When it becomes apparent during the course of a fight that success
cannot ensue, the commander must decide in good time whether he
will carry the engagement through or break it off. To choose the
right moment for the latter operation is generally extraordinarily
difficult, even when it has been planned from the commencement. To
make the necessary dispositions, also, demands great tactical skill.
To continue the fight with determination, perhaps till nightfall, will
often cost no greater sacrifice than the breaking off of the engagement
and the attendant retreat.
Generally speaking, such engagements will only be those which are
fought out on foot. The more open the country, the closer the enemy,
and the greater the number of troops which have already been thrown
into the fighting-line, so much the more difficult will it usually
be to break off the fight. The circumstance also as to whether the
led horses are mobile or immobile, and their position, will naturally
influence the decision. On the other hand, it is easier to extricate
the force after some success has been gained; whether it be that a
hostile attack has been repulsed, or that our own troops have made a
successful counter-stroke. History teaches us that at such moments
there is generally a lull, during which the opponent is obliged to
bring up fresh troops or to make fresh tactical dispositions.
Even under such favourable conditions, however, it will generally be
impossible to break loose from the enemy without suffering heavy loss.
In defence, if the ground is especially favourable, it will certainly
be possible at times to extricate a force without considerable loss.
If it can rapidly withdraw from the firing-line and retire covered
from pursuing fire, the whole force may under certain circumstances
simultaneously evacuate a position, that is to say, if the enemy is
still so far distant that he is unable to employ pursuing fire until
the defender has reached a place of safety. How seldom, however,
will such be the case! Small detachments will generally have to be
sacrificed to secure the retreat of the main body. This means that
various especially strong supporting points in the position will be
occupied, and the force will withdraw under cover of them.
Military history offers us repeated examples where the attacker makes
desperate endeavours to overpower such points, and in so doing forgets
to pursue the withdrawing masses of the defender's troops. This, for
example, was the part played at the battle of Weissenburg by Geisberg
Castle and Schafbusch, and the château with its enclosed park at the
battle of Coulmiers. Under cover of these points, against which all the
efforts of the French were concentrated, the defenders were able in
both cases to withdraw so slightly molested that even touch with them
was completely lost.
The defence of such supporting points, which must be conducted with
the utmost obstinacy, frequently ends in capture, but the end gained
is worth the sacrifice. If the endeavour is made to withdraw the whole
line of defence simultaneously under circumstances where it is possible
for the attacker to bring to bear an effective pursuing fire from the
captured position, loss will generally be much greater than that which
would be deliberately incurred in arresting the pursuit.
The conditions are similar in attack. At manoeuvres certainly we see
the attacker when repulsed turn about, and, in a continuous retreat,
lay himself open to a pursuing fire, which would mean absolute
destruction. I do not think such a manoeuvre possible in reality. As
the advance has been by stages, so must be the retreat. But, whereas
in the advance it was a matter of pressing forward on a wide connected
front, in order to hold the whole of the enemy's position under fire,
and _not_ of massing together where cover could be obtained, the exact
contrary is the case in retreat, and the troops must seek any cover
that will shelter them from the fire of the pursuit. Various strong
points in the attack which have already been taken and occupied must
be obstinately held during the retirement, and from them a heavy fire
poured into the pursuit to bring it to a standstill. Care should be
taken, even during an advance, to keep such places well supplied with
ammunition, which can either be taken forward to the captured position
or be at the disposal of the retiring troops.
I do not think that it will be possible in any other manner to break
off an attack which has penetrated to within effective range of the
enemy, or to carry out a compulsory retreat without disastrous loss.
The troops must fall back, obstinately contesting the ground and
continually recommencing fire from any favourable position. The
commander must make careful preparations, even when advancing, that
a possible retreat shall not lead to disaster, but will be able to
find prepared points of support. All detachments, however, that are
outside the effective range of the enemy's fire, and still capable of
manoeuvre, especially artillery and machine-guns, must from commanding
positions bring fire to bear on those troops which are harassing the
retreat, regardless of the losses they may themselves incur. In such
a moment everything must be subordinated to delivering the retreating
masses from that destruction which the fire of the pursuit portends.
Any advance of pursuing cavalry, also, must be met by heavy fire from
such detachments, regardless of the expenditure of ammunition.
A retreat, then, requires particularly intelligent handling. The
various detachments must be provided with instructions that are clear
and definite. The commander must have his troops well in hand, must
arrange for the occupation of any positions, decide which detachments
shall cover the retreat, dispose of the artillery and machine-guns,
determine the line of retreat of the various units, with due regard to
the situation of their led horses, and arrange for the occupation of
the rallying position. He should himself only leave the field when the
force has got clear of the enemy. He must then, however, straightway
attend to the rearrangement of the tactical dispositions, and take the
other necessary measures. Any reserve still in hand must be used to
check the pursuit where possible by a vigorous offensive. It is just in
such situations that a determined counter-attack, even by a weak force,
makes the greatest impression on the enemy.
As to the further conduct of the retreat after a successful
extrication, definite instructions are naturally impossible. Everything
depends on the circumstances of the moment. The possibilities of
resuming the offensive must be borne in mind, even during a retirement.
To this end it is frequently advisable to fall back partially towards
a flank. Gneisenau, after the defeat at Ligny, directed the retreat
on Wavre, in order to be able to take up the offensive again on the
following day, and thus supplied us with a brilliant example well
worthy of imitation even where the forces engaged are but small.
If it is a matter of mounted combat, the breaking off of the actual
fight is quite impossible. Troops once engaged must carry the fight
through. Even when retreating from the mêlée, fighting cavalry has no
kind of means of extricating itself. It is then entirely dependent on
the enemy, and can only retire at the most rapid speed. Reserves alone
are able to bring the immediate pursuit to a standstill by intervening
in the running fight. Generally, however, this will only end when the
horses of the victor are quite exhausted, or when the latter feels the
necessity of getting his troops in hand and forming again for fresh
duties. The further conduct of the vanquished troops must depend on the
condition of the horses and the general situation. It is of importance
to withdraw beyond the reach of the enemy as soon as possible in order
that full freedom of action may be regained.
If the fire of the hostile artillery is to be feared, it is advisable
to retire extended without regard to tactical formations, and making
the best possible use of the ground. The troops will then only rally
again beyond the range of the enemy's fire. The same naturally holds
good for the retreat from a dismounted action after the men have
remounted.
The commander will be well advised to inform his senior subordinates,
if not all the troops, before the fight begins where the troops are
to concentrate again in case of a reverse. The necessity for such
dispositions generally passes unnoticed in peace, because pursuit
is never thoroughly carried out, and the beaten troops are not so
completely broken up as has repeatedly happened in war in the past and
will happen again. We should not deceive ourselves in this matter,
as otherwise there is a danger of completely losing control over the
troops. Whoever expects to be able to rally a beaten cavalry division
after a mounted fight by blowing the divisional call lays himself open
to bitter disappointment. If the enemy is pursuing with energy, this
will only be possible in the very rarest cases.
Before the commencement of the fight, arrangements must also be made
for the rear communication, as there will otherwise be a danger of
losing transport, and thereby ability to operate. Far to the rear or
close at hand are the two only possible positions for it. In the first
case an escort whose strength will be dictated by the circumstances
will always be necessary.
It should also be remembered that wagons should be able to turn round
where they are halted. If single teams are unable to turn about on
their own ground, it will be better to park the whole of the transport
in such a way that it can easily be moved in any direction. It is
then also easier to protect it against attack. If there is no fear
of attack, the various columns may turn off the road with intervals
corresponding to their length. It appears to me to be of especial
importance to lay stress on these circumstances because in peace
exercises there is no transport, and commanders consequently get
accustomed to paying little attention to it.
As regards the pursuit, it is necessary to differentiate between a
tactical and a strategical pursuit. The latter must crown the success
of the former.
In mounted action, the beaten opponent must be kept at the point of
the sword as long as the strength of the horses hold out. Detachments
not immediately pursuing must be concentrated, and must seek to regain
their ability for manoeuvre as soon as possible.
After a dismounted action on the defensive, the pursuit will first
be taken up by rifle fire. Any mounted reserve there may be should
be launched to the charge against the retiring enemy as soon as the
pursuing fire begins to cease to be effective. A victorious attack, on
the other hand, must make every endeavour to gain the position vacated
by the enemy, and to occupy ground from whence an effective pursuing
fire is possible. The bringing up of the led horses will be of special
importance in this case. If they are immobile, a portion of the men
must be sent to the rear to bring them up, while the remainder hold
the captured position. Any mounted reserves there may be can often be
employed to bring up at least a portion of the led horses. Generally
speaking, however, all troops not already engaged must, as we have
already shown, take up the strategic pursuit as early as possible. This
will supplement and complete the results of the tactical pursuit.
Never to let the enemy rest, even when the tactical pursuit has ceased,
to prevent him regaining his cohesion, to capture prisoners, horses,
and trophies, and, above all, to increase to the utmost the moral
effects of his defeat, is the task before us. The immediate pursuit
must therefore be combined, wherever possible, with a parallel pursuit
commenced in good time. The latter must nip in the bud every attempt
on the part of the retiring enemy to take up rearguard positions,
by turning such positions and pressing forward with reckless energy
against the actual lines of retreat. It must also endeavour to
anticipate the enemy in the occupation of any defiles necessary to his
retreat. At such times there must be no thought of sparing horseflesh.
Even in this pursuit, however, the commander must give a definite
object and a rallying point for the detachments following. He will
otherwise, by reason of rapidity of the movements in progress, risk
losing control of at least part of his troops, and of allowing them to
go farther than the strategical situation demands or admits. For the
rest, I may draw attention to the new Cavalry Drill Regulations, the
compressed instructions of which contain much that is essential and
coincide generally with my views.