When lesser bodies of cavalry, unaccompanied by the other arms, meet
during a mutual advance, it is essentially a matter of endeavouring to
deploy more quickly than the adversary, of surprising him if possible
while still deploying, and of seizing the advantages of the terrain. It
is by good screening of the approach, superior reconnaissance, a quick
eye for the possibilities of the ground, and rapid decision that here,
as before, superiority can be maintained.
It may happen in exceptional cases, under modern conditions, that the
larger bodies of cavalry, accompanied by a proportion of other arms,
are unable at the moment of collision to employ them--_e.g._ in close
country. There may then be a purely cavalry fight on a large scale, and
action must of course be taken according to the tactical principles
involved. Early deployment, maintenance of exterior lines, rapid
decision, are, as regards the leading, the important factors of success.
It is quite another matter where co-operation of the other arms can be
seriously counted on. It is then chiefly the artillery which will set
its stamp upon the development of the fight, and it will no longer
be possible to act according to purely cavalry tactical principles.
A brigade or division, in column of route, or even in several formed
columns, if exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, will suffer such
material and moral loss that such formations, unless compelled by
circumstances, are particularly to be avoided. Whoever is obliged to
effect the deployment of his force under the enemy's guns casts from
him one of the most important elements of success.
It will therefore be necessary, when advancing against the enemy,
to adopt the approach formation, and to seek cover as soon as it is
calculated that the hostile artillery are within effective range. In
order rightly to calculate this moment the enemy's probable advance
must of course be taken into consideration, and, as this may vary
greatly according to the pace adopted, it is advisable in this respect
not to be too optimistic, but to be deployed rather too early than too
late.
Taking into consideration the range of modern artillery, the deployment
should commence, therefore, in open country, at latest when some 6,500
yards from the enemy.[28] As this distance will diminish very quickly
when the opponents are both rapidly advancing, it will certainly be
advisable, if the knowledge of the situation in any way allows, to take
up the required breadth of front still earlier.
I would here lay down that a too rapid advance of our own troops,
unless rendered necessary by the situation, is in no way advantageous.
It is not generally a question of striking the enemy as far to the
front as possible, but of striking surely, and of having sufficient
strength in hand to annihilate him in the pursuit.
A steady and well-thought-out advance should therefore be undertaken;
for a precipitate forward movement distresses the horses quite
unnecessarily, renders an appreciation of the situation more difficult,
and generally allows of no well-considered action. There is also
another reason for avoiding a too rapid advance. This is the fact
that in such a case the most important reports generally come in when
the force is already in the immediate proximity of the enemy. This
disadvantage increases with the rapidity of the advance, as a rapidly
moving force will follow more closely on the heels of its reconnoitring
patrols. To ride slowly forward and to give the patrols time to send
back reports will generally lead to better information as to the
situation, and will allow of a better and quicker decision being made.
The enormous advantage may then be gained of being deployed earlier
than the enemy, and of gaining exterior lines[29] from the beginning.
In spite of this, most cavalry leaders, especially at manoeuvres,
regard their task as a matter of rapidly covering a certain distance,
and see in this the essence of the cavalry spirit. This is, however,
by no means so. Coolness, reflection, economy of force in approach
and deployment, but that lightning-like decision and action at the
proper moment, which can only result from a clear appreciation of the
situation, alone make the great cavalry leader. It is just because such
opposite qualities must be united in the soul of _one_ man that such
leaders are so rare and so difficult to recognise in time of peace.
When a collision with the enemy is in any way in prospect, the
commander must in principle remain, during the advance, with the
foremost detachments of the advanced guard, in order that reports may
reach him as early as possible. When in close proximity to the enemy he
will often be obliged to advance with a sufficient escort from point
to point, in order that he may be able to study the ground from good
points of view, and, where possible, himself observe the movements and
dispositions of the enemy. He will thus be in a position to make his
preliminary arrangements rapidly and effectively, to spare his troops
unnecessary marching, and to counteract any unsuitable dispositions
made by his subordinates. He must not, however, conceal from himself
that even the most effective measures of reconnaissance may fail, and
that he may be faced by the necessity of coming to a decision without
full knowledge as to the enemy.
In such cases, when it can be estimated that deploying distance from
the enemy has been arrived at, further reconnaissance should not be
waited for to assist decision; but the initiative must, under all
circumstances, be maintained. The leader, then, must act according to
his own judgment, and impose the law upon his opponent, and yet be
ready, by careful dispositions, to meet unforeseen events.
It may happen that the opponent is unexpectedly met with, and has
gained an advantage in deployment. In such a case a forward deployment
generally leads to the dribbling up of the force, hampered, as it will
be, by the proximity of the enemy. The deployment should therefore be
made either on the existing line of front or to the rear, according to
the distance from the enemy, and should be covered, where necessary, by
the dismounted action of the advanced guard and by artillery fire. Only
thus can the lost freedom of action be regained, as superior breadth of
deployment is the first and perhaps the most important step towards the
maintenance of the initiative.
We must not, however, assume that this deployment--in a cavalry
division, for instance--requires that the various brigades shall draw
away from each other at regulation intervals, and that the division
will, in this formation, advance towards the enemy. This will generally
be impossible; first, because it is usually advisable to seek the
cover of the ground in order to be secure from possible hostile fire
surprise, even when the enemy's artillery is not yet located; secondly,
because the regulation frontage of deployment of a cavalry division
is much too narrow to allow it to gain exterior lines, or to affect a
concentric attack. The deployment must rather be carried out according
to the demands of the situation at the moment, without regard to
regulation intervals. The division commander will first of all detail a
reserve for himself. To this he will then give the orders necessary for
its conduct as well as to the advanced guard, the various groups of the
main body, and the artillery and machine-guns. The direction of march
of the various subdivisions will thus be determined according to the
ground and the intentions of the commander, and it will also usually
be necessary, in order to keep the troops well in hand, to order the
advance by stages, and to regulate the pace.
If the advance has been carried out in separate columns, the action
of the smaller columns must be regulated before the deployment of
the main column. A certain loss of time will here generally be found
inevitable. The necessary preparations must therefore be made early
enough to ensure that, if the junction of a detachment with the main
body is intended, it will be possible to carry it out before contact
with the enemy is made. It is a matter for especially careful and
well-considered action if one of the lesser columns is to intervene
from a flank direction in a fight which is already raging, an operation
which may be of the most decisive importance, but difficult to effect
in the rapid course of cavalry action. If, however, it is desired to
reap the benefits of such action, an endeavour must be made to gain
time by dismounted action for the arrival of the column which is to
strike the decisive blow. Such measures will always be risky, but may
lead to glorious results.
The orders for the concentration and for the deployment form the
framework on which the whole fight develops. They are therefore of
the highest importance. Faults committed here can seldom be rectified
later, and yet such orders will generally have to be issued before
touch with the enemy is gained, except by patrols, and at a moment
when the main features at most of the enemy's situation are known.
Particular attention must, as we have seen, be paid to his artillery.
No one will deny that herein lies the possibility of misapprehension
and failure, and that many a leader will shrink from the necessity
of such a decision. He, however, who, in spite of the uncertainty of
the situation, succeeds in making up his mind betimes has an obvious
advantage. For it is just in such a battle of encounter that success
will fall to him who knows how to avail himself with rapidity and
determination of the favourable moment, who quickly possesses himself
of important points and localities, and who anticipates the enemy, as
advocated above, in broadening the front, and thereby in deployment.
Under such circumstances the dispositions made for the advanced guard
will be of the greatest importance. Its conduct has often a deciding
influence on the issue of the whole fight.
If it be carelessly handled, this circumstance may mean the loss of the
initiative, and the commander may find himself compelled to turn his
attention to the situation forced upon him by the advanced guard, and
to conduct the fight otherwise than his own intentions and the general
situation demand. On the other hand, a too careful employment of the
advanced detachments is apt to entail loss of advantages which might be
of decisive importance. The proper conduct of such an advanced guard
demands, therefore, an unusually sure military instinct. Its commander
must always be instructed in a detailed manner as to the intentions of
the general, if he is expected to handle his detachment successfully
according to them.
It will often be advisable for the advanced guard to occupy some
point of support dismounted, in order that the deployment and the
further tactical development may be undertaken under cover of it. In
such circumstances there is no reason to shrink, when necessary, from
bringing the advanced guard back to some suitable locality, if thereby
full cover can be afforded for the rear detachments or for separated
portions of the force that may be rejoining. It will often be found
desirable also, in the critical moments of deployment, to strengthen
the resisting power of the advanced guard by machine-guns. It may,
however, on the other hand, be equally advantageous for the advanced
detachments, on collision with the enemy, to charge him recklessly in
order to reap full benefit from some favourable opportunity.
The handling of the artillery, particularly at the moment of
deployment, is of especial importance. It may be a great advantage to
bring it into action before the enemy's artillery, in order to profit
by any carelessness of the hostile troops in deployment and approach,
and to surprise their artillery when coming into position. The conduct
of the advanced guard must therefore be influenced by the fact that
a suitable position must be assured to the artillery. Its fire will
often suffice to induce the enemy to show his strength or to evacuate
localities which he has occupied.
As long as the strength of the enemy is unknown, and the possibilities
of superior force have to be reckoned with, it would be a great error
to stake the whole force as soon as contact has been gained. This is
often done on training-grounds in quite a systematic way, because there
is always a tacit understanding that the enemy is no stronger than
one's own force. In war such action might lead to the gravest disasters.
If, therefore, complete uncertainty reigns as to the enemy's strength,
it will be better at first to operate tentatively with a portion of the
force until an opinion can be arrived at as to whether the decisive
attack can be ventured on. Energetic contact with the enemy by fire
action will generally soon clear up this point.
The view that a gradual and judicious employment of force is not in
accordance with the principles of cavalry action (430)[30] can only
be justified in the case of the pure cavalry combat mounted. This,
however, in my opinion, should only be determined upon if the enemy's
strength is known, at all events to some degree. I do not share the
view of the Regulations that, if uncertainty reigns as to the strength
and intentions of the enemy, freedom of action can be preserved,
even in the mounted combat against cavalry, by the use of formations
in échelon (424).[31] This is only possible by a protracted action
in which gradual reinforcements are used, and only in such a manner
can the enemy be forced to disclose his strength and intentions. A
protracted fight, however, can only be carried out by fire action. A
mounted advance, whether made in échelon or otherwise, cannot alter
the rapid nature of a cavalry fight, and will not allow of sufficient
time being gained to form a proper appreciation of the enemy. Échelon
formations lead at best to eccentric attacks and thereby to unfavorable
tactical situations.
If the situation is to be cleared up by fighting, fire action must be
employed, and as soon as this occurs, whether on the part of the enemy
or oneself, a gradual employment of force is not only no disadvantage,
but is demanded by the circumstances. For at first the fight must
be carried out from depth; the Napoleonic "Je m'engage et puis je
vois"[32] holds good; one's own main force will only be engaged when
the strength and intentions of the enemy become in some measure known.
It will, however, be advisable in all cases to keep a strong reserve in
hand until prepared to advance to a well-considered and planned attack.
The passage of defiles, also, is scarcely likely to be undertaken in
serious war in the manner so often seen at manoeuvres. Here the chief
matter for consideration is generally to keep one side as far from
the defile as possible, in order that the passage of the other may
be possible. Such tender solicitude is scarcely to be expected of a
real enemy, and it will, I opine, scarcely occur to anybody in war to
attempt a defile without preparation, and to advance on the farther
side against an enemy whose strength, as is generally the case in
war, is unknown, thereby running the danger of being thrown back on
the defile and of suffering enormous loss. Such a danger, to which
the whole force is exposed, would certainly only be incurred when the
gravest necessity compelled. What the Regulations say in this respect
(434)[33] has, to my mind, but a limited practical significance.
Such directions would only be followed if the enemy were known to
be still far distant and approaching, where there is time and space
sufficient, and where the force is considered to be at least a match
for the enemy. Even then, preparations should be made for a possible
retirement. In all other cases, however, a defile on the far side of
which the enemy is supposed to be will only be crossed when the ground
for deployment on the far side is at least commanded with fire in such
a way that the enemy will not be able, in case a retirement becomes
necessary, to pursue right into the defile.
It will therefore generally be advisable to throw forward a few
squadrons at a rapid pace across the defile in order to occupy with
dismounted action strong points on the far side, from which the
foreground can be covered. This will secure the passage of the main
body and arrest any possible pursuit. It will often be advantageous to
provide such squadrons with machine-guns. Artillery can most suitably
come into action on the near side of the defile, so that it may be able
to cover the country on the far side with its fire.
Even if a defile occupied by the enemy has been captured by fire action
it is advisable, before the main body crosses it, to secure a few
strong points in the foreground, in order to secure the passage against
counter-attack by the enemy's reserve.
Such necessary care in the preliminaries of an action, however, must
in nowise lead commanders to allow themselves to be forced to adopt
a defensive attitude or to abstain from decisive attack. That is not
the intention. Such measures are only taken to clear up the situation,
which cannot generally be done in war without fighting, and to diminish
the risks of any further action which may ensue. If the enemy has so
far shown himself that an appreciation can to some extent be arrived
at as to its strength, if he has brought artillery into position, if
perhaps he has attacked our advanced guard, or by the action of the
latter has been forced to throw more men into the fight, if, in short,
it can be determined that an attack has prospect of success, then the
decisive offensive must be undertaken with all the force hitherto kept
back. Detachments, also, which have been dismounted can then, according
to circumstances, be withdrawn from the fire fight and otherwise used.
The attack, especially when mounted, will usually be delivered with
greatest advantage from the flank, and must, as a rule, reach well out
in order to escape as far as possible the artillery and machine-gun
fire of the enemy. Whether it be undertaken mounted or dismounted will
depend upon the attitude of the enemy and the attendant circumstances.
In either case it will be advisable to husband a reserve as long as
possible to meet the vicissitudes of the fight, or to be used for a
bold stroke, when it is seen where a decision may be arrived at.
If dismounted action must be undertaken, the principles which govern
the infantry attack hold good. The fire of the artillery and, where
possible, the machine-guns must naturally be utilised for the support
of the attacking troops. The dispositions for the action should,
however, never depend upon the possibility of finding a good artillery
position. The artillery must suit itself to the circumstances, and
come into action wherever it can best co-operate in carrying out
the commander's intentions. It can often be profitably employed
in the protection of an exposed flank. It will be of advantage to
shelter it behind some obstacle in order to save the necessity of
finding a detachment for its security. Machine-guns may sometimes be
advantageously used for the protection of the artillery. It is at the
same time advisable that a specially detailed cavalry escort should be
dismounted for this object.
A concentration of the batteries facilitates fire command and measures
for protection. A dispersion by groups allows a better effect against
the hostile artillery and usually affords a more extensive field of
fire. Machine-guns, which must generally look for positions as far
to the front as possible, or, if they are protected, to a flank, will
usually be best concentrated in a single fire position. They may,
however, be disposed by sections when occasion demands. This principle
holds good also for the artillery. Hard-and-fast rules must be avoided
if the many and varied demands of a cavalry fight are to be met. The
line of fire, however, of artillery and machine-guns should never be
allowed to limit the movements of our own cavalry.
In consequence of the peculiar nature of the cavalry fight it will
often be desirable to keep the limbers with the guns. It may also be an
advantage not to bring the first-line transport and a portion of the
wagons on to the field itself. For similar reasons the light ammunition
columns will at the commencement probably march with the baggage. Thus
too it will often be necessary for the machine-gun detachments to keep
their teams near the guns, or to shoot from the carriage and to leave
the ammunition wagons in a safe place. All these measures contain,
however, the danger that ammunition may not be at hand when wanted, or
that these indispensable supplies may fall into the hands of hostile
raiding parties. The failure of ammunition may, especially in the case
of a protracted dismounted action, be of decisive importance. Such will
be especially the case where the ground favours the use of the rifle,
or where the hostile cavalry is strengthened by cyclists or mounted
infantry and shows an eagerness (natural under such circumstances) to
take advantage of such methods of fighting.
The cavalry leader will, under these conditions, only undertake what
must be an obstinate combat when he cannot in any way avoid it, or at
least is not compelled to attack frontally. He will rather endeavour,
if the general situation allows, to separate the hostile cavalry from
the less mobile infantry by repeated turning movements and then to
attack it when isolated. If the hostile cavalry and horse artillery can
be driven from the field, the infantry detachments will form an easy
prey for the artillery or can be surrounded. Under such circumstances,
always with due regard to the general situation, the road on which
the advance is being made may for a time be abandoned and the turning
movement carried out with the whole force, if such a proceeding affords
a favourable prospect of tactical success. Such a movement threatens
the enemy's communications in the same way as it exposes our own.
Victory, however, will secure the latter again, and will be the more
decisive the farther the enemy can be driven from his natural line of
retreat.
Should the cavalry meet a superior force of all arms, such as might be
pushed forward by the enemy's army, to support the offensive of his
own cavalry, or to serve as a pivot of manoeuvre for them, a decisive
battle must on no account be undertaken with it.
When the Regulations (519)[34] demand that endeavours must be made to
force back such detachments or to break through them, I think that the
tactical value of the arm is over-estimated. I cannot conceive any
real case in which cavalry can break through hostile detachments of
all arms. In my opinion the cavalry will generally have to be content
to make such detachments deploy, by means of artillery fire, and
especially by fire action from a flank, and thereby to lose time, to
deflect them from their line of march, and, by threatening their rear
and communications, prevent them from carrying out their intentions.
Bold measures are in such cases the best, and will preserve to the
cavalry the possibility of continuing the distant reconnaissance in
rear of the hostile detachment.
As to the leading, in all such battles of encounter the commander's
place, as has already been indicated, is at the head of the advanced
guard. As soon, however, as contact has been gained he must, on the
contrary, remain far enough behind the fighting-line to be able to
watch his own troops and the enemy, and to be easily found. He should
not be wandering about the battlefield, seeing everything and arranging
everything himself. Only where it appears necessary to him to make a
moral impression should he place himself at the head of an attacking
force. He might, especially, lead his last reserve into battle, and by
his personal example endeavour to inspire the troops to an impetuous
attack. Such cases, however, will be very exceptional. It will always
be most important that the supreme commander retains control over the
whole of his troops, and can receive messages and at decisive moments
issue orders and instructions to the force.
In the greater number of cases the commander will personally neither
reconnoitre the ground whither he is sending a detachment nor yet the
enemy which it shall engage. He will scarcely ever be able to give to
single small units or even to the directing brigade, if indeed he has
detailed one, the direction of attack. It will often be impossible for
changes in orders to reach troops once set in motion in time to be of
use, especially in a purely cavalry fight.
When the Regulations, in spite of this, declare it to be indispensable
that the leader _himself_ must be able to see if he takes the offensive
against cavalry (403),[35] this is, under modern conditions and large
formations, in most cases quite impracticable, even in manoeuvres. As
a rule the commander will only be able to indicate _the task_, and it
must be left to the subordinate leaders to carry it out to the best of
their ability, according to the situation as they find it on the spot.
The situation during the rapidly changing phases of the cavalry fight
will often be quite different from what was expected when the tasks
were allotted.
On the other hand, before the commencement of the engagement, all
subordinate leaders must be informed as to the situation and the
general idea of the fight, also as to what duties each one of the
larger formations is to carry out; so that all may be in a position
to act according to the views and intentions of the commander if
circumstances should be found different from what was expected. It
will in most cases be desirable to issue the order for deployment in
such a way that at least every brigade commander is informed of the
general situation, and then to give supplementary orders for the fight
which will be issued to all units. Whether in a battle of encounter
it will be always possible to detail a directing brigade I very much
doubt. One brigade will often fight on foot, the other mounted, while
the change from the advanced-guard rôle to deployment for battle
will generally render a handling of the division according to rule
practically impossible. The idea that, with an independent army cavalry
in the battle of encounter, one division can in some measure be handled
as on the drill-ground, and can be put into the fight in proper
cohesion, must be dismissed. That is an error that has grown upon the
exercise-ground, and which the conditions of modern warfare will not
admit.
The more, however, that the method of leading is compelled by the
pressure of modern development to change from tactical routine and
adopt a more or less strategic form, the more unconditionally is it
demanded of subordinate leaders that they be, even when independent,
continually conscious of the guiding tactical principles, and endeavour
to act in accordance with them.
The necessary consideration for the effect of the enemy's fire
should never lead to fainthearted dispositions or paralyse the idea
of decisive offensive action. If the result of the fight appears
doubtful, the most decisive measures must be taken with rapidity and
determination, and the last reserve thrown into the fight, regardless
of consequences, in order to wrest victory from the enemy. For daring
is in itself a mighty factor of success, and one which exercises
enormous influence on the fickle Goddess of Fortune. The calculated
boldness of all, and the greatest initiative within reasonable limits
of subordinate leaders, must give to the fight of the cavalry mass its
peculiar character.
It appears to me that this principle cannot be too greatly emphasised
when considering the cavalry tactics of the present day.
If the fight takes a favourable course, the commander will make timely
preparations for an effective pursuit, get control of any reserves
still intact, and take measures for the concentration of strong
bodies of his troops, so as to be prepared for further tactical
action. Artillery and machine-guns advance rapidly--when necessary, on
their own initiative--in order to come to effective range as soon as
possible. Should the fight take an unfavourable turn, the commander
will first make dispositions for these arms, unless they are to
remain in position and sacrifice themselves to facilitate retirement.
They will generally be sent to the rear in good time to a previously
selected position. Only then will measures be taken to extricate the
troops involved with the enemy, to concentrate them in a safe place,
and to make fresh dispositions. Should the enemy pursue with but weak
detachments, the offensive should be renewed.