Within certain limits determined by the various crises of the fight
the reconnoitring duties of the cavalry are continuous. As the hostile
armies approach one another, distant exploration merges into close
reconnaissance, and from the latter evolves the battle reconnaissance,
when the heavily-charged thunder-clouds of war come into collision, and
the brazen dice of battle are thrown.
Within these limits the arrangements made for reconnaissance should not
require fresh dispositions, but merely supplementing as they gradually
develop from strategical into tactical measures. This is a matter for
consideration when detailing close patrols, as the tendency is to be
too prodigal of the scanty force at disposal. When the army cavalry
concentrates towards the flank of the army, the detachments of it
which have been carrying out the reconnaissance against the enemy's
front must be gradually relieved by the divisional cavalry. The army
cavalry will only be able to assist the divisional cavalry in the close
reconnaissance by the action of those portions of it which may fall
back behind the front of their own army. In such a case all should
be placed under a single command, to prevent useless expenditure of
force and contradictory orders. Whether the divisional cavalry is
to be reinforced by the army cavalry or _vice versâ_, or whether a
separate sphere of action is to be assigned to each, must depend on
circumstances.
It will, however, seldom happen that the army cavalry will fall back
behind the front of its own army. It will nearly always be most
advantageously placed on the flank of the army, and will therefore
only have to carry out such reconnaissance as is possible from this
position. Such reconnaissance, however, is generally the most important.
As already indicated, the reconnoitring squadrons will gradually fall
back upon the army cavalry itself, or upon the advancing columns of
the main army which will now be approaching them. The reconnoitring
squadrons on the outer flank will, however, be well advised not to join
themselves at once to the main body of the cavalry. They must rather
seek to operate against the rear of the enemy, who is already deployed,
or against his lines of advance, in order to be able to report the
presence of any approaching hostile reserves as early as possible. As
a single example of this, had the French at Mars la Tour acted in this
manner they would very soon have discovered the approach of Wedel's
Brigade and its approximate strength. They would not then have been
surprised by the attack of this brigade nor would they have mistaken
it for the advance-guard of the Third Army. One may well assume that
after dealing with Wedel's Brigade the French would, under such
circumstances, have proceeded to undertake a general offensive, and
that the fortunes of the day might have been with them.
The close reconnaissance before the decisive battle must seek, above
all things, to obtain an idea of the grouping of the hostile forces.
Herein lie the conditions of success or failure. To this end endeavours
must be made to get far round the front of the enemy and to observe as
many lines of approach as possible. Rapid and distant patrol riding and
the straining of every nerve must be demanded in such cases.
When the whole force is to be employed, the army cavalry must
endeavour to pave the way for these patrols. If it has been possible
to defeat the hostile cavalry before the decisive battle, this will
be comparatively easy. Otherwise, every means must now be employed to
bring about this decision and to carry it to a successful conclusion,
as well as to deal with other troops which may seek to cover the
enemy's flanks.
That the position of the army cavalry for such duties should not be in
rear of a flank of its own army need scarcely be emphasised. It should
rather strive with all energy to _échelon_ itself in advance of the
wing of its own army and to maintain itself on the enemy's flank. It
will thus be in a position during the period of close reconnaissance to
support its own reconnoitring organs and either to join the battle, or
operate against the flanks and rear of the enemy.[8]
As to the close reconnaissance patrols and the combat patrols, as clear
and definite orders must be given them as to the distant patrols to
operate in certain particular directions or block certain roads. The
arrangements for their return or relief must leave no room for doubt if
it is desired to be independent of the discretion of the patrol leader,
and to be convinced that the observation in all important directions is
being carried out.
It will often be necessary, especially during the period of close
reconnaissance in flank or rear of the enemy, to make the patrols
strong enough to be able to fight their own way, for it will generally
be impossible to support them from the rear. Should it be found
impossible otherwise to break through the thick screen of the hostile
service of security, whole squadrons may operate as patrols, and must
exert all their endurance and speed to attain their object.
When a decision is impending, it is of the greatest importance that the
service of transmission should be especially swift and sure, for there
will be but little time available in which to make fresh arrangements
to meet any newly ascertained movement on the part of the enemy. It
will be necessary under such circumstances to supply even patrols with
the light-signal apparatus, even though there is a danger that these
may be lost. If they are able somewhere from the rear of the hostile
army to flash back an important message _in time for it to be of use_
they will fully have answered their purpose. It will of course be
impossible under such circumstances to establish permanent stations.
Before the departure of a patrol the men must be carefully instructed
as to the point that will most probably be chosen as a receiving
centre, and must make a mental note of its position on the ground, and
also of those places from which it is hoped to send back intelligence.
They must endeavour to escape the enemy's notice and to avoid his
pursuit. When necessary, they must be prepared to fight for possession
of that point from which they expect to be able to transmit reports.
That any intelligence transmitted by signal must also be sent to the
rear by a reporting patrol, goes without saying.
In such situations the activity of the cavalry must be increased to the
utmost, and their action characterised by feverish energy. The last
drop of blood and the latest breath of man and horse must be devoted to
fulfilling the task of reconnaissance.
It is obvious that in such periods of crisis cavalry cannot go into
quarters for the night, whether in friendly or hostile country. It will
be best for them to remain concealed in woods, where they will, as a
rule, be discovered with difficulty. For the rest, the night is the
time which will generally be used for transmitting reports. In friendly
country the assistance of the inhabitants must be used for this purpose
as much as possible. The enemy must continually find himself moving in
the close meshes of a net of hostile enterprise. In hostile country it
will be necessary to requisition supplies by force, but this should
never be done in the area in which observation is required. Where
requisitions have been made in the neighbourhood of the enemy, patrols
should quickly move away, in order not to be surprised, as Count
Zeppelin was in the Schirlenhof, before the battle of Wörth.[9]
For the reconnaissance on the battlefield itself--in contradistinction
to the energetic action in the flanks and rear of the enemy--officers
provided with good glasses must be employed. The scissors telescope,
which no higher cavalry leader should be without, should also be used
for this purpose. Observation should be made, when possible, from some
secure place, and endeavours made to recognise the moment for action
and intervention in the battle. Observation carried out by patrols
from the front during the battle of the measures taken by the enemy is
unpractical and only possible in peace, and is a procedure that is the
outcome of the requirements of leaders lacking in determination, who
wish to be continually informed down to the smallest details about the
enemy, instead of trusting with self-confidence to the compelling force
of their own measures. Patrol service during the battle itself is a
matter for the infantry, and can be carried out by no other troops.