As regards the principles of the defence, I may draw attention to the
instructions laid down in the new Cavalry Regulations, which coincide
with my views in all essentials. There are, however, still a few points
to be raised which seem to me of importance.
First and foremost, I think that it follows, from the above arguments,
that, in the case of cavalry operating independently, engagements may
often take place which, with a generally offensive intention, must be
conducted at times in a defensive spirit and with only part of the
troops--that is to say, where it is not the intention to act on the
defensive with the whole force, but to use the defence only as a means
of resuming the general offensive later at the most advantageous time.
It will be possible, especially in the battle of encounter, to defend
favourable positions or localities with the advanced troops, either
to gain time for the arrival of the main body, or else to oblige the
enemy to weaken his reserves, against which the offensive is intended.
This combination of attack and defence will frequently occur, I am
convinced, even in the battle of encounter.
In such cases the defence must endeavour to deceive the opponent
and to provoke the attack. Efforts will be made, while putting but
few men into the fight, to give the impression of strength in the
firing-line, and yet so to dispose the troops that attack will not
appear impossible, if carried out in sufficient force. Groups of men on
a broad front, a liberal expenditure of ammunition, and sometimes the
holding back of artillery and machine-guns, are the means whereby the
enemy may be thus misled.
But, even if the defensive on a large scale is adopted because the
force is considered too weak to take the offensive in the open, the
guiding principle will still be, as I have already indicated, to obtain
a decision in the defensive fight by an offensive counter-stroke, in so
far as the force and the circumstances of the ground in any way permit.
This is a fundamental principle of the spirit of cavalry.
The force destined for the counter-attack should accordingly be
detailed from the first. Efforts must be made, by using favourable
country for the defensive front and thus being able to occupy it
weakly, to spare every available man for the counter-attack, and
to compensate for the weakness of the force in position by ample
ammunition, well-arranged cross-fire, and similar measures. The troops
designed to play the offensive rôle must first be placed in reserve,
withdrawn, as far as possible, from view and fire of the enemy. As soon
as the situation is cleared up, they will be placed in échelon behind
that flank from which the counter-stroke will take place. Whether this
will be a mounted or dismounted attack depends on the character of the
ground and similar circumstances. In any case a base for attack outside
the limits of the enemy's fire must be reached, and, where possible, by
surprise.
It is therefore of the highest importance that the enemy shall be
prevented from gaining observation as to the conduct of the reserve,
in order that its presence may eventually come as a surprise to him.
Hostile patrols must be attacked with remorseless energy wherever seen,
and, if possible, put out of action. Those look-out points, on the
other hand, from which observation can be made of the enemy must be
occupied early in the fight.
The cavalry will, as a rule, only undertake a completely passive
defence, where the object of the fight is to hold the crossing over
some obstacle, to defend isolated localities, or to gain time. In such
a case the question is one of the obstinate defence of a definite
object, sometimes perhaps, also, of a retirement from one point to
another. Such an operation, however, is always difficult to carry
out on account of the led horses, and should only be attempted in
very favorable country. It demands that the fight shall be broken
off--always a difficult matter, and, to cavalry encumbered by their
led horses, one of considerable danger. The horses certainly render
it possible, by making a proper use of the ground, to withdraw more
rapidly than could infantry in the same case. On the other hand,
however, they tie the dismounted troops down to a definite direction
of retreat, and remounting, when pressed by the enemy, is always a
critical matter.