FEBRUARY 4, 1801, one month before the inauguration of President
Jefferson, Pitt suddenly retired from office, and was succeeded by
a weak ministry, in which Mr. Addington, afterward Lord Sidmouth,
took the post vacated by Pitt. No event could have been happier for
the prospects of President Jefferson, who might fairly count upon
Addington’s weakness to prevent his interference in American affairs.
Knowing himself to be universally regarded as the friend and admirer
of France, Jefferson was the more anxious not to be classed by the
British government among the enemies of England. Even before he was
inaugurated, he took occasion to request Edward Thornton, the British
_chargé_,--
“With great earnestness, to assure his Majesty’s government
that it should experience during his administration as cordial
and sincere acts of friendship as had ever been received under
that of his predecessors. I am aware,” said the President elect,
“that I have been represented as hostile to Great Britain; but
this has been done only for electioneering purposes, and I hope
henceforward such language will be used no longer. I can appeal
to all my past conduct that in everything in which I have
been engaged relatively to England, I have always been guided
by a liberal policy. I wish to be at the head of affairs no
longer than while I am influenced by such sentiments of equal
liberality toward all nations. There is nothing to which I have
a greater repugnance than to establish distinctions in favor of
one nation against another.”
The day after his inauguration he returned to the subject:--
“There is nothing I have more, or I may say so much, at heart as
to adjust happily all differences between us, and to cultivate
the most cordial harmony and good understanding. The English
government is too just, I am persuaded, to regard newspaper
trash, and the assertions contained in them that I am a creature
of France and an enemy of Great Britain. For _republican_
France I may have felt some interest; but that is long over; and
there is assuredly nothing in the present government of that
country which could naturally incline me to show the smallest
undue partiality to it at the expense of Great Britain, or
indeed of any other country.”[240]
Thornton felt no great confidence in the new President’s protests, and
thought it possible that Jefferson had “on this, as he seems to have
done on many late public occasions, taxed his imagination to supply
the deficiency of his feelings.” All Englishmen were attached to the
Federalist and New England interest; they could not understand that
Virginia should be a safer friend than Massachusetts. Yet in truth
Jefferson never was more serious than when he made these professions.
The Southern republicans had nothing to gain from a quarrel with
England; they neither wished for Canada, nor aspired to create shipping
or manufactures: their chief antagonist was not England, but Spain. The
only Power which could seriously injure them was Great Britain; and the
only injury they could inflict in return was by conquering Canada for
the benefit of Northern influence, or by building up manufactures which
they disliked, or by cutting off their own markets for tobacco and
cotton. Nothing warranted a belief that men like Jefferson, Madison,
and Gallatin would ever seek a quarrel with England.
The British Ministry soon laid aside any doubts they might have felt on
the subject. Lord Grenville, who retired with Pitt, was succeeded as
Foreign Secretary by Lord Hawkesbury, afterward better known as Lord
Liverpool. The new Ministry negotiated for peace with Bonaparte. Oct.
1, 1801, the preliminaries were signed, and the world found itself
again in a sort of repose, broken only by the bloody doings at St.
Domingo and Guadeloupe. England returned, like France and Spain, to the
rigor of the colonial system. The customs entries of New York, Boston,
and Philadelphia rapidly diminished in number; American shipping
declined; but Madison was relieved from the burden of belligerent
disputes, which had been the chief anxiety of his predecessors in the
State Department.
Yet peace did not put an end to all difficulties. Rufus King continued
to negotiate in London in regard to the outstanding British debts,
twice recognized by treaty, yet still unpaid by the United States;
in regard to the boundary of Maine and that of the extreme northwest
territory at the source of the Mississippi; and finally, in regard to
impressments; while Edward Thornton at Washington complained that, in
spite of peace and the decline of American shipping, encouragement was
still offered to the desertion of British seamen in every port of the
United States,--in fact that this means was systematically used to
prevent British shipping from entering American ports in competition
with the shipping of America. When Madison alleged that the national
government had no share in such unfriendly conduct, Thornton thrust
under his eyes the law of Virginia,--a law enacted by President
Jefferson’s political friends in his political interests,--which
forbade, under penalty of death, any magistrate of Virginia to be
instrumental in surrendering deserters or criminals, even in cases
where they were bound by treaty to do so. Madison could not deny that
this legislation was contrary to a treaty right which the United
States government was bound to enforce. He admitted that American
shipmasters and consuls in British ports habitually asked the benefit
of the British law, and received it; but he could hold out only a
remote hope that mutual legislation might solve the difficulty by
applying the merchant-seamen laws of the two countries reciprocally.
In conversation with Thornton he lamented, with every appearance of
sincerity and candor, the deficiency of the existing laws, and did not
dispute that Great Britain could hardly be blamed for refusing the
surrender of seamen on her side; but when Thornton asked him to order
the return of a man who under aggravated circumstances had deserted
from the British ship-of-war “Andromache” in the port of Norfolk, and
had been immediately engaged on the United States revenue cutter there,
Madison replied in a note coldly reiterating the fact, with which both
parties were already acquainted, that neither the law of nations nor
the provisions of any treaty enjoined the mutual restitution of seamen.
This recognized formula, under which governments commonly express a
refusal to act, was understood by Thornton as equivalent to an avowal
that the new Administration, controlled by Virginians, would not
venture, even in the future emergency of a demand for extradition under
treaty, to risk the displeasure of Virginia.[241] Desertion, therefore,
received no discouragement from the United States government; on the
contrary, deserters, known to be such, were received at once into the
national service, and their surrender refused. Under such circumstances
the British government was not likely to be more accommodating than the
American.
As the summer of 1802 approached, President Jefferson drew into closer
and more confidential relations with Thornton. During the Federalist
rule the two countries were never on more affectionate terms. At
London Rufus King and Christopher Gore received courteous attention
from Lord Hawkesbury. At Washington, Thornton’s intimacy at the
White House roused the jealousy and alarm of Pichon. As Bonaparte’s
projects against Louisiana disclosed themselves, and as Leclerc’s
first successes at St. Domingo opened the French path to New Orleans,
Jefferson began to pay sudden and almost eager court to Thornton,
who was a little embarrassed by the freedom with which the President
denounced the First Consul. The preliminary articles of peace between
France and England had been signed Oct. 1, 1801; but the treaty of
Amiens, which made these articles definitive, was signed only March
25, 1802. Addington was naturally anxious that the peace should be
maintained; indeed, no one could doubt that the existence of his
Ministry depended on maintaining it. Thornton had no instructions which
warranted him in intriguing against the First Consul, or in making
preparations for a new war; and yet hardly was the treaty of Amiens
made public, when President Jefferson began to talk as though England
were still at war, and it were only a question of time when the United
States must become her ally. The Louisiana question excited him. In
April he wrote his letters to Dupont and Livingston. At about the same
time he took Thornton into his confidence.
“I have had many occasions since it was first started,” wrote
Thornton,[242] “of conversing freely with Mr. Jefferson on this
topic, which is indeed peculiarly interesting to him, and his
reflections on which he utters with perhaps too little caution
to persons who are not disposed to think very favorably of any
change of sentiments with respect to France. He not only regards
the cession of Louisiana and New Orleans as a certain cause of
future war between the two countries, but makes no scruple to
say that if the force of the United States should be unable to
expel the French from those settlements, they must have recourse
to the assistance of other Powers, meaning unquestionably Great
Britain. With regard to France and the person who is at the
head of its government, whether in consequence of the projected
cession of Louisiana or of the little account which seems to
be made of the United States as well at Paris as by French
officers in other parts of the world, Mr. Jefferson speaks in
very unqualified terms of the usurpation of Bonaparte, of the
arbitrary nature and spirit of his government, of his love of
flattery and vain pomp,--features, according to Mr. Jefferson,
which indicate the frivolous character of his mind rather than
a condescension to the taste of the French people. The presses
in America devoted to the President’s Administration make use of
the same language; and without pretending to say that this party
is cured of its bitterness against Great Britain, I can safely
venture to assure your Lordship that its predilection for France
scarcely exists even in name.”
After the stoppage of the _entrepôt_ at New Orleans, when public
opinion seemed intent on driving Jefferson into the war with France
which he had predicted, Thornton found himself and his government in
favor at Washington. The Republicans were even better disposed than
the Federalists. Jefferson was willing to abolish between England and
America the discriminating duties on shipping which the New England
Federalists had imposed, and which they still wished to maintain for
use in the disputed West Indian trade. He told Thornton that he could
no doubt carry the repeal of these countervailing duties through
Congress over the heads of the opposition,[243] “but he wished it to
be adopted in consequence of their own conviction, rather than by a
contrary conduct to afford them the least ground for asserting that
the Southern States were carrying into execution their scheme of
ruin against the navigation and commerce of their Eastern brethren.”
Jefferson was rapidly becoming the friend and confidant of England.
Thornton, naturally delighted with his own success, and with the
mortifications and anxieties of Yrujo and Pichon, went so far as to
urge his government to help the views of the United States against
Louisiana:[244]--
“I should hope, my Lord, that by having some share in the
delivery of this Island of New Orleans to the United States,
which it will be impossible to keep from them whenever they
choose to employ force, his Majesty’s government may hereafter
attach still more this country to our interests, and derive all
the advantage possible from the intercourse with that important
part of the world. A very great change has gradually taken
place in the opinions of all ranks in this government in favor
of Great Britain, which has struck observers more likely to
be impartial than myself. A sense of a common interest has a
great share in the change; but the conduct of France in all her
relations has not failed to produce its full effect; and I find
men, formerly the most vehement in their politics, asserting in
the most unqualified terms the necessity of a union among all
the members of the civilized world to check her encroachments
and to assure the general tranquillity.”
A few days later the President nominated Monroe to act with Livingston
and Pinckney in an attempt to purchase New Orleans. This step, which
was openly avowed to be the alternative and perhaps the antecedent
of war with France, brought Thornton into still more confidential
relations with the Government. Finding that the Secretary of State
was as cautious as the President was talkative, Thornton carried on
an active intercourse with the latter. He first offered to detain the
British government packet for Monroe’s use; but it was found that a
month or two of delay would be necessary. Then, without instructions
from his Government, Thornton took a bolder step:[245]--
“This state of things has naturally excited a sentiment of
common interest, and has encouraged me to enter with more
freedom into the subject, as well with the President as with
Mr. Madison, than I should otherwise have thought right,
without being acquainted with the views of his Majesty’s
government. Under this impression, I ventured, immediately after
the nomination and before the first arrival of Mr. Monroe,
to inquire of the President whether it was his intention to
let him pass over to England, and hold any conversation with
his Majesty’s ministers upon the general question of the
free navigation of the Mississippi. The inquiry was somewhat
premature, and I made it with some apology. Mr. Jefferson
replied, however, unaffectedly, that at so early a stage of the
business he had scarcely thought himself what it might be proper
to do; ... that, on the whole, he thought it very probable that
Mr. Monroe might cross the Channel.... Some time after Mr.
Monroe’s arrival, actuated by the same view, I mentioned to Mr.
Jefferson that it would give me pleasure to furnish the former
with an introduction to his Majesty’s ambassador at Paris,
as it would afford me the occasion of making Lord Whitworth
acquainted with the nature of the object in dispute between this
country, France, and Spain, and would give to Mr. Monroe, if he
were disposed of himself, or were instructed by his Government
to seek it, a more ready pretext for opening himself to his
Lordship, and of keeping him apprised of the progress and turn
of the negotiation. Mr. Jefferson seemed pleased with this
offer, and said he was sure Mr. Monroe would accept it with
great thankfulness.”
Madison talked less freely than his chief, and contented himself
with explaining to the British representative that the views of the
Government in sending Monroe to France were limited to the hope of
inducing the First Consul by money, or other means of persuasion, to
cede in Louisiana a place of deposit over which the United States
might have absolute jurisdiction. He did not tell Thornton of the
decision made by the Cabinet, and the instructions given to Monroe,
April 18, 1803, to offer terms of alliance with England in case the
First Consul should make war;[246] but the tone of cordiality in
Government and people, both in public and private, in New York, Boston,
and Philadelphia, as in the South and West, was gratifying to British
pride, and would have been still more so had not the community somewhat
too openly avowed the intention of leaving England, if possible, to
fight alone. At the first news of the approaching rupture between
France and England, this wish began to appear so plainly that Thornton
was staggered by it. The Americans took no trouble to conceal the hope
that England would have to fight their battles for them.[247]
“The manifest advantage that such a state of things is
calculated to give to their negotiation with France, and which
is already sensibly felt in the altered tone and conduct of
the French government, ... will sufficiently account for their
wishes and for this belief. But possessing the same opinion of
the encroachments of France, and of the barrier which Great
Britain alone places between her and the United States, and
actuated, as I really believe they are, by sincere wishes for
our success, I am afraid they begin to see more clearly that
in a state of war we are effectually fighting their battles,
without the necessity of their active interference; and they
recur once more to the flattering prospect of peace and a
lucrative neutrality.”
In this state of doubt President Jefferson continued his intimate
relations with Thornton.
“He expressed himself very freely,” wrote Thornton, May 30,
1803, “on the contemptible and frivolous conduct, as he
termed it, of a Government that could alter its language so
entirely on the prospect of an approaching rupture with another
nation,--which he acknowledged instantly, on my mention of it,
had been the case toward Mr. Livingston.”
Jefferson attributed Bonaparte’s returning courtesy to fear rather than
to foresight. Thornton himself began to feel the danger that Bonaparte,
after all, might outwit him. He revised his opinion about Louisiana.
England, he saw, had the strongest motives for wishing France to keep
that province.
“The most desirable state of things,” he wrote, “seems to be
that France should become mistress of Louisiana, because her
influence in the United States would be by that event lost
forever, and she could only be dispossessed by a concert between
Great Britain and America in a common cause, which would
produce an indissoluble bond of union and amity between the two
countries.”
This cordiality between England and the United States lasted without
interruption until midsummer. Pichon complained, as has been shown,
of the attentions paid to Thornton by the President.[248] “I remarked
at table that he redoubled his courtesies and attentions toward the
British _chargé_.” The dinner was in the month of January; in the
following June Pichon wrote that the President had begun to accept the
idea of seeing the British at New Orleans:[249]--
“Mr. Jefferson told me a few days ago that he was engaged in
letting that Power know that her presence there would be seen
with regret; but I perceive that, little by little, people are
familiarizing themselves with this eventuality, as their fears
increase in regard to us. They are so convinced that England
sees more and more her true interests in relation to the United
States, and is resolved to conciliate them, that they have no
doubt of her lending herself to some arrangement. What they
fear most is that, as the price of this accommodation, she
may require the United States to take an active part in the
indispensable war; and this is what they ardently wish to avoid.”
Until July 3, 1803, the relations between President Jefferson’s
government and that of Great Britain were so cordial as to raise
a doubt whether the United States could avoid becoming an ally of
England, and taking part in the war with France. Suddenly came the new
convulsion of Europe.
“It was on the third of this month,” wrote Pichon July 7,
1803, “the eve of the anniversary of Independence, that we
received two pieces of news of the deepest interest for this
country,--that of the rupture between France and England,
proclaimed by the latter on May 16, and that of the cession of
Louisiana and New Orleans, made by us on April 30.”[250]
The next day, when Pichon attended the usual reception at the White
House, he found himself received in a manner very different from that
to which he had been of late accustomed.
The two events, thus coming together, were sure to affect seriously the
attitude of the United States toward England. Not only did Jefferson no
longer need British aid, but he found himself in a position where he
could afford with comparative freedom to insist upon his own terms of
neutrality. He had always felt that Great Britain did not sufficiently
respect this neutrality; he never failed to speak of Jay’s treaty
in terms of vehement dislike; and he freely avowed his intention of
allowing all commercial treaties to expire. The relation between these
treaties and the rights of neutrality was simple. Jefferson wanted no
treaties which would prevent him from using commercial weapons against
nations that violated American neutrality; and therefore he reserved to
Congress the right to direct commerce in whatever paths the Government
might prefer.
“On the subject of treaties,” he wrote,[251] “our system is to
have none with any nation, as far as can be avoided. The treaty
with England has therefore not been renewed, and all overtures
for treaty with other nations have been declined. We believe
that with nations, as with individuals, dealings may be carried
on as advantageously, perhaps more so, while their continuance
depends on a voluntary good treatment, as if fixed by a
contract, which, when it becomes injurious to either, is made
by forced constructions to mean what suits them, and becomes a
cause of war instead of a bond of peace.”
Such a system was best suited to the strongest nations, and to
those which could control their dealings to most advantage. The
Administration believed that the United States stood in this position.
The President and Secretary Madison were inclined to assert authority
in their relations with foreign Powers. Even so early as the preceding
February, before Monroe sailed for Europe, Madison told Pichon of
this intention.[252] “He added,” wrote Pichon to Talleyrand, “that if
war should be renewed, as seemed probable, the United States would be
disposed to take a higher tone than heretofore, that Europe had put
their spirit of moderation to proofs that would be no longer endured.”
Immediately after hearing of the Louisiana cession, Pichon wrote that
the same spirit continued to animate the Government.[253] “It is
certain that they propose to cause the neutrality of the United States
to be more exactly respected by the belligerent Powers than in the last
war. The Government has often shown its intentions in this respect,
from the time when everything pointed to an infallible rupture between
us and England.” President Jefferson, while avowing a pacific policy,
explained that his hopes of peace were founded on his power to affect
the interests of the belligerents. At the same moment when Pichon wrote
thus to Talleyrand, the President wrote to the Earl of Buchan:[254]--
“My hope of preserving peace for our country is not founded in
the Quaker principle of non-resistance under every wrong, but
in the belief that a just and friendly conduct on our part will
procure justice and friendship from others. In the existing
contest, each of the combatants will find an interest in our
friendship.”
He was confident that he could control France and England:[255] “I
do not believe we shall have as much to swallow from them as our
predecessors had.”
The Louisiana question being settled, the field was clear for the
United States to take high ground in behalf of neutral rights; and
inevitably the first step must be taken against England. No one denied
that thus far the administration of Addington had behaved well toward
the United States. Rufus King brought to America at the same time
with news of the Louisiana treaty, or had sent shortly before, two
conventions by which long-standing differences were settled. One of
these conventions disposed of the old subject of British debts,--the
British government accepting a round sum of six hundred thousand pounds
on behalf of the creditors.[256] The other created two commissions for
running the boundary line between Maine and Nova Scotia, and between
the Lake of the Woods and the Mississippi River.[257] King went so
far as to express the opinion that had he not been on the eve of his
departure, he might have succeeded in making some arrangement about
impressments; and he assured Gallatin that the actual Administration
in England was the most favorable that had existed or could exist
for the interests of the United States; its only misfortune was its
weakness.[258] The conduct of the British government in regard to
Louisiana proved the truth of King’s assertion. Not only did it offer
no opposition to the sale, but it lent every possible assistance to the
transfer; and under its eye, with its consent, Alexander Baring made
the financial arrangements which were to furnish Bonaparte with ten
million American dollars to pay the preliminary expenses of an invasion
of England.
Nevertheless, if the United States government intended to take a high
tone in regard to neutral rights, it must do so from the beginning
of the war. Aware that success in regard to England, as in regard
to Spain, depended on asserting at the outset, and maintaining with
obstinacy, the principles intended to be established, the President
and Secretary Madison lost no time in causing their attitude to be
clearly understood. An opportunity of asserting this authoritative tone
was given by the appearance of a new British minister at Washington;
and thus it happened that at the time when the Secretary of State was
preparing for his collision with the Marquis of Casa Yrujo and the
Spanish empire, he took on his hands the more serious task of curbing
the pretensions of Anthony Merry and the King of England.