it permits from candidates, places the burden of election expenses
entirely upon the state, and therefore prohibits contributions both
from corporations and individuals. President Roosevelt’s suggestion is
not so radical, involving as it clearly did the raising of funds by
contributions in addition to the proposed congressional appropriations.
If, however, the latter were made sufficient to provide for the “proper
and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties,” one
might inquire for what other purposes the campaign managers would
need money. Waiving this question, a mixed system of state subsidies
and private contributions has certain distinct advantages. There is
considerable force in President Roosevelt’s argument that publicity and
the restriction of large contributions could be more easily obtained
under a plan combining the two kinds of support. Public appropriations
for campaign purposes would place the state in a stronger position
logically to exercise supervision over the whole process of gathering
and spending money for political purposes. However, it remains to
be demonstrated that publicity and the restriction of objectionable
contributions cannot be secured without the payment of party subsidies.
Evidently, also, there would be difficulties in connection with the
supervision of party activities necessary to determine whether or not
the proposed congressional appropriations should be granted. Democratic
campaign managers would certainly feel that no Republican congress
could deal fairly with them in such matters, although a bi-partisan
supervisory board appointed by Congress might escape this suspicion.
Any appropriation of state funds for campaign purposes would also be
objected to on grounds of principle. It is not considered a misfortune,
for example, that a philanthropic, educational, or religious
association must appeal to the public for contributions. On the
contrary this very necessity forces the managers of such organisations
to keep the service of the public constantly in view. Fully endowed
charities, schools, and churches, on the other hand, have a notorious
tendency to develop the dry rot or to degenerate into positive
nuisances. It is possible that even if our two great parties were
guaranteed support from state funds the keen rivalry between them might
preserve them from deterioration. Still the logic of events may at any
time demand the disbandment of a given political party. If at such a
juncture it were assured a large subsidy, equal to or approximating
that of the majority party, it might outlive its usefulness
indefinitely, maintaining its organisation and a numerous body of
adherents simply in order to devour the congressional appropriation
provided for its useless campaign work.
There is one form of campaign expenditure, however, which the state may
well assume and seek to extend, namely that incurred for performing
any service offered equally to all parties. Already public provision
is made for the rent of polling places, the salaries of election
officials, the printing of ballots, and some other expenditures of
a similar character. Legal regulation of the primary and convention
system, such as has been undertaken on a large scale within the last
decade, offers opportunities for the payment of certain preliminary
expenses in the same way. In connection with its referendum elections
Oregon has begun to print and distribute at public expense documents
containing the substance of the laws to be voted on, supplemented by
brief arguments drawn up by adherents of both sides.[72] So far as this
principle can be extended the real need for campaign contributions
from private citizens or corporations will be reduced. Thus without
going the length of placing the whole burden of campaign expenditures
upon the state, experimentation may well be undertaken with various
combinations of the mixed system. If found advisable the relative
amount of the state’s contribution may then be increased from time to
time.
While the work of parties at the present time must be conceded to
be essential and on the whole useful, the argument for their entire
support by the state is still far from being made out. There is, as
we have seen, a certain virtue in the very necessity under which
parties labour of applying to the people for contributions. Normally
it should have the effect of keeping the parties closer in interest
to the people. It is highly improbable that the question of campaign
funds would ever have been raised in American politics if party
contributions were habitually made by a large number of persons each
giving a relatively small amount. If in addition the donors were
inspired by patriotic motives only and never sought to procure corrupt
favours through their contributions such a system would be well nigh
ideal. With all the abuses that have sprung up in this connection it
is probably true that by far the larger number of the contributors
to our campaign funds have been of the better type just described,
although, of course, the same judgment would hardly be expressed
with regard to the greater portion of the total amounts contributed.
Under a system of small contributions from a large number of people
it would matter little even if some of the contributors were not
wholly disinterested. The relatively small proportion of the total sum
represented by any individual subscription would make it absurd for the
donor to claim corrupt favours of importance. It is not so much the
campaign contribution itself that has fallen into disrepute among us
as the secrecy involving the whole subject and the belief that large
corporate contributions have been repaid by corrupt favours. Short of
public subsidies, therefore, most of the advocates of reform in this
field content themselves with the demand for publicity and certain
restrictions as to the collection and expenditure of campaign funds.
The movement for publicity was preceded by much vigorous legislation
against the bribery of voters and other abuses at the ballot-box,
but as these subjects have been abundantly discussed elsewhere they
need only incidental mention here. New York led in the movement
for publicity proper with a law passed in 1890 (ch. 94), requiring
candidates to file statements of their expenditures. This act was very
ineffective, no publicity being required for the expenses of election
committees. Most of the laws subsequently passed have brought campaign
committees as well as candidates specifically under regulation.[73]
By the end of 1908, more than twenty states altogether had taken some
action looking toward the publicity of expenditures. The earlier laws
of this character were very loosely drawn. In many cases they simply
required “statements,” and the results obtained were distinguished
chiefly by gross inadequacy and heterogeneity. Later statutes and
amendments, however, have fixed the form of reports precisely,
itemising them in considerable detail. Wisconsin, for example,
furnishes blanks especially prepared for this purpose. Vouchers for all
sums exceeding five or ten dollars are required in a number of states.
Publicity of receipts is not so commonly prescribed as publicity of
expenditures. Reports of contributions were first required by Colorado
and Michigan in 1891, followed by Massachusetts in 1892, California
in 1894, Arizona in 1895, Ohio in 1896. Repeals of the laws first
passed in Ohio and Michigan indicate that they were somewhat ahead
of public sentiment at the time, although they would hardly be so
regarded now. In this connection the New York law of 1906 (ch. 502),
was an event of first class importance. It compels political committees
to file detailed statements of receipts as well as expenditures, and
provides for judicial investigation to enforce correct statements. The
great weight of the name of the Empire State is thus placed squarely
behind the demand for real publicity of receipts.[74] Under this act,
voluntarily accepted by the national chairmen in 1908, publicity was
given to the finances of a presidential campaign for the first time in
the history of the country.
In the national field the nearest approach to legislation prescribing
publicity for campaign contributions was made by a bill (H. R. 20112)
introduced into the House of Representatives in 1908. Briefly this
bill covered both expenditures and contributions of the national and
the congressional campaign committees of all parties, and of “all
committees, associations, or organisations which shall in two or more
states influence the result or attempt to influence the result of an
election at which Representatives in Congress are to be elected.”
Treasurers of such committees were required to file itemised detailed
statements with the Clerk of the House of Representatives “not more
than fifteen days and not less than ten days before an election,” and
also final reports within thirty days after such elections. These
statements were to include the names and addresses of contributors of
$100 or more, the total of contributions under $100, disbursements
exceeding $10 in detail, and the total of disbursements of less amount.
The bill also contained provisions, which will be referred to later,
designed to cover the use of money by persons or associations other
than those mentioned above. Unfortunately a provision was tacked on
to the foregoing raising the question of the restriction of colored
voting in the South and hinting at a reapportionment of congressional
representation under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. As
a consequence an embittered opposition was made by the Democrats who
charged that the latter provision was deliberately introduced in bad
faith with the intention of making the passage of the bill impossible.
In the House it was carried by a solid Republican vote of 161 in its
favour to 126 Democratic votes in opposition, but was allowed to expire
in the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections for fear that it
would become the object of a Democratic filibuster.
Whatever may be the merits of the proposal to readjust congressional
representation it is clearly a question which is logically separable
from that of campaign contributions. If this separation is effected
there would seem to be reason to hope that a publicity bill similar in
its main outlines to that of 1908 can pass Congress. While a platform
plank of this sort was voted down in the Republican National Convention
of that year, Mr. Taft in his speech of acceptance said:—
“If I am elected President I shall urge upon Congress, with every
hope of success, that a law be passed requiring a filing in a Federal
office of a statement of the contributions received by committees and
candidates in elections for members of Congress, and in such other
elections as are constitutionally within the control of Congress.”[75]
The manœuvring for position between the parties in 1908 which resulted
in the voluntary acceptance by each of high standards of publicity is
too fresh in the public mind to require rehearsal here. For the first
time in the history of presidential elections some definite information
was made available regarding campaign finances. The Republican National
Committee reported contributions of $1,035,368.27. This sum, however,
does not include $620,150 collected in the several states by the
finance committees of the Republican National Committee and turned
over by them to their respective state committees. The Democratic
National Committee reported contributions amounting to $620,644.77. The
list of contributors to the Republican National Fund contained 12,330
names.[76] The Democratic National Committee filed a “list of over
25,000 names representing over 100,000 contributors who contributed
through newspapers, clubs, solicitors, and other organisations, whose
names are on file in the office of the chairman of the Democratic
National Committee at Buffalo.”[77]
On many points, unfortunately, the two reports, while definite to a
degree hitherto unknown, are not strictly comparable. Some species of
“uniform accounting” applicable to this subject is manifestly necessary
before any detailed investigation can be undertaken. One big fact
stands out with sufficient clearness, however, namely that the national
campaign of 1908 was waged at a money cost far below that of the three
preceding campaigns.
Basing his estimate upon what is said to have been spent in 1896,
1900, and 1904, Mr. F. A. Ogg placed the total cost of a presidential
election to both parties, including the state and local contests
occurring at the same time, at $15,000,000.[78] One-third to one-half
of this enormous sum, in his opinion, must be attributed to the
presidential campaign proper. Compared with this estimate of from five
to seven and a half millions the relatively modest total of something
more than two and a quarter millions shown by the figures of 1908 must
be counted a strong argument in favour of publicity.
The most important single issue raised by the policies of the two
parties during the last presidential campaign was that of publicity
before or after election. Early in the campaign the Democratic National
Committee decided to publish on or before October 15th all individual
contributions in excess of $100; contributions received subsequent
to that date to be published on the day of their receipt. Following
the principle of the New York law both parties made post-election
statements. It is manifest that complete statements of expenditures,
or for that matter of contributions as well, can be made only after
election. Every thorough provision for publicity must, therefore,
require post-election reports. Shall preliminary statements also be
required? As against the latter it is urged that contributors whose
motives are of the highest character will be deterred by the fear of
savage partisan criticism. If publicity is delayed until after the
election campaign bitterness will have subsided and a juster view of
the whole situation will be possible. In favour of publicity before the
election it is said that two main ends are aimed at by all legislation
of this sort;—first to prevent the collection and expenditure of
enormous sums for the bribery of voters and other corrupt purposes,
and, second, by revealing the source of campaign funds to make it
difficult or impossible for the victorious party to carry out corrupt
bargains into which it may have entered in order to obtain large
contributions. Publicity after the election will, indeed, serve the
second of these ends, but publicity before would be much more effective
in preventing corrupt collection and expenditure of funds. Moreover
it might prevent the victory of the party pursuing such a policy and
thus, by keeping it out of power, render it incapable of paying by
governmental favour for its contributions.
In attempting to arrive at a conclusion on this issue it is difficult
to assign it such practical importance as it received during the
campaign of 1908. Publicity after election simply delays the time of
exposure. The knowledge that it is bound to come must exert a very
powerful influence over intending contributors. That this was the
case in 1908 is pretty convincingly demonstrated by a comparison of
the figures of that year with the figures for earlier presidential
campaigns. It is certain that publicity pure and simple, whether before
or after election, will seldom show on the face of the returns any
facts seriously reflecting upon party integrity. If there is to be
difficulty in administering laws of this character it will come in the
way of getting at real, complete statements, going back of the names
and figures on the return if necessary. On the other hand it is not
altogether to be deplored that before election publicity may result in
rather bitter criticism of some contributors. Gifts in general, as we
have already noted,[79] stand in especial need of criticism, and this
principle applies with maximum force to campaign gifts. Designed as
they are to affect public policy a plea for privacy cannot be set up on
their behalf. If the criticism of contributors should go to extremes
it will hurt the party making it more than the individuals assailed.
Contributors who know their own motives to be honourable ought not to
allow themselves to be deterred by baseless clamour. If, however, such
criticism is just, both the individual making, and the party receiving
the suspicious contribution deserve to suffer. By deterring other
contributions of a similar questionable character a distinct public
service will be rendered by such ante-election criticism. Knowledge of
the sources of the financial support of a party is certainly not the
only nor the best basis to be employed by an elector in determining
the way he shall cast his vote, but under present conditions it is
certainly a matter which he is entitled to take into consideration.
While admitting, therefore, that there is room for honest difference
of opinion on the question of publicity before or after election,
the weight of the argument would seem to fall distinctly in favour
of the former. It is sincerely to be regretted that the question
became in a sense a matter of party record in 1908. Going back to the
congressional bill of the same year, however, it is worth noting that
the Republican majority in the House once placed itself solidly and
squarely on record in favour of publicity before the election. Looking
at the matter solely from the lower standpoint of expediency that party
is now in a most enviable position to revert to its earlier attitude
and, by enacting the principle of ante-election publicity into law,
to secure for itself the credit of a popular reform. This would place
the two parties on a uniform legal basis for the future, and make it
impossible for the Democrats to assume voluntarily a higher standard
regarding publicity which they could then use as a campaign argument
against the Republicans.[80]
There is one form of publicity before election, if it may be considered
such, which while not a matter of public discussion would seem
advisable in any event. Laws should require that all candidates must
be furnished with daily accounts of the financial operations both as
to receipts and expenditures of campaign committees and others acting
in their interest. Even under the old régime of secrecy scandalous
exposures sometimes occurred. Confronted by such untoward circumstances
partisans always urged in defence that the candidate himself was the
soul of honesty and that he was as ignorant as a new-born babe of
the dirty work carried on by a handful of irresponsible and corrupt
friends. No doubt there have been many cases where the moral insulation
thus alleged really existed. On the other hand some of these pleas in
defence and extenuation were abject farces. They should be prevented
once for all by providing that every candidate must be fully and
promptly informed regarding the financial conditions of his campaign.
Indeed he is entitled to this information in advance of the public,
for his personal honour is at stake. If, then, he should disapprove
of the measures employed in his behalf he can take such action as may
seem desirable to clear his reputation. If, on the other hand, he is
willing that dubious methods should be resorted to, let him not attempt
to play upon the credulity of the public in case of exposure.[81] It
is notorious that the last refuge of a discredited machine is the
nomination of a man whose personal honesty is above suspicion, and
his election by every possible crooked device. While the campaign is
going on the “irreproachable candidate” is kept carefully in ignorance
of the methods of his more “practical” managers. After the election
he may be told of them if it is necessary to force his compliance to
corrupt bargains made in his behalf. Pre-election campaign publicity
for the particular information of candidates ought to make it more
difficult for a machine _in extremis_ to save itself by the nomination
of “irreproachables.” Or if they are nominated they will at least be
able to insist on the “irreproachable” conduct of their campaign. In
any event such publicity would provide the voters with candidates of
whom it might be assumed in every case that they knew exactly what sort
of methods were being used to secure their election.
The question of campaign publicity involves, of course, the further
question as to what organisations and officials shall make reports
of contributions and expenditures. In a general way this duty,
which originally was laid only upon candidates has been extended
sweepingly to party committees and similar bodies. The language of the
congressional bill referred to above is extremely broad, but it does
not settle all the questions that may arise on this point. Associations
may be formed which without nominating candidates of their own or
undertaking other definitely partisan activities may nevertheless
profoundly affect the outcome of an election. A curious illustration
of this point may be found in the Missouri law of 1907,[82] which
provided that civic leagues making reports on the fitness of candidates
for public office must also publish the basis of their information
and file statements of their expenses. It is manifest that leagues
of this character, which seldom if ever nominate candidates of their
own, may nevertheless come under the control of contributing interests
and use their considerable influence to affect elections corruptly.
Other illustrations are supplied by large organisations devoted to the
propaganda of a given cause. In a tariff campaign, for example, both
free trade and protectionist leagues might raise and expend enormous
sums in a way that would materially affect the result at the polls.
There is at least the possibility of evasion and trouble in this
direction, mitigated, however, by the fact that in general the work
of propagandist leagues will be educational and free from grosser
offences such as bribery of voters. Finally there is the possibility of
large direct individual expenditures by warm friends or near relatives
in favour of a given candidacy. This was met in the congressional bill
by requiring reports of expenditures by persons other than members
of campaign committees in excess of $50, not, however, including
travelling expenses or postage, telegraph, and telephone charges.[83]
Legislation compelling all contributors to make their contributions
through campaign committees,[84] or forbidding the direct use of money
by individuals may suffice to overcome this difficulty if it should
ever become threatening.
Publicity laws have done something to fix responsibility for
collections by specifying the nature of organisations which are
compelled to report and further by requiring the appointment of certain
financial officials in such organisations. It would seem difficult to
go further in a legal way. There is, however, a manifest impropriety
in the appointment of persons to do this work who through the exercise
of their own official power or because of knowledge gained while in
office could use threats express or implied in approaching prospective
contributors. At its worst this amounts to a subtle sort of corrupt
blackmail which is only slightly veiled; at its best it may be condoned
as a political device formerly considered clever but now so generally
reprobated as to be dangerous. The general recognition of the purpose
of such appointments should be sufficient to prevent the naming as
party collectors of officials who come, have come, or are to come into
contact with the business world through the exercise of the taxing or
supervisory powers of government.
Closely associated with the subject of publicity is the question of
the prohibition or limitation of contributions from various sources.
Absolute prohibition, of course, could come only as a corollary to a
system of government appropriations for campaign expenses. Under a
mixed system of support or with wholly voluntary support, prohibition
or limitation of certain kinds of contributions may be attempted
by law. Of course there is a possibility that with publicity fully
secured obnoxious contributions may become, through fear of criticism,
extremely rare. Quite a number of states, however, have deemed it
necessary to supplement their publicity acts with acts prohibiting or
restricting certain kinds of contributions.