Whatever objects the President and the Secretary of State may have
expected to gain by their change of tone in the winter of 1803–1804
toward Spain and England, they must have been strangely free from human
passions if they were unconscious of making at least two personal
enemies upon whose ill-will they might count. If they were unaware
of giving their victims cause for bitterness,--or if, as seemed
more probable, they were indifferent to it,--the frequent chances
of retaliation which the two ministers enjoyed soon showed that in
diplomacy revenge was not only sweet but easy. Even the vehement
Spanish hatred felt by Yrujo for Madison fell short of the patient
Anglo-Saxon antipathy rooted in the minds of the British minister and
his wife. When Yrujo, in March, 1804, burst into the State Department
with the Mobile Act in his hand and denounced Madison to his face as
party to an “infamous libel,” he succeeded in greatly annoying the
secretary without violating Jefferson’s “canons of etiquette.” Under
the code of republican manners which the President and his secretary
had introduced, they could not fairly object to anything which Yrujo
might choose to say or do. Absolute equality and “the rule of
_pêle-mêle_” reached their natural conclusion between such hosts
and guests in freedom of language and vehemence of passion. What might
have been Merry’s feelings or conduct had he met with more cordiality
and courtesy was uncertain; but the mortifications of his first month
at Washington embittered his temper, and left distinct marks of
acrimony in the diplomacy of America and England, until war wiped out
the memory of reciprocal annoyances. The Spaniard’s enmity was already
a peril to Madison’s ambition, and one which became more threatening
every day; but the Englishman’s steady resentment was perhaps more
mischievous, if less noisy. The first effect of Jefferson’s tactics
was to ally the British minister with Yrujo; the second bound him
to Senator Pickering and Representative Griswold; the third united
his fortunes with those of Aaron Burr. Merry entered the path of
secret conspiracy; he became the confidant of all the intriguers in
Washington, and gave to their intrigues the support of his official
influence.
The Federalists worked mischievously to widen the breach between the
British minister and the President. They encouraged Merry’s resentment.
Late in January, nearly two months after the first _pêle-mêle_,
Madison officially informed Merry for the first time that the President
meant to recognize no precedence between foreign ministers, but that
all, even including secretaries of legation in charge, were to be
treated with perfect equality, or what Madison termed “a complete
pell-mell,” and would be received, even at their first audience, with
no more ceremony than was practised toward any other individual. Merry
replied that this notice should have been given to him on his arrival,
and that he could not acquiesce in it without instructions. He then
wrote to his Government,[285]--
“I have now but too much reason to fear, what I did not at
first suspect, that the marked inattention toward me of the
present Administration of this country has been a part of their
unfriendly disposition toward his Majesty and toward the nation
which I have the honor to represent.”
At the same moment, in January and February, 1804, Pickering and
Griswold were plotting their New England confederacy. Merry was taken
by them into the secret, and gave them aid. The Senate, February
9, voted to strike out the fifth article of Rufus King’s boundary
convention, and to approve the other articles, which provided for
fixing the disputed boundary-line of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
Merry wrote to his Government that the object of cancelling the fifth
article was to deprive Great Britain of her treaty-right to navigate
the Mississippi:[286]--
“It is hardly necessary for me to point out to your Lordship
that the other articles of the convention are of great
importance to the Eastern States of America, which are much
interested in the immediate settlement of the eastern boundary.
I am led to believe from the language of some of the members of
this State [Massachusetts] that their anxiety on this head is so
great that the rejection of those articles by his Majesty would,
as having been occasioned by the exclusion on the part of this
government of the fifth article, prove to be a great exciting
cause to them to go forward rapidly in the steps which they have
already commenced toward a separation from the Southern part of
the Union. The members of the Senate have availed themselves of
the opportunity of their being collected here to hold private
meetings on this subject, and I learn from them that their
plans and calculations respecting the event have been long
seriously resolved. They think that whenever it shall take place
it will happen suddenly, yet with quietness and the universal
concurrence of the people. Although it does not appear to be
their opinion that any external secret agency would accelerate
the moment, they naturally look forward to Great Britain for
support and assistance whenever the occasion shall arrive.”
As the summer of 1804 came on, Merry’s despatches grew more sombre.
He reported that at Norfolk twelve British ships were detained at one
time in consequence of the desertion of their seamen, several of whom
had entered the United States service on the frigates which were under
orders for Tripoli. Six British seamen having deserted at Charleston
and re-enlisted in the same way, Merry remonstrated. He was told that
the seamen, having voluntarily enlisted in the United States service,
could not be restored, because the British government never restored
American seamen who had voluntarily enlisted. Merry could only reply
that the British government did not knowingly enlist deserters. On the
other hand, Madison remonstrated in “high language,” “accompanied even
with some degree of menace,” against the conduct of Captain Bradley
of the frigate “Cambrian,” one of the British squadron cruising off
Sandy Hook, for taking a British seaman out of a British vessel within
American jurisdiction. Merry added that in contrast to this strictness
toward England the authorities had allowed the officers of the French
frigate “La Poursuivante,” at Baltimore, to send armed parties on shore
at night for the purpose of seizing French seamen, one of whom they had
actually taken by force from a Spanish vessel lying at the wharf.
“From this government having brought into such serious
discussion objects which would certainly have passed unnoticed
had they occurred in relation to the King’s enemies, his
Majesty’s ministers may be led to suspect that such a resolution
has been dictated by some hostile design,” wrote Merry, with
increasing solemnity; “but it is proper for me to observe that
... I cannot persuade myself that they will dare to provoke
hostilities with his Majesty, at least before Mr. Jefferson’s
re-election to the Presidency shall have taken place.”[287]
Merry made a representation to Madison on impressments; but his
arguments did not satisfy the secretary. “This specimen of Merry shows
him to be a mere diplomatic pettifogger,” wrote Madison privately to
the President.[288]
Merry’s temper was in this stage of ever-increasing irritability, when
an event occurred which gave him, as it seemed, a chance to gratify his
resentments. After the adjournment of Congress in March the British
minister heard nothing from Pickering and Griswold. Early in June he
wrote home that the democrats were carrying all the elections:[289]--
“In addition to this triumph of the reigning party, there
have lately appeared in the prints of this country, which
are generally made the instruments of the measures of all
parties, publications of the discovery that has been made of
secret meetings held at this place by some of the Federal
members during the last sitting of Congress for the purpose of
consulting upon the important point of the separation of the
Eastern from the Southern States, which publications seem to
have imposed a complete silence upon the Federal adherents.”
A few weeks afterward, July 11, occurred the duel between Burr
and Hamilton. Merry had no relations with Hamilton, and felt no
peculiar interest in his fate; but he had become intimate with Burr
at Washington, and watched his career with the curiosity which was
the natural result of their common hatred of Jefferson. July 21 Burr
fled from New York, and a few days afterward reached Philadelphia,
where Merry was passing the summer. While there, Burr sent one of
his friends--an Englishman named Williamson--to the British minister
with a startling message, which Merry immediately transmitted to his
Government:[290]--
“I have just received an offer from Mr. Burr, the actual
Vice-President of the United States (which situation he is
about to resign), to lend his assistance to his Majesty’s
government in any manner in which they may think fit to employ
him, particularly in endeavoring to effect a separation of the
western part of the United States from that which lies between
the Atlantic and the mountains, in its whole extent. His
proposition on this and other subjects will be fully detailed to
your Lordship by Colonel Williamson, who has been the bearer of
them to me, and who will embark for England in a few days. It
is therefore only necessary for me to add that if after what is
generally known of the profligacy of Mr. Burr’s character, his
Majesty’s minister should think proper to listen to his offer,
his present situation in this country, where he is now cast off
as much by the democratic as by the Federal party, and where he
still preserves connections with some people of influence, added
to his great ambition and spirit of revenge against the present
Administration, may possibly induce him to exert the talents and
activity which he possesses with fidelity to his employers.”
Meanwhile a change of ministry occurred in England. Pitt returned
to power, representing a state of feeling toward America very
different from that which prevailed under the mild rule of Addington.
Subordinates were quick to feel such changes in the temper of their
superiors. Every British officer knew that henceforth he had behind him
an energetic government, which required vigorous action in maintaining
what it claimed as British rights. Merry felt the new impulse like the
rest; but Pitt’s return acted most seriously on the naval service.
After the renewal of the war in May, 1803, a small British squadron
cruised off Sandy Hook, keeping a sharp look-out for French frigates
in New York Harbor, and searching every merchant-vessel for enemy’s
property. During the summer of 1804 this annoyance became steadily
greater, until the port of New York was almost blockaded, and every
vessel that sailed out or in was liable not only to be stopped and
searched, but to lose some part of its crew by impressment. The British
ministry did indeed instantly recall Captain Bradley of the “Cambrian”
for violating American jurisdiction, and gave strict orders for the
lenient exercise of belligerent rights; but all the more it showed the
intention of insisting upon the submission of America to such rules as
England should prescribe. The President, already in trouble with Spain,
began to feel the double peril; but Congress pressed him forward, and
even while busy with the trial of Judge Chase it found time for two
measures which greatly disturbed the British envoy.
The first of these measures was an “Act for the more effectual
preservation of peace in the ports and harbors of the United States.”
Under this law any United States marshal, on the warrant of any
United States judge, was bound to board any British or other foreign
ship-of-war lying in American waters, and seize every person charged
with having violated the peace. If the marshal should be resisted, or
if surrender was not made, he must call in the military power, and
compel surrender by force of arms. If death should ensue, he should
be held blameless; but the resisting party should be punished as for
felonious homicide. Further, the President was authorized to interdict
at will the ports of the United States to all or any armed vessels of a
foreign nation; and to arrest and indict any foreign officer who should
come within the jurisdiction after committing on the high seas “any
trespass or tort, or any spoliation, on board any vessel of the United
States, or any unlawful interruption or vexation of trading-vessels
actually coming to or going from the United States.”
Such laws were commonly understood in diplomacy as removing the
subject in question from the field of negotiation, preliminary to
reprisals and war. The Act was passed with little debate in the last
hours of the session, in the midst of the confusion which followed the
acquittal of Judge Chase. Merry immediately called on the Secretary of
State, and asked him for some assurance that might serve to quiet the
apprehensions which his Government would feel on reading the Act.[291]
Madison could give none, except that the President would probably not
exercise for the present his discretionary powers. As for the words,
“any trespass or tort,” Madison frankly avowed “he could not but
confess they were meant to imply the impressment of any individual
whatsoever from on board an American vessel, the exercise of which
pretended right on the part of his Majesty’s officers was a matter,
he said, which the sense of the people at large would never allow the
government of this country to acquiesce in.”
To this announcement Merry replied in substance that the right was
one which would certainly never be abandoned by his Government; and
there the matter rested at the close of Jefferson’s first term.
Madison assured the British minister that the authority granted to the
President by Congress over foreign ships of war in American waters
would not at present be enforced. He went even a step further toward
conciliation. The Legislature of Virginia was induced quietly to
modify the Act which had hitherto offered so much encouragement to the
desertion of British seamen.[292]
The second threatening measure was a Resolution of the Senate, March 2,
1805, calling upon the Secretary of State for such Acts of the British
Parliament as imposed heavier duties on the exportation of merchandise
to the United States than on similar goods exported to the nations of
Europe. Such an export duty upon merchandise for the United States and
the West Indies had in fact been imposed by Parliament some two years
before; and this Resolution foreshadowed some commercial retaliation by
Congress.
While sending to his Government these warnings to expect from
Jefferson’s second administration a degree of hostility more active
than from the first, Merry suggested means of giving the United States
occupation that should induce them to leave England alone. A new
element of conspiracy disclosed itself to the British minister.
Under the Louisiana treaty of cession, the United States government
had promised that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be
incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as
possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to
the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens
of the United States.” This pledge had been broken. The usual display
of casuistry had been made to prove that the infraction of treaty was
no infraction at all; but the more outspoken Republicans avowed, as has
been already shown, that the people of Louisiana could not be trusted,
or in the commoner phrase that they were unfit for self-government, and
must be treated as a conquered race until they learned to consider
themselves American citizens.
The people of New Orleans finding themselves in a position of
dependence, which, owing chiefly to their hatred of Governor Claiborne,
seemed more irritating than their old Spanish servitude, sent three
representatives to Washington to urge upon Congress the duty of
executing the treaty. Messieurs Sauvé, Derbigny, and Destréhan
accordingly appeared at Washington, and in December, 1804, presented
a remonstrance so strong that Government was greatly embarrassed to
deal with it.[293] Any reply that should repudiate either the treaty
obligation or the principles of American liberty and self-government
was out of the question; any reply that should affirm either the one or
the other was fatal to the system established by Congress in Louisiana.
John Randolph, on whose shoulders the duty fell, made a report on the
subject. “It is only under the torture,” said he, “that this article
of the treaty of Paris can be made to speak the language ascribed to
it by the memorialists;” but after explaining in his own way what the
article did not mean, he surprised his audience by admitting in effect
that the law of the last session was repugnant to the Constitution,
and that the people of Louisiana had a right to self-government.[294]
Senator Giles said in private that Randolph’s report was “a perfect
transcript of Randolph’s own character; it began by setting the claims
of the Louisianians at defiance, and concluded with a proposal to give
them more than they asked.”[295]
Under these influences the three delegates from the creole society
succeeded in getting, not what they asked, but a general admission that
the people of Louisiana had political rights, which Congress recognized
by an Act, approved March 2, 1805, to the extent of allowing them
to elect a General Assembly of twenty-five representatives, and of
promising them admission into the Union whenever their free inhabitants
should reach the number of sixty thousand. Considering that the people
of Louisiana were supposed to be entitled to “_all_ the rights,
advantages, and immunities of citizens,” Messieurs Sauvé, Derbigny, and
Destréhan thought the concession too small, and expressed themselves
strongly on the subject. Naturally the British minister, as well as
other ill-affected persons at Washington, listened eagerly to the
discontent which promised to breed hostility to the Union.
“The deputies above mentioned,” wrote Merry to his
Government,[296] “who while they had any hopes of obtaining the
redress of their grievances had carefully avoided giving any
umbrage or jealousy to the Government by visiting or holding any
intercourse with the agents of foreign Powers at this place,
when they found that their fate was decided, although the law
had not as yet passed, no longer abstained from communicating
with those agents, nor from expressing very publicly the great
dissatisfaction which the law would occasion among their
constituents,--going even so far as to say that it would not be
tolerated, and that they would be obliged to seek redress from
some other quarter; while they observed that the opportunity
they had had of obtaining a correct knowledge of the state
of things in this country, and of witnessing the proceedings
of Congress, afforded them no confidence in the stability of
the Union, and furnished them with such strong motives to be
dissatisfied with the form and mode of government as to make
them regret extremely the connection which they had been forced
into with it. These sentiments they continued to express till
the moment of their departure from hence, which took place the
day after the close of the session.”
Another man watched the attitude of the three delegates with extreme
interest. Aaron Burr, March 4, 1805, ceased to hold the office of
Vice-president. Since the previous August he had awaited the report
of his friend Colonel Williamson, who entered into conferences with
members of the British ministry, hoping to gain their support for
Burr’s plan of creating a Western Confederacy in the Valley of the
Ohio. No sooner was Burr out of office than he went to Merry with new
communications, which Merry hastened to send to his Government in a
despatch marked “Most secret” in triplicate.[297]
“Mr. Burr (with whom I know that the deputies became very
intimate during their residence here) has mentioned to me
that the inhabitants of Louisiana seem determined to render
themselves independent of the United States, and that the
execution of their design is only delayed by the difficulty of
obtaining previously an assurance of protection and assistance
from some foreign Power, and of concerting and connecting their
independence with that of the inhabitants of the western parts
of the United States, who must always have a command over them
by the rivers which communicate with the Mississippi. It is
clear that Mr. Burr (although he has not as yet confided to me
the exact nature and extent of his plan) means to endeavor to be
the instrument of effecting such a connection.”
For this purpose Burr asked the aid of the British government, and
defined the nature of the assistance he should need,--a British
squadron at the mouth of the Mississippi, and a loan of half a million
dollars.
“I have only to add that if a strict confidence could be placed
in him, he certainly possesses, perhaps in a much greater degree
than any other individual in this country, all the talents,
energy, intrepidity, and firmness which are required for such an
enterprise.”
Pending an answer to this proposal, Burr was to visit New Orleans and
make himself the head of creole disaffection.
Merry was launched into the full tide of conspiracy. At the close of
Jefferson’s first term he saw reason to hope that he might soon repay
with interest the debt of personal and political annoyance which he
owed. While Yrujo was actively engaged in bringing upon Madison the
anger of Spain and France, Merry endeavored to draw his Government into
a system of open and secret reprisals upon the President.
That the new French minister was little better disposed than Merry
and Yrujo has been already shown; but his causes for ill-will were
of a different and less personal nature. Before Turreau’s arrival at
Washington in November, 1804, Pichon in one of his last despatches
declared that Jefferson had already alienated every foreign Power whose
enmity could be dangerous to the United States.
“The state of foreign relations offers a perspective which
must put Mr. Jefferson’s character to proof,” Pichon wrote to
Talleyrand in September, 1804.[298] “The United States find
themselves compromised and at odds with France, England, and
Spain at the same time. This state of things is in great part
due to the indecision of the President, and to the policy
which leads him to sacrifice everything for the sake of his
popularity.”
The complaint was common to all French ministers in the United States,
and meant little more than that all Presidents and policies displeased
them by stopping short of war on England, which was the object of
French diplomacy; but this letter also showed that in Pichon’s eyes the
President had no friends. When Turreau arrived, a few weeks afterward,
he quickly intimated that the President need expect from him not even
such sentimental sympathy as had been so kindly given by Pichon.
At the same moment it was noticed that Jefferson changed his style of
dress. “He has improved much in the article of dress,” wrote Senator
Plumer in December, 1804;[299] “he has laid aside the old slippers,
red waistcoat, and soiled corduroy small-clothes, and was dressed
all in black, with clean linen and powdered hair.” Apparently the
President had profited by the criticisms of the British minister, and
was willing to avoid similar comments from the new French envoy; but he
supposed that the Frenchman would show equal civility, and assume an
equally republican style. He was mistaken. November 23, undisturbed by
Merry’s experience, Turreau presented himself at his first audience in
full regimentals, and with so much gold lace that Jefferson was half
inclined to resent it as an impertinence.[300] Turreau next refused to
meet Merry at dinner. He followed up these demonstrations by embracing
the cause of Yrujo, and ridiculing Madison to his face. He began by
warning his Government that “these people have been thoroughly spoiled;
it is time to put them back into their place.”[301]
Turreau became intimate with the deputies from Louisiana, and notified
Talleyrand that a separation of the western country from the Union was
universally expected. Already, within three months of his arrival, he
put his finger on the men who were to accomplish it.[302] Destréhan, he
said, was a man of high merit; “but being only moderately ambitious,
and head of a numerous family,--having acquired, too, a great personal
esteem,--he is not likely to become the principal mover in innovations
which are always dangerous without a combination of evidently favorable
chances. It is still less likely that he will ever be the instrument
of strangers who should seek to excite troubles for their personal
advantage.” As for Sauvé, much inferior to his colleague in abilities,
he would be guided by Destréhan’s influence. Derbigny was different.
“Young still, with wit, ready expression, and French manners, I believe
him to be greedy of fortune and fame; I suspect that every _rôle_
will suit him, in order to acquire the one or the other; but there are
men of more importance whom circumstances are taking to Louisiana.”
Then Turreau, for the information of Talleyrand, drew a portrait of the
military commander of Upper Louisiana, who had his headquarters at St.
Louis, and whose influence on future events was to be watched.
“General Wilkinson is forty-eight years of age. He has an
amiable exterior. Though said to be well-informed in civil and
political matters, his military capacity is small. Ambitious
and easily dazzled, fond of show and appearances, he complains
rather indiscreetly, and especially after dinner, of the
form of his government, which leaves officers few chances of
fortune, advancement, and glory, and which does not pay its
military chiefs enough to support a proper style. He listened
with pleasure, or rather with enthusiasm, to the details which
I gave him in regard to the organization, the dress, and the
force of the French army. My uniform, the order with which I am
decorated, are objects of envy to him; and he seems to hold to
the American service only because he can do no better. General
Wilkinson is the most intimate friend, or rather the most
devoted creature, of Colonel Burr.”
Talleyrand had become acquainted with Burr in the United States,
and needed no warnings against him; but Turreau showed himself
well-informed:
“Mr. Burr’s career is generally looked upon as finished; but he
is far from sharing that opinion, and I believe he would rather
sacrifice the interests of his country than renounce celebrity
and fortune. Although Louisiana is still only a Territory,
it has obtained the right of sending a delegate to Congress.
Louisiana is therefore to become the theatre of Mr. Burr’s
new intrigues; he is going there under the ægis of General
Wilkinson.”
Perhaps Turreau received this information from Derbigny, which might
account for his estimate of the young man. Certainly Derbigny knew all
that Turreau reported, for in an affidavit[303] two years afterward he
admitted his knowledge.
“In the winter of 1804–1805,” Derbigny made oath, “being
then at Washington City in the capacity of a deputy from the
inhabitants of Louisiana to Congress, jointly with Messrs.
Destréhan and Sauvé, he was introduced to Colonel Burr, then
Vice-president of the United States, by General Wilkinson,
who strongly recommended to this deponent, and as he believes
to his colleagues, to cultivate the acquaintance of Colonel
Burr,--whom he used to call ‘the first gentleman in America,’
telling them that he was a man of the most eminent talents both
as a politician and as a military character; and ... General
Wilkinson told him several times that Colonel Burr, so soon as
his Vice-presidency would be at an end, would go to Louisiana,
where he had certain projects, adding that he was such a man as
to succeed in anything he would undertake, and inviting this
deponent to give him all the information in his power respecting
that country; which mysterious hints appeared to this deponent
very extraordinary, though he could not then understand them.”
What Derbigny in 1807 professed not to have understood, seemed
in 1804 clear to Turreau and Merry as well as to others. Turreau
closed his catalogue by the significant remark: “I am not the only
person who thinks that the assemblage of such men in a country
already discontented is enough to give rise to serious troubles
there.” The treasonable plans of Burr and Wilkinson were a matter
of common notoriety, and roused anxious comment even in the mind of
John Randolph, who was nursing at home the mortification of Judge
Chase’s acquittal.[304] Randolph complained of “the easy credulity
of Mr. Jefferson’s temper,” which made the President a fit material
for intriguers to work upon. Certainly at the close of his first
administration Jefferson seemed surrounded by enemies. The New England
Federalists, the Louisiana creoles, Burr and his crew of adventurers
in every part of the Union, joined hands with the ministers of England
and Spain to make a hostile circle round the President; while the
minister of France looked on without a wish to save the government
whose friendship Bonaparte had sought to obtain at the cost of the
most valuable province and the most splendid traditions of the French
people.