OCTOBER
_Diary of the War_
[Sidenote: Oct. 1918.]
In France the German retirement continued, and the British Army made
considerable progress, while the French were equally successful in
hastening the retreat of the enemy near St. Quentin and later at
Soissons. King Albert's attack threatened to cut off part of the
German Army in Belgium, and in order to prevent this, the Germans were
forced to retire precipitately, leaving behind them vast stores of war
material. Ostend, Lille, and Douai were evacuated, and Sir Roger Keyes,
who commanded what was known as the Dover Patrol, landed on the Belgian
coast. The German intention appears to have been to retire from Belgium
as speedily as possible, and in so doing to avoid any large number of
men being surrounded.
In Italy the Austrians were in full retreat, and on the 27th sued for
Peace.
In Palestine General Allenby, after a series of brilliant operations,
succeeded in cutting off the main portion of the Turkish Army on the
Tigris, with the result that Turkey asked for an Armistice.
THE GUARDS DIVISION
In October the Germans found the retirement more and more difficult.
During September they had lost a quarter of a million prisoners and
an immense number of guns, and their original intention of making a
determined stand on one of their deeply fortified lines had long since
been abandoned. The Allied Armies were pressing them back all along
the line, and the continual retirement was beginning to affect the
spirit of the Army. After the Siegfried line had been broken through,
Sir Douglas Haig commenced operations on a seventeen-mile front from
Cambrai to Sequehart with the Third and Fourth Armies, and the Sixth
Corps, in which the Guards Division was, advanced to the south of
Cambrai.
On October 6 Major-General Matheson received a warning order to be
prepared to move to Havrincourt, but this move was postponed later for
twenty-four hours. The Guards Division was in support of the Second
and Third Divisions, and in the event of little opposition being
encountered was to pass through and continue the advance on La Henières
and Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes, but as the Germans offered a stubborn
resistance the Guards Division did not go into the line until the next
day.
All sorts of wild rumours were about, and as there seemed every danger
of the enemy making use of them to gain time, Major-General Matheson
issued the following order:
(1) Rumours are current that the German Government intends
to propose a suspension of hostilities, with a view to the
discussion of Peace terms. It is possible that attempts at
fraternisation may in consequence be made by German troops in
the line.
(2) The German Army is hard pressed and the German High
Command needs time to carry out its present withdrawal without
heavy loss in men and material. German Peace talk is therefore
circulated in order to relax our pressure, gain time for the
withdrawal, and prepare for a long defensive campaign next
year.
(3) All our troops will be warned against paying any attention
to rumours of this kind. They are intended not to shorten
the war but to save the German Army from the consequences of
defeat this year and to preserve its strength for the defence
of German soil next year. Any attempts made by the enemy to
fraternise in the field will also be disregarded absolutely.
It is our intention to beat the enemy as fast as we can, not to allow
him to recover his strength.
On the morning of October 9 De Crespigny's Brigade on the right, and
Sergison-Brooke's Brigade on the left, passed through the Third and
Second Divisions, and attacked under a barrage.
It was expected that the Caudry--Cambrai railway, running diagonally
across the line of advance, with its steep embankments and deep
cuttings, would form a serious obstacle, and special steps were taken
to bring enfilade artillery and machine-gun fire to bear on it, till
the infantry was within assaulting distance. It was soon found,
however, that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, and it was not
till late in the afternoon that the German advanced troops were again
located, holding a line of trenches west of Boistrancourt and east of
Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes. A night operation to capture Boistrancourt
revealed the farther withdrawal of the enemy.
On the 10th De Crespigny's and Sergison-Brooke's Brigades followed up
the enemy, and after some skirmishing with his rear-guards, took up an
outpost line west of Quevy and St. Hilaire, with detached posts east of
those villages.
On the morning of the 11th the 3rd Guards Brigade, which was now under
the command of Brigadier-General Heywood, passed through the outposts,
and was soon engaged with the German rear-guards, which were now
fighting stubbornly.
The next few days were spent in clearing the enemy from the west bank
of the River Selle, after which there was a pause to allow time for
the reconstruction of the railways in rear. The most difficult problem
of this period was the evacuation of the civil population from the
villages on the banks of the Selle, which were occupied by both our own
and the enemy's troops. The evacuation was carried out by night with
scarcely a casualty.
On the 20th the Guards Division took part in a general attack, launched
with the object of driving the enemy from his new positions, east of
the River Selle. The attack, which started at 1 A.M., was
carried out by De Crespigny's Brigade on the right, and Heywood's
Brigade on the left. The Sixty-second Division was to clear Solesmes
of the enemy on the right of the Guards Division, and the Nineteenth
Division was to capture Haussy on the left. A great deal of the
success of this attack depended on whether the River Selle was held in
any strength, but the Germans never attempted to dispute the passage,
and both Brigades passed over with little loss. The first objective
was secured without difficulty, but when the advance to the second
objective commenced, a good deal of opposition was encountered,
especially on the left, where the Nineteenth Division had been held
up after capturing Haussy. The resistance was so stubborn that at one
time artillery preparation was contemplated; but when the Sixty-second
Division advanced towards Romeries, the Guards Division was able to
secure the second objective, and even push out patrols as far as the
River Harpies.
During the afternoon the Germans put down on the new positions an
artillery concentration, which many officers present considered to have
been the heaviest they had experienced since the battle of the Somme;
our troops were, however, so well dug in that hardly any casualties
were inflicted. On the night of the 22nd the Division was relieved by
the Second Division, which continued the attack the following day.
The remainder of the month was spent in rest, which was, however, much
interfered with by the constant change of quarters, necessitated by the
withdrawal of the enemy.
THE 1ST BATTALION
[Sidenote: 1st Batt.]
At the beginning of October Major the Hon. W. R. Bailey arrived, and
took command of the Battalion. On the 7th orders were received to
proceed to Havrincourt, where the Guards Division was to be in reserve
during an attack by the Second and Third Divisions. The attack proved
successful, and on the evening of the 8th the Battalion moved to
Marcoing, where it was bivouacked in some old trenches. On the 9th the
1st and 2nd Guards Brigade attacked, and the 3rd Guards Brigade was
in Divisional Reserve. The Battalion marched by platoons at 100 yards
intervals to Seranvillers _via_ Masnières and Crevecour. The next
day it moved on to Cattenières, and Major Bailey, accompanied by the
Company Commanders, rode on to Bévillers to reconnoitre.
LIST OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE OPERATIONS
IN OCTOBER
Major the Hon. W. R. Bailey, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Lieut. J. A. Lloyd Acting Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. J. C. Blunt Intelligence Officer.
Capt. P. M. Spence, M.C. King's Company.
2nd Lieut. D. H. Clarke " "
Lieut. C. G. Kennaway No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. B. Osborne " "
2nd Lieut. M. G. Farquharson " "
Capt. J. H. C. Simpson No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. N. P. Andrews " "
Lieut. E. A. D. Bliss No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. C. B. Hall " "
2nd Lieut. R. S. Challands " "
Capt. W. Lindsay, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. C. Venables Chaplain.
[Illustration: _Operations_
_October 11-14, 1918_
_Emery Walker Ltd._
]
[Sidenote: Oct. 11.]
On the 11th the Battalion moved off at 1 A.M., and reached
the rendezvous just east of Bévillers at 4 A.M. It was a very
dark night, drizzling with rain, and the marching was difficult owing
to the mine craters, with which the enemy had endeavoured to destroy
the road, transport wagons constantly falling in, and delaying the
march. The Battalion had been allotted a front of about 2000 yards,
which was covered by the King's Company under Captain Spence on the
right, and No. 2 Company under Lieutenant Kennaway on the left, each
with two platoons in the front line acting as fighting patrols, and two
platoons in the second line with the Company Commanders. No. 3 Company
under Captain Simpson was in support, and No. 4 under Lieutenant Bliss
in Brigade Reserve. The country was quite open with no cover at all,
and consisted of grass and stubble fields. The gently undulating ground
was particularly favourable to the Germans, who were past-masters in
the art of fighting rear-guard actions. At 5 A.M. the advance
began. The first bound was to the railway east of the village of
Quiévy, but no halt was made here, as it was found that the advanced
troops of the 1st Guards Brigade had pushed farther on during the
night. When the leading patrols reached the high ground immediately
east of Quiévy, they were met by heavy machine-gun fire from the
orchard north of Fontaine-au-terre Farm, and were enfiladed by numerous
machine-guns along the St. Vaast--Solesmes road. The leading companies
deployed here. The King's and No. 2 Companies, covered by their own
fire, continued to advance by rushes, and captured the orchard, from
which the Germans hastily retired. Captain Simpson halted No. 3 Company
on the high ground west of the farm, while south of the farm touch
was gained with the 2nd Battalion Auckland Regiment from the New
Zealand Division. The machine-gun fire from the left flank, where the
Scots Guards were checked, continued to be very severe, and completely
held up No. 2 Company. Captain Spence decided to push forward with
the King's Company to try and outflank the enemy's posts, and sent
forward one platoon down the slope. Although this had the desired
effect, and the German infantry retired, they left their machine-guns,
which kept up a sweeping fire along the crest, and prevented the Scots
Guards from advancing. It was thought that, if a demonstration was
made straight towards them, it might perhaps force them to retire,
but when No. 2 Company attempted this the German machine-guns never
moved. Meanwhile the King's Company, with that dogged determination
which has characterised all its movements during the war, drove away
the Germans from the spur of the hill south of Solesmes, and working
round in the area occupied by the New Zealand Division, pushed forward,
and gained the spur itself. The ground over which the King's Company
passed, consisted of a deep and broad valley quite devoid of cover,
and the slightest movement could be observed from the opposite slope,
where German field-guns and machine-guns were posted. The manner in
which Captain Spence directed his company and surmounted all the
difficulties, was specially mentioned by Lieut.-Colonel Bailey, and
this advance undoubtedly made a considerable difference to the centre
of the Guards Division. But the forward position, which the King's
Company had gained, was by no means easy to retain, for the men were
subjected to a heavy machine-gun fire from the north, whilst the
enemy's 5·9 guns registered on them. These men remained unable to
move a muscle until dark, when they dug themselves in. No. 3 Company
was moved up to an orchard in close support, and, as there seemed no
reasonable prospect of success during daylight without heavy loss,
it was not pushed up into the attack. The German machine-guns were
wonderfully well placed, commanding the flat plateaus on the top
of the ridges, with no possibility of their being approached under
cover, and our artillery was unable to help, as it was practically
impossible to locate these machine-gun nests. The men were anxious
to push on, and had to be restrained. All this time the shelling was
heavy but promiscuous, and several men were hit by fragments. Captain
Simpson, Second Lieutenant Clarke, and Second Lieutenant Osborne were
wounded in this way, but the Battalion was really very fortunate in
not having suffered more than it did. Although patrols were sent out
during the night, they were unable to get very far on account of the
enemy's machine-guns, which had evidently been pushed forward to hinder
reconnaissance.
[Sidenote: Oct. 12.]
The next morning it was found that the Germans had retired, and that
the machine-guns had all been withdrawn, the emplacements being full
of empty cartridge cases. Except for some shelling the morning proved
uneventful, and in the afternoon the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and
1st Battalion Welsh Guards were ordered to attack on the left. Two
platoons from No. 2 Company of the 1st Battalion were ordered to
co-operate with them and guard their right flank. The advance was
successfully carried out with little opposition, although the German
artillery put down a heavy barrage on the west line. The company
runners in this fight behaved with great gallantry, and throughout
the day carried their lives in their hands, continually running great
risks. Posts were ordered to be pushed down to the railway, and small
reconnoitring patrols were sent out as soon as it was dark. Except
at the commencement of the operations the Battalion saw few Germans,
and the men realised they were fighting a very cleverly hidden enemy.
Each machine-gun nest had to be located, and shot out in turn. During
that night the King's Company was relieved by No. 4, and No. 3 by No.
2. Lieutenant Challands, who took over command of No. 3 Company, was
knocked out temporarily by the bursting of a shell during the relief.
The Battalion was the only one in the Division to reach its objective,
and this was entirely due to the dash displayed by both officers and
men in this entirely new form of open warfare.
The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards advanced
up to the same line, held by the 1st Battalion Grenadiers. The rest of
the day was very trying for all troops in the forward area on account
of the continual shelling, as the Germans had excellent observation,
and were very accurate in their shooting. The line from Solesmes to
St. Python was very strongly held, and the two posts on the right
held by the Battalion were in dangerous proximity to the enemy. One
of these was rushed by a party of eighty Germans under cover of an
intense Minenwerfer barrage, and only one man escaped. In the evening
the Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, and
marched by companies to Quiévy. The casualties during the three days'
operations were 3 officers wounded, and of other ranks 11 were killed,
3 died of wounds, 45 wounded and 17 missing.
The next day Major Bailey received the following message from
Brigadier-General C. P. Heywood, Commanding the 3rd Guards Brigade:
I should like to put on record my appreciation of the good
work done by you and your Battalion during the past three
days. I was particularly impressed with the initiative and
determined action of the King's Company in pushing forward on
the afternoon of the 11th to the advanced position in D 12
central.
On the 15th Major-General T. G. Matheson, Commanding the Guards
Division, addressed the following message to Brigadier-General Heywood:
I wish to congratulate the Brigadier and all ranks of the 3rd
Guards Brigade on the manner in which they carried out the
task assigned to them from October 11th to 14th.
The advance of the 1st Batt. Grenadier Guards towards Solesmes
and of the 2nd Batt. Scots Guards to St. Python were carried
out with very much gallantry and produced very valuable
results in securing us command of the crossings of the River
Selle. The hard fighting of the 1st Batt. Welsh Guards on the
left flank contributed largely to the success of the other two
Battalions.
I am much pleased with the performance of the Brigade and
should like my appreciation to be conveyed to all ranks.
Two days, the 14th and 15th, were spent at Quiévy cleaning up and
reorganising, but on the evening of the second day the enemy bombarded
the billeting area with 8-inch shells, when two men were killed and
nine were wounded. On the 17th the Battalion marched to Carmières,
where Major Bailey attended a Brigade conference. On the 19th the
Battalion marched by companies with intervals of 200 yards to St.
Vaast, and sheltered in houses and cellars until 10.15 P.M.,
when they moved up to the assembly area, directed by guides from the
1st Battalion Coldstream Guards.
LIST OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE OPERATIONS
OCTOBER 20-22
Major the Hon. W. R. Bailey, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
2nd Lieut. J. C. Blunt Acting Adjutant.
Lieut. R. F. W. Echlin Transport Officer.
Lieut. R. G. Buchanan Act.-Quartermaster.
Capt. P. M. Spence, M.C. King's Company.
Lieut. A. M. Brown " "
2nd Lieut. L. E. G. Wall " "
Lieut. C. G. Kennaway No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. B. Osborne " "
2nd Lieut. M. G. Farquharson " "
Capt. J. H. C. Simpson No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. G. S. Lamont " "
2nd Lieut. L. F. A. d'Erlanger " "
2nd Lieut. N. P. Andrews " "
Lieut. A. E. D. Bliss No. 4 Company.
Lieut. R. S. Challands " "
2nd Lieut. C. B. Hall " "
Capt. W. Lindsay, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. C. Venables Chaplain.
The night was dark and it was pouring with rain, when the Battalion
formed up along the line of railway between Haussy and St. Vaast. It is
impossible adequately to describe the absolute wretchedness of forming
up on a pitch-dark night in pouring rain. An operation seemed hopeless,
and was only possible by giving careful instructions to every single
man in the Battalion. Plenty of time was allowed to prepare for this
fight, but the Battalion was only just ready when the time came to
advance. No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant Bliss, was on the left; No. 3
Company, under Lieutenant Challands, in the centre; and No. 2 Company,
under Lieutenant Kennaway, on the right. Touch was obtained with the
8th Battalion Gloucester Regiment in the Nineteenth Division on the
left, and with the Irish Guards on the right. The Royal Engineeers had
arranged to lay tapes from the railway to the eight temporary bridges,
which they had put over the River Selle, but these tapes were not laid
until shortly before zero hour, and one tape did not lead to a bridge,
with the result that the platoon which followed it had to wade across
the river.
[Sidenote: Oct. 20.]
From the very start everything went well, and the barrage moved with
perfect precision. Chasing the Germans in the dark in this way was
not without excitement, as no one knew whether they would remain and
fight, or retire as soon as they were threatened. It was a great relief
to Major Bailey to find that the enemy had no intention of disputing
the crossing of the river, as this would have entailed the loss of
a number of men at the start. As it was, the Battalion proceeded in
artillery formation as far as the Haussy--Solesmes road, passing over
five or six lines of rifle-pits wonderfully well made in concrete. When
the creeping barrage began to move forward, the Battalion moved with
it, but there was little or no opposition, and the objective was gained
according to scheduled time. The few prisoners that were captured said
that the garrisons of their posts had fled as soon as the barrage
began. Direction was admirably kept, and the men advanced close up
to the barrage, in spite of the heavy plough on the side of the hill
on which they had to advance. The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 1st
Battalion Welsh Guards then came through, and continued the advance. In
the evening the German artillery put down a very heavy barrage on the
railway, shifting it later to the road, and then covering the objective
and the reverse slope of the hill, but in spite of the shelling the
casualties were not heavy.
[Sidenote: Oct. 21.]
The shelling continued all the next day, but the 3rd Guards Brigade was
not required. In the evening the Battalion took over the whole Brigade
front from the Scots Guards and Welsh Guards; the King's and No. 3
Companies were placed in the outpost line; and Nos. 2 and 4 Companies
took over the main line of resistance on the high ground east of the
Solesmes--Vendegies road.
[Sidenote: Oct. 22.]
The line of the Solesmes road was shelled all day, but the Battalion
was very lucky, although No. 4 Company was rather seriously gassed.
Lieutenant E. A. D. Bliss and Second Lieutenant C. B. Hall and ten
men were all gassed. In the evening the Highland Light Infantry
relieved the Battalion, which marched back to billets in St. Vaast.
These operations on the whole had been easy, as the Germans had put
up very little resistance, but the rain and mud had made everything
very miserable, and the men were soaked to the skin before the attack
commenced.
In all the villages round about civilians emerged from cellars, having
hidden there for five days in order to avoid being evacuated by the
Germans. Among the German prisoners, who had been captured during the
advance, were several regimental commanders of the true Prussian type,
with florid faces and bristling moustaches. They presented a sorry
spectacle in the cages, and seemed to feel their position acutely.
[Illustration:
_Langfier Ltd photographers Emery Walker ph. sc._
_Brigadier-General Lord Henry Seymour, D.S.O._
]
On the 23rd the following special order was issued:
The Commanding Officer congratulates all ranks on the way in
which the attack of the 20th was carried out. The difficulties
of a night attack are always great, but in this case they
were almost entirely eliminated by the obvious care with
which the officers and N.C.O.'s had made their preparations
and explained the scheme of attack to their men. No one lost
direction, and the orders given out beforehand were carried
out almost to the letter.
The conditions have been very bad, but as always you have made
the best of things and have kept up the Grenadier tradition of
invariable cheerfulness under hardships. You are now out for
a short time to reorganise and refit. In a day's time the
Battalion will be as keen and smart as it was before, and
I am confident that that spirit which has carried you through
this attack so well will be as good and keen in any other
operation which you may be called upon to perform in future.
I congratulate all ranks, and I sympathise with you for not
having found more Germans to kill, which would have made up
in some small degree for all the worry and anxiety of the
preliminary preparations.
(Signed) W. R. BAILEY, Lt.-Col.
Commanding 1st Batt. Gren. Gds.
While the Second Division continued the attack, the 3rd Guards
Brigade remained in billets in St. Vaast. On the 25th Lieutenant H.
Freeman-Greene and Lieutenant W. A. Pembroke joined the Battalion.
THE 2ND BATTALION
[Sidenote: 2nd Batt.]
After the operations at the end of September the Battalion bivouacked
close to the village of Demicourt for ten days' training. Meanwhile
Lieut.-Colonel Rasch, having been appointed to command the 1st
Provisional Battalion at Aldershot, left for England, and Major C. F.
A. Walker, M.C., took over the 2nd Battalion.
The following officers took part in the fighting on October 9:
Major C. F. A. Walker, M.C. Commanding Officer.
Capt. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. Adjutant.
Lieut. W. H. S. Dent. Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. L. Holbech, M.C. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. C. L. F. Boughey " "
2nd Lieut. E. M. Neill " "
Capt. G. B. Wilson No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. D. L. King " "
2nd Lieut. C. J. N. Adams " "
Capt. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. K. B. Bibby " "
2nd Lieut. E. G. Harcourt-Vernon " "
Lieut. R. H. R. Palmer No. 4 Company.
Lieut. C. C. Cubitt " "
2nd Lieut. B. R. Osborne " "
Lieut. E. L. Coffin Medical Officer.
During the night of the 7th the Battalion moved into some trenches
near Marcoing, and next morning it crossed the St. Quentin Canal at
Masnières. The canal was being shelled at the time, but the Battalion
escaped without any casualties. Orders were now received for the
Battalion to take part in an attack, the first objective being the
La Targette--Forenville road, and the second the railway running
north-east of Wambaix. In view of the possibility of the enemy being
forced to retire, the instructions were that the leading companies were
to push on in the general direction of Cattenières.
[Sidenote: Oct. 9.]
Zero was 6 o'clock on the morning of October 9, and the assembly area
for the 1st Guards Brigade was on the line of old German trenches,
south-west of Seranvillers. Taking up its position on the left of the
line, the Battalion had the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on its
right, with the 1st Battalion Irish Guards in reserve. In conjunction
with this force, the 2nd Guards Brigade was to advance on the left and
the New Zealand Division on the right, and the boundary between the two
leading battalions was the main road through Seranvillers and Wambaix.
It had been arranged for the barrage to descend on the first
objective, and so the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion
Coldstream were able to start moving slowly forward ten minutes before
zero hour. No. 3 Company of the Battalion, under Captain Cornforth,
was on the right and No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant Palmer, on the
left, while No. 2 Company, under Captain Wilson, was in support, and
No. 1 Company, under Lieutenant Holbech, in reserve. The foremost
companies advanced in waves, and the supports and reserves in artillery
formation, preceded by strong patrols, Captain Wilson's company being
responsible for clearing the village of Seranvillers. Two howitzers,
a field-gun, several machine-guns, and a few prisoners were captured
without any real opposition, and the Battalion pushed on very rapidly
to within a short distance of Cattenières, where the patrols were sent
ahead through the village.
But as soon as they emerged from Cattenières, and came on to the ridge
to the north they were held up by heavy machine-gun fire from the wood
surrounding the factory at Ignies-le-Petit. There was a considerable
stretch of open ground in front of the wood, and progress became very
difficult. Lieutenant Palmer, commanding No. 4 Company, ordered Second
Lieutenant Osborne to try and advance with his platoon on the left in
order to enfilade the enemy in the south-east corner of the wood. A
certain amount of ground was gained by sectional rushes under extremely
heavy machine-gun fire, but the complete lack of "dead" ground made
real success impossible, and Major Walker decided to postpone any
farther move until it could be made under cover of darkness.
A wonderfully gallant piece of work during this part of the fighting
was done by No. 16796 Private Edgar Holmes, and won for him the
Victoria Cross, which unfortunately he did not live to receive. He
was acting as a stretcher-bearer, and calmly and fearlessly went on
with his errands of mercy to the wounded under a withering machine-gun
fire. He succeeded in getting two men in, and, quite regardless of
the intense fire at close range, was attending to a third when he was
himself hit in the stomach. He did not falter for a moment, and, paying
no attention to his own wound, went forward once more to rescue yet
another of the fallen. He had covered thirty yards in the direction of
the enemy when he was hit again, this time fatally.
At 1 A.M. on October 10 Major Walker brought up the support
and reserve companies, and directed them to attack the wood and factory
at Ignies-le-Petit. They rushed the factory, encountering little
resistance, and then took up a line and dug in on the farther edge
of the wood, beyond the main road. The whole advance was a complete
success, and the casualties of the Battalion were only one man killed
and 12 wounded. Four hours after the attack began, the 1st Battalion
Irish Guards passed through the Battalion, and went in pursuit of the
retreating Germans.
For the week that followed the Battalion was in Brigade Reserve,
and moved slowly forward through Fresnoy Farm, Bévillers, Quiévy,
Boussières to St. Hilaire, when it prepared for the forthcoming attack.
In the operations on the 20th the officers engaged were:
Major C. F. A. Walker, M.C. Commanding Officer.
Lieut. S. T. S. Clarke, M.C. Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. A. F. Alington Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. L. Holbech, M.C. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. C. L. F. Boughey " "
2nd Lieut. E. M. Neill " "
Capt. G. B. Wilson No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. D. L. King " "
2nd Lieut. C. J. N. Adams " "
Capt. L. St. L. Hermon-Hodge No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. K. B. Bibby " "
2nd Lieut. E. G. Harcourt-Vernon " "
Lieut. H. B. G. Morgan, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. C. C. Cubitt " "
2nd Lieut. B. R. Osborne " "
Lieut. E. L. Coffin Medical Officer.
This attack was only part of a very extensive movement on the whole of
the Third Army front. The Sixty-first Division was ordered to advance
on the right of the Guards Division, and the Nineteenth Division, under
Major-General Jefferies, on the left. Acting as the leading battalion
on the right of the Guards Division, the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards
had the Valenciennes--Solesmes road as its first objective, and, for
its second, a line about a quarter of a mile west of the villages of
Vertain and Romeries. The capture of Solesmes, which was known to be
full of civilians, and strongly held by the enemy, was entrusted to
the Sixty-first Division, while the Guards Division was to push right
on to its final objective. This gave the Battalion the delicate and
dangerous task of advancing the whole way with an exposed flank. Two
other features added to the difficulty of the manœuvre. The long
distance to the final objective had to be traversed under cover of
darkness, and before it could reach the outskirts of Solesmes, known as
St. Python, the Battalion had to cross the River Selle.
[Sidenote: Oct. 19.]
Leaving St. Hilaire at 9.30 P.M. on the 19th inst., the
Battalion followed the 1st Battalion Irish Guards until it reached
its assembly position, which was the railway running from Haussy to
Solesmes. No. 1 Company under Lieutenant Holbech was on the right,
No. 2 Company on the left under Captain Wilson, No. 3 under Captain
Hermon-Hodge in support, and No. 4 under Lieutenant Morgan in reserve.
A drizzling rain fell incessantly, and though the moon was full it was
a very dark night.
[Sidenote: Oct. 20.]
At zero hour, 2 A.M., under a heavy and very effective
barrage, the Battalion advanced to the river in artillery formation,
guided by tapes. Very indifferent bridges had been erected by the Royal
Engineers and the Pioneer Battalion of the Coldstream Guards, and it
was no easy matter getting all the men across in single file on two
extremely narrow planks. However, there were very few casualties, and
the leading companies deployed into waves, and went forward, followed
by the supports and reserves in artillery formation. Very soon after
the start No. 1 Company got to St. Python, but as it was entering it
came under heavy machine-gun fire from the houses. Some useful bombing
work was carried out at this juncture, especially by No. 1 platoon,
led by Corporal Hunter. As the barrage was moving forward, Lieutenant
Holbech decided to leave one platoon to complete the capture of St.
Python, supported by No. 3 Company, while the rest of the leading
companies went on to their first objective, which they reached almost
to schedule time. About 50 prisoners and several machine-guns were
captured in this stage of the attack.
There was an hour's halt at this point, in the course of which the
remaining platoon of No. 1 Company joined up with the leading troops.
It had been uphill work all the way, with a good deal of wire to get
through, and it had been found necessary to constitute No. 3 Company a
defensive flank. Just before another move was due, a party of the enemy
was seen on the right rear of the Battalion, firing lights towards
Solesmes. One platoon under Lieutenant Holbech wheeled about, and
charged it from the rear, "getting home" with the bayonet and capturing
several machine-guns.
The final objective was reached soon after 4 o'clock. But the Germans
were inclined to hold on to their positions, and all the way the
two leading companies met with resistance. This was partly owing to
machine-gun fire from the right flank, as up to this time Solesmes had
not yet been cleared by the Sixty-first Division. On the line of the
final objective No. 1 Company took a field-gun with its garrison of one
officer and 25 men--which brought the total captures of the Battalion
in the attack up to 200 prisoners, two field-guns, and a large number
of machine-guns and trench mortars.
By daylight the leading companies had consolidated their line of
outposts, and in order to protect the right rear of the Battalion, No.
3 Company dug in in échelon to the right flank, with No. 4 Company in
rear of it. About 9 A.M. the Sixty-first Division continued
its advance from Solesmes, and came up into line with the Battalion.
Soon after dawn heavy enemy machine-gun fire had been brought to bear
upon the leading companies, and continued for several hours, while the
German artillery, which up to this time had taken little part in the
operations, began to assert itself, and shells of every sort fell round
the battalion. Lieutenant E. M. Neill, who had been conspicuous for his
work and bravery during the advance, was wounded by shell-fire, and the
total casualties were one officer and 52 other ranks. On the evening of
the 22nd the Battalion was relieved by the 24th Royal Fusiliers, and
marched back to St. Vaast, where it "embussed" for Carnières. There it
remained until the end of the month, when it moved on to St. Hilaire,
proceeding the following day to Capelle.
THE 3RD BATTALION
[Sidenote: 3rd Batt.]
In the first week in October the Battalion remained at Doignies,
where during a practice attack a barrage from a smoke rifle grenade
was tried, and on the 8th moved to Premy Chapel. An attack was being
made by the Sixty-second Division, and the Battalion, which was not
called upon, moved on later to Masnières. Cambrai could be seen in the
distance burning fiercely throughout the night.
On the 9th the orders were not received until the Battalion was in its
assembly position.
The following officers took part in these operations:
Lieut.-Colonel the Viscount Lascelles,
D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. E. G. A. Fitzgerald, D.S.O. Adjutant.
Lieut. R. C. G. de Reuter Intelligence Officer.
Capt. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. K. A. Campbell, D.S.O. " "
2nd Lieut. G. R. Gunther, M.C. " "
Capt. A. H. S. Adair, M.C. No. 2 Company.
Lieut. S. G. Fairbairn, M.C. " "
Lieut. C. B. Hollins " "
Lieut. F. Anson, M.C. No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. H. J. Gibbon, M.C. " "
Capt. E. J. Bunbury, M.C. No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. A. E. F. F. Strangways-Rogers " "
2nd Lieut. H. I'B. Smith " "
2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon " "
Capt. J. H. Graff, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore, M.C. Chaplain.
[Sidenote: Oct. 9.]
In the early part of the attack one of our guns appears to have been
badly laid, with the result that it continued to shoot short, causing
several casualties among the leading companies of the Battalion. This
was particularly irritating, since only a short time before these
companies had been mistaken for the enemy, and had been fired at by
one of our own aeroplanes. The first objective was taken by 6.30, and
no Germans were encountered, the only casualties being caused by our
barrage.
The Battalion started off with No. 1 Company under Captain Fryer on the
right, No. 2 under Captain Adair on the left, No. 3 under Lieutenant
Anson in support, and No. 4 under Captain Bunbury in reserve. As
there seemed every possibility of the Germans retiring rapidly, the
scheme of attack was ambitious, with a large extent of ground to be
covered. The first objective was a trench running from Niergnies to
Seranvillers; the second objective the road running from Cambrai to
La Targette; and after that there were four "bounds," ending up with
the Cambrai--Beauvois road. There was no sign of the enemy, not even
any hostile shelling at first, and no difficulty was experienced in
securing the objectives. In the second bound, Wambaix Copse, which
might possibly have been held by the enemy, was also taken without
opposition. At 10.30 the capture of Estourmel was effected, and still
the enemy had shown no sign of fighting. Lord Lascelles decided
that the dinners should be eaten now, and as the 1st Guards Brigade
had not come up there was plenty of time for the men to dine before
resuming the advance. It was not until the Battalion reached the
Cambrai--Beauvois road and Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes that the enemy's
resistance stiffened, and it suffered casualties. Captain Adair with
No. 2 Company occupied Igniel, but reported that casualties were
occurring from machine-gun fire on his right, and from the enemy's
heavy guns at long range. This village was in a clump of trees on the
crest of a hill on the farther side of the Cambrai--Beauvois road,
and was approached by a sunken road, on each side of which the ground
rose in a gentle slope, and formed an ideal position for machine-guns.
Captain Adair advanced up the sunken road, and as soon as his company
appeared on the hill it was subjected to a harassing machine-gun fire.
He at first ordered his men to dig themselves in, but later he decided
to move up into Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes. When No. 2 Company moved into
the trees and buildings, it was so heavily shelled that Lord Lascelles,
who had come up to see how the situation was developing, told him his
men would be safer out in the open. There seems little doubt that the
German ammunition was already deteriorating, for when their shells
burst the pieces did not scatter so well as before. But for this the
casualties would certainly have been very heavy, and in all probability
it would have been found necessary to retire from the hill altogether.
At 4.30 P.M. Lord Lascelles received instructions to support
a cavalry patrol of the Oxfordshire Hussars, which had been sent out
through the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left. He was surprised at
this message, for he knew that no cavalry patrol could possibly go out
in the face of this machine-gun fire, and when the officer commanding
the patrol appeared at the Battalion Headquarters to say that it had
been unable to go forward at all, he was able to disregard the order,
and send in a report asking for confirmation of his action. In the
evening orders were received to establish an outpost line with two
companies over the Cambrai--Beauvois road, with two companies in
support near Estourmel. That night a warning order was received for a
farther advance the next morning, and the Battalion Headquarters moved
up to Grand Chanfemel.
[Sidenote: Oct. 10.]
The next morning the 1st Battalion Scots Guards passed through the
outpost line, and continued the advance by bounds, while the Battalion
moved forward in support. No. 3 Company on the right, under Lieutenant
Anson, and No. 4, under Captain Bunbury, formed the support, with the
other two companies in reserve. In the afternoon the Scots Guards were
held up west of St. Hilaire, and were ordered to establish an outpost
line for the night. Nos. 3 and 4 Companies were placed under the orders
of the Officer Commanding the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, while two
companies of the 1st Battalion Coldstream were sent up to take their
place.
On the 11th the 1st Guards Brigade passed through the outpost line, and
continued the advance, while the Battalion went into very comfortable
billets in St. Hilaire, where the German baths were used. On the 13th
the 2nd Guards Brigade passed through with the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers
on the right, the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left, and the 1st
Battalion Scots Guards in reserve. These Battalions were ordered to be
at immediate notice to move in case the 3rd Guards Brigade, which was
crossing the Selle River, should require assistance, but the warning
orders were later cancelled; and that night the Battalion relieved the
2nd Battalion Scots Guards in the front line along the Selle River.
Second Lieutenant Gunther with a patrol of eight men crossed the river,
and surprised a German whom he gagged and brought back. He reported
that the enemy seemed in a sleepy and disorganised state, and Lord
Lascelles accordingly asked for permission to push a company across the
river that night, but was told instead to establish a bridgehead on the
following night north of St. Python.
The erection of a bridgehead so near to so many houses was a matter
of some difficulty, since it was obvious that the crossing could not
be held if the enemy occupied houses within 300 yards of it. Lord
Lascelles therefore ordered Lieutenant H. I'B. Smith to occupy the
nearest house to the bridgehead and Lieutenant F. Donnison to search
the four or five houses near it and make sure they were empty. Second
Lieutenant Smith had no difficulty in occupying the house, but found
that the walls on the enemy's side were so full of large holes that the
house was untenable. Lieutenant Donnison moved forward to reconnoitre
but ran into the Germans in some force in the streets beyond, and was
forced by machine-gun fire and bombs to fall back on Lieutenant Smith's
party, leaving behind two men who were too badly wounded to move.
The alternatives open to Lord Lascelles were first, to hold the bridge
with trenches dug practically on it, but this was dismissed as being
strategically unsound; secondly, to dig trenches beyond the bridge,
which was difficult, because the men would have to be on the top of
the river bank, and overlooked by the houses 300 yards away; thirdly,
to occupy one house and strongly fortify it. This seemed at first to be
the best solution of the difficulty, but when Second Lieutenant Smith
and Second Lieutenant Donnison, who had behaved with great gallantry
and coolness, reported that it was impossible to hold the nearest
house, and that all the neighbouring houses would have to be cleared
of the enemy, Lord Lascelles came to the conclusion that this would
involve him in endless operations in the town. He therefore decided to
have the bridgehead dug in on the banks of the river.
Captain Bunbury, who commanded No. 4 Company, from which the two
platoons had been sent to secure the houses on the farther side of the
river, was placed in a difficult position. He brought up the remainder
of his company, and held a quarter of the village of St. Python, the
houses on the other side of the stream being held entirely by the
Germans. It was impossible to get to him in daylight, and by night all
the streets were swept with machine-gun fire. He handled his men under
circumstances of exceptional difficulty with some skill during the days
he was there. Throughout these operations some five hundred civilians
lived in the cellars and performed many acts of kindness to the men of
the Battalion who visited them. It was impossible for them to move out
of their retreat without being shot at. One little girl, eleven years
old, quite unconscious of the danger she ran, walked out in the
streets in broad daylight, and was brutally shot by a German; at great
risk one of the men of the Battalion went out and carried her back, but
she died.
[Illustration:
_Operations_
_October 20th, 1918_
_Emery Walker Ltd._
]
This was the beginning of the period when the Germans seemed to spare
all the buildings, and to concentrate their fire chiefly on the exits
from villages.
On the 16th the enemy was reported to be massing men on the St.
Python--Haussy road, and our artillery shelled the area indicated for
two hours, but no counter-attack developed. The following day the
Battalion was relieved, and went into billets at St. Vaast. On the 20th
the 1st and 3rd Guards Brigades attacked, and captured the high ground
east of Solesmes and St. Python, but the 2nd Guards Brigade was not
wanted. On the 22nd the whole of the Guards Division was taken out of
the line for a week's rest.