corporations. As early as 1894, Mr. Elihu Root, speaking in the New
York Constitutional Convention in favour of an amendment prohibiting
contributions from such sources, said:—“It strikes at a constantly
growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain
people of small means of this country in our political institutions
than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation
of our government.” Even now that the turning point has been passed
and we are clearly on the way to better things there are few students
of our public life who would dissent from Mr. Root’s judgment of
the seriousness of the question raised by corporate contributions
to campaign funds. Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Florida, were
pioneers in acting on this conviction, all four having passed laws in
1897 absolutely forbidding such gifts.[85] Several states followed in a
desultory fashion until in 1907 a sudden burst of legislative activity
occurred as a result of the New York insurance revelations. In that one
year no fewer than eleven states passed laws forbidding life insurance
companies to contribute, and five other states forbade all corporations
of whatever sort to make contributions to campaign funds.
It is frequently objected to laws of this character that they are
worthless because they can readily be evaded. A corporation may
secretly direct one of its officials to make a large contribution
with the understanding that the money is to be returned to him later,
concealed, it may be, in the price paid for some property which he
sells the corporation. No doubt evasion of this sort is possible, but
it will hardly become common because it involves the collusion of so
many men not only in the management of the corporation but also in the
party management, all of whom will fully understand the criminal nature
of the transaction. On the corporation side, moreover, the act remains
a gift, and withal a gift of a much more hazardous nature and one much
less certain to bring returns than such gifts are reputed to have been
in the past. Now even under the most favourable circumstances giving,
whether by corporations or by individuals, is a somewhat painful
process. The absence of souls in the case of the former does not seem
to make their feeling of sacrifice any the less keen. It is highly
improbable, therefore, that in addition to this natural obstacle and
other disadvantages corporations are likely to run the risks of penal
law frequently in order that they may bestow their surplus wealth upon
party organisations.
Of course there are corporations so largely owned by individuals and
so thoroughly identified with the latter that a contribution from
them may seem to amount to the same thing as a contribution from the
corporation. Technically, however, the money must be offered as a
personal gift, and party managers might defend themselves on this score
in case the contributor afterwards demanded a corrupt favour in the
interest of his corporation. If the public remains suspicious of such
large personal contributions by corporate managers the further step may
be taken of fixing by law the maximum amount to be contributed by any
individual.
Considering the special disabilities which have been laid upon
corporations in the matter of campaign contributions it is indeed
remarkable that similar restrictions have not been suggested for other
associations. Either by gradually extending this policy or by a single
sweeping measure the right of contribution may finally be brought to
as purely individual a basis as the right of suffrage itself. Some
partnerships, particularly in manufacturing and the express business,
have been notorious seekers after special privileges, but not being
corporations there is nothing to prevent them from contributing
largely to campaign funds. Labour unions might be developed into very
heavy contributors to campaign funds. Although in the latter case the
contributions would come from a great number of individuals giving
relatively small amounts each, yet the machinery of organisation and
the emulation it could excite among the members might prove potent in
producing very large sums in the aggregate. The same considerations
apply to clubs, whether purely social or propagandist in character,
which can contribute great sums without revealing the identity of large
donors among their members,—except perhaps privately to the financial
officers of a campaign committee. If publicity reveals any such abuses
legislation to correct them along the same lines as our present
corporate prohibitions may prove desirable.
Next to contributions by corporations political contributions from
candidates would seem to stand most in need of restriction. The
English Corrupt and Illegal Practice Prevention Act is very explicit
and drastic on this subject. It even goes to the length of forbidding
contributions for charitable purposes subsequent to the public
announcement of the candidate’s intention to stand for a borough. Our
own legislation, however, has been very fragmentary except in so far
as candidates were affected by the general publicity requirements. By
an act which went into effect, August, 1892, Massachusetts prohibited
political committees from soliciting contributions from candidates who,
however, might “make a voluntary payment of money—for the promotion of
the principles of the party which the committee represents, and for
the general purposes of the committee.” While doubtless excellent as a
statement of ideal relations it is questionable whether this enactment
materially increased the obstacles intervening between campaign
committees and candidates’ pocketbooks. At least the legislature of
the same state found it necessary in 1908 to provide that political
committees should not solicit money from a candidate as a prerequisite
to giving him his nomination papers.[86] A new departure was made by
the Ohio law of 1896, known as the Garfield Act,[87] which endeavoured
to grade candidates’ expenses according to the number of votes cast,
limiting them to $100 for five thousand voters or less, and providing
that they should not exceed $650 in any case.[88] In case of violation
the office of a successful candidate could be declared vacant at any
time during his term. California, Missouri, Montana, Minnesota,
and New York, have also attempted the limitation of candidates’
contributions or expenditures.[89] In 1895, Connecticut and New York
forbade contributions by candidates except to authorised committees
or party agents.[90] California, in 1907, adopted the rather doubtful
expedient of limiting contributions from candidates according to
the length of term and salary of the office for which they are
contesting.[91] Perhaps the most significant step that has been taken
in this direction was the action of New York which in 1906 prohibited
contributions from candidates for judicial offices.[92]
With these exceptions contributions by candidates are in general
free from legal regulation. There have been comparatively few great
exposures to awaken the public conscience to the abuses that have
grown up in this connection, but as to the widespread and extremely
scandalous nature of these abuses no one who is in the least familiar
with practical politics can have the slightest doubt. Broadly
considered any large contribution by a candidate toward his own
election is manifestly indelicate, not to say frankly improper. Custom
has rendered us so familiar with this practice, however, that we are
inclined to accept it as a matter of course. There is a certain
gambling spirit inherent in politics which is profoundly potent for
evil. Primarily this is due, of course, to the inevitable uncertainties
of campaigning. No single factor contributes to it more largely than
the habit of “assessing” candidates for office. Honest and able men
are frequently repelled from politics when they encounter this system.
Some of them may hesitate to make the material sacrifices involved and
are consequently deemed miserly by the politicians, although it is
not the amount of money demanded but rather the uses to which these
men know the money will be put that leads them to withdraw. It is not
too much to maintain that the conditions now existing in many places
are worse than the property qualifications once required by law to
make one eligible to hold office. Our present “voluntary” contribution
system, rendered practically obligatory by party authorities, is more
burdensome on the candidate than a property qualification because
it requires him not only to have property but also to sacrifice a
considerable part of it to obtain office or the chance of office. The
old property qualifications were really lighter and more democratic
since they merely required prospective office holders to own so
much, and all who possessed more than this fixed sum were eligible
equally. The existing system which allows voluntary contributions
by candidates unlimited as to amount is equivalent to a property
qualification interpreted in the light of the prospective generosity
of the candidate. Party managers are continually under temptation to
name the man who has the more money and can be expected to make the
larger contribution. Of course this does not mean that the man with
the biggest “bar’l” is always nominated. Other qualifications such as
the man’s education, character, and equipment for campaigning, must be
taken into account as well as his ability and inclination to pay. Or if
one candidate is placed on the ticket solely because of his liberality
the general average must be raised by a larger admixture of brains and
character on the part of his running mates. So long as candidates’
contributions are unlimited as to amount we are, nevertheless, openly
tolerating conditions which give the maximum effect to wealth as a
qualification for public office. True we wish to encourage our men of
wealth to go into politics, but we desire them to do so on the basis
of their brains and character, not on the basis of their dollars. Even
without the use of money in their own interest they enjoy a tremendous
advantage for candidacy in their leisure and freedom from material
cares. On the other hand the multi-millionaire backed almost solely
by his own wealth and unlimited as to the amount he can spend on his
campaigning has already caused considerable annoyance in our political
life and is likely to become an unmitigated nuisance if checks are not
applied betimes. Although cases of this sort are relatively infrequent
as yet they are likely to occur more commonly in the future. Business
prizes have been so large until recently that they have absorbed the
attention of most of our men of wealth. To our captains of industry the
money rewards of an office were as nothing, and the honour it conferred
added little to their importance. Washington’s recently acquired
prominence as a winter residence for wealthy families may appear to
be nothing more than a whim of gilded society, but the relationships
thus established are certain to stimulate political ambitions in
new quarters. With increasing power and social prestige attached to
office,[93] more owners of great fortunes are likely to enter politics
in the future. In general we have every reason to rejoice that this
is the case, but we should also endeavour to adjust the terms of
competition so that no undue political weight shall be given to the
brute force of millions.
Underlying the system of contributions by candidates is the uncritical
view that the latter should pay largely because they are to enjoy
personally the honours and emoluments of office. Nominees, at least
successful nominees, are deemed to be the special favourites of the
party, and hence morally obligated to contribute generously to its
support. Little consideration is given by those holding such views
to the tremendous tax laid upon the vitality of candidates by the
strenuous modern methods of campaigning, certainly a burden large
enough in most cases to justify their exemption from heavy financial
contributions in addition. But there are other and more serious logical
defects in the theory justifying such impositions upon candidates.
Normally, of course, assessments of this character must be recouped
out of the earnings of the office, although it is said sometimes to
happen that the sum demanded for campaign expenses is larger than the
salary for the entire term of occupancy. One of our states, as we have
seen, attempts to limit candidates’ contributions to a certain ratio of
official earnings.[94] The clear implication of all this is that the
salary of office is considered to represent first, a payment for the
public services rendered by the office holder, and second, a surplus
over the preceding which should be devoted to campaign expenses. If we
accept this view we virtually accept the principle of the payment of
campaign expenses in part at least by the state. One who repudiated
this principle might therefore consistently demand the reduction of
all official salaries by the amount of the campaign surplus which
they contain over and above the value of services actually rendered
by incumbents. As a matter of fact such a reduction would be most
unfortunate, the truth being, as we have already had occasion to note,
that most official salaries in the United States are too low. And,
finally, a consistent believer in the principle of the payment of
campaign contributions by the state might object to its realisation
through the underhanded and coercive method of assessments levied upon
candidates. Some perfectly frank and legal method of administering the
subsidy would be far preferable.
Both in practice and theory, therefore, grave objections may be urged
against a _laisser faire_ policy in regard to campaign contributions
by candidates. Effective publicity may possibly suffice to bring the
abuses which have developed in this connection within bounds. The
existing system, however, is old, widespread, and deeply entrenched.
Public sentiment against it is far from being so strong as the
facts warrant. Particularly significant in this connection is the
recent action of New York in prohibiting contributions from judicial
candidates. Doubtless the reason for this special limitation was
the peculiar sanctity and impartiality which we associate with the
functions of the judiciary. Yet in ideal at least these high qualities
should attach to other public offices. So far, therefore, as the
sanctity and impartiality of public office in general can be cultivated
by prohibiting or limiting campaign contributions we should apply the
reform to the legislative and administrative branches of government as
well as to the judiciary.
It is worth noting that complete prohibition of such contributions,
as in the New York instance, will probably involve the limitation of
contributions by others than candidates. A judicial or other nominee
prohibited by law from using money on his own behalf might, for
example, knowingly or unknowingly, owe his election largely to a few
rich supporters who perhaps would not hesitate at some later time to
try to use the influence which they had thus obtained. Indeed it is
one of the redeeming features of the present system that men of ample
means have sometimes bought independence in office by financing their
own campaigns. If, therefore, it should prove desirable to restrict
candidates’ contributions in the future, care should also be taken to
limit the contributions of third parties. Otherwise the latter, by
assuming the financial burden taken from the shoulders of nominees
might attempt to purchase political influence on which they could
realise after those whom they assisted had obtained office.
While the foregoing argument has been directed chiefly to the case
of candidates for elective office it is also applicable in some
particulars to the campaign contributions of officials under civil
service rules. Usually efforts are made with a considerable degree
of success to protect the latter from the assessment system. The old
abuse of extortion by officials of higher rank is in a fair way to be
obliterated, although sporadic cases of this sort still occur even in
the federal service. Unfortunately it is easy to appoint collectors
who themselves hold no office under civil service rules, but whose
intimate personal relations with high officials are widely known to
subordinates. Civil service employees of higher grades are probably
too well informed of their rights to submit to extortion veiled in
this or any other guise, but there are doubtless considerable numbers
of the less intelligent and poorly paid civil servants, at least in
some of our state and local governments, who are really being assessed
frequently and heavily under the pretence, of course, of “voluntary”
contributions. Probably it is true everywhere that those who suffer
worst from this despicable malpractice are precisely those who are
least able to bear it. Even this, however, is not the chief evil of the
system. Absolute non-partisanship in their official work can hardly
be expected of a body of men who are constantly being approached for
campaign contributions, and in effect being reminded thereby that,
civil service or no civil service, they are deemed to be subject in a
peculiar degree to party taxation. Moreover one of the great weaknesses
of the civil service establishment is the conviction on the part of
the opposition party, inevitable whether or not it be justifiable,
that civil service employees are being exploited for contributions by
the party in power. Publicity may dispel both this abuse, so far as
it exists, and also the misconceptions based upon it. If not it may
prove desirable in the future to prohibit absolutely all campaign
contributions from employees under civil service rules. Administration
will certainly be much easier and suspicion more difficult when no
contribution whatever is legally permissible than under any system
which permits “voluntary” offerings.
In addition to the prohibition or limitation of campaign contributions
from certain specified sources the suggestion has been touched
upon that it may prove desirable in the end to limit the campaign
contributions of individuals. Just what theoretical basis might be
found for fixing the exact amount of such limitation is not clear.
Possibly the number of voters, the number of candidates, and the
estimated legitimate costs of a given campaign could be combined in
some way to give a definite result. In practice, however, the question
of fixing a satisfactory limit to individual contributions will hardly
present any great difficulty. Evasion of such limitations by means
of dummy contributors is, as we have seen,[95] not very probable.
There ought, however, to be a very stringent penalty against the
custom of handing considerable sums to campaign treasurers personally
with the understanding that the amount shall be turned in as the
individual contribution of the treasurer himself. Limitation of the
amount of individual contributions, together with the other safeguards
that have been discussed, may prove a very effective substitute
for ante-election publicity. If we are assured that corporation
contributions are barred, that the contributions of candidates and
civil service employees are either prohibited or strictly limited, and
finally that the contributions of others are limited to relatively
small amounts, it becomes a matter of distinctly minor importance to
know who are the financial supporters on either side. Given these
conditions the publication of such information would scarcely attract
any notice even during the heat of a campaign.
As a first effect the restriction of contributions according to all
or a part of the various propositions discussed above would probably
reduce the aggregate of campaign funds considerably. It remains to
be seen whether this will have an unfavourable influence upon our
political life. Shocked by the magnitude of the sums recently employed
many of our social doctors would advise rigorous starvation and
copious bloodletting as essential to the radical cure of our campaign
diseases. In spite of the necessity of parties under the conditions
of American government public prejudice is strongly inclined to
underestimate the value of party work. Yet considering the size of the
country and the magnitude of the interests involved it is doubtful
if the amount expended in the last presidential election, to cite a
specific instance, was uneconomical. Certainly an even larger sum
could be spent profitably along educational lines in our greater
campaigns. One trouble now is that quite apart from the illegal or
immoral practices charged against American campaign managers the latter
have in too many cases carried on their activities in a conventional
fashion which is rather ineffective and wasteful. Thousands of dollars
are spent in circulating documents and speeches. Yet printed matter of
this character is so cheap and nasty in appearance, so unattractive in
form, so devoid of illustration, and often so dry and prolix that it
is promptly and deservedly thrust into the waste-basket by practically
all recipients. Progressive business men have learned the value of
modern forms of advertising in newspapers, magazines, street cars,
etc., but the political manager seldom employs it with any effect. In
many districts illustrated lectures would be an enormous improvement
over the cheap mouthings of the ordinary cart-tail spell-binder.
Campaign text-books, as the term is at present understood, are at
best dry and formal arsenals of fact fit only for the higher grade of
speakers and leaders, or, at worst, mere hodge-podge collections of
sensational clippings useful only to equip already convinced partisans
with a few accusations and arguments which they can then monotonously
parrot forth from the beginning to the end of the campaign. Constructed
with some regard to pedagogical principles and popular requirements
such books might be made extremely influential. By these and
other improved methods our campaigns may finally come to be worth
what they cost. Certainly few services are of more importance in a
democracy than rousing the people to political issues, instructing
them as to men and policies, leading them out from narrow personal
concerns to participation in the broad life of the state. Even with
all the restrictions on the collection of campaign funds which have
been mentioned above it is improbable that sufficient funds for all
legitimate purposes will in the long run be denied. If any shortage
threatens, campaign managers may better their situation by the same
policy which any institution dependent upon public support must follow
under similar circumstances,—that is, they must so impress the value
of the work they are doing upon the people that ample material support
will be freely offered. If this cannot be done they will simply have to
get along with less, the probability being, of course, that the smaller
amount is quite as much as is necessary and certainly as much as they
deserve.