As the brigades in a modern division must, on account of the effect
of artillery fire, be disposed according to completely different
principles from those of the past, so, too, must the formations adopted
by the various groups be chosen to suit modern conditions.
Our new Regulations lay down that, if the cavalry, after its
preliminary deployment, has to cross an extensive fire-zone, the
subordinate leaders are to choose such formations for their units
as will minimise the effect of the hostile fire, and that, for this
purpose, the configuration of the ground must be turned to the best
advantage, even though it should involve temporary departure from
prescribed intervals.
I do not consider these instructions, which, in contradiction to the
general principles of the Regulations, give free play to the initiative
of all subordinate leaders, are sufficiently definite. They appear
to try to avoid giving a distinct designation to this manner of
advance. Before the publication of the Regulations it was known as
"extended formation." As such I have characterised it in my brochure,
"Reflections on the New Cavalry Regulations," published in 1908,
and it is to be regretted that this title was not maintained in the
Regulations, and with it also the real essence of the whole formation.
This would, I think, have made the matter clearer. I hold it to be of
great importance that the adoption of such formations should be ordered
by higher authority, as otherwise there must be a danger of the troops
getting out of hand.
In adopting these extensions it is not only a question of ground
actually under artillery fire, but also of areas during the crossing of
which fire may be expected, to which, of course, the troops should not
be exposed. Whether such is the case or not, the cavalry commander, who
is observing and receiving intelligence as the troops hurry forward, is
alone in a position to judge, and not each subordinate leader. For this
reason alone, unity of action is absolutely necessary. So is it also
from another point of view. I need scarcely enlarge on the picture of
what would occur if each subordinate commander, each squadron leader,
according to his individual judgment, were to suddenly regulate the
pace and formation of his own volition, while it would be a matter of
difficulty to maintain proper control of the troops if it were left to
the squadron leaders to regain alignment in their own time.
It is therefore imperative, to my mind, that such extensions should
not be left to the discretion of the squadron leader, but ordered by
superior authority. Instructions as to pace should be given at the same
time, and the area indicated where troops are to regain the formation
ordered and decrease the pace. These are points that have escaped the
notice of the Regulations. Orders must also be given as to whether
several lines will eventually be formed. These will then generally have
to follow each other at shrapnel distance. Only the choice of formation
and line of advance must be left to the subordinate leaders, as they
alone are in a position to judge of the local effect of the hostile
fire.
If such dispositions are to be made, all commanders, down to squadron
leaders, must be instructed in time, so that they may have already
adopted the necessary formation on reaching the dangerous zone. They
must at the same time be informed, in so far as can be ascertained,
from which direction artillery fire--for this alone can be in
question--is to be expected.
Should the artillery fire come from the front, column of route will
often be a suitable formation. It affords but a small frontage of
target, and facilitates use of the ground. If the artillery fire is
expected from a flank, the adoption of a single-rank line will often
commend itself. In any case, in the larger formations, distances and
intervals must be adjusted so that one and the same burst of shrapnel
will not strike two squadrons at once.
As the Regulations do not touch on these points, I do not see how a
proper understanding of them can be awakened and cultivated in the
troops, imperative though this may be.
As a rule it will be by no means sufficient to adopt formations for
minimising the effect of artillery fire only in special cases where
such fire is to be expected. The great range of modern guns, and their
capabilities of indirect fire induced by improved means of observation,
and the possibility of bringing fire to bear on large unseen targets
with the aid of the map, make it absolutely necessary, when entering
within possible effective range of artillery, to adopt formations
which will offer no favourable mark. If this tends on the one hand,
as already remarked, to a premature deployment, it forces us, on the
other, to adopt formations which can cross country easily and afford no
easy target for the artillery.
I have already shown in a former work[50] how well the double
column[51] answers this purpose, and in what a comprehensive manner the
principle of independent squadron columns allows of elaboration, to
procure for the cavalry the greatest imaginable freedom of movement.
The Regulations do not agree with these views. They hold fast to
the principle that deployment must always be in line, and not in a
succession of lines, and that before this deployment the squadron
columns hitherto employed will generally be replaced by some other
formation.
The above remain the chief formations for movement and deployment
of the cavalry. The employment of the "regimental mass and brigade
mass"[52] has been limited, but the Regulations give us nothing in
their place. Nor, on the other hand, is the flexibility of the double
column particularly emphasised; its use, indeed, is in a certain sense
limited. I see such limitation in the fact that the trumpet-call
"_Double column!_" has been abolished. As, on the other hand, the call
"_Form regimental mass!_" has been retained, it does not appear as
if the use of double column is to be further developed, or allowed to
replace the regimental and brigade mass on the field of battle.
It is further laid down that the regimental mass is to be used when
beyond the range of the enemy's fire, the brigade mass when concealed
by the ground, even on the battlefield. A deployment is even allowed
for from the brigade in mass towards the flank, and that by a wheel
of the head of the columns. This presupposes that such a column can
be used in a flank movement, which I regard as an impossibility. A
deployment from regimental mass to squadron columns is also provided
for. In view of the great effective range of the modern gun, I cannot
think that movements in such close formation right up to the moment of
deployment can go unpunished upon a modern battlefield.
All these instructions contained in the Regulations, and many others
that take effect in the same sense, cannot be regarded as practical.
They lead us to fear that the regimental and brigade masses, in
spite of all modern conditions, will retain more or less their old
importance. They will serve as a pretext for many a hidebound drill
enthusiast, of which, alas! there are still many among us. Upon the
battlefields of the future, however, we will no longer dare to appear
in such formations, but only widely deployed and in thin columns, in
such dispositions indeed as will allow of a rapid adoption of the
attack formation, such as we have discussed in detail above. I can
only hope that these views will, in the not too far distant future,
come to be more generally recognised and will find their way into the
Regulations.
Finally, I would once again draw attention to the idea of the
"vanguard."[53] It receives but a passing mention in the Regulations,
and no explanation of what is thereby meant. My opinion is that it
is indispensable to all flank movements, and must _continually_ be
used, especially in the offensive. It should therefore be provided
for by regulation in all deployments, and the troops should be fully
conversant with its use.
For the rest, the present Regulations, in spite of all actual progress
made, can only be designated as provisional, and give rise to the hope
that it will be found possible to re-edit them soon, above all as
regards the stereotyped parts, so that, fully prepared and up to date,
we may go forth with confidence to meet the events of any future war.