Napoleon’s plans of campaign.—His letter to Ney, and proclamation
to the Belgians.—His sanguine expectations, and utter
disappointment.—Opinions of French authors on the circumstance of
Napoleon’s not reaching Brussels.—Their inconsistencies.—Desire
of Napoleon to make his marshals responsible for errors he
committed.—Opinion of M. de Vaulabelle.—Napoleon’s charges against
Grouchy; impossibility of the latter’s preventing a portion of
the Prussians reaching the field of Waterloo.—The Emperor’s
charges against Ney refuted.—Admirable conduct of Ney during the
campaign.—Mode of history-writing at St.-Helena.—The battle not
fought against the French nation.—Napoleon’s character.—Motley
composition and equivocal loyalty of part of the allied
army.—Refutation of the charge that the Duke was taken by surprise;
credulity of some English writers on this subject.—His Grace’s
admirable precaution.—Foreign statements, that the Prussians saved
us, examined.—The tardy cooperation of the Prussians produced,
not the defeat, but the total rout of the French.—Conversation of
Napoleon at St.-Helena.—Gourgaud’s account.—Opinions of the Duke
and lord Hill.—Ney’s testimony in the Chamber of Peers.
What were Napoleon’s plans, and how sanguine were his expectations,
will be placed beyond all doubt by the following letter, written to
the prince de la Moskowa, the renowned Ney, who had joined the army
but the evening before, and by his proclamation addressed to the
Belgians.
_To the Prince de la Moskowa._
“CHARLEROI, June 16th, 1815.
“COUSIN,
“I send you the present letter by my aide-de-camp, general Flahaut.
The Major-General (Soult) must have already dispatched orders to
you, but you will receive these sooner, because my officers are
faster than his. You will receive the general order of the day; but
I wish to write to you in detail, because it is of the very highest
importance.
“I advance marshal Grouchy with the third and fourth corps of
infantry upon Sombreffe, and my guard upon Fleurus, where I shall
be in person before mid-day. If I find the enemy there, I shall
attack him, and drive everything before me as far as Gembloux.
There I shall decide, according to the events of the morning,
what is to be done. My decision will be made, perhaps at three
o’clock, perhaps in the evening. My intention is, that the moment
I have determined on my plan, you should be in readiness to march
on Brussels. I will support you with the guard, which will be
at Fleurus or at Sombreffe; and I should like to reach Brussels
to-morrow morning. You should set forward this evening, if I can
form my plan in time for you to hear from me to-day, and you should
march three or four leagues before night, and be in Brussels at
seven to-morrow morning.
“You can dispose of your troops in the following manner: One
division two leagues in advance of Quatre-Bras, if there should
be no obstacle: Six divisions of infantry about Quatre-Bras, and
one division at Marbais, in order that I may have its assistance,
should I want it, at Sombreffe; but this is not to delay your
march: Count de Valmy’s corps, which contains three thousand
cuirassiers of _élite_, at the intersection of the Roman way with
the Brussels road, in case I should need it; as soon as ever I have
formed my plan, you will order this division to rejoin you.
“I should like to have with me the division of the guard which
is commanded by general Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and I send you
in exchange the two divisions of count de Valmy’s corps. But,
according to my plans at this moment, I prefer posting count de
Valmy in such a manner as to have him within reach if I want
him, and to avoid causing general Lefebvre-Desnouettes any false
marches; for it is probable that I shall resolve upon marching with
the guard this evening upon Brussels.
“Nevertheless, cover Lefebvre’s division by the two divisions of
cavalry belonging to D’Erlon and Reille, in order to spare the
guard; for if there should be any hot work with the English, it is
better that it should be with our line than the guard.
“I have adopted as a general principle of this campaign, to divide
my army into two wings, and a reserve.
“Your wing will consist of the four divisions of the first corps,
of the four divisions of the second corps, of two divisions of
light cavalry, and the two divisions of count de Valmy’s corps.
The number of these troops cannot be much less than forty-five
or fifty thousand men. Marshal Grouchy will have nearly an equal
number, and will command the right wing. The guard will form the
reserve, and I shall bring it up in support of the one wing or the
other, according to circumstances. The Major-General will issue the
most precise orders, in order to secure obedience to you, when you
have a separate command: whenever I am present, the commanders of
corps will receive orders directly from me. I shall draw troops,
according to circumstances, from either wing, to strengthen my
reserve.
“You well understand the importance attached to _the taking of
Brussels_. It may also produce important results; for a movement
of such promptitude and daring will cut off the English troops at
Mons, Ostend, etc.
“I wish your measures to be so taken, that, at the first order,
your eight divisions may be able to march rapidly on Brussels,
without any difficulty.
“NAPOLEON.”
PROCLAMATION TO THE BELGIANS AND INHABITANTS OF THE LEFT BANK OF THE
RHINE[84].
... “The ephemeral success of my enemies detached you for a
moment from my Empire: in my exile upon a rock in the sea, I
heard your complaints. The God of battle has decided the fate of
your beautiful provinces; Napoleon is among you. You are worthy
to be Frenchmen. Rise in mass, join my invincible phalanxes, to
exterminate the remainder of those barbarians, who are your enemies
and mine; they fly with rage and despair in their hearts.
“(Signed) NAPOLEON.
“By the Emperor:
“The major-general of the army,
“Count BERTRAND.
“At the Imperial Palace of Laeken.”
Little comment need be made upon this letter and proclamation. They
are characteristic of Napoleon. A most able plan of operations is
developed with his usual recklessness of human life: we see him
prepared to sacrifice his troops of the line to save his guard; and
either wing, so that with the other he might make a dash at Brussels.
His overweening confidence of being there even early on the 17th, and
his sanguine expectations that the population would support him, are
clearly shown by the above documents.
Napoleon must evidently have miscalculated the degree of energy and
promptitude necessary to overcome two such generals as Wellington
and Blücher. He sadly underrated the gallant troops which he and his
marshal had to combat. And when adverse writers talk so much of the
calculating, cautious and methodical Wellington (as Napoleon was
pleased to call him,) being taken by surprise in this campaign, we
may venture to ask, was not the Emperor taken by surprise and thrown
out in all his calculations by the extreme vigilance and energy
which brought three corps of the Prussian army, above eighty-five
thousand men, into position at Ligny by mid-day on the 16th? and
but for an error in the transmission of orders, these troops would
also have been joined by Bulow’s corps; and had general Zieten
sent information to general Müffling or to the duke of Wellington
at Brussels, when the French army in three columns was first seen
in his front in advance of Charleroi, the whole allied army might
have been concentrated at Quatre-Bras during the night of the 15th.
Wellington in person was at Ligny on the 16th; observing Napoleon
preparing for battle, and after conferring with Blücher, he returned
to Quatre-Bras in time to give a most critical check to the gallant
Ney. Was it no surprise to Napoleon to find that Wellington, upon
hearing of Blücher’s retreat from Ligny, instead of falling back
to Ostend, etc., immediately retired with ominous steadiness upon
Mont-St.-Jean? and there arrested the ambition of his opponent, who,
instead of being at Brussels early on the 17th, as intimated to Ney,
was compelled to open his eyes, on the morning of the 18th, to the
fact that he was still above twelve miles from Brussels, and unable
to advance a step nearer without fighting a desperate battle, and
staking his empire on the result! He did fight: the stake was lost,
and, by the next morning, he found himself again at Charleroi, whence
he had dispatched his memorable letter to his “cousin” Ney but two
days before. He must have felt an agony of _surprise_ and something
more, as he fled on for his very life, to escape from his enraged
pursuers.
M. de Vaulabelle indeed, in his “Campaign and Battle of Waterloo,”
published at Paris in 1845, attributes the non-arrival of Napoleon
at Brussels, to his having calculated that the Prussians would not
assemble in any great force until the 17th, (page 53;) and further on
(page 54,) the author says, “Napoleon’s plans and arrangements were
frustrated and his sanguine expectations disappointed, on finding a
barrier of ninety-five thousand Prussians assembled between him and
the Belgian capital.” The above author also informs us, (page 68,)
that a longer delay on the 16th, in executing his projected movements
at Ligny, would have compromised his success on that day; and (page
95,) that “on the 17th, fresh delays succeeded those of the two
preceding ones.” Ney’s troops, although the marshal, it is pretended,
received orders to renew the attack on Quatre-Bras at break of day,
were still in bivac at eleven o’clock. We are given to understand by
M. de Vaulabelle, that similar delays occurred to different corps
placed under the direct command of the Emperor and marshal Grouchy.
We are also told that “the soldiers grumbled at this inaction of
which they did not know the motives, questioned their officers, and
interrogated their generals;” in fact, to use the author’s words,
“_L’énergie et l’activité semblaient s’être réfugiées dans leurs
rangs_.” (“All energy and activity seemed to have taken refuge in
their ranks.”) The inhabitants of St.-Amand also affirm that, on a
group of generals passing through the village, the soldiers followed
them with their cries, “We made our soup at break of day in order to
be sooner at the ball, and we have been four hours doing nothing; why
don’t we fight? There is something underhand[85].”
In face of all these discrepant statements, and upon calm reflection
and close examination of the history of the battle of Waterloo,
Napoleon’s disasters should not be attributed to the neglect
or disobedience of his generals, but, under Providence, to the
consummate bravery of the troops, and the skill of the generals
opposed to him.
Napoleon, when at St.-Helena, admitted that the tactics of his army
in the Waterloo campaign had their defects; but on no occasion, to
my knowledge, did he admit that he himself had committed an error.
He invariably endeavoured to shift all blame, more especially the
irretrievable failure at Waterloo, to other shoulders than his
own, to those of his marshals. He accused Grouchy, the well-tried
soldier in many a hard-fought field, and who was banished for his
attachment to the Imperial cause, of having, by neglect, delay and
non-compliance with orders, occasioned his defeat at Waterloo; and
Grouchy’s alleged false movement is the basis of every argument
advanced by those who yet maintain the military infallibility
of their idolized Emperor. One would imagine, from the tenor of
Napoleon’s order of the day on the 14th of June, “Soldiers! we have
forced marches to make, battles to fight, dangers to encounter,”
that he would not have allowed the precious hours of the morning of
the 16th to be frittered away in inactivity, or have left his troops
until near eleven o’clock in the bivac of the night before, chiefly
where they crossed the Sambre, viz. at Charleroi, Châtelet and
Marchiennes, without making a movement to support his advanced troops
at Frasnes and Fleurus. No doubt the French were fatigued and wanted
rest; but, as the success of the campaign depended upon vigorously
pressing forward, and making the most of the first advantages,
there was no time for rest. Again, on the 17th, after the battles
of Quatre-Bras and Ligny, we find Napoleon lingering on the field
of Ligny, visiting the wounded, and expressing his satisfaction at
witnessing the gallantry of his troops; we find him discussing, with
Gérard and Grouchy, subjects in no way connected with the campaign
which should decree him Emperor or exile; we find it to be near
one o’clock P.M. (17th,) before he put his own force in motion to
join Ney in pursuit of us, or before he gave Grouchy his orders
to pursue the Prussians. Early in the morning, Pajol’s cavalry and
Teste’s infantry divisions were detached towards Namur, in pursuit
of the Prussians; and, strange to say, when, after capturing a
Prussian battery on the Namur road, and sending it to the Imperial
head-quarters, they found themselves completely baffled and at fault,
they returned to their bivac of the preceding night near Mazy, and
lay there till next morning, the 18th.
The Prussians, after their line had been broken about nine o’clock
on the 16th at Ligny, were allowed to retreat upon Wavre unmolested;
nor did Grouchy, who was subsequently ordered by Napoleon “to follow
the Prussians and not to let them out of his sight, to complete their
defeat by attacking them and prevent their effecting a junction with
the allies,” know until the afternoon of the 17th by what route the
main Prussian army had retreated. Grouchy’s advance-guard did not
come up with the Prussian rear till half-past ten A.M. of the 18th,
when three out of the four Prussian corps were already on their march
to join us: of this Grouchy knew nothing; so far from it, he believed
he had the whole Prussian army before him.
If it be objected to Grouchy, that he did not act up to the letter or
the spirit of his instructions, we affirm that it was impossible for
him to do so, the delay in giving him his orders having enabled the
Prussians to gain fourteen hours start of him.
This fact the marshal communicated to the Emperor, who replied that
he, with the rest of his army, was about to follow the English and
give them battle, should they take position in front of the forest of
Soigne, directing Grouchy to communicate with him by the paved road
of Quatre-Bras[86]: but not a word about that general’s joining in
his attack on the English. Napoleon followed us by the paved road to
La Belle-Alliance: Grouchy followed the Prussians by cross-roads to
Gembloux, about six miles, where he halted for the night, and wrote
to Napoleon; receiving the following answer, dated
“FARM OF CAILLOU, ten o’clock A.M.
June 18th, 1815.
“I am directed,” says the Adjutant-General (Soult,) “by the
Emperor, to acquaint you that he is going to attack the English
who are in line of battle in front of Waterloo, near the forest of
Soigne. His Majesty directs you will move upon Wavre, to be nearer
to us, to report your operations, to keep up a communication, etc.”
Again, not one word about marching to assist the Emperor: and here
we may observe that Wavre is not in the direction of Mont-St.-Jean.
When, however, at one o’clock, Napoleon found that Wellington was not
to be trifled with, and that a Prussian corps was hovering upon his
right flank, he dispatched another order, dated
“FIELD OF BATTLE, WATERLOO, one o’clock P.M.
June 18th, 1815.
“MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,
“You wrote from Gembloux this morning at two o’clock, informing the
Emperor, you were about to march to Sart-lez-Walhain. His Majesty
now directs you will manœuvre in _our_ direction; you must find
out the point, in order to keep up the communication, and be at
hand to fall upon and destroy any enemy that may attempt to attack
our right. At this moment we are engaged in battle on the line of
Waterloo, the enemy’s centre is Mont-St.-Jean; so manœuvre to join
our right without loss of time.
“The adjutant-general, DUKE OF DALMATIA.
“_P.S._—An intercepted letter informs us that the Prussian general
Bulow is about to attack our right flank; we think we see the corps
on the heights of St.-Lambert; so approach us without losing an
instant, and destroy Bulow, should you catch him in the fact.”
The order was in itself no doubt sound and judicious; but the
original vice we have already alluded to, as characterizing the
movements of the French army after the passage of the Sambre,
rendered obedience impossible. The letter, written at one o’clock,
did not reach Grouchy until seven, about which time Napoleon’s right
had been attacked and driven back by Bulow’s advanced brigades.
It was half-past seven o’clock A.M. on the 18th of June, when Grouchy
moved from his bivac at Gembloux, and, owing to the bad state of the
roads, nearly half-past eleven, before he reached Sart-lez-Walhain,
a distance of about six miles. At the latter place, the report of a
heavy cannonade was distinctly heard in the direction of Waterloo:
Grouchy was strongly urged by some of his generals to march towards
the firing; and for not doing so, he has been attacked at all points.
He declined the proposition of his generals, on the ground that he
did not consider it his duty to march towards the battle already
raging elsewhere, but to attack, according to his instructions, the
Prussians with whom he had just come up. Grouchy has since declared,
that he did not consider it his duty to follow the advice of Gérard
and the other generals, and that to have done so would have been
acting contrary to his orders. To have detached a portion of his
force towards the main French army would have separated his two corps
by the Dyle river, whose waters were much swollen by the heavy rains,
and whose banks were so swampy, that it would have been impossible
for his divisions to have mutually supported each other; consequently
he continued his march upon Wavre.
For argument’s sake, we will suppose that Grouchy adopts the advice
of his generals, and commences his march at the time the firing was
first heard, about half-past twelve o’clock. On average roads in fair
condition, an army of thirty-two thousand men of all arms would take
seven hours to march fifteen miles; they had already marched about
six miles, as we have seen, over bad roads. From Sart-lez-Walhain to
Plancenoit, Napoleon’s right, the distance is about sixteen miles,
and over bad roads; how could they have come up in time, and that,
without taking into account the obstructions which they must have
encountered from the Prussian corps who were scouring the whole of
that part of the country? It was utterly impossible for Grouchy,
after breaking up his bivac at Gembloux so late as half-past seven
o’clock on the morning of the 18th, to prevent the three Prussian
corps, who well knew his movements, from forming a junction with
us, or from attacking the French right. Had Grouchy left Gembloux
at two o’clock A.M., and marched, unmolested by the Prussians, by
St.-Guibert and Moustier to St.-Lambert, and taken position near
the defiles of the Lasne and St.-Lambert, he might have kept Bulow
from attacking the French right, and Napoleon might, before eight
o’clock, about which time a brigade of Pirch’s and part of a brigade
of Zieten’s corps came up, have attacked Wellington with his whole
remaining force.
After the unaccountable delay on the 17th, the division of his force
by Napoleon appears a false move; for a corps of cavalry would
have sufficed to watch the Prussians. Grouchy, unquestionably, was
dilatory, and wanting in his former energy and judgment; for though
he must have known that the Prussians, or a large portion of them,
would attempt their junction with us, he sent out no patrols to
ascertain whether the contemplated movement was in operation, and
neglected to keep up that which is always so essential, a close
communication with the main body of the French army. His whole
attention appears to have been directed to his right; the events on
his left he entirely neglected.
We have stated Napoleon’s anxiety to impute the blame of the failure
exclusively to his two marshals. We have endeavoured, in the fair
and fearless spirit of military criticism, to examine how far such
inculpation is borne out by facts in the case of marshal Grouchy,
and we now, in the same impartial manner, propose to analyze the
accusation made against the gallant and daring Ney, “the bravest
of the brave.” The charges are twofold: delay at Quatre-Bras, and
rashness at Waterloo.
Ney, as we have seen, had been ordered by Napoleon, on the morning
of the 16th, to seize Quatre-Bras, to occupy Genappe if practicable,
and to be ready to march on Brussels the same evening, (16th,) or on
the morning of the 17th at latest, as the seizure of the capital by a
_coup de main_ on the 17th was the Emperor’s grand object. For this
purpose Ney was, if possible, to press forward three or four leagues
at least, on the 16th, and to be supported by the light cavalry of
the Imperial guard.
Now, Ney is blamed by Napoleon and other military writers (French,)
for not having gained possession of Quatre-Bras early on the 16th,
before our force came up. Certainly no British soldier underrates
the value of an early attack: (as Aroyo-de-Molinos can testify:) but
was Ney justified in attempting to obtain possession of Quatre-Bras?
We incline to think he was not. More than one half of his force was
still in the rear: D’Erlon’s corps was on the Sambre, or close to it,
Girard’s division of Reille’s corps was near Fleurus with Grouchy,
and Kellermann’s cavalry had not joined. No blame to him, the gallant
Ney, for _that_; he had joined the army but the evening before, (the
15th). Notwithstanding these untoward events, he ordered forward
Reille’s (second) corps; but finding that heavy masses of the enemy
were concentrating at St.-Amand on his right, and ignorant of the
force in his front, he judiciously declined to press on till D’Erlon
came up as a support.
Napoleon, before he left Charleroi, sent another order to Ney to
unite his force, (Reille’s and D’Erlon’s corps, and Kellermann’s
cuirassiers who were about to join him,) remarking, “With this
force you ought to overwhelm any strength the enemy may oppose to
you.” When Ney commenced his attack on Quatre-Bras he was cautious.
Napoleon had now arrived at Fleurus, and sent word to Ney, that
Grouchy would attack the Prussians at half-past two o’clock; that he,
Ney, was to press vigorously upon any enemy in his front, and then
turn round and assist in crushing the Prussians at Ligny. About three
o’clock, Ney got another dispatch, informing him that the battle of
Ligny had already begun, directing him to manœuvre _immediately_, so
as to fall upon the Prussian rear with all his force, which would
be utterly destroyed if he acted with vigour, adding, in his own
emphatic language addressed to a heart so susceptible and patriotic
as Ney’s, “The fate of France is in your hands!” But that which
pre-eminently characterized Napoleon’s early career, that to which he
almost exclusively owed his brilliant victories, that in which all
men of all nations will admit his wonderful excellence,—rapidity in
executing his plans,—here again failed him. Lightning may slumber;
but _Time_ will ceaselessly march on, heedless of the errors of
heroes! The Emperor’s delay enabled our noble Picton, with his
gallant band, to come up from Brussels, closely followed by the
Brunswickers, headed by their cherished and chivalrous duke, who
found Quatre-Bras to be his last battle field. Such foes occupied
Ney: and Napoleon knew it not!
Observe, Napoleon (who, according to French historians, could not
err,) intrusting the fate of France to a flank movement by Ney, who
was unable ultimately to hold his own position! He accuses Ney of
having kept Reille’s and D’Erlon’s corps detached, saying, “Had he
united them, not an Englishman would have escaped at Quatre-Bras;”
and yet it was by Napoleon’s _own_ order, (in a pencilled note,)
conveyed by colonel Laurent, that Ney was ordered to detach D’Erlon’s
corps to St.-Amand! Laurent, falling in with the head of the column
then marching on Frasnes, upon his own responsibility changed its
direction. On inquiring for count D’Erlon, he was informed that, as
was his habit, he had gone ahead to Frasnes, preceding his column.
On his arrival at the latter place, Laurent found the general, and
handed over to him the pencilled note, stating, at the same time, the
position in which he might find the head of his column.
At this time general Delcambre, chief of the staff of the 1st
(D’Erlon’s) corps, went to acquaint the prince de la Moskowa of the
change in the line of march. Ney, who was himself then hard pressed
by Wellington, sent back Delcambre with peremptory orders to D’Erlon
to march on Quatre-Bras: but _ere the order could reach_ him, he
was close to St.-Amand, and consequently at too great a distance to
return in time to render assistance to Ney.
Could Ney therefore be made responsible for the absence of D’Erlon’s
corps, its change of direction, or this assumed want of vigour
consequent on either?
It is evident from the tenor of the dispatch from Napoleon at two
o’clock on the 16th, addressed to Ney at Gosselies, that Napoleon did
not imagine that the marshal had left Gosselies _at that hour_, much
less that he had attacked us. Where now was Ney’s delay when, with
a _fraction_ of his force, (three divisions of Reille’s corps and
Piré’s cavalry,) he attacked us at Quatre-Bras?
This proves the fallacy of the assertions contained in the _Mémoires
historiques de Napoléon_, and something perhaps stronger than
fallacies in Gourgaud’s campaign of 1815. In these Ney is assailed
for not attacking us _early_ in the morning of the 16th. We will not
however leave the posthumous fame of the gallant Ney to be sacrificed
to Imperial infallibility. We assert that Ney, on the 16th, did all
at Quatre-Bras that circumstances warranted, and attempted more;
we assert that if he failed in his attempt, (viz. of occupying
Quatre-Bras,) his failure is to be, so far as Ney and his force are
concerned, ascribed to British bayonets, and not to any want of
skill, daring or rapidity on the part of Ney[87], or to any want of
gallantry, or deadly devotion on the part of the brave troops of
Reille, Piré and Kellermann.
We arrive now at the different versions which have been published of
the battle of Waterloo, and which issued from St.-Helena. How much
credit should be attached to these accounts, may be judged by the
following extracts from the able work entitled “The Military life of
the Duke of Wellington:”
“It may perhaps be remarked, that we have attached little authority
to the accounts of this campaign which emanated from St.-Helena. The
writer of this portion of the present work had the honour of being
intimately acquainted with some of the persons composing Napoleon’s
suite at Longwood; and although he has reason to believe the volumes
given to the world with the names of generals de Montholon and
Gourgaud perfixed to them to be genuine; that is, that they were
prepared from Napoleon’s notes and dictation; yet, he conceives,
he has equal reason for rejecting them as testimony. An officer of
Bonaparte’s establishment told him at Longwood, that the termination
of the battle of Waterloo had occasioned the utmost perplexity
amongst them; and that he himself, having been employed by the
ex-Emperor to write an account of the campaign, had presented no less
than _six_ distinct modes of ending the battle, all of which had been
rejected.
“_Ab uno disce omnes._”[88]
Various accounts of the battle that subsequently emanated from
St.-Helena, Grouchy characterizes as containing “supposed
instructions and orders, imaginary movements, etc., deductions
made after the event;” (“_des instructions et des ordres supposés,
des mouvements imaginatifs_, etc.; _des assertions erronées, des
hypothèses faites après coup_.”) I will not trouble my readers with
any further remarks upon accounts so destitute of truth. Gourgaud’s
account, dictated by Napoleon himself, is, for the most part,
indignantly and completely refuted by marshal Grouchy as a mere
“military romance.”
From this trait of history-making, we may judge of the rest of the
accounts that were concocted in the ever fertile imagination of
Napoleon. His utter disregard of truth was part of his policy; and
if, for a time, it enabled him to deceive a high-minded and gallant
people, amongst whom the liberty of the press had been annihilated,
in the end it contributed to his ruin, nearly as much as did the
bravery and perseverance of his victorious opponents. Why did we meet
him at Waterloo? We were not at war with France, with its legitimate
sovereign, or with the French people. But we were at war with
Napoleon: he had been declared _hors la loi_ (outlawed) by civilized
Europe[89]; the idol indeed of a fine army, but a man devoid of
truth and principle, whom no treaties could bind, and whose restless
ambition was utterly incompatible with the peace of Europe.
His chief aim was to obtain universal dominion, and his inordinate
love of glory made him conceive the chimera of a universal monarchy,
of which he was to be the chief. Few have denied him to have been an
able and daring commander, gifted with great military talents; and
the duke of Wellington never hesitated in affirming, that of all the
chiefs of armies in the world, the one in whose presence it was most
hazardous to make a false movement was Napoleon[90].
[Illustration: (Napoleon)]
“The triumph and the vanity,
The rapture of the strife,
The earthquake voice of victory,
To him the breath of life;
The sword, the sceptre and the sway,
That men seem’d born but to obey.”
It was against this man, and not against France, that Wellington
uniformly declared he was leading his troops: “France,” said the Duke
in a letter dated June 4th, 1815, “has no enemies, as far as I know:
I am sure that she does not deserve to have any. We are the enemies
of one man only, and of his partisans, of him who has misused his
influence over the French army, to overthrow the throne of the king,
in order to subjugate France, and then to bring back to all of us the
days of misery which we thought were gone by.... Our state then ought
not to be called one of war with France, but of war on the part of
all Europe, comprising therein France herself, against Napoleon and
against his army, whose bad conduct is the cause of all the evils
which are going to happen, and which we all deplore[91].”
Lest our neighbours may think this view of Napoleon’s character drawn
by English prejudice, and as not affording sufficient reasons for the
determination of Wellington to aim solely at his destruction, and
with a steadiness of resolve not to be turned aside till complete
success attended the efforts of the allies, I beg to record the
following character of Napoleon, and his iron rule over the French
people. It will be observed that this character was drawn by the pen
of Frenchmen, proclaimed by French authorities, and placarded by them
on all the walls of Paris, whose inhabitants knew too well the facts
on which the proclamation was founded. The general and municipal
Council of Paris thus addressed the people, the year before the
battle of Waterloo:
“You owe all the evils which overwhelm you to one man, to him who
every year, by the conscription, decimates your families. Who amongst
us has not lost a brother, a son, relatives, friends? And why have
all these brave men fallen? For him alone, and not for the country.
In what cause have they fallen? They have been immolated to the
mad ambition of leaving behind him the name of the most dreadful
oppressor that ever weighed on the human race.... It is he that
has closed against us the seas of the two worlds. To him we are
indebted for the hatred of the people of all nations, without having
deserved it; for, like them, we have been the unhappy victims as
well as the sad instruments of his madness. What matters it that he
has sacrificed but few to his private hatred, if he has sacrificed
France,—we should not say, France only, but all Europe, to his
boundless ambition? Look at the vast continent of Europe, everywhere
strewed with the mingled bones of Frenchmen, and people with whom we
had no disputes, no causes of mutual hatred, who were too distant
from us to have any cause of quarrel, but whom he precipitated into
all the horrors of war, solely that the earth might be filled with
the noise of his name. Why boast of his past victories? What good
have those dreadful triumphs brought us? The hatred of other nations,
the tears of our families, our daughters forced to remain unmarried,
our matrons plunged into premature widowhood, the despair of fathers
and mothers, to whom there remains, out of a numerous progeny, but
the hand of an infant to close their eyes: behold! these are the
results of all those victories, which have brought foreign armies
within our very walls.... In the name of our most sacred duties, we
abjure all obedience to the usurper; we return to our legitimate
rulers.”
“How just,” adds a French historian, “are these accusations,
although they were made by men who a little before had been
prodigal of flattery and incense to the author of all these public
calamities[92]!”
With such a man as Napoleon is here described, whose towering
military genius no one can call in question, and whose influence had
so long, and so fatally fascinated the gallant French people, whose
eyes were at length opened to the real character of his rule, it must
not be wondered at, that we went to war; nor should our triumph over
him ever be regarded as a triumph over the French nation: between
that high-minded people and the rest of the civilized world, may the
peace, which is already of unexampled duration, and which we bought
so dearly, continue forever!
I may here present to the reader the sentiments of a noble and
distinguished writer, who had long been near Napoleon and had closely
watched his career. On hearing of his arrival at St.-Helena, this
French statesman and scholar gave the following commentary to the
world. No one who is acquainted with the writings of Chateaubriand
will suspect him of any bias towards the British character: yet he
wrote thus of our vanquished foe:
“The bloody drama of Europe is concluded, and the great tragedian,
who for twenty years has made the earth his theatre, and set the
world in tears, has left the stage for ever! He lifted the curtain
with his sword, and filled the scenes with slaughter. His part
was invented by himself, and was terribly unique. Never was there
so ambitious, so restless a spirit; never so daring, so fortunate
a soldier. His aim was universal dominion, and he gazed at it
steadfastly with the eye of the eagle, and the appetite of the
vulture.
“He combined within himself all the elements of terror, nerve, malice
and intellect; a heart that never trembled, a mind that never wavered
from its purpose. The greatness of his plans defied speculation,
and the rapidity of their execution outstripped prophecy. Civilized
nations were the victims of his arts, and savages could not withstand
his warfare. Sceptres crumbled in his grasp, and liberty withered
in his presence. The Almighty appeared to have intrusted to him the
destinies of the globe, and he used them to destroy. He shrouded the
sun with the clouds of battle, and unveiled the night with his fires.
His march reversed the course of nature: the flowers of the spring
perished, the fruits of autumn fell; for his track was cold, and
cheerless, and desolate, like the withering, wintry blast. Amid all
the physical, moral and political changes which he produced, he was
still the same. Always ambitious, always inexorable; no compassion
assuaged, no remorse deterred, no dangers alarmed him. Like the
barbarians, he conquered Italy, and rolling back to its source the
deluge that overwhelmed Rome, he proved himself the Attila of the
West. With Hannibal, he crossed the Alps in triumph; Africa beheld in
him a second Scipio, and standing on the Pyramids of Egypt, he looked
down on the fame of Alexander. He fought the Scythian in his cave,
and the unconquered Arab fled before him. He won, and divided, and
ruled nearly all modern Europe. It became a large French province,
where foreign kings still reigned by courtesy, or mourned in chains.
The Roman pontiff was his prisoner, and he claimed dominion over
the altar with the God of hosts. Even his name inspired universal
terror, and the obscurity of his designs rendered him awfully
mysterious. The navy of Great Britain watched him with the eye of
Argus, and her coast was lined with soldiers who slept on their arms.
He made war before he declared it; and peace was with him a signal
for hostilities. His friends were the first whom he assailed, and
his allies he selected to plunder. There was a singular opposition
between his alleged motives and his conduct. He would have enslaved
the land to make the ocean free, and he wanted only power to enslave
both.
“If he was arrogant, his unparalleled successes must excuse him. Who
could endure the giddiness of such a mountain elevation? Who, that
amid the slaughter of millions had escaped unhurt, would not suppose,
that a deity had lent him armour, like Achilles? Who, that had risen
from such obscurity, overcame such mighty obstacles, vanquished so
many monarchs, won such extensive empires, and enjoyed so absolute
a sway? Who, in the fulness of unequalled power and in the pride of
exulting ambition, would not believe himself the favourite of Heaven?
“He received the tribute of fear, and love, and admiration. The
weight of the chains which he imposed on France was forgotten in
their splendour: it was glorious to follow him, even as a conscript.
The arts became servile in his praise; and genius divided with him
her immortal honours. For it is mind alone that can triumph over
time. Letters, only, yield permanent renown.
“This blood-stained soldier adorned his throne with the trophies of
art, and made Paris the seat of taste as well as of power. There,
the old and the new world met and conversed; there, Time was seen
robbed of his scythe, lingering among beauties which he could not
destroy; there, the heroes and sages of every age mingled in splendid
alliance, and joined in the march of fame. They will appeal to
posterity to mitigate the sentence which humanity claims against the
tyrant Bonaparte. Awful indeed will be that sentence; but when will
posterity be a disinterested tribunal? When will the time arrive that
Europe shall have put off mourning for his crimes? In what distant
recess of futurity will the memory of Moskow sleep? When will Jena,
Gerona, and Austerlitz, when will Jaffa, Corunna, and Waterloo be
named without tears of anguish and vows of retribution? Earth can
never forget, man can never forgive them.
“Let him live, if he can endure life, divested of his crown, without
an army, and almost without a follower. Let him live, he who never
spared his friends, if he can withstand the humiliation of owing
his life to an enemy. Let him live, and listen to the voice of
conscience. He can no longer drown it in the clamorous report of war.
No cuirass guards his bosom from the arrows of remorse. Now that the
cares of state have ceased to distract his thoughts, let him reflect
on his miserable self; and, with the map before him, retrace his
bloody career. Alas! his life is a picture of ruin, and the light
that displays it is the funeral torch of nations. It exhibits one
mighty sepulchre, crowded with the mangled victims of murderous
ambition. Let him reflect on his enormous abuse of power, on his
violated faith, and shameless disregard of all law and justice.
“Let him live, and repent; let him seek to atone in humility and
solitude for the sins of his political life, an example of the
catastrophe of the wicked, and the vanity of false greatness. Great
he unquestionably was, great in the resources of a misguided spirit,
great in the conception and execution of evil; great in mischief,
like the pestilence; great in desolation, like the whirlwind.”
From the equivocal loyalty to the common cause of many of the troops
in the allied army, and the severity of the contest, we were not so
surprised as we were vexed, to see them skulk away, and make for
Brussels, or seek shelter in the woods. Our numbers were greatly
reduced by this sort of defection, long before the close of the
battle. General Müffling estimates the runaways at ten thousand,
(far below the real number). Of course, such heroes would invent
narratives and retail them in their dishonourable flight, in order to
cover themselves from the reproaches and contempt richly merited by
such unsoldierly behaviour. A gallant officer records a fact in point:
“Having been sent before day-light, on the morning after the battle,”
says lieutenant-colonel Basil Jackson, “to communicate the Duke’s
orders for his array to move on Nivelles, ... I had an opportunity
of witnessing how disgraceful had been the conduct of many of the
foreign troops. I saw thousands making their way to the front, who
had quitted their colours during the battle and fled to the forest.
The commanding officer of a cavalry regiment showed me a hundred and
forty men, stating that his loss in the battle had reduced it to that
number. I believe this regiment was not engaged; for very nearly the
original complement of eight hundred men were forthcoming a few days
after! The Duke degraded it, by turning it over to the commissariat
to furnish escorts[93].”
Some there were who wore the British uniform, who took advantage of
the duty of carrying the wounded to the rear, and did not return
to their duty on the field. This circumstance has been pitiably
exaggerated, and even distorted into a tale that the British
generally were flying off to Brussels when the Prussians came up.
The duke of Wellington, in his general order, issued at Nivelles,
two days after the battle, thus noticed the conduct of those who had
improperly absented themselves from their colours:
... “3. The Field-Marshal has observed that several soldiers, and
even officers, have quitted their ranks without leave, and have gone
to Brussels, and even some to Antwerp; where, and in the country
through which they have passed, they have spread a false alarm, in a
manner highly unmilitary, and derogatory to the character of soldiers.
“4. The Field-Marshal requests the general officers commanding
divisions in the British army, and the general officers commanding
the corps of each nation of which the army is composed, to report to
him in writing what officers and men,—the former by name,—are now, or
have been, absent without leave since the 16th[94].”
It may not be out of place to offer a few general remarks on some
points in which the public have felt much interest, and upon which
opinions have greatly differed.
It is certain that the duke of Wellington would not have accepted
battle at Waterloo, had he not been sure of the cooperation of the
Prussians; and the loss which they sustained during the short time
they were engaged, proves the value of that cooperation.
The diversion of the Prussians diminished the French force against
us, by count de Lobau’s corps, eleven battalions of the Imperial
guard, and eighteen squadrons of cavalry, amounting to above fifteen
thousand men and sixty-six guns. It is evident that the blow, which
decided the fate of the day, was given by the Duke when he defeated
the Imperial guard, attacked the French reserves, and forced their
centre: by this, D’Erlon’s columns were turned on their left, and
Reille’s on their right: then followed the general advance of
Wellington’s whole line.
With the splendid light cavalry force Napoleon had at his command,
and Grouchy, detached with thirty-two thousand men of all arms
to watch the Prussians, it is most extraordinary that the first
intimation the Emperor had of their advance upon his right, was
about one o’clock on the 18th, when, from his position above La
Belle-Alliance, he himself saw them at St.-Lambert.
Notwithstanding the numerous charges made by the French cavalry, not
one was made upon our left wing; nor was their cavalry of the right
wing put in motion, till the ardour of our heavy cavalry carried
them upon the French position, when their lancers, cuirassiers and
dragoons were let loose upon our broken and disordered cavalry, who
suffered severely.
D’Erlon’s infantry columns, and the last two attacking columns of the
Imperial guard were entirely unsupported by cavalry, or they never
could have been so closely pursued, and so roughly handled.
The French army under Napoleon was composed almost exclusively of
veterans; many of whom, the year before, had been liberated from
the English, Russian and Austrian prisons: men whose trade was
war, and who were well inured to it; whose battles equalled their
years in number; all of one nation, devoted to their leader and his
cause, most enthusiastic, and well equipped: in fact the finest
army Napoleon ever brought into the field. One more gallant, or more
complete in every respect, never stood before us.
We, on the contrary, were of different nations. Our foreign
auxiliaries, who constituted more than half our numerical strength,
with some exceptions, were little better that raw militia-men.
It would not perhaps be out of place if we now notice an assertion
of French, and even of English writers; namely, that the duke
of Wellington was taken by surprise at the commencement of this
campaign. Surely the French must laugh in their sleeves when they
find English writers credulous enough to print statements which
have originated in the lively imaginations of our neighbours, and
to support the assertion that the Duke depended upon such a man as
Fouché, for information of Napoleon’s arrival in Belgium, and of his
plan of operations. We find a very late writer even quoting Fouché,
to prove what he advances. One would imagine that such authors were
perfectly ignorant of the contents of the Duke’s twelfth volume of
the Dispatches, or of Fouché’s reputation. They deny his Grace the
possession of common prudence, if they believe he would intrust
the safety of his army, and thereby the interests of Europe, to
an ignoble police-spy, whose memory is justly despised by every
Frenchman.
In reply to the unfounded statement that Wellington relied on any
information from that archtraitor and lump of duplicity, it is
sufficient to give the following extract from a letter in the Duke’s
Dispatches, (vol. XII, page 649,) addressed to Dumouriez: “_Avant mon
arrivée à Paris, au mois de juillet, je n’avais jamais vu Fouché,
ni eu avec lui communication quelconque, ni avec aucun de ceux qui
sont liés avec lui_.” (“Before my arrival in Paris, in July, I had
never seen Fouché, nor had had any communication with him, nor with
any one connected with him.”) Of the French movements the Duke had
timely information from a very different source. I was told by sir
Hussey Vivian, (when he visited the field in 1839,) that he was aware
on the 13th of June; of the French being concentrated and ready to
attack; and that he reported the circumstance to the Duke: this is
corroborated in Siborne’s history, at page 49, vol. I: these are
undoubted authorities.
Those who have attentively followed the Duke in his operations during
this campaign, or referred to his correspondence, will have found
that, for weeks before, his Grace had foreseen Napoleon’s intentions
and had made deliberate arrangements to render them unavailing. The
allied army was so cantoned by Wellington, that its divisions could
be promptly united when the plans of Napoleon should be sufficiently
developed. The admirable organization of the allied army, effected
by the Duke so shortly after he took the command, must have struck
our readers: it is evident he was at once the main-spring, directing
head, and very soul of the grand European coalition; and it could
only be a just confidence in the admirable plan he had drawn up for
the conduct of the allied troops, that dictated the letter addressed
to sir Henry Wellesley, June 2d, 1815, and which expresses the
following very remarkable anticipation of coming events:
... “We have as yet done nothing here.... Towards the 16th, I hope
we shall begin. I shall enter France with between seventy and eighty
thousand men; the Prussians near me, with twice as many[95].”
This document was penned a fortnight before the action at
Quatre-Bras, where we began work in earnest, as the Duke had
anticipated, exactly on the 16th. This fact, of itself, should
suffice to stop the mouths of those who delight in telling us that
Wellington was taken by surprise. There were moments indeed, when he
thought that Napoleon’s ambition might be so far controlled by common
prudence, as to be content with remaining within the boundaries of
France, and leaving the odium of acting aggressively to the allied
powers; and in such moments, the Duke spoke and wrote of awaiting
for the combined movements of the Austrians and Russians. But not
for a single instant did he lose sight of the possibility, nay
probability, that Bonaparte would rush across the borders, begin
offensive operations, and make a dash to seize the person of Louis
XVIII, or to get possession of the city of Brussels. Against these
contingencies, how early and how ably our great chieftain provided,
let facts, and not the dreams of mortified narrators, inform the
world.
On the 6th, 7th, and 10th of June, the Duke dispatched letters to the
Prussians’ head-quarters], informing them that the enemy was in great
strength about Maubeuge, where Bonaparte was said to be on the 9th,
and thence to have gone along the frontiers towards Lille; and that
an attack was to be forthwith expected[96].
With this intelligence received by Wellington, and actively
circulated by him among all who were exposed to be attacked by the
French, how was it possible that he should be taken by _surprise_?
Every movement of the enemy was quickly known to him; and his
characteristic vigilance, and matured judgment, enabled him to
foretell the very time and place of the grand attack. All that
depended on him was in perfect readiness, several days before
fighting began. If the Prussians were unaccountably remiss in not
forwarding to his Grace earlier intelligence of the descent of the
enemy into Belgium, it was not for want of watchfulness on the
part of the Duke; _he_ was quite awake. Let the reader turn to the
Appendix of this work, (No. I,) for proof that Wellington was not
easily to be surprised, but that he had all his forces so well in
hand on the 30th of April, that they could march at a moment’s
notice, and unite at any point really attacked.
In reply to the assertion made by French, and even by Prussian
official writers, “that Blücher and his troops saved the allied
army,” it may be observed, the battle of Waterloo must be always
considered as a battle fought by the right wing of an army, for the
purpose of maintaining a position until the arrival of the Prussians,
its left wing, should render victory certain. The safest tactics, in
the Duke’s opinion, were to act entirely on the defensive, and he
had, in consequence, thoroughly matured his arrangements with Blücher
for mutual support. The Duke, therefore, was not only justified
in receiving battle, but had every reason to expect to have been
reinforced several hours before the Prussians came up. Waterloo might
have terminated with much less sacrifice of life, and as decisively
at three, as it afterwards did at eight o’clock. But even admitting,
for a moment, that the arrival of the Prussians saved us at Waterloo,
we undoubtedly saved them by holding our position until they came up.
Had we given way before they cleared the defiles of St.-Lambert, they
would have been annihilated; of this they were aware, as our readers
will be convinced on reference to the letters from the Prussian to
the allied head-quarters[97].
But facts are stubborn things, and it is doubtful whether Napoleon
could have driven the British from the ground, even if the Prussians
had not arrived. The English troops had maintained their position
for eight hours against the most experienced army and the ablest
general ever France sent into the field; not a British regiment was
broken, nor the allied army in a panic, nor, at any time, in serious
danger of being penetrated. Further, even if the Prussians had not
arrived, we are inclined to think that Napoleon could not, in the
exhausted and dispirited condition of his troops, and the lateness of
the hour, have driven the British from their ground. His cavalry was
nearly annihilated: while three brigades of British infantry, one of
the King’s German legion, and two brigades of British cavalry[98],
had, except in the loss sustained by the 27th regiment, and 12th
dragoons, suffered but comparatively little; many of the foreign
troops had not fired a shot: and after the arrival of Vivian and
Vandeleur, the _British cavalry_ were, as our readers have seen,
masters of the field. The junction of the Prussians was a part of
Wellington’s combinations for the battle. Their flank movement at
Waterloo was similar to Desaix’s from Novi to Marengo; with this
no small difference, that upon Bulow’s troops joining, they found
the allied army firm and unbroken, and rather in advance of their
position of the morning[99]: when Desaix joined Bonaparte, he was in
full retreat, one wing of his army destroyed, and obliged to change
his whole front to save the rest from destruction; this eventually
gave him the victory. We are not astonished that the French should
employ this argument as a balm to their disappointment, but it comes
with a peculiar bad grace from the Prussians. Surely, in thus taking
the lion’s share in this glorious victory, they do not think to cover
their defeat at Ligny, or their unaccountable delay in arriving on
the field of Waterloo.
“The roads were very bad, and the Prussians had a numerous artillery,
not over-well horsed. Yet supposing them to have been put in motion
at eight o’clock in the morning, (their official account says _break
of day_,) they were ten or eleven hours in marching little more
than a like number of miles! May we not therefore be allowed to
conjecture, that there was some hesitation on the part of Blücher in
marching upon Waterloo, until he could feel assured of his army being
in little danger from Grouchy?” (JACKSOS and SCOTT’S _Life of the
Duke of Wellington_.)[100].
And if true, as the Prussian official report represents, that Blücher
had such a large force on the field to act, previous to, or during
Napoleon’s last attack upon us, why did not Blücher, to use the
language of two excellent military writers, roll up the French army
as Pakenham’s division did at Salamanca? I have often thought that
if lord Hill could, by any means, have been transferred across the
field to where Bulow debouched, with the same force of British troops
under his command as Bulow had of Prussian, (30,000,) our illustrious
Chief’s table that night might have been honoured by the presence of
Napoleon and his chief officers, and most of the French army favoured
with a free passage to England.
Lieutenant-colonel B. Jackson, in his _Military life of Wellington_,
(vol. II, page 806,) says, “There can exist no doubt whatever that,
paradoxical as it may at first sight appear, the cooperation, thought
somewhat tardy, of the Prussians, produced, _not the defeat_, but the
total rout of Bonaparte’s army: for the duke of Wellington could not,
weakened as his force was at the close of the day, have hazarded an
attack with his whole army, had Blücher not been at hand to support
the movement. The service rendered by our brave allies was therefore
most opportune, and of the highest value.... An error of half an
hour—and men do not consult their watches during the excitement of
battle—made either by the Prussians or ourselves, is sufficient to
account for much of the discrepance existing between their statements
and our own.”
That English and Prussian writers should altogether agree as to the
apportionment of the glory of the day, was not to be expected. It is
clear, to the lasting honour of the two allied nations, that whatever
feelings may have since grown up on this subject, none interfered
at the time with the cordiality of their combined operations. The
following lines, from a Prussian pen, will show that just national
pride is not inconsistent with candour:
“Upon the question, who really fought and won the battle of the
18th, no discussion, much less contention, ought to have arisen.
Without in the slightest degree impeaching the just share of Prussia
in the victory, or losing sight for a moment of the fact that she
bore a great share of the danger, and drew much of it from her
allies and upon herself at a decisive moment, no unprejudiced person
can conceal from himself that the honour of the day is due to the
Anglo-Netherlandish army, and to the measures of its great leader.
The struggle of Mont-St.-Jean was conducted with an obstinacy,
ability, and foresight of which history affords few examples. The
great loss of the English also speaks the merit of their services.
More than seven hundred officers, among them the first of their army,
whether in rank or merit, and upwards of ten thousand soldiers, fell,
or retired wounded from the field[101].”
No one unacquainted with war can form the most distant idea of the
weak state and disorganization to which even a victorious army is
reduced by a long, trying, severe day’s battle. The number of men
absent from the ranks is incredible, and long continued excitement
nearly exhausts the rest.
Although we place little reliance on statements which have originated
from St.-Helena, yet we must be excused if we quote O’Meara, whose
conversations with the Emperor have been faithfully given to the
world. They contain several allusions to the battle of Waterloo, and
attest the Emperor’s conviction of the completeness of our victory
over him, and the hopelessness of all his plans, as well as his utter
despair before he quitted the field.
What other honest interpretation can be given to these words, “I
ought to have died at Waterloo; but, as ill luck will have it, when
you seek death you cannot meet with it. There were numbers killed
close to me, before, behind, on every side of me; but there was no
bullet for me!” Why should a man desire to be struck down, if, as
the fond tale goes amongst some of his indiscriminate admirers, he
had thrice won the battle of Waterloo? He desired death, because
he saw that all his resources were gone, and that the British,
notwithstanding the day’s dreadful carnage, were about to deal the
decisive blow with irresistible force.
The same author relates several facts connected with the battle of
Waterloo, communicated to him by general Gourgaud, under Napoleon’s
roof. These are the general’s words, as written down at the time,
(August 23d, 1817:)
“At the close of the battle of Waterloo, and after the unsuccessful
charge of the French, the English cavalry which charged in return,
approached within two or three hundred yards of the spot where
Napoleon was, with none about him but Soult, Drouot, Bertrand, and
Gourgaud himself. At a short distance from them was a small French
battalion, that had formed square. Napoleon directed general Gourgaud
to order two or three field-pieces belonging to this battalion to be
fired, in order to arrest the cavalry which was coming on. The order
was executed, and one of the balls wounded lord Uxbridge in the leg.
Napoleon put himself at the head of the column, exclaiming, ‘Here we
must die! we must die on the field of battle!’”
Let us observe, that Napoleon must, at this moment, have felt himself
beaten, and that his conquerors were the British, to whom, as the
most noble of his enemies, he paid the compliment, wishing to die by
our hands rather than by those of the Prussians, who were advancing
on his right, ready enough to gratify his wish. But, to continue
general Gourgaud’s account:
“At the very instant that Napoleon was desirous of making a charge
with the handful of men left about him, the English light infantry
was gaining ground. Labédoyère galloped round them, sword in hand,
seeming to court a glorious death on the field of honour. We
prevented Napoleon from rushing into the midst of the enemy. It was
Soult who seized his horse by the bridle, and said, ‘They will not
kill you: you will be taken prisoner;’ and that general, with the
assistance of a few others who gathered round, prevailed on Napoleon
to fly from the field of battle.”
We have often, throughout this discussion, quoted several of our
opponents: let us now give two great authorities on every question
connected with the field of Waterloo, viz. the duke of Wellington and
lord Hill. It is also a conversation, but related by B. R. Haydon
Esq., (_United Service Magazine_, February 1844, page 281:)
“When sir Walter Scott was at Paris in 1815, he was permitted to
ask, and he did put the following questions, at his Grace’s table,
relating to Waterloo, and I repeat them as sir Walter detailed
them to me at my own: ‘Suppose, your Grace, Blücher had not come
up.’ The Duke replied, ‘I could have kept my ground till next
morning.’—‘Suppose Grouchy had come first.’—‘Blücher would have been
close behind him.’—‘But let us suppose, your Grace had been compelled
to retreat.’—‘I could have taken position in the forest of Soigne,
and defied all till the allies joined.’—‘Was there any part of the
day when your Grace despaired?’—‘Never,’ was the reply.
“This was the reply of the first in command. In 1833, the writer of
this letter dined at lord Palmerston’s; on his right sat lord Hill.
As his Lordship lived near the author, he offered to set him down.
When alone in the carriage with lord Hill, remembering what sir
Walter had affirmed of the Duke’s confidence, he said, ‘Was there any
part of the day at Waterloo, my lord, you ever desponded as to the
result?’—‘Desponded!’ replied lord Hill, ‘never: there never was the
least panic; we had gained rather than lost ground, by the evening.
No, there was not a moment I had the least doubt of the result.’”
In conclusion, and as a final answer to the depreciators of British
valour, we offer them the speech of the celebrated Ney, uttered
in the Chamber of Peers four days after the battle, and which is,
perhaps, of the French accounts the most worthy of attention, and too
remarkable to be omitted on the present occasion.
When the peers were assembled, Carnot gave them a flaming account of
Grouchy’s admirable retreat from Wavre, at the head, the minister
said, of sixty thousand men; of Soult’s success in collecting
together twenty thousand of the old guard; of new levies from the
interior, with two hundred pieces of cannon. Ney, highly incensed at
these mischievous untruths, and keenly suffering from the injustice
done to him in Napoleon’s bulletins, started up, and declared
Carnot’s statement to be utterly false:
“Will they dare to assert,” exclaimed the exasperated marshal,
“before eyewitnesses of the disastrous day of the 18th, that we have
yet sixty thousand soldiers embodied? Grouchy cannot have under him
above twenty or five-and-twenty thousand soldiers, at the utmost.
Had he possessed a greater force, he might have covered the retreat,
and the Emperor would still have been in command of an army on the
frontiers. Not a man of the guard will ever rally more. I myself
commanded them; I myself witnessed their total extermination, ere
I left the field of battle: they are annihilated. The enemy are at
Nivelles with eighty thousand men; they may, if they please, be at
Paris in six days. There is no safety for France, but in instant
propositions for peace[102].”
This speech opened the eyes of all Paris to the facts, and prepared
the entry of the allies into France, almost without striking a blow.
It was truly, like my pages, A VOICE FROM WATERLOO and is the last
testimony we shall present to the reader, in refutation of the tale,
that we were beaten before the arrival of the Prussians. It was not
against the latter that the devoted Ney led the Imperial guard, nor
were they by the Prussians annihilated; they were defeated on no
other spot but the allied position on the field of Waterloo.
[Illustration: (end of chapter; image of a cannon)]
FOOTNOTES:
[84] A large quantity of these proclamations was found amongst the
Imperial baggage.
[85] _Campagne et Bataille de Waterloo_, par ACHILLE DE VAULABELLE,
p. 95-96. Paris, 1845.
[86] A positive proof that Napoleon was of opinion that the Prussians
were retiring upon Namur and the Meuse; or why did he direct the
communication to be kept up by the paved road of Quatre-Bras?
[87] It is notorious that Ney was one amongst the last who quitted
the scene of carnage; it is also certain, we had our hands full to
wrest victory from the French. Had all Napoleon’s generals acted with
the same energy, gallantry and constant audacity as Ney did on his
last field, our day’s work would have been more troublesome, and not
so many of us left to tell the tale. As a soldier, I am sorry that
both Ney and the Emperor did not die a soldier’s death at Waterloo.
[88] _Military life of the Duke of Wellington_, by major BASIL
JACKSON and captain ROCHFORT SCOTT; page 609, vol. II.
[89] _See_ GURWOOD, vol. XII, p. 352.
[90] _Quarterly Review_, No. LXX, page 478.
[91] _See_ GURWOOD, vol. XII, page 441.
[92] _Histoire de Napoléon_, par A. GABOURD, p. 345-346.
[93] _Military life of the Duke of Wellington_, by major BASIL
JACKSON and captain ROCHFORT SCOTT; vol. II, page 604.
[94] See _General orders_, in GURWOOD’S _Selections from Dispatches_,
page 865.
[95] _See_ GURWOOD, _Dispatches_, vol. XII, page 438.
[96] _See_ GURWOOD, _Dispatches_, vol. XII, p. 449, 453, 457.
[97] _See_ Appendix, No. V.
[98] 4th, 27th, 40th, (Lambert’s); 52d, 71st, 95th, (Adam’s); 14th,
23d, 51st, (Mitchell’s); 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th line of the German
legion, (Duplat’s); with Vivian’s 10th and 18th British, and 1st
German hussars, and Vandeleur’s 11th, 12th, and 16th light dragoons.
[99] At the time the Prussians first became engaged, Duplat’s
Germans, a part of Halkett’s Hanoverians, with Adam’s brigade,
altogether above five thousand bayonets, stood in their advanced
position, between the north-east angle of the orchard of Hougoumont
and a little to the right of where the Lion now stands.
[100] _See_ Appendix, No. V, page 252.
[101] _Geschichte des Preussischen Staates_, 1763-1815; Frankfort,
1820; vol. III, page 371.
[102] _See_ Ney’s letter, Appendix, No. V, page 253.
APPENDIX.
[Illustration: (decorative separator)]
No. I.
SECRET MEMORANDUM.
_for H. R. H. the prince of Orange, the Earl of Uxbridge, Lord Hill,
and the Quarter-Master-General._
“BRUSSELS, April 29th, 1815.
“1. Having received reports that the Imperial guard had moved
from Paris upon Beauvais, and a report having been for some
days prevalent in the country that Bonaparte was about to visit
the northern frontier, I deem it expedient to concentrate the
cantonments of the troops, with a view to their early junction in
case this country should be attacked, for which concentration the
Quarter-Master-General now sends orders.
“2. In this case, the enemy’s line of attack will be either between
the Lys and the Scheldt, or between the Sambre and the Scheldt, or by
both lines.
“3. In the first case, I should wish the troops of the 4th division
to take up the bridge on the Scheldt, near Avelghem, and with the
regiment of cavalry at Courtray, to fall back upon Audenarde,
which post they are to occupy, and to inundate the country in the
neighbourhood.
“4. The garrison of Ghent are to inundate the country in the
neighbourhood likewise, and that point is to be held at all events.
“5. The cavalry in observation between Menin and Furnes are to fall
back upon Ostend, those between Menin and Tournay upon Tournay, and
thence to join their regiments.
“6. The 1st, 2d, and 3d divisions of infantry are to be collected
at the head-quarters of the divisions, and the cavalry at the
head-quarters of their several brigades, and the whole to be in
readiness to march at a moment’s notice.
“7. The troops of the Netherlands to be collected at Soignies and
Nivelles.
“8. In case the attack should be made between the Sambre and the
Scheldt, I propose to collect the British and Hanoverians at and in
the neighbourhood of Enghien, and the army of the Low-Countries at
and in the neighbourhood of Soignies and Braine-le-Comte.
“9. In this case, the 2d and 3d divisions will collect at their
respective head-quarters, and gradually fall back towards Enghien,
with the cavalry of colonel Arentschild, and the Hanoverian brigade.
“10. The garrisons of Mons and Tournay will stand fast; but that of
Ath will be withdrawn, with the 2d division, if the works should not
have been sufficiently advanced to render the place tenable against a
_coup de main_.
“11. General sir William Ponsonby’s, sir J. O. Vandeleur’s, and sir
Hussey Vivian’s brigades of cavalry, will march upon Hal.
“12. The troops of the Low-Countries will collect upon Soignies and
Braine-le-Comte.
“13. The troops of the 4th division, and the 2d hussars, after taking
up the bridge at Avelghem, will fall back upon Audenarde, and there
wait for further orders.
“14. In case of the attack being directed by both lines supposed,
the troops of the 4th. division, and 2d hussars, and the garrison
of Ghent, will act as directed in Nos. 3 and 4 of this Memorandum;
and the 2d and 3d divisions, and the cavalry, and the troops of the
Low-Countries, as directed in Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 337-8.)
MEMORANDUM
_for Colonel Sir William de Lancey, Deputy Quarter-Master-General._
MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY.
“BRUSSELS, June 15th, 1815.
“General Dornberg’s brigade of cavalry, and the Cumberland hussars,
to march this night upon Vilvorde, and to bivac on the high-road near
to that town.
“The earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the cavalry this
night at Ninove, leaving the 2d hussars looking out between the
Scheldt and the Lys.
“The 1st division of infantry to collect this night at Ath and
adjacent, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.
“The 3d division to collect this night at Braine-le-Comte, and to be
in readiness to move at the shortest notice.
“The 4th division to be collected this night at Grammont, with the
exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which are to be moved to
Audenarde.
“The 5th division, the 81st regiment and the Hanoverian brigade of
the 6th division, to be in readiness to march from Brussels at a
moment’s notice.
“The duke of Brunswick’s corps to collect this night on the high-road
between Brussels and Vilvorde.
“The Nassau troops to collect at day-light to-morrow morning on the
Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.
“The Hanoverian brigade of the 5th division to collect this night at
Hal, and to be in readiness at day-light to-morrow morning to move
towards Brussels, and to halt on the high-road between Alost and
Assche for further orders.
“The prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles the 2d and
3d divisions of the army of the Low-Countries; and, should that point
have been attacked this day, to move the 3d division of British
infantry upon Nivelles, as soon as collected.
“This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain that
the enemy’s attack is upon the right of the Prussian army, and the
left of the British army.
“Lord Hill will be so good as to order prince Frederick of Orange
to occupy Audenarde with five hundred men, and to collect the 1st
division of the army of the Low-Countries, and the Indian brigade, at
Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning at day-light.
“The reserve artillery to be in readiness to move at day-light.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol XII, p. 472-3.)
INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY ON JUNE 16TH.
_Signed by Colonel Sir William De Lancey, Deputy
Quarter-Master-General._
_To General Lord Hill._
“June 16th, 1815.
“The duke of Wellington requests that you will move the 2d division
of infantry upon Braine-le-Comte immediately. His Grace is going to
Waterloo.”
_To the same._
“June 16th, 1815.
“Your Lordship is requested to order prince Frederick of Orange to
move, immediately upon the receipt of this order, the 1st division
of the army of the Low-Countries, and the Indian brigade, from
Sotteghem to Enghien, leaving five hundred men, as before directed,
in Audenarde.”
_To the same._
“GENAPPE, June 16th, 1815.
“The 2d division of infantry to move to-morrow morning at day-break
from Nivelles to Quatre-Bras.
“The 4th division of infantry to move at day-break to-morrow morning
to Nivelles.”
“June 16th, 1815.
“The reserve artillery to move at day-break to-morrow morning, the
17th, to Quatre-Bras, where it will receive further orders.”
_To Major-General Sir J. Lambert._
“June 16th, 1815.
“The brigade of infantry under the command of major-general sir J.
Lambert, to march from Assche at day-break to-morrow morning, the
17th inst., to Genappe, on the Namur road, and to remain there until
further orders.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 274-5.)
[Illustration: (end of Note; decorative separator)]
No. II.
The reader will observe that the letters from which I make the
following extracts, were written at three o’clock in the morning of
the battle.
_To Sir Charles Stuart._
“WATERLOO, June 18th, 1815,
three o’clock A.M.
“MY DEAR STUART,
... “You will see in the letter to the duc de Berry the real state of
our case, and the only risk we run. The Prussians will be ready again
in the morning for anything.
“Pray keep the English (in Brussels,) quiet, if you can. Let them all
prepare to move, but neither be in a hurry nor a fright, as all will
yet turn out well.
“I have given the directions to the governor of Antwerp, to meet the
_crotchets_ which I find in the heads of the king’s governors upon
every turn....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 476.)
_To His Royal Highness the Duc de Berry._
“WATERLOO, June 18th, 1815,
three o’clock in the morning.
“SIR,
“I have not written to your Royal Highness since Thursday, as I had
nothing to communicate ... and I have had a great deal to do.
“We had a very sanguinary battle on Friday last: near the farm of
Quatre-Bras; the Prussians, about Sombreffe. I had very few troops
with me, and no cavalry: I however drove the enemy back, and had
considerable success. The Prussians suffered a good deal, and
retreated during the night; and in consequence I retired also during
the day. I saw very little yesterday of the enemy, who followed us
very gently, and the Prussians not at all. The Prussians have been
joined by their fourth corps, more than thirty thousand strong, and I
have also nearly all my men together.
“It may happen that the enemy will turn us by Hal, although the
weather is terrible and the roads are in a shocking state, and
although I have posted prince Frederick’s corps between Hal and
Enghien. If this should happen, I beg your Royal Highness to march on
Antwerp ... and to inform his Majesty (Louis XVIII,) that I beg him
to leave Ghent for Antwerp by the left of the Scheldt. He will find
no difficulty in crossing at the _Tête de Flandre_.
... “I hope, and I have every reason to believe, that all will turn
out well; but we must take every possible precaution, and avoid
great losses. It is with this view, that I beg your Royal Highness
to follow the directions here given, and his Majesty to make for
Antwerp, not upon false reports, but upon certain information that
the enemy has got into Brussels, in spite of me, in turning me by
Hal....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 476-7.)
The following letters, written just after the battle, will show how
deeply the duke felt the loss of his companions in arms: the renown
his success would ensure was no consolation to him for the loss of
friends and heroes: patriotism, and the confident expectation that an
effectual stop was at length put to the horrors which had desolated
Europe for more than twenty years, were the sources of such comfort
as he could feel himself, or offer to others, for the expenditure of
so many valuable lives.
_To the Earl of Aberdeen, K. T._
“BRUSSELS, June 19th, 1815.
“MY DEAR LORD,
“You will readily give credit to the existence of the extreme grief
with which I announce to you the death of your gallant brother,
(colonel Gordon,) in consequence of a wound received in our great
battle of yesterday.
“He had served me most zealously and usefully for many years, and on
many trying occasions; but he had never rendered himself more useful,
and had never distinguished himself more, than in our late actions.
“He received the wound which occasioned his death, when rallying
one of the Brunswick battalions which was shaking a little; and he
lived long enough to be informed by myself of the glorious result of
our actions, to which he had so much contributed by his active and
zealous assistance.
“I cannot express to you the regret and sorrow with which I
look round me, and contemplate the loss which I have sustained,
particularly in your brother. The glory resulting from such actions,
so dearly bought, is no consolation to me, and I cannot suggest it
as any to you and his friends; but I hope that it may be expected
that this last one has been so decisive, as that no doubt remains
that our exertions and our individual losses will be rewarded by the
early attainment of our just object. It is then that the glory of the
actions in which our friends and relations have fallen, will be some
consolation for their loss.
“Believe me, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
“Your brother had a black horse, given to him, I believe, by lord
Ashburnham, which I will keep till I hear from you what you wish
should be done with it.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 488-9.)
_To the Duke of Beaufort, K. G._
“BRUSSELS, June 19th, 1815.
“MY DEAR LORD,
“I am very sorry to have to acquaint you that your brother Fitzroy
is very severely wounded, and has lost his right arm. I have just
seen him, and he is perfectly free from fever, and as well as
anybody could be under such circumstances. You are aware how useful
he has always been to me, and how much I shall feel the want of his
assistance, and what a regard and affection I feel for him; and you
will readily believe how much concerned I am for his misfortune.
Indeed, the losses I have sustained, have quite broken me down; and I
have no feeling for the advantages we have acquired. I hope, however,
that your brother will soon be able to join me again; and that he
will long live to be, as he is likely to become, an honour to his
country, as he is a satisfaction to his family and friends.
“Believe me, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 489.)
_To Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg._
“JONCOURT, June 26th, 1815.
... “Our battle on the 18th was one of giants; and our success was
most complete, as you perceive. God grant I may never see another!
for I am overwhelmed with grief at the loss of my old friends and
comrades.
“My neighbour and fellow-labourer (Blücher) is in good health, though
he suffers a little from the fall of a horse, wounded under him in
the battle of the 16th....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 510.)
The following extracts will prove the early and complete conviction
of the Duke, that all had been decided at Waterloo.
_To General Dumouriez._
“NIVELLES, June 20th, 1815.
... “You must have heard what I have done; and I hope you are
satisfied. I never saw such a battle as the one the day before
yesterday; and never before did I gain such a victory. I trust it is
all over with Bonaparte. We are in hot pursuit of him....
“WELLINGTON.”
(Gurwood, vol. XII, page 490.)
_To General the Earl of Uxbridge._
“LE CATEAU, June 23d, 1815.
... “My opinion is that we have given Napoleon his death-blow.... He
can make no head against us ... _il n’a qu’à se pendre_,” (he has
only to hang himself)....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 499-500.)
_To the Prince de Talleyrand._
“LE CATEAU, June 24th, 1815.
... “It was I who recommended to the king (Louis XVIII,) to enter
France at present, because I was aware of the extent of our success
in the battle of the 18th....
“I enclose you, in confirmation of my opinion of the extent of our
success, the _Journal de l’Empire_ of the 22d, in which you will find
Bonaparte’s account of the action, the truth of which, as far as it
goes against himself, cannot be doubted....
“I conclude that you can have no scruple about joining the king
forthwith, a measure which I earnestly entreat you and the other
members of the king’s council to adopt without loss of time.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 502-3.)
I may here remark, that in political foresight, the Duke was in
advance of Talleyrand himself, as the letter above demonstrates.
_To Marshal Lord Beresford._
“GONESSE, July 2d, 1815.
“You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such
a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call gluttons. Napoleon
did not manœuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in
columns, and was driven off in the old style....
“I had the infantry for some time in squares; and we had the French
cavalry walking about us as if they had been our own. I never saw the
British infantry behave so well....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 529.)
The subjoined extracts show how steadily Wellington kept in view the
sole object of the war; and that he was not to be cajoled by any
diplomatic chicanery, and what pains he took to keep statesmen to the
point.
_To Earl Bathurst._
“JONCOURT, June 25th, 1815.
“To advanced posts ... yesterday received a proposition to suspend
hostilities, as it was stated that Bonaparte had abdicated in favour
of his son, and has appointed a provisional government, consisting
of Fouché, Carnot, Caulincourt, general Grenier, and Quinette; that
these persons had sent ministers to the allied powers to treat for
peace.
“It appeared both to prince Blücher and to me, that these measures
were a trick....
“The object of the alliance of the powers of Europe is declared by
the first article of the treaty of the 25th of March, to be to force
Napoleon Bonaparte to desist from his projects, and to place him in a
situation in which he will no longer have it in his power to disturb
the peace of the world; and, by the third article, the powers of
Europe have agreed not to lay down their arms till ... it shall have
been rendered impossible for Bonaparte to excite fresh troubles....
“I could not consider his abdication of a usurped power in favour of
his son, and his handing over the government provisionally to five
persons named by himself, to be that description of security which
the allies had in view, which should induce them to lay down their
arms; and therefore I continue my operations....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 508.)
_To the French Commissioners._
“HEAD-QUARTERS, June 26th, 1815.
... “Since the 15th instant, when Napoleon Bonaparte, at the head
of the French armies, invaded the dominions of the king of the
Netherlands, and attacked the Prussian army the Field-Marshal has
considered his sovereign, and those powers whose armies he commands,
in a state of war with the government of France; and he does not
consider the abdication of Napoleon Bonaparte of his usurped
authority, under all the circumstances which have preceded and
attended that measure, as the attainment of the object held out in
the declarations and treaties of the allies, which should induce them
to lay down their arms.
“The Field-Marshal cannot consent therefore to any suspension of
hostilities, however desirous he is of preventing the farther
effusion of blood.
“Their Excellencies ... will probably consider any interview with him
a useless waste of their time....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 512.)
It will appear, by the subjoined documents, that Wellington was
tender of the life of Napoleon, who had not spared that of the duc
d’Enghien, and who had declared that he would treat in the same way,
that is, put to death, any Bourbon prince he should catch within
the boundaries of his empire. Blücher was eager to put Bonaparte to
death, as the guilty author of so much rapine and bloodshed; and
to punish the Parisians by fines, the destruction of the bridge of
Jena, and of their city itself, if they proved refractory. From this
dreadful retaliation, it required all the influence of the Duke over
Blücher to preserve them. Posterity should know, if the French will
not pay attention to the fact, through whose intervention Napoleon’s
life was spared, and Paris saved from dishonour, if not pillage and
utter destruction.
_To Sir Charles Stuart, G.C.B._
“ORVILLÉ, June 28th, 1815.
“MY DEAR STUART,
“I send you my dispatches, which will make you acquainted with the
state of affairs. You may show them to Talleyrand if you choose.
“General —— has been here this day to negotiate for Napoleon’s
passing to America, to which proposition I have answered that I have
no authority. The Prussians think the Jacobins wish to give him over
to me, believing that I will save his life. Blücher wishes to kill
him; but I have told him that I shall remonstrate, and shall insist
upon his being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said
that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with
so foul a transaction; that he and I had acted too distinguished
parts in these transactions to become executioners; and that I was
determined, that if the sovereigns wished to put him to death, they
should appoint an executioner, which should not be me....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 516.)
_To Marshal Prince Blücher._
“GONESSE, July 2d, 1815.
“SIR,
“I requested general Müffling to write to your Highness yesterday,
upon the subject of the propositions which had been made to me by the
French commissioners for a suspension of hostilities, upon which I
have not yet had a positive answer from your Highness....
“If we choose it, we can settle all our matters now, by agreeing to
the proposed armistice....
“By adopting this measure, we provide for the quiet restoration of
his Majesty to his throne; which is that result of the war which the
sovereigns of all of us have always considered the most beneficial
for us all, and the most likely to lead to permanent peace in Europe.
“It is true we shall not have the vain triumph of entering Paris at
the head of our victorious troops; but ... I doubt our having the
means at present of succeeding in an attack upon Paris; and, if we
are to wait till the arrival of marshal prince Wrede to make the
attack, I think we shall find the sovereigns disposed, as they were
last year, to spare the capital of their ally, and either not to
enter the town at all, or enter it under an armistice, such as it is
in your power and mine to sign this day.
“I earnestly urge your Highness ... to let me have your decision
whether you will agree to any armistice, or not....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 526-7.)
_To the French Commissioners._
“GONESSE, July 2d, 1815.
“It is my duty to apprize your Excellencies, that I have just
received a letter from marshal prince Blücher, who expresses the
greatest aversion to granting an armistice.... I have written to him
once more, having the greatest desire to save your capital from the
danger which menaces it; and I expect his answer to-night....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol XII, page 528.)
_To Marshal Prince Blücher._
“PARIS, July 8th, 1815, midnight.
“MEIN LIEBER FÜRST,
“Several reports have been brought to me during the evening and
night, and some from the government, in consequence of the work
carrying on by your Highness on one of the bridges over the Seine,
which it is supposed to be your intention to destroy.
“As this measure will certainly create a good deal of disturbance in
the town, and as the sovereigns, when they were here before, left all
these bridges, etc., standing, I take the liberty of suggesting to
you to delay the destruction of the bridge, at least till they shall
arrive; or, at all events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you
to-morrow morning.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 549.)
The duke of Wellington was obliged to continue his mediation with
Blücher, to prevent the exasperated veteran from punishing the
pockets and humbling the pride of the Parisians; and for this his
generous and enlightened intervention the Duke did not receive the
gratitude that was due to him, as must appear from the following
letters:
_To Marshal Prince Blücher._
“PARIS, July 9th, 1815.
“The subjects on which lord Castlereagh and I conversed with
your Highness and general comte Gneisenau this morning, viz. the
destruction of the bridge of Jena and the levy of the contribution
of one hundred millions of francs upon the city of Paris, appear to
me to be so important to the allies in general, that I cannot allow
myself to omit to draw your Highness’s attention to them again in
this shape.
“The destruction of the bridge of Jena is highly disagreeable to the
king and to the people, and may occasion disturbance in the city.
It is not merely a military measure, but is one likely to attach to
the character of our operations, and is of political importance. It
is adopted solely because the bridge is considered a monument of the
battle of Jena, notwithstanding that the government are willing to
change the name of the bridge.
“Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to observe that
its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made
to the commissioners on the part of the French army, during the
negotiation of the convention; viz. that the monuments, museums,
etc., should be reserved for the decision of the allied sovereigns.
“All that I ask is, that the execution of the orders given for the
destruction of the bridge may be suspended till the sovereigns shall
arrive here, when, if it should be agreed by common accord that the
bridge ought to be destroyed, I shall have no objection....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 552-3.)
_To Monsieur_ ——.
“PARIS, July 13th, 1815.
“I have received your letter of the 10th. Perhaps if you had taken
the trouble to inform yourself respecting the works of the Prussian
army at the bridge of Jena, and the part I have acted in this affair,
you would think that I do not merit the reproaches which you with
your signature, and others anonymously, have made me on this subject.
“But I ascribe them to the levity with which impressions are received
and are allowed to influence the actions of men, and the most
important measures, in this country; and if the injustice you have
done me in your letter lead you to inquire and reflect before you
ever again bring a charge against a public man, I pardon you.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 555-6.)
The pains which the Duke took to preserve the strictest discipline
amongst the troops under his command, and which far surpassed the
care taken by other commanders in similar circumstances, entitled him
to the gratitude of the Parisians, but did not always exempt him from
ill-timed and unreasonable demands. The following severe but just
reply was provoked by general comte de Vaubois, who seems to have
importuned the Duke for compensation for damages said to be done by
the British troops to the French people:
_To General Comte de Vaubois._
“PARIS, November 10th, 1815.
“MONSIEUR,
“You, who have served, must be well aware that it is not possible to
give compensation to the full amount for all the damages arising
from the presence of an army in a country, or the irregularities
of individual soldiers, or the inevitable consequences of military
occupation. It is quite true that I usually require reparation to be
made for damages caused to the inhabitants by any irregularities of
the troops, especially of English troops. But it is more as a means
of discipline than as a full compensation to the inhabitants; and I
cannot adopt in every case the same means with foreign troops, who
are not so well, nor so regularly paid.
“The fact is, _M. le général_, that France, in carrying her arms
into other countries, caused misery, devastation and ruin: I myself
have been eyewitness of the destruction of property throughout whole
provinces, that refused to submit to the yoke of the tyrant, and that
were in consequence entirely depopulated.
“Although private revenge ought never to be the motive of a man, and
most assuredly it is not that of the allied sovereigns, we can hardly
expect that soldiers, men taken from the poorest and most hardy ranks
of society, after having seen their properties, or those of their
relatives, burned, sacked, destroyed by the French, should have any
very great respect for French property, when, by the fortune of war,
they find themselves in France.
“It is our duty, it is the interest of all of us, more even, I
think, than that it is the duty of the French government, to prevent
those acts of devastation; and I believe that there is no one who
has endeavoured to do this duty so much as I have. But, _M. le
général_, you know what armies are; and I appeal to your judgment:
is it possible entirely to prevent such occurences in such an army
as is under my command; particularly when the soldier is excited by
the remembrance of the evils which he and his relatives have had to
endure at the hands of French troops?...
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 685-6.)
_To H.R.H. Prince Frederick of Orange._
“PARIS, November 10th, 1815.
“I send you a letter I have just received from general comte
de Vaubois, concerning the damages done by the soldiers of the
Netherlands.
“You will see that their officers were not present at their bivac ...
and that the damage done by them amounts to 30,000 francs, a sum ten
times greater perhaps than the general will have to pay, as his part
of the contribution to the allies, in five years. It is clearly of
great importance that the allies prevent these irregularities.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 686.)
Many have been pleased to say that the duke of Wellington both
could and ought to have interposed to save marshal Ney from being
ignominiously executed. Without entering into the question, whether
Ney was a perjured traitor to Louis XVIII, and if so, what was the
meetest punishment for his treason, it may be confidently averred
that Napoleon would have spared no man under similar circumstances.
The following documents are worthy of attention:
MEMORANDUM
RESPECTING MARSHAL NEY.
“PARIS, November 19th, 1815.
“It is extraordinary that Madame la maréchale Ney should have thought
proper to publish in print parts of a conversation which she is
supposed to have had with the duke of Wellington; and that she has
omitted to publish that which is a much better record of the Duke’s
opinion on the subject to which the conversation related; viz. the
Duke’s letter to the maréchal prince de la Moskowa, in answer to the
maréchal’s note to his Grace. That letter was as follows:
“November, 14th, 1815.
“I have had the honour of receiving the note which you addressed
to me on the 13th November, relating to the operation of the
capitulation of Paris on your case. The capitulation of Paris of
the 3d July was made between the commanders in chief of the allied
British and Prussian armies on the one part, and the prince
d’Eckmühl, commander in chief of the French army, on the other; and
related exclusively to the military occupation of Paris.
“The object of the 12th article was to prevent the adoption of any
measures of severity, under the military authority of those who
made it, towards any persons in Paris on account of the offices
which they had filled, or their conduct, or their political
opinions. But it was never intended, and could not be intended,
to prevent either the existing French government, under whose
authority the French commander in chief must have acted, or any
French government which should succeed to it, from acting in this
respect as it might deem fit.”
“It is obvious from this letter that the duke of Wellington, one
of the parties to the capitulation of Paris, considers that that
instrument contains nothing which can prevent the king from bringing
marshal Ney to trial in such manner as his Majesty may think
proper[103].
“The contents of the capitulation fully confirm the justice of the
Duke’s opinion. It is made between the commanders in chief of the
contending armies respectively; and the first nine articles relate
solely to the mode and time of the evacuation of Paris by the French
army, and of the occupation by the British and Prussian armies.
“The 10th article provides that the existing authorities shall be
respected by the two commanders in chief of the allies; the 11th,
that public property shall be respected, and that the allies shall
not interfere _en aucune manière dans leur administration et dans
leur gestion_; (in any manner, either in their administration or in
their management;) and the 12th article states, _Seront pareillement
respectées les personnes et les propriétés particulières: les
habitants, et, en général, tous les individus qui se trouvent dans
la capitale, continueront à jouir de leurs droits et libertés, sans
pouvoir être inquiétés, ni recherchés en rien relativement aux
fonctions qu’il occupent, ou auraient occupées, à leur conduite, et
à leurs opinions politiques_. (The persons as well as the property
of individuals, shall be equally respected; the inhabitants, and in
general every individual residing in the capital, shall continue in
full possession of their rights and liberties, without being molested
in any manner, on account of the functions which they may have
filled, their conduct, or their political opinions.)
“By whom were these private properties and persons to be respected?
By the allied generals and their troops mentioned in the 10th and
11th articles; and not by other parties to whom the convention did
not relate in any manner.
“The 13th article provides that _les troupes étrangères_, (the
foreign troops) shall not obstruct the carriage of provisions by land
or water to the capital.
“Thus it appears that every article in the convention relates
exclusively to the operations of the different armies, or to the
conduct of the allies and that of their generals, when they should
enter Paris; and, as the duke of Wellington states in his dispatch of
the 4th of July, with which he transmitted the convention to England,
it ‘decided all the military points then existing at Paris, and
touched nothing political[104].’
“But it appears clearly that, not only was this the Duke’s opinion of
the convention at the time it was signed, but likewise the opinion of
Carnot, of marshal Ney, and of every other person who had an interest
in considering the subject.
“Carnot says, in the _Exposé de la conduite politique de M. Carnot_,
(page 43,) _Il fut résolu d’envoyer aux généraux anglais et prussiens
une commission spéciale chargée de leur proposer une convention
purement militaire, pour la remise de la ville de Paris entre leurs
mains, en écartant toute question politique, puisqu’on ne pouvait
préjuger quelles seraient les intentions des alliés, lorsqu’ils
seraient réunis_. (It was decided to forward to the English and
Prussian generals a special commission, to the purport of proposing
to them a convention, purely military, for the surrender of the city
of Paris into their hands, setting aside all political questions,
since it was impossible to foresee what might be the ultimate
intentions of the allies, when they should be assembled.)
“It appears that marshal Ney fled from Paris in disguise, with a
passport given to him by the duc d’Otrante, under a feigned name,
on the 6th of July. He could not be supposed to be ignorant of the
tenor of the 12th article of the convention; and he must then have
known whether it was the intention of the parties who made it, that
it should protect him from the measures which the king, then at
St.-Denis, should think proper to adopt against him.
“But if marshal Ney could be supposed ignorant of the intention of
the 12th article, the duc d’Otrante, could not, as he was at the
head of the provisional government, under whose authority the prince
d’Eckmühl must have acted when he signed the convention[105].
“Would the duc d’Otrante have given a passport under a feigned name
to marshal Ney, if he had understood the 12th article as giving the
marshal any protection, excepting against measures of severity by the
two commanders in chief?
“Another proof of what was the opinion of the duc d’Otrante, of
the king’s ministers, and of all the persons most interested is
establishing the meaning now attempted to be given to the 12th
article of the convention of the 3d July, is the king’s proclamation
of the 24th July, by which nineteen persons are ordered for trial,
and thirty-eight persons are ordered to quit Paris, and to reside in
particular parts of France, under the observation and superintendence
of the police, till the Chambers should decide upon their fate[106].
“Did the duc d’Otrante, did any of the persons who are the objects of
this proclamation, did any person on their behalf, ever then, or now,
claim for them the protection of the 12th article of the convention?
Certainly the convention was then understood, as it ought to be
understood now, viz. that it was exclusively military and was never
intended to bind the then existing government of France, or any
government which should succeed it.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, p. 694-6.)
EXTRACT FROM THE PROCLAMATION OF LOUIS XVIII.
“CAMBRAY, June 28th, 1815.
... “In the plot which they contrived, I perceive many of my subjects
to have been misled, and some guilty. I promise—I who never promised
in vain, as all Europe can witness,—to pardon to misled Frenchmen
all that has transpired since the day I quitted Lille amidst so
many tears, up to the day I re-entered Cambray, amidst so many
acclamations. But the blood of my people has flowed in consequence of
a treason unprecedented in the annals of the world. That treason has
summoned foreigners into the heart of France; every day reveals to
me a new disaster. I owe it, therefore, to the dignity of my crown,
to the interest of my people, and to the repose of Europe, to except
from pardon the instigators and authors of this horrible plot. They
shall be delivered over to the vindication of the laws by the two
Chambers, which I propose forthwith to assemble....
“LOUIS.”
_To ——[107], Esq._
“PARIS, August 8th, 1815.
“MY DEAR SIR,
“I have received your letter of the 2d, regarding the battle of
Waterloo. The object which you propose to yourself is very difficult
of attainment, and, if really attained, is not a little invidious.
The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some
individuals may recollect all the little events, of which the great
result is the battle won or lost; but no individual can recollect the
order in which, or the exact moment at which they occurred, which
makes all the difference as to their value or importance.
“Then the faults or the misbehaviour of some gave occasion for the
distinction of others, and perhaps were the cause of material losses;
and you cannot write a true history of a battle without including the
faults and misbehaviour of part at least of those engaged.
“Believe me that every man you see in a military uniform is not a
hero; and that, although in the account given of a general action,
such as that of Waterloo, many instances of individual heroism must
be passed over unrelated, it is better for the general interests to
leave those parts of the story untold, than to tell the whole truth.
“If, however, you should still think it right to turn your attention
to this subject, I am most ready to give you every assistance and
information in my power.
“Believe me, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 590.)
_To the same._
“PARIS, August 17th, 1815.
“MY DEAR SIR,
“I have received your letter of the 11th, and I regret much that I
have not been able to prevail upon you to relinquish your plan.
“You may depend upon it, you will never make it a satisfactory work.
“I will get you the list of the French army, generals, etc.
“Just to show you how little reliance can be placed, even on what are
supposed the best accounts of a battle, I mention that there are some
circumstances mentioned in general Müffling’s account which did not
occur as he relates them.
“He was not on the field during the whole battle, particularly not
during the latter part of it.
“The battle began, I believe, at eleven.
“It is impossible so say when each important occurrence took place,
nor in what order. We were attacked first with infantry only; then,
with cavalry only; lastly, and principally, with cavalry and infantry
mixed.
“No houses were possessed by the enemy in Mont-St.-Jean, excepting
the farm in front of the left of our centre[108], on the road to
Genappe, can be called one. This they got, I think, at about two
o’clock, and got it from a circumstance which is to be attributed to
the neglect of the officer commanding on the spot.
“The French cavalry were on the plateau in the centre between the two
high-roads for nearly three quarters of an hour, riding about among
our squares of infantry, all firing having ceased on both sides. I
moved our squares forward to the guns; and our cavalry, which had
been detached by lord Uxbridge to the flanks, was brought back to
the centre. The French cavalry were then driven off. After that
circumstance, repeated attacks were made along the whole front of the
centre of the position, by cavalry and infantry, till seven at night.
How many I cannot tell.
“When the enemy attacked sir Thomas Picton I was there, and they got
as far as the hedge on the cross-road, behind which the —— had been
formed. The latter had run away, and our troops were on our side of
the hedge. The French were driven off with immense loss. This was
the first principal attack. At about two in the afternoon, as I have
above said, they got possession of the farm-house on the high-road,
which defended this part of the position; and they then took
possession of a small mound on the left of the high-road going from
Brussels, immediately opposite the gate of the farm; and they were
never removed from thence till I commenced the attack in the evening:
but they never advanced farther on that side.
“These are answers to all your queries; but remember, I recommend to
you to leave the battle of Waterloo as it is.
“Believe me, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, p. 609-610.)
The fair inference is, that the Duke, on seeing the orchard and
garden of La Haye-Sainte in possession of the enemy about two o’clock
P.M., thought the farm was also in their hands, which certainly was
not the case till about five o’clock.
The farm-house in question, La Haye-Sainte, was lost from a
deficiency of _proper_ ammunition; its gallant defenders were
riflemen. Who was to be blamed for that deficiency, it is difficult
now to ascertain: the Duke, it appears, thought the officer
commanding on the spot was censurable on this account. Let me be
allowed to record my regret, that on this and many other occasions,
valuable lives and important posts were often lost, owing to our
having three different sizes for ball cartridges. If there were
but one size, as I think there might be, for cavalry, infantry
and rifles, the mutual supply of ammunition would be at all times
practicable, and, in critical moments, of the utmost value.
_To His Royal Highness the Duke of York._
“ORVILLÉ, June 28th, 1815.
... “I would beg leave to suggest to your Royal Highness the
expediency of giving to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers
engaged in the battle of Waterloo, a medal[109]. I am convinced it
would have the best effect in the army; and, if the battle should
settle our concerns, they will well deserve it....
“WELLINGTON.”
(_Gurwood_, vol. XII, page 520.)
_To Earl Bathurst._
“PARIS, September 17th, 1815.
“MY DEAR LORD,