English, Prussian and French official accounts of the
battle.—Marshal Grouchy’s report of the battle of Wavre.—Returns of
the different armies.—Position of the allied artillery.—Artillery,
etc., taken at Waterloo.—Questions connected with the campaign:
Wellington’s position at Waterloo.—Opinion of general
Jomini.—The Duke’s plans and expectations.—His letter to lord
Castlereagh.—Resolution of the allied powers, on receiving the
intelligence of Napoleon’s flight from Elba.—Wellington’s letter to
general Kleist.—The Duke’s decision.—His anticipations.—Obstacles
which his Grace met with.—Conduct of the Saxon troops.—Blücher
forced by them to quit Liège.—Wellington’s resolution concerning
these troops.
OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.
The dispatch of the duke of Wellington, written immediately after the
battle, cannot fail to interest every one. It is a document which has
fixed the attention of statesmen and soldiers, not more on account
of the importance of the event it describes, than for the noble
simplicity, perfect calmness and exemplary modesty which characterize
the great man who penned it: it stands in honourable contrast with
the hurried, inflated, untrue accounts of military achievements not
unfrequently given by commanders of no small renown.
(_London Gazette extraordinary._)
“DOWNING-STREET, June 22d, 1815.
“Major the Hon. H. Percy arrived late last night with a dispatch
from field-marshal the duke of Wellington, K.G., to Earl Bathurst,
his Majesty’s principal secretary of state for the war department,
of which the following is a copy:
_To Earl Bathurst._
“WATERLOO, June 19th, 1815.
“MY LORD,
“Bonaparte, having collected the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps
of the French army, and the Imperial guard, and nearly all the
cavalry, on the Sambre, and between that river and the Meuse,
between the 10th and 14th of the month, advanced on the 15th, and
attacked the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobbes, on the Sambre,
at day-light in the morning.
“I did not hear of these events till in the evening of the 15th;
and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march, and
afterwards to march to their left, as soon as I had intelligence
from other quarters to prove that the enemy’s movement upon
Charleroi was the real attack.
“The enemy drove the Prussian posts from the Sambre on that
day; and general Zieten, who commanded the corps which had been
at Charleroi, retired upon Fleurus; and marshal prince Blücher
concentrated the Prussian army upon Sombreffe, holding the
villages in front of his position of St.-Amand and Ligny.
“The enemy continued his march along the road from Charleroi
towards Brussels; and, on the same evening, the 15th, attacked
a brigade of the army of the Netherlands, under the Prince de
Weimar, posted at Frasnes, and forced it back to the farm-house,
on the same road, called les Quatre-Bras.
“The prince of Orange immediately reinforced this brigade with
another of the same division, under general Perponcher, and, in
the morning early, regained part of the ground which had been
lost, so as to have the command of the communication leading from
Nivelles and Brussels with marshal Blücher’s position.
“In the mean time, I had directed the whole army to march upon
les Quatre-Bras; and the 5th division, under lieutenant-general
sir Thomas Picton, arrived at about half-past two in the day,
followed by the corps of troops under the duke of Brunswick, and
afterwards by the contingent of Nassau.
“At this time, the enemy commenced an attack upon Prince Blücher
with his whole force, excepting the 1st and 2d corps, and a corps
of cavalry under general Kellermann, with which he attacked our
post at Les Quatre-Bras.
“The Prussian army maintained their position with their usual
gallantry and perseverance, against a great disparity of numbers,
as the 4th corps of their army, under general Bulow, had not
joined; and I was not able to assist them as I wished, as I was
attacked myself, and the troops, the cavalry in particular, which
had a long distance to march, had not arrived.
“We maintained our position also, and completely defeated and
repulsed all the enemy’s attempts to get possession of it. The
enemy repeatedly attacked us with a large body of infantry and
cavalry, supported by a numerous and powerful artillery. He made
several charges with the cavalry upon our infantry, but all were
repulsed in the steadiest manner.
“In this affair, his Royal Highness the prince of Orange, the
Duke of Brunswick, and lieutenant-general sir Thomas Picton, and
majors-generals sir James Kempt and sir Denis Pack, who were
engaged from the commencement of the enemy’s attack, highly
distinguished themselves, as well as lieutenant-general Charles
baron Alten, major-general sir Colin Halkett, lieutenant-general
Cooke, and major-generals Maitland and Byng, as they successively
arrived. The troops of the 5th division, and those of the
Brunswick corps, were long and severely engaged, and conducted
themselves with the utmost gallantry. I must particularly mention
the 28th, 42d, 79th, and 92d regiments, and the battalion of
Hanoverians.
“Our loss was great, as your Lordship will perceive by the
enclosed return; and I have particularly to regret his Serene
Highness the duke of Brunswick, who fell fighting gallantly at
the head of his troops.
“Although marshal Blücher had maintained his position at
Sombreffe, he still found himself much weakened by the severity
of the contest in which he had been engaged, and, as the 4th
corps had not arrived, he determined to fall back and to
concentrate his army upon Wavre; and he marched in the night,
after the action was over.
“This movement of the marshal rendered necessary a corresponding
one upon my part; and I retired from the farm of Quatre-Bras upon
Genappe, and thence upon Waterloo, the next morning, the 17th, at
ten o’clock.
“The enemy made no effort to pursue marshal Blücher. On the
contrary, a patrol which I sent to Sombreffe in the morning found
all quiet[81]; and the enemy’s vedettes fell back as the patrol
advanced. Neither did he attempt to molest our march to the rear,
although made in the middle of the day, excepting by following,
with a large body of cavalry brought from his right, the cavalry
under the earl of Uxbridge.
“This gave lord Uxbridge an opportunity of charging them with
the 1st life-guards, upon their _débouché_ from the village of
Genappe; upon which occasion his Lordship has declared himself to
be well satisfied with that regiment.
“The position which I took up in front of Waterloo crossed the
high-roads from Charleroi and Nivelles, and had its right thrown
back to a ravine near Merbe-Braine, which was occupied and its
left extended to a height above the hamlet Ter-la-Haye, which was
likewise occupied. In front of the right centre, and near the
Nivelles road, we occupied the house and gardens of Hougoumont,
which covered the return of that flank; and in front of the
left centre we occupied the farm of La Haye-Sainte. By our left
we communicated with marshal prince Blücher at Wavre, through
Ohain; and the marshal had promised me that, in case we should be
attacked, he would support me with one or more corps, as might be
necessary.
“The enemy collected his army, with the exception of the 3d
corps, which had been sent to observe marshal Blücher, on a range
of heights in our front, in the course of the night of the 17th
and yesterday morning; and at about ten o’clock he commenced a
furious attack upon our post at Hougoumont. I had occupied that
post with a detachment from general Byng’s brigade of guards,
which was in position in its rear; and it was for some time under
the command of lieutenant-colonel Macdonell, and afterwards of
colonel Home; and I am happy to add, that it was maintained
throughout the day with the utmost gallantry by these brave
troops, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of large bodies of
the enemy to obtain possession of it.
“The attack upon the right of our centre was accompanied by a
very heavy cannonade upon our whole line, which was destined
to support the repeated attacks of cavalry and infantry,
occasionally mixed, but sometimes separate, which were made
upon it. In one of these the enemy carried the farm-house of
La Haye-Sainte, as the detachment of the light battalion of
the German legion, which occupied it, had expended all its
ammunition; and the enemy occupied the only communication there
was with them.
“The enemy repeatedly charged our infantry with his cavalry, but
these attacks were uniformly unsuccessful; and they afforded
opportunities to our cavalry to charge, in one of which lord
Edward Somerset’s brigade, consisting of the life-guards, the
Royal horse-guards and 1st dragoon guards, highly distinguished
themselves, as did that of major-general sir William Ponsonby,
having taken many prisoners and an eagle.
“These attacks were repeated till about seven in the evening,
when the enemy made a desperate effort with cavalry and infantry,
supported by the fire of artillery, to force our left centre,
near the farm of La Haye-Sainte, which, after a severe contest,
was defeated; and, having observed that the troops retired
from this attack in great confusion, and that the march of
general Bulow’s corps, by Frischermont, upon Plancenoit and
La Belle-Alliance, had begun to take effect, and as I could
perceive the fire of his cannon, and as marshal prince Blücher
had joined in person with a corps of his army to the left of our
line by Ohain, I determined to attack the enemy, and immediately
advanced the whole line of infantry, supported by the cavalry and
artillery. The attack succeeded in every point: the enemy was
forced from his positions on the heights, and fled in the utmost
confusion, leaving behind him, as far as I could judge, a hundred
and fifty pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, which fell
into our hands.
“I continued the pursuit till long after dark, and then
discontinued it only on account of the fatigue of our troops,
who had been engaged during twelve hours, and because I found
myself on the same road with marshal Blücher, who assured me
of his intention to follow the enemy throughout the night. He
has sent me word this morning that he had taken sixty pieces of
cannon belonging to the Imperial guard, and several carriages,
baggage, etc., belonging to Bonaparte, in Genappe.
“I propose to move this morning upon Nivelles, and not to
discontinue my operations.
“Your Lordship will observe that such a desperate action could
not be fought, and such advantages could not be gained, without
great loss; and I am sorry to add that ours has been immense. In
lieutenant-general sir Thomas Picton his Majesty has sustained
the loss of an officer who has frequently distinguished himself
in his service; and he fell gloriously leading his division to a
charge with bayonets, by which one of the most serious attacks
made by the enemy on our position was repulsed. The earl of
Uxbridge, after having successfully got through this arduous day,
received a wound by almost the last shot fired, which will, I am
afraid, deprive his Majesty for some time of his services.
“His Royal Highness the prince of Orange distinguished himself
by his gallantry and conduct till he received a wound from a
musket-ball through the shoulder, which obliged him to quit the
field.
“It gives me the greatest satisfaction to assure your Lordship
that the army never, upon any occasion, conducted itself better.
The division of guards, under lieutenant-general Cooke, who is
severely wounded, major-general Maitland, and major-general Byng,
set an example which was followed by all; and there is no officer
nor description of troops that did not behave well.
“I must, however, particularly mention, for his Royal Highness’s
approbation, lieutenant-general sir Henry Clinton, major-general
Adam, lieutenant-general Charles baron Alten (severely wounded),
major-general sir Colin Halkett (severely wounded), colonel
Ompteda, colonel Mitchell (commanding a brigade of the 4th
division), major-generals sir James Kempt and sir Denis Pack,
major-general Lambert, major-general lord Edward Somerset,
major-general sir William Ponsonby, major-general sir Colquhoun
Grant, and major-general sir Hussey Vivian, major-general sir J.
O. Vandeleur, and major-general count Dornberg,
“I am also particularly indebted to general lord Hill for his
assistance and conduct upon this, as upon all former occasions.
“The artillery and engineer departments were conducted much to
my satisfaction, by colonel sir George Wood and colonel Smith;
and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the
adjutant-general, major-general Barnes, who was wounded, and of
the quarter-master-general colonel De Lancey, who was killed by
a cannon-shot in the middle of the action. This officer is a
serious loss to his Majesty’s service, and to me at this moment.
“I was likewise much indebted to the assistance of
lieutenant-colonel lord Fitzroy Somerset, who was severely
wounded and of the officers composing my personal staff, who have
suffered severely in this action. Lieutenant-colonel the Hon.
sir Alexander Gordon, who has died of his wounds, was a most
promising officer, and is a serious loss to his Majesty’s service.
“General Kruse, of the Nassau service, likewise conducted himself
much to my satisfaction; as did general Tripp, commanding the
heavy brigade of cavalry, and general Vanhope, commanding a
brigade of infantry in the service of the king of the Netherlands.
“General Pozzo di Borgo, general baron Vincent, general Müffling,
and general Alava, were in the field during the action, and
rendered me every assistance in their power. Baron Vincent is
wounded, but I hope not severely; and general Pozzo di Borgo
received a contusion.
“I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to marshal
Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the
successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely
assistance I received from them. The operation of general Bulow
upon the enemy’s flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I
had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which
produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to
retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have
prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should
unfortunately have succeeded.
“Since writing the above, I have received a report that
major-general sir William Ponsonby is killed; and, in announcing
this intelligence to your Lordship, I have to add the expression
of my grief for the fate of an officer who had already rendered
very brilliant and important services, and was an ornament to his
profession.
“I send with this dispatch two eagles, taken by the troops in
this action, which major Percy will have the honour of laying at
the feet of his Royal Highness. I beg leave to recommend him to
your Lordship’s protection.
“I have the honour to be, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
_To Earl Bathurst._
“BRUSSELS, June 19th, 1815.
“MY LORD,
“I have to inform your Lordship, in addition to my dispatch of this
morning, that we have already got here five thousand prisoners,
taken in the action of yesterday, and that there are above two
thousand more coming in to-morrow. There will probably be many more.
“Amongst the prisoners are the comte de Lobau, who commanded the
6th corps, and general Cambronne, who commanded a division of the
guard.
“I propose to send the whole to England, by Ostend.
“I have the honour to be, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
MARSHAL BLUCHER’S OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE PRUSSIAN
ARMY OF THE LOWER RHINE.
(The Marshal’s account of the battle of Ligny is omitted, as,
however interesting, it does not strictly belong to this work.)
... “On the 17th, in the evening, the Prussian army concentrated
itself in the environs of Wavre. Napoleon put himself in motion
against lord Wellington upon the great road leading from Charleroi
to Brussels. An English division maintained, on the same day,
(16th,) near Quatre-Bras, a very severe contest with the enemy.
Lord Wellington had taken a position on the road to Brussels,
having his right wing leaning upon Braine-l’Alleud, the centre
near Mont-St.-Jean, and the left wing against La Haye-Sainte.
Lord Wellington wrote to the Field-Marshal, that he was resolved
to accept the battle in this position, if the Field-Marshal would
support him with two corps of his army. The Field-Marshal promised
to come with his whole army; he even proposed, in case Napoleon
should not attack, that the allies themselves, with their whole
united force, should attack him the next day. This may serve
to show how little the battle of the 16th had disorganized the
Prussian army, or weakened its moral strength. Thus ended the day
of the 17th.”
BATTLE OF THE 18TH.
“At break of day the Prussian army again began to move. The 4th
and 2d corps marched by St.-Lambert, where they were to take a
position, covered by the forest, (near Frischermont,) to take the
enemy in the rear, when the moment should appear favourable. The
first corps was to operate by Ohain, on the right flank of the
enemy. The third corps was to follow slowly, in order to afford
succour in case of need. The battle began about ten o’clock in the
morning. The English army occupied the heights of Mont-St.-Jean;
that of the French was on the heights before Plancenoit: the former
was about 80,000 strong; the enemy had above 130,000. In a short
time, the battle became general along the whole line. It seems that
Napoleon had the design to throw the left wing upon the centre,
and thus to effect the separation of the English army from the
Prussian, which he believed to be retreating upon Maestricht. For
this purpose, he had placed the greatest part of his reserve in the
centre, against his right wing, and upon this point he attacked
with fury. The English army fought with a valour which it is
impossible to surpass. The repeated charges of the old guard were
baffled by the intrepidity of the Scottish regiments; and at every
charge the French cavalry was overthrown by the English cavalry.
But the superiority of the enemy in numbers was too great: Napoleon
continually brought forward considerable masses; and, with whatever
firmness the English troops maintained themselves in their
position, it was not possible but that such heroic exertions must
have a limit.
“It was half-past four o’clock. The excessive difficulties of the
passage by the defile of St.-Lambert had considerably retarded the
march of the Prussian columns, so that only two brigades of the
4th corps had arrived at the covered position which was assigned
to them. The decisive moment was come; there was not an instant to
be lost. The generals did not suffer it to escape: they resolved
immediately to begin the attack with the troops which they had at
hand. General Bulow, therefore, with two brigades and a corps of
cavalry, advanced rapidly upon the rear of the enemy’s right wing.
The enemy did not lose his presence of mind; he instantly turned
his reserve against us, and a murderous conflict began on that
side. The combat remained long uncertain, while the battle with the
English army still continued with the same violence.
“Towards six o’clock in the evening, we received the news that
general Thielmann, with the 3d corps, was attacked near Wavre by a
very considerable corps of the enemy, and that they were already
disputing the possession of the town. The Field-Marshal, however,
did not suffer himself to be disturbed by this news; it was on the
spot where he was, and nowhere else, that the affair was to be
decided. A conflict continually supported by the same obstinacy,
and kept up by fresh troops, could alone ensure the victory, and
if it were obtained here, any reverse sustained near Wavre was
of little consequence. The columns, therefore, continued their
movements.
“It was half an hour past seven, and the issue of the battle was
still uncertain. The whole of the 4th corps, and a part of the 2d,
under general Pirch, had successively come up. The French troops
fought with desperate fury: however, some uncertainty was perceived
in their movements, and it was observed that some pieces of cannon
were retreating. At this moment, the first columns of the corps of
general Zieten arrived on the points of attack, near the village
of Smohain, on the enemy’s right flank, and instantly charged.
This movement decided the defeat of the enemy. His right wing was
broken in three places; he abandoned his positions. Our troops
rushed forward at the _pas de charge_, and attacked him on all
sides, while, at the same time, the whole English line advanced.
“Circumstances were extremely favourable to the attack formed by
the Prussian army: the ground rose in an amphitheatre, so that our
artillery could freely open its fire from the summit of a great
many heights which rose gradually above each other, and in the
intervals of which the troops descended into the plain, formed
into brigades, and in the greatest order; while fresh columns
continually unfolded themselves, issuing from the forest on the
height behind us. The enemy, however, still preserved means to
retreat, till the village of Plancenoit, which he had on his rear,
and which was defended by the guard, was, after several bloody
attacks, carried by storm.
“From that time the retreat became a rout, that soon spread
throughout the whole French army, which, in its dreadful confusion,
hurrying away everything that attempted to stop it, soon assumed
the appearance of the flight of an army of barbarians. It was
half-past nine. The Field-Marshal assembled all the superior
officers, and gave orders to send the last horse and the last man
in pursuit of the enemy.
“The van of the army accelerated its march. The French, being
pursued without intermission, were absolutely disorganized. The
causeway presented the appearance of an immense shipwreck: it
was covered with an innumerable quantity of cannon, caissons,
carriages, baggage, arms, and wrecks of every kind. Those of the
enemy who had attempted to repose for a time, and had not expected
to be so quickly pursued, were driven from more than nine bivacs.
In some villages they attempted to maintain themselves; but as
soon as they heard the beating of our drums, or the sound of the
trumpet, they either fled, or threw themselves into the houses,
where they were cut down, or made prisoners. It was moonlight,
which greatly favoured the pursuit; for the whole march was but a
continued chase, either in the corn-fields, or the houses.
“At Genappe, the enemy had intrenched himself with cannon and
overturned carriages: at our approach, we suddenly heard in the
town a great noise, and a motion of carriages; at the entrance
we were exposed to a brisk fire of musketry: we replied by some
cannon-shot, followed by a _hurrah!_ and an instant after, the
town was ours. It was here that, among many other equipages, the
carriage of Napoleon was taken: he had just left it to mount on
horseback, and, in his hurry, had forgotten in it his sword and
hat. Thus the affairs continued till break of day. About forty
thousand men, in the most complete disorder, the remains of the
whole army have saved themselves, retreating through Charleroi,
partly without arms, and carrying with them only twenty-seven
pieces of their numerous artillery.
“The enemy, in his flight, had passed all his fortresses, the only
defence of his frontiers, which are now passed by our armies.
“At three o’clock, Napoleon had dispatched, from the field of
battle, a courier to Paris, with the news that victory was no
longer doubtful: a few hours after, he had no longer any army
left. We have not yet an exact account of the enemy’s loss; it is
enough to know, that two thirds of the whole were killed, wounded,
or prisoners: among the latter are generals Mouton (de Lobau),
Duhesme, and Compans. Up to this time, about three hundred cannon,
and above five hundred caissons, are in our hands.
“Few victories have been so complete; and there is certainly no
example that an army two days after losing a battle, engaged in
such an action, and so gloriously maintained it. Honour be to
troops capable of so much firmness and valour!
“In the middle of the position occupied by the French army, and
exactly upon the height, is a farm called _La Belle-Alliance_. The
march of all the Prussian columns was directed towards this farm,
which was visible from every side. It was there that Napoleon was
during the battle; it was thence that he gave his orders, that
he flattered himself with the hopes of victory; and it was there
that his ruin was decided. There, too, it was, that, by a happy
chance, field-marshal Blücher and lord Wellington met in the dark,
and mutually saluted each other as victors. In commemoration of
the alliance which now subsists between the English and Prussian
nations, of the union of the two armies, and their reciprocal
confidence, the Field-Marshal desired, that this battle should
bear the name of _La Belle-Alliance_.
“By order of field-marshal Blücher,
“General GNEISENAU.”
FRENCH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT.
“PARIS, June 21st, 1815.
“_Battle of Mont-St.-Jean._
“At nine in the morning, the rain having somewhat abated, the 1st
corps put itself in motion, and placed itself with the left, on the
road to Brussels, and opposite the village of Mont-St.-Jean, which
appeared the centre of the enemy’s position. The 2d corps leaned
its right upon the road to Brussels, and its left upon a small
wood, within cannon-shot of the English army. The cuirassiers were
in reserve behind, and the guard in reserve upon the heights. The
6th corps, with the cavalry of general Domont, under the order of
count de Lobau, was destined to proceed in rear of our right to
oppose a Prussian corps, which appeared to have escaped marshal
Grouchy, and to intend to fall upon our right flank; an intention
which had been made known to us by our reports, and by the letter
of a Prussian general, enclosing an order of battle, and which was
taken by our light troops.
“The troops were full of ardour. We estimated the force of the
English army at eighty thousand men. We supposed that the Prussian
corps, which might be in line towards the right, might be fifteen
thousand men. The enemy’s force, then, was upwards of ninety
thousand men; ours less numerous.
“At noon, all the preparations being terminated, prince Jérôme,
commanding a division of the second corps, and destined to form
the extreme left of it, advanced upon the wood of which the enemy
occupied a part. The cannonade began. The enemy supported, with
thirty pieces of cannon, the troops he had sent to keep the wood.
We made also on our side dispositions of artillery. At one o’clock,
prince Jérôme was master of all the wood, and the whole English
army fell back behind a curtain. Count d’Erlon then attacked the
village of Mont-St.-Jean, and supported his attack with eighty
pieces of cannon, which must have occasioned great loss to the
English army. All the efforts were made towards the ridge. A
brigade of the 1st division of count d’Erlon took the village of
Mont-St.-Jean; a second brigade was charged by a corps of English
cavalry, which occasioned it much loss. At the same moment, a
division of English cavalry charged the battery of count d’Erlon
by its right, and disorganized several pieces; but the cuirassiers
of general Milhaut charged that division, three regiments of which
were broken and cut up.
“It was three in the afternoon. The Emperor made the guard
advance, to place it in the plain upon the ground which the first
corps had occupied at the outset of the battle; this corps being
already in advance. The Prussian division, whose movement had been
foreseen, then engaged with the light troops of count de Lobau,
spreading its fire upon our whole right flank. It was expedient,
before undertaking anything elsewhere, to wait for the event of
his attack. Hence, all the means in reserve were ready to succour
count de Lobau, and overwhelm the Prussian corps when it should be
advanced.
“This done, the Emperor had the design of leading an attack upon
the village of Mont-St.-Jean, from which we expected decisive
success; but, by a movement of impatience so frequent in our
military annals, and which has often been so fatal to us, the
cavalry of reserve having perceived a retrograde movement made by
the English to shelter themselves from our batteries, from which
they suffered so much, crowned the heights of Mont-St.-Jean, and
charged the infantry. This movement, which made in time, and
supported by the reserves, must have decided the day, made in an
isolated manner and before affairs on the right were terminated,
became fatal.
“Having no means of countermanding it, the enemy showing many
masses of cavalry and infantry, and our two divisions of
cuirassiers being engaged, all our cavalry ran at the same moment
to support their comrades. There, for three hours, numerous charges
were made, which enabled us to penetrate several squares, and to
take six standards of the light infantry, an advantage out of
proportion with the loss which our cavalry experienced by the
grape-shot and musket-firing. It was impossible to dispose of our
reserves of infantry until we had repulsed the flank attack of the
Prussian corps. This attack always prolonged itself perpendicularly
upon our right flank. The Emperor sent thither general Duhesme
with the young guard, and several batteries of reserve. The enemy
was kept in check, repulsed, and fell back: he had exhausted his
forces, and we had nothing more to fear. It was this moment that
was indicated for an attack upon the centre of the enemy. As the
cuirassiers suffered by the grape-shot, we sent four battalions of
the middle guard to protect the cuirassiers, keep the position,
and, if possible, disengage and draw back into the plain a part of
our cavalry.
“Two other battalions were sent to keep themselves _en potence_
upon the extreme left of the division which had manœuvred upon our
flanks, in order not to have any uneasiness on that side; the rest
was disposed in reserve, part to occupy the _potence_ in rear of
Mont-St.-Jean, part upon the ridge in rear of the field of battle,
which formed our position of retreat.
“In this state of affairs, the battle was gained; we occupied
all the positions which the enemy occupied at the outset of the
battle: our cavalry having been too soon and ill employed, we could
no longer hope for decisive success; but marshal Grouchy, having
learned the movement of the Prussian corps, marched upon the rear
of that corps, which ensured us a signal success for next day.
After eight hours’ fire and charges of infantry and cavalry, all
the army saw with joy the battle gained, and the field of battle in
our power.
“At half after eight o’clock, the four battalions of the middle
guard, who had been sent to the ridge on the other side of
Mont-St.-Jean, in order to support the cuirassiers, being greatly
annoyed by the grape-shot, endeavoured to carry the batteries with
the bayonet. At the end of the day, a charge directed against
their flank, by several English squadrons, put them in disorder.
The fugitives recrossed the ravine. Several regiments, near at
hand, seeing some troops belonging to the guard in confusion,
believed it was the old guard, and in consequence were thrown into
disorder. Cries of ‘All is lost, the guard is driven back!’ were
heard on every side. The soldiers pretend even that on many points
ill-disposed persons cried out, ‘_Sauve qui peut!_’ However this
may be, a complete panic at once spread itself throughout the whole
field of battle, and they threw themselves in the greatest disorder
on the line of communication: soldiers, cannoneers, caissons, all
pressed to this point; the old guard, which was in reserve, was
infected, and was itself hurried along.
“In an instant, the whole army was nothing but a mass of confusion;
all the soldiers, of all arms, were mixed pell-mell, and it
was utterly impossible to rally a single corps. The enemy, who
perceived this astonishing confusion, immediately attacked with
their cavalry, and increased the disorder, and such was the
confusion, owing to night coming on, that it was impossible to
rally the troops, and point out to them their error. Thus a battle
terminated, a day of false manœuvres rectified, the greatest
success ensured for the next day: all was lost by a moment of panic
terror. Even the squadrons of _service_, drawn up by the side of
the Emperor, were overthrown and disorganized by these tumultuous
waves, and there was then nothing else to be done but to follow the
torrent. The parks of reserve, the baggage which had not repassed
the Sambre, in short everything that was on the field of battle,
remained in the power of the enemy. It was impossible to wait for
the troops on our right; every one knows what the bravest army in
the world is when thus mixed and thrown into confusion, and when
its organization no longer exists.
“The Emperor crossed the Sambre at Charleroi, at five o’clock in
the morning of the 19th. Philippeville and Avesnes have been given
as the points of reunion. Prince Jérôme, general Morand, and other
generals have there already rallied a part of the army. Marshal
Grouchy, with the corps on the right, is moving on the lower Sambre.
“The loss of the enemy must have been very great, if we may judge
from the number of standards we have taken from him, and from the
retrograde movements which he made; ours cannot be calculated
till after troops shall have been collected. Before the disorder
broke out, we had already experienced a very considerable loss,
particularly in our cavalry, so fatally, though so bravely engaged.
Notwithstanding these losses, this brave cavalry constantly kept
the position it had taken from the English, and only abandoned it
when the tumult and disorder of the field of battle forced it. In
the midst of the night, and the obstacles which encumbered their
route, it could not preserve its own organization.
“The artillery has, as usual, covered itself with glory. The
carriages belonging to the head-quarters remained in their ordinary
position; no retrograde movement being judged necessary. In the
course of the night they fell into the enemy’s hands.
“Such has been the issue of the battle of Mont-St.-Jean, glorious
for the French armies, and yet so fatal.”
MARSHAL GROUCHY’S OFFICIAL REPORT TO NAPOLEON.
“DINANT, June 20th, 1815.
“It was not till after seven in the evening of the 18th of June,
that I received the letter of the duke of Dalmatia, (Soult,)
which directed me to march on St.-Lambert, and to attack general
Bulow. I fell in with the enemy as I was marching on Wavre. He
was immediately driven into Wavre, and general Vandamme’s corps
attacked that town, and was warmly engaged. The portion of Wavre,
on the right of the Dyle, was carried: but much difficulty was
experienced in debouching, on the other side; general Gérard was
wounded by a ball in the breast, whilst endeavouring to carry the
mill of Bierge, in order to pass the river, but where he did not
succeed; and lieutenant-general Aix had been killed in the attack
on the town. In this state of things, being impatient to cooperate
with your Majesty’s army on that important day, I detached several
corps to force the passage of the Dyle and march against Bulow.
The corps of Vandamme, in the mean time, maintained the attack on
Wavre, and on the mill, whence the enemy showed an intention to
debouch, but which I did not conceive he was capable of effecting.
I arrived at Limal, passed the river, and the heights were carried
by the division of Vichery and the cavalry. Night did not permit us
to advance farther, and I no longer heard the cannon on the side
where your Majesty was engaged.
“I halted in this situation until day-light. Wavre and Bierge were
occupied by the Prussians, who, at three in the morning of the
19th, attacked in their turn, wishing to take advantage of the
difficult position in which I was, and expecting to drive me into
the defile, and take the artillery which had debouched, and make me
repass the Dyle. Their efforts were fruitless. The Prussians were
repulsed, and the village of Bierge taken. The brave general Penne
was killed.
“General Vandamme then passed one of his divisions by Bierge,
and carried with ease the heights of Wavre, and along the
whole of my line the success was complete. I was in front of
Rosières, preparing to march on Brussels, when I received the sad
intelligence of the loss of the battle of Waterloo. The officer
who brought it informed me, that your Majesty was retreating on
the Sambre, without being able to indicate any particular point
on which I should direct my march. I ceased to pursue, and began
my retrograde movement. The retreating enemy did not think of
following me.
“Learning that the enemy had already passed the Sambre and was on
my flank, and not being sufficiently strong to make a diversion
in favour of your Majesty, without compromising the troops under
my command, I marched on Namur. At this moment, the rear of
the columns were attacked. That of the left made a retrograde
movement sooner than was expected, which endangered, for a moment,
the retreat of the left; but good dispositions soon repaired
everything, and two pieces which had been taken were recovered by
the brave 20th dragoons, who, besides, took a howitzer from the
enemy. We entered Namur without loss. The long defile which extends
from this place to Dinant, in which only a single column can
march, and the embarrassment arising from the numerous transports
of wounded, rendered it necessary to hold for a considerable time
the town, where I had not the means of blowing up the bridge. I
intrusted the defence of Namur to general Vandamme, who, with his
usual intrepidity, maintained himself there till eight in the
evening; so that nothing was left behind, and I occupied Dinant.
“The enemy has lost some thousands of men in the attack on Namur,
where the contest was very obstinate; the troops have performed
their duty in a manner worthy of praise.
“DE GROUCHY.”
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STRENGTH OF THE ALLIED ARMY AT WATERLOO, AND ITS LOSS. |
+--------------------+--------+-------+-------+--------+-----+--------+
| | | | | TOTAL | |Killed, |
| | CAVALRY.| ARTIL-| under | |wounded |
| DESIGNATION. |INFANTRY. | LERY. | arms. |GUNS.| and |
| | | | | | |missing.|
+--------------------+--------+-------+-------+--------+-----+--------+
|British | 15,181 | 5,843 | 2,967 | 23,991 | 78 | 6,932 |
|King’s German Legion| 3,301 | 1,967 | 526 | 5,824 | 18 | 589 |
|Hanoverians | 10,258 | 497 | 465 | 11,220 | 12 | 1,602 |
|Brunswickers | 4,586 | 866 | 510 | 5,962 | 16 | 660 |
|Nassauers | 2,880 | ” | ” | 2,880 | ” | 643 |
|Dutch-Belgians | 13,402 | 3,205 | 1,177 | 17,784 | 32 | 4,000 |
+--------------------+--------+-------+-------+--------+-----+--------+
| Total | 49,608 |12,408 | 5,645 | 67,661 | 156 | 14,426 |
+--------------------+--------+-------+-------+--------+-----+--------+
| |
| British, killed and wounded, on the 16th, at Quatre-Bras: 2,504. On |
| the 17th, in the retreat to the Waterloo position: 108. |
| |
| The greater number of the men (1,875) returned as missing, had gone |
| to the rear with wounded officers and soldiers, and joined |
| afterwards. The officers are supposed killed. |
| |
| The names of British officers, killed and wounded, may be seen in |
| the Appendix, No. IV. |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRUSSIAN FORCE AT WATERLOO, |
| A PORTION OF WHICH BECAME ENGAGED TOWARDS THE CLOSE OF THE DAY. |
+----------------------------------+---------+--------+-----------+
| | | |ARTILLERY. |
| ARRIVED ON THE FIELD |INFANTRY.|CAVALRY.|-----------|
| | | |MEN. |GUNS.|
+----------------------------------+---------+--------+-----+-----+
| About half-past five o’clock P.M.| 12,043 | 2,720 | 783| 40 |
| At three quarters after six | 13,338 | ” | 360| 24 |
| At a quarter before eight | 15,902 | 6,138 | 660| 40 |
| +---------+--------+-----+-----+
| Total | 41,283 | 8,858 |1,803| 104 |
| | | | | |
| General total in the field 51,944 men. | 104 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------+-----+
| |
| Loss at Waterloo, in killed, wounded and missing: 6,682 men. |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE FIELD AT WATERLOO. |
+------------------------------+---------+--------+-------------+
| | | | ARTILLERY. |
| DESIGNATION. |INFANTRY.|CAVALRY.|-------------|
| | | | MEN. |GUNS.|
+------------------------------+---------+--------+-------+-----+
| Imperial Guard | 12,000 | 4,000 | 2,400 | 96 |
| 1st Corps | 17,600 | 1,400 | 1,564 | 46 |
| 2d ” | 15,750 | 1,865 | 1,861 | 38 |
| 6th ” | 6,600 | ” | 1,007 | 30 |
| 3d Cavalry Corps | ” | 3,300 | 300 | 12 |
| 4th ” ” | ” | 3,300 | 300 | 12 |
| 3d Cavalry Division | ” | 1,400 | 150 | 6 |
| 5th ” ” | ” | 1,250 | 150 | 6 |
| +---------+--------+-------+-----+
| Total | 51,950 | 16,515 | 7,732 | 246 |
| +---------+--------+-------+-----+
| Deduct for previous losses| 3,000 | 750 | 500 | ” |
| +---------+--------+-------+-----+
| Under arms | 48,950 | 15,765 | 7,232 | 246 |
| | | | | |
| General total in the field 71,947 men. | |
+---------------------------------------------------------+-----+
The French loss has been computed at nearly fifty thousand men during
the campaign.
Of the French generals, De Lobau (Mouton), Compans, Duhesme and
Cambronne were made prisoners; and Girard, Devaux, Letort, Penne,
Michel, Aix and Baudouin killed.
Perhaps we cannot arrive at a more accurate notion of the loss of
the enemy than that conveyed by Ney, in his speech in the Chamber of
Peers, four days after the battle, to which the reader’s notice is
drawn (page 207): “Not a man of the guard will ever rally more. I
myself witnessed their total extermination: they are annihilated.”
And everybody knows that Napoleon always husbanded the guard, at the
cost of all his other troops. “Their total extermination” implies
then that the whole army was utterly routed.
The slaughter, in the absence of official reports, must be left to be
computed by the sober judgment of the reader.
The French force detached under Grouchy to observe the Prussians
amounted to thirty-two thousand men, and a hundred and four guns.
POSITIONS OF THE ALLIED ARTILLERY TOWARDS THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE.
On the right, close to the Nivelles road, the Brunswick guns.
Stretching towards the left, major Bull’s (howitzers), captain N.
Ramsey’s, major Webber Smith’s, captain Mercer’s, major Symper’s
(German), captain Sandham’s, major Beane’s batteries; and captain
Bolton’s, at the angle between Adam’s left and Maitland’s right.
Captain Sinclair’s battery. Major Vandersmissen’s batteries, at the
interval between Halkett’s brigade. Major Lloyd’s, major sir H.
Ross’s batteries. Major sir R. Gardner’s battery, advancing. Major
Whinyate’s (rocket), major Braun’s (German), major Rogers’ batteries.
A Dutch-Belgian battery. Major Rettberg’s (German), just relieved
by a Prussian battery. A Dutch-Belgian battery. Major Kuhlman’s and
captain Cleeve’s (German) batteries, advancing on the high-road,
after refitting. Five Dutch-Belgian guns near Ditmers’ brigade.
ARTILLERY TAKEN BY THE ALLIED ARMY AT WATERLOO.
12-pounder guns 35
6 do. do. 57
6-inch howitzers 13
24-pounder do. 17
---
Total guns 122
12-pounder spare gun-carriages 6
6 do. do. 8
Howitzer do. 6
12-pounder waggons. 74
6 do. do. 71
Howitzer do. 50
Forge do. 20
Imperial guard do. 52
---
General total 409
---
Exclusive of those taken by the Prussians, on the field and in the
pursuit.
Our readers will give us credit for having observed a strict
impartiality throughout our narrative of the battle; and in the same
spirit would we desire to discuss those questions relating to it,
which have given rise to so many false and exaggerated statements.
The first subject of controversy we shall notice, is the strange,
but oft repeated charge, against Wellington’s military judgment, in
choosing his position in front of Mont-St.-Jean, with a forest in his
rear, _in case of defeat_. I must be excused if I show some little
indignation at the repetition of this charge; a British soldier must
be allowed to be as jealous of the fame of his illustrious commander,
as our gallant opponents were of that of their idolized Napoleon.
Well, what is the charge? That the Waterloo position was not well
chosen for a retreat, having defiles and a wood in its rear.
We begin our examination of this point by remarking that Wellington
chose the position, not in a hurry, nor because he was forced
to do so, but most deliberately, and after having thoroughly
reconnoitred it. He chose it with the conviction that he could well
maintain it until the Prussians could form a junction with him; this
accomplished, he knew that the French would not have a single chance
left. He had but one apprehension; namely, that the enemy would push
on by Hal, and turn the allied right. But Napoleon’s holding us too
cheap, his impetuosity, or his desperation, brought him headlong
upon our chosen position: the very best for our purposes between
Charleroi and Brussels. Let the event assist the impartial reader
in deciding which commander showed the better judgment in selecting
his ground for action. But as far as the Duke is concerned, it is
quite unnecessary to say anything in his defence. Nor should we
have attempted to give a description of the Waterloo position, but
for the judgment of Napoleon, at least as coming to us through the
generals de Montholon, Gourgaud, de Las-Cases, Mr. O’Meara, etc.,
being so directly at variance with that practicality shown by the
duke of Wellington, who, we supposed, had previously both taken up
and successfully defended too many positions, not to know the local
requisites of a good one, and particularly as opposed to a French
army. Waterloo was not fixed upon at the spur of the moment, as I
have elsewhere shown; in addition to which, the Duke, his staff, and
most of our generals were so often over the ground before the battle,
that the farmers complained of the damage done thereby to their
crops. It may be well to observe, for the information of those who
are unacquainted with the position and localities, that the main-road
from the field of Waterloo to Brussels is a very wide and well paved
one. The road to the capital by Braine-l’Alleud and Alsemberg is also
paved[82]. Several cross-roads, in rear of our position, likewise
traverse the forest of Soigne, and communicate with the high-road
between this and Brussels. The trees of the forest, and the hedges,
banks, and buildings on the sides of the roads, would have afforded
excellent protection to light troops covering a retreat, and have
materially aided to keep the pursuing enemy at bay. Close in rear
of the allied army and along the verge of the wood, was a most
advantageous ridge, which might have offered an excellent second
position, and from whence the guns could command everything within
their range. The forest of Soigne itself, composed of lofty trees,
afforded a shelter which resolute men could not be easily driven
from: being nearly free from underwood, it was everywhere passable
for broken infantry and cavalry, and from which no earthly force
could have dislodged us, unless we willed it. When the duke of
Wellington, some years after the battle, was asked what he would have
done, had he been driven from his position at Waterloo, his Grace
replied, “I should have gone into the wood.” The impartial opinion of
the celebrated and able military writer Jomini may with propriety be
here cited:
“We have said that one of the essentials in a position is, that
it should offer the means of retreat; which brings us to the
consideration of a question created by the battle of Waterloo.
Supposing an army to be posted in front of a forest, having a
good road behind its centre and each of its wings; would it be
compromised, as Napoleon asserts, in the event of its losing the
battle? For my own part, I think, on the contrary, that such a
position would be more favourable for retreating, than if the country
were perfectly open; since a beaten army cannot traverse a plain
without being exposed to the utmost danger. Doubtless, if the retreat
should degenerate into a disorderly flight, a portion of the guns
remaining in battery in front of the forest would probably be lost;
but the infantry, the cavalry, and the rest of the artillery, would
be able to retire with as much facility as across a plain. But if,
on the contrary, the retreat takes place with order, nothing can
possibly protect it better than a forest: provided always, there
exist at least two good roads behind the lines; that the enemy be not
allowed to press too close, before the requisite measures preparatory
to retiring are thought of; and that no lateral movement shall enable
the enemy to anticipate the army at the outlets from the forest, as
happened at Hohenlinden. It would also greatly tend to secure the
retreat, if, as was the case at Waterloo, the forest should form a
concave line behind the centre; for such a bend would then become a
regular _place d’armes_, in which to collect the troops and afford
time to file them successively into the high-road[83]”.
General Jomini’s doctrine, with the grounds on which it clearly
rests, will have more weight with the honest reader, (be he a
military man or a civilian, Frenchman or an Englishman,) than the
fond opinions of Napoleon’s admirers.
Let us now turn to the Duke of Wellington’s plans and expectations,
and we shall have ample evidence of his quick perception, consummate
skill and unrivalled judgment.
The Duke was at Vienna at the moment the news reached him of
Bonaparte’s escape from Elba, and of his landing in France. The
following letter records the first impressions made by this event
in the Austrian capital, and the full conviction which Wellington
immediately felt, that the enemy of Europe’s peace would be speedily
overthrown.
_To Viscount Castlereagh, K. G._
“VIENNA, March 12th, 1815.
“MY LORD,
“I received here, on the 7th instant, a dispatch from lord
Burghersh, of the 1st, giving an account that Bonaparte had quitted
the island of Elba, with all his civil and military officers, and
about twelve hundred troops, on the 26th of February. I immediately
communicated this account to the emperors of Austria and Russia, to
the king of Prussia, and to the ministers of the different powers,
and I found among all one prevailing sentiment, of a determination
to unite their efforts to support the system established by the
peace of Paris.
“As it was uncertain to what quarter Bonaparte had gone, whether
he would not return to Elba, or would even land on any part of the
continent, it was agreed that it was best to postpone the adoption
of any measure till his farther progress should be ascertained; and
we have since received accounts from Genoa, stating that he had
landed in France, near Cannes, on the 1st of March; had attempted
to get possession of Antibes, and had been repulsed, and that he
was on his march towards Grasse.
“No accounts had been received at Paris as late as the middle of
the day of the 5th, of his having quitted Elba, nor any accounts,
from any quarter, of his farther progress.
“In the mean time, the sovereigns, and all persons assembled
here, are impressed with the importance of the crisis which this
circumstance occasions in the affairs of the world. All are
desirous of bringing to an early conclusion the business of the
Congress, in order that the whole and undivided attention and
exertion of all may be directed against the common enemy; and I do
not entertain the smallest doubt that, even if Bonaparte should
be able to form a party for himself in France, capable of making
head against the legitimate government of that country, such a
force will be assembled by the powers of Europe, directed by such a
spirit in their councils, as must get the better of him.
“The emperors of Austria and Russia and the king of Prussia have
dispatched letters to the king of France, to place at his Majesty’s
disposal all their respective forces; and Austrian and Prussian
officers are dispatched with the letters, with powers to order the
movement of the troops of their respective countries placed on the
French frontiers, at the suggestion of the king of France.
“The plenipotentiaries of the eight powers who signed the treaty
of Paris, assembled this evening, and have resolved to publish a
declaration, in which they will, in the name of their sovereigns,
declare their firm resolution to maintain the peace and all its
articles, with all their force, if necessary. I enclose the draught
of what is proposed to be published, which, with the alteration of
some expressions and the omission of one or two paragraphs, will, I
believe, be adopted.
“Upon the whole, I assure your Lordship that I am perfectly
satisfied with the spirit which prevails here upon this occasion;
and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, if unfortunately it
should be possible for Bonaparte to hold at all against the king
of France, he must fall under the cordially united efforts of the
sovereigns of Europe.
“I have the honour to be, etc.
“WELLINGTON.”
The Duke, though strongly urged by the allied sovereigns of Austria,
Prussia and Russia to start for the Netherlands, remained in Vienna
until he had completed his duties at the Congress, and received
orders from England to take the command of the troops assembling in
the Low-Countries. He arrived at Brussels early in April. In less
than twenty-four hours, he was master of the state of things, and
immediately wrote the following dispatch
_To General Kleist._
“BRUSSELS, April 5th, 1815.
“GENERAL,
“I arrived here during last night: I have spent the day in
endeavouring to make myself master of the state of affairs.
“The reports respecting the situation, number and the intentions
of the enemy are always excessively vague: but it appears to me we
ought to be prepared against a surprise (_coup de main_) which he
might be tempted to try at any moment.
“There can be no doubt that it would be an immense advantage to
him to make us retrograde with the troops which we have in front
of Brussels; to drive before him the king of France and the Royal
family, and to compel the king of the Netherlands, with his
establishments newly formed here, to make a retreat. This would
be a terrible blow in public opinion, both here and in France:
and, according to his usual management, (_allure_), the news of
his success would be known throughout France, whilst that of any
reverse that might happen to him would be concealed from everybody.
“After having placed 13,400 men as garrisons in Mons, Tournay,
Ypres, Ostend, Nieuport and Antwerp, I can get together about
23,000 good troops, English and Hanoverian; amongst them about
five thousand excellent cavalry. This number will be increased in
a few days, especially in cavalry and artillery. I can also bring
up 20,000 Dutch and Belgian troops, including two thousand cavalry;
the whole having about sixty pieces of cannon.
“My opinion is, that we ought to take measures to unite the
whole Prussian army with this allied Anglo-Dutch army in front
of Brussels; and that, with this view, the troops under your
Excellency’s command should, without loss of time, march along the
Maese, and take up cantonments between Charleroi, Namur and Huy.
“By this disposition, we shall be sure to save this country, so
interesting to the allied powers: we shall cover the concentration
of their forces on the Rhine; and we shall escape the evils which
would inevitably result from a sudden retreat in our actual
circumstances. At the same time, your Excellency would be just as
able as you are in your present position, to march your troops to
any point required by the service of the king; and we should have
for our numerous cavalry a field of battle as favourable as any in
the rear of Brussels.
“I beg your Excellency to take these reasons into consideration,
and to let me know your determination; in order that I may decide
what measures I ought to take in case I should be attacked, if your
Excellency should judge more fit to remain where you are.
“I ought to apprize your Excellency, that the king of the
Netherlands has given orders for providing your troops with all
they may want upon their advance into this country.
“WELLINGTON.”
Our readers will remark in this letter the Duke’s prompt decision on
the importance of an immediate junction of a large Prussian force
with the British allied army, and of protecting Brussels at all
hazards. We shall see how much stress Napoleon laid upon keeping the
British and the Prussians apart, and upon making a dash at Brussels.
These two great commanders then took the same view: but the Duke’s
vigilance and energy baffled all Napoleon’s exertions against the
English allied army and the city of Brussels: the Prussians would
have suffered less at Ligny, if the Duke’s earnest entreaty for the
earliest possible junction of the allies had been duly appreciated.
Wellington also correctly anticipated, from the first moment, that
Charleroi and its vicinity would probably be the point selected by
Napoleon for his irruption into the Netherlands.
It seems from a letter dated 15th of April 1815, of the Duke to
Gneisenau, that he had ascertained that two corps of the enemy,
composed of 45,000 infantry and 7,200 cavalry, were in his front
between the Sambre and the sea: he immediately set off to reconnoitre
the whole frontier: this occupied him four days.
By reference to the “SECRET MEMORANDUM” in the Appendix, No. 1, it
may be seen how prompt, energetic and comprehensive were the measures
resolved upon by the duke of Wellington. As early as the 30th of
April, he wrote to lord Uxbridge, “All the dispositions are so made
that the whole army can be collected in one short movement, with the
Prussians on our left.”
One of Wellington’s difficulties in preparing for the contest, was
the motley character of some of the foreign troops placed, or offered
to be placed, under his command. Some Saxon troops in particular drew
from him very severe, but characteristic strictures and contempt, as
appears from the subjoined documents:
_To the Earl of Clancarty, G. C. B._
“BRUSSELS, May 3d, 1815.
“The Saxons mutinied last night at Liège, and obliged poor old
Blücher to quit the town; the cause of the mutiny was the order to
divide the corps, and that the Prussian part, in which the guards
were included, should take the oath of allegiance to the king of
Prussia.
“We hear of Bonaparte’s quitting Paris, and of the march of troops
to this frontier, in order to attack us. I met Blücher at Tirlemont
this day, and received from him the most satisfactory assurances of
support.
“For an action in Belgium I can now put seventy thousand men into
the field, and Blücher eighty thousand; so that, I hope, we should
give a good account even of Bonaparte.
“I am not satisfied with our delays.
“WELLINGTON.”
_To Prince Hardenberg._
“BRUSSELS, May 3d, 1815.
“MY DEAR PRINCE,
“I have received your letter of the 23d of April, and I regret
that there has been a difference of opinion about the troops to be
sent to this army. I am perfectly indifferent as to whether I have
many or few foreign soldiers under my orders, and as it appears
that prince Blücher and the Prussian officers are not disposed to
let me be beaten by superior numbers, I am satisfied.
“As to the Saxons, your Highness will probably receive by this same
opportunity the reports of their conduct yesterday evening: and
as I have not enough of good troops to be able to detach any of
them to watch a body of men disposed to mutiny, I think I shall do
best in having nothing to do with such troops; and if they do not
get out of the affair of last evening in an honourable manner, and
consistently with the military character, in spite of my respect
for the powers who have placed them at my disposal, I shall beg to
decline taking them under my command.
“WELLINGTON.”
Writing to sir Henry Hardinge, two days afterwards, the Duke observes
that:
“The Saxon troops, it is very obvious, will be of no use to anybody
during the war; and our object must be to prevent them from doing
mischief.... I do not think fourteen thousand men will have much
weight in deciding the fate of the war. But the most fatal of all
measures will be to have fourteen thousand men in the field who
cannot be trusted; and who will require nearly as many more good
troops to observe them.”
These Saxon mutineers were, at the suggestion of the Duke,
immediately sent off as prisoners, through Holland and Hanover, into
Prussia, by the orders of marshal Blücher. But for this foresight and
determined maintenance of military discipline, much greater mischief
would have ensued amongst certain contingents of the allied troops,
who, as it was, by their doubtful attachment to the cause in which
they were enlisted and unsoldierlike behaviour in the field, provoked
many a hearty curse on the day of Waterloo.
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FOOTNOTES:
[81] Lieutenant-colonel the Hon. sir Alexander Gordon was sent,
escorted by captain John Grey’s troop of the 10th hussars, to
ascertain the real line of retreat of the Prussians, and to
communicate with their head-quarters, as to cooperation with the
British army, which was ordered to retire to the position in front of
Waterloo.
[82] Most writers on Waterloo, particularly those from St.-Helena,
appear totally ignorant of the existence of this road.
[83] _Art of War_, page 598.