The duties of the distant patrols are just as difficult as those of the
reconnoitring squadrons, as they are continually brought face to face
with the necessity of forming independent decisions, and, in order to
act and report efficiently, require a high degree of strategic insight.
Apart from the personal capacity of the officer commanding the patrol,
a thorough training emphasising the essential points in its conduct is
necessary for the men.
I have already shown the lines on which such instruction should be
conducted. I would here, however, like to add that the patrol leader,
if he is in any doubt, can clear up the situation in his mind by
cross-questioning himself. It should never suffice to him that the
authority who set him the task veiled his responsibility by general
verbiage. The task must be definitely determined; whether negative
reports are required or not, and when and where reports are to be
sent, more especially when touch has been lost with the squadron. The
complete instructions must of course be confided to the second in
command of the patrol, and the general task to be fulfilled to each
member of it.
For the conduct of the patrol it is a matter of still greater
importance than for the squadron, which has a certain fighting
strength, whether it is acting in its own or in hostile country. It
will have the same points to consider as in the case of a squadron, but
in hostile country its conduct must be still more circumspect, while
in friendly country, where concealment is more easy, its action can be
correspondingly bolder.
If long distances are to be covered, the patrol should remain on the
road until it reaches country where an encounter with the enemy
is likely. The passage through large villages peopled by hostile
inhabitants is to be avoided.
Horses should not be fed, at least in hostile country, in the
neighbourhood of villages or on the main road, but always in a safe
place, and a proportion of them only at a time. In friendly country
they may best be fed in the larger villages, which the hostile patrols
will avoid, but should not halt on the main road.
When the locality is reached where a meeting with hostile detachments
may be expected, the patrol should advance in _bonds successifs_. It
must, unfortunately, be admitted that such methods appear to be quite
foreign to most patrol leaders; at all events, they are seldom applied
in manoeuvres. Most of them ride forward with praiseworthy speed along
the road until they collide with the enemy; then, indeed, they begin
to observe him, without asking themselves whether in war the result
of such tactics would not have already compromised their chances of
success. For if they are once discovered by the enemy they may count on
being relentlessly hunted and pursued, so that there will no longer be,
in most cases, any further possibility of deliberate observation.
Very different indeed are the circumstances when, from a well-chosen
point of view, a patrol is successful in detecting the enemy before
coming into immediate collision with him. The patrol can then order the
whole of its conduct according to its knowledge of the enemy before it
is discovered, and has a very much greater prospect of attaining good
results.
We must lay down here, once and for all, that the distant observation
with the glass is by far the most important; it affords the best survey
over the general conditions, and a better possibility of sending back
a report safely and quickly. It is just in this method of observation
that, in consequence of our peace conditions, patrols are generally so
badly trained. Again and again they fall into the error of approaching
too close to the enemy and, in order to see as much of him as possible,
let him march past them. They are then compelled to send in their
reports from places which lie behind the belt of the hostile service of
security. The despatch-riders have then to ride from the rear through
the hostile advance-guard, outposts, and patrol system.
In peace, where there are no bullets, and prisoners may not be made,
these methods lead to the best results, and to their being employed
again and again, particularly if the superior commanders are inclined
to praise such too complete information instead of condemning it.
In truth, it is the worst system that could be conceived. Properly
speaking, such protracted observation is only possible under certain
circumstances; for instance, if the outer flank of the enemy's advance
has been turned, then perhaps there might be a chance of sending
reports round the flank of the hostile zone of security. It should,
however, be quite inadmissible for a patrol to remain in this manner
_between_ the hostile columns of the enemy's army. Unless it were
unusually lucky, it would quickly be detected and captured; more
particularly if the inhabitants were hostile. It is quite another
matter where a hostile screen has to be broken through. This can
generally only be accomplished by fighting; and it is the first duty
of the reconnoitring squadron to break through the enemy's screen.
Patrols also, which in such a case have succeeded in getting behind
the enemy's outpost-line, cannot count upon sending back messages as
they please. It will only be a question of a rapid offensive through
the screen towards the main body of the enemy. The patrols will then
be surrounded, and must at once proceed to effect their return, and
only report what they have seen when they have successfully broken back
again through the enemy's screen. Despatch-riders have, in such a case,
small prospect of getting through. The less it is possible to observe
and report, the more carefully must the points for breaking through be
chosen, and attention must therefore be paid to reaching good points of
vantage that command a view of places of probable importance.
The time chosen for observation is also of great importance. The enemy
can best be observed, and his strength and intentions appreciated, when
he is on the move. Marches are generally undertaken in the morning,
and towards the evening one may expect to find the enemy in quarters.
Under such circumstances observation is difficult. The patrol leader
must therefore arrange to reach in the morning those points from which
he expects to be able to observe the enemy on the march. He will then
be obliged in most cases to fall back before the advancing enemy, and
will endeavour to ascertain his halting-place and the approximate line
taken up by his outposts. If a distant patrol should be successful in
obtaining such information it will generally have done as much as is
expected of it. It is for the tactical close reconnaissance to send in
information as to details. From the distant reconnaissance it is only
required to form the foundations on which the Head Quarters can base
its decisions. This fact should be borne in mind while reporting on the
enemy.
These duties can for the rest be only carried out under war conditions
and against an enemy who is working to the same end, if undertaken in
a regular and systematic way and with great boldness.
The patrol leader, therefore, should generally make his plan in the
evening for the following day. It will be desirable for him to study
the map very closely, and to impress on his memory the main roads and
especially points which appear to be suitable for observation. He can
thus obtain an impression of the succession of stages necessary for his
advance, and judge how he can best spare his horses without prejudicing
the success of the reconnaissance.
For a patrol to move _en masse_ without scouts, as unfortunately is
often done in peace, is altogether out of the question. In war such
conduct must often be paid for by the lives of the patrol and the
complete failure of the enterprise. A point must always be sent so far
ahead that the patrol will not come under fire at the same time with
it. It should never happen that the point collides unexpectedly with
the enemy. A rear-guard will also in most cases be found desirable.
Circumstances must determine how the flanks can best be protected.
Should the patrol be obliged to ride through country where it might
be surprised, it will be advisable first to make a halt and to send
on scouts. Manoeuvres have repeatedly proved that the point is
insufficient in such a case.
It is in most cases quite inadmissible, especially in hostile country,
to divide the patrol and to arrange a meeting-place farther to the
front. As there will usually be at most but one map available, the
detached party will find themselves in the enemy's country without
means of locating themselves, probably unable to make themselves
understood by the inhabitants, and in any case will run the danger of
being betrayed by them. It will not even be of much avail if they are
given some kind of sketch if they meet with and are chased by the enemy.
I should therefore like to utter a warning against the custom of such
division of patrols in peace which could not be carried out in the
enemy's country. In friendly country they are possible, but always
dangerous. The various detachments having insufficient fighting
strength, the possibility of sending back information will be reduced
and a junction will always be doubtful, while any collision with the
enemy may make it impossible.
There is another error into which patrols frequently fall in peace
manoeuvres, and that is, of leaving the road assigned to them for
observation without sufficient reason, and of using other roads upon
which other patrols are working. Even when a patrol has sure indication
that it will not meet with the enemy upon the road assigned to it, it
should still remain upon this road, and send back definite negative
information, even if no instructions to this effect have been received.
On collision with the enemy's patrols, action must be taken in as
offensive a spirit as possible, but after due reflection. Should a
charge promise any kind of success, the opponent must be attacked in
the most determined way. It will also often be possible to defeat an
enemy of superior numbers by a carefully laid ambush. Every success of
this kind will increase our own moral superiority, paralyse the enemy's
reconnaissance, and facilitate the transmission of information. Before
attacking, however, it should always be ascertained whether the enemy
is followed by any close support which might turn an initial success
into a worse defeat. Thus it does not, for example, promise success
to attack the point of an advancing squadron under the apprehension
that it is a single patrol. Making prisoners and carrying them off, or
sending them back under escort from the patrol, is to be deprecated.
They can generally be rendered harmless by depriving them of their
horses, arms, and boots. Good captured horses, however, should be
always used, either to replace the tired cattle of the patrol, or lead
with it in reserve.
Should the patrol meet with a superior force of cavalry, it must
endeavour to extricate itself and to get round the enemy's flank.
Under such circumstances the ability to ride quickly and safely across
country will be of great service. But it is important, as soon as the
patrol is in safety, that it should again reach the road detailed to
it, and also that the men should be instructed as to how to avoid the
enemy, when carrying messages to the rear, without losing their way.
When a patrol has been successful, by judicious riding, determined
fighting, and clever avoidance of the enemy, in obtaining information
as to the enemy, it is of the utmost importance what information is to
be sent back, and when and how it should be sent.
As I have already indicated above, the patrol must be perfectly clear
as to what facts are most important from the Head Quarters' point of
view. If the opposing armies are still so far apart that a collision
cannot be expected, only those matters that are of strategic importance
need be ascertained and transmitted: _e.g._ number of the hostile
columns, objective of the day's march, any circumstances that lend
themselves to a conclusion as to alterations in the enemy's direction
of march or the combination of his forces. In such a case there is
no need for information as to details. The closer, however, the
opposing armies approach one another, the more does information which
is of tactical significance increase in importance. It is not always
advisable to confine oneself to reporting the bare facts. It will often
be desirable to indicate also the process of reasoning by which the
reporting officer arrives at his impression, for this originates from a
number of _imponderabilia_ which cannot always be detailed in a report.
When this is done, it must be thoroughly and carefully considered how
far this personal impression is dependent upon facts, or if it does
not rather rest upon certain feelings, as to the cause of which no
clear account can be given. Should the latter be the case, the personal
point of view is best left out. Preconceived opinions originate but too
easily in war, and may lead to a biassed interpretation of reports,
and, consequently, to faulty dispositions. The facts must always be
weighed with sober impartiality. Only thus can a true and definite
appreciation be arrived at.
The same naturally holds good for those reports which are sent in from
the reconnoitring squadrons or other reporting centres. The method in
which such information is sifted for passing on brings into play, in
a certain sense, personal conceptions. It is therefore all the more
necessary to reflect seriously over their preparation.
It is imperative that any important information should reach the Head
Quarters of the army or the Great Head Quarters as early as possible,
at all events, early enough to allow of the measures rendered necessary
by the enemy's movements to be initiated and carried out. The patrol
leader must therefore consider the time requisite for a wheel or other
such movement of a modern army in order to calculate what is the latest
time, under any circumstances, that his information must be sent in.
It is obvious, and has already been demonstrated, that he should be
instructed as to the advance of his own army in order that he may be
able to appreciate these matters.
As already stated, it will, as a rule, be necessary for a distant
patrol only to send in two messages daily. The first contact with the
hostile infantry must always be reported. It will generally suffice if
the direction of march of the enemy and the march-objective reached by
him are reported. It will often be desirable to send back only a single
report, setting forth the events of the day. On the other hand, the
method of despatch of such messages must be most carefully prepared.
During the advance of the patrol the leader must call the attention
of his men, more especially from any good look-out points, to any
prominent features passed. He must make marks at difficult places, and
where the main roads have to be left, to assist them in finding their
way back.
Reports should only be sent from some point from which the
despatch-riders have, at least to a certain degree, a safe route, where
they will not have to pass through any hostile outposts, occupied
localities, or defiles. It is highly desirable to continually instruct
the patrol as to the route to the rear, and as to its conduct under
special circumstances, and to give it a sketch of the road. The latter
should contain not only names, which will not be of much use to the
patrol, but characteristic marks which may be used as points of
orientation--forked roads and the like--to assist the men in choosing
the right road. Orderlies should be told the general contents of
messages which they carry.
It is quite out of the question that in war, and especially in hostile
country, despatch-riders will be allowed to ride about free from harm,
as they are unfortunately allowed to do in peace. The endeavour to send
many, and often superfluous, messages by a few men always eventually
leads to the sending of single horsemen as despatch-riders. Such a
custom, which in war must lead to disastrous consequences, cannot be
too sharply reproved.
Single orderlies, in hostile country, cannot be sent, except where
they know the district, and where collision with the enemy's patrols
is out of the question. When long distances have to be covered, there
is also the danger that a horse may succumb, or that the inhabitants
may stop the man. The fact that, in the Franco-Prussian War, the custom
of sending single despatch-riders proved itself generally, if not
entirely, sufficient must not be regarded as of great significance,
as at that time there was no question of having to reckon with the
opposition of hostile cavalry. In a modern war it will certainly be
different, and we may be quite sure that the cavalry of each army will
strive its utmost not only to reconnoitre, but also to prevent the
enemy reconnoitring. The distances to be covered, also, will be very
different from those of 1870-71.
The single despatch-rider, therefore, especially in the case of the
distant patrol, must be replaced by a reporting patrol. This can best
be formed of three men, who can mutually support each other, and,
should they meet with the enemy, have more chance of escape than a
single horseman. For very important information, and against strong
opposition, several such patrols must be sent by different routes.
In friendly country, where the population will give all possible
support, the single despatch-rider can, for short distances, be more
often used, and the reporting patrols can be made weaker according to
circumstances.
These circumstances must determine, as we have seen, the strength of
patrols, and the time which they can stay out without relief.
Patrols must choose their accommodation for the night with great care.
It is obvious that for them, as for the reconnoitring squadrons, it is
of great importance whether they are in their own or hostile country.
In their own country it will often be safer to seek shelter for the
night in the larger villages, because such places will, as a rule,
be avoided by hostile troops. It is, however, not only a question
of safety, but also of keeping the road confided to them in sight
during the night, and of interrupting the transmission of the enemy's
intelligence, which will, like our own, be most active after dark.
His despatch-riders, however, will most probably endeavour to avoid
villages. For the rest, patrols in their own country can choose their
accommodation freely according to the situation, and can at least
always get under cover, even when in the neighbourhood of the enemy.
In hostile country, however, the conditions are different. Isolated
and far distant from support, the patrols run great danger, even from
the inhabitants themselves, and should never try to spend the night in
enclosed villages or farms. If they wish to get cover for the night,
they must look for single houses close to the road, and take measures
that the inhabitants do not betray them to any of the enemy's troops
or to partisans that may be in the neighbourhood. They must also be
careful to keep a good look-out and be ready to get away at a moment's
notice. They should not, however, as long as it is possible, lose
sight of the road detailed to them until absolutely forced to, but
should watch it by an advanced post in order to interrupt the enemy's
transmission service.
When in the presence of the enemy, it will be advisable not to seek
shelter, but to spend the night in woods, or at all events distant
from localities where forage or food has been requisitioned. Horses
may then be off-saddled and fed, singly or by groups, according to
circumstances. Special measures of safety are also necessary under such
circumstances.
It is of great importance to establish communication with the
reconnoitring squadron during the night halt and to adhere closely,
when it is at all possible, to any arrangements made with it. It may
very easily happen, as we have seen, that the task of the reconnoitring
squadron may be changed, and that it may be required to operate in
new directions. It is, therefore, important that the patrols do not
get lost to the squadron, but are in a position to receive fresh
instructions. The patrols can also utilise this opportunity for
receiving reinforcements if necessary.
The patrol may sometimes lose connection with the squadron; it will
then be generally most advisable for it to remain in observation of
that portion of the enemy which has been found upon the road allotted
to it. If this should entail a change of direction, reports should be
sent direct to that portion of the army which is assumed to be the
nearest according to the general situation. This must not, however,
be regarded as a hard-and-fast rule. It should rather be left to the
independent decision of the officer how he will act in the particular
case. Independence of judgment and of character is of the highest
importance, especially when on patrol. These qualities can, however,
only be effective if cavalry officers are instructed as to the
conditions of modern armies and are quite clear in theory as to the
duties and methods of conducting patrols. It is to be hoped that they
will in future realise the obligation of applying themselves most
seriously to this branch of their important duties, that they may be
thoroughly prepared and capable of the greatest effort when the call to
arms resounds in bloody earnest through the land.