ONE of Addington’s friendly acts was the appointment of Anthony Merry
as British minister to the United States. For this selection Rufus
King was directly responsible. Two names were mentioned to him by the
Foreign Office as those of the persons entitled to claim the place; one
was that of Merry, the other was that of Francis James Jackson.
“As I have had the opportunity of knowing both these gentlemen
during my residence here,” wrote Minister King to Secretary
Madison,[259] “it was not without some regret that I heard of
the intention to appoint Mr. Jackson in lieu of Mr. Merry.
From this information I have been led to make further inquiry
concerning their reputations, and the result has proved rather
to increase than to lessen my solicitude. Mr. Jackson is said to
be positive, vain, and intolerant. He is moreover filled with
English prejudices in respect to all other countries, and as far
as his opinions concerning the United States are known, seems
more likely to disserve than to benefit a liberal intercourse
between them and his own country. On the other hand, Mr. Merry
appears to be a plain, unassuming, and amiable man, who having
lived for many years in Spain is in almost every point of
character the reverse of Mr. Jackson, who were he to go to
America would go for the sake of present employment and with
the hope of leaving it as soon as he could receive a similar
appointment in Europe; while Mr. Merry wishes for the mission
with the view of obtaining what he believes will prove to be an
agreeable and permanent residence.”
In deference to Rufus King’s wishes or for some other reason Merry
received the appointment. Doubtless he came to America in the hope
of finding a “permanent residence,” as King remarked; but it could
hardly be agreeable, as he hoped. He was a thorough Englishman, with a
wife more English than himself. He was not prepared for the isolation
of the so-called Federal City, and he did not expect to arrive at a
moment when the United States government, pleased with having curbed
Bonaparte, was preparing to chasten Spain and to discipline England.
Landing at Norfolk from a ship of war Nov. 4, 1803, Merry was obliged
to hire a vessel to carry himself and his belongings to Washington,
where, after a tempestuous voyage, he at last arrived, November 26.
Possibly Mr. and Mrs. Merry, like other travellers, would have grumbled
even though Washington had supplied them with Aladdin’s palace and
Aladdin’s lamp to furnish it; but the truth was not to be denied that
the Federal City offered few conveniences, and was better suited for
members of Congress, who lived without wives in boarding-houses, than
for foreign ministers, with complaining wives, who were required to
set up large establishments and to entertain on a European scale.
“I cannot describe to you,” wrote Merry privately,[260] “the
difficulty and expense which I have to encounter in fixing
myself in a habitation. By dint of money I have just secured two
small houses on the common which is meant to become in time the
city of Washington. They are mere shells of houses, with bare
walls and without fixtures of any kind, even without a pump or
well, all which I must provide at my own cost. Provisions of
any kind, especially vegetables, are frequently hardly to be
obtained at any price. So miserable is our situation.”
Had these been the worst trials that awaited the new British minister,
he might have been glad to meet them; for when once surmounted, they
favored him by preventing social rivalry. Unfortunately he met more
serious annoyances. Until his arrival, Yrujo was the only minister
of full rank in the United States; and Yrujo’s intimate relations at
the White House had given him family privileges. For this reason the
Spanish minister made no struggle to maintain etiquette, but living
mostly in Philadelphia disregarded the want of what he considered good
manners at Washington, according to which he was placed on the same
social footing with his own secretary of legation. Yet Yrujo, American
in many respects, belonged to the school of Spanish diplomacy which
had for centuries studied points of honor. He might well have made
with his own mouth the celebrated retort which one of his predecessors
made to Philip II., who reproached him with sacrificing an interest to
a ceremony: “How a ceremony? Your Majesty’s self is but a ceremony!”
Although Yrujo submitted to Jefferson, he quarrelled with Pichon on
this point, for Pichon was only a secretary in charge of the French
legation. In November, 1803, Yrujo’s friendship for Jefferson was
cooling, and he waited the arrival of Merry in the hope of finding a
champion of diplomatic rights. Jefferson, on the other hand, waited
Merry’s arrival in order to establish, once for all, a new social code;
and that there might be no misunderstanding, he drafted with his own
hand the rules which were to control Executive society,--rules intended
to correct a tendency toward monarchical habits introduced by President
Washington.
In 1801 on coming into power Jefferson announced that he would admit
not the smallest distinction that might separate him from the mass
of his fellow-citizens. He dispensed with the habit of setting apart
certain days and hours for receiving visits of business or curiosity,
announcing that he would on any day and at any hour receive in a
friendly and hospitable manner those who should call upon him.[261] He
evidently wished to place the White House on the footing of easy and
generous hospitality which was the pride of every Virginia gentleman.
No man should be turned away from its doors; its table, liberal and
excellent, should be filled with equal guests, whose self-respect
should be hurt by no artificial rules of precedence. Such hospitality
cost both time and money; but Washington was a petty village, society
was very small, and Jefferson was a poor economist. He entertained
freely and handsomely.
“Yesterday I dined with the President,” wrote Senator Plumer of
New Hampshire, Dec. 25, 1802.[262] “His rule is to have about
ten members of Congress at a time. We sat down to the table at
four, rose at six, and walked immediately into another room
and drank coffee. We had a very good dinner, with a profusion
of fruits and sweetmeats. The wine was the best I ever drank,
particularly the champagne, which was indeed delicious. I wish
his French politics were as good as his French wines.”
So long as this manner of life concerned only the few Americans who
were then residents or visitors at Washington, Jefferson found no great
difficulty in mixing his company and disregarding precedence. Guests
accommodated themselves to the ways of the house, took care of their
own comfort, went to table without special request, and sat wherever
they found a vacant chair; but foreigners could hardly be expected
at first to understand what Jefferson called the rule of pell-mell.
Thornton and Pichon, being only secretaries of legation, rather gained
than lost by it; but Yrujo resented it in secret; and all eyes were
turned to see how the new British minister would conduct himself in the
scramble.
Either before or soon after Merry’s arrival the President wrote the
rules, which he called “Canons of Etiquette to be observed by the
Executive;”[263] and these canons ultimately received the approval
of the Cabinet. Foreign ministers, he said, were to pay the first
visit to the “ministers of the nation;” their wives were to receive
the first visit from the wives of “national ministers.” No grades
among diplomatic members were to give precedence; “all are perfectly
equal, whether foreign or domestic, titled or untitled, in or out
of office.” Finally, “to maintain the principle of equality, or of
_pêle-mêle_, and prevent the growth of precedence out of courtesy,
the members of the Executive will practise at their own houses, and
recommend an adherence to, the ancient usage of the country,--of
gentlemen in mass giving precedence to the ladies in mass in passing
from one apartment where they are assembled into another.” Such,
according to Rufus King, whose aid was invoked on this occasion, was
the usage in London.
Merry duly arrived in Washington, and was told by Madison that the
President would receive his letter of credence Nov. 29, according to
the usual formality. At the appointed hour the British minister, in
diplomatic uniform, as was required in the absence of any hint to the
contrary, called upon Madison, and was taken to the White House, where
he was received by the President. Jefferson’s manner of receiving
guests was well known, although this was the first occasion on which he
had given audience to a new foreign minister. Among several accounts
of his appearance at such times, that of Senator Plumer was one of the
best.
“In a few moments after our arrival,” said the senator, writing
two years before Merry’s mishap,[264] “a tall, high-boned man
came into the room. He was dressed, or rather undressed, in an
old brown coat, red waistcoat, old corduroy small-clothes much
soiled, woollen hose, and slippers without heels. I thought him
a servant, when General Varnum surprised me by announcing that
it was the President.”
The “Evening Post,” about a year later, described him as habitually
appearing in public “dressed in long boots with tops turned down
about the ankles like a Virginia buck; overalls of corduroy faded, by
frequent immersions in soap suds, from yellow to a dull white; a red
single-breasted waistcoat; a light brown coat with brass buttons, both
coat and waistcoat quite threadbare; linen very considerably soiled;
hair uncombed and beard unshaven.” In truth the Virginia republicans
cared little for dress. “You know that the Virginians have some pride
in appearing in simple habiliments,” wrote Joseph Story in regard to
Jefferson, “and are willing to rest their claim to attention upon their
force of mind and suavity of manners.” Indeed, “Virginia carelessness”
was almost a proverb.[265]
On the occasion of Merry’s reception, the President’s chief offence
in etiquette consisted in the slippers without heels. No law of the
United States or treaty stipulation forbade Jefferson to receive Merry
in heelless slippers, or for that matter in bare feet, if he thought
proper to do so. Yet Virginia gentlemen did not intentionally mortify
their guests; and perhaps Madison would have done better to relieve
the President of such a suspicion by notifying Merry beforehand that
he would not be expected to wear full dress. In that case the British
minister might have complimented Jefferson by himself appearing in
slippers without heels.
A card of invitation was next sent, asking Mr. and Mrs. Merry to dine
at the White House, December 2. Such an invitation was in diplomatic
usage equivalent to a command, and Merry at once accepted it. The new
minister was then told that he must call on the heads of departments.
He remonstrated, saying that Liston, his predecessor, had been required
to make the first visit only to the Secretary of State; but he was
told, in effect, that what had been done under the last Administration
was no rule for the present one. Merry acquiesced, and made his
calls. These pin-thrusts irritated him; but he was more seriously
inconvenienced by the sudden withdrawal of diplomatic privileges by the
Senate, although Vice-President Burr took occasion to explain that the
Senate’s action was quite unconnected with the President’s “canons of
etiquette,” and was in truth due to some indiscretion of Yrujo in the
House of Representatives.
Meanwhile the President took an unusual step. When two countries
were at war, neutral governments commonly refrained from inviting
the representative of one belligerent to meet the representative of
the other, unless on formal occasions where the entire diplomatic
body was invited, or in crowds where contact was not necessary. Still
more rarely were such incongruous guests invited to an entertainment
supposed to be given in honor of either individual. No one knew
this rule better than Jefferson, who had been himself four years in
diplomatic service at Paris, besides being three years Secretary
of State to President Washington at Philadelphia. He knew that the
last person whom Merry would care to meet was Pichon, the French
_chargé_; yet he not only invited Pichon, but pressed him to
attend. The Frenchman, aware that Merry was to be mortified by the
etiquette of the dinner, and watching with delight the process by which
Jefferson, day after day, took a higher tone toward England, wrote an
account of the affair to Talleyrand.[266] He said:--
“I was invited to this dinner. I had learned from the President
what was the matter (_ce qui en était_), when I went to
tell him that I was going for some days to Baltimore, where I
was called by the affairs of the frigate ‘La Poursuivante.’
The President was so obliging as to urge my return in order
to be present with Mme. Pichon at the dinner (_Le Président
eut l’honnêteté de me presser de revenir pour être au
diner_). I came back here, although business required a
longer stay at Baltimore. Apart from the reason of respect due
to the President, I had that of witnessing what might happen
(_j’avais celle de connaître ce qui se passerait_).”
Pichon accordingly hurried back from Baltimore, especially at the
President’s request, in order to have the pleasure of seeing Jefferson
humiliate his own guest in his own house.
Pichon was gratified by the result. At four o’clock on the afternoon of
Dec. 2, 1803, this curious party assembled at the White House,--Mr. and
Mrs. Merry, the Marquis Yrujo and his American wife, M. Pichon and his
American wife, Mr. and Mrs. Madison, and some other persons whose names
were not mentioned. When dinner was announced, the President offered
his hand to Mrs. Madison and took her to table, placing her on his
right. Mme. Yrujo took her seat on his left.
“Mrs. Merry was placed by Mr. Madison below the Spanish
minister, who sat next to Mrs. Madison. With respect to
me,” continued the British minister in his account of the
affair,[267] “I was proceeding to place myself, though without
invitation, next to the wife of the Spanish minister, when a
member of the House of Representatives passed quickly by me
and took the seat, without Mr. Jefferson’s using any means
to prevent it, or taking any care that I might be otherwise
placed....
“I will beg leave to intrude a moment longer on your Lordship’s
time,” continued Merry’s report, “by adding to this narrative
that among the persons (none of those who were of this country
were the principal officers of the government except Mr.
Madison) whom the President selected for a dinner which was
understood to be given to me, was M. Pichon the French _chargé
d’affaires_. I use the word _selected_, because it could
not be considered as a diplomatic dinner, since he omitted to
invite to it the Danish _chargé d’affaires_, who, with the
Spanish minister, form the whole body.”
Merry’s report was brief; but Yrujo, who also made an official report
to his Government, after mentioning the neglect shown to Merry before
dinner, added a remark that explained the situation more exactly:[268]--
“I observed immediately the impression that such a proceeding
of the President must have on Mr. and Mrs. Merry; and their
resentment could not but be increased at seeing the manifest,
and in my opinion studied, preference given by the President
throughout to me and my wife over him and Mrs. Merry.”
There the matter might have rested, had not Madison carried the new
“canons” beyond the point of endurance. December 6, four days after
the dinner at the White House, the British minister was to dine with
the Secretary of State. Pichon and Yrujo were again present, and all
the Cabinet with their wives. Yrujo’s report described the scene that
followed.
“I should observe,” said he, “that until then my wife and I
had enjoyed in the houses of Cabinet ministers the precedence
of which we had been deprived in the President’s house; but on
this day the Secretary of State too altered his custom, without
informing us beforehand of his resolution, and took to table
the wife of the Secretary of the Treasury. This unexpected
conduct produced at first some confusion, during which the wife
of the British minister was left without any one giving her his
hand, until her husband advanced, with visible indignation, and
himself took her to table.”
Even Pichon, though pleased to see the British minister humbled, felt
his diplomatic pride a little scandalized at this proceeding. He
admitted that it was an innovation, and added,--
“There is no doubt that Mr. Madison in this instance wished to
establish in his house the same formality as at the President’s,
in order to make Mr. Merry feel more keenly the scandal he had
made; but this incident increased it.”
The scandal which Merry had made consisted in saying that he believed
his treatment at the White House was a premeditated insult against his
country. Madison’s course took away any remaining doubt on the subject
in his mind. Merry became bitter. He wrote home informally:[269]--
“On this occasion, also, the _pas_ and the preference in
every respect was taken by, and given to, the wives of the
Secretaries of the Departments (a set of beings as little
without the manners as without the appearance of gentlewomen),
the foreign ministers and their wives being left to take care
of themselves. In short the latter are now placed here in a
situation so degrading to the countries they represent, and so
personally disagreeable to themselves, as to have become almost
intolerable. The case yesterday was so marked and so irritating
that I determined to hand Mrs. Merry myself to the table, and to
place ourselves wherever we might conveniently find seats.”
Merry then received an official explanation that Jefferson invariably
gave precedence to the wives of his Cabinet ministers, and that
he made no exceptions in favor of foreigners in his rule of
_pêle-mêle_.[270] Merry notified Lord Hawkesbury to that effect.
He did not fail to point out the signs which indicated to him that
these proceedings were but part of a general plan intended to press on
the British government. In truth, the whole issue lay in the question
whether that intent influenced Jefferson’s behavior.
A sort of civil war ensued in the little society of Washington, in
which the women took prominent part, and Mrs. Merry gave back with
interest the insults she considered herself to have received. The
first serious evil was an alliance between Merry and Yrujo, the two men
whom Jefferson had most interest in keeping apart. Pichon wrote home a
lively account of the hostilities that followed.[271]
“M. Yrujo, who is vanity itself, blew the flame more vigorously
than ever.... He concerted reprisals with Mr. Merry, and it
was agreed that whenever they should entertain the secretaries
and their wives, they should take none of them to table, but
should give their hands to their own wives. This resolution was
carried out at a dinner given some days afterward by M. Yrujo.
Mr. and Mrs. Merry were next invited by the Secretary of the
Navy. Mrs. Merry refused; yet this minister, a very well-bred
man (_homme fort poli_), had so arranged things as to give
her his hand. Apparently what had taken place at Mr. Madison’s
was thought harsh (_dur_), and it was wished to bring Mr.
and Mrs. Merry back to a reconciliation. The Cabinet took up the
question, as reported in the newspaper of which I sent you an
extract, and it was resolved that hereafter the President should
give his hand to the lady who might happen to be nearest him,
and that there should be no precedence. Mr. Merry was invited
to a tea by the Secretary of War and by the Secretary of the
Treasury. To avoid all discussion he wholly refused the first,
and after accepting the second he did not come. Finally, New
Year’s Day gave another occasion for scandal. On this day, as on
the Fourth of July, it is the custom to call upon the President;
and even the ladies go there. This year neither Mme. Yrujo nor
Mrs. Merry went, and the Marquis took care to answer every one
who inquired after his wife’s health, that she was perfectly
well. Since then Washington society is turned upside down; all
the women are to the last degree exasperated against Mrs. Merry;
the Federal newspapers have taken up the matter, and increased
the irritation by sarcasms on the Administration and by making
a burlesque of the facts which the Government has not thought
proper to correct. The arrival of M. Bonaparte with his wife in
the midst of all this explosion has furnished Mr. Merry with new
griefs. The President asked M. and Mme. Bonaparte to dinner, and
gave his hand to Madame. There was, however, this difference
between the two cases,--the President had invited on this day,
besides myself and Mme. Pichon, only the two Messrs. Smith and
their wives, who are of Mme. Bonaparte’s family. But when Mr.
Merry heard of it, he remarked that Mme. Bonaparte had on this
occasion taken precedence of the wife of the Secretary of the
Navy.... I am aware,” continued the delighted Pichon, “that with
tact on the part of Mr. Jefferson he might have avoided all
these scandals.”
The British minister wrote to Lord Hawkesbury a brief account of his
reception, closing with the remark:[272]--
“Under these circumstances, my Lord, I have thought it advisable
to avoid all occasions where I and my wife might be exposed to
a repetition of the same want of distinction toward us until I
shall have received authority from you to acquiesce in it, by a
signification of his Majesty’s pleasure to that effect.”
Accordingly, when the President invited the two ministers to dine
at the White House without their wives, they replied that they
could not accept the invitation until after receiving instructions
from their Governments. Jefferson regarded this concerted answer
as an insult.[273] He too lost his temper so far as to indulge in
sharp comments, and thought the matter important enough to call for
explanation. In a private letter to Monroe, dated Jan. 8, 1804, he
wrote:[274]--
“Mr. Merry is with us, and we believe him to be personally as
desirable a character as could have been sent us; but he is
unluckily associated with one of an opposite character in every
point. She has already disturbed our harmony extremely. He began
by claiming the first visit from the national ministers. He
corrected himself in this; but a pretension to take precedence
at dinner, etc., over all others is persevered in. We have told
him that the principle of society as well as of government with
us is the equality of the individuals composing it; that no
man here would come to a dinner where he was to be marked with
inferiority to any other; that we might as well attempt to force
our principle of equality at St. James’s as he his principle of
precedence here. I had been in the habit when I invited female
company (having no lady in my family) to ask one of the ladies
of the four Secretaries to come and take care of my company,
and as she was to do the honors of the table I handed her to
dinner myself. That Mr. Merry might not construe this as giving
them a precedence over Mrs. Merry I have discontinued it,
and here as in private houses the _pêle-mêle_ practice
is adhered to. They have got Yrujo to take a zealous part in
the claim of precedence. It has excited generally emotions of
great contempt and indignation (in which the members of the
Legislature participate sensibly) that the agents of foreign
nations should assume to dictate to us what shall be the laws
of our society. The consequence will be that Mr. and Mrs. Merry
will put themselves into Coventry, and that he will lose the
best half of his usefulness to his nation,--that derived from a
perfectly familiar and private intercourse with the Secretaries
and myself. The latter, be assured, is a virago, and in the
short course of a few weeks has established a degree of dislike
among all classes which one would have thought impossible in so
short a time.... With respect to Merry, he appears so reasonable
and good a man that I should be sorry to lose him as long as
there remains a possibility of reclaiming him to the exercise of
his own dispositions. If his wife perseveres she must eat her
soup at home, and we shall endeavor to draw him into society as
if she did not exist.”
Of all American hospitality none was so justly famous as that of
Virginia. In this State there was probably not a white man, or even a
negro slave, but would have resented the charge that he was capable
of asking a stranger, a foreigner, a woman, under his roof, with the
knowledge that he was about to inflict what the guest would feel as a
humiliation. Still less would he have selected his guest’s only enemy,
and urged him to be present for the purpose of witnessing the slight.
Reasons of state sometimes gave occasion for such practices, but
under the most favorable conditions the tactics were unsafe. Napoleon
in the height of his power insulted queens, browbeat ambassadors,
trampled on his ministers, and made his wife and servants tremble; but
although these manners could at his slightest hint be imitated by a
million soldiers, until Europe, from Cadiz to Moscow, cowered under
his multiplied brutality, the insults and outrages recoiled upon him
in the end. Jefferson could not afford to adopt Napoleonic habits. His
soldiers were three thousand in number, and his own training had not
been that of a successful general; he had seven frigates, and was eager
to lay them up in a single dry-dock. Peace was his passion.
To complicate this civil war in the little society of Washington,
Jerome Bonaparte appeared there, and brought with him his young wife,
Elizabeth Patterson, of Baltimore. Jerome married this beautiful girl
against the remonstrances of Pichon; but after the marriage took place,
not only Pichon, but also Yrujo and Jefferson, showed proper attention
to the First Consul’s brother, who had selected for his wife a niece of
the Secretary of the Navy, and of so influential a senator as General
Smith. Yet nothing irritated Napoleon more than Jerome’s marriage.
In some respects it was even more objectionable to him than that of
Lucien, which gave rise to a family feud. Pichon suspected what would
be the First Consul’s feelings, and wrote letter after letter to clear
himself of blame. In doing so he could not but excite Napoleon’s anger
against American society, and especially against the family of his new
sister-in-law.
“It appears, Citizen Minister,” wrote Pichon to Talleyrand,[275]
“that General Smith, who in spite of the contrary assurances he
has given me, has always had this alliance much at heart, has
thrown his eyes on the mission to Paris as a means of appeasing
(_ramener_) the First Consul. He has long since aimed
at the diplomatic career, for which he is little qualified;
this motive and the near return of Mr. Livingston have decided
his taste. For some time there has been much question of this
nomination among the friends of General Smith. There is also
question of promoting, on the part of the First Consul, for
minister to this country, a selection which should be connected
with the other. It is thought that the appointment of M. Jerome
Bonaparte would be an honorable mode of leaving the First
Consul’s brother time to have his fault forgotten, and of
preparing his return to favor.”
Such readiness among Jefferson’s advisers to court the favors of the
young First Consul was sure not to escape the eyes of the embittered
Federalists. Pichon’s account, although sharp in allusions to General
Smith’s “vanity,” was mild compared with the scorn of the New
Englanders. Apparently the new matrimonial alliance was taken seriously
by prominent Republican leaders. One of the Massachusetts senators
mentioned in his diary[276] a “curious conversation between S. Smith,
Breckenridge, Armstrong, and Baldwin, about ‘Smith’s nephew, the
First Consul’s brother.’ Smith swells upon it to very extraordinary
dimensions.” Pichon openly spoke of the whole family connection,
including both Robert and Samuel Smith, and even Wilson Cary Nicholas,
as possessed with “an inconceivable infatuation” for the match; “it was
really the young man who was seduced.” Nothing that Pichon could say
affected them. Senator J. Q. Adams remarked: “the Smiths are so elated
with their supposed elevation by this adventure, that one step more
would fit them for the discipline of Dr. Willis,”--the famous English
expert in mental diseases.[277]
The President and his friends might not know enough of Napoleon’s
character to foresee the irritation which such reports would create in
his mind, but they were aware of the contrast between their treatment
of Jerome Bonaparte and their slights to Anthony Merry. Had they felt
any doubt upon the subject, the free comments of the British minister
and his wife would have opened their eyes. In truth, no doubt existed.
Washington society was in a manner ordered to proscribe the Merrys and
Yrujo, and pay court to Jerome and the Smiths.
Had this been all, the matter would have ended in a personal quarrel
between the two envoys and the two Virginians, with which the public
would have had no concern. Jefferson’s “canons of etiquette” would in
such a case have had no further importance than as an anecdote of his
social habits. The seriousness of Jefferson’s experiments in etiquette
consisted in the belief that they were part of a political system
which involved a sudden change of policy toward two great Powers. The
“canons” were but the social expression of an altered feeling which
found its political expression in acts marked by equal disregard of
usage. The Spanish minister had already reason to know what he might
expect; for six weeks before Merry’s dinners John Randolph proclaimed
in the House that West Florida belonged to the United States, and
within the week that preceded Merry’s reception, he brought in the
Bill which authorized the President to annex Mobile. After such a
proceeding, no diplomatist would have doubted what meaning to put upon
the new code of Republican society. Merry’s arrival, at the instant of
this aggression upon Spain, was the signal for taking toward England a
higher tone.
Merry could not fail to see what lay before him. From the President,
notwithstanding heelless slippers and “canons of etiquette,” the
British minister heard none but friendly words. After the formal
ceremony of delivering the letter of credence was over,--
“He desired me to sit down,” wrote Merry,[278] “when we
conversed for some time on general affairs. The sentiments
which he expressed respecting those of Europe appeared very
properly to be by no means favorable to the spirit of ambition
and aggrandizement of the present ruler in France, or to the
personal character in any respect of the First Consul, and still
less so to his conduct toward all nations.”
From this subject the President passed to Spanish affairs and to the
Spanish protest against the Louisiana cession, founded on Bonaparte’s
pledge never to alienate that province.
“This circumstance,” continued Merry, “as well as the resistance
altogether which Spain had unexpectedly brought forward in
words, Mr. Jefferson considered as highly ridiculous, and as
showing a very pitiful conduct on her part, since she did
not appear to have taken any measures to support it either
by preparation of defence on the spot, or by sending there a
force to endeavor to prevent the occupation of the country by
the troops of the United States. He concluded by saying that
possession of it would, at all events, be taken.”
If Merry did not contrive, after his dinner at the White House, to
impart this conversation to his colleagues Yrujo and Pichon, he must
have been a man remarkably free from malice. Meanwhile he had his own
affairs to manage, and Madison was not so forbearing as the President.
Merry’s first despatch announced to his Government that Madison had
already raised his tone. Without delay the matter of impressments was
brought into prominence. The “pretended” blockade of Martinique and
Guadeloupe was also strongly characterized.
“It is proper for me to notice,” said Merry in his report of
these remonstrances,[279] “that Mr. Madison gave great weight to
them by renewing them on every occasion of my seeing him, and by
his expressing that they were matters upon which this Government
could not possibly be silent until a proper remedy for the evil
should be applied by his Majesty’s government. His observations
were, however, made with great temper, and accompanied with the
strongest assurances of the disposition of this Government to
conciliate, and to concur in whatever means could be devised
which should not be absolutely derogatory to their independence
and interests, to establish principles and rules which should be
satisfactory to both parties.... But, my Lord, while it is my
duty to do justice to Mr. Madison’s temperate and conciliatory
language, I must not omit to observe that it indicated strongly
a design on the part of this Government to avail themselves
of the present conjuncture by persisting steadily in their
demands of redress of their pretended grievances, in the hope of
obtaining a greater respect to their flag, and of establishing a
more convenient system of neutral navigation than the interests
of the British empire have hitherto allowed his Majesty to
concur in.”
The British government was aware that its so-called right of
impressment and its doctrine of blockade rested on force, and could not
be maintained against superior force; but this consciousness rendered
England only the more sensitive in regard to dangers that threatened
her supremacy. Knowing that the United States would be justified in
declaring war at any moment, Great Britain looked uneasily for the
first symptoms of retaliation. When Madison took so earnest a tone,
Merry might reasonably expect that his words would be followed by acts.
These shocks were not all that the new British minister was obliged to
meet at the threshold of his residence in Washington. At the moment
when he was, as he thought, socially maltreated, and when he was
told by Madison that America meant to insist on her neutral rights,
he learned that the Government did not intend to ratify Rufus King’s
boundary convention. The Senate held that the stipulations of its fifth
article respecting the Mississippi might embarrass the new territory
west of the river. King knew of the Louisiana cession when he signed
the treaty; but the Senate had its own views on the subject, and
under the lead of General Smith[280] preferred to follow them, as it
had done in regard to the second article of the treaty with France,
Sept. 30, 1800, and as it was about to do in regard to Pinckney’s
claims convention, Aug. 11, 1802, with Spain. Merry was surprised to
find that Madison, instead of explaining the grounds of the Senate’s
hesitation, or entering into discussion of the precise geographical
difficulty, contented himself with a bald statement of the fact. The
British minister thought that this was not the most courteous way
of dealing with a treaty negotiated after a full acquaintance with
all the circumstances, and he wrote to his Government to be on its
guard:[281]--
“Notwithstanding Mr. Madison’s assurances to the contrary, I
have some reason to suspect that ideas of encroachment on his
Majesty’s just rights are entertained by some persons who have a
voice in deciding upon the question of the ratification of this
convention, not to say that I have much occasion to observe,
from circumstances in general, that there exists here a strong
impression of the consequence which this country is supposed to
have acquired by the recent additions to the territory of the
United States, as well as by the actual situation of affairs in
Europe.”
In view of the Mobile Act, introduced into Congress by Randolph on
behalf of the government a week before this letter was written,
Merry’s suspicions could hardly be called unreasonable. A like stretch
of authority applied to the northwest territory would have produced
startling results.
Merry’s suspicions that some assault was to be made upon England were
strengthened when Madison, December 5, in pursuance of a call from the
Senate, sent a list of impressments reported to the Department during
the last year. According to this paper the whole number of impressments
was forty-six,--three of which were made by France and her allies;
while of the forty-three made by Great Britain twenty-seven of the
seamen were not American citizens. Of the entire number, twelve were
stated to have had American papers; and of the twelve, nearly half
were impressed on land within British jurisdiction. The grievance,
serious as it was, had not as yet reached proportions greater than
before the Peace of Amiens. Merry drew the inference that Jefferson’s
administration meant to adopt stronger measures than had hitherto been
thought necessary. He soon began to see the scope which the new policy
was to take.
Dec. 22, 1803, Madison opened in a formal conference the diplomatic
scheme which was the outcome of these preliminary movements.[282]
Beginning with a repetition of complaints in regard to impressments,
and dwelling upon the great irritation created by such arbitrary acts,
the secretary next remonstrated against the extent given to the law
of blockade by British cruisers in the West Indies, and at length
announced that the frequent repetition of these grievances had rendered
it necessary for the United States to take immediate steps to find a
remedy for them. Instructions would therefore be shortly sent to Monroe
at London to negotiate a new convention on these subjects. The American
government would wish that its flag should give complete protection to
whatever persons might be under it, excepting only military enemies of
the belligerent. Further, it would propose that the right of visiting
ships at sea should be restrained; that the right of blockade should be
more strictly defined, and American ships be allowed, in consideration
of the distance, to clear for blockaded ports on the chance of the
blockade being removed before they arrived; and finally that the direct
trade between the West Indies and Europe should be thrown open to
American commerce without requiring it to pass through a port of the
United States.
In return Madison offered to the British government the unconditional
surrender of deserters by sea and land, together with certain
precautions against the smuggling of articles contraband of war.
Although Madison pressed the necessity of an immediate understanding
on these points, he did so in his usual temperate and conciliatory
manner; while Merry frankly avowed that he could give no hopes of such
propositions being listened to. He did this the more decisively because
Congress seemed about to take the matter of impressments into its own
hands, and was already debating a Bill for the protection of seamen by
measures which tended to hostilities. Madison disavowed responsibility
for the legislation, although he defended it in principle.[283] Merry
contented himself for the time by saying that if the United States
government sought their remedy in municipal law, the matter would
immediately cease to be a subject of negotiation.
Thus, in one short month, the two governments were brought to what
the British minister supposed to be the verge of rupture. That any
government should take so well-considered a position without meaning
to support it by acts, was not probable. Acts of some kind, more or
less hostile in their nature, were certainly intended by the United
States government in case Great Britain should persist in contempt for
neutral rights; the sudden change of tone at Washington left no doubt
on this point. Edward Thornton, who had not yet been transferred to
another post, wrote in consternation to the Foreign Office, fearing
that blame might be attached to his own conduct while in charge of the
legation:[284]--
“When I compare the complexion of Mr. Merry’s correspondence
with that of my own, particularly during the course of the
last summer, before the intelligence of the Louisiana purchase
reached this country, I can scarcely credit the testimony of my
own senses in examining the turn which affairs have taken, and
the manifest ill-will discovered toward us by the Government
at the present moment.... I believe that the simple truth of
the case is, after all, the circumstance ... that a real change
has taken place in the views of this Government, which may be
dated from the first arrival of the intelligence relative to
the Louisiana purchase, and which has since derived additional
force and acrimony from the opinion that Great Britain cannot
resist, under her present pressure, the new claims of the United
States, and now, from the necessity they are under of recurring
to the influence of France in order to support their demands
against Spain.... The cession of Louisiana, notwithstanding
that the circumstances under which it was made ought to
convince the vainest of men that he was not the sole agent in
the transaction, has elevated the President beyond imagination
in his own opinion; and I have no doubt that he thinks of
securing himself at the next election by having to boast of
concessions and advantages derived from us, similar to those he
has gained from France,--that is, great in appearance, and at a
comparatively insignificant expense.”
From such premises, the conclusion, so far as concerned England, was
inevitable; and Thornton agreed with Merry in affirming it without
reserve:--
“Everything, as it relates to this government, now depends on
our firmness. If we yield an iota without a real and perfect
equivalent (not such imaginary equivalents as Mr. Madison
mentions to Mr. Merry), we are lost.”