. Bridget. The sea cast it up, and its miraculous virtue
was soon attested by innumerable proofs. One of the arms was wanting
when it was found; the best sculptors were employed to supply this
deficiency; but in spite of all their skill not one of them could
produce an arm which would fit the place for which it was designed.
One day a poor but pious woman, as she was gathering shell-fish and
drift-wood for fuel, picked up upon the beach a wooden arm, which she,
supposing that it had belonged to some ordinary and profane image,
laid upon the fire. The reader will be at no loss to imagine that it
sprung out of the flames, ... that the neighbours collected at the
vociferations of the woman, ... that the priests were ready to carry
it in procession to the church of N. Senhor; and that the moment it
was applied to the stump whereto it belonged, a miraculous junction
was effected. Our Lord of Bouças became from that time one of the most
famous idols in Portugal; and on ♦COROGRAFIA PORTUGUEZA, T. I. 361.♦
the day of his festival five-and-twenty thousand persons have sometimes
been assembled at his church, coming thither in pilgrimage from all
parts.
To this idol Marshal Soult thought proper to offer his devotions.
He and his staff visited the church, and prostrating themselves
before the altar, paid, says his journal, that tribute of respect
and reverence which religion requires from those who are animated
with the true spirit of Christianity. “There cannot,” continued the
hypocritical traitor who recorded this mummery, ... “there cannot be
a more affecting and interesting spectacle, than to see a Great Man
humbling himself in the presence of the King of kings and Sovereign
Disposer of empires. All the inhabitants of Matosinhos who were present
at this religious solemnity were wrapt in ecstasy!” The French Marshal
testified his great concern at hearing that the plate and jewels and
ornaments of the church had been carried off; and he promised the
rector that he would offer two large silver candlesticks to Nosso
Senhor, and dedicate a silver lamp to him, and assign funds to keep it
burning night and day, and, moreover, that he would double the stipend
of the rector and the sacristan. “Let this fact,” said his penman, “be
contrasted with what we have been told respecting the irreligion of
the French troops and their leaders! It is time to open our eyes, and
to acknowledge the hand of Providence in the events which have befallen
us. How fortunate are we that Heaven has destined us to be governed by
a hero who possesses a heart disposed to be deeply and warmly impressed
with the majesty of our holy religion, and who aspires only to make it
shine forth with new and never-fading splendour! Let the calumniators
be confounded, and the timid be tranquil! Our hopes ought to be
re-animated now that they have obtained a support, which, resting on
religion, and lifting its head above the storms, promises them entire
realization.”
Not a word of restoring the spoils of the church had been said by
Marshal Soult; ... his promise of the lamp and the funds for the oil,
and the increase of salaries, was confirmed by a decree in which
he dedicated the lamp, assigned a revenue of sixteen milreas for
its support, and doubled the incomes; as far as the decree went he
performed his promise ... and no farther. His situation, indeed, was
becoming too perilous to allow him time for the farce of superstition.
On one hand the events in Galicia alarmed him, ... on the other he
learnt that the English, instead of evacuating Lisbon, were expecting
a fresh army there; and that General Beresford was already arrived,
with the title of Field-marshal conferred upon him by the Prince of
Brazil, to take the command of the Portugueze ♦1809. MARCH.♦ army, and
reorganize it. He had experienced the courage and the patriotism of the
Portugueze, and knew that discipline was all they wanted to make them
as formidable in the field as their forefathers. From the centre of
Spain he could expect little assistance, so rapidly had the Spaniards
re-formed their armies; ... and from France itself no reinforcements
were to be looked for, for Buonaparte was even obliged to withdraw
troops from the Peninsula, that he might march against the Austrians.
♦CHAVES RETAKEN BY SILVEIRA.♦
The first ill news which reached him was from Chaves. Bernardim Freire
had directed Silveira, as soon as the enemy should enter Portugal,
to retire by the passes of Salamonde and Ruyvaens, and so join the
main force assembled for the defence of Portugal. The spirit of
insubordination which broke out at Chaves seems to have frustrated this
purpose. Silveira waited till the last in the vicinity of that place,
hoping to bring off the garrison when they should feel that it was
untenable: failing in that hope, he found it necessary to fall back
before the French in a different direction to Villa Pouca. The enemy,
believing that his little army was what they called demoralized, had
contented themselves with making a strong reconnoissance there under
General Lorges, for the double motive of deceiving the Portugueze with
regard to their intended march, and intimidating the country; then
pursued their way, holding the force which they left behind them in
as much contempt as that which they advanced to attack. But no sooner
had Silveira ascertained their movements than he returned to his
position at S. Barbara; and when the last party of the enemy’s cavalry
had withdrawn from observing him to follow the main body, he ♦MARCH
20.♦ entered Chaves, easily overcoming the little resistance which the
garrison were able to make. Messager, the commandant, withdrew into
the fort, where the Portugueze, having no artillery, blockaded him
for four days: on the fifth they prepared to take it by escalade; the
French then proposed to capitulate, on condition of marching out with
arms and baggage to join Marshal Soult. Five minutes were allowed them
to determine whether they would surrender prisoners at war, and they
were glad to secure their lives by submitting to that condition. About
1300 men were thus taken, and 114 Spaniards whom Soult had left there
as prisoners were restored to liberty. Silveira then followed the steps
of the enemy. Hearing that they had entered Braga, his intention was
to cut off their garrison there, as he had done at Chaves; but while
he was arranging measures for this, he learned the fate of Porto, and
marched in consequence toward Villa Real. On the way he was informed
that the enemy intended to enter Tras os Montes by way either of
Canavezes or of a little town known by the awkward name of _Entre ambos
os rios_, from its position near the point where the Tamega falls into
the Douro. Immediately he occupied both places, repulsed the French in
two attempts upon the former, and reaching Amarante himself just as a
party of the enemy, having burnt the villages of Villa Meam, Manhufe,
and Pildre, were advancing ♦DIARIO OFFICIAL. CORR. BRAZ. III. 113,
115.♦ to take possession of it, he made them retire to Penafiel, and
entered that city the next day on their withdrawing from it.
♦PROCEEDINGS AT COIMBRA.♦
Silveira’s activity raised the hopes of the Portugueze: it was said
in Porto that he would soon take his coffee in that city, and this
was repeated to Soult, who desired Silveira might be assured that he
would provide him with sugar for it. The jest is said to have kept
up ♦OPERATIONS, &C. P. 199.♦ the spirits of those Portugueze who had
consented to serve the French interest. But the cup which they had
prepared for themselves was one which, drug it as they might, nothing
could sweeten. Every sacrifice and every success on the part of their
countrymen, every act of heroism and virtue, every manifestation of
the old national spirit, was a reproach to them; and tidings which
would have elated and rejoiced their hearts if they had not fallen
from their duty, brought to them feelings only of fear, and shame,
and self-condemnation. The Portugueze were so persuaded of their own
strength, and the experience even of the preceding year had so little
abated that persuasion, that they had considered it impossible for the
French to enter Porto, or had expected at least that the city would
have made a long and glorious resistance. And yet the tidings of its
capture, with all the shameful and all the dreadful circumstances
that attended it, occasioned no consternation. That miserable event
was known at Coimbra on the following day; it was known also that no
means had been taken for removing the boats and destroying the bridge;
that the part which had been broken by the crowd of fugitives had
speedily been repaired by the enemy, and that their advanced parties
had proceeded as far as Grijo. It was considered certain that they
would lose no time in occupying so important a city as Coimbra and the
intermediate country, one of the finest and most fertile parts of the
kingdom. Colonel Trant, who commanded there, knew how inadequate his
means were to prevent this; but he knew that efficient aid might soon
be expected from England, that much might sometimes be done by mere
display, and by the judicious use of a scanty force, and that if the
evil could be but for a little while delayed, it might ultimately be
averted.
The force at his disposal consisted of the Coimbra militia and a
detachment of volunteers who had enlisted for the army, in all 500
men; but to these an academical corps of 300 was immediately added,
the students offering themselves with that alacrity, and displaying
that promptitude and intelligence, which belong to youth in their
station. The people began to recover confidence when they knew
that one party from this little force took the road to Aveiro and
another that to Sardam, the two directions in which Coimbra might be
approached from Porto. Report magnified the designs of Colonel Trant
and the means which he possessed; and the double good was produced of
encouraging the Portugueze and delaying the progress of the French,
who, if they advanced to Coimbra, would have commanded the resources
of a fertile country, have approached nearer to the armies with which
their operations were to be combined for effecting the conquest of the
kingdom; and moreover, in case of failure, would have had an easier
retreat open through Beira. A most timely supply was obtained from the
magistrates of Aveiro, who having consulted the Camara of Coimbra,
placed the public money which had been collected in their city at
Colonel Trant’s disposal, and also a considerable magazine of maize and
other grain, ... both being thus secured from the enemy, into whose
hands they must otherwise have fallen, if even a slight detachment had
been sent thither. The fugitives from Porto and from that part of the
country which the invaders occupied found in Coimbra all the assistance
that could be afforded, and were thus prevented from carrying the panic
farther; and the soldiers who had escaped the butchery were refitted
and re-embodied as they came in. Colonel Trant offered the command to
Baron d’Eben; but the Baron knew by experience what it was to command
a hasty and tumultuous force, and chose rather to employ himself in
re-collecting his battalion of the Lusitanian Legion. It was offered
also to the Portugueze Brigadier Antonio Marcellino da Victoria; but he
had witnessed the fate of Freire, and desired to accompany Trant as a
simple volunteer. In addition to the force which was thus augmenting,
two squadrons of regular troops unexpectedly arrived in Coimbra, with
their commander, the Visconde de Barbacena: they had been ordered in a
different direction; but being mostly natives of the Campo de Coimbra,
they had insisted upon going to defend their own immediate country, and
the Viscount deemed it better to obey their inclinations than withstand
a spirit of insubordination to which he might too probably have fallen
a sacrifice. Colonel Trant removed them as soon as possible out of the
city, and separating them from the other troops, stationed them in
advance at Mealhada. The Commander-in-chief being duly apprized of what
had occurred, gave orders that these troops should remain under his
command; and the men, whose intentions had been good when their conduct
was most irregular, were thus brought again into the line of duty.
♦COL. TRANT TAKES A POSITION UPON THE VOUGA.♦
With this motley force, a week after the capture of Porto had been
known, Colonel Trant set forth. Taking the students’ corps under his
♦APRIL 6.♦ own command, he advanced toward Aveiro, and effected the
important purpose of securing the boats and provisions in that port.
The right ♦1809. APRIL.♦ column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell
(who had escaped from the carnage at Porto), he sent to the bridge of
Vouga. That river (the Vacca of the ancients) rises in the Serra de
Alcoba, and having received the Portugueze Agueda, which brings an
equal volume of waters, enters the Lake of Aveiro, and forms a harbour
there not less beautiful than singular: it is separated from the sea
by two long wings of sand, and if the entrance were but good, would be
perhaps the most commodious and capacious in Europe. A party of the
enemy had crossed by the bridge of Vouga, and recrossed by that of
Marnel, leaving in all the intermediate places the accustomed marks
of their sacrilegious barbarity. They were part of a considerable
cavalry force, under General Franceschi. For having taken Porto, and
being masters of the Douro, the French, accustomed to consider military
posts and the course of rivers as every thing, and the people as
nothing in the scale, held that the country as far as the Mondego was
already theirs by right of conquest; and Franceschi’s division would
have advanced to occupy Coimbra if he had not thought that the force
opposed to him was respectable both in numbers and quality. Its number,
which the enemy supposed to be from ten to twelve thousand, did not in
reality exceed 2000, even after two companies of grenadiers had joined
them from Guarda. They had been stationed there under Camp-Marshal
Manoel Pinto Bacellar’s command; but choosing to act upon their own
judgement in those days of general insubordination, they compelled
their officers to conduct them to the Vouga, as the place where they
might soonest be enabled to act against the invaders of their country.
With regard to the quality of this little force, the French supposed
that there were English troops with it, and a great proportion of
English officers. A panic seized Campbell’s men; they fled towards
Coimbra; some of the fugitives joined Trant, and added in no slight
degree to the anxieties of his situation by the alarm which they
communicated. The academical corps indeed, under his immediate command,
was one in which he placed just confidence; but the fatal consequence
of exposing the flower of a nobility and gentry like ordinary lives
had been severely felt in England during the great rebellion; and
the Portugueze remembered an example still more ruinous of the same
prodigality, when with their King Sebastian they lost every thing
except their honour. He addressed them therefore on this occasion; told
them they would have to contend against superior numbers, and hinted at
the reproaches which he might bring upon himself if he should lead so
large a portion of the illustrious youth of Portugal to destruction.
The address produced the animating effect for which it was intended,
and they answered him with a general exclamation of _Moriamur pro Rege
nostro_.
♦CRUELTIES OF THE FRENCH.♦
Fortunately the enemy gave him time; they were delayed by the
expectation of Victor’s advance, by Silveira’s movements, and by ill
news from Galicia; and Trant profited by their inactivity to guard
the bridges, remove the boats, and bring over the flocks and herds of
that pastoral country from the northern bank, the owners assisting in
this the more readily when they saw some of their cattle seized by the
French. Whether it were that Marshal Soult despaired of conciliating
the people whom he came to invade and enslave, or if the system of
severity was more congenial to his own temper as well as to that of
the tyrant whom he served, he endeavoured at this time to intimidate
them by measures as atrocious as those which his predecessor Junot
had pursued. Such Portugueze as he suspected of communicating either
with Trant or Silveira were hung from the trees along the road side,
with or without proof, and their bodies left to putrefy there, all
persons being forbidden to bury them. Deep as was the detestation of
such enemies which this conduct excited, there were other actions
at this time which excited, if possible, a stronger feeling of
indignant abhorrence. A party of disbanded militia, with a Portugueze
Lieutenant-Colonel at their head, surprised a _chef d’escadron_ near
the village of Arrifana, and killed him and three dragoons of his
escort. He was one of the Lameth family, so noted in the first stage
of the French revolution; and having been Soult’s aide-de-camp,
had served in the Peninsula with a zeal which could never have been
employed in a worse cause. Having been a favourite with the commander
and his staff, it was determined to take vengeance for his death; it
had taken place in a part of the country of which they had military
possession, and they thought proper therefore to consider it as an ♦SEE
VOL. I. P. 161, AND VOL. II. P. 134. OPERATIONS, &C. P. 196.♦ action
not conformable to the laws of war. General Thomieres, who had been
accustomed to such services, was sent to inflict what the French called
an exemplary and imposing chastisement, ... not upon the individuals
concerned, for they were doing their duty elsewhere in defence of their
country, but upon the people of Arrifana indiscriminately. A French
detachment accordingly entered the village at daybreak, ♦APRIL 17.♦
seized twenty-four of the inhabitants, marched them into a field, and,
having tied them in couples back to back, fired upon them till they
were all killed. The rest of the villagers, ... brethren and sisters,
parents, wives, and children, were compelled to be spectators of this
butchery; the village was then set on fire, and many of the women and
girls carried into an Ermida or chapel, and there[9] violated.
♦POSITIONS OF THE FRENCH AND PORTUGUEZE ON THAT SIDE.♦
Satisfied with keeping the country north of the Vouga in subjection,
and believing that Trant’s corps consisted of ten or twelve thousand
men, the enemy made no attempt to pass that river; Franceschi, who
commanded the cavalry, having his head-quarters at Albergaria Nova, and
Thomieres at Villa de Feira, where, and at Ovar and Oliveira d’Azemeis,
the infantry were stationed. Trant, cautious of exposing his real
weakness, advanced only his scanty cavalry to the Vouga; the foot were
quartered in Sardam and Agueda, flourishing and industrious villages,
which are separated only by the Agueda, a small but navigable stream.
The road from thence toward Porto passes through a pine forest, and
there, profiting by the broken ground, he had fortified a position,
where the enemy could have derived no advantage from their cavalry if
they should pass the Vouga. From hence he communicated with Silveira,
and even with Porto itself, where there were some citizens ready to
expose themselves to any hazard in the hope of serving the national
cause.
♦ROMANA CAPTURES THE GARRISON AT VILLAFRANCA.♦
To gain time in this quarter while a British force was soon and surely
expected, was to gain every thing: and Marshal Soult was not in a
situation to turn his undivided attention in that direction. Tidings
for which he was little prepared, even after what he had experienced of
the Galician spirit, came upon him from Galicia. The news of Romana’s
defeat before Monterrey had been circulated over that province with
such exaggerations as were deemed likely to intimidate the people. The
French affirmed that Romana himself had been taken ♦1809. MARCH.♦
prisoner; they fired salutes and made rejoicings for their victory,
and proceeded even to the mockery of offering thanksgiving in the
churches. Romana meantime collected and rested his harassed troops at
La Puebla de Sanabria: in spite of all the enemy’s artifices his real
situation was soon known to the Spaniards, and deputations from some
town or village came every day to this faithful General, assuring him
that the Galicians were and would continue true to their country. Some
3000 new levies from Castille joined him there, and finding himself
more secure and more hopeful than at any time since he had taken the
command, he resolved upon striking a blow against the enemy upon the
line of posts which they occupied from Astorga to Villafranca. The
walls of the former city, ancient as they were, were not to be won
without artillery; but Villafranca had no other fortress than the old
castle or palace of the Marqueza de Astorga, which the French had
occupied; and there he determined to attack them, moving first upon
Ponferrada, where he made some prisoners, and recovered a good quantity
of corn, several four-pounders, and one dismounted twelve-pounder,
part of his own stores and artillery. Having remounted the larger
gun, Romana dispatched his Camp-marshal D. Gabriel de Mendizabal to
attack the garrison at Villafranca. That officer’s first care was to
get between them and Galicia, while the commander-in-chief intercepted
their retreat towards Astorga: for this purpose he proceeded to
Cacabelos, ♦MARCH 17.♦ and sent one detachment round by the right
to occupy the bridge at the other end of the town, while another
filed round by the left to join it there; every horseman taking up a
foot soldier behind him to ford the Valcarce, and the smaller river
which falls into it. Mendizabal, with the remainder of the troops,
advanced along the road. His advanced parties drove in the French at
all points, till they retired to the castle. The twelve-pounder was
brought up; but the Spaniards found that the French fired securely
from the old fortification while they themselves were exposed; upon
this they entered, and, with fixed bayonets, advanced to storm the
castle. Mendizabal was at their head; a ball passed through his clothes
without wounding him. He summoned the enemy to surrender, and upon
their hesitating what answer to return, repeated the summons with a
threat, that if they refused, every man should be put to the sword.
The white flag was then hoisted, and a negotiation begun, which the
French were conducting with a view to gain time, till the Spanish
commander cut it short, by allowing them a quarter of an hour to
surrender at discretion. Upon this they submitted; Mendizabal then, as
an act of free grace, permitted the officers to keep their horses and
portmanteaus, and the men their knapsacks; and the colonel-commandant
of the French, in returning thanks for this generosity, complimented
him upon his good fortune in having captured the finest regiment in the
Emperor Napoleon’s service. The prisoners were about 800. The Spaniards
lost two officers and thirty men, eighty-two wounded. The result of
the success was, that the Bierzo was cleared of the French, who fell
back from the neighbouring part of Asturias upon Lugo, there to make
a stand, supported by their main force, which was divided between
Santiago, Coruña, and Ferrol.
♦EFFORTS OF THE GALICIANS.♦
Marshal Ney had still a predominant force in Galicia after Soult’s army
was departed; there were garrisons in every town which was sufficiently
important, either for its size or situation, to require one, and the
French had military possession of the province. But they had yet to
subdue the spirit of the people; and the Galicians, who had no longer
an example of panic and disorder before their eyes, carried on the war
in their own way. Captain M’Kinley in the Lively frigate, with the
Plover sloop under his command, arrived off the coast to assist them.
He discovered none of that apathy for their own country, none of that
contented indifference who was to be their master, none of that sullen
and ungrateful dislike of the English, of which the retreating army had
complained so loudly; he heard from them only expressions of gratitude
to the British government and praise of the British nation; he
perceived in them the true feelings of loyalty and patriotism, and saw
in all their actions honest, enthusiastic ardour, regulated by a cool
and determined courage. The invaders attempted, by the most unrelenting
severity, to keep them down. On the 7th of March a party of French
entered the little towns of Carril and Villa Garcia, murdered some old
men and women in the streets, set fire to the houses of those persons
whom they suspected of being hostile to them, and then retreated to
Padron. To lay waste villages with fire, abandon the women to the
soldiery, and put to death every man whom they took in arms, was the
system upon which the French under Marshals Ney and Soult proceeded.
Such a system, if it failed to intimidate, necessarily recoiled
upon their own heads; and the thirst of vengeance gave a character
of desperation to the courage of the Galicians. About an hundred
French were pillaging a convent, when Don Bernardo Gonzalez, with
two-and-thirty Spaniards, fell upon them, and did such execution while
the enemy were in disorder and encumbered with their plunder, that only
sixteen escaped. During three days the French attempted to destroy the
peasants of Deza and Trasdira; the men of Baños and Tabieros came to
aid their countrymen, and the invaders at length retreated with the
loss of 114 ♦MARCH 9.♦ men. A party from Pontevedra entered Marin: here
the Lively and the Plover opened their fire upon them, and as they
fled from the English ships, their officers fell into the hands of the
peasantry. In this kind of perpetual war the French were wasted; a
malignant fever broke out among them, which raged particularly at their
head-quarters in Santiago, and many who had no disease died of the
fatigue which they endured from being incessantly harassed, and kept
night and day on the alarm.
♦BARRIOS SENT INTO GALICIA.♦
D. Manuel Garcia de Barrios, who held the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel,
had arrived in Galicia early in March with credentials from the Central
Junta authorising him to take such measures as he might deem expedient
for its recovery, ... and this was all with which the government could
furnish him. He had, however, two brave and able officers under him, D.
Manuel Acuña and D. Pablo Morillo, then a young man, who had already
distinguished himself ♦VOL. II. P. 460.♦ upon the Tagus. These officers
took the coast and the interior in this military mission, while Barrios
took the southern part of the province; and they communicated with
Romana and Silveira. Barrios was with the latter General when the
French approached Chaves, and, being prevented by an accident from
leaving the town with him, was shut in there during its short siege.
Aware that if the enemy recognised him they would probably put him
to death, or at best compel him to choose between imprisonment and
taking the oaths to the Intruder, he escaped over the walls when they
entered the place, and remained for some days secreted in a cottage,
suffering severely from a fall and from want of food, and having lost
every thing, even his papers. He made his way, however, to the Valle
Real de Lobera, where he thought Romana would have taken some measures
for raising men; and there he found the spirit which he expected. His
report of himself and of his commission was believed, though he had no
credentials to produce: a Junta was formed, volunteers were raised,
and there, in a confined district, where they were half blockaded by
the enemy, plans were laid for the deliverance of Galicia, Barrios
having for his coadjutors the abbots of S. Mamed and Couto. Their
communication with Romana was impeded by the French at Lugo; but they
received tidings of co-operation in another quarter where they had not
looked for it, and prepared with all alacrity to take advantage of the
opportunity that offered.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE AND GALICIANS BLOCKADE TUY.
MARCH 10.♦
While Soult was before Chaves a party of Portugueze, under Alexandre
Alberto de Serpa, crossed the Minho near its mouth, and were joined
at Guardia by the peasantry; in a few days some thousand men had
collected; the Mayorazgo, D. Joaquin Tenreyro, put himself at their
head, and their parish priests acted as officers. The two Abbots, who
had taken the title of Generals, and disputed which should be called
Commander-in-chief of Galicia, compromised their difference by electing
Barrios commandant-general of the province of Tuy and division of the
Minho, and they set out with all the force they could muster to join
one party of these insurgents who blockaded the French in Tuy, while
Morillo and Acuña were directed to join the others, who, officered as
they were, undisciplined and ill equipped, had proceeded to besiege the
enemy’s garrison in Vigo. It had been Soult’s intention, neglecting
all points of less importance, to concentrate in Tuy all the troops
belonging to his army whom he had left in Galicia. But when a column
of about 800 men, under the _chef d’escadron_ Chalot, bringing with it
the heavy baggage of the general officers and the military chest, was
on the way thither from Santiago, General Lamartiniere ordered them to
Vigo, where the resources were greater both for the men and horses.
♦VIGO.♦
The town of Vigo is situated in a bay, which is one of the largest,
deepest, and safest in the whole coast of the peninsula. It is built
upon a rock; but, notwithstanding the severe loss which the Spaniards,
during the War of the Succession, suffered in that port, no care had
been taken to fortify it; it had merely a wall, a fort flanked with
four bastions on the land side, and an old castle, equally dilapidated,
toward the sea. The neighbourhood of Ferrol has made it neglected as a
naval station, and Galicia is too poor a country for foreign commerce.
There was, however, a manufactory of hats there, which were exported
to America; and a fishery was carried on so extensively as to afford
employment for thirty mercantile houses. It derived some importance
also from being the seat of government for the province of Tuy. The
population amounted to 2500. Sir John Moore had at first fixed upon
this port as the place of his embarkation, and ordered the transports
there; and the delay occasioned by waiting till they came round Cape
Finisterre to join him at Coruña gave time for the French to come up,
and for that battle, which, while it redeemed the character of the
army, proved fatal to himself.
♦THE SPANIARDS APPEAR BEFORE VIGO.♦
Captain Crawford, in the Venus frigate, was off the port, and he wrote
to Captain M’Kinley, who was then at Villa Garcia, in the Lively,
telling him how much the presence of his ship would contribute to the
success of the Spaniards. Meantime Morillo arrived to examine the state
of the siege. He learnt that a reinforcement of 1800 French were at
this time in Pontevedra, about four leagues off. They had to cross the
bridge of St. Payo, over a river which discharges itself into the head
of the Bay of Vigo, and Morillo immediately took measures for defending
the passage. From Don Juan Antonio Gago, an inhabitant of Marin, who
was at the head of 500 peasants, he obtained two eight-pounders, and
from the town of Redondella one twenty-four and two eighteen-pounders.
With these means of defence he entrusted this position to Don Juan de
O’Dogherty, a lieutenant in the Spanish navy, who had the command of
three gun-boats. While he was taking these necessary measures, part of
Romana’s army, which Soult boasted of having destroyed a fortnight
before, drove the enemy back from Pontevedra, and took possession of
the town. Morillo joined them; and being of opinion that the reduction
of Vigo was the most important object which could then be undertaken,
they proceeded to that place.
♦RECAPTURE OF THAT PLACE.♦
The French governor Chalot, a _chef d’escadron_, had replied to
every summons which Tenreyro sent him, that he was not authorised
to surrender to peasantry. Captain M’Kinley having now arrived, he
was again summoned to surrender, and negotiations were begun, which
continued till the third day, when Morillo joined the besiegers with
the force from Pontevedra, ♦MARCH 26.♦ consisting of new levies and
retired veterans, 1500 of whom had come forward to assist in the
deliverance of their country; a council of war was held, by which
Morillo was appointed commander-in-chief, and requested to assume
the title of colonel, for the sake of appearing of more consequence
to M. Chalot, whose complaint it was, that he was not summoned by an
officer of sufficient rank. Having been thus ♦MARCH 27.♦ promoted
to accommodate the _chef d’escadron_, he sent him a summons in due
form to surrender within two hours. Chalot replied, that he could not
possibly capitulate till he had heard the opinion of the council of
war, of which he was president; the members were at present dispersed,
and he required twenty-four hours to collect them. Morillo returned a
verbal answer, that he granted him another two hours, and the French,
after ineffectually attempting to prolong the term, delivered in their
proposals of capitulation, which were, that they should march out with
arms, baggage, the whole of their equipage, and with the honours of
war; that they should be conveyed in English vessels to the nearest
French port, on parole not to bear arms against Spain or her allies
till exchanged, or till peace should have taken place; that the money
belonging to the French government, and destined for the payment of
the troops, should remain in the hands of the paymaster, who was
accountable for it; and that the papers relating to the accounts of
the regiments should be preserved; finally, that the troops should
not lay down their arms, nor the town and forts be delivered up, till
the moment of embarking. Morillo, with the three French officers
who brought these proposals, and two Spaniards, went on board the
Lively, to lay them before Captain M’Kinley, and answer them with his
concurrence. The answer was in a spirit becoming England and Spain.
The garrison were required to ground their arms on the glacis, and
surrender themselves prisoners of war, the officers being allowed to
retain their swords and wearing apparel, nothing more. The demand
respecting the money was refused; the place was to be taken possession
of as soon as the French grounded their arms, and if these articles
were not ratified within an hour, hostilities were to recommence.
The officers who were sent to negotiate agreed to these terms, but the
ratification was delayed beyond the hour allotted; and the Spaniards,
who were prepared to execute what they had threatened, began the
assault between eight and nine at night; while those who had muskets
kept up a fire upon the enemy, others began to hew down the gates. An
old man particularly distinguished himself at the gate of Camboa, by
the vigour with which he laid on his strokes, splintering the wood,
and when a ball went through him, by the composure with which he died,
happy to have fallen in the discharge of his duty, and in the hour of
victory. D. Bernardo Gonzalez, the commanding officer of the detachment
from Pontevedra, sprang forward, and taking up the axe of the dead,
continued the same work, notwithstanding he was thrice wounded; till a
fourth wound disabled him, and he was borne away: seven Spaniards fell
at this point. Meantime Morillo was informed that the capitulation was
now ratified, and forcing his way through the ranks amidst the fire,
with great difficulty he made himself heard, and put a stop to the
assault.
On the following morning, when Morillo had made preparations to enter
and occupy the place, information was brought him from the little
town of Porriño, that a reinforcement from Tuy was on the way to the
French. Porriño is about a league to the eastward of the road between
these two places, and equidistant about two leagues from both. News,
therefore, could not be brought so soon but that the troops must
closely follow it. Morillo instantly sent off a part of his force
as secretly as possible to intercept them, and he remained hurrying
the embarkation of the French, by telling them that he could not
restrain the rage of the peasantry. How well they had deserved any
vengeance which the peasantry could inflict the garrison were perfectly
conscious, and were therefore as eager to get on board as Morillo was
to see them there. In this haste, the baggage could not be examined
conformably to the capitulation, for the hurry of both parties was
increased by hearing a firing from the town. The troops from Tuy had
arrived under its walls, and, to their astonishment, a fire was opened
upon them. They were attacked, routed, and pursued with such vigour,
that out of 450, not more than a fifth part escaped; seventy-two were
taken prisoners, and sent on board to join their countrymen; the
rest were either killed or wounded. The military chest, containing
117,000 francs, had been delivered up according to the terms; but an
examination of the baggage was thought necessary; about 20,000 more
were discovered; and the whole of both[10] sums was distributed among
the troops and peasantry. Never had a more motley army been assembled:
... men of all ranks and professions bore arms together at this time
in Galicia; among those who distinguished themselves were soldiers and
sailors; D. Francisco Sanchez Villamarin, the Alferez of a band of
students from Santiago; the Abbot of Valladares, and the first preacher
of the Franciscans, Fr. Andres Villagelvi.
♦BLOCKADE OF TUY.♦
The French had at this time 5000 men at Santiago, where they were
fortifying themselves. Morillo hastened to place Pontevedra in a state
of defence against them, and to secure the bridge of S. Payo, that
they might not be able to form any farther junction; for they were now
calling in all their smaller detachments, and General Lamartiniere had
then collected about 3300 men in Tuy, including some 1200 invalids. A
fire which was opened against that place across the river from Valença
was soon silenced, and the efforts of the disorderly besiegers were
not more effectual. Report magnified their numbers to 20,000; but when
Barrios arrived to recompose the dispute between the General-Abbots, by
taking the command, he found only a fifth part of the estimated force,
and only a fourth of these provided with muskets. Having obtained six
pieces of cannon from Salvatierra and Vigo, and a scanty supply of
ammunition from the same places, from Bayona, and from his Portugueze
neighbours at Valença and Monçam, he carried on the blockade in spite
of all the efforts of the garrison.
♦1809. APRIL.
THE PORTUGUEZE RECROSS THE MINHO.♦
Marshal Soult was under no small anxiety for this place; he had
recommended it to Ney’s especial care; but he had reason to fear that
Ney would have sufficient employment for all his force; and he knew
what effect the fall of a second garrison would produce not upon the
people of the country alone, but also upon his own men; for he was not
ignorant that the better spirits in his army detested the service upon
which they were employed, and that many even of the worst dreaded it.
After entering Braga he dispatched a party of horse in that direction,
for of the many messengers whom he had sent to Tuy since he marched
from thence on his expedition into Portugal, not one had returned.
They learnt at Barcellos that it was blockaded, that it had thrown
shells into Valença, and that the garrison were strong enough to sally
and incommode the besiegers. Soult could take no measures then for
their relief, and he supposed that the news of his success in Portugal
would alone relieve them to a considerable degree, by drawing off the
Portugueze from the blockade: so in fact it proved; they recrossed the
Minho as soon as they heard of his entrance into Braga, and it was
their departure which enabled Lamartiniere to make his unfortunate
attempt for relieving Vigo.
♦THE FRENCH IN TUY RELIEVED AND WITHDRAWN.♦
Having removed his sick and wounded from Braga to Porto, for they
were safe nowhere but under the immediate protection of the army, the
Marshal sent Generals Graindorges and Heudelet to relieve Tuy and
subdue the intermediate country, where the Portugueze General Botelho
had put the Corregidor of Barcellos to death for having welcomed the
French on their former reconnoissance from Braga. They entered ♦APRIL
8.♦ Ponte de Lima after some resistance; the weak and dilapidated
fortress of Valença was surrendered to them, and Barrios, who upon
♦APRIL 10.♦ tidings of their movements had made an unsuccessful attack
upon Tuy, retired during the night to S. Comba. The French boasted
that Lapella and Monçam, Villa Nova and Caminha had opened their
gates to them, and that the fort of Insoa, at the mouth of the Minho,
had capitulated: the names carried as lofty a sound as if the places
were of any strength, or possessed any importance, or could have been
defended against them, or held by them. But in fact the only advantage
expected or derived from the expedition was that of removing with all
speed the garrison and all the moveable effects first from Tuy to
Valença, that they might be on the safer side of the Minho, and then
with the least possible delay to Porto. In that city Marshal Soult
remained, unable to prosecute his plans of conquest, and not more in
hope of co-operation from Lapisse and Victor, than in apprehension that
a British force might anticipate their tardy movements.