I have already repeatedly indicated that the most favourable position
for the army cavalry is to a flank and in advance of a flank of its
own army, and, where possible, of _that_ flank on which, in the battle
of offence, the decision will be sought, or, when in defence, the main
hostile attack may be expected.[40] The new Cavalry Regulations adopt
this point of view. It is therefore superfluous to comment further
on the advantages of such a position. Unless the cavalry is going to
resign all claim to offensive action, this position will compel it to
seek battle. This may also happen when the cavalry masses of _both_
sides endeavour to take up such a position, and thereby naturally come
into collision, so that a sort of battle of encounter results, but one,
however, that will bear quite a different character from the battle of
encounter in strategic operations.
There will already be a difference, in the fact that the strategic
approach and the tactical disposition in advance guard, main body,
and reserve, will be wanting. In the consciousness, moreover, that,
whatever the relative strength may be, the decisive battle has,
under any circumstances, to be sought, it must be prepared for
systematically. The cavalry will therefore have to adopt a wider
front, or even deploy while farther from the enemy, having to its
front only the necessary bodies for reconnaissance and security. The
reconnaissance must be of a double nature. Timely measures must first
be taken to ascertain whether, on the probable lines of approach
and communication of the enemy, further hostile forces, ammunition
columns, or supply trains are hurrying to the battlefield. Where
the squadrons already pushed forward have received the necessary
further instructions, this reconnaissance will often develop from
the corresponding strategic measures. It will, however, frequently
be necessary to send forward new organs of reconnaissance, even up
to the strength of squadrons, as is discussed in the chapter on
"Close Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance for the Fight." Besides this
far-reaching exploration, immediate tactical reconnaissance for the
fight must also be arranged; this will, in general, be directed against
such hostile troops as may be within tactical reach, and must at the
same time comprise reconnaissance of the ground. This service must
be carried out by contact patrols and it is obviously impossible to
separate the two duties.
The reconnoitring organs suffice in such a case for safety to the
front. To the flank, however, local flanking patrols must be pushed
out during the advance. It may at the same time be advisable, for
the protection of the main body, and as points of support for the
reconnaissance, to occupy defiles and other important places to the
flank or front by dismounted detachments up to the strength of a
squadron or more.
Screened by these various measures, the cavalry mass now advances fully
deployed for the fight. It must be écheloned so far from the flank
of the army that it cannot come under the fire of its own infantry,
and that it can, if in any way possible, turn the outer flank of
the hostile cavalry. The latter may then easily become hampered in
movement by its own troops, and will have to deploy eccentrically, a
disadvantage under any circumstances. Connection with our own army
must, naturally, not be lost, so that in case of an unfavourable issue
of the fight the cavalry may not be completely severed from it. The
tactical dispositions, which should always be of an elastic nature,
must obviate this.
That depth must be maintained in so far as it allows the necessary
frontage, is easily understood. In deploying concentrically the various
groups do not by any means need to be in touch, as during the advance
they will gradually approach each other. They can, or rather must,
be disposed at wide intervals, and it is better that these should be
too great than that the necessary depth should suffer. A reserve must
always be detailed and at the disposal of the commander, in order that
he may retain his influence over the decision and be ready to meet the
vicissitudes of the conflict.
Artillery and machine-guns will generally be able to remain effectively
in action longest on the inner flank, and in this position can also
form a connecting-link between the cavalry and the flank of the
army. Special circumstances, however, may, of course, lead to their
employment elsewhere. Their employment on the extreme outer flank,
however, so often seen in peace, is to be guarded against. From such
a position they can indeed often bring an effective flanking fire to
bear, but are, on the other hand, in great danger, especially when
opposed to a numerically superior enemy. Should the outcome of the
fight be unfavourable, they will generally not only themselves be lost,
but may often contribute to the difficulties of the beaten squadrons.
Machine-gun detachments must be pushed forward recklessly to within
effective range of the enemy, and should not shrink from the danger of
occasional capture.
Should the hostile cavalry be driven from the field, it must be pursued
with sufficient force to prevent its rallying and re-forming, and to
complete its material and moral defeat. Should it seek shelter behind
occupied points of support, farms, woods, and the like, these must be
attacked immediately by employing the greatest possible fire power. It
is a matter of absolute necessity to gain possession of such points, as
they may otherwise stand in the way of further action.
All portions of the cavalry not required for the pursuit should
endeavour quickly to regain their tactical cohesion, that they may be
ready for further effort. If localities are at hand by the occupation
of which the ground won can be secured, they must at once be garrisoned
by dismounted men. Artillery and machine-guns will, in so far as they
are not detailed for the pursuit, or as they return from it, be brought
into position with a like object in view. Every effort must be made
to utilise to the full the advantages which the different methods of
action of which the arm is capable confer, and thereby to minimise the
chances of defeat. _To reckon with the charge alone is, even on the
field of battle, out of date, and calculated to limit the effect of
cavalry action._
If a position of readiness has at first to be taken up, as will
generally be the case until it is known in what direction further
developments will take place, it must be as secure as possible from
the view and fire of the enemy, but must be one from which immediate
action can be taken. A disposition in groups of units will generally be
the most suitable formation. What else is to be done the circumstances
of the various cases must decide; the indispensable condition is that
the cavalry should never be present and inactive throughout the course
of the battle. It must in all cases prevent the enemy's patrols from
making observations as to the disposition of our own army, while, on
the other hand, its own reconnaissance should never cease.
We should, however, be quite wrong to regard such action as sufficient;
rather must our whole attention be devoted to participating in the
decisive battle, if in any way possible. With this view the cavalry
must be careful to ensure its own advance to that portion of the ground
where the decisive battle will probably take place, so that the charge
will not meet with unexpected resistance and obstacles when the moment
comes to ride it home. When this crisis of the battle approaches, the
cavalry must be ready to intervene, whether it be to complete the
defeat of the enemy and to facilitate the victory of its own infantry,
or to support the latter in difficult situations.
Deployment in masses and depth, if possible in several lines, is
indispensable for such attacks. The outer flank must be secured by
reserves against the action of freshly arriving hostile cavalry and the
covering troops of the enemy's artillery. Only when reconnaissance has
clearly shown that there are no more such hostile troops at hand can
the reserves be dispensed with.
The attack will best take place from the flank, and will then generally
find a double objective in the hostile artillery and any infantry
that may be farther to the front; but both should be dealt with
_simultaneously_. There may also be a possibility and a necessity of
attacking from the rear. Circumstances must decide this. In any case,
there should be no question of a gradual engagement of a force, but the
charge of the whole mass must, even when disposed in lines, be carried
out in a simultaneous and preconcerted manner.
The moment chosen for the attack is also of great importance. As the
crisis approaches, endeavours must be made to get as close to the enemy
as possible, in order to shorten the distance that will have to be
covered in the charge. In so doing, the protection of the ground must
be used as long as possible for cover, at least from view, without
adhering to stereotyped tactical formations.
However important and desirable it may be to contribute to the great
decision by a glorious cavalry charge, it should be borne in mind that
the possibility of this will only occur in very rare cases. The more
cultivated and agricultural the country in which the war takes place,
the rarer will be these opportunities, as the circumstances of the
ground offer so many opportunities for local defence.
If we consider the battles of the Franco-Prussian, the Russo-Turkish,
and the Manchurian wars, we must soon admit that great cavalry charges
were practicable only in very isolated cases. The peculiarities of the
ground rendered them impossible; nor can this alter in the future.
If it is to the interests of the defence to seek open country with a
good field of fire, the attacker, on the other hand, will endeavour
to choose ground for the attack which will give him cover from fire
and view. On the whole, the possible European theatres of war are
but little suitable for charges, owing to the extent to which they
have been cultivated. We must not be deceived in this matter by the
experience of our peace manoeuvres. For then suitable ground has to
be sought for the operation of the three arms, and considerations
of compensation make it necessary to choose country as free from
cultivation as possible.
War, however, knows no such considerations, and we must not blind
ourselves to the fact that the opportunity for great decisive charges
will but seldom occur. The greatest imaginable error, therefore,
which the cavalry could possibly commit would be to adopt a waiting
attitude and renounce all other kind of action, in order that the
possibility of a great charge might not slip by unutilised. Besides
the decisive attack, there is another wide field of activity indicated
by the conditions of modern war, where cavalry can operate without
being compelled to renounce co-operation in the decisive battle when
circumstances will allow.
This sphere of activity lies in rear of the hostile army. Here columns
of supply of every kind are streaming forward to the fighting-line.
Here are massed the hostile reserves, already waiting for the decisive
moment. Here stands the heavy artillery of the enemy in action, often
without an escort. And it is here that opportunities for decisive
action must be sought.
If cavalry can succeed, especially in battles of several days'
duration, in interrupting the hostile supplies from the rear, in
surprising the enemy's reserves with fire, causing him heavy loss and
compelling him to deploy against it, or if any advancing portions of
the enemy's army can be brought to a halt and prevented from reaching
the battlefield at the right time, greater results will probably be
obtained than by a doubtful charge. This is quite apart from the great
moral impression which such action must produce on leaders and troops
when the alarm suddenly re-echoes from the rear, and the shrapnel of
the cavalry carries confusion and consternation amongst the reserves
and supports of the fighting-line. The enemy's artillery, also, firing
from covered positions, and otherwise so difficult to reach, may then
fall a prey to a bold cavalry, and will offer opportunities for a
success of far-reaching importance.
Such action must, of course, be conducted with a due co-operation
between mounted and dismounted action.
Against intact hostile reserves the firearm will be principally used,
and endeavour must be made to surprise them in the formation of
assembly or on the march. Against columns of wagons, also, it will be
well to commence with fire action, by shooting down the horses of the
leading teams, and so bringing the columns to a halt. They must then,
however, be actually taken possession of and taken away or destroyed,
in so far as this cannot be done by artillery fire.
The cavalry must therefore endeavour to be ever active, and to
co-operate unceasingly by damaging the enemy and shaking his morale.
Great results can, however, only be obtained if antiquated views,
handed down from time immemorial, are discarded, and the demands of
modern war and the capabilities of modern cavalry are recognised. It
is not a question as to whether we cavalry men are to fight mounted or
dismounted; but that we must be prepared and determined to take part
in the decision, and to employ the whole of our great strength and
mobility to this end.