SEPTEMBER
_Diary of the War_
[Sidenote: Sept. 1918.]
The German retreat still continued, and the Allies gained ground all
along the line. The salient at St. Mihiel was carried by the American
Army, and the Hindenburg line was captured by the British. A combined
attack of the British and Belgian troops under the command of King
Albert succeeded beyond all expectation, and the British Fleet was
able to join in and bombard the coast. An Austrian offer to enter into
Peace negotiations was published, and at the same time the Germans made
overtures to the Belgians, but the Allied conference at Versailles
refused even to consider either of these proposals.
In Macedonia the Allied Forces inflicted a defeat on the Bulgarians,
who retreated on a front of nearly 100 miles, and on September 25 the
Bulgarian Government applied for an unconditional armistice.
In Palestine General Allenby commenced a series of attacks on the Turks
between Rafat and the sea, and on the 30th Damascus was taken.
DIVISIONAL ACCOUNT
During September Marshal Foch followed up his successes all along the
line, and the Germans were forced to abandon position after position.
Ludendorff, however, always imagined that the Siegfried line was
impregnable, and that if the German Army succeeded in getting back
there intact, there was no reason why this position should not be held
during the winter.
To the British Army was assigned the difficult task of piercing this
impregnable line and rendering it untenable, but many doubts were
expressed as to whether this was feasible. Sir Douglas Haig, however,
was convinced that it could be done, and directed the First and Third
Armies to open the attack in the direction of Cambrai, in the hopes
that after they had advanced it would be possible for the Fourth Army
to pierce the strongest part of the line farther south.
After the operations at the end of August the Guards Division had only
five days' rest before it was again put into the line. On September
2 the Canadian Corps had broken the Drocourt--Queant Switch, whilst
on the Sixth Corps front the Third Division had, after very heavy
fighting, made ground in the neighbourhood of Noreuil and Lagnicourt.
The Guards Division moved up from the Ransart area, and was ordered to
continue the attack the following day. The position of the advanced
troops of the Third Division was so uncertain that it was decided to
form up for the attack, along the railway line just east of Noreuil,
some distance in rear of the line which the Third Division claimed to
have reached, the troops of this Division being then withdrawn. This
necessitated the sacrifice of a certain amount of ground won by the
Third Division at a heavy cost, but it ensured a straight jumping-off
line, and enormously simplified the task of the artillery. (This
procedure was repeated on October 9, and on each occasion was fully
justified by results.)
After a long and tiring march from their rest areas, Sergison-Brooke's
and Follett's Brigades formed up on the right and left respectively,
with De Crespigny's Brigade in reserve south of St. Leger. The attack
started under a very good barrage at 5.20 A.M. Reports soon
showed that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, and the advance
continued without opposition until the old British front line, just
short of the Hindenburg line, was reached. By this time the troops were
utterly exhausted, having covered since noon the previous day some
twenty miles, in full fighting kit and over hilly country.
During the course of the advance a number of prisoners and guns were
captured, but the most noticeable feature on the ground which was
recovered was the enormous number of the enemy's dead horses which
littered and often blocked the roads: eloquent testimony of the work of
our aeroplanes and long-range guns, but entailing heavy and unpleasant
fatigue work for our tired troops.
On September 4 Follett's Brigade was ordered to push forward, and form
an advance-guard for the rest of the Division, but it found that the
Germans were holding the Hindenburg line in some force. This prevented
any ground being gained, and the line soon stabilised along the Army
front.
The principal features of the operations that took place between
September 5 and 26 were:
(_a_) Some fine trench fighting, by which the 1st Battalion Grenadier
Guards, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Lord Gort, reached the line
of the Canal du Nord.
(_b_) The heavy and continuous fighting for the village of Mœuvres
farther north, during which it changed hands several times before being
finally captured and held by the Fifty-second Division.
(_c_) The heavy gas-shelling, with which the Germans searched all
possible assembly positions every night in evident fear of an attack,
and which, but for the improved gas discipline, would have caused heavy
casualties.
During this period the troops had the satisfaction of seeing two huge
German bombing 'planes brought down in flames, on successive nights by
our night-flying scouts, working in conjunction with the reorganised
searchlight system.
On September 11 Major-General Feilding left to take command of the
London District on the retirement of Lieut.-General Sir Francis Lloyd,
who had held that command with conspicuous success during the war. For
four years Sir Francis Lloyd had occupied one of the most responsible
and difficult positions in the Army, and had dealt, especially in
the initial stages of the war, with innumerable problems requiring
consummate skill, judgment, and tact.
There were several generals who were eligible to succeed Major-General
Feilding in command of the Guards Division; all of them had fought
consistently for four years, and had been proved and tempered in
the furnace of war. The choice of the Commander-in-Chief fell upon
Major-General T. G. Matheson, C.B., an officer of exceptional ability,
who was reputed to be one of the best Divisional Commanders in the
British Army.
On September 25 the orders for the forthcoming attacks were issued.
The Guards Division was to attack and capture the ridge running east
from Flesquières to Premy Chapel. On the right the Third Division would
attack and capture the village of Flesquières, and on the left the
Fifty-second Division would capture the Hindenburg line west of the
Canal du Nord, after which the Sixty-third Division would pass through,
and swinging right-handed would take the Hindenburg support line and
the villages of Graincourt and Anneux. In the event of this operation
being completely successful, further objectives were given, including
Marcoing for the Third Division, Nine Wood and the outskirts of
Noyelles for the Guards Division, Cantaing and Fontaine-Notre-Dame for
the Fifty-seventh Division, which was to pass through the Sixty-third
Division. The Sixty-second and Second Divisions were to be prepared
to pass through the Third and Guards Divisions respectively, and
capture Rumilly and the high ground east of the Canal de l'Escaut. In
the Guards Division Sergison-Brooke's Brigade was to take the first
objective (the Hindenburg support line) and form a defensive flank to
the left during the next advance, until Graincourt had been secured by
the Fifty-second and Sixty-third Divisions.
De Crespigny's Brigade would then pass through and capture the
trench-system north-west, north, and north-east of Flesquières, moving
on afterwards to the spur running from Flesquières to Cantaing with a
view to capturing the batteries in that area and turning the Graincourt
line. This advance was to synchronise with the attack by Follett's
Brigade, but was not to be pressed against strong resistance.
Follett's Brigade was to pass through De Crespigny's Brigade, and to
capture the third objective, including the high ground round Premy
Chapel. Detailed orders for a farther advance were given in the event
of no great resistance being encountered.
The attack would be supported by six brigades R.H.A., heavy artillery,
and three machine-gun companies.
The assembly was rendered unusually difficult by reason of the
exceptionally large number of troops that had to be accommodated, by
the necessity of avoiding gas areas, and by the extreme darkness of the
night. The 1st Battalion Scots Guards also suffered from a barrage,
which the enemy put down on their assembly trench just before zero. The
attack started at 5.20 A.M., and at once met with a check on the left,
where the 1st Battalion Coldstream was held up by a machine-gun hidden
under a fallen bridge. By the time this obstacle had been overcome the
barrage was lost, and this Battalion suffered heavy casualties before
reaching its objective, particularly near Mammoth cross-roads, but the
remainder of the Brigade reached the first objective with very slight
loss.
The advance to the second objective was a very difficult operation. It
was known that the Sixty-third Division could not reach Graincourt from
the north for another two hours, and General de Crespigny had therefore
to hold back his left, and push forward along Shingler Trench with his
right. In the meantime Graincourt and the trenches south of it were
kept under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, in order to prevent,
as far as possible, the Germans enfilading the troops advancing farther
south. Flesquières was captured in conjunction with the Third Division,
but the beetroot factory to the east of it held out, so that it was
impossible for Follett's Brigade to get through in time to follow their
barrage.
The Fifty-second and Sixty-third Divisions on the left had been held
up, which prevented De Crespigny's Brigade from advancing, and the left
flank of the Guards Division was therefore very much extended, and
exposed to cross fire from the left. General Follett, who had come up
with General de Crespigny to see how the battle developed, before his
Brigade came into action, was killed by this cross fire. His death was
mourned by the whole Division, for there was no braver man in the Army,
and indeed it was a serious loss to his Brigade just as it was going
into action. Major-General Matheson sent orders that Lieut.-Colonel
Lord Gort was to take command of the Brigade, but that pending his
arrival General de Crespigny was to command both Brigades.
At this stage the battle might easily have died down, as the time-table
was out of gear; the attack on the left had apparently failed, and
the Germans in Graincourt village and Graincourt line were giving a
great deal of trouble with their cross fire. Fortunately, however,
a Commander of great enterprise and determination in Lord Gort was
in the line, and before long the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, supported
by the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, had pushed out along the ridge
east of Flesquières, and established itself only just short of Premy
Chapel, while the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, together with units of De
Crespigny's Brigade, formed a defensive flank along Shingler and Silver
Trenches.
Not long after, the Sixty-third Division, having organised a new
attack, pushed down the Hindenburg support line, and the Germans began
to pour out of Graincourt; as they streamed away, horse, foot, and gun,
towards Cantaing, they were caught in flank by rifle, machine-gun, and
artillery fire from the Guards Division, and suffered heavily. The 2nd
Battalion Grenadiers at once pushed forward and captured Orival Wood,
taking some guns, and driving the remaining batteries away.
The Second Division was ordered to pass through and pursue the
retreating enemy, but dusk fell before it reached the front line, and
all it could do was to take over the line occupied by the advanced
troops of the Guards Division, which was withdrawn during the night to
the area east and west of the Canal du Nord.
On September 27 the casualties in the Guards Division were 40 officers
and 1200 other ranks. The total number of prisoners taken by the
Division was 25 officers and 703 other ranks, in addition to 10
field-guns.
THE 1ST BATTALION
[Sidenote: 1st Batt.]
On September 2 the Battalion proceeded to the area about Homme Mort,
and halted for dinner near Moyenneville. In the afternoon the whole
Brigade concentrated in Maida Vale, and Lord Gort rode forward with the
Company Commanders towards Longatte, in view of an attack the following
day. The orders for the attack were issued that night, and early the
next morning the Battalion proceeded to Noreuil, where they went into
old German dug-outs. The Germans had retired to the Hindenburg line,
and a general advance on Bourlon and Mœuvres was ordered (on the
whole Corps front). The 1st Battalion marched to a position west of
Lagnicourt, where they remained for the night. A farther advance was
made the next day, and on the 5th it reached Louverval Wood, where a
week was spent training and practising open warfare.
On the 11th the Battalion moved up into the front line, but the relief
was only effected by the infiltration of the companies through troops
of the 50th Infantry Brigade. This Brigade, having made an attack
that evening, had failed to secure its objective, and the relief was
consequently not an easy one. Lord Gort and Captain Simpson spent the
night reconnoitring the trenches in the outer zone of the Hindenburg
line, in constant danger of being caught by the Germans, and the
information they gained enabled the Battalion to establish itself by
dawn the next morning in the objective, which the 5th Infantry Brigade
had intended to secure the night before. At dawn a bombing attack
was made up Brown Trench, and the line of Alban Avenue was secured.
A barrage, supporting the attack on Havrincourt, was put down on the
whole front, and soon brought retaliation from the enemy. Near the
sunken trench in Alban Avenue a shell burst, killing Lieutenant E. B.
Shelley, and wounding Second Lieutenant Payne severely and Captain
Simpson slightly. In addition to the shelling, the enemy's machine-guns
were very active, enfilading Alban Avenue. In the afternoon the 225th
German Infantry Regiment carried out a bombing attack on Beatty and
Babs posts, but was repulsed with several killed and wounded, leaving
two machine-guns in our hands. Throughout the day the enemy maintained
a heavy harassing fire, and in the evening again attempted a bombing
attack on Beatty and Babs posts, but with the same result. The
following day the shelling decreased considerably, and inter-company
relief was carried out. First Lieutenant W. B. Evans, U.S.A.M.O.R.C.,
and Captain the Rev. J. O. Venables, in addition to 27 other ranks,
were gassed on the 13th, and every day there were a number of men
killed, wounded, and gassed.
On the 15th the following letter from Brigadier-General W. S. Osborn,
5th Infantry Brigade, was received by Brigadier-General Follett:
The 5th Infantry Brigade much appreciates the support given
them on their left by the 1st Batt. Grenadier Guards in
Beatty Post and Alban Trench. The counter-attack repulsed
by Grenadier Guardsmen would have fallen on their weakened
Companies. A captured map showed the Hun main line running
down Hunt Avenue with outposts in Slag Avenue, and the
counter-attack was evidently made to gain this resistance
line. Will you please thank Colonel Lord Gort from me on
behalf of the 5th I.B.
The week preceding the attack on Premy Chapel was uneventful, and
on the 25th Major-General Matheson explained the details of the
operations. Captain Lawford was appointed to the Staff of the Fourth
Army, and Captain Lovell, M.C., took over the duties of Adjutant.
[Illustration:
_Attack on Premy Chapel_
_September 27th. 1918_
_Emery Walker Ltd._
]
_The Attack on Premy Chapel_
[Sidenote: Sept. 26.]
On the evening of the 26th the Battalion left its billets about a mile
north-west of the village of Lagnicourt, and marched with its full
battle equipment, accompanied by Lewis guns, limbers, field-kitchens,
and water-carts, along the Lagnicourt--Doignies road, to its bivouacs
about 1500 yards west of Louverval Wood. The strength of the Battalion
was 15 officers and 395 other ranks actually going into action.
The officers who took part in the attack were:
Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O.,
M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer.
Capt. W. H. Lovell, M.C. Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. J. C. Blunt Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. A. M. Brown King's Company.
Lieut. C. G. Kennaway " "
Capt. J. S. Carter No. 2 Company.
Lieut. A. A. Morris " "
Lieut. L. C. Jesper " "
Capt. J. H. C. Simpson No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. L. F. A. d'Erlanger " "
2nd Lieut. G. S. Lamont " "
Lieut. B. H. Jones No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. D. H. Clarke " "
2nd Lieut. A. Grant " "
Capt. W. Lindsay, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. C. Venables Chaplain.
Lieut. R. W. F. Echlin was acting Brigade Transport Officer, and Lieut.
R. G. Buchanan as Quartermaster.
Lord Gort issued the following operation orders:
The Battalion will attack Premy Chapel hill tomorrow the
27th, with the object of securing the line of the sunken road.
The attack will be made in conjunction with the 2/20th London
Regiment, who will be advancing on Marcoing, and the 2nd
Battalion Scots Guards, who will be attacking Leech Trench.
The strong patrols of the Battalion will debouch for the
attack from the line of the sunken road at zero + 4 hours 20
minutes so as to cross the brown line (Beet Trench) at zero +4
hours and 30 minutes. Approach march orders have been issued
separately.
The Battalion will attack with No. 2 Company on right and No.
4 Company on left in front line, preceded at a distance of 300
yards by strong patrols.
Dividing line between the two leading Companies in the attack
will be T of Beet Trench to A in Log Avenue, all inclusive to
No. 4 Company.
No. 3 Company will be in support écheloned behind No. 4
Company at a distance of 500 yards in readiness to make a
flank attack on Premy Hill from the north should it be found
necessary.
The King's Company will be in Battalion Reserve and will
follow No. 3 Company at a distance of 500 yards until the
neighbourhood of Premy Trench is reached, when it will occupy
suitable shell-holes and trenches.
Two Stokes mortars, each with 50 rounds, will move immediately
in rear of and under the command of the O.C. No. 3 Company.
One section machine-guns will follow in rear of the King's
Company and will be prepared to assist a flank attack on
Premy from the north with covering fire and to assist the
consolidation of Premy Hill by guns placed in the Graincourt
line.
Corps heavy artillery will bombard Premy Hill until zero + 5
hours, when the guns will lift on to Nine Wood for half an
hour and then cease firing.
The remainder of the orders contained detailed instructions for the
action of the Battalion, if the attack on the right and left proved
successful.
[Sidenote: Sept. 27.]
It was very dark when the Battalion started on its march, and the
artillery on both sides was very quiet. The order of march was No.
2 Company under Captain Carter, No. 4 under Lieutenant Jones, No. 3
under Captain Simpson, and the King's Company under Lieutenant Brown,
while Lord Gort, accompanied by Captain Lovell, the Adjutant, and
some orderlies, walked at the head of the Battalion. On reaching the
Bapaume--Cambrai road a halt was made to wait for zero hour, 5.20 A.M.,
at which time the Battalion was to advance towards Flesquières. At zero
hour the advance began across country to Demicourt. There was at first
very little shelling, but as the Battalion neared the Canal du Nord the
shells began to fall more rapidly. There was no water in the Canal, and
by means of short ladders placed against the banks the crossing was
effected 100 yards north of Lock Seven, with only a dozen casualties,
including Lieutenant Jesper, who was wounded as he reached the near
bank. Lord Gort went back to Lock Seven to confer with the officer
commanding the tanks which were to support the Battalion, and was
unable to find him; it was ascertained later that he had been wounded.
The Battalion had to be in position east of Flesquières at 9.20 A.M.,
and Lord Gort therefore continued the advance without further delay.
The ground over which it was necessary to pass was undulating, and was
swept by the enemy's fire, but the skilful manner in which Lord Gort
conducted this advance accounted for the small number of casualties the
Battalion sustained. The situation did not look very promising, for
the Germans were still holding Graincourt some 4000 yards to the left
rear. The 2nd Battalion was unable to advance on Orival Wood, which
should have been taken before the 1st Battalion started, and the Third
Division, through which the 1st Battalion had to advance, had failed
to carry Beet Trench. On nearing Flesquières, the enemy's machine-gun
fire from the direction of Graincourt became very heavy, and Captain
Carter was killed, being hit in the head. On reaching Flesquières
Lord Gort took the leading companies round the northern edge of the
village, threading a way through the houses, as the machine-gun fire
was heavy from the left flank. Two enemy batteries were still in action
in the neighbourhood of Beet Trench, and the Germans were also holding
the Beetroot Factory and Beet Trench very strongly with infantry and
machine-guns. No sign of any troops on the left could be seen, and
tanks, which were to co-operate, had not yet arrived. Lord Gort himself
took the leading platoons of the two leading companies into position
for assault, and while doing so was slightly wounded over the left
eye. While the patrol platoon of No. 2 Company was crawling forward to
locate the exact position of the enemy, Second Lieutenant Clarke, with
the patrol platoon of No. 4 Company, worked round the left flank of
the enemy, captured Beetroot Factory, and took the garrison prisoners.
It was a skilful and daring manœuvre, as the platoon was fired at from
both flanks, and suffered heavily. One tank now arrived, and Lord Gort
at once decided to push on towards Premy Chapel, in spite of the fact
that no corresponding advance seemed to have been begun on either flank.
Second Lieutenant Clarke, who had returned with his prisoners, was now
ordered to take a platoon from No. 3 Company in support, and again work
round the left flank in order to attack Beet Trench from the rear. Lord
Gort went across the open to a tank, that was working behind the sunken
road, and showed the Commander where to cross, and in what direction to
advance; but when it neared Beet Trench the tank was put out of action
by direct artillery fire. It was now found that the 2nd Battalion Scots
Guards, which should have been advancing on the left flank, was not in
position, nor was the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards able to advance on
Orival Wood. On the right the situation was better, for the Sixty-third
Division was reported to be making good progress. The 1st Battalion
Welsh Guards, which was in Brigade Reserve, undertook to come up and
protect the left flank. All the time there were several hostile air
balloons up directing the fire on the tank, and a German aeroplane had
signalled the presence of troops in the sunken road, which immediately
became a target for the enemy's artillery. One shell burst close to
Lord Gort, wounding him severely in the arm, but although an artery
had been cut and he lost a great deal of blood, he refused to go back
to the dressing-station, and asked Captain Lindsay to bind his arm up
temporarily.
His wound, however, proved more serious than he thought, and Captain
Simpson took over command of the Battalion. Somewhat later Lord Gort
insisted on starting off again to join the leading companies, but on
reaching Beet Trench he collapsed from loss of blood.
Meanwhile the platoon of No. 3 Company under Second Lieutenant Clarke
had succeeded in their turning movement, captured a German machine-gun
post, and, in spite of being fired on by our tank, worked round to the
east of Beet Trench. Two hundred Germans were driven into the sunken
road, and forced to surrender, while two batteries of field howitzers
and six machine-guns were captured.
The two leading companies continued their advance and No. 3 Company
moved forward in their support in échelon to their left flank, while
the King's Company moved up to the sunken road in reserve. The enemy
was now shelling the neighbourhood of Beet Trench, and sweeping the
whole ground with machine-gun fire. No. 2 Company reached Labour
Trench, leaving two platoons in support in Premy Trench, but in the
face of point-blank artillery fire from Nine Wood was unable to advance
any farther. Lieutenant A. A. Morris, who was the only officer left
with the company, was killed while advancing with the leading platoons.
Second Lieutenant A. Grant in No. 4 Company was killed about the same
time, while Lieutenant B. Jones was wounded.
The enemy was holding Marcoing on the right flank and a spur by Leech
Alley on the left, so that the whole attack had become wedge-shaped,
and, while no advance was taking place on either flank, the 1st
Battalion continued to drive this wedge into the enemy's lines. But
however successful or daring a manœuvre like this may be, its
ultimate success depends on the knowledge when to stop. In answer to a
message sent by Captain Simpson, Brigadier-General de Crespigny said
that any farther advance was not to be attempted in the face of such
heavy fire, until the left flank had been secured by the advance of
fresh troops through Graincourt. Captain Simpson decided to establish
the main line of resistance in Beet Trench, with a line of outposts
pushed well in front, to act as a screen for the advance of the
Second Division, which was known to be advancing. Accordingly No. 2
Company was withdrawn to Premy Support Trench, No. 3 to the gun-pit and
Beetroot Factory, and the King's and No. 4 Companies to Beet Trench,
with outposts some 300 yards in front. This manœuvre was carried
out under heavy fire, but was executed with such steadiness that the
casualties were few. The men, however, seemed disappointed that they
could not push farther on. The Adjutant, Captain Lovell, was hit by a
machine-gun bullet whilst accompanying Captain Simpson, who had gone up
to superintend the movement.
The Germans appear to have been thoroughly mystified by this attack
throughout the whole operation, and to have imagined that the advance
might eventually develop into a turning movement, threatening their
line of retreat. When the Second Division came up at 2.30, they found
the enemy retreating everywhere before them. As soon as the advance had
been begun by this Division, the 1st Battalion was withdrawn to an area
west of the Canal.
The extraordinary success achieved by the Battalion during this attack
was entirely due to the courage, endurance, and determination of Lord
Gort, who was awarded the V.C. for his conspicuous bravery. He was able
by his example and the reckless exposure of his own life to infuse
into all ranks an indomitable determination to reach the objective, no
matter what the cost might be. He had himself brought the Battalion
to a very high state of efficiency, and there is little doubt that
with a less highly trained battalion such an attack might have ended
disastrously.
The casualties incurred during this attack were: Killed, Captain J.
S. Carter, Lieutenant A. A. Morris, and Second Lieutenant A. Grant;
wounded, Lieut.-Colonel Lord Gort, Captain W. H. Lovell, Lieutenant B.
H. Jones, Lieutenant A. M. Brown, Second Lieutenant J. C. Blunt, Second
Lieutenant L. C. Jesper; and amongst other ranks there were 35 killed
and 24 wounded.
The last days in September were spent by the Battalion reorganising
and re-fitting in bivouacs west of Canal du Nord, when the following
officers arrived: Captain P. M. Spence, M.C., Lieutenant C. G.
Kennaway, Lieutenant R. S. Challands, Lieutenant A. M. Brown, Second
Lieutenant M. G. Farquharson, Second Lieutenant E. A. D. Bliss, Second
Lieutenant N. P. Andrews, Second Lieutenant J. C. Blunt, and Second
Lieutenant R. B. Osborne.
THE 2ND BATTALION
[Sidenote: 2nd Batt.]
During the first week in September the Battalion near Adinfer was
training and reorganising, after the heavy losses incurred in the
operations at the end of August. From the 7th to 11th the Battalion,
under Major Harcourt-Vernon, went up into the front line, where it
came in for much shelling, especially from gas-shells, and, although
the troops on each flank carried out offensive operations, it was not
called upon to attack. After ten days spent out of the line, during
which Second Lieutenant K. B. Bibby and Second Lieutenant E. M. Neill
joined, the Battalion moved up to Llama Post.
The following officers took part in the operations on September 27:
Major G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. the Hon. S. E. Marsham Intelligence Officer.
Capt. L. St. L. Hermon-Hodge No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. C. M. Bevan " "
2nd Lieut. E. M. Neill " "
Lieut. W. H. S. Dent No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. D. L. King " "
2nd Lieut. K. B. Bibby " "
Lieut. R. H. R. Palmer No. 3 Company.
Lieut. T. A. Combe " "
Lieut. R. T. Sharpe " "
Capt. F. H. J. Drummond, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. C. C. Cubitt " "
2nd Lieut. P. V. Pelly " "
Lieut. E. L. Major (U.S. Army) Medical Officer.
[Sidenote: Sept. 27.]
During the night rain fell, and the tracks were, in consequence, very
slippery. This, added to the fact that some of the bridges which had
been put across the trenches on the previous day had been broken,
caused some delay, and prevented the pack animals, which were following
the companies with hot food containers, from keeping up with the
Battalion; they were consequently sent round by road, but failed to
arrive before the companies left their assembly positions. The enemy's
artillery was exceptionally quiet during the march, and only a few
shells fell in Boursies, as the Battalion passed through. Walsh Trench
and Walsh Support were reached at 4.30 A.M.
The general plan of attack was as follows: Sergison-Brooke's Brigade
was to take the first objective, which was the Hindenburg support line
between Graincourt and Flesquières. The 1st Battalion Irish Guards
was then to pass through and take the second objective, which was the
old British front line of December 1917 to March 1918, just north of
Flesquières. The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards was to follow the Irish
Guards, and pass through them in order to exploit any success gained
towards Orival Wood and Graincourt, while Follett's Brigade on the
right would push on towards Nine Wood.
The Battalion moved off at zero plus one hour from its assembly
position, in the normal approach formation with No. 1 Company under
Captain Hermon-Hodge, and No. 2 under Lieutenant Dent in the front
line, and Nos. 3 and 4 Companies under Lieutenant Palmer and Captain
Drummond in support. The ridge west of the Canal du Nord was being
heavily shelled, but the Battalion passed over it with few casualties,
and crossed the Canal itself easily enough with the aid of ladders on
each bank. Any advance through the intricate labyrinth of trenches
in the Hindenburg line was by no means a simple matter, especially
under fire, and the instructions Major Harcourt-Vernon received were
to bring up the Battalion to Soap Trench and Ship Trench in the
Hindenburg support line, and then to advance to the forming-up area.
The Battalion was unable to leave the Hindenburg support line until
8.20 A.M., partly on account of No. 4 Company having lost
direction, and being engaged by machine-gun fire from the left, and
partly on account of Summer Lane not having been completely cleared of
the enemy. In order to deal with this machine-gun nest in Summer Lane,
Major Harcourt-Vernon despatched one platoon under Second Lieutenant
Pelly with orders to clear the Germans out. Second Lieutenant Pelly
successfully carried out his orders, and not only chased the Germans
away, but also took eight prisoners. The advance was then continued,
but a heavy fire from the direction of Graincourt and Knave Trench
caused many casualties, and Second Lieutenant Pelly was wounded. The
mopping up had not been very thorough, and some casualties occurred
from snipers' bullets from the rear.
The Third Division had taken Flesquières, but the Sixty-third Division
had failed to occupy Graincourt, with the result that the Germans
were able to enfilade the troops advancing to Flesquières. When the
Battalion advanced to the Beetroot Factory, two batteries of field-guns
fired at them with open sights, and machine-guns from Graincourt swept
the ground over which they had to pass. On reaching the Beetroot
Factory, the Company Commanders at once sent out patrols to make
good the ground towards Orival Wood, and silence the batteries and
machine-guns, which were causing the casualties, but the volume and
accuracy of the enemy's fire prevented them from making much headway.
Lieutenant Combe and Lieutenant Bevan were wounded, whilst trying to
push forward with patrols, and there seemed no prospect of advancing
until Graincourt had been captured.
In the afternoon the situation underwent a change owing to Lord Gort's
daring advance with the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards. This had the
effect of moving the whole German line. Graincourt was at last taken,
and an advance on Orival Wood was begun. About 4.30 the Second Division
began to arrive, and in conjunction with the King's Regiment advanced
from Flesquières. This enabled the 2nd Battalion to push through Orival
Wood, although it was unable to debouch from its north edge. Lieutenant
Sharpe was wounded during this advance. The Battalion succeeded in
capturing seven field-guns and three howitzers, in addition to some
forty prisoners. Later in the evening the Fifty-seventh Division
attempted to attack down the Graincourt--Marcoing Road, and met with
little success.
The Battalion was withdrawn at 3 o'clock the next morning, and returned
to a camp on the west of the Canal. The casualties were not heavy. The
Battalion lost 9 men killed, 86 wounded, and 2 missing, in addition to
the 4 officers already mentioned as having been wounded.
THE 3RD BATTALION
[Sidenote: 3rd Batt.]
On the 24th the Battalion moved back to Ransart, and reorganised the
companies which had suffered. Lieutenant J. A. Inglis-Jones joined on
the 31st. Lieut.-Colonel Thorne left to take over command of the Ninth
Corps School, and was succeeded by Major Viscount Lascelles.
On September 1 a warning order was received that the Brigade would take
part in an attack, and the following morning the Battalion marched to
Hamelincourt. Under the impression that it would stay there for the
night, Lord Lascelles gave the men orders to collect material in the
ruins of the village, bivouac, and cook their dinners; but bivouacking
took rather longer than was expected, and just when dinners were
cooked, orders were received for the Battalion to move at once to
L'Homme Mort, near St. Leger. The result was that the men had a hurried
meal. At a Brigade conference that was held, verbal orders for the
attack were issued, and it was decided that, rather than risk finding
pockets of Germans within the forming-up positions, it would be safer
to ignore the advance made that morning, and form up on ground that had
been in our possession for several days.
At 1 A.M. the leading company started for the assembly
positions, and although the guide twice lost his way it arrived at the
destination at 3 A.M. An hour later Lord Lascelles went round
the positions and could find no trace of the other three companies. At
5.5 A.M., the hour at which the Battalion was to advance, they
arrived, having been on the march for four hours, owing to inefficient
guides.
The Germans had meanwhile decided not to wait for the attack and had
already retired when the Battalion commenced to advance, so that there
was no fighting. When No. 1 and No. 2 Companies, under Captain Fryer
and Captain Dury, reached the final objective, it was merely a matter
of rounding up a certain number of deserters. Lord Lascelles, on going
up to the leading companies, found a stretch of undulating country in
front with no sign of the enemy, and ordered an advance to the next
ridge, at the same time directing No. 3 Company, under Lieutenant
Cornish in support, and No. 4 Company, under Captain Hirst in reserve,
to move forward as far as the position already occupied by the leading
companies. This sweeping advance with no apparent opposition somewhat
confused the leading companies, which were accustomed during the long
period of trench warfare to short advances with definite objectives.
The fatigue of the men was beginning to tell, and this last advance
was a distinct effort, but by two o'clock in the afternoon the
leading companies had consolidated the position in Boursies. There
were no casualties, although the enemy put up a few shells over the
Battalion, as it topped the ridge 500 yards west of the village.
During the afternoon the German artillery became very busy, and
interfered a good deal with the patrols, but otherwise caused little
or no damage. The men had been on the move since dawn the day before,
and were consequently exhausted, but the Germans made no attempt to
counter-attack, and it was therefore possible to get some rest.
At 5 o'clock the following morning the 3rd Guards Brigade passed
through the Battalion, which was withdrawn to watch the exposed right
flank. The visibility was good, and a few sentries were all that were
required, while the remainder of the Battalion obtained some rest. On
the 5th the Battalion relieved the Welsh Guards in the front line,
and Lord Lascelles decided to move the Battalion Headquarters farther
forward, and to hand over what had been the Welsh Guards Headquarters
to the Medical Officer for an aid-post. Nos. 3 and 4 Companies were
placed in the front line, with Nos. 1 and 2 in support. The right of
the Battalion was not in touch with any troops, there being a gap of
some 500 yards, and this was accounted for by the fact that the ground
was covered with wire of the old Hindenburg line and of the old British
line facing it. This wire was almost impenetrable laterally, and was
at right angles to the line held by the Battalion. The enemy was in
considerable strength in front, and held some 400 yards west of the
Canal du Nord as an outpost line in the old maze of trenches, with a
strong defensive position behind the Canal. The ground sloped down to
the Canal, and the farther the Battalion advanced, the more they were
overlooked from the opposite slope; but the necessity of gaining touch
with the 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifles made an advance necessary.
The line of resistance, about 600 yards behind the front line, which
the Battalion received instructions to dig, was nearly finished, when
the enemy put a concentrated gas bombardment on the valley, where the
Company Headquarters of the two companies in support were placed. For
an hour the Germans bombarded the valley with sneezing-gas shells,
and all the officers and men kept on their masks, but when the gas
bombardment appeared to cease and was succeeded by one of H.E. shells,
every one incautiously took off his mask. This new bombardment proved
to be one of mustard gas. By the time this was realised every one was
being sick, and all the officers and N.C.O.'s were casualties. Lord
Lascelles came up from Battalion Headquarters to see what had happened,
and met Captain Dury being led away blind. There were 61 men in No. 1
Company and 30 men in No. 2 who had been gassed, in addition to the
following officers: Second Lieutenant S. Calvocoressi, Captain G. Dury,
Second Lieutenant W. B. L. Manley, Lieutenant H. P. Gordon, and Second
Lieutenant R. K. Henderson.
In the meantime Lieutenant Cornish, commanding No. 3 Company, had
received orders from Lord Lascelles to close the gap on his right, and
after reconnoitring the situation had established a liaison post with
the King's Royal Rifles at Joan Post. When darkness came he managed
to send out more men, and added two fresh posts south of Goat Trench;
but the ground to be covered was over 500 yards, and the difficulty
was that the line from the right of the Battalion to the left of the
King's Royal Rifles ran diagonally over a crest, and not parallel to
it. Lines of very thick and strong wire ran in irregular lines, and in
various directions. What therefore seemed fairly simple by daylight was
extremely difficult in the dark, since no patrol could keep direction
on account of the wire. A compass was useless, owing to the wire, and
there were no landmarks. Lord Lascelles, who was not at all happy
about his right flank, ordered Lieutenant Cornish to double his liaison
post, and to put up a Véry light perpendicular at dusk from his post on
the left of the gap, so that a detachment from the liaison post could
work towards it.
These measures, although far from satisfactory, were the best that
could be done in the circumstances, and Lieutenant Cornish was
afterwards highly commended for the energy and resource which he showed
in dealing with an admittedly difficult situation.
On the 8th the Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers,
and retired to some trenches in Dunhelm Avenue. From the 8th to the
15th the whole of the 2nd Brigade went into reserve positions near
Lagnicourt, where no incidents of any importance occurred. As a draft
was shortly expected, the companies were not equalised in strength, but
it was Nos. 1 and 2 Companies that had suffered most, and, as the other
two companies would have to lead the attack at the end of the month,
there was no objection to the half-assimilated draft being in reserve.
On the 20th the Battalion was warned that it would shortly have to take
part in the attack on the Canal du Nord, and that it would relieve
the 1st Battalion Scots Guards on the night of the 21st. A piece of
ground was at once selected for practice purposes, and the enemy's
trenches and salient features were taped out on it, while the Royal
Engineers constructed a model of the area to be attacked. The expected
draft arrived just in time to take part in the rehearsal, and was
absorbed in Nos. 1 and 2 Companies. The following day after a Company
Commanders' conference, the details of the attack were carefully
explained by the Commanding Officer, Lord Lascelles, who had attended
a conference at Brigade Headquarters. No. 3 Company and one platoon of
No. 4 were to attack Slag Heap; the remainder of No. 4 Company would
be in support; No. 2 Company would remain where it was in the front
line, and No. 1 would be in Brigade Reserve. Thus all four companies
were to be more or less in the front line, but No. 4 Company, under
Lieutenant Bunbury, was the one most likely to come into touch with the
enemy. During the relief No. 4 Company was raided, but the Welsh Guards
had not yet left the line, and the enemy consequently received a very
warm reception. The possibility of an attack on that part of the line
had already occurred to Lieutenant Bunbury, as a similar raid had been
attempted two days before, and the ground being a regular rabbit-warren
of disused trenches made it extremely difficult to guard against a
surprise; but he kept his company constantly on the alert, and was
ready for the Germans when they came.
On the 25th a heavy barrage descended on the whole front line, and
all wires became disconnected. The enemy raided the position of the
line occupied by No. 4 Company, and managed to get into trenches at
an unoccupied spot, but were ejected by a patrol. There were a few
casualties from the barrage, but no men missing. On the following day
detailed orders for the attack were issued, and the Battalion proceeded
to the assembly position.
LIST OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE OPERATIONS
ON SEPTEMBER 27
Lieut.-Colonel the Viscount Lascelles, D.S.O Commanding Officer.
Capt. E. G. A. Fitzgerald, D.S.O. Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. R. C. G. de Reuter Intelligence Officer.
Capt. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. C. C. Carstairs, M.C. " "
Lieut. F. S. V. Donnison " "
Capt. A. H. S. Adair, M.C. No. 2 Company.
Lieut. S. G. Fairbairn, M.C. " "
Lieut. C. B. Hollins " "
2nd Lieut. J. Chapman " "
Lieut. E. N. de Geijer, M.C. No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. H. J. Gibbon, M.C. " "
2nd Lieut. A. D. Cooper, D.S.O. " "
Lieut. E. J. Bunbury, M.C. No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon " "
2nd Lieut. G. R. Gunther, M.C. " "
2nd Lieut. H. I'B. Smith " "
Lieut. Graff, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.
[Sidenote: Sept. 27.]
The attack of the Battalion was at right angles to the main attack,
which was somewhat confusing; but, as the Battalion was holding a
salient, it was necessary to have the right half Battalion facing east,
one company facing north, and one company (in échelon) facing east.
There was still a pocket of Germans on the left between the Battalion
and the Canal, but the ground was heavily wired and quite impassable.
It was therefore necessary to attack northward, and as there were
many lines of trenches and much wire, the attack had to be organised
in small parties, working over the top of the ground but parallel
with the trenches, so that the wire might be crossed by entering
the trenches. Each party was in charge of an officer or a specially
selected non-commissioned officer, and although there was undoubtedly a
risk of losing many first-rate men, this decision was justified by the
fact that, in spite of the maze of trenches, none of the parties failed
to reach their objectives.
No. 3 Company, under Lieutenant de Geijer, reached Slag Heap, and got
touch with the 1st Battalion Coldstream. An aid-post was established
there, and parties began to move up Donkey and Dog Trench, when the
Coldstream reported that they were suffering heavy casualties from
their left flank. Instructions were at once sent by Lord Lascelles
to keep down the machine-gun fire referred to, but the Battalion was
itself subjected to a heavy fire from two machine-guns, which swept
most of the ground crossed by carrying parties, and caused casualties
among unsuspecting troops in rear. Two Stokes mortars were ordered up,
but as soon as the Germans saw them coming into position they retired.
Lance-Corporal Watson crossed the Canal with Private Parry in order to
silence another machine-gun (probably the gun which was harassing the
Coldstream), and succeeded in capturing not only the gun but an officer
and seven men near Kangaroo Trench. Second Lieutenant Gibbon with three
men took half a dozen prisoners, and sent them back down a trench. As
the last German disappeared round the traverse, he treacherously drew
a bomb from his pocket and threw it at Second Lieutenant Gibbon and
his men, who had just enough time to run round another traverse. No. 3
Company took 83 prisoners, including the wounded, and 23 machine-guns,
and their casualties were not heavy, for they only had 12 men wounded
and 2 missing. In the evening verbal orders were received to move back
to Doignies.