The attack of an enemy who takes up a defensive attitude can obviously
only be carried out dismounted. It must be a matter, therefore, for
careful consideration whether such an operation shall be undertaken
or not. Considerable numerical superiority is necessary to ensure
success. A reserve will be needed, which can be used dismounted, to
give the final decision at the decisive point, or to meet unexpected
events. Besides this, it will be necessary in most cases to make a
detachment which shall provide for the security of the led horses, for
reconnaissance, and for operating against the enemy's flank and rear.
It is the task of such a detachment to seek out and overthrow the
enemy's mounted reserve, that it may then be able to co-operate in the
main attack. The expression "Mounted reserve," used in the Regulations
to designate this detachment, hardly corresponds with the rôle of
these troops, which will be offensive from the commencement.
Here also I find myself in disagreement with the idea of the
Regulations that the dismounted reserve can be frequently detailed from
the troops which have remained mounted (460).[36] The mounted reserve
must, as we have seen, operate offensively. The Regulations themselves
allot this task to it by laying down that it shall undertake operations
against the enemy's flank, his led horses, and his reserves (464).[37]
It is, however, not compatible with these duties that the mounted
reserve shall at the same time find a dismounted reserve, which can
only enter the fight from the rear, and until then must remain behind
the fighting-line. Different troops must be detailed from the first for
both these duties, otherwise neither of them will be properly carried
out.
Should the cavalry commander not have at his disposal sufficient force
to meet all these demands, he will generally be better advised to
abstain from the attack, and to endeavour to carry out his mission
in some other manner. An unsuccessful enterprise not only entails
unnecessary loss, but tends to lower the moral value of the troops. It
is only when conscious of great moral and tactical superiority, or when
there is a prospect of surprising the enemy, that an attack should be
dared without the necessary numerical preponderance.
The more difficult and serious such an undertaking is, the greater
efforts must be made to gain at least a favourable base for attack,
as regards not only the direction of the attack but also any special
advantages of the ground. The mobility of the troops renders rapid
changes of direction possible, such as are unknown to the infantry.
Unlike the case of the infantry, therefore, the line of advance and of
attack need not coincide. If thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's
position, and the ground in front of it, is made in good time, it will
often be possible to change the base of attack even at the last moment
and to appear suddenly from an unexpected direction.
Therefore, even in the approach, the deployment, and the advance to
effective range, the ground should be carefully utilised in order that
cover from view and fire may be secured as long as possible. It is also
important to clear the country where the approach and deployment will
take place of the enemy's patrols, and to do everything possible to
prevent his reconnaissance.
Artillery and machine-guns must come into action in such a way that
they will be able to combine with the firing-line in concentrating an
overwhelming fire against the decisive points of attack. The guns will
generally be able to come into action under cover, and to fire indirect
against the enemy in position. They will only engage the enemy's
artillery if the latter shows itself in open or half-covered positions
with the object of turning its fire on the advancing attack. Otherwise
the fire of the artillery will be directed against the enemy's
firing-line or any mounted detachments that are visible. It is of
importance that a sufficient quantity of ammunition should be brought
up, and that it should not be wasted by random fire against invisible
targets.
The orders for the fight must be issued with great care and clearness,
for, once the battle is begun, it will not generally be possible to
make changes of disposition. The difficulty, also, of changing the
front of the fighting-line increases in proportion to the size of the
units employed. It is therefore of the highest importance not only to
determine the front of attack before the commencement of a fight, but
also to give a clear order allotting a definite task to each unit,
which should, when possible, be made known to all the troops. Only if
this is achieved will they be able to act independently according to
the spirit of the orders.
When all preparatory dispositions have been made, the attack should, if
possible, be commenced simultaneously, unless circumstances demand that
some detachments take up the fire fight before the others are ready
to co-operate. From the moment that the attack is commenced, but one
thought should inspire the troops: "_Forward against the enemy, cost
what it may_." Pressing continually to the front, each must endeavour
to surpass his neighbour. Should further advance be impossible without
reinforcements, the ground won must be maintained at all costs, even
against hostile counter-attack.
The strength of the first deployment of the firing-line must depend
on circumstances. In any case the whole breadth of that part of the
enemy's front must be simultaneously engaged which is able to direct
its fire against the attack, as otherwise the latter will be exposed
to flanking or cross-fire.
If the ground allows of a covered approach to within effective range,
a sufficiently thick firing-line should be established at once. On the
other hand, where cover is scarce, it will sometimes be advisable,
when sufficient time can be spared, to deploy at first only a loose,
irregular firing-line, which will offer a difficult target to the
enemy, or to remain at first under cover and gradually to strengthen
the firing-line in the same way until it attains the strength necessary
to commence the attack. In the further advance, supports must follow
all the firing-lines, to make good losses, keep up the ammunition
supply, and to put new moral strength into the fighting-line.
Open country in such cases demands increased depth in order to minimise
loss, while close country requires that depth should be diminished, and
it will be found advisable to act accordingly. Close formation can and
must be maintained as long as the terrain and the hostile fire admit.
It will of course be impossible to expose such formations within range
of the enemy's fire. The advance will then consist of rushes, with
pauses for breath, of distribution into small units, and the adoption
of extended order. The nearer the decision of the fight, the closer
must the supports follow, ready to co-operate.
In difficult country the order and cohesion of units must not be lost.
It is especially important for the supports as well as the firing-line
to make use of any available cover, so that units may be re-formed,
ammunition supply regulated, and that the officers may regain their
influence over the troops. This latter moral element deserves especial
consideration.
When feeling its way forward the firing-line should avoid regular
formation, and its rushes should not be made in too small bodies, as
such a proceeding is apt to mask the fire of neighbouring detachments.
It will likewise generally happen that some portions of the line are
able to advance under cover of the ground more rapidly than others.
These must then ask themselves the question whether their isolated
advance might not lead to a reverse which would imperil the success
of the attack. On the other hand, the unceasing pressing forward of
all the various detachments is conditional to success. If localities
exist in the foreground which might serve as supporting points for the
further development of the attack, it should be considered whether
they should not be occupied as rapidly as possible, and, where
necessary, secured against counter-attack by being placed in a state
of hasty defence. The advance of neighbouring detachments may then be
facilitated from such points by energetic fire action. Such points
at the same time secure the possession of the ground won and, under
certain circumstances, protect those portions of the artillery and the
machine-gun detachments which may accompany the attack, according as
circumstances dictate. In any case such a measure (the co-operation of
artillery and machine-guns) brings moral support to the attacking-line,
and may at times prevent a defeat.
As soon as the firing-line has arrived within assaulting distance its
fire must be increased to the utmost. All detachments in rear press
forward regardless of loss as soon as they become aware that the
first line is preparing for the assault. At the trumpet-call "Rapid
advance"[38] the whole hurl themselves with the greatest determination
and with loud cheers upon the enemy. Any reserves which may be still
to the rear strain every nerve to reach the advanced firing-line. The
assault should, if possible, be simultaneous. But the effort to secure
this should never lead to detachments waiting for each other. Where a
possibility is offered to single portions of the force to penetrate
into the enemy's position they must advance independently, and all
other detachments must conform.
It is important that the assault should not be begun too early, but
that the firing-line should work its way forward to the closest range
before rising for the final charge. The Infantry Drill Regulations lay
down 150 paces as a guide for this distance in peace. That is a great
deal too much. I do not think that the firing-line, especially in deep
ground or uphill, can "rush" forward in full marching order 150 paces
after having already carried out a lengthy attack. These instructions
of the Infantry Drill should certainly be modified. Cavalry, however,
should not fall into this error. A premature assault may imperil the
success of the attack, because physical force may fail, and the enemy's
fire is given a chance of regaining its full strength. The fire weapon
should rather be used up to the last moment. The assault should take
place only from the closest possible distance, and this will ensure
success. For the rest, I may draw attention to the instructions laid
down in the Cavalry Drill for the dispositions for the attack and for
its conduct. On these points it coincides with my view, and it would
be superfluous here to repeat what lies therein. If I have gone into
the question of the conduct of the attack rather more closely, it
is to emphasise certain points that are not prominent enough in the
compressed instructions of the Regulations, and which do not generally
receive sufficient consideration.
As to surprise fire action, also, the Regulations contain all the
essentials (471-473).[39]
I may, however, touch here upon another matter which is connected with
dismounted action, _i.e._ the question of armament. It has often been
proposed, and from influential quarters, to replace the cavalry sword
by some kind of a bayonet. If, it is said, with a certain appearance of
justification, cavalry are to assault hostile positions on foot, they
must have some _arme blanche_ for the hand-to-hand fight, and this can
only be a bayonet. The war in Manchuria, where such mêlées repeatedly
took place, is cited as a proof of the necessity of such an armament. I
cannot ally myself with such proposals. As to the repeated hand-to-hand
fights in the Russo-Japanese war, these took place principally because
the Russians found it impossible to evacuate their entrenchments in
time, and that they took such full advantage of cover that they were in
some measure surprised by the attacker. These examples can certainly
not be adapted therefore to the dismounted action of our cavalry.
With them it will never be a question of prepared positions--which
cavalry will, as a rule, neither attack nor defend--but of actions
resulting from a battle of encounter. In such cases, however, as the
experience of military history teaches us, a hand-to-hand fight is
quite exceptional. Even the struggle for localities is fought out
almost entirely with the firearm. If the defence should consist of
dismounted cavalry and cyclists, it cannot as a rule be assumed that
such troops will allow the attack to come to close quarters. They will
more generally, as soon as the decision of the fire fight has become
clear, endeavour to reach their horses or cycles and to escape the fire
of the pursuit. As a matter of fact, therefore, dismounted cavalry
would really only use the bayonet on foot in quite exceptional cases,
and it would only be justifiable to introduce it if there were no
attendant disadvantages. Such, however, is not the case. I would regard
the abolition of the present sword as a great danger, calculated to
seriously injure the morale of the cavalry.
Our lance is an excellent weapon for the charge, but for single combat
only in cases where the men have freedom of movement. In the close
turmoil of the fight it is very difficult to handle with success;
besides which, it easily becomes unserviceable on striking an object
too heavily. Should it pierce a body at the full speed of a horse's
gallop it will generally bend on being drawn out (if indeed the rider
in his haste extricates it at all), and then becomes unserviceable. In
such a case the man needs his sword. A short bayonet can never replace
this, and a compromise between a bayonet and a sword would be of but
little service. If the sword is taken away from the cavalry soldier he
will be rendered in many cases weaponless. There can be no doubt of
this. And the consciousness of this drawback would very soon be felt
by the troops and would damp their eagerness for the fight.
The case, then, is this. When confronted by a hostile cavalry of
any activity, the mounted combat, the mêlée, at least for smaller
detachments and patrols, will be of almost daily occurrence; while, as
we have seen, the hand-to-hand fight on foot must be most exceptional.
To injure the efficiency of the troops for their daily rôle for the
sake of such isolated occurrences I hold to be a great mistake, and
therefore hope that the arm will be spared this fate.