will be greater activity on the part of campaign collectors to secure
contributions in smaller amounts. This would seem desirable in every
way. Until we commit ourselves to the principle of state subsidies it
ought to be part of common school instruction everywhere to insist on
the duty of the voter to contribute something toward party support.
Possibly large contributions might be found unobjectionable in the
future if given for some specific purpose, the circulation of a certain
speech, for example, or some other educational form of political
activity. Considering the abuses which have been charged against
campaign managers the almost universal habit of making gifts to them
on a _carte blanche_ basis is remarkable to say the least. Taking a
suggestion from educational practice, large campaign contributions
might be further legitimatised in case it were stipulated, that equal
amounts should be raised in small sums by campaign managers. If the
time be short in which to comply with a condition of this sort, the
interest in such collections, on the other hand, would be very great.
Certainly it could scarcely be argued that a sum thus collected
represented nothing more than the selfish desire of a rich man to
promote one of his personal interests.
Besides prohibiting or limiting contributions from certain sources it
may also prove desirable to fix time limits within which large gifts
may not be received. Among other conditions voluntarily accepted in
1908 the Democratic National Committee pledged itself to receive no
contribution above $100 within three days of the election. The time
limit in this case was scarcely long enough to be very impressive, but
the principle involved is of some importance. Such facts as we possess
with regard to the history of campaign funds indicate “fat-frying”
of a most strenuous and compromising character during the last few
days preceding an election. Alarmist and hysterical reports about
doubtful states were prepared on both sides and presented tearfully and
confidentially to men of wealth, to candidates, and to other persons
from whom money might perchance be obtainable. The probability is very
strong that the great sums thus raised and of necessity spent at the
eleventh hour were more largely subject to waste, theft, and corrupt
use, than any other money which was placed in the hands of campaign
managers. Prohibition of contributions within a short period prior to
election or their limitation in amount during such period ought to
reduce this evil considerably, at least on the collecting side. If
subjected to such a restriction campaign managers will, of course, seek
to secure as large a sum as possible before the time limit expires, and
they will also take care to keep a sufficient reserve on hand for the
culminating needs of the campaign. Nevertheless they will be pretty
effectually estopped from calamity howling at the last minute as a
means of obtaining large additional “slush” funds.
A very important question is raised by one section of the Wisconsin
law of 1897,[96] which provides that contributions to aid certain
candidates may be made only by residents of their districts. So far as
ascertainable this is the only case of a geographical limitation upon
the gathering of campaign funds. It is a matter of common knowledge
that in national contests very great sums collected on the outside are
poured into doubtful states, sometimes with material influence upon the
results. Large amounts of money are occasionally massed in a single
district to elect a particularly strong, or to defeat a particularly
obnoxious member of Congress. In state and local contests the same sort
of financial manipulation is not unusual. Our laws, unlike those of
England, do not permit plural voting. An American citizen votes where
he resides. No matter how great may be his property holdings he cannot
vote elsewhere. But he may spend his dollars anywhere in support of
candidates and policies, or his contributions may be similarly employed
by the party managers to whom they are handed. It is too early to
discuss the equities of a situation the moral obliquity of which is as
yet so dimly perceived. A principle of some importance, however, would
seem to underlie the Wisconsin prohibition against invasion by foreign
campaign contributions.
Assuming publicity and other necessary restrictions of campaign
funds to have been put into effect, the question may be raised
as to whether business interests could secure proper hearing for
themselves in political affairs. It must be conceded at once that
government should act always with due regard to economic factors. Many
campaign contributions of times past, including even some of the most
objectionable, were made by business men who felt that while by so
doing they were pledging public officials in their favour they were
at the same time pledging these officials to that course of conduct
which was best for the prosperity and welfare of the country as a
whole. Quite apart from all moral considerations such contributions
were looked upon as a sort of business tax, made necessary by our
democratic political conditions, and as such fundamentally justifiable.
There is no excuse for not knowing better now; in a short time there
will be absolutely no justification for tolerating contributions made
on this basis. Business men who pursued the old policy were following
what looked like a short and easy cut to their immediate ends. In
reality they were piling up class hatred, restrictive legislation,
obnoxious taxes, and various instalments of socialism. Fortunately this
destructive process, so far as objectionable campaign contributions
minister to it, is likely to be checked. But legitimate businesses,
including big monopolistic concerns properly conducted, will not be
debarred by publicity and the regulation of campaign contributions
from the use of a great many open and effective means of bringing
their interests to the attention of government. Of course grafting
business will receive a set-back, but this is exactly what is desired.
Our great economic interests would probably be in a far healthier
condition to-day if they had employed legitimate agencies only in the
past, and neglected altogether the short and dangerous cut to political
influence offered by large campaign contributions. Business is now
learning the value of frank and honest methods of dealing with the
people, of publicity on its own account as contrasted with the old
public-be-damned attitude. Internal reforms of business practices, the
correction of abuses from within and by insiders, are seen to be much
less costly than the application of legislative sledge-hammers. The
American people is far from radical at heart. Given full and honest
expositions of the case for business it is highly improbable that rash
and destructive policies will triumph in the future, any more than they
were wont to triumph in time past when business interests fought them
in a manner scarcely less objectionable than the subversive policies
themselves. And always back of the public opinion and temper of the
people there are constitutional guaranties and the courts to maintain
them,—safeguards stronger in all probability than those possessed
by property in any other civilised nation in the world to-day.[97]
Manifestly it will require much more than a reform of our present
system of collecting campaign funds to prevent the proper and adequate
hearing by governmental authorities of the legitimate business
interests of the country.
By way of objection to such limitations of campaign contributions as
have been proposed it might be urged that since gifts of services as
well as gifts of money are made to campaign committees the former
as well as the latter must logically be subjected to regulation.
In certain cases it may be admitted that regulation of services is
necessary. Particularly is this true of civil service employees. It
is by no means improbable that it may be found advisable to enforce
by law their complete abstention from all kinds of political work,
leaving them nothing beyond the right to cast their vote. Certainly a
very considerable amount of trouble is experienced at the present time
in keeping them clearly within the legal, but not always self-evident,
lines drawn by civil service acts and rulings. With this exception,
perhaps, there would seem to be every reason to leave campaign
contributions of services free from every restriction but publicity.
No means should be neglected of encouraging the widest possible
participation by amateurs in party activities and party management, and
this is one such means. It is true, of course, that the services of
some exceptionally able men may be equivalent to money gifts of tens
or hundreds of thousands of dollars, and also that such gifts may not
be equally or even proportionally divided among the parties. Normally,
however, the differences between individuals as to their political
abilities are not to be compared in magnitude to the existing enormous
differences in wealth which have made regulation of money contributions
a necessity. And if one party is pre-eminently the gainer through
gifts of services by brilliant men certainly it would seem to deserve
any advantage thus obtained. Its rivals may thereby learn the value
of the enthusiastic support of men of talent, and bestir themselves
to revise their own programmes so that such men may be induced to
enlist in their fighting columns. It is possible that minor parties
and reform movements are relatively more successful in this way than
the great parties. If so no dislocation of the political balance of
power is likely to be occasioned by a policy of regulation of monetary
contributions coupled with _laisser faire_ as to contributions of
services. Usually the strength of minor parties in enthusiastic
personal support will still find itself more than outmatched by the
strength of the old line parties in traditional fealty, in practical
experience, and in greater monetary resources.
Whatever additional reform measures may be suggested by further
experience with regard to the publicity and restriction of campaign
contributions, two broad general principles would seem to apply in the
application of all legislation of this character.
First, the subject is clearly one of state and local as well as of
national politics. The two former are subject to the same abuses as the
latter. State and local politics are immensely important in themselves.
They touch the daily affairs of the great mass of the people much more
closely than do national politics. Moreover there is danger that with
campaign fund reform in national affairs only, no matter how thorough
it might be, the neglect of similar reforms in state and local politics
would facilitate the evasion of national law. At least it would seem to
make it possible to use large funds in local and state contests in such
a way as to help indirectly but very materially the national interests
of one or the other party. Fortunately some of our most important
states have already provided for a measure of publicity sufficient to
reduce this possibility so far as they are concerned. The danger will
not be much lessened, however, until their example has been followed
generally. Still it is hardly to be regretted that at the present time
the major public interest is centred in the great presidential contest.
There is no danger that the object lesson voluntarily given by the
two national parties in 1908 will be forgotten by the American people
either in succeeding presidential campaigns or in our minor state and
city elections. But while we are securing the great political front
door let us remember that the horse may also be stolen if we neglect to
lock the numerous side and back doors.
Secondly, our primary and convention system is subject to the same
abuses in the use of money as the election system proper. Indeed
in states solid one way or the other it is probable that corrupt
practices are more common in connection with nominations, where there
may be sharp fighting, than in the subsequent cut and dried election.
Organic reforms of a most sweeping character are in process in this
field,[98] and when the time is ripe it would seem to be an easy
matter to graft upon them the requirement of publicity of nominating
expenses and other restrictions upon primary contributions similar
in a general way to the restrictions now being imposed upon campaign
contributions. A start has already been made in this direction. By a
law which went into effect in 1892, Massachusetts established publicity
in respect to nominating as well as election expenses. The Garfield
Corrupt Practices Act passed by the Ohio legislature of 1896,[99] and
unfortunately repealed in 1902, required publicity and limited the
expenditure of candidates before conventions and primaries as well as
before elections. In 1906, Pennsylvania passed a law[100] containing
a list of the legitimate forms of campaign expenditure and requiring
statements from candidates for nomination in the primary as well as
from candidates for election. Nebraska, Virginia, and Georgia, have
also passed laws of this character.[101] In sharp contrast with these
movements for better things within our states are the deplorable
conditions currently alleged to exist in the greatest of all our
nominating institutions,—the National Conventions. It would seem hardly
possible to delay much longer reform measures designed to bring about
improved conditions in this field.
Considering the many unsettled points with regard to the proper
measures for regulating campaign contributions and the necessity for
the extension of such reforms to many areas as yet untouched it is
evident that we are dealing with a movement which has scarcely made
more than a beginning. Even with satisfactory legislation on our
statute books the fight will not be completely won. Fortunately it is
believed that the argument of unconstitutionality cannot be employed
against this movement.[102] Difficulties of administration will have
to be met, however, although it is highly improbable that these will
be so great as the difficulties occasioned by the execution of other
parts of our corrupt practices acts, such for example as the manifold
conditions which prevent the complete enforcement of laws against
the bribery of voters. Bi-partisan state election boards may take
over all ordinary official duties in connection with laws requiring
the publicity of, or otherwise limiting, campaign contributions. In
this work they may be somewhat aided by the mutual criticism of the
parties themselves, although, unfortunately, this is a party function
which is very imperfectly performed in the United States. Much good
may be accomplished by such voluntary organisations as the New York
_Association to Prevent Corrupt Practices at Elections_. With men
of prominence in both of the leading parties in its directorate and
membership the Association proposes:
“First, To ascertain whether any judicial proceedings should be
brought by the Association’s initiative; that is to say, whether there
is apparent evidence of bribery, or of deliberate falsification,
concealment, and evasion in the statements [of campaign contributions
and expenditures] such as would warrant a judicial inquiry to compel a
proper accounting.”
“Second, To secure a permanent record for the Association of the
important facts in connection with the statements filed, upon which
an opinion may be based as to whether additional corrupt practices
legislation ought to be recommended by the Association to the
Legislature.”
The Association further intends to exercise the closest scrutiny
over such items as “canvassers,” “watchers,” “expenditures for
workers,” and so on. Particularly praiseworthy in its platform is the
determination to prosecute violations before the courts. Unless some
determined agency undertakes this function all campaign fund enactments
will promptly sink to the level of those already too numerous American
laws which adorn our statute books with ideal maxims but in practice
are ignored by our administrators.[103]
Assuming both legislative and administrative activity in campaign
fund reform still we must not overestimate the value of the probable
results. Only a part of the problem of the support of party machinery
and party workers will be solved thereby, but at least it may be said
that an important contribution toward the ultimate complete solution of
the problem will be made. Bribery and corruption will not be done away
with by the reform. They are, as we have seen, much too persistent and
extended to yield to any single reform effort. Indeed some forms of
bribery may be encouraged by the new practice with regard to campaign
contributions. Although it may be made impossible to place men under
obligations while they are candidates it will still be possible to buy
them, if they are purchasable, after they have been elected. One should
remember, however, that if primaries and elections can be purged
of corrupt financial influences it is probable that our successful
candidates for office will be less open to venal influence than those
who win out under the present vicious system. Thoroughgoing campaign
fund reform will enable candidates to attain office without assuming
financial burdens of such a character as to make it difficult for
them to act in a perfectly honest and independent manner. By far the
worst evil of the present system is the ease with which it enables men
otherwise incorruptible to be placed tactfully, subtly, and—as time
goes on—always more completely under obligations incompatible with
public duty. Finally campaign fund reform will enable parties to become
what democratic theory requires them to be, namely honest interpreters
of the popular will instead of crooked agents of sinister influence
into which they will otherwise degenerate. Taking the most moderate
view of the benefits to arise from such reforms, therefore, it would
seem a clear duty of all patriotic citizens and statesmen to work first
for the publicity of campaign contributions and afterwards for such
other restrictions upon their collection and use as experience may
suggest.
FOOTNOTES:
[67] “Present Discontents,” Bohn ed. vol. i, p. 375.
[68] _Cf._ Jane Addams, “Democracy and Social Ethics,” ch. vii.
[69] _Cf._ “The Rise and Growth of American Politics,” p. 312.
[70] _Cf._ “The Rise and Growth of American Politics,” p. 323. He adds
that: “No other nation in the world is rich enough for the political
experimentation which the United States is carrying on; but when the
end crowns the work, its cost may be found to have been small in
comparison with the value of the recompense.”
[71] Nevada was the first state to enact legislation of this character.
(L. 1895, ch. 103; repealed, 1899, ch. 108.) In the same year a
Minnesota law (ch. 277) presented a very detailed definition of
legitimate expenses. The laws of Pennsylvania (1906, ch. 17), and of
New York (1906, ch. 503), are very significant. Professor Merriam sums
them up as follows: “Both provide that no expenses shall be incurred
except of the classes authorised in the act. The New York list, which
is rather more liberal in this respect than that of Pennsylvania,
includes rent of halls and compensation of speakers, music, and
fireworks, advertisement and incidental expenses of meetings, posters,
lithographs, banners, and literary material, payments to agents to
supervise the preparation of campaign articles and advertisements, and
furnish information to newspapers; for advertising, pictures, reading
material, etc.; for rent of offices and club rooms, compensation of
clerks and agents; for attorneys at law; for preparation of lists of
voters; for necessary personal and travelling expenses of candidates
and committeemen; for postage, express, telegraph, and telephone; for
preparing nominating petitions; for workers and watchers at the polls,
and food for the same; for transportation of the sick and infirm to the
polls.” (“N. Y. State Library Review of Legislation, 1906,” p. 160.)
_Cf._ also Virginia, L. 1903, ch. 98; South Dakota, L. 1907, ch. 146;
and California, L. 1907, ch. 350.
In 1907, New York took the further step of limiting the amount of
expenditure for a given purpose, ch. 398 of that year providing that
not more than three carriages in a city district, nor more than six
in other districts, should be used for the transportation of voters.
Acting on the same principle Massachusetts in 1908 (ch. 85), prohibited
the employment by political committees of more than six persons in a
voting precinct or city ward. As the lavish expenditure of campaign
funds for service, rents, and commodities may become nothing more than
a veiled form of vote buying, the significance of the action of New
York and Massachusetts is apparent. The English Act of 1883 contains
similar provisions.
The New Jersey law of 1906 (ch. 208) contains a long list of
_prohibited_ expenditures, including payments for entertainment, for
fitting up club rooms for social or recreative purposes, or providing
uniforms for any organised club, and the payment for insertion of
articles in newspapers and magazines unless labelled as paid articles.
[72] _Cf._ also the Oregon law proposed by initiative petition and
adopted June 1, 1908.
[73] New York now requires full reports from committees also (ch. 502,
L. 1906).
[74] Iowa, L. 1907, ch. 50, followed New York’s example.
[75] “Republican Campaign Text Book,” 1908, p. 25. In his message at
the beginning of the second (_i. e._, the first regular) session of the
Sixty-first Congress on December 7, 1909, President Taft returns to the
subject as follows:
“I urgently recommend to Congress that a law be passed requiring that
candidates in elections of Members of the House of Representatives, and
committees in charge of their candidacy and campaign, file in a proper
office of the United States Government a statement of the contributions
received _and of the expenditures incurred_ in the campaign for such
elections, and that similar legislation be enacted in respect to all
other elections which are constitutionally within the control of
Congress.”
The passage in the foregoing, italicised by the writer, is noteworthy
in that it indicates a step in advance by the president. His speech
of acceptance referred to contributions only, whereas the message of
December 7, 1909, demands publicity of expenditures as well as of party
income.
[76] New York _Tribune_, November 24, 1908, p. 3. The Cincinnati
_Enquirer_ of November 22, 1908, said that approximately 20,000 persons
contributed to the Republican fund. Possibly the discrepancy is due
to the inclusion in the latter figure of contributors to the finance
committees of the Republican National Committee in the several states,
which as noted above collected $620,150.
[77] Cincinnati _Commercial-Tribune_, November 23, 1908. According to
the New York _Tribune_ of November 24, 1908, p. 3, in which is given a
list of contributors to the Republican fund in sums of $500 and upward
the larger contributors to the Republican fund were as follows: C. P.
Taft, $110,000; Union League Club, New York, $34,377, Larz Anderson
and G. A. Garrotson, each $25,000; Union League Club, Philadelphia,
$22,500; Andrew Carnegie and J. P. Morgan each $20,000. In addition
to these there were fifteen contributors of sums of between $6000 and
$15,000 inclusive; twenty-four contributors of $5000 each; thirty-four
of sums between $2500 and $4000 inclusive; twenty of $2000 each;
twenty-eight of sums between $1250 and $1500 inclusive; one hundred
and nineteen contributors of $1000 each; ten of between $750 and $900
inclusive; and two hundred and fifty contributors of $500 each.