In the battle of all arms, cavalry must be handled according to
principles which are quite different and almost diametrically opposed
to those which characterise its independent action as army cavalry.
For, in the latter case, not only is the defeat of the enemy kept in
view, but another definite object has also to be pursued. This object
can only be attained if successful in the fight, while an unsuccessful
battle will paralyse the activity of the cavalry, and may cost the
army the loss of its organs of reconnaissance. However daring its
conduct then, it should never be engaged in hopeless enterprises, and
should only undertake a fight where success can be reckoned upon with a
certain measure of probability.
If, therefore, the strength and intentions of the enemy are not fully
known, it will be better, as we have seen, to guard against engaging
the whole force in such an uncertain enterprise. Efforts should rather
be made, as I have endeavoured to show, to clear up the situation by a
careful feeling of the enemy and a gradual engagement of force. Once
possessed of this knowledge of the situation, it will be possible
either to seek a decision or to break off the fight in time to avoid
the risk of incurring too considerable a loss.
Quite different is the case in the main battle. Here the objective is
contained in the battle itself. It is the destruction of the enemy
that is sought. It is not expected that each single detachment engaged
should be victorious, but that the net result of the battle should be a
victory. The task of the various detachments is only to engage and to
destroy so much of the enemy's force as lies within their power. This
naturally holds good for the cavalry. It is not now demanded that each
single action of the cavalry should of itself be successful, but that
the general engagement of the cavalry should have the greatest possible
effect. A considerable result may often be obtained by the attacking
cavalry drawing the enemy's fire upon itself for a time, and thus
affording the infantry the possibility of gaining ground to the front,
or of re-forming and receiving reinforcements.
To break off the main battle is generally quite out of the question.
The very fact that the battle has been begun betokens the intention
of carrying it through to a final decision, even where the enemy has
shown himself to be in superior force. The various troops which advance
to the conflict need not therefore reflect whether _they_ have any
special prospect of success, but must strive for this success with
all their power. This means for the cavalry, in by far the greater
number of cases, always at least where a charge is in prospect, _the
simultaneous engaging of its whole fighting strength_, naturally
in that tactical formation which the conditions of weapons demand.
If in its _independent_ operations cavalry must be dealt with as a
strategical body, and thus employed in the fight, it is _in the main
battle_ a purely tactical body, which must be engaged _en masse_, and
not in detail. This contrast appears, at least to me, to be an obvious
one. There is another that is equally clear.
In independent operations it is the duty of the cavalry, before all
else, to defeat the enemy's _cavalry_. Victory over the latter creates
the possibility of carrying out its proper task, that of reconnoitring
and screening, without being involved in further fighting on a large
scale. In the main battle, however, it would be taking quite a
false view of its duty if it were to restrict itself to driving the
hostile cavalry from the field. Victory over the latter has indeed
a certain value, as it paralyses its further action, but it will,
in most cases, be comparatively useless for the main issue of the
battle unless further consequences result from it. A victory over the
hostile cavalry only receives its particular importance when by it the
possibility is gained of intervening in the decisive encounter _of the
other arms_, and of acting unhindered when, in the course of events, it
becomes a matter either of pursuit or of covering a retreat.
Finally, in independent operations, even small detachments can aim at
great results, and a division of force will frequently be indicated. In
the great battle, however, any considerable effect can only be attained
by the action of the mass. The reason for this lies in the size of
modern armies.
It will be advisable to concentrate the mass of the cavalry at what
are considered the decisive points, in order to be able to engage it
simultaneously. Any frittering away of force upon the field of battle
will strike the troops with impotence. We have only to remember the
battle of Coulmiers, where the richest prospects of success confronted
a cavalry which achieved nothing, because it did not act in concert.
Where great tactical units have to be concentrated which are not under
a single command, it will be advisable that the laws of seniority be
set aside, and the command given to that leader from whom the best
performances are to be expected, even though he be not the senior.
In the cavalry, more than in any other arm, success depends upon the
leader. Nothing is more rare than a good cavalry leader, and it would
therefore be a great mistake to ignore such a one, and thus perhaps
to sacrifice the fortunes of the day to the Moloch of Seniority. We
should rather act like Frederick the Great at Rossbach, when he placed
Seydlitz at the head of his cavalry, and we must expect from Prussians
to-day the same generosity as Frederick's generals showed in willingly
serving under their junior.
The best of leaders, however, will only be capable of great
performances if he is fully acquainted with the intentions of the Head
Quarters and the idea of the battle. He must therefore be not only
closely informed before the fight, but must remain throughout its
progress in continual communication with the Head Quarters, and must
be made aware of all dispositions and at the same time must share its
observations and be in touch with its intentions. The German cavalry
would certainly have been able to fight a more successful and connected
action at Mars la Tour, as at Coulmiers, if it had been better informed
as to the general situation, and had thus been in a position to
appreciate for itself what was necessary and what was possible.
If, however, understanding between the commander-in-chief and the
leader of the cavalry is established, and if full confidence in the
judgment and energy of the latter exists, he must be allowed that
necessary freedom and independence which alone ensure successful
action. On the other hand, he should never wait for orders to
intervene, but must himself turn any favourable moments of the fight
to account by rapid and energetic independent action. Even if he is
definitely placed at the disposal of the commander, he should not
shrink at critical moments from acting on his own responsibility,
informing, of course, his superior officer of his actions. As an
example of the relations between the supreme command and the cavalry
leader I would draw attention to the conduct of King Frederick and
General von Seydlitz in the battle of Zorndorf. The King felt the
necessity of restoring the wavering fortunes of the day by launching
the cavalry to the attack, but Seydlitz independently chose the moment
for the charge; and success justified them both. When, however, in the
battle of Kunersdorf, the General was compelled to order the charge
against his better judgment, the consequences were a heavy defeat for
the cavalry.