Sir, at the commencement of the session of Congress, it became the duty

of the President to speak, and what could any American expect that he

would say? The treaty had been violated in the first instance, by the

ministers of the French king, in neglecting to lay it before the

Chambers until after the first instalment was due. It was then twice

submitted, at so late a period of the session, that it was impossible

for the Chambers to examine and decide the question before their

adjournment. On the last of these occasions, the chairman of the

committee, to which the subject was referred, had reported a severe

reprimand against the government, for not having sooner presented the

bill, and expressed a hope that it might be presented at an early period

of the next session. It was then rejected by the Chamber of Deputies;

and when the French government had solemnly engaged to hasten the

presentation of the rejected law, as soon as their constitution would

permit, they prorogue the Chambers to the latest period which custom

sanctions, in the very face of the remonstrances of the minister of the

United States. I ask again, sir, before such an array of circumstances,

what could any man, what could any American expect the President would

say in his message? The cup of forbearance had been drained by him to

the very dregs. It was then his duty to speak so as to be heard and to

be regarded on the other side of the Atlantic. If the same spirit which

dictated the message, or anything like it, had been manifested by

Congress, the money, in my opinion, would ere this have been paid.

The question was then reduced to a single point. We demanded the

execution of a solemn treaty; it had been refused. France had promised

again to bring the question before the Chambers as soon as possible. The

Chambers were prorogued until the latest day. The President had every

reason to believe that France was trifling with us, and that the treaty

would again be rejected. Is there a Senator, within the sound of my

voice, who, if France had finally determined not to pay the money, would

have tamely submitted to this violation of national faith? Not one!

The late war with Great Britain elevated us in the estimation of the

whole world. In every portion of Europe, we have reason to be proud that

we are American citizens. We have paid dearly for the exalted character

we now enjoy among the nations, and we ought to preserve it and transmit

it unimpaired to future generations. To them it will be a most precious

inheritance.

If, after having compelled the weaker nations of the world to pay us

indemnities for captures made from our citizens, we should cower before

the power of France, and abandon our rights against her, when they had

been secured by a solemn treaty, we should be regarded as a mere Hector

among the nations. The same course which you have pursued towards the

weak, you must pursue towards the powerful. If you do not, your name

will become a by-word and a proverb.

But under all the provocations which the country had received, what is

the character of that message? Let it be scanned with eagle eyes, and

there is nothing in its language at which the most fastidious critic can

take offence. It contains an enumeration of our wrongs in mild and

dignified language, and a contingent recommendation of reprisals, in

case the indemnity should again be rejected by the Chambers. But in

this, and in all other respects, it defers entirely to the judgment of

Congress. Every idea of an intended menace is excluded by the

President’s express declaration. He says: “Such a measure ought not to

be considered by France as a menace. Her pride and power are too well

known to expect any thing from her fears, and preclude the necessity of

the declaration, that nothing partaking of the character of intimidation

is intended by us.”

I ask again, is it not forbearing in its language? Is there a single

statement in it not founded upon truth? Does it even state the whole

truth against France? Are there not strong points omitted? All these

questions must be answered in the affirmative. On this subject we have

strong evidence from the Duke de Broglie himself. In his famous letter

to Mr. Pageot of June 17th, 1835,—the arrow of the Parthian as he

flew,—this fact is admitted. He says:

“If we examine in detail the message of the President of the United

States, (I mean that part of it which concerns the relations between the

United States and France,) it will possibly be found, that passing

successively from phrase to phrase, none will be met that cannot bear an

interpretation more or less plausible, nor of which, strictly speaking,

it cannot be said that it is a simple exposé of such a fact, true in

itself, or the assertion of such or such a right which no one contests,

or the performance of such or such an obligation imposed on the

President by the very nature of his functions. There will certainly be

found several in which the idea of impeaching the good faith of the

French government, or of acting upon it through menace or intimidation,

is more or less disavowed.”

It was the whole message, and not any of the detached parts, at which

the French government chose to take offence.

It is not my present purpose to discuss the propriety of the

recommendation of reprisals, or whether that was the best mode of

redress which could have been suggested. Some decided recommendation,

however, was required from the executive, both by public opinion and by

the wrongs which we had so long patiently endured.

Who can suppose that the executive intended to menace France, or to

obtain from her fears what would be denied by her sense of justice? The

President, in this very message, expressly disclaims such an idea. Her

history places her far above any such imputation. The wonder is, how she

could have ever supposed the President, against his own solemn

declaration, intended to do her any such injustice. She ought to have

considered it as it was, a mere executive recommendation to Congress,

not intended for her at all—not to operate upon her fears, but upon

their deliberations in deciding whether any and what measures should be

adopted to secure the execution of the treaty. But on this subject I

shall say more hereafter.

We have now arrived at the special message of the President to Congress

of the 26th February last; a document which has a most important bearing

on the appropriation of the three millions which was rejected by the

Senate. I have given this historical sketch of our controversy with

France, for the purpose of bringing Senators to the very point of time,

and to the precise condition of this question, when the Senate negatived

that appropriation.

What had Congress done in relation to the French question when this

message was presented to us? Nothing, sir, nothing. The Senate had

unanimously passed a resolution on the 15th January, that it was

inexpedient, at present, to adopt any legislative measure, in regard to

the state of affairs between the United States and France. This

unanimity was obtained by two considerations. The one was, that the

French Chambers had been convened, though not for the purpose of acting

upon our treaty, on the first, instead of the twenty-ninth of December,

a fact unknown to the President at the date of his message. The other,

that this circumstance afforded a reasonable ground of hope, that we

might learn their final determination before the close of our session on

the 3d March. But whatever may have been the causes, the Senate had

determined that, for the present, nothing should be done.

In the House of Representatives, at the date of the special message, on

the 26th February, no measure whatever had been adopted. The President

had just cause to believe that the sentiments contained in his message

to Congress, at the commencement of their session, were not in unison

with the feelings of either branch of the legislature. He therefore

determined to lay all the information in his possession before Congress,

and leave it for them to decide whether any or what measures should be

adopted for the defence of the country. I shall read this message. It is

as follows:

“I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, with

copies of all the letters received from Mr. Livingston since the message

to the House of Representatives of the 6th instant, of the instructions

given to that minister, and of all the late correspondence with the

French government in Paris, or in Washington, except a note of Mr.

Serrurier, which, for the reasons stated in the report, is not now

communicated.

“It will be seen that I have deemed it my duty to instruct Mr.

Livingston to quit France with his legation, and return to the United

States, if an appropriation for the fulfilment of the convention shall

be refused by the Chambers.

“The subject being now, in all its present aspects, before Congress,

whose right it is to decide what measures are to be pursued on that

event, I deem it unnecessary to make further recommendation, being

confident that, on their part, every thing will be done to maintain the

rights and honor of the country which the occasion requires.”

The President leaves the whole question to Congress. What was the

information then communicated? That a very high state of excitement

existed against us in France. That the French minister had been recalled

from this country; an act which is generally the immediate precursor of

hostilities between nations. Besides, Mr. Livingston, who was a

competent judge and on the spot, with the best means of knowledge,

informed his Government that he would not be surprised, should the law

be rejected, if they anticipated our reprisals, by the seizure of our

vessels in port, or the attack of our ships in the Mediterranean, by a

superior force. Such were his apprehensions, upon this subject, that he

felt it to be his duty, without delay, to inform Commodore Patterson of

the state of things, so that he might be upon his guard.

Ought these apprehensions of Mr. Livingston to have been disregarded?

Let the history of that gallant people answer this question. How often

has the injustice of their cause been concealed from their own view by

the dazzling brilliancy of some grand and striking exploit? Glory is

their passion, and their great emperor, who knew them best, often acted

upon this principle. To anticipate their enemy, and commence the war

with some bold stroke, would be in perfect accordance with their

character.

Every Senator, when he voted upon the appropriation, must have known, or

at least might have known, all the information which was contained in

the documents accompanying the President’s message.

It has been objected, that if the President desired this appropriation

of three millions, he ought to have recommended it in his message. I

protest against this principle. He acted wisely, discreetly, and with a

becoming respect for Congress, to leave the whole question to their

decision. This was especially proper, as we had not thought proper to

adopt any measure in relation to the subject.

Suppose the President had, in his special message, recommended this

appropriation, what would have been said, and justly said, upon the

subject? Denunciations the most eloquent would have resounded against

him throughout the whole country, from Georgia to Maine. It would have

everywhere been proclaimed as an act of executive dictation. In our then

existing relations with France, it would have been said, and said with

much force, that such a recommendation from the executive might have had

a tendency to exasperate her people, and produce war. Besides, I shall

never consent to adopt the principle that we ought to take no measures

to defend the country, without the recommendation of the executive. This

would be to submit to that very dictation, against which, on other

occasions, gentlemen themselves have so loudly protested. No, sir, I

shall always assert the perfect right of Congress to act upon such

subjects, independently of any executive recommendation.

This special message was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations,

in the House of Representatives, on the 26th February. On the next day

they reported three resolutions, one of which was, “that contingent

preparation ought to be made, to meet any emergency growing out of our

relations with France.” The session was rapidly drawing to a close. But

a few days of it then remained. It would have been vain to act upon this

resolution. It was a mere abstraction. Had it been adopted, it could

have produced no effect; the money was wanted to place the country in a

state of defence, and not a mere opinion that it ought to be granted.

The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, therefore, on the

28th February, had this resolution laid upon the table, and gave notice

that he would move an amendment to the fortification bill, appropriating

three millions of dollars, one million to the army, and two millions to

the navy, to provide for the contingent defence of the country.

It has been urged, that because the President, in his last annual

message, has said that this contingent appropriation was inserted

according to his views, that some blame attaches to him from the mode of

its introduction. Without pretending to know the fact, I will venture

the assertion, that he never requested any member, either of this or the

other branch of the legislature, to make such a motion. He had taken his

stand—he had left the whole subject to Congress. From this he never

departed. If the chairman of any committee, or any other member of the

Senate or the House, called upon him to know his views upon the subject,

he no doubt communicated them freely and frankly. This is his nature.

Surely no blame can attach to him for having expressed his opinion upon

this subject to any member who might ask it. It has been the uniform

course pursued on such occasions.

On the 2d of March, the House of Representatives, by a unanimous vote,

resolved that, in their opinion, the treaty with France, of the 4th

July, 1831, should be maintained, and its execution insisted on. This

was no party vote. It was dictated by a common American feeling, which

rose superior to party. After this solemn declaration of the House, made

in the face of the world, how could it be supposed they would adjourn,

without endeavoring to place the country in an attitude of defence?

What, sir! The representatives of the people, with an overflowing

treasury, to leave the country naked and exposed to hostile invasion,

and to make no provision for our navy, after having declared unanimously

that the treaty should be maintained! Who could have supposed it?

On the 3d of March, upon the motion of the chairman of the Committee on

Foreign Relations (Mr. Cambreleng) and in pursuance of the notice which

he had given on the 28th of February, this appropriation of three

millions was annexed as an amendment to the fortification bill. The vote

upon the question was 109 in the affirmative, and 77 in the negative.

This vote, although not unanimous, like the former, was no party vote.

The bill, thus amended, was brought to the Senate. Now, sir, let me ask,

if this appropriation had proceeded from the House alone, without any

message or any suggestion from the executive, would this not have been a

legitimate source? Ought such an appropriation to be opposed in the

Senate, because it had not received executive sanction? Have the

Representatives of the people no right to originate a bill for the

defence and security of their constituents and their country, without

first consulting the will of the President? For one, I shall never

submit to any such a slavish principle. It would make the Executive

every thing, and Congress nothing.

Had the indemnity been absolutely rejected by the Chambers, the two

nations would have been placed in a state of defiance towards each

other. In such a condition it was the right—nay, more, it was the

imperative duty of the House of Representatives to make contingent

preparation for the worst. The urgency of the case was still more

striking, because in ten or eleven of the States Representatives could

not be elected until months after the adjournment, and, therefore,

Congress could not have been assembled to meet any emergency which might

occur.

But, sir, does it require a recommendation of the Executive, or a vote

of the House of Representatives, to originate such an appropriation? Any

individual Senator or member of the House may do it with the strictest

propriety. Did the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton) ask the

approbation of the President, before he made the motion at the last

session, which does him so much honor, to increase the appropriation for

fortifications half a million? How did the amendments proposed by the

Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) to the fortification bill of

the last session originate? I presume from the Committee of Finance, of

which he was the chairman. No doubt he conferred with the head of the

proper Executive Department, according to the custom in such cases; but

still these appropriations of more than four hundred thousand dollars

had their origin in that committee. It was a proper, a legitimate

source. Is then the ancient practice to be changed, and must it become a

standing rule that we are to appropriate no money without the orders or

the expressed wish of the Executive? I trust not.

The form of this appropriation has been objected to. I shall read it.

“_And be it further enacted_, That the sum of three millions of dollars

be, and the same is hereby, appropriated out of any money in the

Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended, in whole or in

part, under the direction of the President of the United States, for the

military and naval service, including fortifications and ordnance, and

increase of the navy; Provided, such expenditures shall be rendered

necessary, for the defence of the country, prior to the next meeting of

Congress.”

It has been urged that to grant money in such general terms would have

been a violation of the Constitution. I do not understand that the

Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), at the present session, has

distinctly placed it upon this ground. Other Senators have done so in

the strongest terms. Is there any thing in the Constitution which

touches the question? It simply declares that “no money shall be drawn

from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”

Whether these appropriations shall be general or specific, is left

entirely, as it ought to have been, to the discretion of Congress. I

admit that, _ex vi termini_, an appropriation of money must have a

reference to some object. But whether you refer to a class, or to an

individual, to the genus or to the species, your appropriation is

equally constitutional. The degree of specification necessary to make

the law valid never can become a constitutional question. The terms of

the instrument are as broad and as general as the English language can

make them. In this particular, as in almost every other, the framers of

the Constitution have manifested their wisdom and their foresight. Cases

may occur and have occurred in the history of this Government, demanding

the strictest secrecy; cases in which to specify, would be to defeat the

very object of the appropriation. A remarkable example of this kind

occurs in the administration of Mr. Jefferson, to which I shall

presently advert.

There are other cases in which from the very nature of things you cannot

specify the objects of an appropriation without the gift of prophecy. I

take the present to be a clear case of this description. The

appropriation was contingent; it was to be for the defence of the

country. How then could it have been specific? How could you foresee

when, or where, or how the attack of France would be made? Without this

foreknowledge, you could not designate when, or where, or how it would

become necessary to use the money. This must depend upon France, not

upon ourselves. She might be disposed to confine the contest merely to a

naval war. In that event it would become necessary to apply the whole

sum to secure us against naval attacks. She might threaten to invade

Louisiana or any other portion of the Union. The money would then be

required to call out the militia, and to march them and the regular army

to that point. Every thing must depend upon the movements of the enemy.

It might become necessary, in order most effectually to resist the

contemplated attack, to construct steam frigates or steam batteries, or

it might be deemed more proper to increase your ordinary navy and

complete and arm your fortifications. In a country where Congress cannot

be always in session, you must in times of danger, grant some

discretionary powers to the Executive. This should always be avoided

when it is possible, consistently with the safety of the country. But it

was wise, it was prudent in the framers of the Constitution, in order to

meet such cases, to declare in general terms that “no money shall be

drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by

law.” Not specific appropriations. The terms are general and

unrestricted. If the amendment had appropriated one million to

fortifications, the second million to the increase of the navy, and the

third to the purchase of ordnance and arms, it might have been found

that a great deal too much had been appropriated to one object, and a

great deal too little to another.

As a matter of expediency, as a means of limiting the discretion of

executive officers, I am decidedly friendly to specific appropriations,

whenever they can be made. I so declared in the debate at the last

session. I then expressed a wish that this appropriation had been more

specific; but upon reflection, I do not see how it could have been made

much more so, unless we had possessed the gift of prophecy. But the

Constitution has nothing to do with the question.

After all, I attached more value to specific appropriations before I had

examined this subject, than I do at the present moment. Still I admit

their importance. The clause which immediately follows in the

Constitution, is the true touchstone of responsibility. Although the

appropriation may be general; yet “a regular statement and account of

the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published

from time to time.” No matter in what language public money may be

granted to the Executive, in its expenditure, he is but the mere trustee

of the American people, and he must produce to them his vouchers for

every cent entrusted to his care. This constitutional provision holds

him to a strict responsibility, to a responsibility much more severe

than if Congress had been required in all cases to make specific

appropriations.

How Senators can create a dictator, and give him unlimited power over

the purse and the sword out of such an appropriation, I am at a loss to

conceive. It is a flight of imagination beyond my reach. What, sir, to

appropriate three millions for the military and naval defence of the

country in case it should become necessary during the recess of

Congress, and at its next meeting to compel the President to account for

the whole sum he may have expended; is this to create a dictator? Is

this to surrender our liberties into the hands of one man? And yet

gentlemen have contended for this proposition.

What has been the practice of the Government in regard to this subject?

During the period of our first two Presidents, appropriations were made

in the most general terms. No one then imagined that this was a

violation of the Constitution. When Mr. Jefferson came into power, this

practice was changed. In his message to Congress, of December 8th, 1801,

he says: “In our care too of the public contributions entrusted to our

discretion, it would be prudent to multiply barriers against their

dissipation, by appropriating specific sums to every specific purpose

_susceptible of definition_.” _Susceptible of definition._ Here is the

rule, and here is the exception. He treats the subject not as a

constitutional question, but as one of mere expediency. In little more

than two short years after this recommendation, Mr. Jefferson found it

was necessary to obtain an appropriation from Congress in the most

general terms. To have made it specific, would necessarily have defeated

its very object. Secrecy was necessary to success. Accordingly on the

26th February, 1803, Congress made the most extraordinary appropriation

in our annals. They granted to the President the sum of two millions of

dollars, “for the purpose of defraying any extraordinary expenses which

may be incurred in the intercourse between the United States and foreign

nations.” Here, sir, was a grant almost without any limit. It was

co-extensive with the whole world. Every nation on the face of the earth

was within the sphere of its operation. The President might have used

this money to subsidize foreign nations to destroy our liberties. That

he was utterly incapable of such conduct it is scarcely necessary to

observe. I do not know that I should have voted for such an unlimited

grant. Still, however, there was a responsibility to be found in his

obligation under the Constitution to account for its expenditure. Mr.

Jefferson never used any part of this appropriation. It had been

intended for the purchase of the sovereignty of New Orleans and of other

possessions in that quarter; but our treaty with France of the 30th

April, 1803, by which Louisiana was ceded to us, rendered it unnecessary

for him to draw any part of this money from the Treasury, under the act

of Congress, by which it had been granted.

Before the close of Mr. Jefferson’s second term, it was found that

specific appropriations in the extent to which they had been carried,

had become inconvenient. Congress often granted too much for one object,

and too little for another. This must necessarily be the case, because

we cannot say beforehand precisely how much shall be required for any

one purpose. On the 3d of March, 1809, an act was passed, which was

approved by Mr. Jefferson, containing the following provision:

“_Provided, nevertheless_, That, during the recess of Congress, the

President of the United States may, and he is hereby authorized, on the

application of the Secretary of the proper department, and not

otherwise, to direct, if in his opinion necessary for the public

service, that a portion of the moneys appropriated for a particular

branch of expenditure in that department, be applied to another branch

of expenditure in the same department; in which case, a special account

of the moneys thus transferred, and of their application, shall be laid

before Congress during the first week of their next ensuing session.”

Is this act constitutional? If it be so, there is an end of the

question. Has its constitutionality ever been doubted? It authorizes the

President to take the money appropriated by Congress for one special

object and apply it to another. The money destined for any one purpose

by an appropriation bill, may be diverted from that purpose by the

President, and be applied to any other purpose entirely different, with

no limitation whatever upon his discretion, except that money to be

expended by one of the Departments, either of War, or of the Navy, or of

the Treasury, could not be transferred to another Department.

It is not my intention to cite all the precedents bearing upon this

question. I shall merely advert to one other. On the 10th of March,

1812, Congress appropriated five hundred thousand dollars “for the

purpose of fortifying and defending the maritime frontier of the United

States.” This was in anticipation of the late war with Great Britain,

and is as general in its terms, and leaves as much to executive

discretion, as the proposed appropriation of three millions.

I trust, then, that I have established the positions that this

appropriation originated from a legitimate source—was necessary for the

defence and honor of the country, and violated no provision of the

constitution. If so, it ought to have received the approbation of the

Senate.

When the fortification bill came back to the Senate, with this

appropriation attached to it by the House, the Senator from

Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), instantly moved that it should be rejected.

I feel no disposition to make any harsh observations in relation to that

gentleman. I think, however, that his remark, that if the enemy had been

thundering at the gates of the capitol, he would have moved to reject

the appropriation, was a most unfortunate one for himself. I consider it

nothing more than a bold figure of speech. I feel the most perfect

confidence that the gentleman is now willing to vote all the money which

may be necessary for the defence of the country.

Of the gentleman’s sincerity in opposing this appropriation, I did not

then, nor do I now entertain a doubt. He was ardent and impassioned in

his manner, and was evidently in a state of highly excited feeling.

Probably strong political prejudices may have influenced his judgment

without his knowledge. He thought that a high constitutional question

was involved in the amendment, and acted accordingly.

When the bill returned again to the Senate, after we had rejected, and

the House had insisted upon their amendment, the Senator immediately

moved that we should adhere to our rejection. I well recollect, sir,

that you (Mr. King, of Alabama, was in the chair), remarked at the time,

that this was a harsh motion, and should it prevail, would be well

calculated to exasperate the feelings of the House, and to defeat the

bill. You then observed that the proper motion would be to insist upon

our rejection, and ask a conference; and that the motion to adhere ought

not to be resorted to until all gentler measures had failed.

The Senator now claims the merit, and is anxious to sustain the

responsibility, of having moved to reject this appropriation. He also

asks, in mercy, that when the expunging process shall commence, his

vote, upon this occasion, may be spared from its operation.

For the sake of my country, and in undisguised sincerity of purpose, I

declare, for the sake of the gentleman, I am rejoiced that the

responsibility which he covets will, probably, not be so dreadful as we

had just reason to apprehend. Had France attacked us, or should she yet

attack us, in our present defenceless condition; should our cities be

exposed to pillage, or the blood of our citizens be shed, either upon

the land or the ocean; should our national character be dishonored,

tremendous, indeed, would be the responsibility of the gentleman. In

that event, he need not beseech us to spare his vote from the process of

expunging. You might as well attempt to expunge a sunbeam. That vote

will live for ever in the memory of the American people.

It was the vote of the Senate which gave the mortal blow to the

fortification bill. Had they passed this appropriation of three

millions, that bill would now have been a law. Where it died, it is

scarcely necessary to inquire. It was in mortal agony when the

consultation of six political doctors was held upon it at midnight, in

our conference chamber, and it probably breathed its last, on its way

from that chamber to the House of Representatives, for want of a quorum

in that body.

Its fate, in one respect, I hope may yet be of service to the country.

It ought to admonish us, if possible, to do all our legislative business

before midnight on the last day of the session. I never shall forget the

night I sat side by side, in the House of Representatives, with the

Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), until the morning had nearly

dawned. The most important bills were continually returning from the

Senate with amendments. It would have been in the power of any one

member remaining in the House to have defeated any measure by merely

asking for a division. This would have shown that no quorum was present.

The members who still remained were worn down and exhausted, and were

thus rendered incapable of attending to their duties. It was legislation

without deliberation. I trust that this evil may be now corrected.

Should it not, I do not know that, at the conclusion of a Congress, my

conscience would be so tender as to prevent me from voting, as I have

done heretofore, after midnight on the third of March.

I have one other point to discuss. I shall now proceed to present to the

Senate the state of our relations with France, at the present moment,

for the purpose of proving that we ought to adopt the resolutions of the

Senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton), and grant all appropriations

necessary for the defence of the country. For this purpose, we must

again return to Paris. The President’s annual message of December, 1834,

arrived in that city on the 8th of January—a day propitious in our

annals. The attack upon the British troops on the night of the 23d of

December did not surprise them more than this message did the French

ministers. After the most patient endurance of wrongs for so many years,

they seemed to be astounded that the President should have asserted our

rights in such a bold and manly manner. That message, sir, will produce

the payment of the indemnity. What effect had it upon the character of

our country abroad? Let Mr. Livingston answer this question. In writing

to the Secretary of State, on the 11th January, 1835, he says: “It has

certainly raised us in the estimation of other powers, if I may judge

from the demeanor of their representatives here; and my opinion is, that

as soon as the first excitement subsides, it will operate favorably on

the councils of France.” There was not an American in Paris, on that

day, who, upon the perusal of this message, did not feel the flush of

honest pride of country mantling in his countenance.

On the 22d of November previous, Mr. Livingston was convinced that the

king was sincere in his intention of urging the execution of the treaty,

and then had no doubt of the sincerity of his cabinet. The Chambers

assembled on the 1st of December; and after an arduous struggle for two

days against the opposition, victory perched upon the banner of the

ministers. They were thus securely seated in their places. On the 6th of

December Mr. Livingston again writes, that “The conversations I have had

with the king and all the ministers convince me that now they are

perfectly in earnest, and united on the question of the treaty, and that

it will be urged with zeal and ability.” In a few short days, however, a

change came over their spirit. On the 22d December Mr. Livingston uses

the following language in writing to the Department of State: “My last

despatch (6th December) was written immediately after the vote of the

Chamber of Deputies had, as it was thought, secured a majority to the

administration; and it naturally excited hopes which that supposition

was calculated to inspire. I soon found, however, both from the tone of

the administration press and from the language of the king and all the

ministers with whom I conferred on the subject, that they were not

willing to put their popularity to the test on our question; it will not

be made one on the determination of which the ministers are willing to

risk their portfolios. The very next day, after the debate, the

ministerial gazette (_Des Debats_) declared that, satisfied with the

approbation the Chamber had given to their system, it was at perfect

liberty to exercise its discretion as to particular measures which do

not form _an essential part of that system_; and the communications I

subsequently had with the king and the ministers confirmed me in the

opinion that the law for executing our convention was to be considered

as one of those free questions. I combated this opinion, and asked

whether the faithful observance of treaties was not _an essential part

of their system_; and, if so, whether it did not come within their

rule.”

The observance of treaties was not an essential part of their system!

Victorious and securely fixed, the ministers would not risk their places

in attempting to obtain from the Chambers the appropriation required to

carry our treaty into execution. It would not be made a cabinet

question. It was evident they had determined to pursue the same course

of delay and procrastination which they had previously pursued. But the

message arrived, and it roused them from their apathy. All doubts which

had existed upon the subject of making the payment of our indemnity a

cabinet question at once vanished. We have never heard of any such

since; and it was not until some months after that the French ministers

thought of annexing any condition to this payment.

On the 13th of January, Mr. Livingston had a conference with the Count

de Rigny. He then explained to him the nature of a message from our

President to Congress. He compared it to a family council under the

French law, and showed that it was a mere communication from one branch

of our Government to another, with which a foreign nation had no right

to interfere, and at which they ought not to take offence. They parted

on friendly terms, and again met on the same terms in the evening, at

the Austrian Ambassador’s. Mr. Livingston was, therefore, much

astonished when, about ten o’clock at night of the same day, he received

a note from the count, informing him that Mr. Serrurier, the French

minister at Washington, had been recalled, and that his passports were

at his service. This seems to have been a sudden determination of the

French cabinet.

Now, sir, upon the presumption that France had been insulted by the

message, this was the proper mode of resenting the insult. Promptly to

suspend all diplomatic intercourse with the nation who had menaced her

or questioned her honor, was a mode of redress worthy of her high and

chivalrous character. The next impulse of wounded pride would be

promptly to pay the debt which she owed, and release herself from every

pecuniary obligation to the nation which had done her this wrong. These

were the first determinations of the king’s ministers.

France has since been placed before the world, by her rulers, in the

most false position ever occupied by a brave and gallant nation. She

believes herself to be insulted, and what is the consequence? She

refuses to pay a debt now admitted to be just by all the branches of her

government. Her wounded feelings are estimated by dollars and cents, and

she withholds twenty-five millions of francs, due to a foreign nation,

to soothe her injured pride. How are the mighty fallen! Truly it may be

said, the days of chivalry are gone. Have the pride and the genius of

Napoleon left no traces of themselves under the constitutional monarchy?

In private life, if you are insulted by an individual to whom you are

indebted, what is the first impulse of a man of honor? To owe no

pecuniary obligation to the man who has wounded your feelings—to pay him

the debt instantly, and to demand reparation for the insult, or at the

least, to hold no friendly communication with him afterwards.

This course the king’s ministers had, at first, determined to pursue.

The reason why they abandoned it, I shall endeavor to explain hereafter.

Mr. Livingston, in his letter to Mr. Forsyth of the 14th January, 1835,

says: “The law, it is said, will be presented to-day, and I have very

little doubt that it will pass. The ministerial phalanx, reinforced by

those of the opposition (and they are not a few), who will not take the

responsibility of involving the country _in the difficulties which they

now see must ensue_, will be sufficient to carry the vote.”

Did Mr. Livingston intend to say France would be terrified into this

measure? By no means. But, in the intercourse between independent

States, there is a point at which diplomacy must end, and when a nation

must either abandon her rights, or determine to assert them by the

sword, or by such strong and decided measures as may eventually lead to

hostilities. When this point is reached, it becomes a serious and

alarming crisis for those to whom, on earth, the destiny of nations is

entrusted. When the one alternative is war, either immediate or

prospective, with all the miseries which follow in its train, and the

other the payment of a just debt to an ancient ally and firm friend, who

could doubt what must be the decision? Such was the position in which

France stood toward the United States. Not only justice, but policy

required the payment of the debt. In the event of war, or, of a

non-intercourse between the two nations, her wine-growers, her producers

and manufacturers of silk, and all her other manufacturing interests,

especially those of her southern provinces, would be vitally injured.

The payment of five millions of dollars would be but a drop in the

ocean, compared with the extent of their sufferings. In France, they

then believed that the time for diplomacy—the time for procrastination

had ended. The President’s message had opened their eyes to the

importance of the subject. It was under this impression that Mr.

Livingston predicted that the bill would pass the Chambers. That it

would have done so without any condition, had Congress responded to the

President’s message, I do not say, by authorizing reprisals, but by

manifesting a decided resolution to insist upon the execution of the

treaty, will, I think, appear abundantly evident hereafter.

The French ministry having manifested their sensibility to the supposed

insult, by recalling Mr. Serrurier, proceeded immediately to present the

bill for the execution of the treaty to the Chambers. In presenting it

on the 15th January, Mr. Humann, the minister of finance, addressed the

Chamber. His speech contains the views then entertained by the French

cabinet. I shall read an extract from it. He says:

“General Jackson has been in error respecting the extent of the

faculties conferred upon us, by the constitution of the State; but if he

has been mistaken as to the laws of our country, we will not fall into

the same error with regard to the institutions of the United States.

Now, the spirit and letter of those institutions authorize us to regard

the document above named [the message], as the expression of an opinion

merely personal, so long as that opinion has not received the sanction

of the other two branches of the American Government. The message is a

Government act, which is still incomplete, and should not lead to any of

these determinations, which France is in the habit of taking in reply to

a threat or insult.”

The French ministry, at that time, considered the President’s message,

merely his personal act, until it should receive the sanction of

Congress. They, then, had not dreamt of requiring an explanation of it,

as the only condition on which they would pay the money. This was an

after thought. The bill presented by Mr. Humann merely prescribed that

the payment should not be made, “until it shall have been ascertained

that the Government of the United States has done nothing to injure the

interests of France.” This bill was immediately referred to a committee,

of which Mr. Dumon was the chairman. On the 28th of March, he reported

it to the Chamber, with a provision, that the money should not be paid,

if the Government of the United States shall have done anything

“contrary to the dignities and the interests of France.” Still we hear

nothing of an explanation of the message being made a condition of the

payment of the money. The clauses in the bill to which I have adverted

were evidently inserted to meet the contingency of reprisals having been

sanctioned by Congress.

The debate upon the bill in the Chamber of Deputies commenced on the 9th

of April and terminated on the 18th. On that day General Valazé proposed

his amendment declaring that “the payments in execution of the present

law cannot be made until the French government shall have received

satisfactory explanations with regard to the message of the President of

the United States, dated the 2d December, 1834.”

The Duke de Broglie, the minister of foreign affairs, accepted this

amendment. I shall read his remarks on this occasion. He says: “The

intention of the government has always been conformable with the desire

expressed by the author of the amendment which is now before the

Chambers (_great agitation_), the government has always meant that

diplomatic relations should not be renewed with the Government of the

United States until it had received satisfactory explanations. The

government, therefore, does not repulse the amendment itself.” After

this, on the same day, the bill passed the Chamber by a vote of 289 to

137.

Well might the Chamber be agitated at such an annunciation from the

minister of foreign affairs. Why this sudden change in the policy of the

French government? The answer is plain. Congress had adjourned on the

4th of March, without manifesting by their actions any disposition to

make the fulfilment of the treaty a serious question. Whilst our

Treasury was overflowing, they had refused to make any provision for the

defence of the country. They had left the whole coast of the United

States from Maine to Georgia in a defenceless condition. The effect upon

the French Chamber and the French people was such as might have been

anticipated. To prove this, I shall read an extract from a speech

delivered by Mr. Bignon, one of the Deputies, on the 10th April. I

select this from many others, because it contains nothing which can be

offensive to any Senator. It will be recollected that Mr. Bignon is the

gentleman who had been more instrumental in defeating the bill at the

previous session than any other member.

“President Jackson’s message has astonished them (the Americans) as well

as us; they have seen themselves thrown by it into a very hazardous

situation. What have they done? They are too circumspect and

clear-headed to express, by an official determination, their disapproval

of an act which, in reality, has not received their assent. Some of

them, for instance Mr. Adams, in the House of Representatives, may

indeed, from a politic patriotism, have even eulogized the President’s

energy, and obtained from the Chamber the expression that the treaty of

1831 must be complied with; but at a preceding sitting the same member

took pains to declare that he was not the defender of a system of war;

he proclaimed aloud that the resolution adopted by the Senate was an

expedient suggested by prudence, and he thought the House of

Representatives should pursue the same course. Gentlemen, the American

legislature had to resort to expedients to get out of the embarrassing

dilemma in which the President’s message had placed them; and they acted

wisely.”

From the conduct of Congress, the French Chambers were under the

impression that the people of the United States would not adopt any

energetic measures to compel the fulfilment of the treaty. They had no

idea that the nation would sustain the President in his efforts. They

had reason to believe that he was almost left alone. They appear ever

since to have acted under this delusion. According to the impression of

Mr. Bignon, the nation was astounded at President Jackson’s message.

This is the true reason why the ministry accepted the amendment

requiring President Jackson to make an explanation.

The best mode of obtaining justice from the powerful as well as from the

weak—the best mode of elevating this nation to the lofty position she is

destined to occupy among the nations of the earth—the best mode of

preventing war and preserving peace, is to stand up firmly for our

rights. The assertion of these rights, not by threats, but boldly,

manfully, and frankly, is the surest method of obtaining justice and

respect from other nations.

At so early a day as the 29th of January, Mr. Livingston had addressed a

note to the Duke de Broglie, distinctly disavowing any intention on the

part of the President, by his message, to intimidate France, or to

charge the French government with bad faith. On the 25th of April, in

another letter to the duke, he communicated to him the President’s

official approbation of his former note. In this last letter, he

reiterates his explanations, and assures the duke that, whilst the

President intended to use no menace, nor to charge any breach of faith

against the king’s government, he never could and never would make any

explanation of his message on the demand of a foreign government. This

letter would, of itself, be sufficient to give its author a high rank

not only among the diplomatists, but the statesmen of his country. The

sentiments it contains were unanimously approved by the American people.

Although it was received by the duke before the bill had been acted upon

by the Chamber of Peers, it produced no effect upon the French ministry.

The bill was finally passed and obtained the sanction of the king in a

form requiring the President to explain his message before the money

could be paid.

This state of fact distinctly raises the important question, whether a

President of the United States can be questioned by a foreign government

for anything contained in a message to Congress. The principle that he

cannot, has already been firmly established by the practice of our

Government. Even in our intercourse with France, in former times, the

question has been settled. This principle results from the very nature

of our institutions. It must ever be maintained inviolate. Reverse it,

and you destroy the independent existence of this Republic, so far as

its intercourse with foreign nations is concerned.

The Constitution requires that the President of the United States

“shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state

of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he

shall judge necessary and expedient.” This information is intended not

only for the use of Congress, but of the people. They are the source of

all power, and from their impulse all legitimate legislation must

proceed. Both Congress and the people must be informed of the state of

our foreign relations by the executive. If the President cannot speak

freely to them upon this subject; if he cannot give them all the

information which may be necessary to enable them to act, except under

the penalty of offending a foreign government, the Constitution of the

United States, to this extent, becomes a dead letter. The maintenance of

this principle is an indispensable condition of our existence, under the

present form of Government.

If we are engaged in any controversy with a foreign nation, it is not

only the right, but it is the imperative duty, of the President to

communicate the facts to Congress, however much they may operate against

that nation. Can we then, for a single moment, permit a foreign

government to demand an apology from the President for performing one of

his highest duties to the people of the United States?

Let us put an extreme case. Suppose the President, after giving a

history of our wrongs to Congress, recommends not merely a resort to

reprisals, but to war, against another nation. Shall this nation, which

has inflicted upon us injury, be permitted to change her position, to

cancel all our claims for justice, and to insist that we have become the

aggressors, because a resort to arms has been recommended? I feel the

most perfect confidence that not a single Senator will ever consent to

yield this position to France or to any other nation. I need not labor

this question. The subject has been placed in the clearest and strongest

light by Mr. Livingston, in his letter to the Duke de Broglie of the

25th of April.

If any possible exemption to the rule could be tolerated, surely this

would not present the case. The Duke de Broglie himself, in his letter

to Mr. Pageot, is constrained to admit that there is not a single

offensive sentence respecting France in the message; but yet he

complains of the general effect of the whole.

With a full knowledge, then, that the President could not, would not,

dare not explain his message, on the demand of any foreign government,

the Duke de Broglie addresses his famous letter to the chargé d’affaires

at Washington. It bears date at Paris on the 17th June, 1835. Before I

proceed to make any remarks upon this letter, I wish to bring its

character distinctly into view of the Senate. It commences by declaring,

in opposition to the principle that the President of the United States

cannot be called upon by a foreign government to make explanations of a

message to Congress, that, “by virtue of a clause inserted in the

article first, by the Chamber of Deputies, the French government must

defer making the payments agreed upon, _until that of the United States

shall have explained the true meaning and real purport of divers

passages inserted by the President of the Union in his message at the

opening of the last session of Congress, and at which all France, at the

first aspect, was justly offended_.”

It proceeds still further, and announces that, “the government, having

discovered nothing in that clause at variance with its own sentiments,

or the course it had intended to pursue, the project of law thus amended

on the 18th April, by the Chamber of Deputies, was carried on the 27th,

to the Chamber of Peers.”

The duke, after having thus distinctly stated that an explanation of the

message was required as a condition of the payment of the money, and

after presenting a historical sketch of the controversy, then

controverts, at considerable length, the position which had been

maintained by Mr. Livingston, that the President could not be questioned

by a foreign government for anything contained in a message to Congress.

He afterwards asserts, in the broadest terms, that the explanations

which had been voluntarily made by Mr. Livingston, and sanctioned by the

President, were not sufficient.

In suggesting what would satisfy France, he says, “we do not here

contend about this or that phrase, this or that allegation, this or that

expression; we contend about the intention itself, which has dictated

that part of the message.” And again, speaking of Mr. Livingston’s

letters of the 29th January and 25th April, he adds:

“You will easily conceive, sir, and the Cabinet of Washington will, we

think, understand it also, that such phrases incidentally inserted in

documents, the purport and tenor of which are purely polemical,

surrounded, in some measure, by details of a controversy, which is

besides not always free from bitterness, cannot dispel sufficiently the

impression produced by the perusal of the message, nor strike the mind

_as would the same idea expressed in terms single, positive, direct, and

unaccompanied by any recrimination concerning facts or incidents no

longer of any importance_. Such is the motive which, among many others,

has placed the French government in the impossibility of acceding to the

wish expressed by Mr. Livingston, towards the conclusion of his note of

the 29th of April, by declaring (to the Chamber of Peers probably) that

previous explanations given by the minister of the United States, and

subsequently approved by the President, had satisfied it.”

After having thus announced the kind of explanation which would be

expected, he states, that the French government “in pausing then for the

present, and waiting for the fulfilment of those engagements to be

claimed, (the engagements of the treaty) and expecting those to be

claimed _in terms consistent with the regard due to it_, it is not

afraid of being accused, nor France, which it represents, of being

accused of appreciating national honor by any number of millions, which

it could withhold as a compensation for any injury offered to it.” The

letter concludes by authorizing Mr. Pageot to read it to Mr. Forsyth,

_and if he be desirous, to let him take a copy of it_.

It is impossible to peruse this letter, able and ingenious as it is,

without at once perceiving that it asks what the President can never

grant, without violating the principle that France has no right to

demand an explanation of his message.

On the 11th of September, Mr. Pageot, the French chargé d’affaires,

called at the Department of State and read this despatch to Mr. Forsyth.

The latter did not think proper to ask a copy of it; and for this he has

been loudly condemned. In my judgment, his conduct was perfectly

correct.

No objection can be made to this indirect mode of communication with the

Government of the United States adopted by the duke. It is sanctioned by

diplomatic usage. The rules, however, which govern it, are clearly

deducible from its very nature. It is a mere diplomatic feeler thrown

out to ascertain the views of another government. The duke himself

justly observes that its object is “to avoid the irritation which might

involuntarily rise from an exchange of contradictory notes in a direct

controversy.”

Had Mr. Forsyth asked and received a copy of this despatch, he must have

given it an answer. Respect for the source from which it proceeded would

have demanded this at his hands. If this answer could have been nothing

but a direct refusal to comply with the suggestions of the French

government, then he was correct in not requesting leave to take a copy

of it. Why was this the case? Because it would have added to the

difficulties of the question, already sufficiently numerous, and would

have involved him in a direct controversy, which it is the very object

of this mode of communication to prevent. This is the reason why it was

left by the despatch itself, within his own option whether to request a

copy or not; and his refusal to make this request ought to have given no

offence to the French government.

Now, sir, what answer could he have given to this communication, but a

direct refusal? Had not the duke been fully apprised before he wrote

this despatch, that it could receive no other answer? It required

explanations as a condition of the payment of the money, which he had

been informed the President could never make. On this ground, then, and

for the very purpose of avoiding controversy, the conduct of Mr. Forsyth

is correct.

But there is another reason to justify his conduct, which, I think, must

carry conviction to every mind. The President proposed, in his annual

message, voluntarily to declare, that he had never intended to menace

France, or to impeach the faith of the French government. This he has

since done in the strongest terms. As offence was taken by the French

government at the language of a former message, it was believed that

such a declaration in a subsequent message would be, as it ought to be,

entirely satisfactory to France. Had Mr. Forsyth taken a copy of this

despatch, and placed it among the archives of the Government, how could

the President have made, consistently with his principles, the

disclaimer which he has done? A demand for an explanation would thus

have been interposed by a foreign government, which would have compelled

him to remain silent. The refusal of Mr. Forsyth to ask a copy of the

despatch, left the controversy in its old condition; and, so far as our

government was concerned, left this letter from the Duke de Broglie to

Mr. Pageot as if it never had been written. The President, therefore,

remained at perfect liberty to say what he thought proper in his

message.

If this letter had proposed any reasonable terms of reconciling our

difficulties with France—if it had laid any foundation on which a

rational hope might have rested that it would become the means of

producing a result so desirable, it would have been the duty of Mr.

Forsyth to request a copy. Upon much reflection, however, I must declare

that I cannot imagine what good could have resulted from it in any

contingency; and it might have done much evil. Had it prevented the

President from speaking as he has done in his last message, concerning

France, it might have involved the country in a much more serious

misunderstanding with that power than existed at the present moment.

I should be glad to say no more of this despatch, if I could do so

consistently with a sense of duty. Mr. Pageot did not rest satisfied

with Mr. Forsyth’s omission to request a copy of it, as he ought to have

done. He deemed it proper to attempt to force that upon him which the

despatch itself had left entirely to his own discretion. Accordingly, on

the 1st of December last, he enclosed him a copy. On the third, Mr.

Forsyth returned it with a polite refusal. On the fifth, Mr. Pageot

again addressed Mr. Forsyth, and avowed that his intention in

communicating the document, “was to make known the real disposition of

my government to the President of the United States, _and through him to

Congress and the American people_.” Thus it is manifest that his purpose

was to make the President the instrument by which he might appeal to the

American people against the American Government. After he had failed in

this effort, what is his next resort? He publishes this despatch to the

people of the United States through the medium of our public journals. I

now hold in my hand the number of the _Courier des Etats Unis_ of the

20th of January, a journal published in New York, which contains the

original despatch in the French language. In a subsequent number of the

same journal, of the 24th January, there is an editorial article on the

subject of the President’s special message to Congress, and of this

despatch, of a part of which I shall give my own translation. It is as

follows:

“Our last number contained the despatch of M. the Duke de Broglie to the

chargé d’affaires of France at Washington, concerning which the Senate

had demanded such explanations as were in the power of the executive. On

the same day, the late message of the President of the United States,

which had been expected with so much impatience and anxiety, arrived at

New York. To this document are annexed many letters of the Duke de

Broglie, of Mr. Forsyth, and of Mr. Pageot, which will be read with

great interest. We give a simple analysis of the least important, _and

an exact copy of those which have been written originally in French_.”

“The public attention was first occupied with the letter of the Minister

of Foreign Affairs, which was known here some hours before the message

of the President of the United States; and if some journals of the

Government have found this publication unseasonable, _made by the

legation of France according to the orders which it had received_,

nobody, at least, has been able to deny the talent, the moderation, and

the force of reasoning which have presided at its preparation.”

By whom was the legation of France ordered to publish this despatch? Who

alone had the power of issuing such an order? The French government.

Against this positive language, I can still scarcely believe that the

Duke de Broglie has given an order so highly reprehensible.

The publication of this despatch was an outrage upon all diplomatic

usage. It ought to have been intended as the harbinger of peace, and not

of renewed controversy. From its very nature it was secret and

confidential. If not received, it ought to have been as if it never had

existed. Upon any other principle, it would aggravate the controversy

which such communications are always intended to prevent. It has now

been diverted from its natural purpose by the French legation, and has

been made the subject of an appeal by France to the American people

against their own Government. It has thus greatly increased the

difficulties between the two countries. It has proclaimed to the world

that France requires from the President of the United States, an apology

of his message as an indispensable condition of the execution of our

treaty. It has, therefore, rendered it much more difficult for her to

retract.

The true meaning of this despatch is now rendered manifest to the most

sceptical. The Duke de Broglie, in his interview with Mr. Barton, on the

12th October last, has placed his own construction upon it. The apology

which he then required from the President contains his own commentary

upon this despatch. I need not read the history of that interview to the

Senate, to prove that I am correct in this assertion. It must be fresh

in the recollection of every Senator.

Considered as an appeal to the American people against their own

Government, the publication of this despatch deserves still more serious

consideration. Foreign influence, in all ages, has been the bane of

republics. It has destroyed nearly all of them which have ever existed.

We ought to resist its approaches on every occasion. In the very infancy

of our existence as a nation, a similar attempt was made by France. It

was then repulsed as became a nation of freemen. The present attempt

will have the same effect on the American people. It will render them

still more firm and still more united in the cause of their country.

Of Mr. Barton’s recall, I need say but little. It was the direct

consequence of the refusal of France to execute the treaty, without an

apology from the President of his message.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries had been first

interrupted by France. On this subject, hear what the Count de Rigny

said in his exposé read to the Chamber of Peers, on the 27th April last,

on presenting the bill for the execution of our treaty. I give my own

translation:

“You know the measure which the government of the king adopted at the

very instant when the message, presented by the President of the Union,

at the opening of the last Congress, arrived in Europe. You know that

since that time, a similar measure had been adopted by President Jackson

himself. The two ministers, accredited near the two governments, are

reciprocally recalled; the effect of this double recall is at this

moment, if not to interrupt, in all respects, the diplomatic

communications between the two States, at least to interrupt them in

what regards the treaty of the 4th July. If these relations ought to be

renewed, and we doubt not that they ought, it is not for us hereafter to

take the initiative.”

On the 5th of June, the President had officially sanctioned the

explanations which had been made to the French government by Mr.

Livingston, in his letter of the 25th of April, as he had previously

sanctioned those which had been made by the same gentleman, in his note

of the 29th of January. These were considered by the President, amply

sufficient to satisfy the susceptible feelings of France. In order to

give them full time to produce their effect, and to afford the French

ministry an ample opportunity for reflection, he delayed sending any

orders to demand the money secured by the treaty until the middle of

December. On the 14th of that month, Mr. Barton was instructed to call

upon the Duke de Broglie, and request to be informed what were the

intentions of the French government, in relation to the payment of the

money secured by the treaty. He expected these instructions on the 20th

of October. The special message has communicated to us the result. “We

will pay the money,” says the Duke de Broglie, “when _the Government of

the United States is ready on its part, to declare to us, by addressing

its claim to us officially in writing, that it regrets the

misunderstanding which has arisen between the two countries; that this

misunderstanding is founded on a mistake; that it never entered into its

intention to call in question the good faith of the French government,

nor to take a menacing attitude towards France_;” and he adds, “_if the

Government of the United States does_ _not give this assurance, we shall

be obliged to think that this misunderstanding is not the result of an

error_.”

Is there any American so utterly lost to those generous feelings which

love of country should inspire, as to purchase five millions with the

loss of national honor? Who, for these or any number of millions, would

see the venerable man, now at the head of our Government, bowing at the

footstool of the throne of Louis Philippe, and like a child, prepared to

say its lesson, repeating this degrading apology? First, perish the five

millions,—perish a thousand times the amount. The man whose bosom has

been so often bared in the defence of his country will never submit to

such degrading terms. His motto has always been, death before dishonor.

Why, then, it may be asked, have I expressed a hope, a belief, that this

unfortunate controversy will be amicably terminated when the two nations

are now directly at issue? I will tell you why. This has been called a

mere question of etiquette; and such it is, so far as France is

concerned. She has already received every explanation which the most

jealous susceptibility ought to demand. These have been voluntarily

tendered to her.

Since the date of the Duke de Broglie’s letter to Mr. Pageot of the 17th

June, we have received from the President of the United States his

general message at the commencement of the session, and his special

message on French affairs. Both these documents disclaim, in the

strongest terms, any intention to menace France, or to impute bad faith

to the French government by the message of December, 1834. Viewing the

subject in this light; considering that at the interview with Mr.

Barton, the duke could not have anticipated what would be the tone of

these documents, I now entertain a strong hope that the French

government have already reconsidered their determination. If a mediation

has been proposed and accepted, I cannot entertain a doubt as to what

will be the opinion of the mediator. He ought to say to France, you have

already received all the explanations, and these have been voluntarily

accorded, which the United States can make without national degradation.

With these you ought to be satisfied. With you, it is a mere question of

etiquette. All the disclaimers which you ought to desire have already

been made by the President of the United States. The only question with

you now is not one of substance, but merely whether these explanations

are in proper form. But in regard to the United States, the question is

far different. What is with you mere etiquette, is a question of life

and death to them. Let the President of the United States make the

apology which you have dictated,—let him once admit the right of a

foreign government to question his messages to Congress, and to demand

explanations of any language at which they may choose to take offence,

and their independent existence as a Government, to that extent, is

virtually destroyed.

We must remember that France may yield with honor; _we_ never can,

without disgrace. Will she yield? That is the question. I confess I

should have entertained a stronger belief that she would, had she not

published the duke’s letter to Mr. Pageot as an appeal to the American

people. She must still believe that the people of this country are

divided in opinion in regard to the firm maintenance of their rights. In

this she will find herself entirely mistaken. But should Congress, at

the present session, refuse to sustain the President by adopting

measures of defence; should the precedent of the last session be

followed for the present year, then I shall entertain the most gloomy

forebodings. The Father of his country has informed us that the best

mode of preserving peace is to be prepared for war. I firmly believe,

therefore, that a unanimous vote of the Senate in favor of the

resolutions now before them, to follow to Europe the acceptance of the

mediation, would, almost to a certainty, render it successful. It would

be an act of the soundest policy as well as of the highest patriotism.

It would prove, not that we intend to menace France, because such an

attempt would be ridiculous; but that the American people are unanimous

in the assertion of their rights, and have resolved to prepare for the

worst. A French fleet is now hovering upon our coasts; and shall we sit

still, with an overflowing Treasury, and leave our country defenceless?

This will never be said with truth of the American Congress.

If war should come, which God forbid,—if France should still persist in

her effort to degrade the American people in the person of their Chief

Magistrate,—we may appeal to Heaven for the justice of our cause, and

look forward with confidence to victory from that Being in whose hands

is the destiny of nations.

Previous to the delivery of this speech, the President had, on the 15th

of January, recommended to Congress a partial non-intercourse with

France. But in a short time the government of Great Britain made an

offer of mediation, which was accepted, and the whole difficulty with

France was amicably adjusted.

-----

Footnote 47:

General Jackson’s first term extended from March 4th, 1829, to March

4th, 1833. His second term ended March 4th, 1837.

Footnote 48:

Upon this vexed question of instruction there is perhaps no more

important distinction than that which was drawn by Mr. Webster in his

celebrated speech of March 7, 1850: namely, that where a State has an

interest of her own, not adverse to the general interest of the

country, a Senator is bound to follow the direction which he receives

from the legislature; but if the question be one which affects her

interests, and at the same time affects equally the interests of all

the other States, the Senator is not bound to obey the will of the

State, because he is in the position of an arbitrator or referee. The

first proposition seems evident enough, but of course it embraces none

but a limited class of questions. It is in the far more numerous cases

which fall under the second proposition that the difficulty inherent

in the doctrine of instruction arises. Mr. Buchanan, it will be seen

hereafter, consistently acted upon the view with which he began his

senatorial career.

Footnote 49:

General Jackson himself continued, during his Presidency and after his

retirement, in his correspondence to apply to his party the term

“Republican.”

Footnote 50:

John Sargent of Pennsylvania was the Whig candidate for the

Vice-Presidency along with Mr. Clay, and he received the same

electoral vote.

Footnote 51:

The secret history of such collisions between governments not

infrequently throws an unexpected light upon their public aspects.

When General Jackson was preparing his annual message of December,

1834, some of his friends in Washington were very anxious that it

should not be too peremptory on the subject of the French payment. At

their request, Mr. Justice Catron, of the Supreme Court, waited upon

the President, and advised a moderate tone. The President took from

his drawer an autograph letter from King Louis Philippe, and handed it

to the judge to read. In this letter the king represented that a war

between the United States and France would be especially disastrous to

the wine-growing districts, and that the interests of those provinces

could be relied upon to oppose it; but that it was necessary that the

alternative of war should be distinctly presented as certain to follow

a final refusal of the Chambers to make the payment demanded. The king

therefore urged General Jackson to adopt a very decided tone in his

message, being confident that, if he did so, the opposition would give

way and war would be avoided.

Another anecdote concerning this message was communicated to the

writer from an entirely authentic source. After the message had been

written, some of its expressions were softened by a member of the

Cabinet, before the MS. was sent to the printer, without the

President’s knowledge. When it was in type, the confidential

proof-reader of the _Globe_ office took the proof-sheets to the

President; and he afterwards, said that he never before knew what

profane swearing was. General Jackson promptly restored his own

language to the proof-sheets.

Footnote 52:

Mr. Ticknor, writing from Paris, February, 1836, said: “One thing,

however, has done us much honor. General Jackson’s message, as far as

France is concerned,—for they know nothing about the rest of it,—has

been applauded to the skies. The day it arrived I happened to dine

with the Russian minister here, in a party of about thirty persons,

and I assure you it seemed to me as if nine-and-twenty of them came up

to me with congratulations. I was really made to feel awkward at last;

but this has been the tone all over the Continent, where they have

been confoundedly afraid we might begin a war which would end no

prophecy could tell where.” (_Life, &c., of George Ticknor_, I. 480.)

Count Pozzo di Borgo’s company would not be likely to be composed of

persons sympathizing with the French opposition.

-----

CHAPTER XII.

1835–1837.

REMOVAL OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS—BENTON’S “EXPUNGING” RESOLUTION.

Among the exciting topics of this period, there was no ground on which

the Whigs attacked the administration of General Jackson with greater

severity than that which related to his removal of executive officers.

In the remarkable protest, which he sent to the Senate in 1834, against

the censure which that body had passed upon his executive acts, and

especially his removal of one Secretary of the Treasury who would not,

and the appointment of another who would, remove the public deposits

from the Bank of the United States, he had claimed a general executive

power of supervision and control over all executive officers. He had

made many other removals from office, which were complained of as

dictated by purely political motives; and in the session of 1834–5, a

bill was introduced into the Senate, one of the objects of which was to

require the President, when making a nomination to fill a vacancy

occasioned by the removal of any officer, to state the fact of such

removal, and to render reasons for it. On this bill, Mr. Buchanan, on

the 17th of February, 1835, made the following speech, which is of value

now, because it relates to a topic that has not yet ceased to be a

matter of controversy:

Mr. PRESIDENT: It is with extreme diffidence and reluctance that I rise

to address you on the present occasion. It was my intention to suffer

this bill to pass, contenting myself with a simple vote in the negative.

This course I should have pursued, had the constitutional question been

fully discussed by any gentleman on our side of the Senate. As this has

not been done, I feel it to be a duty which I owe to those who sent me

here, as well as to myself, to express my opinion on the subject, and

the reasons on which that opinion is founded.

The present bill presents a most important question concerning our

fundamental institutions. It attacks a construction of the Constitution

of the United States which has been considered settled for almost half a

century. Has the President, under the Constitution, the power of

removing executive officers? If any question can ever be put at rest in

this country, this, emphatically, ought to be considered that one. It

was solemnly settled in 1789 by the first Congress of the United States.

Of whom was that Congress composed? Of the men who had sustained the

toils and dangers of the revolutionary war—of the men who sat in the

convention which framed the Constitution, and who passed from that

convention into the first Congress. These men, who laid the foundations

of our Republic broad and deep, most solemnly and deliberately decided,

that to the President, and to him alone, belonged the power of removal.

This was not at a moment when the country was convulsed by party spirit.

Very far from it. The Fathers of the Republic were then occupied in

putting the Government in motion, and in establishing such principles as

might preserve the liberties and promote the best interests of the

American people for ages. In what condition are we, at the present

moment, to rejudge the judgment of those men and reverse their solemn

decision? Is not party spirit raging throughout the land? Are there not

high party feelings in this body? Are we in a condition calmly and

deliberately, without prejudice and without passion, to review and to

condemn their judgment?

Why, sir, even if there were no authority in the Constitution for the

power of removal, the decision of this body, at this time, would have

but little influence among the people. They would compare the

calmness—the self-possession—the freedom from political excitement of

the sages who established the precedent, with the party violence and the

high political feeling of the Senate at the present day; and the weight

of authority would be all against us.

The debate in the first Congress was very long and very able. Every

argument which patriotism and ingenuity could suggest was exhausted. The

question was at length decided in the House of Representatives on the

22d June, 1789. On the yeas and nays, thirty voted in affirmance of the

President’s power of removal, and eighteen against it;—a large majority,

considering the comparatively small number of which the House was then

composed.

The question arose on the bill to establish the Department of Foreign

Affairs. It contained a clause declaring the Secretary of State “to be

removable from office by the President of the United States.” From this

clause it might have been inferred that the power of removal was

intended to be conferred upon the President by Congress, and not

acknowledged to exist in him under the Constitution. To remove every

difficulty,—to place doubt at defiance in all future time, the words “to

be removable from office by the President of the United States” were

stricken from the bill, and this right was expressly acknowledged to

exist independently of all legislation. By the second section of the

bill, which became a law on the 27th July, 1789, it is declared that

“the Chief Clerk in the Department of Foreign Affairs, _whenever the

principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the

United States_, or in any other case of vacancy, shall, during such

vacancy, have the charge and custody of all records, books, and papers,

appertaining to the said Department.” Here then is a clear, strong,

distinct recognition by the House of Representatives of the President’s

power of removal, not by virtue of law, but under the Constitution. This

phraseology was carefully adopted for the purpose of putting this very

question at rest forever, so far as Congress could effect this purpose.

The bill, having passed the House of Representatives, was sent to the

Senate for their concurrence. The power of removal was there solemnly

considered. This was the very body which, according to the doctrine of

gentlemen, has a right to control this power; and yet they affirmed the

principle that it was vested in the President, and in him alone. It is

true that the question was determined by the casting vote of Mr.

Adams,—then the Vice-President: but the act was approved by General

Washington, and the power has ever since been exercised without dispute

by him and his successors in office, until after the election of the

present President. Washington, the elder Adams, Jefferson, Madison,

Monroe, and the younger Adams removed whom they pleased from office; but

after the accession of Jackson, the existence of this power is denied.

We are now required to believe that all which former Presidents have

done was wrong;—that the first Congress were entirely mistaken in their

construction of the Constitution:—and that the President does not

possess the power of removal except with the concurrence of the Senate.

If ever a question has occurred in the history of any country which

ought to be considered settled, this is that one. A solemn decision at

first, adopted in practice afterwards by all branches of the Government,

for five and forty years, makes the precedent one of almost irresistible

force.

What then have we a right to expect on our side of the House from the

opposition? Not merely that they shall prove it to be a doubtful

question, but they shall present a case so clear as to render it

manifest that all which has been done has been without authority, and

all the removals which have ever been made, have been in violation of

the Constitution. The burden rests entirely upon the gentlemen, and a

ponderous load they have to sustain.

But, sir, if the question were entirely new, if it never had been

decided either by precedent or by practice, I think it may be made

abundantly clear, that the strength of the argument is greatly on the

side of those who maintain the power.

What is the nature of the Constitution of the United States? The powers

which it devolves upon the Government, are divided into three distinct

classes, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial. To preserve

the liberties of any country, it is necessary that these three branches

of the government should be kept distinct and separate as far as

possible. When they are all united in the same person—this is the very

definition of despotism. As you approximate to this state of things, in

the same proportion you advance towards arbitrary power. These are

axioms which cannot—which will not be denied.

Doubtless for wise purposes, the framers of our Constitution have in a

very few excepted cases, blended these powers together. The executive,

by his veto, has a control over our legislation. The Senate, although a

branch of the legislature, exercises judicial power in cases of

impeachment. The President nominates, “and by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate,” appoints all officers, except those of an

inferior nature, the appointment of which may be vested by Congress “in

the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of

departments.”

Now, sir, my position is, that when the Constitution of the United

States, in a special case, has conferred upon the Senate, which is

essentially a branch of the legislature, a participation in executive

power, you cannot by construction extend this power beyond the plain

terms of the grant. It is an exception from the general rule pervading

the whole instrument. Appointment to office is in the strictest sense an

executive power. But it is expressly declared that the assent of the

Senate shall be necessary to the exercise of this power on the part of

the President. The grant to the Senate is special. In this particular

case, it is an abstraction from the general executive powers granted

under the Constitution to the President. According to the maxim of the

common law, _expressio unius est exclusio alterius_—it follows

conclusively that what has not been given is withheld, and remains in

that branch of the Government which is the appropriate depository of

executive power. The exception proves the rule. And the grant of

executive power to the Senate is confined to appointments to office, and

to them alone. This necessarily excludes other executive powers. It

cannot, therefore, be contended with any force, as the gentleman from

Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) has contended, that because the consent of

the Senate is made necessary by the Constitution to appointments of

officers,—that, therefore, by implication, it is necessary for their

removal. Besides, these two things are very distinct in their nature, as

I shall hereafter have occasion to demonstrate.

But to proceed with the argument. I shall contend that the sole power of

removing executive officers is vested in the President by the

Constitution. First, from a correct construction of the instrument

itself; and second, even if that were doubtful, from the great danger

resulting to the public interest from any other construction.

The Constitution declares in express language that “the executive power

shall be vested in a President of the United States.” Under these

general terms, I shall, once for all, disclaim the idea of attempting to

derive any portion of the power of the Chief Magistrate from any other

fountain than the Constitution itself. I therefore entirely repel the

imputation, so far as I am concerned, which would invest him with

executive powers derived from the prerogatives of the kings or emperors

of the old world. Such arguments are entirely out of the question.

The Constitution also declares that “he shall take care that the laws be

faithfully executed.” These two clauses of the Constitution confer the

executive power on the President, and define his duties. Is, then, the

removal from office an executive power? If it be so, there is an end of

the question; because the Constitution nowhere declares that the Senate,

or any other human tribunal, shall participate in the exercise of this

power. It will not be contended but that the power of removal exists,

and must exist, somewhere. Where else can it exist but in the executive,

on whom the Constitution imposes the obligation of taking care that the

laws shall be faithfully executed? It will not be pretended that the

power of removal is either of a legislative or judicial character. From

its very nature, it belongs to the executive. In case he discovers that

an officer is violating his trust—that instead of executing the laws,

his conduct is in direct opposition to their requisition, is it not,

strictly speaking, an executive power to arrest him in his career, by

removing him from office? How could the President execute the trust

confided to him, if he were destitute of this authority? If he possessed

it not, he would be compelled to witness the executive officers

violating the laws of Congress without the power of preventing it.

On this subject, it is impossible for me to advance anything new. It was

exhausted by Mr. Madison, in the debate of 1789, in the House of

Representatives. I am confident the Senate will indulge me whilst I read

two extracts from his speeches on that occasion, delivered on the 16th

and 17th June, 1789. The first was delivered on the 16th June, 1789, and

is as follows:

“By a strict examination of the Constitution, on what appears to be its

true principles, and considering the great departments of the Government

in the relation they have to each other, I have my doubts whether we are

not absolutely tied down to the construction declared in the bill. In

the first section of the first article, it is said that all legislative

powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United

States. In the second article, it is affirmed that the executive power

shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. In the

third article, it is declared that the judicial power of the United

States shall be vested in one Supreme Court; and in such inferior courts

as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.

“I suppose it will be readily admitted, that so far as the Constitution

has separated the powers of these great departments, it would be

improper to combine them together; and so far as it has left any

particular department in the entire possession of the powers incident to

that department, I conceive we ought not to qualify them further than

they are qualified by the Constitution. The legislative powers are

vested in Congress, and are to be exercised by them uncontrolled by any

other department, except the Constitution has qualified it otherwise.

The Constitution has qualified the legislative power, by authorizing the

President to object to any act it may pass, requiring, in this case,

two-thirds of both Houses to concur in making a law; but still the

absolute legislative power is vested in the Congress with this

qualification alone.

“The Constitution affirms, that the executive power shall be vested in

the President. Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes, there are.

The Constitution says, that in appointing to office, the Senate shall be

associated with the President, unless in case of inferior officers, when

the law shall otherwise direct. Have we a right to extend this

exception? I believe not. If the Constitution had invested all executive

power in the President, I venture to assert that the Legislature has no

right to diminish or modify his executive authority.”

Again:

“The doctrine, however, which seems to stand most in opposition to the

principles I contend for, is, that the power to annul an appointment is,

in the nature of things, incidental to the power which makes the

appointment. I agree that if nothing more was said in the Constitution

than that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the

Senate, should appoint to office, there would be great force in saying

that the power of removal resulted by a natural implication from the

power of appointing. But there is another part of the Constitution, no

less explicit than the one on which the gentleman’s doctrine is founded;

it is that part which declares that the executive power shall be vested

in a President of the United States.

“The association of the Senate with the President in exercising that

particular function, is an exception to this general rule, and

exceptions to general rules, I conceive, are ever to be taken strictly.

But there is another part of the Constitution which inclines, in my

judgment, to favor the construction I put upon it; the President is

required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If the duty

to see the laws faithfully executed be required at the hands of the

Executive Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally intended he

should have that species of power which is necessary to accomplish that

end. Now, if the officer, when once appointed, is not to depend upon the

President for his official existence, but upon a distinct body, (for

where there are two negatives required, either can prevent the removal,)

I confess I do not see how the President can take care that the laws be

faithfully executed. It is true, by a circuitous operation, he may

obtain an impeachment, and even without this it is possible he may

obtain the concurrence of the Senate for the purpose of displacing an

officer; but would this give that species of control to the Executive

Magistrate which seems to be required by the Constitution? I own, if my

opinion was not contrary to that entertained by what I suppose to be the

minority on this question, I should be doubtful of being mistaken, when

I discovered how inconsistent that construction would make the

Constitution with itself. I can hardly bring myself to imagine the

wisdom of the convention who framed the Constitution contemplated such

incongruity.”

But, sir, if doubts could arise on the language of the Constitution

itself, then it would become proper, for the purpose of ascertaining the

true meaning of the instrument, to resort to arguments _ab

inconvenienti_. The framers of the Constitution never intended it to

mean what would defeat the very purposes which it was intended to

accomplish. I think I can prove that to deprive the President of the

power of removal would be fatal to the best interests of the country.

And first, the Senate cannot always be in session. I thank Heaven for

that. We must separate and attend to our ordinary business. It is

necessary for a healthy political constitution that we should breathe

the fresh and pure air of the country. The political excitement would

rise too high if it were not cooled off in this manner. The American

people never will consent, and never ought to consent, that our sessions

shall become perpetual. The framers of the Constitution never intended

that this should be the case. But once establish the principle that the

Senate must consent to removals, as well as to appointments, and this

consequence is inevitable.

A foreign minister in a remote part of the world is pursuing a course,

dangerous to the best interests, and ruinous to the character of the

country. He is disgracing us abroad, and endangering the public peace.

He has been intrusted with an important negotiation, and is betraying

his trust. He has become corrupt, or is entirely incompetent. This

information arrives at Washington, three or four days after the

adjournment of Congress on the 3d of March. What is to be done? Is the

President to be entirely powerless until the succeeding December, when

the Senate may meet again? Shall he be obliged to wait until the

mischief is entirely consummated—until the country is ruined—before he

can recall the corrupt or wicked minister? Or will any gentleman contend

that upon every occasion, when a removal from office becomes necessary,

he shall call the Senators from their homes throughout this widely

extended republic? And yet, this is the inevitable consequence of the

position contended for by gentlemen. Could the framers of the

Constitution ever have intended such an absurdity? This argument was

also adverted to by Mr. Madison.

But again, there are great numbers of disbursing officers scattered over

the Union. Information is received during the recess of the Senate, that

one of them in Arkansas or at the Rocky Mountains, has been guilty of

peculation, and is wasting the public money. Must the President fold his

arms, and suffer him to proceed in his fraudulent course, until the next

meeting of the Senate? The truth is, that the President cannot execute

the laws of the Union, without this power of removal.

But cases still stronger may be presented. The heads of departments are

the confidential advisers of the President. It is chiefly through their

agency that he must conduct the great operations of Government. Without

a direct control over them, it would be impossible for him to take care

that the laws shall be faithfully executed. Suppose that one of them,

during the recess of the Senate, violates his instructions, refuses to

hold any intercourse with the President, and pursues a career which he

believes to be in opposition to the Constitution, the laws and the best

interests of the country. Shall the executive arm be paralyzed; and in

such a case, must he patiently submit to all these evils until the

Senate can be convened? In time of war, the country might be ruined by a

corrupt Secretary of War, before the Senate could be assembled.

It is not my intention, on this occasion, to discuss the question of the

removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States. I merely

wish to present it as a forcible illustration of my argument. Suppose

the late Secretary of the Treasury had determined to remove the

deposits, and the President had believed this measure would be as

ruinous to the country as the friends of the bank apprehended. If the

Secretary, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the President, had

proceeded to issue the order for their removal, what should we have

heard from those who were the loudest in their denunciations against the

Executive, if he had said, my arms are tied, I have no power to arrest

the act—the deposits must be removed, because I cannot remove my

Secretary? Here the evil would have been done before the Senate could

possibly have been assembled. I am indebted to the speech of the Senator

from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun), at the last session, for this

illustration. The truth is, view the subject in any light you may, the

power of removal is in its nature inseparable from the executive power.

I have been presenting the inconveniences which would arise, during the

recess of the Senate, from the want of this power in the executive. But

suppose the Senate to be always in session, would this remove every

difficulty? By no means. Confer upon the Senate the power of rejecting

removals, and you make the executive, in the language of the debate of

1789, a double-headed monster. That power on whom is devolved the

execution of your laws, must be able to remove a corrupt or an

incompetent agent from office, or he cannot perform his duties. The

Senate may, without inconvenience, and with very great advantage to the

country, participate in appointments; but when the man is once in

office, the President must necessarily possess the power of turning him

out in case he does not perform his duties. This power ought not to

depend upon the will of the Senate; for that body have nothing to do

with the execution of the laws.

If the power contended for were vested in the Senate, what would be the

consequences? Still more dangerous, if possible, than any which I have

yet depicted. The cases in which removals are necessary, must rapidly

increase with the number of our officers and our rapidly extending

population. If the President must assign reasons to the Senate for his

removals, according to the provisions of this bill, or if the Senate

must participate in these removals, as well as in appointments, it

necessarily follows, that these reasons must be investigated. Witnesses

must be examined to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the charges made

against the officer sought to be removed. The case must be tried

judicially. Time must be consumed to the prejudice of our other duties.

The legislative functions of the Senate must thus become impaired, and

feelings excited between co-ordinate branches of the Government

calculated to produce a most injurious effect upon the country. In this

state of things, the case might readily occur which was anticipated by

Mr. Madison in 1789. A majority of the Senate might even keep one of the

heads of department in office against the will of the President. Whether

they would have done so or not last winter, in the case of the Secretary

of the Treasury, I shall not pretend to determine.

If this power were conferred upon the Senate, it would interfere with

our judicial functions to a dangerous and alarming extent. The removal

of a high officer of the Government is recommended by the President to

the Senate, because of official misconduct. The charges are tried before

the Senate. From the very nature of the question it must become in fact

a judicial investigation. The Senate determine either that he shall

remain in his office or that he shall be removed. In either case, the

House of Representatives, possessing the sole power of impeachment under

the Constitution, determine to exercise it against this officer. But the

Senate have, by their previous proceedings, utterly disqualified

themselves from giving to the accused an impartial trial. They have

already decided upon his guilt or his innocence. Instead of proceeding

to the trial, unbiased by favor or by prejudice, their minds are

inflamed, their judgments are biased, and they come to the investigation

with the feelings of partisans, rather than those of judges. The House

of Representatives would have a just right to complain loudly against

the exercise of this power by the Senate. We should thus disqualify

ourselves from judging impartially in cases between the people of the

United States and the high officers of the Government.

I think I have successfully established the position that no two things

can in their nature be more distinct than the power of appointment and

that of removal. If this be the case, then what becomes of the argument

of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster)? It rested entirely

upon the principle, that these two powers were so identical in their

nature, that because the Senate, under the Constitution, have the

express power of advising and consenting to appointments, that,

therefore, by implication, they must possess the power of advising and

consenting to removals. The inference is without foundation.

The truth is, that the more we discuss this question, we shall have the

greater reason to admire the wisdom of the Constitution, and of those

enlightened and patriotic men who placed that construction upon it in

the beginning, which I shall venture to predict never will be disturbed

by the American people. The Senate, from the nature of the body, are

fully competent to assist the President in appointments. It would change

their character altogether, and paralyze the executive arm of the

Government, if they were to usurp the power of interfering in removals

from office. Let the Constitution and the construction of it by its

founders, in this particular, be perpetual!

It has been objected that the President, by this construction, is too

far removed from responsibility in the exercise of this power. But he is

responsible to the American people, whose servant he is, in this as in

all other cases. Unless you palsy the executive arm, and render it

powerless to do good, lest it may do evil, you cannot support the

doctrine which has been urged. You must vest some discretion; you must

repose some confidence in the executive, or the wheels of Government

must stand still. Should he abuse his power, he is liable to the censure

of public opinion; and, in flagrant cases, he may be impeached.

It was contended in the first Congress, and the same argument has been

urged upon the present occasion, that the power of removal was not

recognized by the Constitution—that it was a case omitted, and that,

therefore, by implication, it belongs to Congress. This argument was

fully met and successfully refuted in 1789. If this principle were

established, the executive power would have no necessary control over

executive officers. Congress might confer the power of removal upon the

Senate alone, or upon the House of Representatives alone, or upon both

conjointly, without any participation of the President. This

Government—the admiration of the world, would present the solecism of an

executive without any control over executive agents, except what might

be granted to him by the legislature. We are not placed in this

unfortunate predicament. The President, under the Constitution, has the

power of removal. It is a constitutional power, not to be controlled by

the legislature. It is a power equally sovereign in its nature with that

of legislation itself. He is a co-ordinate branch of the Government, and

has the same right to exercise his discretion in removals from office,

that Congress possess in regard to the enactment of laws.

This brings me to consider the constitutionality of the third section of

the bill now depending before us. It provides “that in all nominations

made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by

removal from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the

Senate at the time that the nomination is made, _with a statement of the

reasons for such removal_.”

Whence do we derive our authority to demand his reasons? If the

Constitution has conferred upon him the power of removal, as I think I

have clearly shown, is it not absolute in its nature and entirely free

from the control of Congress? Is he not as independent in the exercise

of this power as Congress in the exercise of any power conferred upon

them by the Constitution? Would he not have the same authority to demand

from us our reasons for rejecting a nomination, as we possess to call

upon him for his reasons for making a removal? Might he not say, I am

answerable to the American people, and to them alone, for the exercise

of this power, in the same manner that the Senate is for the exercise of

any power conferred upon them by the Constitution?

With all the deference which I feel for the opinions of the Senator from

Tennessee (Mr. White), I think he has arrived at the conclusion that the

third section of this bill is constitutional, by blending things

together which are in their nature entirely distinct. He asks, is it not

in the power of Congress to create the office, to define its duties, and

to change and vary these duties at pleasure? Granted. May they not, if

they believe the office unnecessary, repeal the law, and must not the

officer fall with it? Granted. These are legislative powers, clearly

conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. It is then asked, may

Congress not prescribe it as the duty of these officers to give reasons

for their conduct? Certainly they may. And why? Because they are the

creatures of Congress—they are called into existence by Congress—and

they will cease to exist at the pleasure of Congress. Is this the

condition of the executive, who is a co-ordinate branch of the

Government, and who is answerable for his conduct, not to Congress, but

to the people of the United States. What right have we to demand reasons

from the servant of another as to how he performs his duties? To his own

master, which, in this particular, is the American people, and to them

alone, he is responsible. If Congress can command him to give reasons to

the Senate for his removals, the Senate may judge of the validity of

these reasons, and condemn them if they think proper. The executive of

the country is thus rendered subordinate to the Senate;—a position in

which the Constitution of the country never intended to place him. In my

opinion, this bill as strongly negatives the constitutional power of the

President to remove from office, without the concurrence of the Senate,

as if it were so declared in express language. For this reason I shall

vote against it.

In the next session, which commenced in December, 1836, Mr. Buchanan

delivered a speech which may perhaps be regarded as the ablest of his

efforts in the Senate. It related to a topic that had long been attended

with intense political excitement. President Jackson’s removal of the

public deposits from the Bank of the United States furnished to the Whig

opponents of his administration a means of attack, of which they were

not slow to avail themselves. The powerful opposition, which at the time

of that occurrence controlled the proceedings of the Senate, was led by

Mr. Clay, who was the defeated Whig candidate for the Presidency at the

election of 1832. Swaying his party in the Senate with an imperious

will, and enforcing his determinations by a fascinating eloquence, Mr.

Clay, on the 28th of March, 1834, carried a resolution, which was

inscribed on the journal of the Senate in the following words: “That the

President, in the late executive proceedings, in relation to the public

revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by

the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.” On the 3d of

March, 1835, a resolution introduced by Col. Benton, of Missouri,

ordering Mr. Clay’s resolution to be “expunged” from the journal, came

up for consideration. The word “expunged” was stricken out by a vote in

which the mover and other friends of the administration concurred, so

that some other less objectionable phrase might be substituted. But as

soon as this word was stricken out, Mr. Webster moved to lay the

resolution on the table, giving notice that he would not withdraw his

motion “for friend or foe.” The motion was not debatable, and as the

Whigs still had a majority, it was carried by a party vote. The

Democratic Senators then determined that the word “expunged” should

never be again surrendered. At the next session they had a majority; and

Col. Benton’s resolution then came up, in a form which directed that Mr.

Clay’s resolution of 1834 be expunged from the journal of the Senate, by

drawing black lines around it, and writing across its face the words,

“Expunged by order of the Senate, this —— day of —— in the year of our

Lord 1837.” It was upon this proposal, in reply to an impassioned speech

by Mr. Clay, that Mr. Buchanan, on the 16th of January, 1837, addressed

the Senate.

There is one praise to be accorded to this speech, which, considering

the party character of the struggle, is not a small one. Mr. Buchanan

separated what was personal and partisan in this controversy from the

serious questions involved; and covering the whole field of argument

upon the really important topics in a temperate and courteous but firm

discussion, he placed his side of the debate upon its true merits. He

began by contending that the censure, which the Senate had in 1834

passed upon the President, was unjust, because he had violated no law in

ordering the Secretary of the Treasury to remove the public deposits

from the Bank. He then argued that the Senate had committed an

infraction of the Constitution, by recording upon its journal an

accusation that the President had been guilty of an offence for which he

might be impeached, and for which it would be the duty of the Senate to

try him on articles of impeachment, if the House of Representatives

should ever proceed against him in that manner. In thus prejudging the

case, by a resolution of mere naked censure, adopted in its legislative

capacity, the Senate had rendered itself incompetent to perform its high

judicial function. He concluded his argument by a very ingenious and

elaborate criticism of the word “expunge,” arguing that there was a real

and solid distinction between a physical obliteration of a record,

making it impossible thereafter to be read, and such an annulment of its

legal existence as was now proposed, and which, by leaving it in a

condition to be read, would nevertheless deprive it of all force. It

must be confessed that this was a very finely drawn distinction; but it

was supported by no inconsiderable acuteness and force, and with great

fairness of reasoning. Col. Benton’s resolution was adopted by a party

vote, and was immediately carried out.[53]

The following is a full report of Mr. Buchanan’s speech in support of

the Expunging Resolution:

MR. PRESIDENT:—After the able and eloquent display of the Senator from

Kentucky, (Mr. Clay) who has just resumed his seat, after having so long

enchained the attention of his audience, it might be the dictate of

prudence for me to remain silent. But I feel too deeply my

responsibility as an American Senator, not to make the attempt to place

before the Senate and the country the reasons which, in my opinion, will

justify the vote which I intend to give this day.

A more grave and solemn question has rarely, if ever, been submitted to

the Senate of the United States, than the one now under discussion. This

Senate is now called upon to review its own decision, to rejudge its own

justice, and to annihilate its own sentence, pronounced against the

co-ordinate executive branch of this Government. On the 28th of March,

1834, the American Senate, in the face of the American people, in the

face of the whole world, by a solemn resolution, pronounced the

President of the United States to be a violator of the Constitution of

his country—of that Constitution which he had solemnly sworn “to

preserve, protect, and defend.” Whether we consider the exalted

character of the tribunal which pronounced this condemnation, or the

illustrious object against which it was directed, we ought to feel

deeply impressed with the high and lasting importance of the present

proceeding. It is in fact, if not in form, the trial of the Senate, for

having unjustly and unconstitutionally tried and condemned the

President; and their accusers are the American people. In this cause I

am one of the judges. In some respects, it is a painful position for me

to occupy. It is vain, however, to express unavailing regrets. I must,

and shall, firmly and sternly, do my duty; although in the performance

of it I may wound the feelings of gentlemen whom I respect and esteem. I

shall proceed no farther than the occasion demands, and will, therefore,

justify.

Who was the President of the United States, against whom this sentence

has been pronounced? Andrew Jackson—a name which every American mother,

after the party strife which agitates us for the present moment shall

have passed away, will, during all the generations which this Republic

is destined to endure, teach her infant to lisp with that of the

venerated name of Washington. The one was the founder, the other the

preserver, of the liberties of his country.

If President Jackson has been guilty of violating the Constitution of

the United States, let impartial justice take its course. I admit that

it is no justification for such a crime, that his long life has been

more distinguished by acts of disinterested patriotism than that of any

American citizen now living. It is no justification that the honesty of

his heart and the purity of his intentions have become proverbial, even

amongst his political enemies. It is no justification that in the hour

of danger, and in the day of battle, he has been his country’s shield.

If he has been guilty, let his name be “damned to everlasting fame,”

with those of Cæsar and of Napoleon.

If, on the other hand, he is pure and immaculate from the charge, let us

be swift to do him justice, and to blot out the foul stigma which the

Senate has placed upon his character. If we are not, he may go down to

the grave in doubt as to what may be the final judgment of his country.

In any event, he must soon retire to the shades of private life. Shall

we, then, suffer his official term to expire, without first doing him

justice? It may be said of me, as it has already been said of other

Senators, that I am one of the gross adulators of the President. But,

sir, I have never said thus much of him whilst he was in the meridian of

his power. Now that his political sun is nearly set, I feel myself at

liberty to pour forth my grateful feelings, as an American citizen, to a

man who has done so much for his country. I have never, for myself,

either directly or indirectly, solicited office at his hands; and my

character must greatly change, if I should ever do so from any of his

successors. If I should bestow upon him the meed of my poor praise, it

springs from an impulse far different from that which has been

attributed to the majority on this floor. I speak as an independent

freeman and American Senator; and I feel proud now to have the

opportunity of raising my voice in his defence.

On the 28th day of March, 1834, the Senate of the United States

resolved, “that the President, in the late executive proceedings, in

relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and

power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of

both.”

In discussing this subject, I shall undertake to prove, first, that this

resolution is unjust; secondly, that it is unconstitutional; and in the

last place, that it ought to be expunged from our journals, in the

manner proposed by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton).

First, then, it is unjust. On this branch of the subject I had intended

to confine myself to a bare expression of my own decided opinion. This

point has been so often and so ably discussed, that it is impossible for

me to cast any new light upon it. But as it is my intention to follow

the footsteps of the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) wherever they may

lead, I must again tread the ground which has been so often trodden. As

the Senator, however, has confined himself to a mere passing reference

to the topics which this head presents, I shall, in this particular,

follow his example.

Although the resolution condemning the President is vague and general in

its terms, yet we all know that it was founded upon his removal of the

public deposits from the Bank of the United States. The Senator from

Kentucky has contended that this act was a violation of law. And why?

Because, says he, it is well known that the public money was secure in

that institution; and by its charter the public deposits could not be

removed from it, unless under a just apprehension that they were in

danger. Now, sir, I admit that if the President had no right to remove

these deposits, except for the sole reason that their safety was in

danger, the Senator has established his position. But what is the fact?

Was the Government thus restricted by the terms of the bank charter? I

answer, no. Such a limitation is nowhere to be found in it. Let me read

the sixteenth section, which is the only one relating to the subject. It

enacts, “that the deposits of the money of the United States, in places

in which the said bank and branches thereof may be established, shall be

made in said bank or branches thereof, _unless the Secretary of the

Treasury shall at any other time otherwise order and direct_; in which

case the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately lay before

Congress, if in session, and, if not, immediately after the commencement

of the next session, the reasons of such order or direction.”

Is not the authority thus conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury

as broad and as ample as the English language will admit? Where is the

limitation, where the restriction? One might have supposed from the

argument of the Senator from Kentucky, that the charter restricted the

Secretary of the Treasury from removing the deposits, unless he believed

them to be insecure in the Bank of the United States; but the language

of the law itself completely refutes his argument. They were to remain

in the Bank of the United States, “_unless the Secretary of the Treasury

shall at any time otherwise order and direct_.”

The sole limitation upon the discretion of that officer was his

immediate and direct responsibility to Congress. To us he was bound to

render his reasons for removing the deposits. We, and we alone, are

constituted the judges as to the sufficiency of these reasons.

It would be an easy task to prove that the authors of the bank charter

acted wisely in not limiting the discretion of the Secretary of the

Treasury over the deposits to the single case of their apprehended

insecurity. We may imagine many other reasons which would have rendered

their removal both wise and expedient. But I forbear; especially as the

case now before the Senate presents as striking an illustration of this

proposition as I could possibly imagine. Upon what principle, then, do I

justify the removal of the deposits?

The Bank of the United States had determined to apply for a recharter at

the session of Congress immediately preceding the last Presidential

election. Preparatory to this application, and whilst it was pending, in

the short space of sixteen months, it had increased its loans more than

twenty-eight million dollars. They rose from forty-two millions to

seventy millions between the last of December, 1830, and the first of

May, 1832. Whilst this boasted regulator of the currency was thus

expanding its discounts, all the local banks followed the example. The

impulse of self-interest urged them to pursue this course. A delusive

prosperity was thus spread over the land. Money everywhere became

plenty. The bank was regarded as the beneficent parent, who was pouring

her money out into the laps of her children. She thought herself wise

and provident in thus rendering herself popular. The recharter passed

both Houses of Congress by triumphant majorities. But then came “the

frost, the killing frost.” It was not so easy to propitiate “the Old

Roman.” Although he well knew the power and influence which the bank

could exert against him at the then approaching Presidential election,

he cast such considerations to the winds. He vetoed the bill, and in the

most solemn manner placed himself for trial upon this question before

the American people.

From that moment the faith of many of his former friends began to grow

cold. The bank openly took the field against his re-election. It

expended large sums in subsidizing editors, and in circulating

pamphlets, and papers, and speeches, throughout the Union, calculated to

inflame the public mind against the President. I merely glance at these

things.

Let us pause for a single moment to consider the consequences of such

conduct. What right had the bank, as a corporation, to enter the arena

of politics for the purpose of defending itself, and attacking the

President? Whilst I freely admit that each individual stockholder

possessed the same rights, in this respect, as every other American

citizen, I pray you to consider what a dangerous precedent the bank has

thus established. Our banks now number nearly a thousand, and our other

chartered institutions are almost innumerable. If all these corporations

are to be justified in using their corporate funds for the purpose of

influencing elections; of elevating their political friends, and

crushing their political foes, our condition is truly deplorable. We

shall thus introduce into the State a new, a dangerous, and an alarming

power, the effects of which no man can anticipate. Watchful jealousy is

the price which a free people must ever pay for their liberties; and

this jealousy should be Argus-eyed in watching the political movements

of corporations.

After the bank had been defeated in the Presidential election, it

adopted a new course of policy. What it had been unable to accomplish by

making money plenty, it determined it would wrest from the sufferings of

the people by making money scarce. Pressure and panic then became its

weapons; and with these it was determined, if possible, to extort a

recharter from the American people. It commenced this warfare upon the

interests of the country about the first of August, 1833. In two short

months it decreased its loans more than four millions of dollars, whilst

the deposits of the Government with it had increased, during the same

period, two millions and a quarter. I speak in round numbers. It was

then in the act of reducing its discounts at the rate of two millions of

dollars per month.

The State banks had expanded their loans with the former expansion of

the Bank of the United States. It now became necessary to contract them.

The severest pressure began to be felt everywhere. Had the Bank of the

United States been permitted a short time longer to proceed in this

course, fortified as it was with the millions of the Government which it

held on deposit, a scene of almost universal bankruptcy and insolvency

must have been presented in our commercial cities. It thus became

absolutely necessary for the President either to deprive the bank of the

public deposits, as the only means of protecting the State banks, and

through them the people, from these impending evils, or calmly to look

on and see it spreading ruin throughout the land. It was necessary for

him to adopt this policy for the purpose of preventing a universal

derangement of the currency, a general sacrifice of property, and, as an

inevitable consequence, the recharter of this institution.

By the removal of the deposits, he struck a blow against the bank from

which it has never since recovered. This was the club of Hercules with

which he slew the hydra. This was the master-stroke by which he

prostrated what a large majority of the American people believe to have

been a corrupt and a corrupting institution. For this he is not only

justified, but deserves the eternal gratitude of his country. For this

the Senate have condemned him; but the people of the United States have

hailed him as a deliverer.