The same principles hold good for those portions of the army cavalry
which find themselves _behind_ the fighting-line, and not on the
exposed flank. Such a position is generally, indeed, undesirable, but
may be the outcome of circumstances.
The task before the cavalry is here naturally quite a different
one from when on the flank of the army. The necessity, or even the
possibility, will in this case scarcely ever occur of having to deal
with hostile cavalry, and of opening thereby a way for intervention in
the decisive battle. It is much more likely in this case to happen
that the cavalry will have to adopt a waiting attitude, and see
whether its engagement as a mounted arm will be necessary. During this
period of waiting, the cavalry must remain beyond the range of hostile
fire, but as near the fighting-line as intelligent use of the ground
will permit. Its position should never be chosen so far to the rear
that it cannot arrive on the spot at the right time for the attack;
for the moments which offer a favourable prospect for a charge are
often fleeting--they depend upon the tactical situation and the moral
condition of the opponent. These conditions may, however, quickly
change if, for instance, reinforcements should arrive on the field.
Thus, at Mars la Tour, when the 6th Cavalry Division advanced in order
to attack the obviously shaken and retiring 2nd Corps of the French, it
struck, according to the account of the German General Staff, not this
corps, but the intact Guard Grenadier Division of Picard, which had
already advanced in support, and the charge was frustrated.[41]
To be prepared to meet such conditions, it will generally be advisable
not only to remain as close behind the fighting-line as possible, but
to prepare for a rapid deployment to the front, so that a disposition
in groups, with the necessary deploying intervals, may be adopted
behind that part of the fighting-line where the ground is especially
adapted to a charge of large masses. If it can be seen that the crisis
of the fight is approaching, and that the intervention of the cavalry
may be necessary, the latter should advance still closer to the
fighting-line, making, of course, full use of the ground for cover,
but no longer taking heed of small losses.
The cavalry will advance to the charge in order either to complete the
defeat of an already wavering enemy, and to capture his artillery, or
to relieve its own infantry, exhausted in the fight or suffering from
want of ammunition, when other reserves have been used up, or have
not yet arrived on the spot. The attack will probably always have to
be conducted against an extended front. Flanking and surprise attacks
will rarely be possible under such circumstances. It will scarcely ever
be practicable to carry out _separate_ attacks against the hostile
infantry and artillery, as in the case of a flank attack. The charge
will rather, in by far the greater number of cases, first strike the
hostile line of infantry, and must endeavour to ride through this and
then to fall upon the enemy's artillery.
The formation for attack must be chosen to correspond with this point
of view. A considerable extension will be necessary for the first line,
so that, although the wings of the attacking-line may be exposed to
flanking fire, the main portion of the front of attack will only have
to reckon with frontal fire, and the enemy will not be in a position to
direct a concentric fire against it. The great range of modern weapons
demands a very considerable extension for this purpose if success is to
be ensured. Suitable ground, also, must be chosen for this deployment.
It will often allow, if rightly used, of one or other flank finding
cover. A previous close study of the ground over which the attack is to
be made is therefore imperative for the cavalry leader, even though it
may entail personal exposure to the enemy's fire.
Necessary, however, as this extension is, a formation in depth in
two or three lines is also imperative if decisive results are to
be gained--this is, as I have already pointed out, the formation
especially necessary against firearms. To lay down the distances which
must be taken up between the lines according as infantry or artillery
is the objective, as is done in the Regulations, will naturally be
impossible in most cases, as both arms will have to be reckoned with
simultaneously. A mean distance of about 250 paces would generally meet
the case.
It is obvious that not only the preliminary deployment, but the
formation for attack must take place beyond the effective range of the
enemy's fire, for, once inside this zone, flank movements can no longer
be carried out, and nothing else can be done but to gallop straight
to the front. As, however, our own infantry will have to be ridden
through in the charge, it is impossible in such a case to attack in
close order. The first lines should therefore be of loose single-rank
formation, with wide intervals from man to man. This is also to be
recommended on the ground that it will allow a greater breadth of
front for the same strength. Behind the leading lines squadrons
can then follow in column of troops, which can easily ride through
their own infantry, and adapt themselves to the ground, utilizing
for their advance the less exposed portions of the terrain. In such
dispositions there can naturally be no talk of regular distances, and
the circumstances of the case must decide.
If sufficient force is available, reserves must follow behind the
centre and in échelon behind the flanks. Their duty will be to to turn
against hostile cavalry and other troops which may take the advancing
mass in flank or may threaten a charge.
The batteries and machine-guns belonging to the cavalry will usually
remain at the disposal of the cavalry commander, even during the great
battle. If a charge is launched it will sometimes be advantageous
to use them for flank protection, for which purpose they may be
temporarily held back. Such cases, however, will be rare. The commander
will therefore have to consider whether it is not more advisable to let
them take part in the general engagement, even when the cavalry is not
yet called upon to intervene. For it must be clearly understood that in
this case, as in the other, where the cavalry is on the flank of the
army, there will seldom be an opportunity for the charge, for reasons
already given.
As, however, the cavalry in the former case should not remain inactive
even if there is no opportunity for the _charge_ during the decisive
battle, the same holds good where the cavalry is placed behind the
front of the army.
Having a less extensive field of action than in the case of the cavalry
on the flank, it is all the more necessary, if there is no chance of
a charge, for it to act in the manner of a reserve. The cavalry must
not shrink, when necessity demands, from employing its whole force in
the fire fight, disregarding for this purpose its purely cavalry rôle,
which may, perhaps, be resumed later. The first essential is that
victory shall be won. To this end all available forces must co-operate.
We will find a good example to follow in the battle of Fredericksburg
and the manner in which Stuart threw the whole of his cavalry into
the fight. The employment of cavalry in the War of Secession in North
America, the study of which I have urgently recommended, can here again
serve us as a guide to follow.