JULY AND AUGUST 1918
_Diary of the War_
[Sidenote: 1918.]
After some successes on a small scale by the French at St. Pierre
Aigle, and by the Americans at Château-Thierry, the Germans launched
their third and last offensive on a fifty-mile front in the direction
of Rheims, and penetrated the line to a depth of two to three miles.
Thirty German divisions took part in this battle, and the fighting was
very severe. On July 18 Marshal Foch began his brilliant counter-stroke
on a twenty-seven-mile front from Fontenoy to Belleau, and drove the
Germans back over the Marne, capturing a large number of prisoners.
Although in full retreat, the Germans continued to offer a stubborn
resistance, and counter-attacked all along the line.
In August Sir Douglas Haig struck with the Fourth Army under Sir Henry
Rawlinson, and succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Germans
and capturing 22,000 prisoners. Hardly had the enemy recovered from
this blow, when the Third Army under Sir Julian Byng advanced on a
nine-mile front, and recovered a large portion of the ground that had
been lost in the spring.
In Italy the Austrians were completely defeated by the Italians,
who took a large number of prisoners and guns, and the whole Piave
Delta was cleared. These successes were quickly followed up until the
Austrians were in full retreat.
In Albania the Allied Forces made considerable progress and compelled
the Austrians to retire.
In Palestine the British positions covering the passages of the Jordan
and the north of Jericho were attacked by the Turks.
OPERATIONS FROM AUGUST 21 TO 28
_Divisional Account_
[Sidenote: Aug.]
After Rawlinson's success on the Somme Byng was ordered to advance,
recover the Arras--Albert railway, and generally to hustle the Germans,
who were now falling slowly back. This was to be the prelude to the
main operation.
The attack on August 21 was planned and carried out at exceedingly
short notice, and was completely successful. The subsequent daily
attacks, executed in pursuance of the policy laid down by higher
authority, gave the enemy no rest and no opportunity of organising a
new line of resistance, but they rendered the task of coordination with
the division on the flanks almost impossible. By the time the position
of the advanced troops of the Guards Division at the end of the day's
fighting had been ascertained (probably not before 4 A.M.),
there was usually only just time to plan and issue orders for the next
day's operations. It seldom happened that the situation and intention
of the flank divisions could be ascertained before orders were issued,
with the result that each division had to work independently.
[Sidenote: Aug. 21.]
The Guards Division was at that time in the Sixth Corps, which had been
ordered to capture the Ablainzeville--Moyenneville spur on the morning
of the 21st. The attack was carried out by the Second Division on the
right, followed by the Third Division and 2nd Guards Brigade from the
Guards Division on the left, with the 5th Infantry Brigade from the
Second Division in reserve.
In the 2nd Guards Brigade (Sergison-Brooke) the attack was carried out
by the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards and 1st Battalion Scots Guards,
with the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards in reserve. When the first
objectives had been secured the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards was
pushed through, and captured the line of the railway. The attack was
supported by seven brigades of field artillery and heavy guns under
Colonel Phipps. One company of the 4th Battalion Guards Machine Gun
Regiment was attached, and sixteen tanks (Mark IV.) were to co-operate.
The 1st Guards Brigade (with Gort temporarily in command) was ordered
to advance towards the railway, and be prepared to occupy Hamel Switch
in the event of the leading brigade finding it unoccupied. There
was very thick mist in the early morning, and the contact patrols
were unable to work, but the enemy had expected this attack, and
had withdrawn all his guns, leaving only a very small garrison in
the forward area. Moyenneville was secured without difficulty, while
the Second Division captured Courcelles. On reaching the railway the
resistance stiffened; and when General Sergison-Brooke reported that
all the tanks appeared to have been drawn away south-east, and that
there were none operating on the front of the Brigade, Major-General
Feilding warned him that no advance beyond the railway must be
attempted without them. In the meantime the Third Division on the right
had some stiff fighting on the railway, and the Fifty-ninth Division
on the left made some progress towards Boisieux St. Marc. Gort's
Brigade reached the quarries on the other side of the railway in the
afternoon, and found there was heavy hostile shelling from the north
of Courcelles. That night the patrols entered Hamelincourt Trench, and
early the next morning the Germans counter-attacked, but failed to
eject the companies which were occupying Hamel Works.
[Sidenote: Aug. 22.]
On the 22nd orders were issued for a farther advance the next day.
Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke, in command of the 2nd Guards
Brigade, was instructed to advance. On his left the Third and
Fifty-sixth Divisions would operate, and on his right the Second
Division would capture Gomiecourt. The enemy was to be pressed
continuously in order to conform to the attack by British and French
troops elsewhere. On the 23rd the enemy shelled Boiry with gas and
high-explosive shells, but did not offer any serious resistance.
Sergison-Brooke's 2nd Guards Brigade met with little opposition, and
gained all their objectives along Hamelincourt Trench, capturing Hamel
Mound. Orders were then sent to Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke to
advance on the line Judas Farm--St. Leger Mill, while Brigadier-General
Follett was told to move up the 3rd Guards Brigade, and be prepared to
relieve the 2nd Guards Brigade in the evening. Meanwhile the Second
Division had captured Ervillers.
The great feature of the day's fighting was the advance of the 1st
Battalion Grenadier Guards, which had been placed at the disposal of
General Sergison-Brooke. After a long approach march, this Battalion,
advancing with both flanks exposed, passed through Sergison-Brooke's
Brigade, and seized the key-position south-west of St. Leger. The
capture of this position enabled the divisions on both flanks to
advance the following day with little loss.
[Sidenote: Aug. 23.]
That night when the 3rd Guards Brigade relieved the 2nd, the Guards
Division had reached the line running through Mory Switch as far as
Judas Trench, thence to Judas Farm, and on to Boyelles Reserve, where
it was in touch with the Fifty-sixth Division.
The next morning--the 24th--the 3rd Guards Brigade continued the
pursuit of the Germans, and was ordered to advance on St. Leger, which
was not to be entered by the battalions engaged in the attack, as the
battalion in reserve would be responsible for the "mopping up" of the
town. This advance was successfully accomplished, but after St. Leger
had been secured, it was found impossible to make any further progress
until Mory Copse was cleared. The Second Division was accordingly
ordered to take and hold Mory Copse, while the 3rd Guards Brigade was
to push forward at once, and conform to the general advance. As soon as
Mory and Mory Copse had been secured, the Second Division advanced on
Behagnies and Sapignies.
[Sidenote: Aug. 25.]
The attack continued on the 25th, and the Guards Division advanced
towards Ecouste and Longatte _via_ Bank's Trench and Bank's Reserve,
while the Fifty-sixth Division tried to gain the Hindenburg
support line. The occupation of Behagnies and part of Sapignies
was successfully accomplished by the Second Division on the right.
Follett's 3rd Guards Brigade advanced supported by tanks, but these
were quickly put out of action by the anti-tank rifles of the Germans.
Considerable resistance was met with in Leger Wood, and there was heavy
hostile machine-gun fire from Croisilles. The 1st Battalion Grenadier
Guards made a wonderfully fine advance on the right of the Brigade,
but was strongly counter-attacked and suffered heavy casualties. The
Sixty-second Division was unable to capture Mory on account of the
division on its right being held up; later in the evening it succeeded
in reaching Camouflage Copse. That night De Crespigny's 1st Guards
Brigade relieved the 3rd Guards Brigade.
The following day orders for a further attack were issued. The advance
was to be continued by the Sixty-second, Fifty-sixth, and Guards
Divisions, the latter directed on high ground north and south of
Ecouste and Longatte, while the Fifty-sixth Division was to envelop
Croisilles, moving down the Hindenburg line. The advance was not to be
pressed if strong resistance was encountered. The 1st Guards Brigade
was to advance under barrage in a line from Croisilles Copse to the
Crucifix, and the heavy artillery was to concentrate on Sensee Valley.
[Sidenote: Aug. 27.]
Early on the 27th the Sixty-second Division captured Bank's Trench,
and De Crespigny's Brigade reached Burnhill Trench. Here the 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards was held up by heavy machine-gun fire, while
the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards was counter-attacked from both
flanks, and driven back to the line of Leger Reserve--Bank's Trench.
The Fifty-sixth Division was also in difficulties, and could make no
headway against the machine-gun fire from Croisilles. The situation
as regards the Guards Division was as follows: On the right the 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards was in touch with the Sixty-second Division
on the ridge south-west of L'Homme Mort, the line then reaching a
sunken road leading to St. Leger. There were some men in Bank's Trench,
but there were also isolated parties of the enemy still there, which
made reorganisation impossible until dark. Major-General Feilding sent
orders to Brigadier-General de Crespigny to reorganise the battalions
in front, and to endeavour to secure the line from Bank's Trench to
Leger Reserve. If it was found that the Germans had withdrawn, the 76th
Brigade was to pass through the 1st Guards Brigade and follow them
up. During the night Bank's Trench was cleared of Germans, and 150
prisoners were taken.
On the 28th De Crespigny's Brigade was holding a line along Mory
Switch--Bank's Trench and St. Leger Reserve, and the enemy was reported
to have withdrawn to Longatte support. At mid-day the Fifty-sixth
Division captured Croisilles, and continued its advance towards
Bullecourt. The whole of Bank's Trench up to the Mory--Ecoust road had
now fallen into the hands of De Crespigny's Brigade, and patrols had
been sent out some way in front. During the day the Germans withdrew
towards Ecoust and Bullecourt, followed by our patrols. Orders were
given for this brigade to be relieved by the 76th Infantry Brigade,
and to retire to the area between the Arras--Bapaume road and the
Arras--Albert railway.
The total number of prisoners taken by the Division from the 21st to
the 29th was 30 officers, and 1479 other ranks.
The casualties were: Killed, 28 officers, 278 other ranks; wounded, 58
officers, 1675 other ranks; missing, 3 officers, 239 other ranks.
[Sidenote: 1st. Batt.]
THE 1ST BATTALION
_July and August_
ROLL OF OFFICERS
Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O.,
M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer.
Major the Hon. W. R. Bailey, D.S.O. Second in Command.
Capt. R. D. Lawford, M.C. Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. E. G. Hawkesworth Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. R. F. W. Echlin Transport Officer.
Capt. J. Teece, M.C. Quartermaster.
Capt. P. Malcolm King's Company.
Lieut. J. A. Lloyd " "
Lieut. L. G. Byng, M.C. " "
2nd Lieut. R. G. Buchanan " "
2nd Lieut. C. O. Rocke " "
Capt. A. T. G. Rhodes No. 2 Company.
Lieut. G. Hughes " "
2nd Lieut. J. L. Campbell " "
Capt. A. A. Moller, M.C. No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. A. Grant " "
2nd Lieut. A. A. J. Warner " "
2nd Lieut. L. F. A. d'Erlanger " "
Capt. R. Wolrige-Gordon, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. the Hon. P. P. Cary " "
Lieut. H. B. Vernon " "
Lieut. B. H. Jones " "
2nd Lieut. R. L. Webber " "
2nd Lieut. A. M. Brown " "
Lieut. W. B. Evans, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.
[Sidenote: July.]
After six days spent at Barly, the 1st Battalion marched to
Bavincourt, where it entrained for Blaireville. On arrival the men
were provided with tea and cigarettes by the Thirty-second Division,
and the Battalion took over trench shelters from the 2nd Battalion
Manchester Regiment, whose Adjutant was Captain Kaye, formerly a
sergeant in the King's Company, and whose Second in Command was Major
Marshall, late Irish Guards. On the 10th the Battalion relieved the
2nd Battalion Scots Guards, which was the battalion in support, and
some high-velocity shells fell in its area, wounding three men. On
the 14th the Battalion moved up to the front line, which had become
very slippery owing to the heavy rainstorms, and the ground was so
deep in mud in some places that the relief was not completed till 2
A.M. The enemy was quiet on the whole, but some movement
was observed round Boyelles. The following day the Germans showed
an inclination to push machine-guns forward on the south side of
the railway in order to get close to our lines. Hostile aircraft
was more active, but was kept well in hand, and in the evening two
German aeroplanes were brought down near Hamelincourt. On the 19th
the Battalion was relieved, and retired to the reserve line trenches.
The period spent in reserve was uneventful, but on the 27th, when
the Battalion had moved up in support, the Germans carried out a
concentrated gas bombardment of the area Boisleux-au-Mont village and
station, and eight men in No. 4 Company were gassed. On the 30th Second
Lieutenant J. L. Campbell, Company Sergeant-Major Frost, and two men
were wounded during some severe shelling. The former recovered, but
Sergeant-Major Frost succumbed to the wounds he had received, and died
that evening. On the 31st six platoons from the 320th Regiment of the
American Army, in addition to the Second in Command and the Lewis-gun
officer, were attached to the Battalion. The enemy's artillery that
evening showed an increased activity, and put down a destructive
barrage which lasted for three hours.
[Sidenote: Aug.]
From the 1st to the 6th of August the 1st Battalion was in the front
line at Boisleux-au-Mont, where, except for intermittent shelling,
everything was unusually quiet. During one of the periods of shelling
Lieutenant G. Hughes was severely wounded, and died in the evening.
There were 2 men killed and 11 wounded, in addition to two of the
American troops. On the 6th the Battalion returned to the reserve
trenches at Blaireville, where it remained until the 15th. In the
absence of Brigadier-General de Crespigny, Lord Gort assumed temporary
command of the 1st Guards Brigade, and Major Bailey commanded the
Battalion. On the 21st Sergison-Brooke's Brigade attacked in a thick
mist on the right of the 3rd Guards Brigade, and the Germans put down
a heavy barrage of shells and Minenwerfer on the trenches occupied by
the 1st Battalion. The mist rendered smoke-bombs useless, and a patrol
was sent out to get touch with the enemy, who was expected to retire.
Lieutenant Hawkesworth with nine men entered Marc trench supported by
a platoon from No. 3 Company, and captured two Germans; a strong party
of the enemy which tried to recapture them, was beaten off with several
men killed. On the 22nd the Battalion was relieved, and proceeded to
Boiry St. Martin.
[Sidenote: Aug. 23.]
In accordance with General Follett's order, the 2nd Battalion Scots
Guards and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards moved to the low ground east of
Ayette, while the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards was ordered to send
an officer to Brigade Headquarters. Lieutenant Hawkesworth, who was
selected for this duty, sent back word that the Battalion was to be
ready to march at once. At 12.50 P.M. Major Bailey received
orders to move up his Battalion to the east of Moyenneville, and
to report to Sergison-Brooke's Brigade as soon as he arrived there.
Accordingly the Battalion marched off, and reached its destination
about 3.15 P.M. There was no time to issue written orders,
and General Sergison-Brooke was able to explain only verbally to Major
Bailey the objective of the Battalion. Having summoned his Company
Commanders, Major Bailey informed them of the general situation. The
3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 1st Battalion Scots Guards were
holding the general line of Hamerville trench and also Hamel trench,
while the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards was established on the high
ground about Judas Farm. The situation on the right, however, was not
clear, and no troops of the Second Division had been seen east of
Ervillers. The 1st Battalion was therefore to move forward as soon as
possible, gain touch with the Second Division about Ervillers, and in
conjunction with it, capture Mory Switch.
LIST OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THESE OPERATIONS
Major the Hon. W. R. Bailey, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Lieut. J. A. Lloyd Acting Adjutant.
Lieut. E. G. Hawkesworth Intelligence Officer.
Captain P. Malcolm King's Company.
Captain the Hon. P. P. Cary " "
2nd Lieut. C. Cruttenden " "
2nd Lieut. C. O. Rocke. " "
Lieut. H. B. Vernon No. 2 Company.
Lieut. A. A. Morris " "
2nd Lieut. R. J. E. Conant " "
Captain A. S. Chambers No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. G. S. Lamont " "
2nd Lieut. A. A. J. Warner " "
Captain R. Wolrige-Gordon, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. L. G. Byng, M.C. " "
2nd Lieut. G. E. Barber " "
2nd Lieut. R. L. Webber " "
Capt. W. B. Evans, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.
At 4.10 P.M. the Battalion advanced in approach march formation with
the King's Company under Captain Cary on the right, and No. 2 Company
under Lieutenant H. B. Vernon on the left, with No. 3 Company under
Captain Chambers in support and No. 4 Company under Lieutenant Byng in
reserve. The frontage occupied by the Battalion was 1000 yards, with
strong patrols preceding the two leading companies at a distance of 300
yards. On reaching the line of the Ervillers--Hamelincourt road, the
leading companies came under a light field-gun barrage and long-range
machine-gun fire, which forced them to deploy, and the support company
conformed as soon as it arrived at the same place. Captain Chambers
then moved his company to a position écheloned in rear of the King's
Company, so as to be in a position to protect the right flank. When
the leading companies reached the neighbourhood of Jewel trench,
the Germans offered a certain amount of resistance, which caused a
momentary check, but the threat of an outflanking movement by No. 3
Company broke down their defence, and they fled, pursued by Lewis-gun
and rifle fire, leaving fifty men who were taken prisoners.
No. 4 Company was moved to a position on the high ground on the right
to cover that flank, and was given orders to be prepared to move across
the front of Ervillers, if a hostile counter-attack developed in that
direction. The other three companies swept on to the next objective,
which was carried without a further check. The three leading companies
then proceeded forward to capture the final objective, and the defence
of the enemy broke down, as soon as he saw that the victorious advance
of the Battalion could not be stopped. By 5.45 P.M. the position was
completely in the hands of the Battalion, many prisoners being taken,
numbers of whom rushed forward with their hands up as soon as the
leading companies appeared over the ridge. After the final objective
had been secured, No. 4 Company returned to its proper position in
reserve, its place on the right being taken by a sub-section of
machine-guns. At dusk the Battalion was distributed as follows: No. 3
Company in Mory Switch trench as far as Hally Avenue (exclusive), No. 2
Company conformed from Hally Avenue (inclusive) to Judas trench, while
the King's Company formed a refused right flank in shell-slits about
Iscariot Work, and No. 4 Company was in reserve in Jewel trench.
Considering the extent of ground that had been covered and the rapidity
with which the objective had been secured, the casualties were not
heavy: Lieutenant Rocke, who had been with the leading platoon of the
King's Company, was killed, and Captain Cary in the King's Company
and Lieutenant Conant of No. 2 Company were wounded. The casualties
amongst other ranks amounted to about forty.
[Sidenote: Aug. 24.]
At 4 A.M. Major Bailey received orders to continue the attack,
and summoned a conference of Company Commanders. He explained to them
that the Battalion was to advance at 7 A.M. on a front of 1000
yards and écheloned in depth. No. 4 Company was to lead the attack on a
front of 500 yards, with the left flank on Hally Avenue; No. 3 Company
écheloned at a distance of 250 yards on their right, No. 2 Company in
support, covering the centre at a distance of 250 yards behind the left
of No. 3 Company, and the King's Company in reserve.
The three leading companies were formed up by daylight in Mory Switch
trench, but the King's Company remained in its position near Iscariot
Work. The wire in front of Mory was too thick to cut before daylight,
and the men were told to work their way through the gaps as best they
could. As soon as the attack started, some thirty prisoners were taken;
they were in positions outside the wire, and surrendered without firing
a shot. A shrapnel barrage had been put down by our artillery, but it
was placed too far in advance to be of any real assistance, and as the
attack developed the Germans opened an intense machine-gun fire from
Mory Copse and Hally Copse. It soon became evident that, until some
advance was made on the right, there was no possibility of the attack
succeeding, and even if it did succeed there seemed little prospect
of the 1st Battalion retaining the position it had gained, unless the
Second Division could keep pace with them. Nothing could be done but
to wait until the situation on the right developed, and the difficulty
of the position was increased by the fact that all communication with
the leading companies was cut off for the remainder of the day. During
the morning Germans could be seen dribbling forward small parties to
Mory Copse, and the sniping and machine-gun fire from this direction
became more intense. At 10.45 the Second Division made an attempt
to come up on the right, but was immediately checked and suffered
considerably.
The casualties in the 1st Battalion were naturally heavy. Second
Lieutenant G. E. Barber was killed, and Lieutenant L. G. Byng, M.C.,
was so severely wounded that he died that evening. Major Bailey,
Captain Chambers, Lieutenant Vernon, Second Lieutenant Warner, and
Second Lieutenant Webber were wounded, and amongst the other ranks
there were 150 casualties.
Lord Gort, who had been temporarily commanding the 1st Guards Brigade,
returned to the Battalion that evening, and Captain Wolrige-Gordon,
M.C., came up to take over command of No. 4 Company, while Lieutenant
Hawkesworth left Battalion Headquarters to command No. 3 Company. On
learning that the Brigade was to continue the attack on the following
day with the assistance of eight tanks, Lord Gort went round the
line at dusk, and decided that, as the King's and No. 3 Companies
had suffered fewest casualties, they should undertake the attack. He
therefore gave orders for these two companies to withdraw for the
night, and get as much rest as they could in Mory Switch, while No.
2 and 4 Companies should supply the outposts; and he impressed on
the officers commanding these companies, that in view of the attack
the next day the men should be spared as much as possible, and that
defensive measures for the night should be undertaken mainly by patrols.
[Sidenote: Aug. 25.]
After consultation with the officers commanding the 2nd Battalion
Scots Guards, the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, and the tanks, Lord
Gort returned to his Battalion Headquarters, and summoned the Company
Commanders--Second Lieutenant Cruttenden, King's Company; Lieutenant
A. A. Morris, No. 2 Company; Lieutenant Hawkesworth, No. 3 Company;
and Captain Wolrige-Gordon, No. 4 Company. The details of the attack
were explained, and orders were issued. The total fighting strength of
the Battalion was only 212 with 7 officers, including the Battalion
Headquarters Staff.
In order to increase the number of officers, Captain Malcolm was sent
up to join the King's Company. He received this order only at 10
P.M. the night before, and the distance he had to go made it
most improbable that he could reach the Battalion before the attack
started. But his determination to lead the King's Company into action
helped him to overcome all difficulties. By dint of riding and walking
all night over appalling country, without any guide, he managed to find
the Battalion in time.
At 4.30 A.M. the attack started. A very thick mist covered
the ground, which made it difficult for the tanks to find their way.
Lieutenant Hawkesworth started off with No. 3 Company supported by one
tank, but when he reached the neighbourhood of Bank's Trench the tank
broke down, and when the fog lifted he found he had only forty men
quite unsupported. Unfortunately, at this moment he was badly wounded,
and therefore ordered his men, who were without an officer, to fall
back on to Mory Switch.
The King's and No. 4 Companies moved up Mory Switch supported by one
tank, while another worked on the southern flank. The fog was still
thick, and as the first tank advanced it was suddenly engaged at very
close range by a stray machine-gun post. Armour-piercing bullets
were used, and the engine and water jacket were penetrated. It was
therefore necessary to find the other tank, which could be heard
working in the fog, and after an unsuccessful attempt to get it going
in the right direction, it eventually succeeded in moving forward at
8.30 A.M., supported by the King's Company and a platoon of
No. 4 Company. But soon afterwards the fog lifted, and the tank was
immediately put out of action. Germans in bodies of fifty and one
hundred could be seen standing about in Bank's Trench, but as the
King's Company and a platoon of No. 3 Company were close by, Lord Gort
did not give the order to engage these hostile parties with machine-gun
fire, until he could ascertain if they were prisoners surrendering or
not. After a lapse of five minutes fire was opened on them, and they
disappeared into their trenches. Meanwhile the enemy opened a very
heavy and concentrated machine-gun fire on Mory Switch, and engaged the
disabled tank with a field-gun. Lord Gort having been called back to
Battalion Headquarters to speak to the Brigadier on the telephone with
reference to the attack of the Sixty-second Division, which was timed
to begin at 9 A.M., ordered Captain Wolrige-Gordon to hold
on to Mory Switch and Camouflage Copse. But the enfilade machine-gun
fire made this impossible, more especially as the right flank was quite
unsupported, and the three companies had to withdraw from Mory Switch
to the north-west of Mory.
At 4 P.M. after a severe bombardment the Germans developed
a counter-attack, which was met by the Sixty-second Division, and
driven back. Battalions of this division returned to the attack, and
regained some ground, while the 1st Battalion reoccupied Mory Switch.
Lord Gort told the captain of the leading company of the battalion
from the Sixty-second Division that he was prepared to push on to the
sunken road, if his company would co-operate, but the Company Commander
replied that the right flank of his battalion was entirely unsupported,
and that therefore any further advance was out of the question. The
Sixty-second Division was subsequently withdrawn to the line from which
they started, but the 1st Battalion was able to maintain its position
and to clear Hally Copse of the enemy. That night it withdrew to Boiry
St. Martin, and was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards.
Captain Malcolm and Second Lieutenant Cruttenden were reported
missing, and Lieutenant Hawkesworth was wounded. The total number of
casualties during the three days' fighting was 13 officers and 258
other ranks, out of 18 officers and 489 other ranks who were engaged
in the operations. 250 prisoners, 1 field-gun, and 20 machine-guns, in
addition to several trench mortars, were captured by the Battalion.
In a letter which Brigadier-General G. B. S. Follett, commanding
the 3rd Guards Brigade, wrote to Sir Henry Streatfeild, the
Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Regiment, he said:
As you have probably heard by now, we attacked on the 23rd,
24th, and 25th August--that is, this Brigade. The 1st
Battalion Grenadiers gave the finest exhibition that has ever
been made in this war. At 3 P.M. on the 23rd they
were sent up to protect the right flank of the 2nd Brigade and
take the heights south of St. Leger. There was just time to
issue verbal orders and to collect the Company Commanders for
a conference. Starting about 3.45 P.M. they had taken
all objectives before 6 P.M.--that is, advancing
5000 yards from their starting point! Having been very highly
trained by Gort during the past month or two, they proceeded
to put their training into practice, with the result that it
was a wonderful success. Commanded by Bailey (Gort was with
the 1st Guards Brigade), they were magnificently manœuvred
by their company and platoon commanders, moving in great depth
on a very wide extension. They captured 197 prisoners, 15
machine-guns and several trench mortars, and killed a lot.
Their casualties were 2 officers and 50 O.R. I say again, the
finest attack in open warfare that has ever been made. During
the night 23-24 they even did a relief, and we were up against
the junction of two fresh divisions in great strength, with
the result that no great advance was made and many losses.
[Sidenote: Aug. 26-31.]
After remaining for twenty-four hours at Boiry St. Martin, the
Battalion marched to Berles-au-Bois, where it occupied shelters in a
bank. Lieutenant E. B. Shelley and twenty-five men joined, in addition
to a large draft from the 4th Battalion under Captain Simpson, and the
following days were spent in reorganising the companies.
THE 2ND BATTALION
ROLL OF OFFICERS
Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon, D.S.O. Second in Command.
Capt. A. H. Penn, M.C. Adjutant.
Lieut. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. Assistant Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. S. C. K. George Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. G. G. M. Vereker, M.C. Transport Officer.
Capt. the Hon. W. E. Acraman, M.C., D.C.M. Quartermaster.
2nd Lieut. J. S. Carter Bombing Officer.
2nd Lieut. H. B. G. Morgan Lewis-Gun Officer.
Capt. F. A. M. Browning, D.S.O. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. S. T. S. Clarke, M.C. " "
Lieut. L. St. L. Hermon-Hodge " "
Lieut. G. F. Lawrence " "
2nd Lieut. R. C. M. Bevan " "
Capt. O. Martin Smith No. 2 Company.
Lieut. R. H. R. Palmer " "
Lieut. W. H. S. Dent " "
Capt. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. R. M. Oliver " "
2nd Lieut. H. White " "
2nd Lieut. F. J. Langley " "
2nd Lieut. the Hon. S. A. S. Montagu " "
Lieut. F. H. J. Drummond, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. F. P. Loftus " "
Lieut. N. McK. Jesper " "
2nd Lieut. P. V. Pelly " "
2nd Lieut. J. A. Paton " "
Capt. the Rev. Hon. C. F. Lyttelton Chaplain.
Capt. J. L. Early, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.
[Sidenote: July.]
The 2nd Battalion, which had been training during the first few days
in July at Saulty, proceeded by train on the 5th to Ransart, where
tea was provided for the men by the Thirty-second Division. Guides
from the Royal Scots led the Battalion to the position which it was to
take up as reserve battalion of the brigade 500 yards east of Ransart.
The Guards Division was occupying a sector of the line with its right
joining the Second Division between Ayette and Moyenneville, and its
left joining the Canadian Corps on the outskirts of Boisieux St. Marc.
While in reserve, companies carried out training round the outskirts of
Ransart, and scouting and patrolling by day were practised. In order
to accustom the men to night-work they wore darkened glasses, which
produced much the same effect as night. On the 11th the Battalion moved
up into support, and relieved the 1st Battalion Irish Guards near the
outskirts of Hendecourt. A place was found for a cricket-ground in a
sheltered valley, and two matches were played with composition balls
and bats made by the pioneers. From the 17th to the 23rd the Battalion
went up into the front line, which had been formerly held by isolated
posts, but which was now a continuous trench. The weather was fine and
the casualties were not heavy, although there was usually a certain
amount of shelling in the early morning. From the 24th to the 28th the
Battalion returned to the reserve trenches at Ransart, when Lieutenant
T. A. Combe, Lieutenant M. H. Ponsonby, Second Lieutenant A. P. J. M.
P. de Lisle, and Second Lieutenant D. L. King joined the Battalion.
During the days in reserve an increasing stream of American officers
were attached to the 1st Guards Brigade for instruction, and the
following amusing messages show the excellent relations that existed
between the officers of the two armies:
From:--Guards Division Q.
To:--Transport Officer, 1st Guards Brigade.
Draw 6 bottles of Whisky from Divisional Soldiers Club and
deliver to Brigade H.Q. for American Officers attached.
From G.O.C. 1st Guards Brigade.
To:--Guards Division Q.
On behalf of all officers of the American Army attached to
the Brigade under my command, I wish to express my deepest
thanks for the courteous present of whisky foreshadowed in
your message. I am requested to add that these officers accept
this gift as a proof of the solidarity of the union existing
between the American and British nations, which will endure
until the whisky runs out.
C. R. C. DE CRESPIGNY,
Brigadier-General.
[Sidenote: Aug.]
While the Battalion was in support at Hendecourt, Captain A. H. Penn,
M.C., resigned the adjutancy, much to the regret of all ranks, and
was succeeded by Captain R. G. Briscoe, M.C. On August 4 the Battalion
went up into the front line in front of Boiry St. Martin, and on August
5 six platoons of Americans who were to be initiated in the mysteries
of trench warfare were attached for four days. The enemy was, however,
not very active, and there was but little shelling. From the 10th to
the 16th the Battalion remained in reserve at Ransart, where Lieutenant
G. F. Lawrence took on the duties of Intelligence Officer from Second
Lieutenant S. C. K. George, who was invalided home with dysentery. On
the 18th the Battalion relieved the 320th American Regiment in the
front line, where again the enemy was fairly quiet. Two advanced posts
were established some 500 yards from the line, and the nights were
spent in active patrolling to prevent the enemy occupying the dead
ground in front of Moyenneville, which was to become the forming-up
area for the attack on the 21st.
After three days spent in the reserve, the Battalion moved up into very
inadequate trench accommodation in Boiry St. Martin. These trenches
were now the reserve line, and out of range of enemy artillery owing to
the advance on the 21st.
[Sidenote: Aug. 25.]
On the afternoon of the 25th the Battalion marched off to relieve a
battalion in the 3rd Guards Brigade. A three hours' uncomfortable
halt was made in a field at Hamelincourt, and as the ground had been
well covered with gas, the companies had to move about to escape the
drifting fumes. Respirators had to be worn, which rendered the eating
of the evening meal no easy matter.
The relief in the front line of St. Leger was carried out without a
hitch, although complicated by the fact that the Battalion was taking
over a wide and sketchy front from the remnants of the 1st Battalion
Grenadier Guards and the 1st Battalion Scots Guards. During the night
Second Lieutenant H. A. Finch and eight men went out as a patrol to
get in touch with the enemy and never returned. Second Lieutenant
Finch was found killed 1000 yards in front of the line, when the
Battalion advanced, which showed how thoroughly he had carried out his
instructions.
August 26 was a very quiet day, with occasional shelling around Mory
Trench. Judging by the extent to which he fired his machine-guns after
dark, the enemy seemed very apprehensive. The following officers took
part in the operations on August 26-28:
Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Lieut. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. Adjutant.
Lieut. G. F. Lawrence Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. M. H. Ponsonby No. 1 Company.
Lieut. N. McK. Jesper " "
Lieut. C. C. T. Giles " "
Capt. O. Martin Smith No. 2 Company.
Lieut. C. Gwyer " "
2nd Lieut. A. P. J. M. P. de Lisle " "
Capt. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. H. White " "
Lieut. R. M. Oliver " "
2nd Lieut. F. J. Langley " "
Lieut. H. B. G. Morgan No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. J. A. Paton " "
1st Lieut. E. L. Major (U.S.A. Army) Medical Officer.
[Sidenote: Aug. 26.]
At midnight on the 26th a conference held at Battalion Headquarters
was attended by all Company Commanders, at which Lieut.-Colonel Rasch
explained the general situation and the objectives of the advance for
the following day as far as they were known.
Definite orders were not received until 1.30 A.M. on the
morning of the 27th. The instructions the Battalion received were to
push forward at zero hour (7 A.M.), with the 2nd Battalion
Coldstream Guards on its left, and the Sixty-second Division on its
right, and to secure the enemy's trenches in and south of Ecoust and
Longatte. Before dawn the Battalion was to be reorganised and disposed
in battle formation. No. 3 Company under Captain J. C. Cornforth, M.C.,
extended along the whole Battalion frontage of 1500 yards, along the
road in No Man's Land, running from Mory Copse to St. Leger. No. 2
Company under Captain O. M. Smith in left support lay concealed until
zero in Hally Copse. No. 4 Company under Lieutenant Morgan was in right
support in Mory Copse, and No. 1 Company under Lieutenant M. Ponsonby
in reserve, with Battalion Headquarters in Mory Trench.
There were three points in these orders which caused a little
uneasiness. In the first place, a very short space of time before
dawn was allowed to re-dispose the Battalion, although fortunately
strong patrols had been sent out earlier in the night to secure the
Mory Copse--St. Leger road. In the second place, dawn being at 4.30
A.M. and zero at 7 A.M., No. 3 Company would be in an exposed position
during daylight at some points within fifty yards of the enemy. It
was a clear night, and even in the darkness this company got into
difficulties, for while they were forming up, they were observed by the
enemy, who spent the rest of the night sweeping the ground and putting
up innumerable lights, probably thinking it was a patrol. Fortunately
there were a number of large felled tree-trunks along the road, which
enabled this Company to escape detection from ground observation, and
from the low-flying aeroplanes, which continually patrolled No Man's
Land at dawn. In the third place, although Bank's Trench was known to
be held all along the whole front, the barrage table showed that on the
left of the Battalion the barrage would open a considerable distance
behind the trench, probably owing to the proximity of our front troops
to the enemy position.
The reorganisation and forming up of the Battalion were successfully
carried out before dawn. Unfortunately, while No. 1 Company was moving
across the open to take up its position in reserve, a shell fell in the
centre of No. 1 Platoon, mortally wounding Lieutenant M. Ponsonby, and
causing casualties to the whole platoon, with the exception of three
other ranks. Lieutenant Jesper took command of the remaining three
platoons, and brought them to their allotted positions.
[Sidenote: Aug. 27.]
At zero hour (7 A.M.) the field-gun barrage came down on a
line about 300 yards in front of No. 3 Company, creeping forward at
the rate of 100 yards every two minutes. As soon as our troops moved
off from their forming-up positions to close up to the barrage, the
enemy covered his front with a deadly and accurate screen of bullets,
fired from numerous carefully-sighted machine-guns, which were so well
protected that our field-gun barrage had little or no effect upon them.
In consequence we suffered heavy casualties from the very outset. On
the left the troops of the leading company were mown down as soon as
they got on to their feet, and were unable to advance. The right of the
2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards had also suffered severely, and was
unable to push forward.
As No. 2 Company, under Captain O. Martin Smith, debouched from Hally
Copse, it was caught by the machine-gun fire, and nearly cut to pieces
before it could extend from artillery formation. Captain O. Martin
Smith made a determined effort to reinforce the left of No. 3 Company,
and push forward the advance, but long before his Company reached the
front troops it had suffered over 50 per cent casualties. Captain O.
Martin Smith and Lieutenant de Lisle were wounded, and Lieutenant
Gwyer, who was pluckily pushing forward in spite of the storm of
bullets, was killed. Captain O. Martin Smith ordered his Company to
lie down in the open, while the N.C.O.'s collected the men who were
nearest to them, and eventually got in close support of No. 3 Company.
As, however, the enemy was entrenched on the top of the rise, 200 yards
in front, the slightest movement attracted a torrent of lead. This
made it impossible to get communication in any direction or to collect
the wounded, who had to remain in the open on the fire-swept ground
until dark. Lieutenant R. M. Oliver, who had been in charge of the left
platoon of No. 3 Company, had been killed earlier, so the left half of
the Battalion was now without an officer.
In the centre, during the first 200 yards, the machine-gun fire,
although equally intense, was slightly less accurate; but on nearing
the St. Leger--Homme Mort road Captain Cornforth found it swept by a
practically impassable hail of machine-gun bullets, fired from three
directions--the Homme Mort on the south, Bank's Trench on the east, and
outskirts of St. Leger on the north. This last enemy position was off
the Battalion frontage, and the troops opposite it had been held up.
The only method of relieving this pressure on the left was to push on
at all costs in our centre and right.
Lieut.-Colonel Rasch sent up No. 1 Company to reinforce the thinned
ranks of No. 3, and to help in the capture of Homme Mort and the
rushing of Bank's Trench. While going up this Company came under heavy
fire, and Lieutenant Jesper and Lieutenant Giles were both wounded.
Captain Cornforth therefore took over command of this Company in
addition to his own.
With these reinforcements Lieutenant White and Second Lieutenant
Langley led their platoons forward against the machine-gun nest at
Homme Mort, but in advancing up the slope they were met with an
increasing volume of accurate fire, and both the officers were mortally
wounded before the position was reached. These platoons, however, with
an inspired dash and determination took the position after a hard
fight. Twenty prisoners were captured, in spite of the fact that, in
the short rush up to the position, these platoons had been practically
decimated.
At the same time Captain Cornforth decided to rush Bank's Trench,
although the road was still swept by enfilade fire from the left,
and by frontal fire from the trench itself. A party of men was sent
over the road to cover the advance, but few succeeded in crossing it.
Captain Cornforth thereupon collected a small number of men, led them
across the road, and by short rushes succeeded with three other men in
gaining Bank's Trench. Here fortunately they found a large supply of
German hand-grenades, which they quickly detonated, and by this means
succeeded in clearing the trench for 500 yards northwards, knocking
out six German machine-guns and taking 40 men prisoners. Several other
men soon succeeded in joining them, and this party, which eventually
numbered one officer and 25 men, found that they were completely
isolated. No other troops could be located on their flanks, and the
ground was being swept by machine-gun fire from Bank's Copse in the
front, from the high ground on the right, and from the outskirts of St.
Leger on the left. It was impossible to advance farther, and the rest
of the day was spent in resisting the efforts of the Germans to turn
them out, and in endeavouring to gain communication on the flanks.
Lieutenant Morgan with No. 4 Company was more successful. At zero he
advanced along Mory Switch and the southern end of Bank's Trench,
eventually establishing a position in Vraucourt Trench. The lie of the
land and the cover afforded by the trenches enabled this Company to
keep up with the barrage, and to avoid coming under the intense fire
that the remainder of the Battalion had experienced. During the advance
this Company captured a German Battalion Commander and 180 men--a
remarkably fine performance. Lieutenant Morgan led his Company forward
with such dash that they succeeded in penetrating the enemy's position
to a depth of 2000 yards. However, it was soon clear that they were
completely isolated, as they were being fired at from all directions.
When it was dark Lieutenant Morgan decided that it would be unwise to
remain in such an advanced position, since neither the Sixty-second
Division on his right nor our own troops on his left showed any signs
of coming into line with him, and he consequently withdrew his Company
until he was in touch with troops on his flanks.
[Sidenote: Aug. 28.]
During the night the enemy retired from our front, and in the morning
the remnants of the Battalion were reorganised, and continued the
advance over the original frontage for about 1700 yards to a marked-out
trench called Bank's Reserve. Here some machine-guns were encountered,
but a good and continuous line was established with connection on both
flanks.
This line was handed over to the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders
on the night of the 28th-29th, and the Battalion marched back to
the trenches east of Hamelincourt. The only officers left with the
Battalion were Lieut.-Colonel Rasch, Captain Cornforth, Captain
Briscoe, and Lieutenant Morgan. The total casualties were 12 officers
and 278 other ranks. Amongst the officers the casualties were as
follows:
Lieut. G. F. Lawrence Killed.
Lieut. R. M. Oliver "
Lieut. C. Gwyer "
Lieut. H. White "
2nd Lieut. F. J. Langley "
2nd Lieut. H. A. Finch "
Lieut. M. H. Ponsonby Died of wounds.
Capt. O. Martin Smith Wounded.
Lieut. N. McK. Jesper "
Lieut. C. C. T. Giles "
2nd Lieut. J. A. Paton "
2nd Lieut. A. P. J. M. P. de Lisle "
In a message, which Major-General Feilding afterwards sent to
Brigadier-General de Crespigny, he said: "All Battalions of the 1st
Guards Brigade discharged their duty splendidly. The attack delivered
by the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 2nd Battalion Coldstream
Guards on August 27 not only inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and
brought in large numbers of prisoners, but also compelled him next day
to relax his hold on the high ground south of Croisilles."
THE 3RD BATTALION
ROLL OF OFFICERS
Lieut.-Colonel A. F. A. N. Thorne, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Major Viscount Lascelles, D.S.O. Second in Command.
Capt. the Hon. A. G. Agar-Robartes, M.C. Adjutant.
Lieut. E. G. A. Fitzgerald, D.S.O. Assistant Adjutant.
Lieut. E. N. de Geijer Intelligence Officer.
Capt. F. J. Heasman, M.C. Transport Officer.
Capt. G. H. Wall Quartermaster.
Capt. A. F. R. Wiggins No. 1 Company.
Lieut. G. M. Cornish, M.C. " "
Lieut. A. G. Elliott " "
2nd Lieut. E. L. F. Clough-Taylor " "
2nd Lieut. R. Delacombe " "
Capt. G. A. I. Dury, M.C. No. 2 Company.
Lieut. C. C. Carstairs, M.C. " "
Lieut. A. H. S. Adair " "
2nd Lieut. W. B. L. Manley " "
2nd Lieut. G. R. Gunther " "
2nd Lieut. J. Chapman " "
2nd Lieut. R. K. Henderson " "
Capt. N. C. Tufnell No. 3 Company.
Lieut. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C. " "
Lieut. C. C. Brown " "
Lieut. G. W. Godman " "
2nd Lieut. H. J. Gibbon " "
2nd Lieut. A. D. Cooper " "
Capt. G. F. R. Hirst No. 4 Company.
Lieut. C. H. Bedford " "
Lieut. R. G. West " "
2nd Lieut. E. J. Bunbury " "
2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon " "
2nd Lieut. R. C. G. de Reuter " "
Capt. R. Anderson, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore, M.C. Chaplain.
[Sidenote: July.]
The first week in July was spent by the 3rd Battalion at Labazeque,
and on the 7th it proceeded to Ransart, where it relieved the 10th
Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in the right sector of the
front occupied by the Guards Division.
Two companies were placed in the front line with one company in support
and one in reserve, and officers' patrols were sent out every night
from dusk to dawn, but there was no movement on the part of the enemy.
On the 10th the Battalion moved back into support, and on the 15th into
Divisional Reserve, where it remained for three days. From the 19th to
the 24th the Battalion went up again into the front trenches, where
the work consisted of improving the line by laying down duckboards and
digging sumps and latrines. Fifteen officers, 30 sergeants, and 55
corporals from the American Army were attached to the Battalion, and
were distributed between the four companies and Battalion Headquarters.
Lieutenant S. G. Fairbairn, Second Lieutenant H. P. Gordon, and
Second Lieutenant S. Calvocoressi arrived during this tour of duty
in the trenches, and on the 25th the Battalion retired into support,
where more officers and men of the American Army were attached for
instruction. On the 30th the Battalion moved back into Divisional
Reserve.
[Sidenote: Aug.]
After four days in reserve the Battalion went up into the front line
near Adinfer, where it remained for a week carrying out inter-company
relief. In this part of the line patrols were sent out every night,
and a company from the 320th Regiment of the United States Army,
which accompanied the Battalion, supplied a certain number of men for
this purpose. On the 6th Second Lieutenant R. P. Papillon when out
on patrol duty, encountered a German patrol in Observation Trench,
and after severely wounding one of the enemy, succeeded in bringing
back an identification mark. The Higher Command, however, required
further information, and accordingly a special patrol was sent out on
the night of the 10th. Captain Churchill, whose great experience in
all kinds of incursions into the enemy's line rendered him eminently
fitted for the task, was sent from the Brigade Headquarters, to take
charge of the party, which consisted of Second Lieutenant de Reuter
and seven men. A covering-party composed of thirteen men, under the
command of Sergeant Birtles, accompanied the raiders. Hardly had the
patrol started, when a shell fell among them, wounding one man, who
had to be carried back to the trenches. Following the German outpost
line, which consisted of small adjacent rifle-pits, but which showed
no sign of frequent occupation, the patrol came on the German wire.
This formidable obstacle consisted of barbed wire in concertina
shape, staked to the ground, with strands running through it. After
a careful search a gap was found, and through this the patrol went.
After following the track for about forty yards a German sentry was
seen. The patrol stood still, and the sentry walked away unconscious of
its presence. Soon afterwards some more of the enemy were seen moving
round to the left of the track. They were evidently suspicious, as
they only whispered. Three of them came crawling slowly towards the
patrol. In dead silence the patrol waited, but the Germans turned back,
and apparently reported all clear, for thirty to forty more Germans
appeared, and stood up close together. They came to within thirty
yards of the patrol, when Lieutenant de Reuter gave the order "rapid
fire." Several of them were seen to fall. It was now merely a question
whether the Germans would attempt to capture the patrol or not, but
they contented themselves with firing and throwing a few bombs,
while Véry lights were sent up. Captain Churchill therefore retired
unmolested through the wire, having only had one man wounded.
On the 10th Second Lieutenant de Geijer and twenty other ranks raided a
German post under an artillery barrage. At 3.15 A.M. a Stokes
mortar barrage supplemented the artillery bombardment, and the raiding
party in two groups, under Second Lieutenant de Geijer and Sergeant
Butler respectively, rushed the enemy's post. The Germans had, however,
abandoned the post just before the raid took place, and the last
two were seen to run from it, as the raiders started. Much valuable
information was gained, as the Germans left everything behind, but,
with the exception of Lieutenant de Geijer who was slightly wounded,
there were no casualties.
On the 11th the Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion Coldstream,
and went into support, moving on four days later to billets in Saulty,
where it remained until the 20th.
On the 20th the Battalion "debussed" between Blaireville and
Heudecourt, and took up its assembly positions east and south-east of
Boiry.
The orders General Sergison-Brooke received were to attack Moyenneville
in conjunction with the Second and Third Divisions on the right. In
the operation orders which he issued the capture of the first two
objectives was to be carried out by the 1st Battalion Scots Guards on
the right, and by the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left. The 3rd
Battalion Grenadiers was then to pass through, and secure the third
objective. Eight tanks would co-operate in front of each Battalion.
The following officers of the 3rd Battalion took part in these
operations:
Lieut.-Colonel A. F. A. N. Thorne, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Lieut. E. N. de Geijer Intelligence Officer.
Capt. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. C. C. Carstairs, M.C. " "
Lieut. R. Delacombe " "
2nd Lieut. E. L. F. Clough-Taylor " "
Lieut. A. H. S. Adair No. 2 Company.
Lieut. S. G. Fairbairn " "
Lieut. J. Chapman " "
Capt. N. C. Tufnell No. 3 Company.
Lieut. C. Clifton Brown " "
2nd Lieut. A. D. Cooper " "
Capt. G. F. R. Hirst No. 4 Company.
Lieut. R. G. West " "
2nd Lieut. R. C. G. de Reuter " "
2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon " "
Lieut. Graff, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore, M.C. Chaplain.
[Sidenote: Aug. 21.]
There was a thick mist in the morning, so thick that it was impossible
to see more than a few yards ahead. On the one hand this favoured the
attackers; on the other there was always the risk of the Battalion
losing its way and never reaching the enemy's lines. In spite of
everything, however, the leading Battalions eventually succeeded in
securing the first two objectives.
The 3rd Battalion had breakfasted, water-bottles had been refilled,
and the companies were beginning to get ready for the advance, when
this blanket of fog came down. At zero hour, 4.53 A.M., the
barrage opened up and the attack began. Captain Smith, who commanded
C Company 15th Battalion Tank Corps (Mark V. Star Tanks), arrived at
Battalion Headquarters, and reported that his tanks had been delayed
by gas in Coseul Valley, so that they would not be able to advance
with the Battalion as arranged, but that they would endeavour to
overtake it on the second objective. The Battalion started off with
No. 3 Company under Captain Tufnell on the right, No. 4 under Captain
Hirst on the left, No. 2 under Lieutenant Adair in support, and No. 1
under Captain Fryer in reserve. The fog was as thick as ever, and the
smoke shells in the barrage increased its density. Keeping direction by
compass was tedious and difficult, since it necessitated the removal
of the steel helmet and box respirator, and even then it was far from
accurate. To add to the difficulties, there were several pockets of
German machine-gunners, which had been missed by the 1st Battalion
Scots Guards in their advance, and which suddenly loomed out in the
mist often in rear of the Battalion as it advanced. No. 12 Platoon
captured two machine-gun posts in the first objective, and the markers
under Lieutenant de Geijer, the Intelligence Officer, found German
machine-gunners still holding out to the west of the second objective,
in the area where the Battalion should have formed up. The 1st
Battalion Scots Guards had captured the right and left of the second
objective, but owing to the fog the centre was still in the hands of
the Germans.
The 1st Battalion Scots Guards, on finding out what had happened, soon
cleared out these Germans with the aid of No. 1 Company (the Reserve
Company).
By 6 A.M. the Battalion Headquarters had reached its destination,
namely, the two trees between the first and second objectives, but
was unable to get in touch with any of the companies. Tanks were
moving about in the fog, and the Lewis guns were engaging the German
machine-guns at close quarters, and were firing indiscriminately into
the fog. To give an example of how confusing the situation was, the
Battalion Headquarters was charged from the front by two platoons of
the Scots Guards, who mistook it in the fog for a German machine-gun
post.
By 7.30 No. 2 Company, under Lieutenant Adair, had gone through
the junction of the 1st Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion
Coldstream, and was advancing on its objective, which was the valley
between the railway and Moyenneville. A little later Captain Tufnell
and Captain Hirst reported that Nos. 9 and 12 Platoons of No. 3 Company
and all No. 4 Company were near Moyblain Trench, having completely lost
their way. No. 11 Platoon had also lost its bearings, and after moving
round in a semicircle, was discovered heading towards the rear instead
of towards the front.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Duff Cooper, with No. 10 Platoon, having
entirely lost touch with the remainder of the company, had wandered
too far to the south, and after pushing on in what he thought was the
right direction for three hours, found himself in the outskirts of
Courcelles. There he met a platoon of the 7th Battalion K.S.L.I., which
had also lost its way, and, knowing that the Halte on the railway was
the eventual objective, he determined to make for it. Together these
two platoons started off, and as they were clearing the dug-outs on the
road, they fell in with a tank which suddenly appeared out of the fog.
With its assistance they attacked and captured the railway on each side
of the Halte, where a German aid-post was placed. There is no doubt
that these two isolated platoons were the only units that succeeded in
reaching the third objective for some hours, on the whole front of the
two Northern Divisions.
When Lieut.-Colonel Thorne received a message from Lieutenant Duff
Cooper, saying that the Halte had been taken, he sent up No. 1 Company
under Captain Fryer to the assistance of this isolated platoon, and in
order to save time directed No. 2 Company to advance on the objective
originally assigned to No. 4. Lieutenant Forbes with two machine-guns
was sent up to co-operate with No. 1 Company, and Lieutenant Hulme with
two more to assist No. 2 Company. No barrage could be arranged for this
attack, and it was impossible to obtain any assistance from the tanks,
which were now returning to their rallying positions, since they were
all suffering from engine trouble or the lack of petrol.
At 10 A.M. the fog began to lift, but Captain Fryer had by
this time brought up Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons to the assistance of No. 10
Platoon. Captain Fryer and Lieutenant Duff Cooper made a most valuable
reconnaissance of the railway north of the Halte under heavy fire,
and on returning decided at once to attack the German posts they had
discovered. No. 10 Platoon started off, and supported by Nos. 1 and 2
Platoons succeeded in capturing the whole of the objectives allotted
to No. 3 Company. This attack was carried out with great dash, but
Lieutenant Delacombe and Second Lieutenant Clough-Taylor were wounded.
Nos. 7 and 8 Platoons of No. 2 Company had in the meantime commenced
their advance on the railway cutting, but soon found that they were
exposed to heavy enfilade fire from the railway north of the Halte.
They made but little headway at first, but, when the attack of No. 10
Platoon lifted the enemy's fire off them, they pushed forward, and
rushed the railway and hollow ground to the east of it, capturing 5
machine-guns and 60 prisoners, and gaining touch with the 1st Battalion
Coldstream Guards on the left and No. 1 Company on the right.
No. 3 Company now moved up into support of No. 1, and four machine-guns
were placed in Magazine Trench as barrage guns. No. 6 Platoon made a
farther advance, and seized the hollow east of the railway and west of
Hameau North, where 10 machine-guns and 60 prisoners were captured.
Nos. 3 and 8 Platoons advanced to the east of the railway, and
completed the capture of the whole objective allotted to the Battalion.
Although twelve hours behind the scheduled time, Lieut.-Colonel Thorne
was able to report that the task of the Battalion had been successfully
carried out.
The leading of No. 10 Platoon and Nos. 1 and 2 Companies was
particularly fine, and the response made by the men was beyond all
praise. The fact that in spite of the fog each platoon managed to
get to its own place was entirely due to the persistence with which
Platoon Commanders advanced whenever opportunity offered, and to the
determination on the part of the men to reach the enemy. After the fog
lifted the attack was carried out steadily and relentlessly across
ground swept by shell-fire and machine-guns, and succeeded in spite of
the lack of an artillery barrage or tanks.
After dark, ammunition, water and rations were sent up by pack animals,
and all the platoons rejoined their companies. Reconnoitring patrols
under Lieutenant Clifton Brown and Lieutenant West were sent out to
locate the new German line, and discovered that the enemy was holding
the line of the sunken road about half a mile east of the railway. The
Germans were apparently in some strength, and very much on the look-out.
[Illustration:
_Photographed by the Mendoza Galleries Emery Walker ph. sc._
_Brigadier-General B. N. Sergison-Brooke D.S.O._
]
[Sidenote: Aug. 22.]
The next morning a heavy hostile barrage came down on the whole
position occupied by the Battalion, and the outposts could see the
enemy advancing in three waves. The S.O.S. signal at once went up.
Immediately our artillery put down a magnificent and accurate barrage,
and the companies in front opened a concentrated fire with Lewis guns
and rifles on the advancing enemy. The German counter-attack stood
no chance at all, and completely crumbled away; only in one place did
the Germans succeed in gaining a footing, and that was on the right,
where they captured a trench. When the attack utterly failed, this
party of Germans had to withdraw with heavy loss.
The following German orders that were subsequently taken from a
prisoner give the details of this counter-attack. It will be seen that
they advanced in some strength, and it is all the more remarkable that
this carefully planned attack should have been repulsed by only two
companies of the 3rd Battalion.
CAPTURED GERMAN DIVISIONAL ORDER
234 Div. Div. H.Q.,
Abt. la. 2802. 21-8-18.
DIVISIONAL ORDER
1. According to information received from the Army we have
repulsed 4½ English Divisions to-day. The enemy has been beaten
and he knows it.
The enemy has reached the Achiet le Grand Boisleux Railway.
New artillery positions have been located, large enemy
concentrations and movement observed.
2. XVIII. Corps will retake the old main line of resistance.
For this operation the 234 Div.--under the orders of the 40th
Div.--will attack with the 2nd Guards Res. Div.--under the
orders of the 6th Bav. Res. Div.--on its left.
3. The infantry will be divided into three attacking groups
under the command of Col. Reichart (Comdr. 88 Inf. Bde.).
_Right attacking group._ Major v. Kluefer.
181 I.R.
3rd Bn. 452 I.R.
3 Batteries, 32 F.A.R.
Res. Pion. Coy. 55.
_Centre attacking group._ Major v. Pape.
104 I.R.
451 I.R. less 2nd Bn.
3 Batteries 32 F.A.R.
3 Coy. Pion. Bn. 22.
_Left attacking group._ Capt. Heine.
1st and 3rd Bns. 453 I.R.
2nd Bn. 452 I.R.
359 Pion. Coy.
360 Pion. Coy.
Objective:-- Moyenneville--Aerodrome ridge.
4. The 21st Res. Div. will detail one Bn. to support the
attack on Moyenneville. 88 Inf. Bde. will establish liaison
with this Bn. Zero hour on the whole front of attack will be
5.45 A.M. (German time).
5. 134 I.R. with three Batteries F.A.R. 32 as Divisional
Reserve will be held in readiness N.E. of Mory.
6. Col. v. Bibra (Comdr. 234 Inf. Bde.) with the battalions
formerly in support (1st Bn. 452 I.R., 3rd Bn. 451 I.R., 2nd
Bn. 453 I.R.) will hold the artillery defensive position.
These Battalions will remain as "safety garrison" and
will hold the line at all costs in the event of a hostile
counter-attack.
7. Duties of the Artillery:
_X-15 to X._ Burst of fire on the enemy front line on the
Railway embankment.
_X._ Heavy bombardment on Moyenneville and Courcelles. Lift on
to the line Eastern outskirts Moyenneville Eastern outskirts
Courcelles, continue heavy bombardment on Moyenneville and
Courcelles.
_X plus 20._ Lift to the line _Eastern_ outskirts
Moyenneville--_Western_ outskirts of Courcelles.
_X plus 40._ Lift to the line W. of the
Moyenneville--Ablainzeville Road.
_X plus 60._ Lift to the trench which extends from
Moyenneville across Aerodrome ridge towards the S. (former
main line of resistance).
X " 5.45 A.M.
Three Batteries F.A.R. 501 and Foot Art. Bn. 401 have occupied
positions E. of Ervillers.
11. Div. H. Q.... Queant.
V. STUMPFF,
G.O.C., 234 Div.