Having in the last chapter endeavoured to elaborate tactical
principles, and to give practical hints, I will now shortly deal with
the duties of the various units, and endeavour to form an impression of
the performances that may be expected of them in the fight.
When a _squadron_, acting independently in reconnaissance, as advanced
guard, flank guard, or divisional cavalry, finds itself obliged to
attack, it will, as a rule, employ its whole force simultaneously,
whether it charges in line, knee to knee, or uses a troop in single
rank as first line. If a troop has been thrown forward as advanced
guard, it must quickly clear the front, and endeavour to join the
squadron, so as to strengthen it before the collision, and not to
become prematurely involved in a disadvantageous fight.
The squadron is generally too weak to carry out an offensive fight
on foot. There is also no means of guarding the led horses but by
patrols. If they should become isolated during the attack, there will
be a danger of losing them, especially in hostile country. A squadron
must therefore only determine on a dismounted attack when such action
is absolutely unavoidable. For dispersing hostile patrols or armed
inhabitants, about a troop dismounted will generally suffice, where
there is no opportunity of surprising them in the charge, or of
enveloping them. A defensive fight on foot must not be undertaken by a
single squadron unless absolutely necessary, or which the led horses
can be disposed in a safe place in the immediate neighbourhood, where
the flanks cannot be turned, or where the arrival of reinforcements can
be relied upon.
A squadron attacking knee to knee is stronger than a numerically
superior enemy who charges in looser formation and is not armed with
the lance.
The _regiment_ of four or five squadrons is numerically too weak a body
to be able of itself to carry out the larger strategical missions. It
will therefore operate in more or less close co-operation with other
troops, and will seldom be called upon to fight independently. It may,
however, find itself for a time obliged to rely upon its own fighting
strength, whether acting as divisional cavalry, as advanced guard, or
as a detachment from a larger force of cavalry.
If a fight is in immediate prospect, column of troops must first be
formed from column of route, and a broader front, which will allow
of a rapid assumption of the attack formation, must then be adopted
according to the ground.
In the charge against cavalry the regiment should only on rare
occasions deploy all its squadrons into line, but must, whenever
practicable, detail one squadron to follow in second line, and another
in forward échelon, to protect the more exposed flank and to turn that
of the enemy.
It will also be possible for the regiment to operate dismounted against
weaker hostile detachments. If relative strength allows, at least a
squadron should be detached to guard the led horses and to carry out
reconnaissance duties. In the defence on foot, with ample ammunition
and every available rifle in the firing-line, the regiment represents a
formidable fighting force, even when obliged to detach one, or even two
squadrons, for reconnaissance and for the protection of the flanks and
the led horses.
In the fight of smaller bodies of all arms, a regiment will frequently
be able to intervene in a most effective manner by a timely charge,
from which considerable results may often be expected, especially
during pursuit of a retreating and shaken enemy. In such cases the
formation of lines for attack will frequently be superfluous, and a
broad enveloping formation may be adopted.
The _brigade_ of two regiments is numerically too weak of itself
to carry out strategical missions, and to be able to engage in the
independent actions they demand. The heavy drains on its strength which
such missions generally entail will usually weaken the fighting power
so much that the brigade will no longer be in a condition to engage an
opponent of any strength who may have to be dealt with by mounted or
dismounted action, or the two in combination.
At the same time, circumstances may lead to a brigade being _forced_
to carry out an independent rôle. It will then have to reconnoitre
with great care, so that it may only embark on a decisive encounter
with a full knowledge of the situation. Otherwise, in view of its
small offensive power, it will run a great risk of suffering defeat,
especially when dismounted.
In the defence on foot, on the other hand, a brigade may be regarded as
an important factor of strength, capable of successfully resisting an
enemy of considerable superiority, as long as its flanks are protected
and the led horses do not require too large an escort.
On approaching the enemy, the brigade must form column of troops from
column of route in good time and the regiments must be deployed on the
frontage and in the formations demanded by the situation. In such cases
a reserve must always be detailed. The allotment of different rôles in
the fight to the various regiments or groups will form the framework
for the tactical deployment. In all attacks the brigade or its
component parts must always adopt the formation in lines. Where there
is blind ground to a flank, a forward échelon must be formed which will
co-operate concentrically in the charge. In the attack on foot, too,
it will often be advantageous to échelon detachments forward under due
protection, in order to envelop the enemy's position.
In the combat of detachments of all arms, and especially in pursuit,
considerable performances must be expected of a brigade. A timely
charge or the employment of its fire power in an effective direction
may bring about a decision.
The _division_ of six regiments, under circumstances where its full
strength can be employed in the charge, represents, even against troops
using the rifle, a very considerable fighting power, which can, if
judiciously handled and launched at the right moment, have a decisive
effect, even in a battle of armies.
In independent missions it must be remembered that a complete regiment
of four squadrons with 15 files per troop will represent 400 rifles
at most. In war, however, this figure will never be reached. Wastage
on the march and the provision of the necessary detachments and
patrols, weaken squadrons very considerably. We must further remember
that in every great battle a mounted reserve will always have to be
detailed, while, in addition to this, detachments such as reconnoitring
squadrons, escorts to transport, reporting centres, and signal
stations, will generally fail to rejoin in time for the battle. Thus
the division will seldom actually be able to reckon on more than 1,000
to 1,500 rifles in the firing-line.
Even counting on the co-operation of artillery and machine-guns, which
the enemy will also have at his disposal, this represents no great
offensive strength. It is therefore necessary to be quite clear in
our minds that only weak detachments can be attacked with prospect of
success.
A cavalry division is greatly handicapped by these circumstances
in carrying out the rôle which may be assigned to it in the course
of operations. The resistance of a body of equal strength where
circumstances demand a dismounted attack can thus never be overcome.
Mounted, however, it is quite another matter. A well-trained German
cavalry division, handled according to sound tactical principles and
schooled to charge in close formation, may attack even a stronger enemy
regardless of consequences.
Should the task at issue demand a larger force, several divisions must
be united in a _cavalry corps_. In the battle of all arms such a corps,
either by the charge or by employment of its fire power, may aim at
decisive results. For the conduct of independent strategic missions
fire power is an important factor. As in this case the number of men
detached, etc., will be divided between the divisions, a strength of
3,500 rifles can at times be reached in a corps of two divisions.
For the division, as for the corps, the framework of the tactical
deployment depends upon the commander's tactical plan, as too does
the allotment of duties in the fight to the various units, divisions,
brigades, and regiments, or to the tactical groups, advanced guard,
main body, reserve, etc., and any attempt at retaining the command in
one hand is obviously out of the question. Stress has already been
laid on the necessity for early deployment, and once this is effected,
the various subdivisions of the force must take their own independent
measures for carrying out the rôles that devolve upon them.
On the other hand, neither in the fight of the independent cavalry nor
in the great battle should a unit be allowed to become isolated in the
combat. The necessary combination must always be preserved. United
action, however, is only possible if subordinate leaders never lose
sight of the general purpose of the fight, and continually bear in mind
the necessary interchangeable relations of the various tactical methods.
In war it will seldom be possible either to undertake or to carry out
the very best course of action, but will generally be unnecessary, for
we may certainly count on numerous errors and vacillations on the part
of the enemy, especially in the case of cavalry warfare.
It is of far greater importance that any plan once undertaken should be
energetically carried through to a conclusion.
Success in war is first and foremost a matter of character and will.
The indomitable will to conquer carries with it a considerable
guarantee of success.
The determination to win, cost what it may, is therefore the first and
greatest quality required of a cavalry leader--and the offensive is the
weapon with which he can best enforce his will.