NOVEMBER
_Diary of the War_
[Sidenote: Nov. 1918.]
The Versailles Conference opened. A mutiny among the German sailors
at Kiel broke out, and had far-reaching effects. In France the Allied
Armies continued to press forward, and the German retreat became more
rapid. In reply to overtures made by the Germans, the Allies replied
that if Germany wished for an armistice she must apply to General
Foch, in the usual military form, for the conditions under which an
armistice would be granted. On the 8th the German Envoys were received
by General Foch, and were given the conditions drawn up by the Allies.
A revolution broke out in Berlin, and the abdication of the Kaiser was
announced. On the 11th the Armistice was signed.
At the beginning of November Austria surrendered unconditionally.
THE GUARDS DIVISION
[Sidenote: The Guards Division.]
The advance in November, culminating in the capture of Maubeuge, was so
rapid, the extent of ground covered in so short a time so great, and
the number of prisoners and guns taken so large, that there was little
doubt that an Armistice on any conditions was the only thing that could
save the German army from absolute disaster.
The Guards Division moved up on the 2nd from Escarmain towards Villers
Pol. The objectives or bounds were no longer measured in yards but in
miles, and the ambitious programme produced by the Divisional Staff
would have been considered beyond the bounds of possibility, even six
months before.
It was known that the Germans must now stand and fight, if they were
to gain time for the withdrawal of their armies elsewhere, and a final
attack was ordered for November 4 in order to break through their
resistance, and complete the victory of the Allied Armies. Preparations
for the attack were somewhat disorganised by a partial withdrawal of
the enemy during the afternoon of the 3rd.
General Sergison-Brooke and General de Crespigny felt their way
forward, and Villers Pol was occupied during the night, but it was
impossible to notify the artillery of the exact position of the leading
companies by the time the attacks started on the 4th, and in order to
allow a margin of safety the barrage had to start some way east of the
village, with the result that some of our troops never caught it. Up to
mid-day the Germans fought very stubbornly, but they were everywhere
driven back, and by the evening Preux-au-Sart was in our hands, an
advance of nearly four miles. So fierce had been the fighting that
the losses on both sides were exceptionally heavy, the Germans in
particular leaving a large number of dead upon the ground.
During the two following days Heywood's Brigade drove back the enemy's
rear-guards another five miles, and patrols of the 1st Battalion
Welsh Guards entered Bavai, an important town, and the junction of no
less than eleven roads. Bavai was not on the front allotted to the
Guards Division, but during the whole of this advance the line on the
left of the Division was very much thrown back, which caused great
inconvenience, since it enabled the enemy to enfilade the troops from
the north, for the Germans were now prodigal in the expenditure of
shells, which they knew they could never carry away with them. The
troops billeted in villages in rear suffered considerably, and as
the left flank of the Division was thrown back the back areas were
all within easy range from the north. In particular the village of
Amfroipret was heavily punished, and General Heywood was severely
wounded by a shell, which exploded in his headquarters just west of
that village. Once more the 3rd Guards Brigade was without a commander.
Brigadier-General Campbell, V.C., was sent for to take command, and in
the meantime the Brigade was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling,
Scots Guards.
On the 7th Sergison-Brooke's Brigade, passing through the 3rd Guards
Brigade, continued to drive the enemy back, but the following day
the advance was checked owing to enfilade fire from the north. That
afternoon a German orderly carrying an important message was captured.
The message was at once sent by special despatch rider to Divisional
Headquarters, and on being translated proved to be an urgent order
to the rear-guard commander, telling him to hold on to his present
position at all costs, and cover the withdrawal of the main body to a
line east of Maubeuge. The resistance of the rear-guard, the message
added, must be such as to gain time for the consolidation of this new
line and thus save the rest of the army. General Matheson at once
ordered General Sergison-Brooke to push forward his reserve Battalion
(the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers) directly it was dark, with instructions
to force its way through the enemy's rear-guard and straight on down
the road to Maubeuge.
The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers moved forward at 10 P.M., and
reached the citadel of Maubeuge at 2 A.M., but it was just
too late to cut off the enemy's rear-guard. De Crespigny's Brigade was
ordered to consolidate a line on the high ground east of the city;
this was many miles east of any point reached by the remainder of the
British Army. With the capture of Maubeuge the advance of the Guards
Division ended, and at 11 A.M. on the 11th the Armistice was
signed.
The final rapid advance had been made under circumstances of
exceptional difficulty, since the systematic destruction of the
railways by the Germans had necessitated the supply of ammunition and
rations being brought up by road. The country was closely intersected
by streams, and as all road bridges were destroyed, it was necessary
to erect temporary bridges with deviations through the fields leading
to them, while the original bridges were being repaired. Constant rain
and the continuous stream of transport soon turned these deviations
into a quagmire, through which the horses, often up to their bellies in
mud, had to pull their heavy load: only the persistent determination
of the transport officers and men to get through at all hazards, and
the fine condition of the horses made the task of supplying the troops
possible.
Even then these efforts would have been of no avail, but for the work
of the Royal Engineers in repairing the innumerable bridges to carry
lorry traffic: day and night, without rest and with scarcely time for
food, they worked, and never failed to do what was asked of them.
But the finest part of the advance, without which victory could not
have been enforced in 1918, was the dash and courage of the infantry
in face of the insidious knowledge that peace was within sight. Every
officer and man who went into those attacks in November knew that
it might be the last engagement of the war, and that if he avoided
unnecessary risk he would probably get through safely; if he took it,
he might be throwing away his life on the last day of the war. That
knowledge had not the smallest effect upon the conduct of the troops,
and the attack on November 4 was carried out with a dash and reckless
courage that had never been surpassed in the war.
The result cannot be over-estimated: instead of a half-hearted
Armistice with the Germans still under the impression they were,
as far as the army was concerned, virtually the victors, the last
attacks had shown them that it was merely a matter of estimating how
far their defeat had been completed, and had made them understand that
their safest course lay in bringing about an Armistice as speedily as
possible, to save the reputation of their army.
THE 1ST BATTALION
[Sidenote: 1st Batt.]
After ten days' rest spent in billets at St. Vaast the Battalion went
in pursuit of the retreating Germans, and marched to Escarmain, which
was being shelled by the enemy. On the 4th the 1st and 2nd Guards
Brigades attacked, while the 3rd Guards Brigade was in Divisional
Reserve. The Battalion moved by companies at 200-yards intervals to
Mortre Farm, where it bivouacked in the orchard, moving on again in the
afternoon to Villers Pol. Here orders were received that the Battalion
was to go through the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards and to continue
the advance.
LIST OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE OPERATIONS
FROM NOVEMBER 4 TO 7
Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. W. R. Bailey, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Major C. H. Greville, D.S.O. Second in Command.
Lieut. J. A. Lloyd Acting Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. J. C. Blunt Intelligence Officer.
Capt. J. Teece, M.C. Quartermaster.
Capt. P. M. Spence, M.C. King's Company.
Lieut. R. G. Buchanan " "
2nd Lieut. A. D. Anderson " "
Lieut. C. G. Kennaway No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. M. G. Farquharson " "
2nd Lieut. G. S. Lamont, D.S.O. " "
Lieut. R. S. Challands No. 3 Company.
Lieut. W. A. Pembroke " "
2nd Lieut. N. P. Andrews " "
Lieut. H. Freeman-Greene No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. L. F. A. d'Erlanger " "
2nd Lieut. C. A. Fitch " "
Capt. W. Lindsay, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. C. Venables Chaplain.
[Sidenote: Nov. 5.]
At 2.15 A.M. the Battalion moved out from Villers Pol with
intervals of thirty yards between platoons, and marched to La Buvette
cross-roads, where a halt was made, and the Lewis guns were taken
off the limbers. Directed by two guides from the 1st Battalion Scots
Guards, the Battalion made its way across country to a bridge, where
a long halt was made to find the Headquarters of the 3rd Battalion
Grenadiers--no easy matter in the dark. The Battalion eventually
managed to get into position close behind the front line posts. No.
2 Company, under Lieutenant Kennaway, was on the right and in touch
with the 2/20th London Regiment from the Sixty-second Division; No. 3
Company, under Lieutenant Challands, on the left in touch with the 2nd
Battalion Scots Guards; No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant Freeman-Greene,
was in support; and the King's Company, under Captain Spence, was in
reserve.
At 6 A.M. the advance began. Rain fell and continued
intermittently during the three days' operations. The advance was much
hampered, especially in the initial stages, by a creeping barrage
put down by the Sixty-second Division, without any warning having
been given to the Battalion. The going was very heavy, and the very
enclosed country, intersected by thick hedges and wire fences, made it
difficult for the companies to keep their directions. Little opposition
was encountered, until the leading platoons reached Amfroipret, when
one German officer and five men were taken prisoners in the village.
Immediately east of the village and in the wooded country south of the
railway, the Battalion began to encounter the enemy's rear-guard, but
after driving it in some way the advance came to a standstill about the
line of the road from Bout la Haut to Cambron Farm. The extraordinary
difficulty of locating a hidden enemy in such an enclosed country made
the advance hazardous, and the Germans appeared to be holding very
strongly with machine-guns a line some five hundred yards east of this
road. Lieutenant Kennaway, with No. 2 Company, attempted to secure the
cross-roads in front of him, and failed to make any headway against the
enemy's machine-guns. During this gallant attempt Lieutenant Lamont,
who was with the leading platoon, was killed, in addition to many men.
The situation was not without anxiety, for on neither flank could any
British troops be seen. It looked as if the Battalion had been going
on too fast for the rest of the line, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey
decided to wait until the situation on the right developed. No. 2
Company accordingly dug in where it was, and the King's Company was
moved to Cambron Farm to fill up the gap there was between the right
of the line and the Sixty-second Division. The situation on the left
required some adjustment, for the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards had been
apparently held up, and No. 3 Company had to be responsible for that
flank of the Battalion. About mid-day a company of the Scots Guards
came up through the village, and occupied Bermeries without opposition,
making the left flank once more secure. This enabled No. 4 Company
to push forward through the orchards and drive out an enemy's post,
but again the enemy's machine-guns prevented any farther advance. The
difficulties in this action were that, when once a company or platoon
had been sent off anywhere, it could not be found again owing to the
enclosed nature of the country. No communication between the various
parties was possible, and the operations therefore developed into small
isolated parties fighting independently of each other. The Germans
began to shell the village with heavy shell during the afternoon, and
the front line posts were fired on at close range by field artillery.
During the evening No. 3 Company took over the outpost line from No.
4 Company, which was withdrawn to cellars in the eastern end of the
village.
Lieut.-Colonel Bailey received orders for a farther advance next day,
and the King's and No. 2 Companies were to secure the cross-roads, if
possible during the night. It was, however, so dark, and the enemy was
in so great strength, that the operation was not attempted that night.
Brigadier-General Heywood, commanding the 3rd Guards Brigade, was
wounded in the evening, and the command devolved upon Lieut.-Colonel
Stirling, commanding the 2nd Scots Guards.
[Sidenote: Nov. 6.]
It poured with rain all night. The Battalion formed up south of the
railway on the line of the forward posts, with the King's Company,
under Captain Spence, on the right; No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant
Freeman-Greene, on the left; No. 3 Company, under Lieutenant Challands,
in support (their position north of the railway being taken over by
the Welsh Guards), and No. 2 Company, under Lieutenant Kennaway, in
reserve. The King's Company and No. 2 Company were ordered to make good
the line of the Bavai--Queve-au-loup road, where Nos. 2 and 3 Companies
would advance through them, and secure the last two objectives. The
King's and No. 4 Companies were comparatively fresh, as they had had
some hours' rest in barns and cellars during the night, but Nos. 2
and 3 Companies were soaked through by the rain, and tired out after
a hard day constantly on the move and a night spent in digging in on
the outpost line. At 6 A.M. the advance began, and was again
most difficult, on account of the enclosed country. The Battalion met
no opposition until it reached some high ground, when the leading
platoons came under a very heavy machine-gun fire from the far side
of the valley, and a harassing fire from field-guns. No. 4 Company
was temporarily checked, but the King's Company, under cover of the
houses and hedges along the Mecquignies road, seized the crossing over
the river, and worked up till it got in touch with a company from the
Sixty-second Division on the right. This advance through houses was
well carried out, and the Lewis gunners performed wonders in getting
their guns into houses. One party of German machine-gunners was shot
down in the church tower. No. 3 Company was halted on the road, and
No. 2 Company in reserve moved up to the cross-roads at Bavisiaux. The
grounds of Mecquignies Château were strongly held by machine-guns,
but after a sharp fight the King's Company drove out the enemy and
seized the Château. In this fighting Second Lieutenant A. D. Anderson
was killed, while gallantly leading his men to the attack. Lieutenant
Freeman-Greene, seeing the King's Company advance up the farther slope,
at once began to push on with No. 4 Company, and in spite of a hail of
machine-gun bullets reached the line of the river with little loss,
and gained touch with the left of the King's Company. After this the
fighting became very promiscuous, and platoons became scattered among
the orchards and fields of the Château. Touch was established with the
Welsh Guards, who had been temporarily checked in Buvigny, and who were
now moving on, and the enemy seemed to be retiring all along the line.
Lieut.-Colonel Bailey was ordered to push on and try and seize the
line on the Bavai road before night, and he accordingly moved up No. 2
Company to the Château grounds. The King's and No. 4 Companies had in
the meantime made good the high ground north of the Château, driving
out some advanced posts of the enemy. No. 3 Company was ordered to move
through Mecquignies village and to seize the orchards north-east of the
village. This it succeeded in doing, meeting with little opposition.
The King's and No. 4 Companies at once prolonged the line to the left,
and pushed out patrols to the east. This line was consolidated, and as
the night was very dark no farther advance was considered advisable.
The 466th German Regiment which opposed the advance fought extremely
well, and was cleverly handled by its commander, who thoroughly
understood how to fight a rear-guard action. The wet weather and the
mud made these operations peculiarly trying to men who had had little
training in close country fighting, but the discipline in the Battalion
was so good that each platoon, however isolated, could be relied on
to act intelligently. The scenes in the various villages were most
touching, for the civilians who emerged from cellars and underground
dug-outs all acclaimed the men as their deliverers, and were highly
excited in their joy.
[Sidenote: Nov. 7.]
Early on the 7th the 1st Battalion Scots Guards advanced through the
Battalion, which was withdrawn to Amfroipret. Lieut.-Colonel Bailey
issued the following message to the Company Commanders:
Please let all ranks know that I consider the advance on the
5th and 6th to have been carried out excellently in spite of
very heavy going and the difficulties of keeping direction.
On the 5th Nos. 2 and 3 Companies, though they had little
fighting, had a thoroughly miserable and uncomfortable time,
which as usual was borne with the greatest cheerfulness. The
King's Company and No. 4 Company were better off, as they got
a few hours' rest under cover.
On the 6th, in spite of very heavy machine-gun fire from front
and flank and most difficult country, the King's Company and
No. 4 pushed ahead and drove in the rear troops of the enemy,
thus making good the passage of the river Du Moulin de Bavai.
The greatest credit is due not only to the fine fighting
powers of the men but also to the good leading and forethought
of the leaders.
The two days' fighting were unsatisfactory as far as the
killing of Germans was concerned, and the conditions miserable
from the start to finish, but the Battalion, as always, went
quicker and farther than any other Battalion in the Brigade,
and the distance you went undoubtedly helped the 24th Division
by threatening the communications of the enemy, holding the
ground north-west of Bavai, and causing them to retire.
You have well kept up the traditions of the Regiment and
maintained the Grenadier spirit--the most magnificent in the
world. I congratulate officers, non-commissioned officers, and
men, and I know that you will never fail.
W. R. BAILEY, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards.
On the 9th the Battalion marched to La Longueville, and the 1st Guards
Brigade entered Maubeuge. On the following day it reached Douzies,
where the news arrived that the Armistice had been signed. On the
morning of the 11th the Battalion paraded, and the Commanding Officer
read out the official telegram declaring the Armistice to be in force.
[Illustration: _Operations_
_November 1-11, 1918_
_Emery Walker Ltd._
]
[Sidenote: 2nd Batt.]
THE 2ND BATTALION
In the fighting on November 4 the following officers took part:
Lieut.-Colonel C. F. A. Walker, M.C. Commanding Officer.
Capt. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. Adjutant.
Lieut. L. Holbech, M.C. Intelligence Officer.
Capt. L. St. L. Hermon-Hodge No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. D. L. King " "
Lieut. W. H. S. Dent No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. C. J. N. Adams " "
Lieut. R. H. R. Palmer No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. K. B. Bibby " "
2nd Lieut. E. G. Harcourt-Vernon " "
Lieut. C. C. Cubitt No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. B. R. Osborne " "
Lieut. E. L. Coffin Medical Officer.
[Sidenote: Nov. 4.]
The Battalion marched from Capelle through La Croisette and Villers
Pol to its assembly area, which was a line 100 yards east of the
Jenlain--Le Quesnoy road. Villers Pol was being heavily shelled at
the time, and a good number of casualties resulted. Lieut.-Colonel
Walker was ordered to advance in support of the 2nd Battalion
Coldstream Guards, until the capture of the first objective, the
Fresnay--Wargnies-le-Petit road, had been completed, then to pass
through and secure the second objective, a line some 3000 yards farther
east. Zero hour was fixed for 7.20 A.M. The rain ceased early,
but a very heavy mist hung low over the ground and made it impossible
for troops to see more than 200 yards ahead. No. 4 Company, under
Lieutenant Cubitt, was on the left of the line; No. 3 Company, under
Lieutenant Palmer, on the right; No. 2 Company, under Lieutenant Dent,
in support; and No. 1 Company, under Captain Hermon-Hodge, in reserve.
The 2nd Guards Brigade under Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke went
forward on the right of the Battalion. Owing to mist the Coldstream
lost their direction, and proceeded at a right incline. Seeing troops
ahead moving along close to the barrage, the foremost companies of the
Battalion imagined that they were Coldstream Guards making for the
first objective. It was only discovered later that these were really
the Germans in retirement. As No. 4 Company passed over the high ground
near the wood south-west of Wargnies-le-Petit, the mist suddenly
lifted, and they came under heavy machine-gun fire from the north.
Lieutenant Cubitt was wounded, and the company had a considerable
number of casualties. Second Lieutenant Osborne, who now took command,
led two platoons a bit farther by short rushes, but was eventually
stopped by a sweeping machine-gun fire, which made farther progress
impossible. German field-guns were also firing at a short range, and
the Battalion lost a good many men. Lieutenant Osborne therefore took
it upon himself to make a personal reconnaissance of the enemy's
positions, and see whether there was not a better line of advance.
With almost reckless gallantry he went out, and carefully examined the
German line, but the result of his scrutiny was never known, as he was
shot through the heart by a machine-gun bullet on the way back. As No.
4 Company was now without an officer, Sergeant E. Carter took command.
[Sidenote: Nov. 5.]
Meanwhile No. 3 Company under Lieutenant Palmer had made its way
through the southern part of the wood near Wargnies-le-Petit. On
leaving the wood along the eastern edge, they came under machine-gun
and rifle fire from the enemy, who was barely 200 yards away.
Lieutenant Palmer advanced by short rushes, and not only took the
position, but captured or killed the whole garrison. It was found
impossible to proceed, and the company dug in a line of outposts.
During this attack the field-guns of the Guards Divisional Artillery
were brought up at a gallop to within a very short distance behind
the leading troops--a daring and difficult achievement that is worthy
of record. As soon as these guns opened fire on the village of
Wargnies-le-Petit, the companies on the left were able to continue
their progress. Touch was then gained with the 3rd Grenadier Guards
on the right, and with the Forty-second Division on the left. Nothing
more could be done that afternoon, and the Battalion consolidated its
position. Early on the morning of the 5th the 1st Battalion Irish
Guards passed through, and pursued the retreating Germans, who had
fallen back during the night. The Battalion moved up into billets in
Wargnies-le-Petit, and reorganised. Owing to casualties among officers
and men, Nos. 3 and 4 Companies were amalgamated into a composite
company under Lieutenant Palmer.
[Sidenote: Nov. 7.]
Two days later the Battalion moved on to Bavai. On the 9th it was in
Brigade Reserve, and supported the 2nd Guards Brigade in the advance on
Maubeuge. No. 1 Company was in support of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream
Guards, and No. 2 Company in support of the 1st Battalion Irish Guards,
taking the main Bavai--Maubeuge road as the centre of the Brigade
frontage. The composite company followed in support, ready to form a
defensive flank in either direction. There was no opposition, and at
5.30 the Battalion entered Douzies, and occupied the high ground east
of Maubeuge. The 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards consolidated the
outpost line, with No. 1 Company forming a Brigade defensive flank. The
remainder of the Battalion was billeted at Port Allont. On entering
Maubeuge the troops had a great reception from the civilians in the
town.
On the 11th the cryptic news arrived:
Hostilities will cease at 11 A.M. to-day.
The Armistice had been proclaimed.
THE 3RD BATTALION
[Sidenote: 3rd Batt.]
On November 2 the Battalion left St. Python, where it had been
billeted, and moved up to Capelle.
The following officers in the 3rd Battalion took part in the operations
from November 4 to 9:
Lieut.-Colonel the Viscount Lascelles,
D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Lieut. G. M. Cornish, M.C. Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. R. C. G. de Reuter Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. K. A. Campbell, D.S.O. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. C. C. Carstairs " "
2nd Lieut. G. R. Gunther " "
Capt. A. H. S. Adair, M.C. No. 2 Company.
Lieut. S. G. Fairbairn, M.C. " "
2nd Lieut. A. E. F. F. Strangways-Rogers " "
Capt. E. N. de Geijer, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. F. Anson, M.C. " "
2nd Lieut. H. J. Gibbon, M.C. " "
Lieut. E. J. Bunbury, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. G. W. Godman " "
Capt. J. Lawson, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore Chaplain.
The Battalion moved off early to bivouac at Capelle. After slipping
and stumbling along a greasy chalk track, the companies reached their
positions, and were told to dig in. This order was easier to give than
to execute, for the men had only their light entrenching tools, which
were ill suited for excavating a flinty chalk ground. A few shells came
over to enliven the proceedings, but otherwise the day passed quietly.
On the following day orders were received for an attack by the Guards
Division, and battle stores were drawn.
[Sidenote: Nov. 4.]
On the 4th the Battalion started to take up its assembly positions in
rear of La Flaque Wood, and was much hampered on the approach march
by the crowded state of the roads and the congestion of traffic. On
reaching Villers Pol, it was forced to halt, as the bridge across
the Rhonelle had been destroyed, and the stream had to be crossed
by a single plank. During the crossing a few high-explosive and gas
shells were sent over, and the men had to put on their masks. Owing to
the dense fog the Company Commanders experienced some difficulty in
finding the way to the assembly positions, but fortunately they had
been provided with the large-scale aeroplane reconnaissance maps, and
were able to go unerringly by the shortest route. The attack was led
by the 1st Battalion Coldstream, which had the 1st Guards Brigade (2nd
Battalion Coldstream) on their left. The Battalion was to pass through
the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, whilst the 2nd Battalion Grenadier
Guards was to pass similarly through the 2nd Battalion Coldstream
Guards, and to continue the attack across a gully and on to the
villages and woods beyond. On the way No. 2 Company had some casualties
from shell-fire.
Though somewhat late on account of the fog, the Battalion started off
with No. 1 Company (under Lieutenant Campbell) on the right, and No.
2 Company (under Captain Adair) on the left, and advanced through
Flaque Wood. Passing through the leading Battalions they found the
2nd Battalion Coldstream had occupied the frontage of the 2nd Guards
Brigade, and throughout the day (as indeed throughout the whole
advance) units were apt to incline to the right, owing to the fact that
the enemy retirement was north-east, and the enemy units gave way more
readily opposite our right flank.
Lord Lascelles had issued orders that he would move Battalion
Headquarters to a sunken road, on the edge of the gully, two hours
after the leading companies were timed to pass that spot. The approach
of this road was shelled by a field-gun at short range, but fortunately
the arable ground, on which the shells fell, was so soft that one
of them bursting in the middle of Battalion Headquarters caused no
casualties.
On arriving at the road, the leading companies did not advance beyond
it, but at this moment the enemy were seen removing their gun, and a
patrol from each company was hurried forward, down the gully, whilst
Lewis guns were set to fire over their heads at the retiring gun.
On the far side of the gully an abandoned 5·9 was taken over by No.
1 Company, and on reaching the crest of the hill an enemy trench was
found defended by machine-guns. Whilst reconnoitring to organise his
attack, Captain Adair was wounded in the leg.
In the meanwhile the Sixty-second Division (on the right) had got well
forward, and the right of No. 1 Company was able to push on whilst the
left of No. 1 Company and the whole of No. 2 Company were held up.
Second Lieutenant A. E. F. F. Strangways-Rogers, reconnoitring along
the hedgerows on the right of No. 2 Company, was fatally wounded.
Lieutenant Campbell then organised an attack with his right platoon,
under a barrage of smoke-bombs, which, though they were badly handled
and burst innocuously in the air, so astonished the enemy that he
abandoned the key to his position, and withdrew down his trench to a
position in rear.
Farther on were some thick-set hedges, admirably adapted for a
rear-guard action, and on reaching them Lieutenant Carstairs found
there was only one gap sufficiently large to let one man through at a
time. He led the way, followed by his platoon, and immediately came
under fire from the left flank. While trying to locate the enemy, he
was severely wounded, and as there were no stretcher-bearers available
he had to lie where he was. Lieutenant Campbell on hearing this came
up, and seeing that the men were lying bunched up together, ordered
Lieutenant Gunther to straighten out the line, while he went to get a
platoon to reinforce his right flank. The Germans were unpleasantly
close, but their exact position had not yet been located. Lieutenant
Gunther, having carried out his orders, went out to where Lieutenant
Carstairs was lying on the ground, and was shot through the head.
Meanwhile the left of No. 2 Company was not in touch with the 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards, and the enemy was trying to creep round
that flank into the gully. Fortunately Lieut.-Colonel R. Bingham with a
section of the Guards Machine Gun Regiment was there, and had managed
by skilful sniping to hold them back. Lord Lascelles decided to bring
up No. 3 Company under Captain de Geijer to protect that flank, and
ordered the two leading companies to take advantage of the delay to eat
their rations.
During this delay the enemy opposite No. 2 Company, finding their
southern flank had been driven in, retired off the hill, and evacuated
the greater part of the village of Preux, which lay below. As soon as
his flank was secure, Captain Adair sent a platoon, under Lieutenant
Fairbairn, forward, and this platoon occupied the northern end of the
village without resistance. In No. 4 Company Lieutenant Godman was
wounded.
The enemy still held a trench in front of the southern end of the
village, but an attack launched by Lieutenant Campbell drove them out
of a position, which was really untenable when the houses in their rear
were held by us. They abandoned their machine-guns and their equipment.
There remained only a few detached houses at the southern end of the
village, with a trench in front of them, to complete the capture of the
line east of Preux, from which the following day's attack was to start.
This position was approached down an open slope, and the attacking
party was driven back, Lieutenant Campbell (the only officer left in
No. 1 Company), Sergeant Bennett, Sergeant Stevenson, and Sergeant
Valerio being wounded.
Lieutenant Campbell remained with his company, and organised a fresh
attack to take place at dusk, but left the execution of it to Company
Sergeant-Major Marks, who carried it out with great skill and resource.
He captured the trench but not the houses, and consolidated his
position.
Lord Lascelles ordered the attack on the houses to be postponed until
10 P.M., when it would be dark. This was accomplished without
difficulty, and the jumping-off line for the next day's attack was
completed. During the night Lieutenant F. Anson was sent to take
command of No. 1 Company.
The casualties among stretcher-bearers had been particularly heavy,
but Captain S. Phillimore did the work of four men in attending to the
wounded and relieving the medical officer of some of his work, which
owing to the shortage of stretcher-bearers was scattered all over the
field.
Captain Adair and Lieutenant Campbell were afterwards specially
mentioned by the Commanding Officer in his report of the operations,
not only on account of the skill and courage they displayed in handling
their companies, but also for their tenacity and courage in carrying on
their duties for some hours after they were wounded.
[Sidenote: Nov. 5.]
On the 5th the 3rd Guards Brigade passed through, and continued the
advance, while the Battalion remained behind at Preux, and was employed
on salvage work.
[Sidenote: Nov. 7.]
On the 7th the Battalion was placed, at the last moment, on the left
of the attack, but, owing to the state of the roads, it did not reach
the line from which it was to start for the attack, until twenty
minutes after the other Battalions had started. The enemy had, however,
retired, and the objectives were occupied without opposition. Since
the area allotted to the Battalion was in the Twenty-fourth Divisional
Area, the Battalion was relieved by the 9th Battalion East Surrey
Regiment, and went into support to the 2nd Guards Brigade at Audignies.
On the 8th the 2nd Guards Brigade was again ordered to continue the
attack. The Battalion, being in support, moved off at 6 A.M.,
but was forced to halt west of Longueville, where the bridge had been
demolished. After a bridge had been constructed by the Battalion the
limbers were pushed across at once, and the companies crossed without
difficulty. Billets in Malgarni were taken, until the news arrived that
no farther move forward was likely that day, when the Battalion moved
up north into Longueville. From despatches captured from the Germans
it was known that a general retirement had been ordered that night,
and the Brigadier asked Lord Lascelles whether his Battalion was fresh
enough to attempt the capture of Maubeuge that night. He answered
that it was, and the Battalion was ordered to advance along the main
Maubeuge road. It was a very dark night; and a straight high road,
often above the level of the surrounding fields, where the enemy might
still be lurking, was not the best route to take, but as rapidity was
the main point, Lord Lascelles moved the Battalion in advance-guard
formation straight down the road, instructing the companies to occupy
the ditches on either side of the road if attacked.
Although hampered by mine craters, the Battalion reached Maubeuge at 4
A.M., and occupied the town and citadel. It met no opposition,
but three German officers and 35 men were taken prisoners. So rapid was
our advance that Lieutenant Bunbury sent a platoon to capture a German
field-gun still in action. This platoon got within 150 yards of the gun
before it was taken away at a gallop. The only civilian Lord Lascelles
was able to find above ground in Maubeuge was a priest, who told him
that the enemy had all retired a few hours before the Grenadiers
arrived, which confirmed the information extracted from the German
despatches. The inhabitants came out in the morning, and welcomed the
Battalion with the greatest enthusiasm.
On the 11th the cessation of hostilities was announced, and the
Battalion attended a thanksgiving service.