I have not seen or heard anything of Baron Sacken since his arrival in

this city.

Within the past few days it has been known here that the emperor had

refused to receive Sir Stratford Canning as ambassador from England. As

his reasons were altogether personal, this refusal can produce no

serious difficulty between the two nations. The Russians say that Sir

Stratford, when here before, evinced a captious and jealous disposition,

which rendered him very disagreeable.

I expect to reach the United States about the last of November or

beginning of December.

Yours very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

-----

Footnote 34:

General Jackson at his second election received 219 electoral votes

out of 288.

Footnote 35:

This I believe to have been a mistake, in respect to the nullification

ordinance. It was adopted by a State convention, and consequently

could only be repealed by another convention. This, I believe, was not

done; but the laws based upon this ordinance were probably repealed by

the legislature after Mr. Clay’s compromise. See the _Life of

Webster_, by the present writer, Vol. I, p. 156.

Footnote 36:

Louis McLane, of Delaware, became Secretary of State in May, 1833. He

was succeeded by John Forsyth, of Georgia, in June, 1834.

Footnote 37:

Mrs. Buchanan died on the 14th of May, 1833, at the house of her

daughter, Mrs. Lane, in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. The letters of Mrs.

Buchanan, of which I have seen many more than I have quoted, although

rather formal in expression, show a mind of much cultivation, imbued

with a fervent religious spirit, and of very decided and just

opinions. In one of her letters to her son James, written in 1822, she

says: “Harriet and myself, at the request of Mr. S., a clergyman, are

engaged in reading Neale’s History of the Puritans, in which I observe

a development of Queen Elizabeth’s character and management, not much

to her honor; however, it appears evident, in opposition to her own

intentions, she was made an instrument in the hands of Providence, of

promoting the Reformation, which has certainly rendered an essential

service to the world.” If the good lady had read Mr. Hallam’s very

impartial account of Elizabeth’s management of the two opposite

parties among the English Protestants, she would not have had much

reason for changing the opinion which she formed from reading Neale,

although it would not have been correct to say that the Queen’s course

was in any just sense dishonorable to her. The truth probably is, that

Elizabeth, in nearly everything that she did in regard to religion,

was governed by motives of policy, and not by convictions or special

inclinations. In many respects, she was not a Protestant, according to

the Puritan standard, and in many others she was not a Catholic.

-----

CHAPTER X.

1833.

DEPARTURE FROM ST. PETERSBURG—JOURNEY TO PARIS—PRINCESS LIEVEN—POZZO DI

BORGO—DUC DE BROGLIE—GENERAL LAFAYETTE—LOUIS PHILIPPE—ARRIVAL IN

LONDON—DINNER AT PRINCE LIEVEN’S AND LORD PALMERSTON’S—PRINCE

TALLEYRAND.

Mr. Buchanan commenced his homeward journey on the 8th of August (1833).

Omitting what merely relates to places and things now well known to all

travelers, I select the following passages from his diary:

_Thursday, August 8, 1833._

I left St. Petersburg. Mr. Bligh, Mr. Gevers and Mr. Clay accompanied me

as far as Cronstadt. At 6 o’clock in the afternoon we passed the guard

ship and arrived at Travemunde, on Tuesday, the 13th, between 12 and 1

o’clock in the day, after a rough and stormy passage. The boat

(Alexandra) has not sufficient steam power for her tonnage, having only

140 horse-power for more than 700 tons, and the consequence is that she

can make but little way against a head wind. The price of the passage is

250 roubles ($50), the consequence of an indiscreet monopoly which has

been granted by the emperor.

We had on board the Princess Lieven and her two youngest sons, the

Princes George and Arthur, called after the late king[38] and the Duke

of Wellington—the one about thirteen, the other nine—fine boys. Count

Matuscervie was also on board, bound for Aberdeenshire on a hunting

expedition. He is excessively fond of horse-racing, hunting and all

field sports, and seems to take much greater delight in talking of these

subjects, than those of a serious nature. The princess has in a great

degree lost that beauty which captivated the king and the Duke of W. Her

nose is now sharp and her face somewhat red; but her manners and

conversation are very fine. I consider her superior to Matuscervie as a

diplomatist.[39] I endeavored to cultivate her good graces, not by

assiduous attentions, which are often annoying, but by kind and

respectful conduct towards her whenever the opportunity occurred

unsought. I succeeded. She is a woman and possesses all the

superstitious feelings in regard to omens which distinguish the

Russians. The count and myself made a bet on the length of the voyage,

and drank the wine before its termination. This gave her much

uneasiness, and the wind became more violent immediately after. The

count wrote a complimentary certificate in the captain’s [log] book, and

it was signed before the close of the voyage. Immediately after we had

quite a storm, which continued the whole night. I should have been

alarmed myself, but thanks to the Yankee captain with whom I crossed the

Atlantic, who would carry sail in a hurricane. Captain Dietz, of the

boat, a round-faced and pleasant Dutchman, and a naturalized citizen of

the United States, attributed our bad voyage entirely to the

circumstance of having a parson aboard (The Rev. Mr. Kneill). He swore

he could show all his [log] books and prove that, since he commanded a

vessel, he had never made a single prosperous voyage with a clergyman on

board. This was added to the stock of the princess’s superstition, and I

found her uneasy at the idea of having him on board, on their passage

from Hamburg to London. I told her I considered it almost a moral

phenomenon to see such a woman believing in these presages. She said she

had not _un esprit fort_. She could not help it. She said Lady Holland

was as bad as herself in this respect. It was she [Lady Holland] who had

first informed her that it was bad luck to set out on a journey on

Friday. The princess did not believe it; but she had once tried it; her

carriage was broken, and she injured, so as not to be entirely recovered

for a year.

Lord Wellington, she said, never thought himself wrong. He was always

right, in his opinion. He had committed three great blunders whilst he

was minister.

The first was in sending Prince Polignac to govern France. The duke had

told her that this prince was the greatest man in France. Politeness

alone had prevented her from laughing in his face. He was _mediocre

parmi les mediocres_; besides, he was obstinate to the very last degree.

The second was on the Catholic emancipation question; and the third in

refusing all reform after having himself opened the door for it.

Lord Lowther had called to see her in Hamburg, and informed her that

there would have been, a few days ago, a new ministry in England, but

for the timidity of Sir Robert Peel. I told her I thought this was

prudence in Sir Robert. The Tories could not now govern England. She

concurred in opinion with me; said the duke was now near seventy, and

could not afford to wait, but that was not the case with Sir Robert. We

talked of the Polish question, etc., etc...... Met Mr. Wheaton, his wife

and daughter in Hamburg.[40]

_Tuesday, at 12 o’clock (day)._

We left Cologne and arrived in Aix-la-Chapelle, a distance of nine and a

quarter German miles, through Bergheim and Juliers. The latter strongly

fortified.

The king of Prussia seems to be determined to strengthen himself in this

country. Judging from what I have observed myself and heard from others,

he cannot rely upon the affections of the people. Indeed, they talk very

freely. They all refer to the days of Napoleon; and compare their

situation then with what it is at present. The old maitre d’hotel at

Bergheim, who has kept a public house for fifty years, and who seems to

be a sensible and honest-hearted old man, told me that the taxes were

not half so heavy under Napoleon as they were at present. That he was

the greatest man there had ever been in the world, and they loved the

French much better than the Prussians. Other travelers, who understand

German, have told me that at the public tables they talk of a revolution

as certain; without pretending to conjecture when it will take place.

But the king of Prussia is a wise man. He has been taught in the school

of misfortune, and has been greatly benefited by the lessons of that

stern mistress. There is great freedom of speech allowed throughout the

Prussian dominions, and in those east of the Rhine the king is popular,

notwithstanding the violation of his promise to give them a

constitution. This arises from a general conviction of his wisdom and

justice, and particularly from the equal conduct he has pursued towards

all classes of his subjects. The people are pleased with him, because

his conduct towards the nobles has given them no cause of jealousy. He

is a democratic despot, and this is perhaps the true policy of all

despots.

In the Rhenish provinces, it is difficult for the people to rebel, in

the midst of strong and almost impregnable fortifications and of troops

faithful and well disciplined.

_Saturday night, August 31, (1833)._

Arrived in Paris, and went to lodgings provided for me by Mr.

Harris,[41] in the Rue de Paix.

_Sunday._

I walked to the Place Vendome, and saw the triumphal column. The statue

of Napoleon was again placed upon its summit during the anniversary of

what are called here the glorious days of the revolution of July (1830).

I also visited the garden of the Tuileries, the Champs Elysées, and the

Place of Louis XVI, between the two. Here this unfortunate monarch was

executed.

A column is to be erected in the centre, exactly resembling Cleopatra’s

Needle. There is a model of it now standing. Dined with Mr. Harris—a man

sufficiently civil and ceremonious, but a mannerist...... He has been so

long in Europe as to have lost much of his American feelings, if he ever

possessed them in a strong degree. Not unskilful as a diplomatist. He is

remembered kindly in Russia, whilst such men as Bayard and Pinkney are

forgotten. He seems to have done his duty in relation to the

confirmation of the French treaty by the chambers.

_Monday._

Called on the Duke of Treviso (Mortier) and General Lafayette; found

them both in the country; took a drive with Mr. Harris into the Bois de

Boulogne. He is exceedingly anxious to be appointed minister to Russia.

I also visited Notre Dame.

_Tuesday._

Visited the Louvre. Whilst there, met very unexpectedly Walter

Patterson, Esq., of the State of New York, and Mr. Stevenson and Mr.

Burns, of the same State.

Afterwards called with Mr. Harris on Count Pozzo di Borgo;[42] had an

interesting conversation with him. He thinks the French selfish, that

their courage proceeds from vanity, and that they are wholly unfit for

the enjoyment of constitutional liberty. He says they will fight well,

when seen, but are incapable of sustaining disasters. He has done

everything he could to preserve peace; but if war must come, he thinks

the French mistaken as to its result. If one were to judge merely from

the striking superiority of the Russian over the French troops in

appearance, this conclusion would seem very natural.

_Saturday, Sunday and Monday._

So unwell that I could not go out. Mr. Harris made a dinner party of

Americans for me on Saturday, which, much to my regret, I could not

attend. General Lafayette called and sat nearly an hour with me before

he went to this dinner; but I was in great pain the whole time.

Judging from what I have heard from the General, Major Poussin and

others, I have no doubt the Republican party are making rapid advances

in France. This is not confined to the lower orders, but extends to the

highest circles. From all I can observe and learn, they are wholly

unprepared for republican institutions. They want political virtue as

much as any people. They are very selfish, destitute in a great degree

of religion, and are always discontented with the present because they

hope something from change. Political virtue, with the exception of

Lafayette and a few others, don’t exist among them.

The policy of the latter [Lafayette] is that France shall now school

herself preparatory to republican institutions, for fifteen or twenty

years. But I think he is afraid the change will take place sooner. He

has lost much of his popularity in France, because they believe him to

be an imbecile, and because he will not lead the Republican party to

immediate action. He has lost all confidence in Louis Philippe, who, in

my opinion, is as desirous of being a Legitimate as the Emperor

Alexander.

In case of general republican commotions in France, a continental war

becomes inevitable. The three great powers of Europe are preparing for

it, and if one were to judge from the appearance of the Russian and

Prussian soldiers compared with the French, he would be tempted to doubt

the result. There is an energy in liberty, however, and there will

probably be such an aid to its cause among the oppressed of Germany,

Poland and other nations, that we may cherish the hope that France will

not be overrun. I do not consider the French either safe or good

apostles of liberty. I sincerely hope I am mistaken. Everything here is

now Bonaparte; and at present they appear to live upon the memory of

their greatness under him.

I ought always to remember with gratitude the kindness of Mr. Emlen,

Doctor Fisher and Mr. Patterson[43] during my three days’ sickness. Hope

to be out to-morrow again.

_Thursday, 12th._

Thank God! a fine day. Visited the Duc de Broglie, in company with Mr.

Harris. Conversation concerning the omission of the French Chamber to

ratify the treaty.

I told him that, however the government here might be able to satisfy

that at Washington, and understand each other on the subject, their

explanations could not reach the people of the United States. I had no

doubt the transaction would give rise to much unpleasant feeling among

our people, and might lead to an unhappy state of feeling between the

two countries. That I should not be astonished if this were to manifest

itself on the meeting of Congress. He said that he was very sorry, Mr.

Harris could appreciate his exertions; he was happy to say that the

feeling in favor of the treaty was growing; the advantages of the

commerce were becoming more manifest, and he had no doubt that one of

the first acts which the Chamber would perform after its meeting, would

be to ratify it. He hoped it would come so soon that Congress would

receive the news before there was any expression of feeling. [He]

Criminated Mr. Dupin in relation to it—said he only called for the

papers because he knew that all the reports of previous commissions had

been against the treaty. He said, although not a member of the

administration which made it, he approved it and would now make such a

treaty.[44]

_September 13th._

I dined to-day with Count Pozzo di Borgo. Before dinner he took Mr.

Harris and myself into a room apart from the rest of the company, and

told me he wished to communicate to me, so that I might inform the

President, on my return, what was the true condition of Europe at the

present moment. He said there did not exist at the present any immediate

apprehension of war; though from the state of things there was no

telling at what time war might take place.

Everything was unsettled in France; they were a turbulent and restless

people, and busily employed with their propaganda. They were wholly

unfit for liberal institutions; and, in fact, these were not what they

wanted. They wished again for the glory of the times of Bonaparte. He

could himself, in a month, raise an insurrection in France; but what the

allied powers wanted was peace, and peace they would maintain so long as

they could consistently with propriety. That this they did not wish from

fear of the result. Far from it. They, to wit, Russia, Prussia and

Austria, were indissolubly united, and war with one would be war with

all.

Those three powers, with the German Confederation, could, in three

months, bring an army of 600,000 men into the field, 500,000 infantry

and 100,000 cavalry, and have an army of reserve of the same number. The

French journals were continually attacking them without cause, for

interfering with foreign states, but I understood him to say that

Austria would interfere in Piedmont, and if the French should attempt to

prevent it, the allies would make common cause against them. They

disliked and distrusted France very much; England not so much. If the

latter would act a prudent and proper part, she might have great

influence on the affairs of Europe; but the English ministry were fools.

They were encouraging France, and yet it was almost certain they would

not fire a gun in defence of the latter. England depended upon her

commerce, and she could not afford to lose that of the whole continent

of Europe, which she would do in the event of war. She had acted very

foolishly in giving Belgium to France.

What he wished me especially to tell the President was that he hoped the

United States in the event of a war would cause their neutrality to be

respected, and would not suffer the existence of illegal blockades. That

in the event of war, England would have every interest to cripple

American commerce; for, in that event, the commerce of the world would

fall into the hands of Americans. That the English must even use their

vessels to carry articles essentially necessary to them from the north

of Europe.

I promised I would communicate all he had said to the President, and

observed that when we were comparatively feeble, we had gone to war for

the purpose of maintaining our neutral rights upon the ocean; and that

at this time of day, when we were much more powerful, neither the

President nor people of the United States would suffer them to be

violated with impunity. Our policy was peaceful; we never interfered

with the political concerns of other nations. The strictest neutrality

we should observe both from principle and from policy. This had been the

course of our Government ever since the celebrated proclamation of

neutrality of General Washington, which I explained to him. I was not

now afraid that England would, as she had done before, attempt to

violate the neutral rights of a nation which in six months could put to

sea fifty ships of the line and heavy frigates. He expressed some

admiration and astonishment at this statement, which was confirmed by

Mr. Harris, and observed he could not believe that they would.

The conversation then turned upon the French treaty. He said he had been

speaking several times to Broglie, as he called him, upon the subject.

He had done what he could for us. Broglie was well disposed, and he

thought with the assistance of Lafayette and his friends, it would be

ratified very early in the next session. I told him I had understood

that Mr. Dupin, the President of the Chamber, was rather opposed to us.

He said that Dupin was an unprincipled man, I think he said a rascal,

very selfish, and fond of money. He was now receiving a pension of 200

or 300 pounds. I did not understand exactly from whom.

After we went to table, we had much conversation in nearly the same

strain. He told me he wished I could be present at two or three sittings

of the Chamber. They were like cats, all in a passion, and all making a

noise, and afterwards laughing; wholly unfit for liberty. They wanted

such a man as Bonaparte and glory again, not liberty.

Before we went to table I asked him what he thought of Louis Philippe,

and whether the allied sovereigns had confidence in his character. He

answered equivocally. Said Louis Philippe might be well disposed; but he

might be controlled by the factions, and made to do what he did not

approve. His government wanted strength.

At table, in speaking of the emperor [Nicholas], I said I had taken

occasion, since my arrival in France, to speak of the personal character

of the emperor to some persons, as I thought it deserved. He replied as

if I had mentioned the name of Lafayette, which I did not, and asked

what Lafayette had thought of that. I said that General Lafayette was

aware of the good personal character of the emperor, and that of the

empress, and the happy influence of their example on the Russian

nobility, and had freely admitted it. He said that the general had lost

his influence with Louis Philippe, and in a great degree in France. I

observed that whatever opinion others might express concerning him, I

considered it the duty of every American to speak with gratitude of him.

Mr. Harris here shook his head at me, but I continued to talk about him,

and the donation we had made him. The count said it was all spent, and I

replied I was very sorry for it. Various subjects were talked over, and

the count took leave of me in the kindest and most affectionate manner.

He was glad to have an opportunity of communicating this information to

a gentleman of my character, who had been sent on a special mission to

Russia, and acquitted himself in such a manner as I had done. General

Jackson might probably have never heard of him; but he had often [heard]

of the general, and respected his character very highly. I told him his

name was known throughout the political world. General Jackson would be

proud of his good opinion, which I should not fail to communicate.

I forgot to mention that, at the proper place, I introduced the subject

of the treaty concerning maritime rights, and said one object of my

mission was to make a treaty which should assert these rights as between

the two nations. He replied that he presumed it had been explained to me

that the reason why Russia did not accede to this treaty at the present

moment was the delicate relations between them and England. Such a

treaty at this time would set England in a flame. Russia was but a

second-rate naval power. She agreed, however, entirely with the

principles concerning maritime rights maintained by us, and at the

proper time would assert them in the same manner as if she had entered

into the treaty. In the course of the conversation, he observed that the

influence of Russia was firmly established in Constantinople. Yes, I

observed, she had been acting whilst the other powers were talking. I

asked the true character of the sultan, and he spoke of him as rather a

wavering and weak man, etc.

Mr. Buchanan, after visiting the interesting old city of Rouen, embarked

at Havre for Southampton, and arrived at Thompson’s Hotel in Cavendish

Square, London, on the 18th of September. A dinner at Prince Lieven’s

and another at Lord Palmerston’s are the only things worthy of note that

I find in his journal kept during this visit.

_Monday, September 23._

Dined at Prince Lieven’s.

The company were the Prince and Princess, Prince Talleyrand and the

Duchess de Dino[45], Prince Esterhazy, Baron Wessenberg, Lord

Palmerston, Baron Bülow, Mr. Dedal, Mr. Vail, the Earl and Countess of

Sefton, Mr. Lomonosoff and myself—fourteen. The whole London conference

there. A dinner given to Prince Talleyrand, who left London the next day

for Paris.

They were all very civil and kind to me, particularly Princess Lieven,

Lord Palmerston and Prince Esterhazy. After dinner, I was introduced to

Prince Talleyrand by Lord Palmerston, at the solicitation of the latter.

He at once asked me, in French, if I could speak French. I told him not

well, but I could understand it. He then asked some questions about

America, and inquired particularly for the family of General Hamilton,

and about the descendants of General Schuyler. He said that when he was

minister for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Burr came to Paris and sent his

card to him. He returned the card, with a message that he had the

portrait of General Hamilton hanging up in his parlor.

They told me, before I made his acquaintance, that though eighty-three,

by his own acknowledgment, his mind was as active as ever. This I doubt.

He has the appearance of a very old man, though not very thin, like the

French. At dinner he spoke very little, though he ate with a good

appetite. They say he eats but one meal a day. After dinner he was a

little more sprightly. He accepted an invitation to dine again with the

Prince and Princess on the 8th December, at half-past seven, with

pleasantry. Baron Bülow told me the next day that his ability and skill

in the conference were wonderful. He would lie down and say nothing

whilst all the rest were talking, but when they got tired and into

confusion, he would come out with great power, and restore all things to

their proper order.

Lord Palmerston did not arrive at the dinner till after we had sat down,

about eight o’clock. They say he is never punctual. He is an agreeable

and open-hearted man to appearance. I had much conversation with him on

three occasions, particularly after his own dinner, and he must be a

great hypocrite if not in favor of promoting the most friendly relations

between England and the United States. Prince Esterhazy on this day

expressed his admiration of the President, and his warm friendship

towards the American people, and said this was the feeling of Prince

Metternich. He had recommended to the emperor to open diplomatic

relations with us, which the latter had acceded to, and a minister would

soon be sent. He spoke of his own country, Hungary, with great devotion,

and said he never would have been a diplomat but for the friendship of

the late king (George IV.). He pressed me several times to give

Americans letters of introduction to him.

_Tuesday, 24._

Dined at Lord Palmerston’s.

Lord Palmerston’s dinner consisted of his Lordship, Princes Esterhazy

and Lieven, Barons Bülow, Wessenberg and Ompteda, Mr. Backhouse, Mr.

Vail, Mr. Bacourt, Sir George Shea, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Sullivan, Jr. and

myself.

I sat next Baron Bülow at table. He talked freely of the conduct of the

King of Holland. Blamed his obstinacy and perverseness. Said he might

yet bring ruin on his own head. The Dutch were an excellent people. He

had deceived them, induced them to believe that all he wanted was the

separation of Holland from Belgium upon fair terms, when he was only

keeping the question open in the hope that he might get Belgium under

his dominion again, which the Dutch did not wish. When they discovered

they had been deceived, he did not know what might be the consequence.

He said he could not anticipate when the conference would end. The King

of Holland could have got better terms formerly than it was possible for

him now. He told me _significantly_ that the King of Prussia would not

meet the emperors of Russia and Austria in conference. The whole

conversation coming from the Prussian minister to the conference

astonished me.

Mr. Bates[46] told me the English were fifty years behind the Americans

in commercial enterprise and shipbuilding. He was examined before a

committee of the House of Commons. When questioned upon this subject, he

said he had been kindly received and treated in England, and did not

like to answer the question and have his answers published. They then

told him to give his opinion, and it should not be taken down.

He told them the reason of the superiority was in the character of

masters and sailors. They were educated, had a sense of character and

responsibility, entirely different from the same classes in England.

Masters were respectable men, and sailors were now shipped from a

reading-room in Boston.

He expressed his opinion to me that the Americans would, before long,

carry on the chief trade between England and China. Everything favored

them. The destruction of the East India Company’s charter and of the

West India merchants, etc.

[He speaks of] The astonishment of the shipbuilder, when he gave the

dimensions of a vessel to him, and his astonishment afterwards at being

shown the American vessel which was his model, etc.

-----

Footnote 38:

George IV.

Footnote 39:

This remarkable woman is regularly chronicled in Encyclopedias and

Biographical Dictionaries as a Russian diplomatist. She certainly

fulfilled that character in an extraordinary manner for a period of

about forty years. When Mr. Buchanan met her, on his passage down the

Baltic, she was on her way to join her husband in London. She was then

forty-nine. The children referred to both died in 1835. The princess

died at Paris, January 25, 1857, at the age of 73. She is said to have

been a Protestant. In her later years she was a very intimate friend

of M. Guizot, who was present at her death-bed. See further mention of

her, _post_.

Footnote 40:

Henry Wheaton, the learned author of “Elements of International Law,”

long in the diplomatic service of the United States.

Footnote 41:

At that time American chargé d’affaires in Paris.

Footnote 42:

Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo was a native of Corsica, born at Ajaccio,

in 1764. His efforts, along with those of Paoli, to accomplish the

liberation of Corsica from the French power, and place it under the

protection of England, produced in him a decided leaning against

France through his whole career. In 1803 he entered the diplomatic

service of Russia, in which he continued for the remainder of his long

life, under both the emperors Alexander I and Nicholas I. He was

Russian ambassador at Paris from 1815 to the time of his death, with

temporary absences in London on special missions. He died in 1845. At

the period of Mr. Buchanan’s visit to Paris, di Borgo was seventy

years old, with as full and varied a diplomatic experience as any man

of his time. He was celebrated for the brilliancy of his conversation

in the French language. In the private journal of the late Mr. George

Ticknor, written at Paris in ——, I find the following passage: “I do

not know how a foreigner has acquired the French genius so completely

as to shine in that kind of conversation from which foreigners are

supposed to be excluded, but certainly I have seen nobody yet who has

the genuine French wit, with its peculiar grace and fluency, so

completely in his power, as M. Pozzo di Borgo.” In a note to this

passage Mr. Ticknor adds: “I have learned since that he is a Corsican,

and by a singular concurrence of circumstances, was born in the same

town with Bonaparte, and of a family which is in an hereditary

opposition to that of the emperor.” It was no doubt with singular

zest, that di Borgo, in 1814–15, took part in the great European

settlement which dethroned Bonaparte.

Footnote 43:

American friends.

Footnote 44:

See _post_, in relation to this collision between France and the

United States.

Footnote 45:

The wife of Prince Talleyrand’s nephew, the Duc de Dino.

Footnote 46:

Joshua Bates, Esq., long the American partner of the house of Baring

Brothers & Co., and for many years its head.

-----

CHAPTER XI.

1833–1836.

MR. BUCHANAN RETURNS HOME—GREETING FROM GENERAL JACKSON—ELECTED TO THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—STATE OF PARTIES—THE GREAT WHIG LEADERS

IN THE SENATE—PERIL OF A WAR WITH FRANCE.

Mr. Buchanan was greeted on his arrival at his home in Lancaster by the

following letter from General Jackson:

[GENERAL JACKSON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18, 1833.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I have received your note by Mr. John Van Buren, and am delighted to

hear that you have reached your country in good health, after so long an

absence in her service. I anticipate much pleasure from the personal

interview, which you have promised me I shall have in the course of this

week, but do not desire to hasten you more than your convenience, or the

wishes of your friends will permit. I leave until then all else that I

would say, except my congratulation on your safe arrival, which I beg

you to accept with my best wishes for your health and happiness.

Very sincerely and respectfully,

ANDREW JACKSON.

The winter of 1833–34 appears to have been passed in private occupations

which have left no traces. But in the latter part of the summer of 1834,

Mr. Buchanan was appointed one of the commissioners on the part of the

State of Pennsylvania, to arrange with commissioners of the State of New

Jersey, concerning the use of the waters of the Delaware. It was not

entirely convenient for him to accept this appointment; but as it was to

be a public service without any pecuniary compensation, he felt that he

had no alternative. How long he was occupied about it, I have not

discovered. In the following December, the election of a Senator of the

United States, to succeed Mr. Wilkins, who had been appointed minister

to Russia, was to be made by the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Mr.

Buchanan was chosen on the 6th of December (1834), upon the fourth

balloting; his principal competitors being Joel B. Sutherland, James

Clarke, and Amos Ellmaker. He was of course elected by the Democratic

members of the Legislature, and as a supporter of the administration of

President Jackson.[47]

The correspondence which took place between him and those who elected

him, is of interest now, chiefly because it discloses that he held to

what has been called the doctrine of instruction; that is to say, the

right of a State Legislature to direct the vote of a Senator of the

State in Congress, and the duty of the Senator to obey the direction.

[TO THE HON. JAMES BUCHANAN.]

HARRISBURG, Dec. 8, 1834.

DEAR SIR:—

Ere this reaches you, doubtless you will have been notified of your

election to the Senate of the United States, by the Legislative body of

this State to which we have the honor to belong. And it is with

unfeigned gratification that we individually can claim a participation

in the confidence which has on this occasion been reposed in your

talents and integrity. Nor is that gratification by any means lessened,

from the consideration that you are the personal as well as the

political friend of both our State and National Executives, who have

done so much within their respective spheres to exalt the character and

promote the interests of our State and Nation. And above all, who, in

their official relations, so nobly stood forth in the rescue of our

common country from the grasp of a corrupt moneyed monopoly, as reckless

as it was aristocratical, and as merciless as it was powerful. And it is

with no less pride than pleasure that we shall look to you, in your new

and high relations, as the champion of the measures projected by our

venerable President, Andrew Jackson, and seconded by our worthy

Executive, George Wolf.

Respectfully your friends and obedient servants,

(Signed by) JACOB KERN,

and Seventy other Members.

The following communication, in reply, was laid before the members, at a

meeting held in the Capitol on the 7th instant, by Col. Jacob Kern,

Speaker of the Senate:

[TO JACOB KERN, ESQ., AND OTHERS, MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF

PENNSYLVANIA.]

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22, 1834.

GENTLEMEN:—

I want language to express my feelings on the perusal of your kind

letter, which was delivered to me at the moment I was about to leave

Harrisburg. Elevated by your free and unsolicited suffrages to the only

public station I desire to occupy, it shall be my constant endeavor to

justify, by my conduct, the generous confidence which you have thus

reposed. The interest and the honor of Pennsylvania, so far as you have

committed them to my hands, shall never be wilfully abandoned or

betrayed.

Although you have not asked me for any pledge or promise relating to my

course in the Senate, yet I am sensible that many of you desire I should

express my opinion publicly in regard to the right of legislative

instruction. I shall do so with the utmost frankness. On this question I

have not, and never have had, any serious difficulties. The right

results from the very nature of our institutions. The will of the

people, when fully and fairly expressed, ought to be obeyed by all their

_political agents_. This is the very nature and essence of a

representative democracy.

Without entering into an argument upon the general question, which would

be altogether misplaced upon the present occasion, it may not be

improper to observe that the principle applies with redoubled force to

Senators in Congress. They represent the sovereign States, who are the

parties to that constitutional compact which called the federal union

into existence. In the Senate, these States are represented as distinct

communities, each entitled to the same number of votes, without regard

to their population. In that body they are all equal, as they were

before the adoption of the federal constitution. Here, emphatically, if

any where, the voice of the States ought to be heard, and ought to be

obeyed. Shall it then be said that a Senator possesses the

constitutional right to violate the express instructions of the

sovereign State which he represents, and wield the power and the vote

which have been conferred upon him for the benefit of his constituents

in a manner which they have solemnly declared to be ruinous to their

dearest interests, or dangerous to their liberties! The bare statement

of the proposition carries conviction to my mind. All, or nearly all the

State Legislatures, have long been in the practice of instructing their

Senators, and this affords the strongest evidence of the principle upon

which the custom is founded.

It has been objected, that the right of instruction may destroy the

tenure of the Senatorial office, and render it subject to all the

political fluctuations in the several States. But the Senator is only

bound to obey: he is not called upon to resign. And although there may

be circumstances in which a man of honor might feel himself constrained

to retire from the public service rather than give the vote of his State

against his own convictions, yet these cases must, from their nature, be

of rare occurrence.

Besides, this objection implies an entire want of confidence in the

State legislatures. It supposes that they may become the instruments of

faction for the purpose of harassing Senators, and compelling them to

resign. In fact, it results in the principle that the people are

incapable of managing their own concerns, and are, therefore, under the

necessity of conferring an irresponsible political power upon one of

their own number, to save them from themselves. From the nature of our

institutions, we must repose such a degree of confidence in the State

legislatures as to presume that they will not abuse the power with which

they have been intrusted.

If it should ever clearly appear, in any case, that the immediate

representatives of the people have not obeyed their will in voting

instructions, this might present an exception to the general rule. Such

an occurrence, however, though possible, is highly improbable. It is not

to be presumed that State legislatures will exercise this important

power, unless upon grave and solemn occasions, after mature deliberation

and a thorough knowledge of the public will.

I have thus expressed my opinion freely upon this important question,

though I am well aware it differs from that of some of the ablest and

best men of our country.[48]

In relation to the course which I intend to pursue in the Senate, I

shall say but little. My conduct must speak for itself. I feel sensible

that in point of ability I shall disappoint the partial expectations of

my friends. To become distinguished in that body, the ablest in the

world in proportion to its numbers, requires a stretch of intellect and

a range of political knowledge and experience, which I do not pretend to

possess. Whilst, therefore, I cannot become “the champion of the

measures projected by our venerable President,” I shall, both from

principle and inclination, give them an honest and consistent support.

Before concluding this letter, permit me to state my entire concurrence

in the sentiments you have expressed concerning “our worthy executive,

George Wolf.” In the darkest hour of pressure and of panic during the

last winter, when the internal improvements of the State were, to all

appearance, about to be arrested, he stood unmoved, and met the storm in

a manner which proved him to be the able, faithful, and fearless

representative of Pennsylvania Democracy. His message contributed much

to dispel the gloom which, for a time, seemed to have settled on our

country. It was the bright dawn of that glorious day of prosperity which

we have since enjoyed.

With sentiments of the most profound gratitude and respect, I remain

Your obedient servant,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

As I am now to trace a long senatorial career, which began at a period

when the Senate of the United States contained men of the very highest

ability and renown, it is proper to give a brief account of the state of

parties and the questions of the time, and to fix Mr. Buchanan’s

position among the statesmen whom he had to meet. When he took his seat

in the Senate, on the 15th of December, 1834, General Jackson was in his

second term of office, which began on the 4th of March, 1833. He had

received a very large majority of the electoral votes—seventy-four more

than were necessary to a choice. Mr. Van Buren had become Vice-President

by a majority of electoral votes less than General Jackson’s, by the

number of thirty. He was, of course, in the chair of the Senate. In

Congress and throughout the country, the supporters of the

administration had become known as the Democratic party, the old term of

“Republicans,” and the more recent one of “Jackson men,” being generally

dropped.[49] The opposition had become classified and consolidated under

the name of the Whig party, a term substituted for that of “National

Republicans.” Their leader and candidate in the presidential election of

1832 was Mr. Clay.[50] There was a third party, known as the

“Anti-Masons,” who gave the seven electoral votes of Vermont to Mr.

Wirt, as their candidate for the Presidency, and to Amos Ellmaker of

Pennsylvania as their candidate for the Vice-Presidency.

Notwithstanding General Jackson’s great popularity and influence

throughout the country, a large majority of the Senate were opposed to

his administration and his measures. This opposition became concentrated

and intensified by the President’s removal of the public deposits from

the Bank of the United States, into certain selected State banks. A

resolution, strongly condemning this act, had been carried in the

Senate, by twenty-eight yeas against eighteen nays, on the 28th of

March, 1834, nine months before Mr. Buchanan entered the Senate. This

vote may therefore be regarded as a general index of the relative

strength of parties in that body when Mr. Buchanan became a member of

it. How this great opposition majority became so changed three years

afterward, that the friends of General Jackson were able to expunge this

resolution from the records of the Senate, will appear hereafter. The

leading Senators of the opposition at the commencement of the session,

in December, 1834, and distinctly classified as Whigs, were Mr. Clay,

Mr. Webster, Mr. Clayton of Delaware, Mr. Ewing of Ohio, and Mr.

Frelinghuysen and Mr. Southard of New Jersey.

The most important Democratic or administration Senators were, Messrs.

Wright of New York, Benton of Missouri, and Mr. King of Alabama. Calhoun

stood apart from both the political parties. He had been chosen

Vice-President in 1828 by the same party which then elected General

Jackson for the first time, and he then had the same electoral votes,

with the exception of seven of the votes of Georgia. He was consequently

in the Chair of the Senate in 1830, when the great debate took place

between Mr. Webster and Colonel Hayne on the subject of nullification.

In 1833, when the South Carolina doctrine of nullification culminated in

a threatened resistance to collection of the Federal revenue within her

borders, and made it necessary for General Jackson to issue his

celebrated proclamation, Mr. Calhoun was elected as a senator in

Congress from South Carolina, and he determined to resign the

Vice-Presidency. In December, 1832, he took his seat in the Senate. The

breach between him and the President, which was caused by the attitude

of the latter towards the “Nullifiers,” was understood to be widened by

the probability that Mr. Van Buren would be the Democratic candidate for

the Presidency, to succeed General Jackson in 1837, and by the

well-known wish of the latter that Mr. Van Buren should become his

successor. The breach between Mr. Calhoun and the President became still

farther widened, when the State of South Carolina adopted her famous

ordinance for preventing the collection of the Federal revenue within

her limits. From General Jackson’s known firmness of character and

tendency to severe measures, Mr. Calhoun found himself in some personal

danger. Then followed Mr. Clay’s interposition, by means of his

compromise tariff, which was designed to ward off an actual collision

between the federal executive and the nullifying leaders of South

Carolina. Mr. Calhoun was thus saved from personal humiliation, and

perhaps from some personal peril. But no real reconciliation took place

between him and General Jackson, and he remained in an isolated position

in the Senate, a great and powerful debater, vindicating with singular

ability, when a proper occasion offered, his peculiar views of the

nature of the Constitution, always discharging his duties as a senator

with entire purity, but never acting upon any measure as a member of

either of the political parties into which the Senate was divided.

Taking the entire composition of the Senate at that period, with the

opposing forces of the Democratic and the Whig parties, and with Mr.

Calhoun’s intermediate position, there has never been a period in the

history of that body, when there was more real power of debate

displayed, or when public measures were more thoroughly considered. If

Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Webster towered above the other senators,

there were not wanting men who may be said to have approached them in

ability; and if Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster, on the Whig side, sometimes

appeared to give to the opposition a preponderating intellectual force,

it was not always a supremacy that could be said to be undisputed by

their Democratic opponents, although they did for a long time control

the action of the Senate. The country looked on upon these great

senatorial contests with predilections which varied, of course, with the

political feelings and associations of men; but the President, his

measures and his policy, notwithstanding the power of the Senatorial

opposition, continued to grow in the popular favor, and to receive

constant proofs of the popular support. To some of the principal

questions of the time I now turn. The first in which Mr. Buchanan took

part, soon after he entered the Senate, related to the conduct of

France.

In 1831 a convention was concluded between the United States and the

government of King Louis Philippe, by which the latter bound itself to

pay to the United States twenty-five millions of francs, for the

liquidation of certain claims of American citizens against France, and

to be distributed to the claimants by the American Government, as it

should determine. The Government of the United States, on its part,

engaged to pay to the French government one million five hundred

thousand francs, to liquidate the claims, urged by the French government

for its citizens, on the United States, and to be distributed by the

French government, as it should determine. Each party bound itself to

pay its stipulated sum in six annual instalments: those payable by the

United States to be deducted from the larger sums payable by France. The

first French instalment, $4,166,666.66, became due at the expiration of

one year next following the exchange of ratifications. The exchange of

ratifications took place February 2d, 1832, and consequently the first

French instalment became due on the 3d of February, 1833. A bill of

exchange was drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury on the French

Minister of Finance, for the amount of the instalment, and sold to the

Bank of the United States. Payment was refused at the French Treasury

when the bill was presented, for the reason that the Legislative

Chambers had made no appropriation to meet the instalment. We have seen

that when Mr. Buchanan was in Paris, in the summer of 1833 he held

conversations on this matter with the Duc de Broglie and Count Pozzo di

Borgo; from which it appears that moderate and rational persons in

France then believed that the Chambers would at the next session make

the necessary appropriation. In December, 1833, President Jackson, in

his annual message to Congress, adverted to this subject, and said that

he had despatched an envoy to the French government to attend to it, and

that he had received from that government assurances that at the next

meeting of the Chambers it would be brought forward and satisfactorily

disposed of. He added that if he should be disappointed in this hope,

the subject would be again brought before Congress, “in such manner as

the occasion might require.” The opposition in France regarded this as a

menace. The subject was brought before the Chambers several times, but

in April, 1834, the appropriation necessary to carry the treaty into

effect was refused. The king’s government then sent a national vessel to

this country, bearing the king’s assurance that the Chambers should be

called together, after the election of new members, as soon as the

charter would permit, and that the influence of the executive should be

exerted to procure the necessary appropriation, in time to be

communicated to the President before the assembling of Congress in

December, 1834. The Chambers met on the 31st of July, but this matter

was not acted upon, and they were prorogued to the 29th of December. New

assurances were given by the French government that at the ensuing

session the appropriation should be pressed. In his annual message of

December, 1834, the President made severe comments on the course of all

branches of the French government, and recommended a law authorizing

reprisals on French property, in case the appropriation should not be

made at the ensuing session of the Chambers. This was the attitude of

the matter when Mr. Buchanan entered the Senate.[51]

The Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, at the head of which was Mr.

Clay, had made a report against the adoption of the President’s

recommendation. On the 14th of January, (1835) on a resolution

introduced by Mr. Cuthbert of Georgia, Mr. Buchanan took occasion to

say:

IN SENATE, January 14, 1835.

France had, before the close of the last session of Congress, declared

that it was the unanimous determination of the king’s government to

appear before the new legislature with its treaty and its bill in hand,

and that its intention was to do all that the charter allowed to hasten,

as much as possible, the period of the new presentation of the rejected

law. The President rested satisfied with this assurance, and, on the

faith of it, did not present the subject to Congress. How has France

redeemed this pledge? Has that government hastened, as much as possible,

the presentation of the rejected law? At the first meeting of the new

legislature the law was not presented; and in the face of this

engagement, the Chambers were prorogued, not to meet in the autumn, but

on the 29th of December, the very latest day which custom had

sanctioned. If this assurance had any meaning at all, it was that the

Chambers should be convened at least in sufficient time to communicate

to the President information that they had assembled, before the meeting

of Congress. The President, at the date of the message, was not aware

that the Chambers would assemble on the first of the month. No such

information had been communicated to him. It now appears that they did

assemble on that day. And the only reason that he should vote for the

resolution was, that he was willing to wait until the result of their

deliberations could be known.

What effect this circumstance might have had on the President’s mind,

had he known of its existence, he was not prepared to say. He had no

information to give on that subject.

There is a point, sir, said Mr. Buchanan, in the intercourse between

nations, at which diplomacy must end, and a nation must either consent

to abandon her rights, or assert them by force. After having negotiated

for a quarter of a century to obtain a treaty to redress the wrongs of

our injured citizens, and after the French Chamber has once deliberately

rejected that treaty, will not this point have been reached, should the

Chamber again refuse to make the appropriation? If this be so, is it not

right, is it not fair, to present the alternative to France? Would she

not have just cause to complain if we should not adopt this very course?

To inform her frankly and freely that we have arrived at this point, I

am solemnly convinced, is the best diplomacy to which we can resort to

obtain redress for the wrongs of the injured claimants. France will then

have the alternative fairly presented; and it will be for her to decide

whether she will involve herself in war with her ancient ally, rather

than pay those claims which the Executive branch of her Government have

determined to be just by a solemn treaty. Such an attitude on the part

of America will do more for the execution of the treaty than any

temporizing measures of policy which we can adopt. I never was more

clearly impressed with the truth of any proposition.

France, from the language of the President, will have no right to

consider this a menace. It is no more than to say, diplomacy has ended,

and the treaty must be executed, or we shall, however reluctantly, be

compelled to take redress into our own hands. France is a brave and a

chivalrous nation; her whole history proves that she is not to be

intimidated, even by Europe in arms; but she is wise as well as warlike.

To inform her that our rights must be asserted, is to place her in the

serious and solemn position of deciding whether she will resist the

payment of a just debt by force. Whenever she is convinced that this

result is inevitable, the money will be paid; and although I hope I may

be mistaken, I believe there will be no payment until she knows we shall

assume this attitude. France has never appeared to regard the question

in this serious light.

It has been asked what the American Congress would do placed in similar

circumstances. Would they appropriate money with a menace impending over

their heads? I answer, no, never. But I should never consider it a

menace, if, after refusing to vote an appropriation to carry a treaty

into effect, a foreign government in the spirit of candor, in language

mild and courteous, such as that used by the President, were to inform

us they could not abandon their rights, and, however painful it may be,

they should be compelled, by a sense of duty, to assert them by force.

After some further discussion, the resolution was so modified as to

declare that it was at that time inexpedient to adopt any legislative

measure in regard to the state of affairs between the United States and

France. In this form the resolution was unanimously adopted.

The President’s message was received in Paris in the early part of

January (1835). It was resented as a threat. The French minister at

Washington was recalled, and on the 13th of January, the day before the

vote in the Senate, Mr. Livingston, the minister of the United States at

Paris, was informed that his passports were at his service. But a bill

was introduced by the ministry in the Chambers, to make the necessary

appropriation. It was passed in the latter part of April, but with an

amendment making the payment conditional upon an apology from President

Jackson for the language of his message of the previous December. There

was little likelihood that any such apology would be made for language

addressed by the President to the people of the United States through

their representatives in Congress. On the contrary, in the early part of

the next session (January, 1836) the world was somewhat startled by a

recommendation made to Congress by the President, of partial

non-intercourse with France.[52] On the 18th of January, on a motion by

Mr. Clay to refer this recommendation to the Committee on Foreign

Affairs,

Mr. Buchanan said that he had been so much gratified with the message

which had just been read, that he could not, and he thought he ought

not, at this the very first moment, to refrain from expressing his

entire approbation of its general tone and spirit. He had watched with

intense anxiety the progress of our unfortunate controversy with France.

He had hoped, sincerely hoped, that the explanations which had been made

by Mr. Livingston, and officially approved by the President of the

United States, would have proved satisfactory to the French government.

In this he had found his hopes to be vain. After this effort had failed,

he felt a degree of confidence, almost amounting to moral assurance,

that the last message to Congress would have been hailed by France, as

it was by the American people, as the olive branch which would have

restored amity and good understanding between us and our ancient ally.

Even in this, he feared, he was again doomed to be disappointed. The

government of France, unless they change their determination, will not

consider this message as sufficient. We have the terms clearly

prescribed by the Duke de Broglie, upon which, and upon which alone, the

French government will consent to comply with the treaty, and to pay the

five millions of dollars to our injured fellow-citizens. Speculation is

now at an end. The clouds and darkness which have hung over this

question have vanished. It is now made clear as a sunbeam. The money

will not be paid, says the organ of the French government, unless the

Government of the United States shall address its claim officially in

writing to France, accompanied by what appeared to him, and he believed

would appear to the whole American people, without distinction of party,

to be a degrading apology. The striking peculiarity of the case, the one

which he would undertake to say distinguished it from any other case

which had arisen in modern times, in the intercourse between independent

nations, was, that the very terms of this apology were dictated to the

American Government by the French Secretary of Foreign Affairs. One of

these terms was, that it had never entered into the intention

(_pensée_), the thought of this Government, to call in question the good

faith of the government of France.

But the French Government proceed still further. Upon the refusal to

make this apology, which they ought to have known would never be

made—could never be made—they are not content to leave question where it

then was. They have given us notice in advance that they will consider

our refusal to make this degrading apology an evidence that the

misunderstanding did not proceed on our part from mere error and

mistake.

In addition to all this, the last note of the Duke de Broglie to Mr.

Barton declares that the Government of the United States knows that

henceforward the execution of the treaty must depend upon itself. They

thus leave us to decide whether we shall make the apology in the

prescribed terms, or abandon our claim to the fulfillment of the treaty.

He would not allow himself to express the feelings which were excited in

his mind upon hearing these letters of the Duke de Broglie read. Most

sincerely, most ardently, did he hope that the French government, when

this message reached them, if not before, might reconsider their

determination, and that all our difficulties might yet pass away. But

their language is now clear, specific, incapable of ambiguity or doubt.

It would, then, become our duty calmly, but firmly, to take such a stand

as the interests and the honor of the country may require.

Mr. B. had already said much more than he intended when he rose. He

would, however, make another remark before he took his seat. He felt a

proper degree of confidence, he might add a great degree of confidence,

in the President of the United States. He knew him to be honest and

firm, and faithful to his country; prompt to resent its injuries and

avenge its wrongs. He confessed he had anticipated a message of a

stronger character. He had supposed that a general non-intercourse with

France would, at least, have been recommended. But the recommendation

was confined to the mere refusal to admit French ships or French

productions to enter our ports. It left France free to receive her

supplies of cotton from the United States, without which the

manufacturers of that country could not exist. This was wise, it was

prudent; it left to France to judge for herself if this unnatural

contest must still continue, whether she would close her ports against

our vessels and our productions.

In the spring of 1832 (Mr. B. did not recollect precisely the time)

Congress passed an act to carry into effect our part of the treaty.

Under this treaty, the wines of France had ever since been admitted into

the United States upon the favorable terms therein stipulated. Her silks

were imported free of duty, in contradistinction to those which came

from beyond the Cape of Good Hope. She had for years been enjoying these

privileges. Nothing milder, then, could possibly be recommended than to

withdraw these advantages from her, and to exclude her vessels and her

productions from our ports.

Mr. Buchanan said that when he made the observations which had called

forth the remarks of the Senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun) he

had believed the message to be the harbinger of peace, and not of war.

This was still his opinion. In this respect he differed entirely from

the gentleman. Under this impression, he had then risen merely to remark

that, considering the provocation which we had received, the tone, the

spirit, and the recommendations themselves, of the message, were mild

and prudent, and were well calculated to make an impression upon France,

and to render her sensible of her injustice.

It had been far from his intention to excite a general debate on the

French question, and he would not be drawn into it now by the remarks of

the Senator from South Carolina. He must, however, be permitted to say,

he was sorry, very sorry, that the gentleman had proclaimed that, if war

should come, we are the authors of that war, and it would be the fault,

not of the French, but of the American Government. Such a declaration,

proceeding from such a source, from a voice so powerful and so potent,

would be heard on the other side of the Atlantic, and there might

produce a most injurious effect. He was happy to say that this sentiment

was directly at war with the opinion of our Committee on Foreign

Relations, who, in their report of the last session, had expressed the

decided opinion that the American Government, should it become

necessary, must insist upon the execution of the treaty. It was at war

with the unanimous resolution of the House of Representatives of the

same session, declaring that the treaty must be maintained. He believed

it was equally at war with the feelings and opinions of the American

people.

Whilst he expressed his hope and his belief that this message would

prove to be the olive branch of peace, still there was so much

uncertainty in the event, that it now became our imperative duty to

prepare for the worst. Shall we (said Mr. B.) whilst a powerful fleet is

riding along our southern coast, in a menacing attitude, sit here and

withhold from the President the means which are necessary to place our

country in a state of defence? He trusted this would never, never be the

case.

The messages and documents were then read, and referred to the Committee

on Foreign Relations, as moved by Mr. Clay.

On the last night of the session, which terminated on the 3d-4th of

March, 1835, an amendment made in the House of Representatives, to the

Fortification bill, was before the Senate. It proposed:

“That the sum of three millions of dollars be and the same is hereby

appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise

appropriated, to be expended, in whole or in part, under the direction

of the President of the United States, for the military and naval

service, including fortifications and ordnance and increase of the navy:

Provided such expenditures shall be rendered necessary for the defence

of the country, prior to the next meeting of Congress.”

The motive of this amendment was to enable the President to put the

country into a more efficient state of defence, in view of the danger of

a war with France. It was opposed by Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay as an

unconstitutional mode of action, and also because the state of the

French question did not require such action. Mr. Buchanan (on the 3d of

March, 1835,) vindicated the amendment in the following manner:

Mr. Buchanan said he was astonished at the remarks which had been made

by gentlemen on the subject of this appropriation. The most fearful

apprehensions had been expressed, the destruction of our liberties had

been predicted, if we should grant to the President three millions of

dollars to defend the country, in case it should become necessary to

expend it for that purpose, before the next meeting of Congress. For his

part, he could realize no such dangers.

Gentlemen have said, and said truly, that the Constitution of the United

States has conferred upon Congress, and Congress alone, the power of

declaring war. When they go further, and state that this appropriation

will enable the executive to make war upon France, without the consent

of Congress, they are, in my humble judgment, entirely mistaken.

Sir, said Mr. B., what is the true nature, and what are the legitimate

objects of this appropriation? Do we not know that, although the

President cannot make offensive war against France, France may make war

upon us; and that we may thus be involved in hostilities in spite of

ourselves, before the next meeting of Congress? If the Chamber of

Deputies should determine to violate the treaty, and to fix an enduring

stigma upon the public faith of the French nation, is it certain that

France may not proceed a step further, and strike the first blow? Mr.

Livingston himself, in the correspondence which had been communicated to

us by the President, has expressed serious apprehensions that this may

be the result. France may consider war, eventually, to be inevitable;

she may, and I trust does, believe that we have determined not to submit

patiently to her violation of a solemn treaty and thus abandon the just

claims of our injured citizens; and taking advantage of our unprepared

condition, she may commence hostilities herself. The first blow is often

half the battle between nations as well as individuals. Have we any

security that such will not be her conduct? Have we any reason to

believe she will wait until we are ready? Her past history forbids us to

indulge too securely in any such belief. If she should adopt this

course, in what a fearful condition shall we place the country, if we

adjourn without making this appropriation! The Senate will observe that

not a dollar of this money can be drawn from the Treasury, unless it

shall become necessary for the defence of the country, prior to the next

meeting of Congress.

Another circumstance which renders this appropriation indispensable is,

that Congress cannot possibly be convened by the President much before

their usual time of meeting. There are, I believe, nine States in this

Union, who have not yet elected their representatives to the next

Congress. Some of these elections will take place in April, and others

not till August, and even October. We have now arrived almost at the

last hour of our political existence; and shall we leave the country

wholly defenceless until the meeting of the next Congress? Gentlemen

have warned us of the fearful responsibility which we should incur in

making this appropriation. Sir, said Mr. B., I warn them that the

responsibility will be still more dreadful, should we refuse it. In that

event, what will be our condition should we be attacked by France? Our

sea-coast, from Georgia to Maine, will be exposed to the incursions of

the enemy; our cities may be plundered and burned; the national

character may be disgraced; and all this whilst we have an overflowing

Treasury. When I view the consequences which may possibly flow from our

refusal to make this grant, I repeat that the responsibility of

withholding it may become truly dreadful. No portion of it shall rest

upon my shoulders.

Our constitutional right to appropriate this money is unquestionable.

Whilst I express this opinion, I am sorry that the present appropriation

is not more specific in its objects. Appropriation bills ought to be

passed in such a manner as to leave as little to executive discretion as

possible. The purposes for which the money is to be applied ought to be

clearly and distinctly stated. If there were time to do it, the bill

might be improved in this respect. But, sir, this is an extraordinary

crisis, and demands prompt action. We must now take it as it is, or not

take it at all. There is no time left to make the changes which might be

desired.

Gentlemen have contended that, under this appropriation, the President

would be authorized to increase the army, and appoint as many new

officers to command it as he thought proper. But this is not the case.

He could not, under any just construction of this bill, raise a single

new company, or appoint a single officer, not authorized by existing

laws. No such power is conferred upon him by its terms. It will

authorize him to expend three millions of the public money, should the

contingency happen which it contemplates, for putting the vessels of war

now in ordinary in a condition for actual service, and for completing

those the building of which has already been authorized by Congress. The

money may also be applied to the completion and repair of our

fortifications, and in placing them in a state of security and defence

against any attack. Should it become necessary to call out the militia

under existing laws, to garrison these fortifications, or defend our

coast, this money may also be expended for that purpose. There is

nothing in the language of the appropriation to justify the construction

that the President might raise new armies, and create new officers to

command them.

It is my own impression that there will be no necessity for expending

any portion of this money. If there should be, however: and it is the

part of wisdom to provide against such a contingency; let the

responsibility rest upon those who refuse the appropriation. The country

will be left defenceless, and the very knowledge of this circumstance

may invite an attack.

The entire Fortification Bill failed to be passed at this session, in

consequence of the disagreement between the two houses in regard to this

three million appropriation. At the next session, which began in

December, 1835, Colonel Benton of Missouri introduced in the Senate

certain resolutions for setting apart so much of the surplus revenue as

might be necessary for the defence and permanent security of the

country. On the 1st and 2d of February, 1836, Mr. Buchanan addressed the

Senate on these resolutions as follows:

Mr. PRESIDENT: I am much better pleased with the first resolution

offered by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton) since he has modified

it upon the suggestion of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy). When

individuals have more money than they know how to expend, they often

squander it foolishly. The remark applies, perhaps, with still greater

force to nations. When our Treasury is overflowing, Congress, who are

but mere trustees for the people, ought to be especially on their guard

against wasteful expenditures of the public money. The surplus can be

applied to some good and useful purpose. I am willing to grant all that

may be necessary for the public defence but no more. I am therefore

pleased that the resolution has assumed its present form.

The true question involved in this discussion is, on whom ought the

responsibility to rest for having adjourned on the 3d of March last

without providing for the defence of the country. There can be no doubt

a fearful responsibility rests somewhere. For my own part, I should have

been willing to leave the decision of this question to our constituents.

I am a man of peace; and dislike the crimination and recrimination which

this discussion must necessarily produce. But it is vain to regret what

cannot now be avoided. The friends of the administration have been

attacked; and we must now defend ourselves. I deem it necessary,

therefore, to state the reasons why I voted, on the 3d of March last, in

favor of the appropriation of three millions for the defence of the

country, and why I glory in that vote.

The language used by Senators in reference to this appropriation has

been very strong. It has been denounced as a violation of the

Constitution. It has been declared to be such a measure as would not

have received the support of the minority, had they believed it could

prevail, and they would be held responsible for it. It has been

stigmatized as most unusual—most astonishing—most surprising. And

finally, to cap the climax, it has been proclaimed that the passage of

such an appropriation would be virtually to create a dictator, and to

surrender the power of the purse and the sword into the hands of the

President.

I voted for that appropriation under the highest convictions of public

duty, and I now intend to defend my vote against all these charges.

In examining the circumstances which not only justified this

appropriation, but rendered it absolutely necessary, I am forced into

the discussion of the French question. We have been told, that if we

should go to war with France, we are the authors of that war. The

Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Southard), has declared that it will be

produced by the boastful vanity of one man, the petulance of another,

and the fitful violence of a third. It would not be difficult to

conjecture who are the individuals to whom the Senator alludes.

He has also informed us, that in the event of such a war, the guilt

which must rest somewhere will be tremendous.

Now, sir, I shall undertake to prove, that scarcely an example exists in

history of a powerful and independent nation having suffered such wrongs

and indignities as we have done from France, with so much patience and

forbearance. If France should now resort to arms,—if our defenceless

seacoast should be plundered,—if the blood of our citizens should be

shed,—the responsibility of the Senate, to use the language of the

gentleman, will be tremendous. I shall not follow the example of the

Senator, and say, their guilt,—because that would be to attribute to

them an evil intention, which I believe did not exist.

In discussing this subject, I shall first present to the view of the

Senate the precise attitude of the two nations towards each other, when

the appropriation of three millions was refused, and then examine the

reasons which have been urged to justify this refusal. After having done

so, I shall exhibit our relations with France as they exist at the

present moment, for the purpose of proving that we ought now to adopt

the resolutions of the gentleman from Missouri, and grant all necessary

appropriations for the defence of the country.

In discussing this subject, it is not my intention to follow the

fortification bill either into the chamber of the committee of

conference, or into the hall of the House of Representatives. It is not

my purpose to explain the confusion which then existed, and which always

must exist after midnight, on the last evening of the session. I shall

contend that the Senate ought to have voted the three millions; that the

fortification bill ought to have passed the Senate with this amendment;

and that, therefore, the Senate is responsible not only for the loss of

this appropriation, but for that of the entire bill.

What then was the attitude in which we stood towards France at the

moment when the Senate rejected this appropriation for the defence of

the country? What, at that moment, was known, or ought to have been

known, in regard to this question by every Senator on this floor?

The justice of our claims upon France are now admitted by all mankind.

Our generosity was equal to their justice. When she was crushed in the

dust by Europe in arms—when her cities were garrisoned by a foreign

foe—when her independence was trampled under foot, we refused to urge

our claims. This was due to our ancient ally. It was due to our grateful

remembrance of the days of other years. The testimony of Lafayette

conclusively establishes this fact. In the Chamber of Deputies, on 13th

June, 1833, he declared that we had refused to unite with the enemies of

France in urging our claims in 1814 and 1815; and that, if we had done

so, these claims would then have been settled. This circumstance will

constitute one of the brightest pages of our history.

Was the sum secured to our injured fellow-citizens by the treaty of the

4th July, 1831, more than they had a right to demand? Let the report of

our Committee on Foreign Relations, at the last session, answer this

question. They concur entirely with the President, in the statement he

had made in his message, that it was absolutely certain the indemnity

fell far short of the actual amount of our just claims, independently of

damages and interest for the detention; and that it was well known at

the time that in this respect, the settlement involved a sacrifice. But

there is now no longer room for any conjecture or doubt upon this

subject. The commissioners under the treaty have closed their labors.

From the very nature of their constitution, it became the interest of

every claimant to reduce the other claims as much as possible, so that

his own dividend might thus be increased. After a laborious and patient

investigation, the claims which have been allowed by the commissioners

amount to $9,352,193.47. Each claimant will receive but little more than

half his principal, at the end of a quarter of a century, after losing

all the interest.

Why then has this treaty remained without execution on the part of

France, until this day? Our Committee on Foreign Relations, at the last

session, declared their conviction that the King of France “had

invariably, on all suitable occasions, manifested an anxious desire,

faithfully and honestly, to fulfil the engagements contracted under his

authority and in his name.” They say, that “the opposition to the

execution of the treaty, and the payment of our just claims, does not

proceed from the king’s government, but from a majority in the Chamber

of Deputies.”

Now, sir, it is my purpose to contest this opinion, and to show, as I

think I can conclusively, that it is not a just inference from the

facts.

And here, to prevent all possible misconstruction, either on this side,

or on the other side of the Atlantic, if by any accident my humble

remarks should ever travel to such a distance, permit me to say that I

am solely responsible for them myself. These opinions were in a degree

formed while I was in a foreign land, and were there freely expressed

upon all suitable occasions. I was then beyond the sphere of party

influence and felt only as an American citizen.

Is it not then manifest, to use the language of Mr. Livingston in his

note to the Count de Rigny of the 3d August, 1834, that the French

government have never appreciated the importance of the subject at its

just value? There are two modes in which the king could have manifested

this anxious desire faithfully to fulfil the treaty. These are, by words

and by actions. When a man’s words and his actions correspond, you have

the highest evidence of his sincerity. Even then he may be a hypocrite

in the eyes of that Being before whom the fountains of human action are

unveiled. But when a man’s words and his actions are at variance,—when

he promises and does not perform or even attempt to perform,—when “he

speaks the word of promise to the ear and breaks it to the hope,”—the

whole world will at once pronounce him insincere. If this be true in the

transactions of common life, with how much more force does it apply to

the intercourse between diplomatists? The deceitfulness of diplomacy has

become almost a proverb. In Europe the talent of over-reaching gives a

minister the glory of diplomatic skill. The French school has been

distinguished in this art. To prove it, I need only mention the name of

Talleyrand. The American school teaches far different lessons. On this

our success has, in a great degree, depended. The skillful diplomatists

of Europe are foiled by the downright honesty and directness of purpose

which have characterized all our negotiations.

Even the established forms of diplomacy contain much unmeaning language,

which is perfectly understood by everybody, and deceives nobody. If

ministers have avowed their sincerity, and their ardent desire to

execute the treaty; to deny them, on our part, would be insulting, and

might lead to the most unpleasant consequences. In forming an estimate

of their intentions, therefore, every wise man will regard their

actions, rather than their words. By their deeds they shall be known.

Let us then test the French government by this touchstone of truth.

The ratifications of the treaty of the 4th July, 1831, were exchanged at

Washington, on the 2d February, 1832. When this treaty arrived in Paris,

the French Chambers were in session, and they continued in session for

several weeks. They did not adjourn, until the 19th of April. No time

more propitious for presenting this treaty to the Chambers, could have

been selected, than that very moment. Europe then was, as I believe it

still is, one vast magazine of gunpowder. It was generally believed,

that the Polish revolution was the spark which would produce the

explosion. There was imminent danger of a continental war, in which

France, to preserve her existence, would have to put forth all her

energies. Russia, Prussia, and Austria, were armed and ready for the

battle. It was then the clear policy of France to be at a good

understanding with the United States. If it had been the ardent desire

of the king’s government, to carry into effect the stipulations of the

treaty, they would have presented it to the Chambers before their

adjournment. This would undoubtedly have been the course pursued by any

President of the United States, under similar circumstances. But the

treaty was not presented.

I freely admit, that this omission, standing by itself, might be

explained by the near approach of the adjournment, at the time the

treaty arrived from Washington. It is one important link, however, in

the chain of circumstances, which cannot be omitted.

The Government of the United States proceeded immediately to execute

their part of the treaty. By the act of the 13th July, 1832, the duties

on French wines were reduced according to its terms, to take effect from

the day of the exchange of ratifications. At the same session, the

Congress of the United States, impelled no doubt by their kindly

feelings towards France, which had been roused into action by what they

believed to be a final and equitable settlement of all our disputes,

voluntarily reduced the duty upon silks coming from this side of the

Cape of Good Hope to five per cent., whilst those beyond were fixed at

ten per cent. And at the next session, on the 2d of March, 1833, this

duty of five per cent. was taken off altogether; and ever since, French

silks have been admitted into our country free of duty. There is now, in

fact, a discriminating duty of ten per cent. in their favor, over silks

from beyond the Cape of Good Hope.

What has France gained by these measures, in duties on her wines and her

silks, which she would otherwise have been bound to pay? I have called

upon the Secretary of the Treasury, for the purpose of ascertaining the

amount. I now hold in my hand a tabular statement, prepared at my

request, which shows, that had the duties remained what they were at the

date of the ratification of the treaty, these articles, since that time,

would have paid into the Treasury on the 30th September, 1834, the sum

of $3,061,525. Judging from the large importations which have since been

made, I feel no hesitation in declaring it as my opinion that, at the

present moment, these duties would amount to more than the whole

indemnity which France has engaged to pay to our fellow-citizens. Before

the conclusion of the ten years mentioned in the treaty, she will have

been freed from the payment of duties to an amount considerably above

twelve millions of dollars.

By the same act of the 13th July, 1832, a board of commissioners was

established to receive, examine, and decide the claims of our citizens

under the treaty, who were to meet on the first day of the following

August. This act also directed the Secretary of the Treasury to cause

the several instalments, with the interest thereon, payable to the

United States in virtue of the convention, to be received from the

French government and transferred to the United States in such manner as

he may deem best. In this respect the provisions of the act corresponded

with the terms of the treaty, which prescribe that the money shall be

paid into the hands of such person or persons as shall be authorized to

receive it by the Government of the United States.

Were the French government immediately informed of all these

proceedings? Who can doubt it? Certainly no one at all acquainted with

the vigilance and zeal of their diplomatic agents.

The 19th of November, 1832, the day for the meeting of the Chambers, at

length arrived.—Every American was anxious to know what the king would

say in his speech concerning the treaty. No one could doubt but that he

would strongly recommend to the Chambers to make the appropriation of

twenty-five millions of francs, the first instalment of which would

become due on the 2d of February following. All, however, which the

speech contains in relation to the treaty is comprised in the following

sentences: “I have also ordered my minister to communicate to you the

treaty concluded on the 4th July, 1831, between my government and that

of the United States of America. This arrangement puts an end to the

reciprocal claims of the two countries.” Now, sir, I am well aware of

the brevity and non-committal character of kings’ speeches in Europe. I

know the necessity which exists there for circumspection and caution.

But making every fair allowance for these considerations, I may at least

say, that the speech does not manifest an anxious desire to carry the

treaty into effect. What might the king have said; what ought he have

said; what would he have said had he felt this anxious desire? It might

all have been embraced in a single additional sentence, such as the

following: “The Congress of the United States have already provided for

the admission of French wines into their ports upon the terms of this

treaty, and have voluntarily reduced their duties upon French silks, I

must, therefore, request you to grant me the means of discharging the

first instalment which will become due, under this treaty, on the 2d day

of February next.” The king did not even ask the Chambers for the money

necessary to redeem the faith of France. In this respect the debt due to

the United States is placed in striking contrast to the Greek

loan.—Immediately after the two sentences of the speech, which I have

already quoted, the king proceeds: “You will likewise be called to

examine the treaty by which Prince Otho of Bavaria is called to the

throne of Greece. _I shall have to request from you the means of

guaranteeing, in union with my allies, a loan which is indispensable for

the establishment of the new State founded by our cares and

concurrence._”

The establishment of the new State founded by our cares and concurrence!

Russia, sir, has made greater advances by her skill in diplomacy than by

her vast physical power. Unless I am much mistaken, the creation of this

new State, with Prince Otho as its king, will accomplish the very object

which it was the interest and purpose of France to defeat. It will, in

the end, virtually convert Greece into a Russian province. I could say

much more on the subject, but I forbear. My present purpose is merely to

present in a striking view, the difference between the king’s language

in relation to our treaty, and that treaty which placed the son of the

king of Bavaria on the throne of Greece.

Time passed away, and the 2d February, 1833, the day when the first

instalment under the treaty became due, arrived. It was to be paid “into

the hands of such person or persons as shall be authorized by the

Government of the United States to receive it.” The money on that day

ought to have been ready at Paris. But strange, but most wonderful as it

may appear, although the Chambers had been in session from the 19th of

November until the 2d of February, the king’s government had never even

presented the treaty to the Chambers,—had never even asked them for a

grant of the money necessary to fulfil its engagements. Well might Mr.

Livingston say, that they had never properly appreciated the importance

of the subject.

The Government of the United States, knowing that the king in his speech

had promised to present the treaty to the Chambers, and knowing that

they had been in session since November, might have taken means to

demand the first instalment at Paris on the 2d day of February. Strictly

speaking, it was their duty to do so, acting as trustees for the

claimants. But they did not draw a bill of exchange at Washington for

the first instalment, until five days after it had become due at Paris.

This bill was not presented to the French government for payment until

the 23d of March, 1833. Even at that day the French ministry had not

presented either the treaty, or a bill to carry it into effect, to the

Chambers. The faith of France was thus violated by the neglect of the

king’s government, long before any bill was presented. They, and not the

Chambers, are responsible for this violation. It was even impossible for

the Chambers to prevent it. Had this treaty and bill been laid before

them in time to have enabled them to redeem the faith of France, the

loyalty of the French character would never have permitted them to be

guilty of a positive violation of national honor. The faith of the

nation was forfeited before they were called upon to act. The

responsibility was voluntarily assumed by the king’s ministers. The

Chambers are clear of it. Besides, the ministry were all powerful with

the Chambers during that session. They carried everything they urged.

Even the bill providing the means of guaranteeing the Greek loan became

a law. Can it then for a single moment be believed that if a bill to

carry into effect our treaty—a treaty securing such important advantages

to France—had been presented at an early period of the session, and had

been pressed by the ministry, that they would have failed in the

attempt? At all events, it was their imperative duty to pursue this

course. The aspect of the political horizon in Europe was still

lowering. There was still imminent danger of a general war. France was

still in a position to make her dread any serious misunderstanding with

the United States.

After all this, on the 26th March, the Duke de Broglie, in a note to Mr.

Niles, our chargé d’affaires at Paris, stated that it was “a source of

regret, and, indeed, of astonishment, that the Government of the United

States did not think proper to have an understanding with that of

France, before taking this step.” What step? The demand of an honest

debt, almost two months after it had been due, under a solemn treaty.

Indeed, the duke, judging from the tone of his note, appears almost to

have considered the demand an insult. To make a positive engagement to

pay a fixed sum on a particular day, and when that sum is demanded

nearly two months after, to express astonishment to the creditor, would,

in private life, be considered trifling and evasive.

The excuse made by the French ministry for their conduct is altogether

vain. Had they dreaded the vote of the Chambers—had they been afraid to

appear before them with their treaty and their bill, they would, and

they ought to have communicated their apprehensions to this Government,

and asked it to suspend the demand of the money. But they had never

whispered such a suspicion, after the exchange of their ratifications of

the treaty; and the first intimation of it on this side of the Atlantic,

was accompanied by the astounding fact that the French government had

dishonored our bill. It is true, that before the treaty was signed, they

had expressed some apprehensions to Mr. Rives on this subject. These, it

would seem, from their subsequent conduct, were merely diplomatic, and

intended to produce delay; because, from the date of the treaty, on the

4th July, 1831, until after our bill of exchange was dishonored in

March, 1833, no intimation of danger from that quarter was ever

suggested. These circumstances made a great noise throughout Europe, and

soon became the subject of general remark.

On the 6th of April, 1833, a year and more than two months after the

exchange of the ratifications at Washington, the treaty and bill were

first presented to the French Chambers. The session closed on the 25th

of April, without any further action on the subject. No attempt was made

by the ministry to press it; and as the session would terminate so soon,

perhaps no attempt ought to have been made. But, as a new session was to

commence the day after the termination of the old, and to continue two

months, a favorable opportunity was thus presented to urge the passage

of the law upon the Chambers. Was this done? No, sir. The ministry still

continued to pursue the same course. They suffered the remainder of the

month of April to pass, the month of May to pass, and not until the

eleventh of June, only fifteen days before the close of the session, did

they again present the bill to carry into effect the treaty. It was

referred to a committee, of which Mr. Benjamin Delessert was the

chairman. On the 18th of June, he made a report. This report contains a

severe reprimand of the French government for not having presented the

bill at an earlier period of the session; and expresses the hope that

the treaty may be communicated at the opening of the next session. If we

are to judge of the opinion of the Chamber from the tone and character

of this report, instead of being hostile to the execution of the treaty,

had it been presented to them in proper time, they felt every

disposition to regard it in a favorable light. I shall read the whole

report—it is very short, and is as follows:

“Gentlemen: The committee charged by you, to examine the bill relative

to the treaty, concluded on the 4th of July, 1831, between France and

the United States, has demanded a number of documents and reports, which

must be examined, in order to obtain a complete knowledge of so

important a transaction.

“The committee was soon convinced that a conscientious examination of

these papers would require much time; and that, at so advanced a period

of the session, its labors would have no definitive result. It regrets

that, from motives which the government only can explain, the bill was

not presented earlier to the Chamber for discussion. It regrets this so

much the more as it is convinced of the importance of the treaty, which

essentially interests our maritime commerce, our agriculture, and our

manufactures.

“Several chambers of commerce, particularly those of Paris and Lyons,

have manifested an ardent desire that the business should be speedily

terminated.

“The committee would be satisfied if, after a deeper study of the

question, it could enlighten the Chamber with regard to the justice of

the claims alleged by each of the parties to the treaty, and which form

the basis of it; but as time does not allow a definitive report to be

made on the subject, it considers itself as the organ of the Chamber, in

expressing the wish that this treaty be communicated, at the opening of

the next session; and that its result may be such as to strengthen the

bonds of friendship, which must ever exist between two nations so long

united by common interest and sympathy.”

After a careful review of this whole transaction, I am convinced that

the government of France never would have pursued such a course towards

us, had they entertained a just sense of our power, and our willingness

to exert it in behalf of our injured fellow-citizens. Had Russia or

Austria been her creditors, instead of ourselves, the debt would have

been paid when it became due; or, at the least, the ministers of the

king would have exerted themselves, in a far different manner, to obtain

the necessary appropriation from the Chambers. I am again constrained,

however reluctantly, to adopt the opinion which I had formed at the

moment. Our fierce political strife in this country is not understood in

Europe; and least of all, perhaps, in France. During the autumn of 1832,

and the session of 1832–3, it was believed abroad that we were on the

very eve of a revolution; that our glorious Union was at the point of

dissolution. I speak, sir, from actual knowledge. Whilst the advocates

of despotism were looking forward, with eager hope, to see the last free

republic blotted out from the face of nations, the friends of freedom

throughout the world were disheartened, and dreaded the result of our

experiment. The storm did rage in this country with the utmost violence.

It is no wonder that those friends of liberty, on the other side of the

Atlantic, who did not know how to appreciate the recuperative energies

of a free and enlightened people, governed by Federal and State

institutions of their own choice, should have been alarmed for the

safety of the Republic. For myself I can say that I never felt any

serious apprehension; yet the thrill of delight with which I received

the news of the passage of the famous compromise law of March, 1833, can

never be effaced from my memory. I did not then stop to inquire into the

nature of its provisions. It was enough for me to know that the Republic

was safe, not only in my own opinion, but in the opinion of the world.

Suppose, sir, that the President of the United States, under similar

circumstances, had withheld a treaty from Congress requiring an

appropriation, for fourteen months after it had been duly ratified, and

had thus forfeited the national faith to a foreign government, what

would have been the consequence? Sir, he ought to have been, he would

have been impeached. No circumstances could ever have justified such

conduct in the eyes of the American Congress or the American people.

After all the provocation which the President had received, as the

representative of his country, what was his conduct? It might have been

supposed that this violent man, as the Senator from New Jersey (Mr.

Southard) has designated him, would at once have recommended decisive

measures. Judging from his energy,—from his well-known devotion to the

interests of his country,—and above all, from his famous declaration to

ask nothing from foreign nations but what was right, and to submit to

nothing wrong, I should have expected from him an indignant message at

the commencement of the next session of Congress. Instead of that, the

message of December, 1833, in relation to French affairs, is of the

mildest character. It breathes a spirit of confident hope that our

ancient ally would do us justice during the next session of the

Chambers. His exposition of the subject is concluded by the following

declaration:

“As this subject involves important interests, and has attracted a

considerable share of the public attention, I have deemed it proper to

make this explicit statement of its actual condition; and should I be

disappointed in the hope now entertained, the subject will be again

brought to the notice of Congress in such a manner as the occasion may

require.”

And thus ends the first act of this astonishing historical drama.

Throughout the whole of it, beginning, middle and end, the French

government, and not the French Chambers, were exclusively to blame.

We have now arrived at the mission of Mr. Livingston. He reached Paris

in September, 1833. The Duc de Broglie assured him “that the king’s

government would willingly and without hesitation promise to direct the

deliberations of the Chambers to the _projet de loi_ relative to the

execution of the convention of July 4, 1831, on the day after the

Chamber is constituted, and to employ every means to secure the happy

conclusion of an affair, the final determination of which the United

States cannot desire more ardently than ourselves.” After this

assurance, and after all that had passed, it was confidently expected

that the king would, in strong terms, have recommended the adoption of

the appropriation by the Chambers. In this we were again doomed to

disappointment. In his opening speech he made no direct allusion to the

subject. He simply says, that, “the financial laws, and those required

for the execution of treaties, will be presented to you.”

The bill was presented, and debated, and finally rejected by the Chamber

of Deputies on the 1st day of April, 1834, by a vote of 176 to 168. It

is not my present purpose to dwell upon the causes of this rejection. No

doubt the principal one was that the French ministers were surrounded

near the conclusion of the debate, and were unable at the moment to show

that the captures at St. Sebastians were not included in our treaty with

Spain. I am sorry they were not better prepared upon this point; but I

attribute to them no blame on that account.

It has been urged over and over again, both on this floor and elsewhere,

that the rejection of the treaty was occasioned by the publication in

this country of Mr. Rives’s letter to Mr. Livingston of the 8th of July,

1831. Is this the fact? If it be so it ought to be known to the world.

If it be not, both the character of this Government and of Mr. Rives

should be rescued from the imputation. What is the opinion expressed in

this letter? Is it that the American claimants would obtain, under the

treaty, more than the amount of their just claims? No such thing. Is it

that they would obtain the amount of their just claims with interest?

Not even this. The negotiator merely expresses the opinion that they

would receive every cent of the principal. He does not allege that they

would receive one cent of interest for a delay of nearly a quarter of a

century. This opinion is evidently founded upon that expressed by Mr.

Gallatin in a despatch dated on the 14th January, 1822, cited by Mr.

Rives, in which the former expresses his belief that five millions of

dollars would satisfy all our just claims. It ought to be observed that

the sum stipulated to be paid by the treaty is only 25,000,000 of

francs, or about $4,700,000; and that more than nine years had elapsed

between the date of Mr. Gallatin’s despatch and the signing of the

treaty. These facts all appear on the face of the letter, with the

additional fact that the statements of the claimants, which have from

time to time been presented to Congress, carry the amount of the claims

much higher. These statements, however, Mr. Rives did not believe were a

safe guide.

This is the amount of the letter, when fairly analyzed, which, it is

alleged, destroyed the treaty before the French Chambers. If a copy of

it had been placed in the hands of every Deputy, it could not possibly

have produced any such effect.

That it did not occasion the rejection of the treaty is absolutely

certain. I have examined the whole debate for the purpose of discovering

any allusion to this letter; but I have examined it in vain. Not the

slightest trace of the letter can be detected in any of the numerous

speeches delivered on that occasion. The topics of opposition were

various, and several of them of a strange character; but the letter is

not even once alluded to throughout the whole debate. If its existence

were known at the time in the French Chamber, this letter, written by a

minister to his own government, expressing a favorable opinion of the

result of his own negotiations, was a document of a character so

natural, so much to be expected, that not one Deputy in opposition to

the treaty believed it to be of sufficient importance even to merit a

passing notice. Still, I have often thought it strange it had never been

mentioned in the debate. The mystery is now resolved. The truth is, this

letter, which is alleged to have produced such fatal effects, was

entirely unknown to the members of the French Chamber when they rejected

the treaty. This fact is well established by a letter from Mr. Jay, the

chairman of the committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies to

investigate our claims, addressed to Mr. Gibbes, and dated at Paris on

the 24th January, 1835. I shall read it.

(_Extract of a letter from Mr. Jay to Mr. Gibbes, dated 24th January,

1835._)—“It is asserted in the American prints that the rejection of the

American treaty by the Chamber of Deputies, at their last session, was

chiefly owing to the publication of a letter from Mr. Rives to his own

Government. This is an error, which justice to that distinguished

statesman, and a sense of his unremitting exertions to promote the

interests of his Government while here, induce me formally to

contradict. No such evidence appears in the debates; and in none of my

conversations with the members have I heard his letter alleged as the

motive for disputing the amount due. I much question, indeed, if any

other Deputy than myself ever read the letter alluded to.”

We have now arrived at that point of time when a majority of the French

Chambers arrayed themselves against the treaty. This decision was made

on the 1st April, 1834. Some apprehensions then prevailed among the king

and his ministers. The business was now becoming serious. New assurances

had now become necessary to prevent the President from presenting the

whole transaction to Congress, which they knew would still be in

session, when the information of the rejection would reach the United

States. In his annual message, at the commencement of the session, it

will be recollected, he had declared that should he be disappointed in

the hope then entertained, he would again bring the subject before

Congress, in such a manner as the occasion might require. They knew that

he was a man who performed his promises, and a great effort was to be

made to induce him to change his purpose.

Accordingly a French brig of war, the Cuirassier, is fitted out with

despatches to Mr. Serrurier. They reached him on the 3d June. On the

4th, he has an interview with Mr. McLane, and makes explanations which

the latter very properly requests may be reduced to writing. In

compliance with this request, the French minister, on the 5th, addresses

a note to Mr. McLane. After expressing the regrets of the French

government at the rejection of the bill, he uses the following language:

“The king’s government, sir, after this rejection, the object of so much

painful disappointment to both governments, has deliberated, and its

unanimous determination has been to make an appeal from the first vote

of the present Chamber to the next Chamber, and to appear before the

next legislature with its treaty and its bill in hand.

“It flatters itself that the light already thrown upon this serious

question, during these first debates, and the expression of the public

wishes becoming each day more clear and distinct, and, finally, a more

mature examination, will have, in the mean time, modified the minds of

persons, and that its own conviction will become the conviction of the

Chambers. The king’s government, sir, will make every loyal and

constitutional effort to that effect, and will do all that its

persevering persuasion of the justice and of the mutual advantages of

the treaty authorizes you to expect from it. Its intention, moreover, is

to do all that our constitution allows, to hasten, as much as possible,

the period of the new presentation of the rejected law.

“Such, sir, are the sentiments, such the intentions of his majesty’s

government. I think I may rely that, on its part, the Government of the

Republic will avoid, with foreseeing solicitude, in this transitory

state of things, all that might become a fresh cause of irritation

between the two countries, compromit the treaty, and raise up an

obstacle perhaps insurmountable, to the views of reconciliation and

harmony which animate the king’s council.”

Now, sir, examine this letter, even without any reference to the answer

of Mr. McLane, and can there be a doubt as to its true construction? It

was not merely the disposition, but “it was the _intention_ of the

king’s government to do all that their constitution allows; to hasten,

as much as possible, the period of the new presentation of the rejected

law.” The President knew that under the constitution of France the king

could at any time convoke the Chambers upon three weeks’ notice. It was

in his power, therefore, to present this law to the Chambers whenever he

thought proper. The promise was to hasten this presentation as much as

possible. Without any thing further the President had a right

confidently to expect that the Chambers would be convoked in season to

enable him to present their decision to the Congress of the United

States in his next annual message. The assurance was made on the 5th

June, and Congress did not assemble until the beginning of December. But

the letter of Mr. McLane, of the 27th June, removes all possible doubt

from this subject. He informs Mr. Serrurier that “the President is still

unable to understand the causes which led to the result of the

proceeding in the Chamber, especially when he recollected the assurances

which had so often been made by the king and his ministers, of their

earnest desire to carry the convention into effect, and the support

which the Chamber had afforded in all the other measures proposed by the

king.” And again:

“The assurances which M. Serrurier’s letter contains, of the adherence

of the king’s government to the treaty, of its unanimous determination

to appeal from the decision of the present to the new Chamber, and its

conviction that the public wish, and a mature examination of the

subject, will lead to a favorable result, and its intention to make

every constitutional effort to that effect, and finally, its intention

to do all that the constitution allows to hasten the presentation of the

new law, have been fully considered by the President.

“Though fully sensible of the high responsibility which he owes to the

American people, in a matter touching so nearly the national honor, the

President, still trusting to the good faith and justice of France,

willing to manifest a spirit of forbearance so long as it may be

consistent with the rights and dignity of his country, and truly

desiring to preserve those relations of friendship, which, commencing in

our struggle for independence, form the true policy of both nations, and

sincerely respecting the king’s wishes, will rely upon the assurances

which M. Serrurier has been instructed to offer, and will therefore

await with confidence the promised appeal to the new Chamber.

“The President, in desiring the undersigned to request that his

sentiments on this subject may be made known to his majesty’s

government, has instructed him also to state his expectation that the

king, seeing the great interests now involved in the subject, and the

deep solicitude felt by the people of the United States respecting it,

will enable him, when presenting the subject to Congress, as his duty

will require him to do at the opening of their next session, to announce

at that time the result of that appeal, and of his majesty’s efforts for

its success.”

Had this letter of Mr. McLane placed a different construction upon the

engagement of the French government from that which Mr. Serrurier

intended to communicate, it was his duty to make the necessary

explanations without delay. He, in that case, would have done so

instantly. It was a subject of too much importance to suffer any

misapprehension to exist concerning it for a single moment.

Notwithstanding all which had passed, the President, on the faith of

these assurances of the French government, suffered Congress to adjourn

without presenting the subject to their view. This rash, this violent

man, instigated by his own good feelings towards our ancient ally, and

by his love of peace, determines that he would try them once more, that

he once more would extend the olive branch before presenting to Congress

and the nation a history of our wrongs. I confess I do not approve of

this policy. I think the time had then arrived to manifest to France

some sensibility on our part on account of her delay in executing the

treaty. I believe that such a course would have been dictated by sound

policy.

What were the consequences of this new manifestation of the kindly

feelings of the President towards France? Was it properly appreciated by

the French government? Was it received in the liberal and friendly

spirit from which it had proceeded? Let the sequel answer these

questions. I shall read you Mr. Livingston’s opinion on the subject. In

a letter to Mr. Forsyth, under date of the 22d November, 1834, he thus

expresses himself:

“I do not hope for any decision on our affairs before the middle of

January. One motive for delay is an expectation that the message of the

President may arrive before the discussion, and that it may contain

something to show a strong national feeling on the subject. _This is not

mere conjecture: I know the fact_; and I repeat now, from a full

knowledge of the case, what I have more than once stated in my former

despatches as my firm persuasion, that the moderate tone taken by our

Government, when the rejection was first known, was attributed by some

to indifference, or to a conviction on the part of the President that he

would not be supported in any strong measure by the people, and by

others to a consciousness that the convention had given us more than we

were entitled to ask.”

I shall now proceed to show in what manner the French government

performed the engagement which had been made by their representative in

Washington to hasten the presentation of the rejected law as much as

possible.

The Chambers met on the 31st July, and the king made them a speech. This

speech contains no allusion to the subject of the treaty except the

following: “The laws necessary for carrying treaties into effect, and

those still required for the accomplishment of the promises of the

Chamber, will be presented to you in the course of this session.” The

rejected bill was not presented. After a session of two weeks, the

Chambers were prorogued on the 16th August until the 29th December,—a

day, almost a month after the next meeting of Congress.

I admit that strong reasons existed for dispensing with that part of the

obligation which required the French government to present the bill at

this short session. No good reason has ever been alleged to excuse them

for proroguing the Chambers until so late a day as the 29th of December.

They might have met, and they ought to have met, at an early period of

the autumn. They have heretofore met, on different occasions, for the

despatch of business, in every month of the year. It was in vain that

Mr. Livingston urged the necessity of an earlier meeting on the Count de

Rigny. It was in vain that he appealed to the positive engagement of the

French government made by Mr. Serrurier. It was in vain that he declared

to him, “that the President could not, at the opening of the next

session of Congress, avoid laying before that body a statement of the

then position of affairs on this interesting subject, nor, under any

circumstances, permit that session to end, as it must, on the third of

March, without recommending such measures as he may deem that justice

and the honor of the country may require.” All his remonstrances were

disregarded. Instead of hastening the presentation of the rejected law

as much as possible, they refused to assemble the Chambers in time even

to present the bill before the meeting of Congress. Their meeting was so

long delayed, as to render it almost impossible that their determination

should be known in this country before the close of the session,

notwithstanding the President had agreed not to present the subject to

Congress at the previous session, under a firm conviction that he would

receive this determination in time to lay it before them at the

commencement of their next session. Is there a Senator in this hall, who

can believe for a moment, that if the President had been informed the

rejected bill would not be laid before the Chambers until the 29th

December, he would have refrained from communicating to Congress, at

their previous session, the state of the controversy between the two

countries? Upon this construction, the engagement of the French

government was mere words, without the slightest meaning; and the

national vessel which brought it in such solemn form, might much better

have remained at home.

What was the apology—what was the pretext under which the king’s

government refused to assemble the Chambers at an earlier period? It

was, that Mr. Serrurier had made no engagement to that effect, and that

the intention which he had expressed in behalf of his government to do

all that the constitution allows, to hasten, as much as possible, the

period of the new presentation of the rejected law, meant no more than

that this was their disposition. The word “intention” is thus changed

into “disposition” by the Count de Rigny, and the whole engagement which

was presented to the President in such an imposing form, was thus

converted into a mere unmeaning profession of their desire to hasten

this presentation as much as possible.