various heads are comparatively simple. Office holders must be kept
in line, and to this end patronage, promotion, and the control of
primaries are important. The direct use of money for bribes may play
only a small part in this process; opportunities for auto-corruption
may be left open in special cases, but personal and party loyalty
and ambition can be relied on to a large extent. Back of the office
holders of the hour, however, there are the constantly recurring
necessities of election day. Party organisation must be kept up
continuously, involving the reward in some way of swarms of assistants
and hangers-on who cannot all be remunerated directly at public
expense. At times votes must be bought, and repeaters, thugs, and
ballot-box stuffers must be paid for their services. A heavy toll
is apt to be taken out of the funds used for such purposes by every
hand through which they pass on their way down. In addition to the
expenditures already noted there are many other occasions, some of
them quite legitimate in character, and others unobjectionable or even
laudable, for the lavish use of money to secure party success and party
control.
The situation which has just been described is so common that the only
justification for repeating its description here is the necessity of
completing an outline the other parts and interrelations of which
are somewhat more obscure. In the gradual awakening of the American
people to corrupt conditions existing in their government the first
evils clearly seen were the abuses of the patronage and the defilement
of the ballot-box. Civil service reform and corrupt practices acts
(the latter term seems lamentably narrow in its original usage to
the present somewhat more sophisticated generation) were the result.
Later the presence of purveyors of vice immediately behind much of
the prevailing electoral corruption was clearly discerned, and the
battle on that score is still being waged. It is beyond question that
our present local option movement is directed against the saloon not
so much because it is a place where intoxicating liquor is sold, as
because it is a political centre which did not know how to be moderate
in its exercise of power during the days of its ascendancy. Still later
the more secret relationship between grafting business and political
corruption was laid bare. Renewed determination to impose the necessary
measures of state regulation and, more specifically, the campaign
contribution issue were the results. The problems presented by corrupt
practices in connection with political control are still far from
adequate solution. Reforms already achieved in the right direction, and
still more the determination to press for further reforms, are the most
hopeful features of the present situation. In our national government,
for example, the civil service movement has reached a gratifyingly
high development, but it still needs much extension and strengthening
in our states and cities. We have some stringent legislation against
ballot-box crimes, but, an election once settled, our tolerance on
this subject is amazing and deplorable. Every act which simplifies our
governmental machinery, which places responsibility squarely upon a
few shoulders and provides means for enforcing it, which shortens our
cumbersome ballots, which makes the primary accessible to independent
voters, will help in the solution of the problem of honest party
control.
Without undertaking a summary of the argument on the various forms
of business and political corruption the same point may be made with
regard to them that was made with reference to the corruption in the
professions, journalism, and the higher education,—namely that the
major forms of evil are recognised and savagely criticised. To an
even greater extent legislative action has been secured against the
primarily political forms of corruption. The fight for the regulation
of business is the great unsolved problem of our time, but so far as
it is successful we may expect not only more honest business practices
but also a favourable reaction upon political life. A great many means
may be brought to bear to secure honesty in the buying and selling
operations of the state and to prevent the corrupt toleration of vice.
Their success will mean that the corrupt political manager will find
himself deprived of some of his most lucrative sources of income. A
strong impression prevails at the present time that corruption funds in
general are much smaller in amount than a few years ago. In part this
is perhaps due to a change of heart, in part to the fear, intensified
by recent events, of exposure. Perhaps, however, it is still more
largely the result of a conviction that the “goods” could not, or
would not, in the present state of public opinion, be delivered by
the politicians. It is evident that the more successful we are in
thus drying up the income sources of venal political organisations
the smaller will be the resources available in their hands for the
extension and perpetuation of their power of control.
FOOTNOTES:
[53] “Sin and Society,” p. 78.
[54] “Back to Beginnings,” Commencement Address, Oberlin College, June
28, 1905.
[55] “The Nature of Political Corruption,” p. 46, _supra._
[56] Limitation of the scope of this study to the internal forms
of corruption makes it impossible to discuss this very interesting
topic. It may be noted, however, that in international cases certain
peculiarities occur regarding the personal element of corruption. When
the military secrets of one government are purchased by another, the
faithless official of the former who makes the sale is, of course,
corrupt in the highest degree. What shall be said of the nation making
the purchase? Personal interest on its side is merged in the collective
interest of a commonwealth numbering millions of inhabitants it may
be. The case is not entirely unlike those in which group interest
rather than self interest impels to corrupt action (see p. 65), except
that in the latter the groups are subordinate and not sovereign. If,
however, the state which buys the secrets of another government runs
counter to international law or morality in so doing, it may be held
to be pursuing a relatively narrow interest regardless of the broader
interest of humanity as a whole. From this point of view the state
which uses money for such ends is guilty of corruption although, of
course, it is a highly socialised form of corruption.
[57] “Law and Opinion in England,” p. 216.
[58] _Cf._ H. C. Adams, “Public Debts,” pt. iii, ch. iv, for a very
able discussion of the influence of the commercial spirit on public
officials.
[59] _Cf._ sec. vii, “Die Organisation als Klassenerhöhungsmaschine,”
in Robert Michel’s very thorough and illuminating study of
the organisation of the German social-democracy. _Archiv. f.
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik_, Bd. xxiii, Heft 2 (September,
1906).
[60] For an overwhelmingly convincing presentation of materials on this
point _cf._ the “Digest of Report by the Bureau of Municipal Research
on the Administration of the Water Revenues, Manhattan,”—_Efficient
Citizenship Leaflet_, no. 145. Corruption of this sneaking sort
resembles tax dodging in that it is so largely indulged in by otherwise
respectable people. _Cf._ p. 192.
[61] “Enough Money to Uplift the World,” p. 6, by William H. Allen,
Director, Bureau of Municipal Research, reprinted as a pamphlet by the
Bureau from the _World’s Work_ of May, 1909.
[62] _Cf._ p. 5, _supra_, for a discussion of the consequences of the
corrupt protection of vice and crime.
[63] _Cf_ p. 61, _supra_.
[64] _Cf._ especially No. 3 of the Taxation Series published by the
Board, entitled, “Cincinnati an Independent Assessment District,” by
Allen Ripley Foote.
[65] The assumption is not extreme. In the pamphlet referred to it is
held that by the various means proposed, Cincinnati’s (then) rate of
2.96 per cent. might be reduced to 0.75 per cent. “When the real estate
of the state of Kansas was revalued by the Tax Commission,” according
to Mr. Foote, “the valuation was increased 484 per cent.” Of course
real increase of property values through considerable periods of time
accounts in part for such totals whenever assessment periods are a
number of years apart.
[66] “Civil Service in Great Britain,” p. 154.
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE THEORY OF PARTY SUPPORT
VI
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE THEORY OF PARTY SUPPORT
A party, according to Burke, “is a body of men united, for promoting
by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular
principle in which they are all agreed.”[67] One must admit that
the definition is admirable in that it lays emphasis upon the ideal
end of party action,—the promotion of the national interest. It is
adroit in that it evades the question so constantly thrust upon one in
practical politics as to how far the real motive powers of party are
class interest and personal greed and ambition. Applied to the simpler
conditions of England where the single great object of political strife
is the capture of a parliamentary majority, Burke’s definition may be
accepted as sufficient even to-day. But it would need considerable
amplification before it could be regarded as an adequate description of
the vital activities of an American political party.
While the threshing out of reforms proposed in the public interest
and their translation into law is with us, as in England, the most
important single function of party, still it is but one among a
number of functions actually performed. Our adherence to the “check
and balance” system involves the possibility of clashes between the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and these clashes would
certainly be both more frequent and more violent were it not for the
party control which seeks to maintain harmony among the three great
departments of government. The relation between our state and city
governments is also such that conflict is chronic except where a
party organisation secures concerted action. In the state and city
governments themselves administration is so poorly organised that
authorities would constantly be falling afoul of each other were it
not for the intervention of party managers who realise the necessity
of maintaining harmony. Our elections involve a tremendous volume
of labour most of which is performed by party workers. Not only
legislative, but also frequently executive and judicial candidates
must be voted for; national, state, and local offices must be filled.
Back of the elections is a complex convention or primary system which
must be kept in running order. Referendum and latterly initiative and
recall elections require servants and machinery. The ordinary good
citizen who experiences a deep feeling of personal satisfaction if
he casts his vote, and who until recently considered himself little
less than a civic hero if he also attended his primary, seldom has an
adequate conception of the enormous volume of detailed work which a
popular government such as ours involves. By those persons who are not
so fortunately situated the political worker is called upon for all
manner of services,—for aid in securing naturalisation papers, for
assistance in obtaining employment, for advice in every emergency of
life, for charitable relief. No doubt a _quid pro quo_ is exacted in
all these cases, but so long as philanthropy fails to provide other and
better agencies the social value of such work must be admitted.[68]
Considering these various and exacting party activities it is
altogether probable, as Professor Henry Jones Ford maintains, that “the
machinery of control in American government requires more people to
tend and work it than all other political machinery in the rest of the
civilised world.”[69]
Under our present system the performance of this tremendous volume
of work is essential. In connection with it many grave abuses have
developed, but in the final balance there must be some surplus of
good over evil. Moreover the division of labour which places the
major portion of our political work in the hands of the much maligned
politician is at bottom economic. By so doing we enable our “good”
citizen to devote a larger share of attention to his business, his
family, and the other more immediate affairs of life. No doubt he
has taken too great an advantage of this opportunity, and thereby
enabled the political class to run things with a high hand. The future
of democracy in America will depend largely upon the extent of the
activity and intelligence manifested by our citizens. But at the very
best the great mass can give only a limited portion of its time to
public affairs. Too much politics and too little business, as in South
America, is also bad.
So far as can be foreseen at present, therefore, the political worker
and party machinery bid fair to remain functional and efficient in
America for an indefinite period. Reforms harmonising and simplifying
the departments and spheres of government may reduce to some extent
the volume of our necessary political work. On the other hand our
growth in population and the increase of governmental functions tend
constantly to increase it. Whatever the future may bring forth present
conditions clearly require the co-operation of strong parties with a
complex governmental organisation. “In America,” wrote Mr. Bryce, “the
government goes for less than in Europe, the parties count for more.
The great moving forces are the parties.” Students of political science
generally have recognised that parties constitute an integral and very
vital part of our political system. It would perhaps not be putting it
too strongly to maintain that our government is divided into what may
be called an “official” part, consisting of the legally constituted
political structure and actual office holders, and an “unofficial”
part, consisting of the party organisations and their workers. As
things are now the co-operation of the two is absolutely essential to
efficiency. Nothing is so helpless or so certain to disappear promptly
from the political arena as an “official” group which has lost the
support of its complementary “unofficial” organisation.
Now while the utility and necessity of co-operation between official
and unofficial political forces is generally recognised by careful
students we have, singularly enough, provided regular and legitimate
means of subsistence only for the former, leaving the latter to shift
for itself as best it may. Our unofficial political forces, _i.e._, the
party organisations and their workers, are, as we have seen, burdened
with tasks of enormous magnitude. Under simpler conditions Burke’s
“body of men joined together for the purpose of promoting the national
interest upon some particular principle” might indeed “by their joint
endeavour” alone succeed in performing this work in a patriotic and
disinterested spirit. With the growth of American population and the
development of our very complex government, however, this became
impossible. Steady professional work by a large body of men is demanded
under present conditions. Much of this work the politician knows to be
necessary and useful even if the full measure of its social utility
seldom dawns upon him. Naturally he thinks the labourer worthy of
his hire, or, at any rate, he is keenly conscious of his own bread
and butter necessities. No regular income being provided for the
politician as such, he proceeds to collect it in various ways, some of
them perfectly open and even praiseworthy, as in the case of campaign
contributions made by disinterested persons, and others distinctly
furtive or even corrupt and criminal. Under the old régime if his party
was successful at the polls there was, of course, the possibility of
a job,—that is of a translation from the unofficial to the official
governmental sphere. Even in the hey-day of the spoils system, however,
there were never jobs enough to supply the faithful and those who
received appointments were consequently “assessed” large sums to pay
for the labours of their less fortunate companions in arms. And the
politicians of the beaten party went bare although their social service
in arousing the people on the issues of the campaign was probably as
valuable in proportion to their numbers as that rendered by the workers
of the victorious party. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that
the party worker in office would pay more attention to the requirements
of the machine than to his public duties, and the evils thus occasioned
naturally gave rise to civil service reform. Wherever it has been
applied the merit system has done much to discourage the collection of
party revenues from office holders. As sources of income there remain,
however, the manifold possibilities of the sale of political influence
ranging all the way from permission to violate a municipal ordinance up
to the sale of a franchise or the grant of legislative favours to large
private interests. Many of the forms of corruption dealt with in the
preceding studies are cases in point.
Whatever means may be employed to collect funds the total cost of
party maintenance in the United States is extremely heavy. Referring
to this frequently unreckoned burden, Professor Ford remarks: “It is
a fond delusion of the people that our republican form of government
is less expensive than the monarchical forms which obtain in Europe.
The truth is that ours is the costliest government in the world.”[70]
Turn the matter about as one will it is inevitable that these costs of
parties must be paid. Our present method of paying them is indirect,
furtive, fraught with grave moral consequences, and it is tremendously
extravagant. We do not perceive the latter point clearly because we
seldom get an insight into the total amount demanded or into the many
and devious ways by which it is collected. What is exacted of us in
the final analysis is not to be reckoned in money alone but also in
bad and inefficient government with all the harm that it entails upon
business, health, security, and morality. And we must continue to pay
in our present wasteful and foolish manner until we devise a better
method or make some arrangement to dispense largely with the services
of party organizations.
What the ultimate lines of the solution may be it is too early to
inquire. It is only very recently that we have become aware of the
existence and magnitude of the problem. Indeed in its present form the
problem is itself of recent origin. Not until the presidential campaign
in 1876 was money used on a scale which could be described as lavish.
The interest which has been shown recently in campaign contributions
is gratifying evidence that our former neglect of the sources of party
support is giving way to lively interest. Such contributions, however,
represent a part only of the total expenses of political management.
Party organisations must be kept up permanently and politicians, in or
out of office, have a large amount of party work to perform between
elections. As a matter of fact campaign funds may be regarded as a form
of provision for the surplus demand occasioned by the election time
necessity of running the machine at full blast with a large number
of supernumerary workers under employment. The size of the total
sums contributed at such periods, the influences behind some of the
contributions, and the new interest of the public in these influences
make it desirable, however, to consider the matter as a single but very
important section of the broader subject of party support in general.
Admitting the necessity and utility under present conditions of party
organisation and party work it is certainly not unreasonable to suggest
that part of the burden of campaign management should be borne by the
state. In his message at the beginning of the first session of the
Sixtieth Congress, December, 1907, President Roosevelt said on this
subject:
“The need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress
provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of
each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to
meet the necessity for thorough organisation and machinery, which
requires a large expenditure of money. Then the stipulation should be
made that no party receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should
accept more than a fixed amount from any individual subscriber or
donor; and the necessary publicity for receipts and expenditures could
without difficulty be provided.”
It was frankly admitted that this proposal was “very radical” and
that until the people had time to familiarise themselves with it
they would not be willing to consider its adoption. Indeed popular
feeling nowadays, whether rightly or wrongly, is strongly averse to
the granting of aid to party organisations and is manifestly bent on
cutting off some of their sources of supply rather than on providing
others. Many objections may be made to President Roosevelt’s proposal,
some of them technical in character, others on the basis of principle.
“Legitimate expenses” might be hard to define, but the attempt has been
made already by several state legislatures.[71] Congress would either
have to vote the same sum to each of the two principal parties, or else
devise some scheme of _pro rata_ distribution. How minor political
parties would fare under the former arrangement is not discussed.
Colorado met this question in 1909, by providing that the state should
pay twenty-five cents for each vote cast at the preceding contest
for governor. The money is distributed to the state party chairmen
in proportion to the votes cast by each party. One-half of it must
be handed over to the county chairmen in proportion to the number of
votes cast in each county. Other contributions to campaign funds are
prohibited, except from candidates, who, however, may not give sums
in excess of twenty-five per cent of their first year’s salary. What
the practical outcome of the plan may be it is, of course, impossible
to predict. Just how a new minor party is to get itself started, apart
from the limited contributions of its candidates, does not appear.
Objection might also be raised to this _pro rata_ arrangement on the
ground that it bases the financial support of parties almost entirely
upon their showing at the preceding election. So far as the strength of
parties is determined by their money income the effect of the law will
manifestly be to maintain the _status quo ante_. Theoretically party
support ought to depend on the present actual standing of a party,
that is, the comparative value to the state of its policies at the
election for which its expenses are to be paid. Of course no agreement
is possible as to just what this standing is in given cases. None the
less it would seem clear that there might be a wide divergence between
the relative showing made by a party at the polls two or more years ago
and its present deserts. Possibly also a system of voluntary giving
with restrictions of corporate contributions and other abuses might
more correctly measure the current merit of parties than the _pro rata_
state appropriation system.