removing the deposits from the Bank of the United States, united in his
own hands the power of the purse of the nation with that of the sword. I
think it is not difficult to answer this argument. What was to become of
the public money, in case it had been removed from the Bank of the
United States, under its charter, for the cause which the Senator
himself deems justifiable? Why, sir, it would then have been immediately
remitted to the guardianship of those laws under which it had been
protected before the Bank of the United States was called into
existence. Such was the present case. In regard to this point, no matter
whether the cause of removal were sufficient or not, the moment the
deposits were actually removed they became subject to the pre-existing
laws, and not to the arbitrary will of the President.
The Senator from Kentucky has contended that the President violated the
Constitution and the laws, by dismissing Mr. Duane from office because
he would not remove the deposits, and by appointing Mr. Taney to
accomplish this purpose. I shall not discuss at any length the power of
removal. It is now too late in the day to question it. That the
executive possesses this power was decided by the first Congress. It has
often since been discussed and decided in the same manner, and it has
been exercised by every President of the United States. The President is
bound by the Constitution to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.” If he cannot remove his executive officers, it is impossible
that he can perform this duty. Every inferior officer might set up for
himself; might violate the laws of the country, and put him at defiance,
whilst he would remain perfectly powerless. He could not arrest their
career. A foreign minister might be betraying and disgracing the nation
abroad, without any power to recall him until the next meeting of the
Senate. This construction of the Constitution involves so many dangers
and so many absurdities, that it could not be maintained for a moment,
even if there had not been a constant practice against it of almost half
a century.
But it is contended by the Senator that the Secretary of the Treasury is
a sort of independent power in the State, and is released from the
control of the executive. And why? Simply because he is directed by law
to make his annual report to Congress and not to the President. If this
position be correct, then it necessarily follows that the executive is
released from the obligation of taking care that the numerous and
important acts of Congress regulating the fiscal concerns of the country
shall be faithfully executed. The Secretary of the Treasury is thus made
independent of his control. What would be the position of this officer
under such a construction of the Constitution and laws, it would be very
difficult to decide. And this wonderful transformation of his character
has arisen from the mere circumstance that Congress have by law directed
him to make an annual report to them! No, sir; the executive is
responsible to Congress for the faithful execution of all the laws; and
if the present or any other President should prove faithless to his high
trust, the present Senate, notwithstanding all which has been said,
would be as ready as their predecessors to inflict condign punishment
upon him, in the mode pointed out by the Constitution.
I have now arrived at the great question of the constitutional power of
the Senate to adopt the resolution of March, 1834. It is my firm
conviction that the Senate possesses no such power; and it is now my
purpose to establish this position. The decision on this point must
depend upon a true answer to the question: Does this resolution contain
any impeachable charge against the President? If it does, I trust I
shall demonstrate that the Senate violated its constitutional duty in
proceeding to condemn him in this manner. I shall again read the
resolution:
“_Resolved_, That the President, in the late executive proceedings in
relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and
power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of
both.”
This language is brief and comprehensive. It comes at once to the point.
It bears a striking impress of the character of the Senator from
Kentucky. Does it charge an impeachable offence against the President?
The fourth section of the second article of the Constitution declares
that the “President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the
United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”
It has been contended that this condemnatory resolution contains no
impeachable offence, because it charges no criminal intention against
the President; and I admit that it does not attribute to him any corrupt
motive in express words. Is this sufficient to convince the judgment of
any impartial man that none was intended? Let us, for a few moments,
examine this proposition. If it be well founded, the Senate may for ever
hereafter usurp the power of trying, condemning, and destroying any
officer of the Government, without affording him the slightest
opportunity of being heard in his defence. They may abuse their power,
and prostrate any object of their vengeance. It seems we have now made
the discovery, that the Senate are authorized to exert this tremendous
power—that they may thus assume to themselves the office both of accuser
and of judge, provided the indictment contains no express allegation of
a criminal intention. The President, or any officer of the Government,
may be denounced by the Senate as a violator of the Constitution of his
country,—as derelict in the performance of his public duties, provided
there is no express imputation of an improper motive. The characters of
men whose reputation is dearer to them than their lives may thus be
destroyed. They may be held up to public execration by the omission of a
few formal words. The condemnation of the Senate carries with it such a
moral power, that perhaps there is no man in the United States, except
Andrew Jackson, who could have resisted its force. No, sir; such an
argument can never command conviction. That which we have no power to do
directly, we can never accomplish by indirect means. We cannot by
resolution convict a man of an impeachable offence, merely because we
may omit the formal words of an impeachment. We must regard the
substance of things, and not the mere form.
But again. Although a criminal intention be not charged, in so many
words, by this resolution, yet its language, even without the attendant
circumstances, clearly conveys this meaning. The President is charged
with having “assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by
the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.” “Assumed upon
himself.” What is the plain palpable meaning of this phrase connected
with what precedes and follows? Is it not “to arrogate,” “to claim or
seize unjustly.” These are two of the first meanings of the word assume,
according to the lexicographers. To assume upon one’s self is a mode of
expression which is rarely taken in a good sense. As it is used here, I
ask if any man of plain common understanding, after reading this
resolution, would ever arrive at the conclusion that any Senator voted
for it under the impression that the President was innocent of any
improper intention, and that he violated the Constitution from mere
mistake and from pure motives? The common sense of mankind revolts at
the idea. How can it be contended, for a single moment, that you can
denounce the President as a man who had “assumed upon himself” the power
of violating the laws and the Constitution of his country, and in the
same breath declare that you had not the least intention to criminate
him, and that your language was altogether inoffensive. The two
propositions are manifestly inconsistent.
But I go one step further. If we were sitting as a court of impeachment,
and the bare proposition were established to our satisfaction that the
President had, in violation of the Constitution and the laws, withdrawn
the public revenue of the country from the depository to whose charge
Congress had committed it, and assumed the control over it himself, we
would be bound to convict him of a high official misdemeanor. Under such
circumstances, we should be bound to infer a criminal intention from
this illegal and unconstitutional act. Criminal justice could never be
administered,—society could not exist, if the tribunals of the country
should not attribute evil motives to illegal and unconstitutional
conduct. Omniscience alone can examine the heart. When poor frail man is
placed in the judgment-seat, he must infer the intentions of the accused
from his actions. That “the tree is known by its fruits” is an axiom
which we have derived from the fountain of all truth. Does a poor,
naked, hungry wretch, at this inclement season of the year, take from my
pocket a single dollar; the law infers a criminal intent, and he must be
convicted and punished as a thief, though he may have been actuated by
no other motive than that of saving his wife and his children from
starvation. And shall a different rule be applied to the President of
the United States? Shall it be said of a man elevated to the highest
station on earth, for his wisdom, his integrity, and his virtues, with
all his constitutional advisers around him, when he violates the
Constitution of his country and usurps the control over its entire
revenue, that he may successfully defend himself by declaring he had
done this deed without any criminal intention? No, sir; in such a case,
above all others, the criminal intention must be inferred from the
unconstitutional exercise of high and dangerous powers. The safety of
the Republic demands that the President of the United States should
never shield himself behind such flimsy pretexts. This resolution,
therefore, although it may not have assumed the form of an article of
impeachment, possesses all the substance.
It was my fate some years ago to have assisted as a manager, in behalf
of the House of Representatives, in the trial of an impeachment before
this body. It then became my duty to examine all the precedents in such
cases which had occurred under our Government, since the adoption of the
Federal Constitution. On that occasion, I found one which has a strong
bearing upon this question. I refer to the case of Judge Pickering. He
was tried and condemned by the Senate upon all the four articles
exhibited against him; although the first three contained no other
charge than that of making decisions contrary to law, in a cause
involving a mere question of property, and then refusing to grant the
party injured an appeal from his decision, to which he was entitled.
From the clear violation of law in this case, the Senate must have
inferred an impure and improper motive.
If any thing further were wanting to prove that the resolution of the
Senate contained a criminal and impeachable charge against the
President, it might be demonstrated from all the circumstances attending
the transaction. Whilst this resolution was in progress through the
Senate, the Bank of the United States was employed in producing panic
and pressure throughout the land. Much actual suffering was experienced
by the people; and where that did not exist, they dreaded unknown and
awful calamities. Confidence between man and man was at an end. There
was a fearful pause in the business of the country. We were then engaged
in the most violent party conflict recorded in our annals. To use the
language of the Senator from Kentucky, we were in the midst of a
revolution. On the one side it was contended that the power over the
purse of the nation had been usurped by the President; that in his own
person he had united this power with that of the sword, and that the
liberties of the people were gone, unless he could be arrested in his
mad career. On the other hand, the friends of the President maintained
that the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States was
an act of stern justice to the people; that it was strictly legal and
constitutional; that he was impelled to it by the highest and purest
principles of patriotism; and that it was the only means of prostrating
an institution which threatened the destruction of our dearest rights
and liberties. During this terrific conflict public indignation was
aroused to such a degree, that the President received a great number of
anonymous letters, threatening him with assassination unless he should
restore the deposits.
It was during the pendency of this conflict throughout the country, that
the Senator from Kentucky thought proper, on the 26th December, 1833, to
present his condemnatory resolution to the Senate. And here, sir, permit
me to say that I do not believe there was any corrupt connection between
any Senator upon this floor and the Bank of the United States. But it
was at this inauspicious moment that the resolution was introduced. How
was it supported by the Senator from Kentucky? He told us that a
revolution had already commenced. He told us that by the 3d of March,
1837, if the progress of innovation should continue, there would be
scarcely a vestige remaining of the Government and policy as they had
existed prior to the 3d March, 1829. That in a term of years a little
more than that which was required to establish our liberties, the
Government would be transformed into an elective monarchy—the worst of
all forms of government. He compared the measure adopted by General
Jackson with the conduct of the usurping Cæsar, who, after he had
overrun Italy in sixty days, and conquered the liberties of his native
country, terrified the Tribune Metellus, who guarded the treasury of the
Roman people, and seized it by open force. He declared that the
President had proclaimed an open, palpable, and daring usurpation. He
concluded by asserting that the premonitory symptoms of despotism were
upon us; and if Congress did not apply an instantaneous and effective
remedy, the fatal collapse would soon come on, and we should die—ignobly
die! base, mean, and abject slaves, the scorn and contempt of mankind,
unpitied, unwept, and unmourned. What a spectacle was then presented in
this Chamber! We are told, in the reports of the day, that, when he took
his seat, there was repeated and loud applause in the galleries. This,
it will be remembered, was the introductory speech of the Senator. In my
opinion, it was one of the ablest and most eloquent of all his able and
eloquent speeches. He was then riding upon the whirlwind and directing
the storm. At the time I read it, for I was not then in the Senate, it
reminded me of the able, the vindictive, and the eloquent appeal of Mr.
Burke before the House of Lords, on the impeachment of Warren Hastings,
in which he denounced that governor-general as the ravager and oppressor
of India, and the scourge of the millions who had been placed under his
authority.
And yet, we are now told that this resolution did not intend to impute
any criminal motive to the President. That he was a good old man, though
not a good constitutional lawyer: and that he knew better how to wield
the sword than to construe the Constitution.
[Mr. Clay here rose to explain. He said, “I never have said and never
will say, that personally I acquitted the President of any improper
intention. I lament that I cannot say it. But what I did say, was that
the act of the Senate of 1834 is free from the imputation of any
criminal motives.”]
Sir, said Mr. B., this avowal is in character with the frank and manly
nature of the Senator from Kentucky. It is no more than what I expected
from him. The imputation of any improper motive to the President has
been again and again disclaimed by other Senators upon this floor. The
Senator from Kentucky has now boldly come out in his true colors, and
avows the principles which he held at the time. He acknowledges that he
did not acquit the President from improper intentions, when charging him
with a violation of the Constitution of his country.
This trial of the President before the Senate, continued for three
months. During this whole period, instead of the evidence which a
judicial tribunal ought to receive, exciting memorials, signed by vast
numbers of the people, and well calculated to inflame the passions of
his judges, were daily pouring in upon the Senate. He was denounced upon
this floor by every odious epithet which belongs to tyrants. Finally,
the obnoxious resolution was adopted by the vote of the Senate, on the
28th day of March, 1834. After the exposition which I have made, can any
impartial mind doubt but that this resolution intended to charge against
the President a wilful and daring violation of the Constitution and the
laws? I think not.
The Senator from Kentucky has argued, with his usual power, that the
functions of the Senate, acting in a legislative capacity, are not to be
restricted, because it is possible that the same question, in another
form, may come before us judicially. I concur in the truth and justice
of this position. We must perform our legislative duties; and if, in the
investigation of facts, having legislation distinctly in view, we should
incidentally be led to the investigation of criminal charges, it is a
necessity imposed upon us by our condition, from which we cannot escape.
It results from the varying nature of our duties, and not from our own
will. I admit that it would be difficult to mark the precise line which
separates our legislative from our judicial functions. I shall not
attempt it. In many cases, from necessity, they are in some degree
intermingled. The present resolution, however, stands far in advance of
this line. It is placed in bold relief, and is clear of all such
difficulties. It is a mere naked resolution of censure. It refers solely
to the past conduct of the President, and condemns it in the strongest
terms, without even proposing any act of legislation by which the evil
may be remedied hereafter. It was judgment upon the past alone; not
prevention for the future. Nay, more: the resolution is so vague and
general in its terms that it is impossible to ascertain from its face
the cause of the President’s condemnation. The Senate have resolved that
the executive “has assumed upon himself authority and power not
conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.” What
is the specification under this charge? Why, that he has acted thus, “in
the late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue?” What
executive proceedings? The resolution leaves us entirely in the dark
upon this subject. How could any legislation spring from such a
resolution? It is impossible. None such was ever attempted.
If the resolution had preserved its original phraseology—if it had
condemned the President for dismissing one Secretary of the Treasury
because he would not remove the deposits, and for appointing his
successor to effect this purpose, the Senator might then have contended
that the evil was distinctly pointed out; and, although no legislation
was proposed, the remedy might be applied hereafter. But he has deprived
himself even of this feeble argument. He has left us upon an ocean of
uncertainty, without chart or compass. “The late executive proceedings
in relation to the revenue,” is a phrase of the most general and
indefinite character. Every Senator who voted in favor of this
resolution may have acted upon different principles. To procure its
passage, nothing more was necessary than that a majority should unite in
the conclusion that the President had violated the Constitution and the
laws in some one or other of his numerous acts in relation to the public
revenue. The views of Senators constituting the majority may have varied
from each other to any conceivable extent; and yet they may have united
in the final vote. That this was the fact to a considerable extent, I
have always understood. It is utterly impossible, either that such a
proceeding could ever have been intended to become the basis of
legislation, or that legislative action could have ever sprung from such
a source.
I flatter myself, then, I have succeeded in proving that this resolution
charged the President with a high official misdemeanor, wholly
disconnected from legislation, which, if true, ought to have subjected
him to impeachment.
This brings me directly to the question, had the Senate any power, under
the Constitution, to adopt such a resolution? In other words, can the
Senate condemn a public officer by a simple resolution, for an offence
which would subject him to an impeachment? To state the proposition, is
to answer this question in the negative. Dreadful would be the
consequences if we possess and should exercise such a power.
This body is invested with high and responsible powers of a legislative,
an executive, and a judicial character. No person can enter it until he
has attained a mature age. Our term of service is longer than that of
any other elective functionary. If Senators will have it so, it is the
most aristocratic branch of our Government. For what purpose did the
framers of the Constitution confer upon it these varied and important
powers, and this long tenure of office? The answer is plain. It was
placed in this secure and elevated position that it might be above the
storms of faction which so often inflame the passions of men. It never
was intended to be an arena for political gladiators. Until the second
session of the third Congress, the Senate always sat with closed doors,
except in the single instance when the eligibility of Mr. Gallatin to a
seat in the body was the subject of discussion. Of this particular
practice, however, I cannot approve. I merely state it, to show the
intention of those who formed the Constitution. I was informed by one of
the most eminent statesmen and Senators which this country has ever
produced, now no more (the late Mr. King), that for some years after the
Federal Government commenced its operation, the debates of the Senate
resembled conversations rather than speeches, and that it originated but
few legislative measures. Senators were then critics rather than authors
in legislation. Whether its gain in eloquence, since it has become a
popular assembly, and since the sound of thundering applause has been
heard in our galleries at the denunciation of the President, has been an
equivalent for its loss in true dignity, may well be doubted. To give
this body its just influence with the people, it ought to preserve
itself as free as possible from angry political discussions. In the
performance of our executive duties, in the ratification of treaties,
and in the confirmation of nominations, the Constitution has connected
us with the executive. The efficient and successful administration of
the Government therefore requires that we should move on together in as
much harmony as may be consistent with the independent exercise of our
respective functions.
But above all, we should be the most cautious in guarding our judicial
character from suspicion. We constitute the high court of impeachment of
this nation, before which every officer of the Government may be
arraigned. To this tribunal is committed the character of men whose
character is far dearer to them than their lives. We should be the rock
standing in the midst of the ocean, for the purpose of affording a
shelter to the faithful officer from unjust persecution, against which
the billows might dash themselves in vain. Whilst we are a terror to
evil doers, we should be a praise to those who do well. We should never
voluntarily perform any act which might prejudice our judgment, or
render us suspected as a judicial tribunal. More especially, when the
President of the United States is arraigned at the bar of public opinion
for offences which might subject him to an impeachment, we should remain
not only chaste but unsuspected. Better, infinitely better, would it be
for us not to manifest our feeling, even in a case in which we were
morally certain the House of Representatives would not prefer before us
articles of impeachment, than to reach the object of our disapprobation
by a usurpation of their rights. It is true that when the Senate passed
the resolution condemning the President, a majority in the House were of
a different opinion. But the next elections might have changed that
majority into a minority. The House might then have voted articles of
impeachment against the President. Under such circumstances, I pray you
to consider in what a condition the Senate would have been placed. They
had already prejudged the case. They had already convicted the
President, and denounced him to the world as a violator of the
Constitution. In criminal prosecutions, even against the greatest
malefactor, if a juror has prejudged the cause, he cannot enter the jury
box. The Senate had rendered itself wholly incompetent in this case to
perform its highest judicial functions. The trial of the President, had
articles of impeachment been preferred against him, would have been but
a solemn mockery of justice.
The Constitution of the United States has carefully provided against
such an enormous evil, by declaring that “the House of Representatives
shall have the sole power of impeachment,” and “the Senate shall have
the sole power to try all impeachments.” Until the accused is brought
before us by the House, it is a manifest violation of our solemn duty to
condemn him by a resolution.
If a court of criminal jurisdiction, without any indictment having been
found by a grand jury, without having given the defendant notice to
appear, without having afforded him an opportunity of cross-examining
the witnesses against him, and making his defence, should resolve that
he was guilty of a high crime, and place this conviction upon their
records, all mankind would exclaim against the injustice and
unconstitutionality of the act. Wherein consists the difference between
this case and the condemnation of the President? In nothing, except that
such a conviction by the Senate, on account of its exalted character,
would fall with tenfold force upon its object. I have often been
astonished, notwithstanding the extended and well deserved popularity of
General Jackson, that the moral influence of this condemnation by the
Senate had not crushed him. With what tremendous effect might this
assumed power of the Senate be used to blast the reputation of any man
who might fall under its displeasure! The precedent is extremely
dangerous; and the American people have wisely determined to blot it out
forever.
It is painful to reflect what might have been the condition of the
country, if at the inauspicious moment of the passage of the resolution
against the President, its interests and its honor had rendered it
necessary to engage in a foreign war. The fearful consequences of such a
condition, at such a moment, must strike every mind. Would the Senate
then have confided to the President the necessary power to defend the
country? Where could the sinews of war have been found? In what
condition was this body, at that moment, to act upon an important treaty
negotiated by the President, or upon any of his nominations? But I
forbear to enlarge upon this topic.
I have now arrived at the last point in this discussion. Do the Senate
possess the power, under the Constitution, of expunging the resolution
of March, 1834, from their journals, in the manner proposed by the
Senator from Missouri? (Mr. Benton.) I cheerfully admit we must show
that this is not contrary to the Constitution; for we can never redress
one violation of that instrument by committing another. Before I proceed
to this branch of the subject, I shall put myself right, by a brief
historical reminiscence. I entered the Senate in December, 1834, fresh
from the ranks of the people, without the slightest feeling of hostility
against any Senator on this floor. I then thought that the resolution of
the Senator from Missouri was too severe in proposing to _expunge_.
Although I was anxious to record, in strong terms, my entire
disapprobation of the resolution of March, 1834, yet I was willing to
accomplish this object without doing more violence to the feelings of my
associates on this floor, than was absolutely necessary to justify the
President. Actuated by these friendly motives, I exerted all my little
influence with the Senator from Missouri, to induce him to abandon the
word _expunge_, and substitute some others in its place. I knew that
this word was exceedingly obnoxious to the Senators who had voted for
the former resolution. Other friends of his also exerted their
influence; and at length his kindly feelings prevailed, and he consented
to abandon that word, although it was peculiarly dear to him. I speak
from my own knowledge. “All which I saw and part of which I was.”
The resolution of the Senator from Missouri came before the Senate on
the 3d of March, 1835. Under it the resolution of March, 1834, was
“ordered to be expunged from the journal,” for reasons appearing on its
face, which I need not enumerate. The Senator from Tennessee (Mr. White)
moved to amend the resolution of the Senator from Missouri, by striking
out the order to expunge, with the reasons for it, and inserting in
their stead the words, “rescinded, reversed, repealed, and declared to
be null and void.” Some difference of opinion then arose among the
friends of the Administration as to the words which should be
substituted in place of the order to expunge. For the purpose of leaving
this question perfectly open, you, sir, (Mr. King, of Alabama, was in
the chair,) then moved to amend the original motion of Mr. Benton, by
striking out the words, “ordered to be expunged from the journal of the
Senate.” This motion prevailed, on the ayes and noes, by a vote of 39 to
7; and amongst the ayes, the name of the Senator from Missouri is
recorded. The resolution was thus left a blank, in its most essential
features, ready to be filled up as the Senate might direct. The era of
good feeling, in regard to this subject had commenced. It was nipped in
the bud, however, by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster).
Whilst the resolution was still in blank, he rose in his place, and
proclaimed the triumph of the Constitution, by the vote to strike out
the word expunge, and then moved to lay the resolution on the table,
declaring that he would neither withdraw his motion for friend nor foe.
This motion precluded all amendment and all debate. It prevailed by a
party vote; and thus we were left with our resolution a blank. Such was
the manner in which the Senators in opposition received our advances of
courtesy and kindness, in the moment of their strength and our weakness.
Had the Senator from Massachusetts suffered us to proceed but for five
minutes, we should have filled up the blank in the resolution. It would
then have assumed a distinct form, and they would never afterwards have
heard of the word expunge. We should have been content with the words
“rescinded, reversed, repealed, and declared to be null and void.” But
the conduct of the Senator from Massachusetts on that occasion, and that
of the party with which he acted, roused the indignation of every friend
of the Administration on this floor. We then determined that the word
_expunge_ should never again be surrendered.
The Senator from Kentucky has introduced a precedent from the
proceedings of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, for the
purpose of proving that we have no right to adopt this resolution. To
this I can have no possible objection. But I can tell the Senator, if I
were convinced that I had voted wrong, when comparatively a boy, more
than twenty years ago, the fear of being termed inconsistent would not
now deter me from voting right upon the same question. I do not,
however, repent of my vote upon that occasion. I would now vote in the
same manner, under similar circumstances. I should not vote to expunge,
under any circumstances, any proceeding from the journals by
obliterating the record. If I do not prove before I take my seat, that
the case in the Legislature of Pennsylvania was essentially different
from that now before the Senate, I shall agree to be proclaimed
inconsistent and time-serving.
It was my settled conviction at the commencement of the last session of
Congress, that the Senate had no power to obliterate their journal. This
was shaken, but not removed, by the argument of the Senator from
Louisiana, (Mr. Porter), who confessedly made the ablest speech on the
other side of the question. The Constitution declares that “each House
shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require
secrecy.” What was the position which that Senator then attempted to
maintain? In order to prove that we had no power to obliterate or
destroy our journals, he thought it necessary to contend that the word
“keep” as used in the Constitution, means both to record and to
preserve. This appeared to me to be a mere begging of the question.
I shall attempt no definition of the word “keep.” At least since the
days of Plato, we know that definitions have been dangerous. Yet I think
that the meaning of this word, as applied to the subject matter, is so
plain that he who runs may read. If I direct my agent to keep a journal
of his proceedings, and publish the same, my palpable meaning is, that
he shall write these proceedings down, from day to day, and publish what
he has written for general information. After he has obeyed my commands,
after he has kept his journal, and published it to the world, he has
executed the essential part of the trust confided to him. What becomes
of this original manuscript journal afterwards, is a matter of total
indifference. So in regard to the manuscript journals of either House of
Congress: after more than a thousand copies have been printed, and
published, and distributed over the Union, it is a matter of not the
least importance what disposition may be made of them. They have
answered their purpose, and, in any practical view, become useless. If
they were burnt, or otherwise destroyed, it would not be an event of the
slightest public consequence. Such indifference has prevailed upon this
subject, that these journals have been considered, in the House of
Representatives, as so much waste paper, and, during a period of
thirty-four years after the organization of the Government, they were
actually destroyed. From this circumstance, no public or private
inconvenience has been or ever can be sustained; because our printed
journals are received in evidence in all courts of justice in the same
manner as if the originals were produced.
The Senator from Louisiana has discovered that to “keep” means both “to
record” and “to preserve.” But can you give this, or any other word in
the English language, two distinct and independent meanings at the same
time, as applied to the same subject? I think not. From the imperfection
of human language, from the impossibility of having appropriate words to
express every idea, the same word, as applied to different subjects, has
a variety of significations. As applied to any one subject, it cannot,
at the same time, convey two distinct meanings. In the Constitution it
must mean either “to write down,” or “to preserve.” It cannot have both
significations. Let Senators, then, take their choice. If it signifies
“to write down,” as it unquestionably does, what becomes of the
constitutional injunction to preserve? The truth is, that the
Constitution has not provided what shall be done with the manuscript
journal, after it has served the purposes for which it was called into
existence. When it has been published to the people of the United
States, for whose use it was ordered to be kept; after it has thus been
perpetuated, and they have been furnished with the means of judging of
the public conduct of their public servants, it ceases to be an object
of the least importance. Whether it be thrown into the garret of the
Capitol with other useless lumber, or be destroyed, is a matter of no
public interest. It has probably never once been referred to in the
history of our Government. If it should ever be determined to be a
violation of the Constitution to obliterate or destroy this manuscript
journal, it must be upon different principles from those which have been
urged in this debate. My own impression is, that as the framers of the
Constitution have directed us to keep a journal, a constructive duty may
be implied from this command, which would forbid us to obliterate or
destroy it. Under this impression, I should vote, as I did twenty years
ago, in the Legislature of Pennsylvania, against any proposition
actually to expunge any part of the journal. But waiving this
unprofitable discussion, let us proceed to the real point in
controversy.
Is any such proceeding as that of actually expunging the journal,
proposed by the resolution of the Senator from Missouri? I answer, no
such thing. If the Constitution had, in express terms, directed us to
record and to preserve a journal of our proceedings, there is nothing in
the resolution now before us which would be inconsistent with such a
provision.
Is the drawing of a black line around the resolution of the Senate, of
March, 1834, to obliterate or deface it? On the contrary, is it not to
render it more conspicuous,—to place it in bold relief,—to give it a
prominence in the public view, beyond any other proceeding of this body,
in past, and I trust, in all future time. If the argument of Senators
were, not that we have no power to obliterate; but that the Senate
possessed no power to render one portion of the journal more conspicuous
than another, it would have had much greater force. Why, sir, by means
of this very proceeding, that portion of our journal upon which it
operates will be rescued from a slumber which would otherwise have been
eternal, and, fac-similes of the original resolution, without a word or
a letter defaced, will be circulated over the whole Union.
But, sir, this resolution also directs that across the face of the
condemnatory resolution there shall be written by the Secretary,
“Expunged by the order of the Senate this —— day of ——, in the year of
our Lord 1837.”
Will this obliterate any part of the original resolution? If it does,
the duty of the Secretary will be performed in a very bungling manner.
No such thing is intended. It would be easy to remove every scruple from
every mind upon this subject, by amending the resolution of the Senator
from Missouri, so as to direct the Secretary to perform his duty in such
a manner as not to obliterate any part of the condemnatory resolution.
Such a direction, however, appears to me to be wholly unnecessary. The
nature of the whole proceeding is very plain. We now adopt a resolution,
expressing our strong reprobation of the original resolution; and for
this purpose we use the word “expunged,” as the strongest term which we
can apply. We then direct our Secretary to draw black lines around it,
and place such a reference to our proceedings of this day upon its face,
that in all time to come, whoever may inspect this portion of our
journal, will be pointed at once to the record of its condemnation. What
lawyer has not observed upon the margin of the judgment docket, if the
original judgment has been removed to a superior court, and there
reversed, a minute of such reversal? In our editions of the statutes,
have we not all noted the repeal of any of them, which may have taken
place at a subsequent period? Who ever heard, in the one case or the
other, that this was obliterating or destroying the record, or the book?
So in this case, we make a mere reference to our future proceeding upon
the face of the resolution, instead of the margin. Suppose we should
only repeal the obnoxious resolution, and direct such a reference to be
made upon its face? Would any Senator contend that this would be an
obliteration of the journal?
But it has been contended that the word _expunge_ is not the appropriate
word; and we have wrested it from its true signification, in applying it
to the present case. Even if this allegation were correct, the answer
would be at hand. You might then convict us of bad taste, but not of a
violation of the Constitution. On the face of the resolution we have
stated distinctly what we mean. We have directed the Secretary in what
manner he shall understand it, and we have excluded the idea that it is
our intention to obliterate or to destroy the journal.
But I shall contend that the word _expunge_ is the appropriate word, and
that there is not another in the English language so precisely adapted
to convey our meaning. I shall show, from the highest literary and
parliamentary authorities, that the word has acquired a signification
entirely distinct from that of actual obliteration. Let me proceed
immediately to this task. After citing my authorities, I shall proceed
with the argument. First, then, for those of a literary character. I
read from Crabbe’s Synonymes, page 140; and every Senator will admit
that this is a work of established reputation. In speaking of the use of
the word expunge, the author says: “When the contents of a book are in
part rejected, they are aptly described as being _expunged_; in this
manner the free-thinking sects _expunge_ everything from the Bible which
does not suit their purpose, or they _expunge_ from their creed what
does not humor their passions.” The idea that an actual obliteration was
intended in these cases would be manifestly absurd. In the same page
there is a quotation from Mr. Burke to illustrate the meaning of this
word. “I believe,” says he, “that any person who was of age to take a
part in public concerns forty years ago (if the intermediate space were
_expunged_ from his memory), could hardly credit his senses when he
should hear that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in this
island.” I shall now cite Mr. Jefferson as a literary authority. He has
often been referred to on this floor as a standard in politics. For this
high authority, I am indebted to my friend from Louisiana (Mr.
Nicholas). In the original draft of the declaration of independence, he
uses the word _expunge_ in the following manner: “Such has been the
patient sufferance of these colonies; and such is now the necessity
which constrains them _to expunge_ their former systems of government.”
Although the word _alter_ was substituted for _expunge_, I presume upon
the ground that this was too strong a term, yet the change does not
detract from the literary authority of the precedent.—_Jefferson’s
Correspondence, &c., 1st volume, page 17._
I presume that I have shown that the word _expunge_ has acquired a
distinct metaphorical meaning in our literature, which excludes the idea
of actual obliteration. If I should proceed one step further, and prove
that in legislative proceedings it has acquired the very same
signification, I shall then have fully established my position. For this
purpose I cite, first, “the Secret Proceedings and Debates of the
Federal Convention.” In page 118, we find the following entries: “On
motion _to expunge_ the clause of the qualification as to age, it was
carried—ten States against one.” Again: “On the clause respecting the
ineligibility to any other office, it was moved that the words ‘by any
particular State,’ _be expunged_—four States for, five against, and two
divided.” So page 119: “The last blank was filled up with _one year_,
and carried—eight ayes, two noes, one divided.”
“Mr. Pinckney moved _to expunge_ the clause—agreed to, _nem.
con._” Again: “Mr. Butler moved _to expunge_ the clause of the
stipends—lost, seven against, three for, one divided.” Again, in page
157: “Mr. Pinckney moved that that part of the clause which disqualifies
a person from holding an office in the State _be expunged_, because the
first and best characters in a State may thereby be deprived of a seat
in the national council.”
“Question put _to strike out_ the words moved for and carried—eight
ayes, three noes.”
It will thus be perceived that in the proceedings of the very convention
which formed the Constitution under which we are now governed, the word
_expunge_ was often used in its figurative sense. It will certainly not
be asserted, or even intimated, by any Senator here, that when these
motions to expunge prevailed, the words of the original draft of the
Constitution were actually obliterated or defaced. The meaning is
palpable. These provisions were merely rejected; not actually blotted
out.
But I shall now produce a precedent precisely in point. It presents
itself in the proceedings of the Senate of Massachusetts, and refers to
the famous resolution of that body adopted on the 15th day of June,
1813, in relation to the capture of the British vessel Peacock;
denouncing the late war, and declaring that it was not becoming in a
moral and religious people, to express any approbation of military or
naval exploits which were not immediately connected with the defence of
our seacoast. Massachusetts adopted the following resolution:
_“Resolved_ That the aforesaid resolve of the fifteenth day of
June, A. D. 1813, and the preamble thereof, _be, and the same are
hereby, expunged from the journals of the Senate_.”
It is self-evident that, in this case, not the least intention existed
of defacing the old manuscript journal. The word “expunge” was used in
its figurative signification, just as it is in the case before us, to
express the strongest reprobation of the former proceeding. That
proceeding was to be expunged solely by force of the subsequent
resolution, and not by any actual obliteration. There never was any
actual obliteration of the journal.
Judging, then, from the highest English authorities, from the works of
celebrated authors and statesmen, and from the proceedings of
legislative bodies, is it not evident that the word _expunge_ has
acquired a distinct meaning, altogether inconsistent with any actual
obliteration?
All that we have heard about defacing and destroying the journal are
mere phantoms, which have been conjured up to terrify the timid. We
intend no such thing. We only mean, most strongly, to express our
conviction that the condemnatory resolution ought never to have found a
place on the journal. If more authorities were wanting, I might refer to
the Legislature of Virginia. The present expunging resolution is in
exact conformity with their instructions to their Senators. As a matter
of taste, I cannot say that I much admire their plan, though I entertain
no doubt but that it is perfectly constitutional. That State is highly
literary; and I think I have established that their Legislature, when
they used the word _expunge_, without intending thereby to effect an
actual obliteration of the journal, justly appreciated the meaning of
the language which they employed.
The word _expunge_ is, in my opinion, the only one which we could have
used, clearly and forcibly to accomplish our purpose. Even if it had not
been sanctioned by practice as a parliamentary word, we ought ourselves
to have first established the precedent. It suits the case precisely. If
you rescind, reverse, or repeal a resolution; you thereby admit that it
once had some constitutional or legal authority. If you declare it to
have been null and void from the beginning; this is but the expression
of your own opinion that such was the fact. This word expunge acts upon
the resolution itself. It at once goes to its origin, and destroys its
legal existence as if it had never been. It does not merely kill, but it
annihilates.
Parliamentary practice has changed the meaning of several other words
from their primitive signification, in a similar manner with that of the
word expunge. The original signification of the word rescind is “to cut
off.” Usage has made it mean, in reference to a law or resolution, to
abrogate or repeal it. We every day hear motions “to strike out.” What
is the literal meaning of this expression? The question may be best
answered by asking another. If I were to request you to strike out a
line from your letter, and you were willing to comply with my request,
what would be your conduct? You would run your pen through it
immediately. You would literally strike it out. Yet what use do we make
of this phrase every day in our legislative proceedings? If I make a
motion to strike out a section from a bill and it prevails, the
Secretary encloses the printed copy of it in black lines, and makes a
note on the margin that it has been stricken out. The original he never
touches. Why then should not the word expunge, without obliterating the
proceeding to which it is directed, signify to destroy as if it never
had existed?
After all that has been said, I think I need scarcely again recur to the
Pennsylvania precedent. It is evident from the whole of that proceeding
that an actual expunging of the journal was intended, if it had not
already been executed. I have no recollection whatever of the
circumstances, but I am under a perfect conviction, from the face of the
journal, that such was the nature of the case. I should vote now as I
did then, after a period of more than twenty years. Both my vote, and
the motion which I subsequently made upon that occasion, evidently
proceeded upon this principle. The question arose in this manner, as it
appears from the journal. On the 10th of February, 1816, “The Speaker
informed the House that a constitutional question being involved in a
decision by him yesterday, on a motion to expunge certain proceedings
from the journal, he was desirous of having the opinion of the House on
that decision,” viz: “that a majority can expunge from the journal
proceedings in which the yeas and nays have not been called.” Now, as no
trace whatever appears upon the journal of the preceding day of the
motion to which the Speaker refers, it is highly probable, nay, it is
almost certain, that the proceedings had been actually expunged before
he asked the advice of the House.
No man feels with more sensibility, the necessity which compels him to
perform an unkind act towards his brother Senators than myself; but we
have now arrived at that point when imperious duty demands that we
should either adopt this expunging resolution or abandon it forever.
Already much precious time has been employed in its discussion. The
moment has arrived when we must act. Senators in the opposition console
themselves with the belief that posterity will do them justice, should
it be denied to them by the present generation. They place their own
names in the one scale and ours in the other, and flatter themselves
with the hope that before that tribunal at least, their weight will
preponderate. For my own part, I am willing to abide the issue. I am
willing to be judged for the vote which I shall give to-day, not only by
the present, but by future generations, should my obscure name ever be
mentioned in after times. After the passions and prejudices of the
present moment shall have subsided, and the impartial historian shall
come to record the proceedings of this day, he will say that the
distinguished men who passed the resolution condemning the President
were urged on to the act by a desire to occupy the high places in the
Government. That an ambition noble in itself, but not wisely regulated,
had obscured their judgment, and impelled them to the adoption of a
measure unjust, illegal, and unconstitutional. That in order to
vindicate both the Constitution and the President, we were justified in
passing this expunging resolution, and thus stamping the former
proceeding with our strongest disapprobation.
I rejoice in the belief that this promises to be one of the last highly
exciting questions of the present day. During the period of General
Jackson’s civil administration, what has he not done for the American
people? During this period he has had more difficult and dangerous
questions to settle, both at home and abroad,—questions which aroused
more intensely the passions of men,—than any of his predecessors. They
are now all happily ended, except the one which we shall this day bring
to a close,
“And all the clouds that lowered upon our house
In the deep bosom of the ocean buried.”
The country now enjoys abundant prosperity at home, whilst it is
respected and admired by foreign nations. Although the waves may yet be
in some agitation from the effect of the storms through which we have
passed, yet I think I can perceive the rainbow of peace extending itself
across the firmament of Heaven.
Should the next administration pursue the same course of policy with the
present—should it dispense equal justice to all portions and all
interests of the Union, without sacrificing any—should it be conducted
with prudence and with firmness, and I doubt not but that this will be
the case—we shall hereafter enjoy comparative peace and quiet in our
day. This will be the precious fruit of the energy, the toils, and the
wisdom of the pilot who has conducted us in safety through the storms of
his tempestuous administration.
I am now prepared for the question. I shall vote for this resolution;
but not cheerfully. I regret the necessity which exists for passing it;
but I believe that imperious duty demands its adoption. If I know my own
heart, I can truly say that I am not actuated by any desire to obtain a
miserable, petty, personal triumph, either for myself, or for the
President of the United States, over my associates upon this floor.
I am now ready to record my vote, and thus, in the opprobrious language
of Senators in the opposition, to become one of the executioners of the
condemnatory resolution.
-----
Footnote 53:
The writer has had occasion to treat of this occurrence more at length
in his Life of Mr. Webster. He has there expressed the opinion that if
the friends of the President, when they obtained a majority in the
Senate, had contented themselves with adopting a resolution
exonerating him from the censure passed in 1834, no one could have
complained. Probably they would have done so, if the circumstances
attending the adoption of Mr. Clay’s resolution had not provoked them
to devise what they regarded as an imposing form of stigmatizing that
act. All that is of any consequence now, in relation to this
proceeding, turns upon the contradiction between the constitutional
requirement to “keep” a legislative journal, and a subsequent
obliteration or cancellation of any part of it, by any means whatever.
On this subject, see the protest read in the Senate by Mr. Webster, in
his Life, by the present writer, vol. I, p. 545, _et seq._
-----
CHAPTER XIII.
1836.
FIRST INTRODUCTION OF THE SUBJECT OF SLAVERY IN THE SENATE, DURING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JACKSON—PETITIONS FOR ITS ABOLITION IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—THE RIGHT OF PETITION VINDICATED BY
BUCHANAN—INCENDIARY PUBLICATIONS—ADMISSION OF MICHIGAN INTO THE
UNION—STATUARY FOR THE CAPITOL—AFFAIRS OF TEXAS.
In the latter part of the second administration of General Jackson, the
subject of slavery began to be pressed upon the attention of Congress by
petitions for its abolition in the District of Columbia.
In a future chapter will be traced the origin and progress of the
anti-slavery agitation in the Northern States. At present, it is only
needful for me to describe Mr. Buchanan’s course as a Senator, on the
different aspects of this subject which arose during the second
administration of General Jackson. On the 7th of January, 1836, two
petitions were presented in the Senate, signed by citizens of Ohio,
praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. Mr.
Calhoun demanded that they should be read, and, after the reading, he
objected to their being received. Mr. Buchanan made the following
remarks in replying to Mr. Calhoun:
Mr. Buchanan said that, for two or three weeks past, there had been in
his possession a memorial from the Cain Quarterly Meeting of the
religious Society of Friends, in the State of Pennsylvania, requesting
Congress to abolish slavery and the slave trade within the District of
Columbia. This memorial was not a printed form—its language was not that
in established use for such documents. It did not proceed from those
desperate fanatics who have been endeavoring to disturb the security and
peace of society in the Southern States, by the distribution of
incendiary pamphlets and papers. Far different is the truth. It emanates
from a society of Christians, whose object had always been to promote
peace and good-will among men, and who have been the efficient and
persevering friends of humanity in every clime. To their untiring
efforts, more than to those of any other denomination of Christians, we
owe the progress which has been made in abolishing the African slave
trade throughout the world. This memorial was their testimony against
the existence of slavery. This testimony they had borne for more than a
century. Of the purity of their motives, there could not be a question.
He had omitted to present this memorial at an earlier day, because he
had thought that, on its presentation at the proper time, much good
might be done. He had believed that, by private consultations, some
resolution might be devised upon this exciting subject which would
obtain the unanimous vote of the Senate. If there was one man in that
body not willing to adopt a proper measure to calm the troubled spirit
of the South, he did not know him. This, in his judgment, would be the
best mode of accomplishing the object which we all desire to accomplish.
The proper course to attain this result was, in his opinion, to refer
the subject, either to a select committee, or to the Committee for the
District of Columbia. They would examine it in all its bearings, they
would ascertain the views and feelings of individual Senators, and he
had no doubt they would be able to recommend some measure to the Senate
on which they could all unite. This would have a most happy effect upon
the country. He had intended, upon presenting the memorial which he had
in charge, to have suggested this mode of proceeding. He regretted,
therefore, he had not known that his friend from Ohio (Mr. Morris) was
in possession of memorials having a similar object in view. If he had
been informed of it, he should have endeavored to persuade him to wait
until Monday next, when he (Mr. B.) would have been prepared to pursue
the course he had indicated. But the question has now been forced upon
us. No (said Mr. B.), it has not been forced upon me, because I am glad
to have a suitable occasion of expressing my opinions upon the subject.
The memorial which I have in my possession is entitled to the utmost
respect, from the character of the memorialists. As I entirely dissent
from the opinion which they express, that we ought to abolish slavery in
the District of Columbia, I feel it to be due to them, to myself, and to
the Senate, respectfully, but firmly, to state the reasons why I cannot
advocate their views or acquiesce in their conclusions.
If any one principle of constitutional law can, at this day, be
considered as settled, it is, that Congress have no right, no power,
over the question of slavery within those States where it exists. The
property of the master in his slave existed in full force before the
Federal Constitution was adopted. It was a subject which then belonged,
as it still belongs, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the several
States. These States, by the adoption of the Constitution, never yielded
to the General Government any right to interfere with the question. It
remains where it was previous to the establishment of our confederacy.
The Constitution has, in the clearest terms, recognized the right of
property in slaves. It prohibits any State into which a slave may have
fled from passing any law to discharge him from slavery, and declares
that he shall be delivered up by the authorities of such State to his
master. Nay, more, it makes the existence of slavery the foundation of
political power, by giving to those States within which it exists
representatives in Congress, not only in proportion to the whole number
of free persons, but also in proportion to three-fifths of the number of
slaves.
An occasion very fortunately arose in the first Congress to settle this
question forever. The Society for the abolition of Slavery in
Pennsylvania brought it before that Congress by a memorial which was
presented on the 11th day of February, 1790. After the subject had been
discussed for several days, and after solemn deliberation, the House of
Representatives, in Committee of the Whole, on the 23d day of March,
1790, resolved “That Congress have no authority to interfere in the
emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of the
States; it remaining with the several States alone to provide any
regulations therein, which humanity and true policy may require.”
I have thought it would be proper to present this decision, which was
made almost half a century ago, distinctly to the view of the American
people. The language of the resolution is clear, precise, and definite.
It leaves the question where the Constitution left it, and where, so far
as I am concerned, it ever shall remain. The Constitution of the United
States never would have been called into existence,—instead of the
innumerable blessings which have flowed from our happy Union, we should
have had anarchy, jealousy, and civil war among the sister Republics of
which our confederacy is composed, had not the free States abandoned all
control over this question. For one, whatever may be my opinions upon
the abstract question of slavery, (and I am free to confess they are
those of the people of Pennsylvania,) I shall never attempt to violate
this fundamental compact. The Union will be dissolved, and incalculable
evils will arise from its ashes, the moment any such attempt is
seriously made by the free States in Congress.
What, then, are the circumstances under which these memorials are now
presented? A number of fanatics, led on by foreign incendiaries, have
been scattering “arrows, firebrands, and death” throughout the Southern
States. The natural tendency of their publications is to produce
dissatisfaction and revolt among the slaves, and to incite their wild
passions to vengeance. All history, as well as the present condition of
the slaves, proves that there can be no danger of the final result of a
servile war. But, in the mean time, what dreadful scenes may be enacted
before such an insurrection, which would spare neither age nor sex,
could be suppressed! What agony of mind must be suffered, especially by
the gentler sex, in consequence of these publications! Many a mother
clasps her infant to her bosom when she retires to rest, under dreadful
apprehensions that she may be aroused from her slumbers by the savage
yells of the slaves by whom she is surrounded. These are the works of
the abolitionists. That their motives may be honest I do not doubt, but
their zeal is without knowledge. The history of the human race presents
numerous examples of ignorant enthusiasts, the purity of whose
intentions cannot be doubted, who have spread devastation and bloodshed
over the face of the earth.
These fanatics, instead of benefiting the slaves who are the objects of
their regard, have inflicted serious injury upon them. Self-preservation
is the first law of nature. The masters, for the sake of their wives and
children, for the sake of all that is near and dear to them on earth,
must tighten the reins of authority over their slaves. They must thus
counteract the efforts of the abolitionists. The slaves are denied many
indulgences which their masters would otherwise cheerfully grant. They
must be kept in such a state of bondage as effectually to prevent their
rising. These are the injurious effects produced by the abolitionists
upon the slave himself. Whilst, on the one hand, they render his
condition miserable, by presenting to his mind vague notions of freedom
never to be realized, on the other, they make it doubly miserable, by
compelling the master to be severe, in order to prevent any attempts at
insurrection. They thus render it impossible for the master to treat his
slave according to the dictates of his heart and his feelings.
Besides, do not the abolitionists perceive that the spirit which is thus
roused must protract to an indefinite period the emancipation of the
slave? The necessary effect of their efforts is to render desperate
those to whom the power of emancipation really belongs. I believe most
conscientiously, in whatever light this subject can be viewed, that the
best interests of the slave require that the question should be left,
where the Constitution has left it, to the slaveholding States
themselves, without foreign interference.
This being a true statement of the case, as applied to the States where
slavery exists, what is now asked by these memorialists? That in this
District of ten miles square—a District carved out of two slaveholding
States, and surrounded by them on all sides—slavery shall be abolished.
What would be the effects of granting their request? You would thus
erect a citadel in the very heart of these States, upon a territory
which they have ceded to you for a far different purpose, from which
abolitionists and incendiaries could securely attack the peace and
safety of their citizens. You establish a spot within the slaveholding
States which would be a city of refuge for run-away slaves. You create
by law a central point from which trains of gunpowder may be securely
laid, extending into the surrounding States, which may, at any moment,
produce a fearful and destructive explosion. By passing such a law, you
introduce the enemy into the very bosom of these two States, and afford
him every opportunity to produce a servile insurrection. Is there any
reasonable man who can for one moment suppose that Virginia and Maryland
would have ceded the District of Columbia to the United States, if they
had entertained the slightest idea that Congress would ever use it for
any such purpose? They ceded it for your use, for your convenience, and
not for their own destruction. When slavery ceases to exist, under the
laws of Virginia and Maryland, then, and not till then, ought it to be
abolished in the District of Columbia.
(Mr. B. said that, notwithstanding these were his opinions, he could not
vote for the motion of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) not
to receive these memorials. He would not at present proceed to state his
reasons, still hoping the Senate could yet agree upon some course which
would prove satisfactory to all. With this view, he moved that the whole
subject be postponed until Monday next.)
When the following Monday came (January 11th, 1836), Mr. Buchanan said:
He was now about to present the memorial of the Caln Quarterly Meeting
of the Religious Society of Friends in Pennsylvania, requesting Congress
to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. On
this subject he had expressed his opinions to the Senate on Thursday
last, and he had no disposition to repeat them at present. He would say,
however, that on a review of these opinions, he was perfectly satisfied
with them. All he should now say was, that the memorial which he was
about to present was perfectly respectful in its language. Indeed, it
could not possibly be otherwise, considering the respectable source from
which it emanated.
It would become his duty to make some motion in regard to this memorial.
On Thursday last, he had suggested that in his judgment the best course
to pursue was to refer these memorials to a selected committee, or to
the committee for the District of Columbia. He still thought so; but he
now found that insurmountable obstacles presented themselves to such a
reference.
In presenting this memorial and in exerting himself so far as in him
lay, to secure for it that respectful reception by the Senate which it
deserved, he should do his duty to the memorialists. After it should
receive this reception, he should have a duty to perform to himself and
to his country. He was clearly of opinion, for the reasons he had stated
on Thursday last, that Congress ought not at this time to abolish
slavery in the District of Columbia, and that it was our duty promptly
to place this exciting question at rest. He should, therefore, move that
the memorial be read, and that the prayer of the memorialists be
rejected.
At a subsequent day (January 19th), the pending question was, on the
reception of the Memorial of the Pennsylvania Quakers, or Friends; and
on this question Mr. Buchanan said:
It was not now his intention to repeat anything he had said on a former
occasion in regard to the abolition of slavery in this District. The
remarks which he had then made, after much reflection, still met his
entire approbation. He would not now have alluded to them were it not
for the misapprehension which still appeared to prevail upon this floor
in regard to the state of Northern feeling on this subject.
Those remarks had, he believed, been more extensively circulated
throughout Pennsylvania than any which he had ever made upon any
occasion. If they had been censured anywhere in that State, by any
party, the fact was unknown to him. On the contrary, he had strong
reasons to believe they had been received with general approbation.
He was not in the habit of using private letters to sustain any position
which he might take upon this floor or elsewhere. He would say, however,
that since he had presented the memorial now the subject of
consideration before the Senate, he had received another memorial of a
similar character from the city of Philadelphia. This memorial had been
transmitted to him by two gentlemen whose name and character would be
the strongest guaranty for the truth of their assertions, did he feel
himself at liberty to make them known to the Senate. He would not even
have alluded to their letter, but that it related to a public subject in
which the country was deeply interested, and accompanied the memorial
which they had requested him to present to the Senate. The following is
an extract from this letter:
“Although we have not the pleasure of thy acquaintance, permit us on
this occasion to express our satisfaction with thy remarks in the Senate
some weeks since, in which the opinion was forcibly sustained that no
sensible man at the North would advocate the right of Congress to
interfere with the subject of slavery in the slave States themselves. We
are fully persuaded this is the fact in our neighborhood.
“In a pretty extensive acquaintance with the friends of abolition in
this city, we unhesitatingly declare that we have never heard such an
opinion advocated, _and we defy our opponents to point out a man that
has ever circulated any publication calculated to produce discord in the
Southern States_.
“But whilst we fully recognize this view, we are aware that the
Constitution guaranties to us the right of memorializing Congress on any
subject connected with the welfare of the District of Columbia, and we
intend ever to exercise it in the spirit of charity and good-feeling.”
Mr. B. believed this statement to be true. Although all the people of
Pennsylvania were opposed to slavery in the abstract, yet they would not
sanction any attempts to excite the slaves of the Southern States to
insurrection and bloodshed. Whilst they knew their own rights, and would
maintain them, they never would invade the rights of others which had
been secured by the Federal Constitution. He was proud to say this had
always been the character and the conduct of the State which he had in
part the honor to represent in her relations with her sister States.
He felt himself justified in declaring that Pennsylvania was perfectly
sound upon this question. Abolitionists there may be in Pennsylvania,
but it had never been his fate to meet a single one. If we have a man
amongst us who desires, by the circulation of incendiary publications
and pictures throughout the slaveholding States, to produce a servile
insurrection, and thus to abolish slavery, he knew him not. In the
language of the letter he had just read, whatever might be the case
further north, he might defy any gentleman to point out a man in
Pennsylvania who has ever circulated any publication calculated to
produce discord in the Southern States.
He had heard within the last few days that emissaries were now traveling
throughout Pennsylvania for the purpose of propagating the doctrine of
immediate abolition. He thought he might venture to predict that they
would fail in their attempts.
Although he did not mean at present to discuss the general question, yet
the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Preston) must permit him to say
that, in his remarks of yesterday, he had done much to dignify the cause
of abolition, and to give its supporters a character which they did not
deserve.
Mr. B. was not so well able to judge what effect those remarks might
produce on the South; but he protested against the accuracy of the
statements which that gentleman had made in regard to the condition of
Northern feeling on this subject. His information had been incorrect. If
the gloomy coloring of the picture which he had presented could be
considered any thing but a fancy sketch, the South might believe that
the time had arrived when it would be their duty to decide whether it
was not necessary to dissolve this Union, for the protection of their
rights. Mr. B. thought far otherwise. This crisis had not arrived, and,
he trusted, never would arrive. The force of public opinion will
prostrate this fanatical and dangerous spirit. He must say, however,
that the enemies of the cause of abolition at the North had a right to
expect that gentlemen from the South would not adopt a course which
might tend to increase our difficulties. They ought to permit us to
judge for ourselves in this matter, and to throw no obstacles in our way
which the nature of the subject does not necessarily present.
Let it be once understood that the sacred right of petition and the
cause of the abolitionists must rise or must fall together, and the
consequences may be fatal. I would, therefore, warn Southern gentlemen
to reflect seriously in what situation they place their friends in the
North, by insisting that this petition shall not be received.
We have just as little right to interfere with slavery in the South, as
we have to touch the right of petition. Whence is this right derived?
Can a republican government exist without it? Man might as well attempt
to exist without breathing the vital air. No government possessing any
of the elements of liberty has ever existed, or can ever exist, unless
its citizens or subjects enjoy this right. From the very structure of
your Government, from the very establishment of a Senate and House of
Representatives, the right of petition naturally and necessarily
resulted. A representative republic, established by the people, without
the people having the right to make their wants and their wishes known
to their servants, would be the most palpable absurdity. This right,
even if it were not expressly sanctioned by the Constitution, would
result from its very nature. It could not be controlled by any action of
Congress, or either branch of it. If the Constitution had been silent
upon the subject, the only consequence would be, that it would stand in
the very front rank of those rights of the people which are expressly
guarantied to them by the ninth article of the amendments to that
instrument, inserted from abundant but necessary caution. I shall read
this article. It declares that “the enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.” It would, without any express provision, have
stood in the same rank with the liberty of speech and of the press, and
have been entirely beyond the control of the Government. It is a right
which could not have been infringed without extinguishing the vital
spirit of our institutions. If any had been so bold as to attempt to
violate it, it would have been a conclusive argument to say to them that
the Constitution has given you no power over the right of petition, and
you dare not touch it.
The Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) has justly denominated the
amendments to the Constitution as our Bill of Rights. The jealousy which
the States entertained of federal power brought these amendments into
existence. They supposed that, in future times, Congress might desire to
extend the powers of this Government, and usurp the rights which were
not granted them by the people of the States. From a provident caution,
they have, in express terms, denied to Congress every sort of control
over religion; over the freedom of speech and of the press; and over the
right of petition. The first article of the amendments declares that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
Now, sir, what is the first position taken by the Senator from South
Carolina against receiving this memorial? I desire to quote him with
perfect accuracy. He says that the Constitution prohibits Congress from
passing any law to abridge the right of petition; that, to refuse to
receive this petition, would not be to pass any such law, and that
therefore, the Constitution would not be violated by such a refusal.
Does not the Senator perceive that, if this doctrine can be maintained,
the right of petition is gone forever? It is a mere empty name. The
Senate would possess the power of controlling it at their will and
pleasure. No matter what may be the prayer of any petition; no matter
how just may be the grievances of the people demanding redress, we may
refuse to hear their complaints, and inform them that this is one of our
prerogatives; because, to refuse to receive their petition is not the
passage of a law abridging their right to petition. How can the
gentleman escape from this consequence? Is the Senate to be the arbiter?
Are we to decide what the people may petition for, and what they shall
not bring before us? Is the servant to dictate to the master? Such a
construction can never be the true one.
The most striking feature of this argument is, that the very article of
the Constitution which was intended to guard the right of petition with
the most jealous care is thus perverted from its original intention, and
made the instrument of destroying this very right. What we cannot do by
law, what is beyond the power of both Houses of Congress and the
President, according to the gentleman’s argument, the Senate can of
itself accomplish. The Senate alone, if his argument be correct, may
abridge the right of petition, acting in its separate capacity, though
it could not, as one branch of the Legislature, consent to any law which
would confer upon itself this power.
What is the true history and character of this article of the
Constitution? In the thirteenth year of the reign of that “royal
scoundrel” Charles the Second, as the Senator from Virginia (Mr. Leigh)
has justly denominated him, an act of Parliament was passed, abridging
the right of petition. It declared that “no petition to the king or
either House of Parliament, for any alteration in Church or State, shall
be signed by above twenty persons, unless the matter thereof be approved
by three justices of the peace, or the major part of the grand jury in
the county; and in London by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common
council; nor shall any petition be presented by more than ten persons at
a time.” Each Senator will readily perceive that the right of petition
was thus laid almost entirely prostrate at the feet of the sovereign.
The justices of the peace, and the sheriffs who selected the grand
juries, were his creatures, appointed and removed at his pleasure. Out
of the city of London, without their consent, no petition for an
alteration in Church or State could be signed by more than twenty
individuals. At the revolution of 1688, the Bill of Rights guarantied to
English subjects the right of petitioning the king, but the courts of
justice decided that it did not repeal the statute of the second
Charles. This statute still remained in force at the adoption of the
federal Constitution. Such was the state of the law in that country,
from which we have derived most of our institutions, when this amendment
to the Constitution was adopted.
Although the Constitution, as it came from the hands of its framers,
gave to Congress no power to touch the right of petition, yet some of
the States to whom it was submitted for ratification, apprehending the
time might arrive when Congress would be disposed to act like the
British Parliament, expressly withdrew the subject from our control. Not
satisfied with the fact that no power over it had been granted by the
Constitution, they determined to prohibit us in express terms from ever
exercising such a power. This is the true history of the first article
of our Bill of Rights.
Let me put another case to the Senator from South Carolina. Some years
since, as a manager on the part of the House of Representatives, I had
the honor to appear before this body, then sitting as a high court of
impeachment. In that case, the accused, when sitting as a district judge
of the United States, had brought an attorney of his court before him by
an attachment for contempt, and without any trial by jury had convicted
him of a libel, and sentenced him to imprisonment. The judge was
acquitted; and at the moment I thought this decision had placed the
freedom of the press in danger. If the sedition law were clearly
unconstitutional, and nobody now doubts it; if Congress could not confer
upon the courts of the United States, by express enactment, any question
over the power of libel, I thought it monstrous that a judge, without
the intervention of a jury, under highly excited feelings, should be
permitted to try and to punish libels committed against himself
according to his will and pleasure. My apprehensions were of but short
duration. A few days after the acquittal of this judge, the Senate,
without one dissenting voice, passed a bill, not to create a new law,
but declaratory of what the old law, or rather what the Constitution
was, under which no federal judge will ever again dare to punish a libel
as a contempt. The constitutional provision in favor of the liberty of
the press was thus redeemed from judicial construction.
Now, sir, we must all admit that libels of the grossest character are
daily published against the Senate and its individual members. Suppose
an attempt should be made to bring one of these libelers before us, and
to punish him for a contempt, would the gentleman from South Carolina
contend that we might do so without violating the Constitution, and that
we might convict him and sentence him to imprisonment, because such a
conviction and sentence would not be the passage of a law abridging the
freedom of the press? The gentleman’s excited feelings upon the subject
of abolition have led his judgment astray. No construction can be
correct which would lead to such palpable absurdities.
The very language of this amendment itself contains the strongest
recognition of the right of petition. In the clearest terms, it
presupposes its existence. How can you abridge a right which has no
previous existence? On this question I deem the argument of my friend
from Georgia (Mr. King) conclusive. The amendment assumes that the
people have the right to petition for the redress of grievances, and
places it beyond the power of Congress to touch this sacred right. The
truth is, that the authors of the amendment believed this to be a
Government of such tremendous power that it was necessary, in express
terms, to withdraw from its grasp their most essential rights. The right
of every citizen to worship his God according to the dictates of his own
conscience; his right freely to speak, and freely to print and publish
his thoughts to the world; and his right to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances, are placed entirely beyond the control of the
Congress of the United States, or either of its branches. There may they
ever remain! These fundamental principles of liberty are companions.
They rest upon the same foundation. They must stand or must fall
together. They will be maintained so long as American liberty shall
endure.
The next argument advanced by the gentleman is, that we are not bound to
receive this petition, because to grant its prayer would be
unconstitutional? In this argument I shall not touch the question,
whether Congress possess the power to abolish slavery in the District of
Columbia or not. Suppose they do not, can the gentleman maintain the
position, that we are authorized by the Constitution to refuse to
receive a petition from the people, because we may deem the object of it
unconstitutional? Whence is any such restriction of the right of
petition derived? Who gave it to us? Is it to be found in the
Constitution? The people are not constitutional lawyers; but they feel
oppression, and know when they are aggrieved. They present their
complaints to us in the form of a petition. I ask, by what authority can
we refuse to receive it? They have a right to spread their wishes and
their wants before us, and to ask for redress. We are bound respectfully
to consider their request; and the best answer which we can give them
is, that they have not conferred upon us the power, under the
Constitution of the United States, to grant them the relief which they
desire. On any other principle we may first decide that we have no power
over a particular subject, and then refuse to hear the petitions of the
people in relation to it. We would thus place the constitutional right
of our constituents to petition at the mercy of our own discretion.
Again, sir, we possess the power of originating amendments to the
Constitution. Although, therefore, we may not be able to grant the
petitioners relief, such a petition may induce us to exercise this
power, and to ask for a new grant of authority from the States.
The gentleman’s third proposition was, that we are not bound to receive
this petition, because it is no grievance to the citizens of any of the
States, that slavery exists in this District. But who are to be the
judges, in the first instance, whether the people are aggrieved or not?
Is it those who suffer, or fancy they suffer, or the Senate? If we are
to decide when they ought to feel aggrieved, and when they ought to be
satisfied, if the tribunal to whom their petitions are addressed may
refuse to receive them, because, in their opinion, there was no just
cause of complaint, the right of petition is destroyed. It would be but
a poor answer to their petitions to tell them they ought not to have
felt aggrieved, that they are mistaken, and that, therefore, their
complaints would not be received by their servants.
I may be asked, is there no case in which I would be willing to refuse
to receive a petition? I answer that it must be a very strong one indeed
to justify such a refusal. There is one exception, however, which
results from the very nature of the right itself. Neither the body
addressed nor any of its members must be insulted, under the pretext of
exercising this right. It must not be perverted from its purpose, and be
made the instrument of degrading the body to which the petition is
addressed. Such a petition would be in fraud of the right itself, and
the necessary power of self-protection and self-preservation inherent in
every legislative body confers upon it the authority of defending itself
against direct insults presented in this or any other form. Beyond this
exception I would not go; and it is solely for the purpose of
self-protection, in my opinion, that the rules of the Senate enable any
of its members to raise the question, whether a petition shall be
received or not. If the rule has any other object in view, it is a
violation of the Constitution.
I would confine this exception within the narrowest limits. The acts of
the body addressed may be freely canvassed by the people, and they may
be shown to be unjust or unconstitutional. These may be the very reasons
why the petition is presented. “To speak his mind is every freeman’s
right.” They may and they ought to express themselves with that manly
independence which belongs to American citizens. To exclude their
petition, it must appear palpable that an insult to the body was
intended, and not a redress of grievances.
Extreme cases have been put by the Senator from South Carolina.
Ridiculous or extravagant petitions may be presented; though I should
think that scarcely a sane man could be found in this country who would
ask Congress to abolish slavery in the State of Georgia. In such a case
I would receive the petition, and consign it at once to that merited
contempt which it would deserve. The Constitution secures the right of
being heard by petition to every citizen; and I would not abridge it
because he happened to be a fool.
The proposition is almost too plain for argument, that if the people
have a constitutional right to petition, a corresponding duty is imposed
upon us to receive their petitions. From the very nature of things,
rights and duties are reciprocal. The human mind cannot conceive of the
one without the other. They are relative terms. If the people have a
right to command, it is the duty of their servants to obey. If I have a
right to a sum of money, it is the duty of my debtor to pay it to me. If
the people have a right to petition their representatives, it is our
duty to receive their petition.
This question was solemnly determined by the Senate more than thirty
years ago. Neither before nor since that time, so far as I can learn,
has the general right of petition ever been called in question, until
the motion now under consideration was made by the Senator from South
Carolina. Of course I do not speak of cases embraced within the
exception which I have just stated. No Senator has ever contended that
this is one of them. To prove my position, I shall read an extract from
our journals. On Monday, the 21st January, 1805, “Mr. Logan presented a
petition signed Thomas Morris, Clerk, in behalf of the meeting of the
representatives of the people called Quakers, in Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, etc., stating that the petitioners, from a sense of religious
duty, had again come forward to plead the cause of their oppressed and
degraded fellow-men of the African race; and, on the question, “Shall
this petition be received?” it passed in the affirmative; yeas, 19;
nays, 9.
“The yeas and nays being required by one-fifth of the Senators present,
those who voted in the affirmative are—Messrs. Adams, Mass., Bayard,
Del., Brown, Ky., Condict, N. J., Franklin, N. C., Hillhouse, Conn.,
Howland, R. I., Logan, Penn., Maclay, Penn., Mitchell, N. Y., Alcott, N.
H., Pickering, Mass., Plumer, N. H., Smith, Ohio, Smith, Vt., Stone, N.
C., Sumpter, S. C., White, Del., Worthington, Ohio.
“And those who voted in the negative are—Anderson, Tenn., Baldwin, Ga.,
Bradley, Vt., Cocke, Tenn., Jackson, Ga., Moore, Va., Smith, Md., Smith,
N. Y., and Wright, Md.
“So the petition was read.”
The Senate will perceive that I have added to the names of the members
of the Senate that of the States which they each represented. The
Senator from South Carolina will see that, among those who, upon this
occasion, sustained the right of petition, there is found the name of
General Sumpter, his distinguished predecessor. I wish him also to
observe that but seven Senators from slaveholding States voted against
receiving the petition; although it was of a character well calculated
to excite their hostile and jealous feelings.
The present, sir, is a real controversy between liberty and power. In my
humble judgment, it is far the most important question which has been
before the Senate since I have had the honor of occupying a seat in this
body. It is a contest between those, however unintentionally, who desire
to abridge the right of the people, in asking their servants for a
redress of grievances, and those who desire to leave it, as the
Constitution left it, free as the air. Petitions ought ever to find
their way into the Senate without impediment; and I trust that the
decision upon this question will result in the establishment of one of
the dearest rights which a free people can enjoy.
Now, sir, why should the Senator from South Carolina urge the motion
which he has made? I wish I could persuade him to withdraw it. We of the
North honestly believe, and I feel confident he will not doubt our
sincerity, that we cannot vote for his motion without violating our duty
to God and to the country—without disregarding the oath which we have
sworn, to support the Constitution. This is not the condition of those
who advocate his motion. It is not pretended that the Constitution
imposes any obligation upon them to vote for this motion. With them it
is a question of mere expediency; with us, one of constitutional duty. I
ask gentlemen of the South, for their own sake, as well as for that of
their friends in the North, to vote against this motion. It will place
us all in a false position, where neither their sentiments nor ours will
be properly understood.
The people of the North are justly jealous of their rights and
liberties. Among these, they hold the right of petition to be one of the
most sacred character. I would say to the gentlemen of the South, why
then will you array yourselves, without any necessity, against this
right? You believe that we are much divided on the question of
abolition; why, then, will you introduce another element of discord
amongst us, which may do your cause much harm, and which cannot possibly
do it any good? When you possess an impregnable fortress, if you will
defend it, why take shelter in an outwork, where defeat is certain? Why
select the very weakest position, one on which you will yourselves
present a divided front to the enemy, when it is in your power to choose
one on which you and we can all unite? You will thus afford an
opportunity to the abolitionists at the North to form a false issue with
your friends. You place us in such a condition that we cannot defend
you, without infringing the sacred right of petition. Do you not
perceive that the question of abolition may thus be indissolubly
connected, in public estimation, with a cause which we can never
abandon. If the abolitionists themselves had been consulted, I will
venture to assert, they ought to have advised the very course which has
been adopted by their greatest enemies.
The vote upon this unfortunate motion may do almost equal harm in the
South. It may produce an impression there, that we who will vote against
the motion are not friendly to the protection of their constitutional
rights. It may arouse jealousy and suspicion, where none ought to exist;
and may thus magnify a danger which has already been greatly
exaggerated. In defending any great cause, it is always disastrous to
take a position which cannot be maintained. Your forces thus become
scattered and inefficient, and the enemy may obtain possession of the
citadel whilst you are vainly attempting to defend an outpost. I am
sorry, indeed, that this motion has been made.
I shall now proceed to defend my own motion from the attacks which have
been made upon it. It has been equally opposed by both extremes. I have
not found, upon the present occasion, the maxim to be true, that “in
medio tutissimus ibis.” The Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Porter), and the
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), seem both to believe that
little, if any, difference exists between the refusal to receive a
petition, and the rejection of its prayer after it has been received.
Indeed, the gentleman from Louisiana, whom I am happy to call my friend,
says he can see no difference at all between these motions. At the
moment I heard this remark, I was inclined to believe that it proceeded
from that confusion of ideas which sometimes exists in the clearest
heads of the country from which he derives his origin, and from which I
am myself proud to be descended. What, sir, no difference between
refusing to receive a request at all, and actually receiving it and
considering it respectfully, and afterwards deciding, without delay,
that it is not in your power to grant it! There is no man in the
country, acquainted with the meaning of the plainest words in the
English language, who will not recognize the distinction in a moment.
If a constituent of that gentleman should present to him a written
request, and he should tell him to go about his business, and take his
paper with him, that he would not have any thing to do with him or it:
this would be to refuse to receive the petition.
On the other hand, if the gentleman should receive this written request
of his constituent, read it over carefully and respectfully, and file it
away among his papers, but, finding it was of an unreasonable or
dangerous character, he should inform him, without taking further time
to reflect upon it, that the case was a plain one, and that he could
not, consistently with what he believed to be his duty, grant the
request: this would be to reject the prayer of the petition.
There is as much difference between the two cases, as there would be
between kicking a man down stairs who attempted to enter your house, and
receiving him politely, examining his request, and then refusing to
comply with it.
It has been suggested that the most proper course would be to refer this
petition to a committee. What possible good can result from referring
it? Is there a Senator on this floor who has not long since determined
whether he will vote to abolish slavery in this District or not? Does
any gentleman require the report of a committee, in order to enable him
to decide this question? Not one.
By granting the prayer of this memorial, as I observed on a former
occasion, you would establish a magazine of gunpowder here, from which
trains might be laid into the surrounding States, which would produce
fearful explosions. In the very heart of the slave-holding States
themselves you would erect an impregnable citadel from whence the
abolitionists might securely spread throughout these States, by
circulating their incendiary pamphlets and pictures, the seeds of
disunion, insurrection, and servile war. You would thus take advantage
of Virginia and Maryland in ceding to you this District, without
expressly forbidding Congress to abolish slavery here whilst it exists
within their limits. No man can, for one moment, suppose that they would
have made this cession upon any other terms, had they imagined that a
necessity could ever exist for such a restriction. Whatever may be my
opinion of the power of Congress, under the Constitution, to interfere
with this question, about which at present I say nothing, I shall as
steadily and as sternly oppose its exercise as if I believed no such
power to exist.
In making the motion now before the Senate, I intended to adopt as
strong a measure as I could, consistently with the right of petition and
a proper respect for the petitioners. I am the last man in the world who
would, intentionally, treat these respectable constituents of my own
with disrespect. I know them well, and prize them highly. On a former
occasion I did ample justice to their character. I deny that they are
abolitionists. I cannot, however, conceive how any person could have
supposed that it was disrespectful to them to refuse to grant their
prayer in the first instance, and not disrespectful to refuse to grant
it after their memorial had been referred to a committee. In the first
case their memorial will be received by the Senate, and will be filed
among the records of the country. That it has already been the subject
of sufficient deliberation and debate; that it has already occupied a
due portion of the time of the Senate, cannot be doubted or denied.
Every one acquainted with the proceedings of courts of justice must know
that often, very often, when petitions are presented to them, the
request is refused without any delay. This is always done in a plain
case by a competent judge. And yet who ever heard that this was treating
the petitioner with disrespect? In order to be respectful to these
memorialists, must we go through the unmeaning form, in this case, of
referring the memorial to a committee, and pretending to deliberate when
we are now all fully prepared to decide?
I repeat, too, that I intended to make as strong a motion in this case
as the circumstances would justify. It is necessary that we should use
every constitutional effort to suppress the agitation which now disturbs
the land. This is necessary, as much for the happiness and future
prospects of the slave as for the security of the master. Before this
storm began to rage, the laws in regard to slaves had been greatly
ameliorated by the slave-holding States; they enjoyed many privileges
which were unknown in former times. In some of the slave States
prospective and gradual emancipation was publicly and seriously
discussed. But now, thanks to the abolitionists, the slaves have been
deprived of these privileges, and whilst the integrity of the Union is
endangered, their prospect of final emancipation is delayed to an
indefinite period. To leave this question where the Constitution has
left it, to the slave-holding States themselves, is equally dictated by
a humane regard for the slave as well as for their masters.
There are other objections to the reference of this memorial to a
committee, which must, I think, be conclusive. I ask the Senate, after
witnessing the debate upon the present question, to what conclusion
could this committee arrive? If they attempted to assert any principle
beyond the naked proposition before us, that the prayer of the
memorialists ought not to be granted, we would be cast into a labyrinth
of difficulties. It would be confusion worse confounded. If we wish to
obtain a strong vote, and thus at the same time tranquilize the South
and the North upon this exciting topic, the reference of it to a
committee would be the most unfortunate course which we could adopt.
Senators are divided into four classes on this question. The first
believe that to abolish slavery in this District would be a violation of
the Constitution of the United States. Should the committee recommend
any proposition of a less decided character, these Senators would feel
it to be their duty to attempt to amend it, by asserting this principle;
and thus we should excite another dangerous and unprofitable debate. The
second class, although they may not believe that the subject is
constitutionally beyond the control of Congress, yet they think that the
acts of cession from Maryland and Virginia to the United States forbid
us to act upon the subject. These gentlemen would insist upon the
affirmance of this proposition. The third class would not go as far as
either of the former. They do not believe that the subject is placed
beyond the power of Congress, either by the Constitution or by the
compacts of cession, yet they are as firmly opposed to granting the
prayer of the petition, whilst slavery continues to exist in Maryland
and Virginia, as if they held both these opinions. They know that these
States never would have ceded this territory of ten miles square to the
United States upon any other condition, if it had entered into their
conception that Congress would make an attempt, sooner or later, to
convert it into a free district. Besides, they are convinced that to
exercise this power, at an earlier period, would seriously endanger not
only the peace and harmony of the Union, but its very existence. This
class of Senators, whilst they entertain these opinions, which ought to
be entirely satisfactory to the South, could never consent to vote for a
resolution declaring that to act upon the subject would be a violation
of the Constitution or of the compacts. The fourth class, and probably
not the least numerous, are opposed to the agitation of the question,
under existing circumstances, and will vote against the abolition of
slavery in this District at the present moment, but would be unwilling
to give any vote which might pledge them for the future. Here are the
elements of discord. Although we can all, or nearly all, agree in the
general result, yet we should differ essentially in the means of
arriving at it. The politic and the wise course, then, is, to adopt my
motion that the prayer of the memorialists ought to be rejected. Each
gentleman will arrive at this conclusion in his own way. Although we may
thus travel different roads, we will all reach the same point. Should
the committee go one step further than report this very proposition, we
should at once be separated into four divisions; and the result must be
that the whole subject would finally be laid upon the table, and thus
the abolitionists would obtain a victory over the friends of the Union
both to the North and to the South.
Before I made the motion now before the Senate, I deliberately and
anxiously considered all these embarrassing difficulties. At the first,
I was under the impression that the reference of this subject to a
committee would be the wisest course. In view of all the difficulties,
however, I changed my opinion: and I am now willing, most cheerfully, to
assume all the responsibility which may rest upon me for having made
this motion.
I might have moved to lay the memorial upon the table; but I did not
believe that this would be doing that justice to the South which she has
a right to demand at our hands. She is entitled to the strongest vote,
upon the strongest proposition, which gentlemen can give, without
violating their principles.
I have but a few more words to say. As events have deprived me of the
occupation assigned to me by the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
Mangum), I feel myself at liberty to invade the province allotted by the
same gentleman to the Senator from New York (Mr. Wright), and to defend
a distinguished member of the Albany Regency. In this I am a mere
volunteer. I choose thus to act because Governor Marcy has expressed my
opinions better than I could do myself.
And here, permit me to say that, in my judgment, Southern gentlemen who
are not satisfied with his last message, so far as it relates to the
abolitionists, are very unreasonable. With the general tone and spirit
of that message no one has found any fault; no one can justly find any
fault. In point of fact, it is not even liable to the solitary objection
which has been urged against it, that he did not recommend to the
legislature the passage of a law for the purpose of punishing those
abolitionists who, in that State, should attempt to excite insurrection
and sedition in the slaveholding States, by the circulation of
inflammatory publications and pictures. It is true that he does not
advise the immediate passage of such a law, but this was because he
thought public opinion would be sufficient to put them down. He,
however, looks to it as eventually proper, in case, contrary to his
opinion, such a measure should become necessary to arrest the evil. He
expressly asserts, and clearly proves, that the legislature possesses
the power to pass such a law. This is the scope and spirit of his
message.
Ought he to have recommended the immediate passage of such a law? I
think not. The history of mankind, in all ages, demonstrates that the
surest mode of giving importance to any sect, whether in politics or
religion, is to subject its members to persecution. It has become a
proverb, that “the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.” By
persecution, religious sects, maintaining doctrines the most absurd and
the most extravagant—doctrines directly at war with the pure faith and
principles announced to the world by the Divine Author of our religion,
have been magnified into importance. I do not believe there is any State
in this Union (unless the information which we have received from the
Senators from Vermont might make that State an exception), where penal
laws of the character proposed would not advance, instead of destroying
the cause of the abolitionists. I feel confident such would be the event
in Pennsylvania. Severe legislation, unless there is a manifest
necessity for it, is always prejudicial. This question may be safely
left to public opinion, which, in our age, and in our country, like a
mighty torrent, sweeps away error. The people, although they may
sometimes be misled in the beginning, always judge correctly in the end.
Let severe penal laws on this subject be enacted in any State—let a few
honest but misguided enthusiasts be prosecuted under them—let them be
tried and punished in the face of the country, and you will thus excite
the sympathies of the people, and create a hundred abolitionists where
one only now exists. Southern gentlemen have no right to doubt our
sincerity on this subject, and they ought to permit us to judge for
ourselves as to the best mode of allaying the excitement which they
believe exists among ourselves.
If the spirit of abolition had become so extensive and so formidable as
some gentlemen suppose, we might justly be alarmed for the existence of
this Union. Comparatively speaking, I believe it to be weak and
powerless, though it is noisy. Without excitement got up here or
elsewhere, which may continue its existence for some time longer, it
will pass away in a short period, like the other excitements which have
disturbed the public mind, and are now almost forgotten.
On the 9th of March (1836) the following proceedings took place:
The Senate proceeded to consider the petition of the Society of Friends
in Philadelphia, on the subject of the abolition of slavery in the
District of Columbia.
The question being on the motion “that the petition be not received”—Mr.
Calhoun addressed the Senate in reply to what had fallen from other
Senators on the subject.
Mr. Clay made a few remarks in explanation, called for by some part of
the remarks of the Senator from South Carolina.
The question was then taken on the motion of Mr. Calhoun, “Shall the
petition be received?” and decided as follows:
Yeas,—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Clayton, Crittenden, Davis,
Ewing of Ill., Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill,
Hubbard, Kent, King of Ala., King of Ga., Knight, Linn, McKean, Morris,
Naudain, Niles, Prentiss, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Southard,
Swift, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tomlinson, Wall, Webster, Wright.—36.
Nays.—Messrs. Black, Calhoun, Cuthbert, Leigh, Moore, Nicholas, Preston,
Porter, Walker, White.—10.
The question being next on the motion of Mr. Buchanan, to reject the
prayer of the petition,
Mr. Clay made some remarks on the motion, and concluded by moving to
amend it by adding to it:—
For the Senate, without now affirming or denying the constitutional
power of Congress to grant the prayer of the petition, believes, even
supposing the power uncontested, which it is not, that the exercise of
it would be inexpedient;
1st. Because the people of the District of Columbia have not themselves
petitioned for the abolition of slavery within the District.
2d. Because the States of Virginia and Maryland would be injuriously
affected by such a measure, whilst the institution of slavery continues
to subsist within their respective jurisdictions, and neither of these
States would probably have ceded to the United States the territory now
forming the District if it had anticipated the adoption of any such
measure without clearly and expressly guarding against it. And,
3d. Because the injury which would be inflicted by exciting alarm and
apprehension in the States tolerating slavery, and by disturbing the
harmony between them and the other members of the Confederacy, would far
exceed any practical benefit which could possibly flow from the
abolition of slavery within the District.
Mr. Porter wished more time to reflect, and moved to lay the motion on
the table, but withdrew it at the instance of Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. Buchanan said that some remarks, both of the Senator from South
Carolina (Mr. Calhoun), and of the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay),
compelled him to make a few observations in his own defence.
Sir, said Mr. B., I rejoice at the result of the vote which has this day
been recorded. It will forever secure to the citizens of this country,
the sacred right of petition. The question has now been finally settled
by a decisive vote of the Senate. The memorial which I presented from a
portion of the highly respectable Society of Friends, has been received
by a triumphant majority. Another happy consequence of this vote is,
that abolition is forever separated from the right of petition. The
abolitionists will now never be able to connect their cause with the
violation of a right so justly dear to the people. They must now stand
alone. This is the very position in which every friend of the Union,
both to the North and the South, ought to desire to see them placed.
From the remarks which have just been made by the Senators from South
Carolina and Kentucky, it might almost be supposed that my motion to
reject the prayer of the memorialists, was trifling with the right of
petition, which, in the course of debate, I have defended with all my
power. Is there the slightest foundation for such an imputation?
The memorial has been received by the Senate, and has been read. If this
body are in doubt whether they will grant its prayer—if they wish
further information upon this subject than what they already possess,
then they ought to refer it. On the other hand, if every Senator has
already determined how he will vote upon the question, why send the
memorial to a committee? It presents but one simple question for our
decision. It asks us to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. My
motion proposes that this prayer shall be rejected. Now, is it not
self-evident to every Senator upon this floor, that any committee which
can be formed out of this body, will arrive at the same conclusion? Why,
then, refer this memorial to obtain a report, when we already know what
that report will be? Why keep the question open for further agitation
and debate? Should it be referred to a committee, upon their report, we
shall have the same ground to travel over again which we have been
treading for so long a time. I have yet to learn that when a petition is
presented to any tribunal, in a case so clear as not to require
deliberation, that it is either disrespectful to the petitioners, or
that it infringes the right of petition, to decide against its prayer
without delay.
But in this case, powerful reasons exist why the memorial ought not to
be referred. Although we all agree that slavery ought not to be
abolished in the District of Columbia, yet we arrive at this conclusion
by different courses of reasoning. Before I presented this memorial, I
endeavored to ascertain from Senators whether it would be possible to
obtain a strong vote in favor of any proposition more specific in its
terms than that now before the Senate. I found this would be impossible.
I then made the motion to reject the prayer of the memorial, after much
deliberation.
I found the Senate divided upon this subject into four sections. One
portion was opposed to the prayer of the memorial, because, in their
opinion, it would be unconstitutional to grant it; another, because it
would violate our compacts of cession with Virginia and Maryland; a
third, because it would be inexpedient and unjust to abolish slavery in
this District, whilst it exists in the surrounding States; and a fourth,
who were unwilling to go even to this extent, but who equally condemned
its abolition at the present moment. Here were the elements of discord.
Whilst all, or nearly all, are harmonious in their conclusion that the
prayer of the petition ought not to be granted, their premises are far
different. My object was to get the strongest vote, for the purpose of
calming the agitation, both to the South and to the North. In order to
accomplish this purpose, my motion must be one on which the largest
majority could agree, and on which each member might vote for his own
peculiar reasons. I ask what motion could I have made, so well
calculated to attain the end, as the one now before the Senate?
The amendment which has just been proposed by the Senator from Kentucky
will, I fear, prove to be the apple of discord in this body. It is too
strong a measure for one portion of the Senate, whilst it is too weak
for another. Those who believe that we have no power under the
Constitution to abolish slavery in this District, will not vote for the
amendment, because it does recognize this principle; whilst such
gentlemen as deem it inexpedient at the present time to act upon the
subject, but who do not wish to commit themselves for the future, will
be equally opposed to the reasons which this amendment assigns. For my
own part, individually, I should not object to the amendment. I could
most cheerfully vote for all the principles which it contains. If I
believed it would unite in its favor as large a majority of the Senate
as the motion which I have made, unaccompanied by these reasons, it
should have my support. But this, I am convinced, will not be the case;
and my purpose is to obtain the largest vote possible, because this will
have the strongest influence upon public opinion. It would most
effectually check the agitation upon this subject.
Sir, said Mr. B., this question of domestic slavery is the weak point in
our institutions. Tariffs may be raised almost to prohibition, and then
they may be reduced so as to yield no adequate protection to the
manufacturer; our Union is sufficiently strong to endure the shock.
Fierce political storms may arise—the moral elements of the country may
be convulsed by the struggles of ambitious men for the highest honors of
the Government—the sunshine does not more certainly succeed the storm,
than that all will again be peace. Touch this question of slavery
seriously—let it once be made manifest to the people of the South that
they cannot live with us, except in a state of continual apprehension
and alarm for their wives and their children, for all that is near and
dear to them upon the earth,—and the Union is from that moment
dissolved. It does not then become a question of expediency, but of
self-preservation. It is a question brought home to the fireside, to the
domestic circle of every white man in the Southern States. This day,
this dark and gloomy day for the Republic, will, I most devoutly trust
and believe, never arrive. Although, in Pennsylvania, we are all opposed
to slavery in the abstract, yet we will never violate the constitutional
compact which we have made with our sister States. Their rights will be
held sacred by us. Under the Constitution it is their own question; and
there let it remain.
Mr. Preston said there may be other reasons; he had some which were
stronger than those assigned, and he should vote against these, which
contained a negative pregnant, looking to a state of things when
Congress could act on the subject.
Mr. Porter said one of his reasons for wishing to lay on the table the
amendment was, that he might examine and ascertain if such reasons as
would be satisfactory to him, so as to command his vote, could be
assigned. He renewed his motion, and again withdrew it; when
Mr. Clay stated that he had no objection to let the amendment lie for
further examination.
After a few words from Mr. Cuthbert, on motion of Mr. Morris, the Senate
adjourned.
On the 11th of March, the following proceedings occurred:
Mr. Leigh rose, and said that, in pursuance of the promise which he
yesterday made to the Senate to move to resume the consideration of the
abolition petition at the earliest moment that he should have decided
what course his duty required him to pursue in regard to the amendment
which he yesterday offered to the motion for rejection, now moved that
the Senate take up that subject.
The motion having been agreed to, Mr. Leigh withdrew the amendment
offered by him yesterday; and the question recurred on Mr. Buchanan’s
motion that _the prayer of the petition be rejected_.
[The following is a copy of the petition:
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES:
The memorial of Caln Quarterly Meeting of the Religious Society of
Friends, commonly called Quakers, respectfully represents: That, having
long felt deep sympathy with that portion of the inhabitants of these
United States which is held in bondage, and having no doubt that the
happiness and interests, moral and pecuniary, of both master and slave,
and our whole community, would be greatly promoted if the inestimable
right to liberty was extended equally to all, we contemplate with
extreme regret that the District of Columbia, over which you possess
entire control, is acknowledged to be one of the greatest marts for the
traffic in the persons of human beings in the known world,
notwithstanding the principles of the Constitution declare that all men
have an unalienable right to the blessing of liberty.
We therefore earnestly desire that you will enact such laws as will
secure the right of freedom to every human being residing within the
constitutional jurisdiction of Congress, and prohibit every species of
traffic in the persons of men, which is as inconsistent in principle,
and inhuman in practice, as the foreign slave trade.
Signed by direction, and on behalf of the aforesaid quarterly meeting,
held in Lancaster county, Pennsylvania, the 19th of 11 mo., 1835.
LINDLEY COATS,
ESTHER HAYES,
_Clerks_.]
The yeas and nays were ordered on the question of rejection.
Mr. McKean moved to amend the motion by striking out all after the word
“that”—(namely, the words “the prayer of the petition to be rejected,”)
and inserting “it is inexpedient at this time to legislate on the
subject of slavery in the District of Columbia.”
On this question the yeas and nays were ordered, on his motion.
The question being taken, it was decided as follows:
Yeas—Messrs. Hendricks, McKean—2.
Nays—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert,
Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hill,
Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Knight, Leigh, Linn,
Nicholas, Niles, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles,
Shepley, Swift, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, Webster,
White, Wright—37.
Mr. McKean moved to amend the motion by inserting between the first word
“that” and the words “the prayer of the petition be rejected,” the words
“inexpedient to legislate on the subject of slavery in the District of
Columbia, and that.”
On this question he called for the yeas and nays, which were ordered.
The question was then taken, and decided as follows:
Yeas—Messrs. Ewing of Ohio, Hendricks, McKean—3.
Nays—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert,
Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King of
Alabama, King of Georgia, Knight, Leigh, Linn, Moore, Niles, Nicholas,
Preston, Porter, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Swift, Tallmadge,
Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, Webster, White, Wright—36.
The question being on the original motion of Mr. Buchanan, “that the
prayer of the petition be rejected”—
Mr. McKean said that, in offering the amendments which he had proposed,
he had discharged his conscience of an imperative duty. It had pleased
the Senate to reject these amendments, and, as he was thus deprived of
the power of making the motion more palatable, all that he could now do
was to vote for the proposition of his colleague.
Same day, after debate.—The question was then taken on the motion to
reject the prayer of the petition, and decided as follows:
Yeas—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert,
Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard,
King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Leigh, Linn, McKean, Moore, Nicholas,
Niles, Porter, Preston, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge,
Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, White, Wright—34.
Nays—Messrs. Davis, Hendricks, Knight, Prentiss, Swift, Webster—6.
So the prayer of the petition was rejected.
On the 25th of April, Mr. Buchanan presented a petition from the Society
of Friends, in Philadelphia, on which he said:
He rose to present the memorial of the Yearly Meeting of the religious
Society of Friends, which had been recently held in the city of
Philadelphia, remonstrating against the admission of Arkansas into the
Union, whilst a provision remained in her constitution which admits of
and may perpetuate slavery. This Yearly Meeting embraced within its
jurisdiction the greater part of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the whole
of the State of Delaware, and the Eastern Shore of Maryland. The
language of this memorial was perfectly respectful. Indeed, it could not
be otherwise, considering the source from which it emanated. It breathed
throughout the pure and Christian spirit which had always animated the
Society of Friends; and although he did not concur with them in opinion,
their memorial was entitled to be received with great respect.