The Union commanders were naturally very apprehensive that as soon as
Price and Mc-Culloch realized that the field had been abandoned they
would precipitate upon them their immense horde of vengeful horsemen.
Such was not the case. Nothing tells so eloquently of the severity of
the blow which Lyon had dealt his enemies than that it was two whole
days before Price and McCulloch were in a frame of mind to move forward
10 miles and occupy Springfield, the goal of their campaign. This delay
was golden to the Union commanders, hampered as they were by hosts of
Union refugees fleeing from the rebel wrath, and incumbering the column
with all manner of vehicles and great droves of stock. Considering the
activity of the Missourians in guerrilla warfare, and the vicious way
they usually harried the Union forces, it is incomprehensible, except on
the theory that the Confederate forces had been stunned into torpor
by the blow. The Union column was able to make its long retreat of
125 miles from Springfield to Rolla and traverse an exceedingly rough
country cut up every few miles by ravines, gorges and creeks, without
the slightest molestation from the six or eight thousand horsemen whom
McCulloch had complained were so much in the way during the battle on
the banks of Wilson's Creek.
190
Gen. McCulloch made a number of lengthy and labored explanations to the
Confederate War Department of his failure to make any pursuit, but in
the light of facts that then should have been attainable none of these
was at all satisfactory. He admits that he did not enter Springfield
until after his scouts had brought him satisfactory assurances that the
Union army had abandoned the town. Aug. 12 he advanced to Springfield,
and issued proclamations to the people announcing himself as their
deliverer, and that his army "by great gallantry and determined courage"
had entirely "routed the enemy with great slaughter."
If he expected to be received and feted as a liberator he was sorely
disappointed, and in one of his letters he says in connection with his
customary uncomplimentary allusions to Gen. Price's army, "and from all
I can see we had as well be in Boston as far as the friendly feelings of
the inhabitants are concerned."
The truth was that the advance of the Confederates had had a blighting
effect upon that large portion of the people which had hoped to remain
neutral in the struggle.
Gen. Lyon, with all his intensity of purpose, had kept uppermost in mind
that he was an agent of the law, and his mission was to enforce the
law. He had kept his troops under excellent discipline, had permitted
no outrages upon citizens, and had either paid for or given vouchers for
anything his men needed, and had generally conducted himself in
strict obedience of the law. His course was a crushing refutal of the
inflammatory proclamations of Gov. Jackson and others about the Union
soldiers being robbers, thieves, ravishers and outragers.
191
Quite different was the course of the twenty or more thousand men whom
Price and McCulloch led into Springfield. They were under very little
discipline of any kind, and were burning with a desire to punish and
drive out of the country not merely those who were outspoken Unionists,
but all who were not radical Secessionists. They knew that the sentiment
in Springfield and the country of which it was the center was in favor
of the Union, and they wanted to stamp this out by terror.
While this brought to their ranks a great many of the more pliant
neutrals, it drove away from them a great number, and put into the ranks
of the Union many who had been more or less inclined to the pro-slavery
element.
The soreness between Price and McCulloch which had been filmed over
before the battle by Price subordinating himself and his troops to
McCulloch, became more inflamed during the stay at Springfield. In spite
of the fact that the Missouri troops had done much better fighting, and
suffered severer losses in the battle than McCulloch, he persisted in
denouncing them as cowards, stragglers and mobites, without soldierly
qualities.
The following extracts from a report to J. P. Benjamin, Confederate
Secretary of War, will show the temper which pervaded all his
correspondence, and was probably still more manifest in his personal
relations with the Missourians:
It was at this point that I first saw the total inefficiency
of the Missouri mounted men under Brig.-Gen. Rains. A
thousand, more or less, of them composed the advance guard,
and whilst reconnoiterlng the enemy's position, some eight
miles distant from our camp, were put to flight by a single
cannon-shot, running in the greatest confusion, without the
loss of a single man except one who died of overheat or
sunstroke, and bringing no reliable information as to the
position or fore of the enemy; nor were they of the
slightest service as scouts or spies afterwards.
192
As evidence of this I will mention here the fact of the
enemy being allowed to leave his position, six miles distant
from us, 20 hours before we knew it; thus causing us to make
a night march to surprise the enemy, who was at that time
entirely out of our reach. A day or two previous to this
march the Generals of the Missouri forces, by common consent
on their part and unasked on mine, tendered me the command
of their troops, which I at first declined, saying to them
it was done to throw the responsibility of ordering a
retreat upon me if one had to be ordered for the want of
supplies, their breadstuffs giving out about this time; and,
in truth, we would have been in a starving condition had it
not been for the young corn, which was just in condition to
be used. * * *
The battle over, it was ascertained that the camp followers,
whose presence I had so strongly objected to, had robbed our
dead and wounded on the battlefield of their arms, and at
the same time had taken those left by the enemy. I tried to
recover the arms thus lost by my men, and also a portion of
those taken from the enemy, but in vain. Gen. Pearce made an
effort to get back those muskets loaned to Gen. Price before
we entered Missouri the first time. I was informed he
recovered only 10 out of 615. I then asked that the battery
be given me, which was one taken by the Louisiana regiment
at the point of the bayonet. The guns were turned over by
the order of Gen. Price, minus the horses and most of the
harness. I would not have demanded these guns had Gen. Price
done the Louisiana regiment justice in his official report
The language used by him was calculated to make the
impression that the battery was captured by his men Instead
of that regiment * * *
McCulloch was a voluminous writer, both to the Confederate War
Department and to personal and official friends, and few of these
communications are without some complaint about the Missouri troops.
Everything that he had failed to do was due to their inefficiency,
their lack of soldierly perceptions, and conduct. They would give him
no information, would not scout nor reconnoiter, and he was continually
left in the dark as to the movements of the enemy. When they were
attacked he claimed that they would run away in a shameful manner. His
dislike of Gen. Rains seemed to grow more bitter continually.
[Illustration: 195-General Samuel R. J. Curtis]
193
Gen. Price saw a great opportunity and was anxious to improve it. The
retreat of the Union forces from Springfield opened up the whole western
part of the State, and a prompt movement would carry the army forward to
the Missouri River again, where it could control the navigation of
that great stream, receive thousands of recruits now being assembled at
places north of the river, separate the Unionists of Missouri from the
loyal people in Kansas and Nebraska, and hearten up the Secessionists
everywhere as much as it disheartened the Union people, and possibly
recover St. Louis.
He pressed this with all earnestness upon Gen. McCulloch, only to have
it received with cold indifference or strong objections. He proposed
that if McCulloch would undertake the movement, that he, Price, would
continue in subordination to him and give him all the assistance that
his troops could give.
There is no doubt that Price was entirely right in his views, and that
a prompt forward movement with such forces as he and McCulloch commanded
would have been a very serious matter for the Union cause and carry
discouragement everywhere to add to that which had been caused by the
disaster of Bull Run.
The relations between the two Generals constantly became more strained,
and for the latter part of the two weeks which McCulloch remained at
Springfield there was little communication between them. Gen. Price made
good use of the time to bring in recruits from every part of the State
which was accessible and to organize and discipline them for further
service.
At the end of a fortnight Gen. McCulloch suffered Gen. Pearce to return
to Arkansas with his Arkansas Division, while Gen. McCulloch retired
with his brigade of Louisianians and Texans, and Price was left free to
do as he pleased.
194
The death of Gen. Lyon at last aroused Gen. Fremont to a fever of energy
to do the things that he should have done weeks before. He began a
bombardment of Washington with telegrams asking for men, money and
supplies, and sent dispatches of the most urgent nature to everybody
from whom he could expect the least help. He called on the Governors of
the loyal Western States to hurry to him all the troops that they could
raise, and asked from Washington Regular troops, artillery, $3,000,000
for the Quartermaster's Department, and other requirements in
proportion. He made a requisition on the St. Louis banks for money, and
showed a great deal of fertility of resource.
Aug. 15, five days after the battle, President Lincoln, stirred up by
his fusillade of telegrams, dispatched him the following:
Washington, Aug. 15, 1861. To Gen. Fremont:
Been answering your messages ever since day before
yesterday. Do you receive the answers? The War Department
has notified all the Governors you designate to forward all
available force. So telegraphed you. Have you received these
messages? Answer immediately.
A. LINCOLN.
With relation to his conduct toward Gen. Lyon, Gen. Fremont afterward
testified to this effect before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:
A glance at the map will make it apparent that Cairo was the
point which first demanded immediate attention. The force
under Gen. Lyon could retreat, but the position at Cairo
could not be abandoned; the question of holding Cairo was
one which involved the safety of the whole Northwest. Had
the taking of St. Louis followed the defeat of Manassas, the
disaster might have been irretrievable; while the loss of
Springfield, should our army be compelled to fall back upon
Rolla, would only carry with it the loss of a part of
Missouri--a loss greatly to be regretted, but not
irretrievable. Having reinforced Cape Girardeau and Ironton,
by the ut-most exertions, I succeeded in getting together
and embarking with a force of 3,800 men, five days after my
arrival in St Louis.
195
From St. Louis to Cairo was an easy day's Journey by water,
and transportation abundant To Springfield was a week's
march; and before I could have reached it Cairo would have
been taken and with it, I believe, St Louis.
On my arrival at Cairo I found the force under Gen. Prentiss
reduced to 1,200 men, consisting mainly of a regiment which
had agreed to await my arrival. A few miles below, at New
Madrid, Gen. Pillow had landed a force estimated at 20,000,
which subsequent events showed was not exaggerated. Our
force, greatly increased to the enemy by rumor, drove him
to a hasty retreat and permanently secured the position.
I returned to St. Louis on the 4th, having in the meantime
ordered Col. Stephenson's regiment from Boonville, and Col.
Montgomery's from Kansas, to march to the relief of Gen.
Lyon.
Immediately upon my arrival from Cairo, I set myself at
work, amid incessant demands upon my time from every
quarter, principally to provide reinforcements for Gen.
Lyon.
I do not accept Springfield as a disaster belonging to my
administration. Causes wholly out of my jurisdiction had
already prepared the defeat of Gen. Lyon before my arrival
at St Louis.
The ebullition of the Secession sentiment in Missouri following the news
of the battle of Wilson's Creek made Gen. Fremont feel that the most
extraordinary measures were necessary in order to hold the State. He
had reasons for this alarm, for the greatest activity was manifested
in every County in enrolling young men in Secession companies and
regiments. Heavy columns were threatening invasion from various points.
One of these was led by Gen. Hardee, a Regular officer of much ability,
who had acquired considerable fame by his translation of the tactics in
use in the Army. He had been appointed to the command of North Arkansas,
and had collected considerable force at Pocahontas, at the head of
navigation on the White River, where he was within easy striking
distance of the State and Lyon's line of retreat, and was threatening
numberless direful things.
196
McCulloch and Price had sent special messengers to him to urge him to
join his force with theirs to crush Lyon, or at least to move forward
and cut off Lyon's communications with Rolla. They found Hardee within
400 yards of the Missouri State line. He had every disposition to do as
desired, but had too much of the Regular officer in him to be willing
to move until his forces were thoroly organized and equipped. There was
little in him of the spirit of Lyon or Price, who improvised means for
doing what they wanted to do, no matter whether regulations permitted it
or not.
Hardee complained that though he had then 2,300 men and expected to
shortly raise this force to 5,000, one of his batteries had no horses
and no harness, and none of his regiments had transportation enough for
field service, and that all regiments were badly equipped and needed
discipline and instruction.
Later, Hardee repaired many of these deficiencies, and was in shape to
do a great deal of damage to the Union cause, and of this Fremont and
his subordinates were well aware. Gens. Polk and Pillow, with quite
strong forces at Columbus, were threatening Cairo and southeast
Missouri, and an advance was made into the State by their picturesque
subordinate, Gen. M. Jeff Thompson, the poet laureate of the New Madrid
marshes and the "Swamp Fox" who was to emulate the exploits of Francis
Marion. Thompson moved forward with a considerable force of irregular
mounted men, the number of which was greatly exaggerated, and it was
reported that behind him was a column commanded by Pillow, ranging all
the way from 8,000 to 25,000.
197
Gen. Fremont set an immense force of laborers to work on an elaborate
system of fortification for the city of St. Louis, and also began the
construction of fortifications at Cape Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla and
Jefferson City. He employed laborers instead of using his troops, in
order to give the latter opportunity to be drilled and equipped.
He issued the following startling General Order, which produced the
greatest commotion in the State and outside of it:
Headquarters of the Western Department,
St Louis, Aug. 31, 1861.
Circumstances in my judgment of sufficient urgency render it
necessary that the Commanding General of this Department
should assume the administrative power of the State. Its
disorganized condition, the devastation of property by bands
of murderers and marauders who infest nearly every County in
the State, and avail themselves of the public misfortunes
and the vicinity of a hostile force to gratify private and
neighborhood vengeance, and who find an enemy wherever they
find plunder, finally demand the severest measures to
repress the daily increasing crimes and outrages which are
driving off the inhabitants and ruining the State. In this
condition the public safety and the success of our arms
require unity of purpose, without let or hindrance to the
prompt administration of affairs.
In order, therefore, to suppress disorders, to maintain, as
far as now practicable, the public peace, and to give
security and protection to the persons and property of loyal
citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established martial
law thru-out the State of Missouri. The lines of the army of
occupation in this State are, for the present, declared to
extend from Leavenworth, by way of the posts of Jefferson
City, Rolla and Ironton to Cape Girardeau, on the
Mississippi River. All persons who shall be taken with arms
in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-
martial, and, if found guilty, will be shot. The property,
real and personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri
who shall take up arms against the United States, or shall
be directly proven to have taken active part with their
enemies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the
public use; and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby
declared free men.
All persons who shall be proven to have destroyed, after the
publication of this order, railroad tracks, bridges or
telegraphs, shall suffer the extreme penalty of the law.
All persons engaged in treasonable correspondence, in giving
or procuring aid to the enemies of the United States, in
disturbing the public tranquility by creating and
circulating false reports or incendiary documents, are in
their own interest warned that they are exposing themselves.
198
All persons who have been led away from their allegiance are
required to return to their homes forthwith; any such
absence, without sufficient cause, will be held to be
presumptive evidence against them.
The object of this declaration is to place in the hands of
the military authorities the power to give Instantaneous
effect to existing laws, and to supply such deficiencies as
the conditions of war demand. But it is not intended to
suspend the ordinary tribunals of the country, where the law
will be administered by the civil officers in the usual
manner and with their customary authority, while the same
can be peaceably exercised.
The Commanding General will labor vigilantly for the public
welfare, and, in his efforts for their safety, hopes to
obtain not only the acquiescence, but the active support, of
the people of the country.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General Commanding.
Another man who appeared on the scene as Colonel of the 2d Iowa was
Samuel R. Curtis, an Ohio man, who graduated from West Point in 1831, in
the same class with Gens. Ammen, Humphreys and W. H. Emory. He resigned
the next year and became a prominent civil engineer in Ohio. He served
in the Mexican War as Colonel of the 2d Ohio, and at the close of that
struggle returned to his profession of engineering, removed to Iowa, and
at the outbreak of the war was a member of Congress from that State. He
was a man of decided military ability, and the victory won at Pea Ridge
was his personal triumph. He was to rise to the rank of Major-General
and command an independent army, but become involved in the factional
fights in Missouri and have his further career curtailed.
199
Still another name which appears with increased frequency about this
time is that of U. S. Grant, an Ohio man, who had graduated from West
Point in 1843, and had shown much real enterprise and soldiership in
Mexico, but had fallen under the disfavor of his commanding officers;
had been compelled to resign while holding the rank of Captain in the
4th U. S., and for eight years had had a losing struggle in trying to
make a living in civil pursuits. A happy accident put him at the head of
the 21st Ill., with which he had entered Missouri to guard the Hannibal
& St. Joseph Railroad, and incidentally to dispose of one Thomas A.
Harris, a very energetic and able man who held a Brigadier-Generalship
from Gov. Jackson, and who was making himself particularly active in
the neighborhood of that railroad. Grant showed much energy in chasing
around for Harris, but had never succeeded in bringing him into battle,
though when he left for other scenes Harris was hiding among the knobs
of Salt River, with his command reduced to three enlisted men and his
staff.
Though he was out of favor with Gen. McClellan and many others who
were directing military operations, in some way a Brigadier-General's
commission came to U. S. Grant, and he was assigned to the District of
Southeastern Missouri, with headquarters at Cape Girardeau, where his
duty was to hold in check the poetical M. Jeff Thompson, the noisy
Gideon J. Pillow and the prelatic Leonidas J. Polk in their efforts to
get control of the southeastern corner of the State and menace Cairo and
St. Louis.
Maj. Sturgis was promptly made a Brigadier-General to date from Wilson's
Creek, and assigned to the command of Northeast Missouri, where he had
five or six thousand men under him.
Capt. Fred Steele had accepted a commission as Colonel of the 8th Iowa;
Capt. Jos. B. Plummer shortly took the Colonelcy of a new regiment, the
11th Mo.; Capt. Totten became Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel of the 1st
Mo. Art., of which Schofield was Major.
200
Notwithstanding the feeling of the officers and soldiers who had
participated in the battle of Wilson's Creek against Sigel, it was found
so necessary to "recognize the Germans" and hold them strongly for the
Union cause that he was made a Brigadier-General to date from May 17,
1861, which put him in the same class of Volunteer Brigadier-Generals as
Hunter, Heintzelman, Fitz John Porter, Wm. B. Franklin, Wm. T. Sherman,
C. P. Stone, Don Carlos Buell, John Pope, Philip Kearny, Joseph
Hooker, U. S. Grant, John A. McClernand and A. S. Williams, all of whose
volunteer commissions bore the date of May 17. This was subsequently a
cause of trouble.
There appeared also another of those figures so common among the State
builders of this country, and upholding to the fullest the character
of a leader of pioneers. James H. Lane was an Indiana man, son of a
preacher; had served with credit as Colonel of Indiana troops in Mexico,
and had been Lieutenant-Governor of Indiana and Member of Congress, but
getting at odds with his party had migrated to Kansas, where his natural
talents and fiery, aggressive courage speedily brought him to the front
as the leader of the warlike Free State men, who resisted with force and
arms the attempts of the Pro-slavery men to dominate the Territory.
His instant readiness for battle and the unsparing energy with which he
prosecuted his enterprises so endeared him to the Free State men that
when the State was admitted there was no question about his election as
her first United States Senator.
201
Kansas had promptly raised two regiments, which had fought superbly
at Wilson's Creek and afterwards joined in the retrograde movement to
Rolla. This left Kansas without any protection, and the people naturally
reasoned that in the advance upon the territory left unguarded by the
retirement of the Union army, Gen. Price and his Missourians would
embrace the opportunity to pay back with interest the debt of vengeance
which had been running since the wars of '56 and '57. Therefore Lane
received the authority to recruit five regiments in Kansas, and went
about his work with his characteristic energy.
The 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Kan. at once began organizing, receiving
many recruits from the young Union men who had been forced to leave
Missouri, and within a week or more after the battle of Wilson's Creek
Gen. Lane had mustered an effective force of about 2,500 men, who had
received some clothing and equipment and much instruction from the
Regular officers and men at Forts Scott, Riley and Leavenworth.
With these forces in hand under a man of Lane's well-known character,
neither Gen. Price nor his men had much disposition to meddle with
Kansas, even if the General had not other and more comprehensive views.
Gen. Price was not waiting for Fremont's plans to develop before
executing his own. He employed the two weeks after the battle in
diligently organizing his men, and Aug. 26 left Springfield at the head
of a column of about 10,000 enthusiastic young Missourians, who had
in that brief time made great progress in soldiership. He caused great
alarm at Fort Scott, by pointing the head of his column toward that
place, and arriving within 10 miles of it on the night of the 1st
of September, sent Rains's Division, which was made up of men from
southwest Missouri, forward to reconnoiter.
202
Rains's advance of 30 mounted men under Capt. Rector Johnson pushed
forward to within sight of Fort Scott, on the morning of Sept. 1, and
captured a drove of 80 Government mules which had been sent out to graze
on the prairies. They also carried off all the able-bodied men that they
could find on their line of march. Two companies of the newly-raised
Kansas cavalry promptly attacked Johnson's command, which fell back
across the line toward the main body, encamped at Dry Wood. Gen. Lane
gathered up such of his volunteers as were in reach, and moved to Dry
Wood, where he offered Gen. Rains battle, but the latter declined to be
drawn from the shelter in the woods in which he had formed his lines,
and Lane did not think it was prudent to attack a force the strength of
which he could not ascertain.
A noisy, long-range skirmish ensued, which terminated at nightfall by
Lane withdrawing his forces to Fort Scott. The next day, leaving Col.
Jennison with 400 cavalry in Fort Scott, Lane crossed the Little Osage
and threw up fortifications on its banks to oppose Price's further
advance and give him battle should he attempt to move into Kansas.
Gen. Price declined to fight him in his chosen position, but drew his
forces together and started to execute his cherished plan of advancing
to the Missouri River and forming connection there with the troops
which Gens. Harris and Green had been raising in northern Missouri, not
seriously molested in their work by the Union forces under Gens.
Pope and Sturgis. The action at Dry Wood was made the most of by the
Secessionists, who claimed a defeat for the terror-striking "Jim" Lane.
The casualties were insignificant for the forces engaged, as there were
but five killed and 12 wounded on the Union side, and four killed and 16
wounded on the Confederate.
203
It was feared that after Gen. Price had moved forward to the Missouri
River McCulloch would come up from Arkansas and take Fort Scott, which
he had been authorized to do by the Confederate Secretary of War;
but McCulloch seems to have had other ideas, and spent the weeks in
inaction.
The situation of the Union men of southwest Missouri became gloomy in
the extreme. The whole country was overrun with guerrilla bands hunting
down the Union men, and not infrequently shooting them on sight.
Gen. Fremont had seriously alarmed Polk, Pillow and Thompson by his
showy reinforcement of Cairo with 3,800 men. Though Pillow was reputed
to have about 20,000 troops at his disposal, he was seized with a great
fear, wrote to Hardee at Pocahontas urging him to come to his help, and
limited the sphere of the operations of his dashing lieutenant, M. Jeff
Thompson. Maj.-Gen. Polk seems to have also been deeply impressed,
for he wrote to Pillow urging him to put his troops in trenches in the
neighborhood of New Madrid, strongly fortify that place and stretch a
chain across the river to prevent the passage of gunboats.
Then Polk had another tremor, and ordered Pillow to evacuate New Madrid
at once, taking his men and heavy guns across the river to the strong
works of Fort Pillow. Pillow, however, as insubordinate and self-seeking
as he had been in the Mexican War, and thirsting for the distinction of
taking Cape Girardeau, did not obey his superior's orders, but retained
his forces at New Madrid. He had the audacity to write to his superior,
"Withdraw your control over me for a few hours."
204
Pillow, merely hanging on to the remotest fringe of the State, assumed
the title of "Liberator of Missouri", and his correspondence, orders and
proclamations were headed, "Headquarters Army of Liberation."
About the same time an old acquaintance, Lieut-Gov. Thos. C. Reynolds,
he of the ready pen and fluent phrases, taking advantage of a hasty
journey of Gov. Jackson to Richmond, assumed full gubernatorial powers,
set up his capital in Pillow's camp at New Madrid, and proceeded to
clothe him with the most extraordinary prerogatives. He made himself the
whole of the "Sovereign people of Missouri," and issued a proclamation
withdrawing the State from the Union. He said that "disregarding the
forms and considering only realities, I view an ordinance for the
separation from the North and union with the Confederate States as
a mere outward expression giving notice to others of an act already
consummated in the hearts of the people." He then proceeded to establish
a military despotism which made the worst of what had been said of
Fremont pale before it. He clothed all the military commanders--not
merely those of Missouri provided by the odious Military Act, but
such Confederate commanders as Pillow and Hardee, who should enter the
State--with a most absolute power over the lives and property of the
people of Missouri.
205
The following oath was prescribed which all citizens were to be
compelled to take by any officer of the Missouri State Guards or
Confederate army who might come upon them:
Know all men, that I------------, of the County of----------,
State of Missouri, do solemnly swear that I will bear
true faith and allegiance to the State of Missouri, and
support the Constitution of the State, and that I will not
give aid, comfort, information, protection or encouragement
to the enemies or opposers of the Missouri State Guards, or
their allies, the armies of the Confederate States, upon the
penalty of death for treason.
In the meanwhile Gen. Price, more practical and capable than any of
them, with true military foresight was rushing his troops toward the
Missouri River, gaining recruits and arousing enthusiasm with every
day's march. Leading his own advance he hurried towards Warrensburg, the
County seat of Johnson County, about 30 miles south of Lexington,
where he hoped to seize about $100,000 deposited in the State banks.
He arrived too late for this however, because the Union troops had the
same object in view, and had anticipated him, carrying the money off
with them and leaving behind some very clever caricatures, drawn by the
skillful artists among the Germans, which irritated Price and his men
more than it was reasonable they should.
The Union commander at Warrensburg, Col. Everett Peabody, of the
13th Mo., had kept himself well informed as to Price's movements, and
retreated from Warrensburg to Lexington, burning the bridges after he
had crossed them. He sent notice to Fremont of Price's movements.
Col. James A. Mulligan, with the 23d 111., an Irish regiment, was
ordered forward to Lexington to Col. Peabdy's assistance, and to hold
the place to the last.
206
The 1st Ill. Cav., Col. Thos. A. Marshall, and fragments of Home Guard
regiments in process of organization, were drawn back to Lexington, in
face of the advance of Price's columns. There was also a mongrel field
battery, consisting of one 4-pounder, three 6-pounders, one 12-pounder
and two little 4-inch howitzers, the latter being useless on account of
having no shells.
The cavalry was only armed with pistols and sabers.
No official Union reports are on file as to the affair, but the total
strength of the garrison is given unofficially at from 2,640 to 3,300.
The correspondent of the Missouri Republican gives these figures:
23d 111., Col. Mulligan............................... 800
Home Guards, Col. White.......................... 500
13th Mo., Col. Peabody................................ 840
1st Ill. Cav., CoL Marshall........................... 500
Total...................................................2,040
Col. Mulligan assumed command of the whole by seniority of commission.
He was an Irishman with all his race's pugnacity, and also its
effervescence. He was born in Utica, N. Y., in 1830, had graduated from
a Roman Catholic college, studied law, and edited the principal Roman
Catholic paper in the West, "The Tablet."
207
Lexington, which is the County seat of Lafayette County, was a
very important place in frontier times, and the center of the great
hemp-growing region of Missouri. It is situated on the south bank of the
Missouri River, about 300 miles by its course above St. Louis, and about
84 miles below Kansas City by water, or 42 miles by rail. It consisted
of two towns, Old and New Lexington, about a mile apart, having
altogether about 5,000 people. It had some manufactories and two or
three colleges, one of which, the Masonic College, situated on high
ground between Old and New Lexington, a half mile from the river, was
taken by Col. Mulligan for his position, which he proceeded to fortify
with high, substantial works to accommodate 10,000 men, inclosing about
15 acres on the summit of the bluffs. Between 2,000 and 3,000 horses and
other animals of the trains were gathered inside this inclosure.
A week before Col. Mulligan's arrival, on Sept. 9, Gov. Jackson had
briefly set up his Capital there, and held a session of that portion
of the Legislature which adhered to him. The approach of Col. Pea-body
caused a precipitate adjournment, and there was left behind $800,000 in
coin, which was buried in the cellar of the college, with the great seal
of the State of Missouri.
At dawn on Sept. 12, Gen. Price, riding with his advance, Rains's
Division, struck the Union pickets stretching through the cornfields
outside of Lexington, but though he brought up all his infantry within
reach, and McDonald's, Guibor's, and Clark's batteries, his heads of
columns were beaten back everywhere by the stubborn Union soldiers, who
had been waiting three days for him, and he wisely decided to withdraw
two or three miles and wait for the rest of his forces and ammunition
wagons to come up.
208
Col. Mulligan telegraphed to Col. Jeff C. Davis, at Jefferson City--120
miles away--the fact of Price's advance and his need for help, and Davis
sent the news to Fremont, who ordered forward three regiments and two
batteries to Davis, and directed him to reinforce Mulligan, which he
could do by rail and river. Fremont also sent orders to Pope and Sturgis
to help Mulligan out, but there was not much urgency in the orders, and
each of his subordinates seems to have taken his own time and way of
obeying or not obeying.
Jeff C. Davis had at that time something over 5,000 men at Jefferson
City, and subsequent reinforcements raised this number, it was claimed,
to 11,000--certainly to 8,000. Davis afterward became a valuable
division and corps commander, but he certainly did not show up well in
this transaction. He, also, had too much of the "Regular" in him. He
complained of a lack of wagons and harness, commissary supplies and
ammunition, to enable him to make a forward movement. He had none of the
spirit of Lyon and Price, to impress teams and supplies and make means
to do what ought to be done.
It was harvest time in that fertile part of Missouri, and his army need
not have suffered for food, wherever he went. But all that he did was
to send forward a couple of regiments to occupy points and prevent the
Secessionists from crossing the river at those places. They had all
either crossed or found other unguarded places.
Pope showed similar incapacity. He had 5,000 men in easy reach of
Lexington, but he was more engrossed in the Hannibal & St Joseph
Railroad and in matters in Keokuk and Canton than in Lexington. He
telegraphed to Gen. Fremont that he would move forward 4,000 men to
Lexington, and actually did send forward Lieut.-Col. Scott with the 3d
Iowa and Robt. F. Smith with the 16th 111., with instructions to form
a junction at liberty, in Clay County, and then proceed to Lexington.
Lieut-Col. Scott pushed on to the Blue Mills Landing on the Missouri
River, where he came in contact with a large Secession force. Six
regiments of the Missouri State Guard were there, making their way to
Lexington.
209
D. R. Atchison, former Senator from Missouri, President of the United
States Senate, and of much notoriety during the Kansas and Nebraska
troubles, took command of this force and attacked Col. Scott, compelling
rapid retreat. Atchison reported to Price the usual story about the
small number under his command and the large force of the Yankees
routed, but this does not harmonize with his praises to Cols. Sanders,
Patten, Childs, Cundliff, Wilfley, and Maj. Gause, each of whom he says
handled his "regiment" with great gallantry.
Col. Smith met Col. Scott in his retreat, learned from him the
overwhelming force in front, and retreated with him, so that portion of
the relief came to naught.
Gen. Sturgis moved forward from Mexico with about 4,000 men and reached
the Missouri River, but finding no means for crossing, and surveying the
host that was gathered around the city, retired with such haste as to
leave his tents and camp equipage.
Gen. Price proceeded with astonishing deliberation, when we consider
that he must have known that Fremont had something over 20,000 men
within striking distance.
Retreat was still open for Col. Mulligan, as he had two steamboats
at his command, but he felt that his orders obliged him to remain in
Lexington for the protection of much public property which had been
gathered there, and that as his situation was known to Gen. Fremont,
relief would be speedily sent to him.
210
In the meantime, every hour had swelled Gen. Price's forces. Some of
the Secession writers have claimed that there were actually as many as
38,000 men gathered in his camps. Of course, a large proportion of his
force was useless unless to help beat off a relieving column, because,
owing to the small extent of the position occupied by Col. Mulligan,
only a limited number of men could be employed against it, and 10,000
were as effective as 100,000. A very large portion of Gen. Price's
forces were men who flocked to his camp as to a picnic or a barbecue,
because something was going on, and they fell away from him again when
he began a backward movement, as rapidly as they came.
Then ensued for six days a very strange battle. Swarms of Missourians
crowded the ravines in the bluffs, behind trees, stones, the walls,
fences and chimneys of the houses, and whatever else would afford
adequate protection, and kept up an incessant fusillade upon the
garrison safely ensconced behind thick banks of earth. When a squad
occupying a secure shelter grew tired, or had fired away all its
ammunition, it would go back to camp for dinner, when their places would
be taken by others eager to share in the noise and excitement and have
a story to take back home of the number of Yankees who had fallen under
their deadly aim. If all these stories of the men "who had been at
Lexington" could have been true, more men would have been sent to
the grave than answered Lincoln's call for 500,000 volunteers. The
artillerists were as enthusiastic and industrious as the men with
"Yager" rifles and shotguns, and banged away with unflagging zeal and
corresponding lack of mortality. The walls of the college were badly
scarred, but the worst effect was that an occasional shell would take
effect among the horses, and drop on the ground carcasses which speedily
putrified under the hot sun, and added an unbearable stench to the
other hardships of the garrison.
211
This went on day and night, for the moon was bright, and there was
no reason why a man who had powder and shot, and could not get an
opportunity at any of the coverts during the day, should not put in
pleasantly a few hours at night.
Naturally a rain of bullets, even though they might hit rarer than
lightning strokes, had a wearing effect on the garrison.
While this noisy fusillade by the mob of truculent bushwhackers was
going on, there were much more soldierly occurrences by the more
soldierly men on both sides.
There were sorties and counter-sorties in which the greatest gallantry
was displayed on both sides, and in which substantially all the losses
occurred. The Secessionists captured a Union flag in one of these, which
was balanced by a Secession flag captured by the 1st 111. Cav. Owing to
the great superiority of the enemy in numbers, the finality of all these
was against the garrison, which was everywhere pushed back from
the edges of the bluff, and also from some buildings on the bluffs
overlooking the works.
Gen. Rains's Division invested the eastern and northeastern position of
Mulligan's works; Gen. Parsons the southwestern, with Clark's Division,
commanded by Col. Congreve Jackson, and Steen's Division as reserves.
212
Col. Rives, commanding Gen. Slack's Division, occupied the west along
the river bank and captured the steamboats by which Mulligan could
escape or receive reinforcements; Gens. Harris and Mc-Bride extended
this line along the north, cutting off the garrison from all access to
the river and water. This became very effective in forcing surrender, as
not only the men but the animals suffered terribly from thirst.
By the morning of Sept. 18, six days after the first encounter with the
pickets, Gen. Price had all his forces up and properly disposed about
the garrison. He and his principal subordinates were very weary of
the noisy and fruitless bushwhacking, and eager for something more
conclusive.
Orders were issued for the whole line to close in upon the Union works,
and they were gallantly responded to and met as gallant resistance from
the beleaguered garrison in the 52 hours of stubborn fighting which
ensued. Col. Congreve Jackson, commanding Gen. John B. Clark's Third
Division, reported that he succeeded in getting to within 460 yards of
the College.
Col. Benj. A. Rives, commanding Gen. Slack's Fourth Division, says
that after having been driven back by a gallant counter-assault, he got
within 100 yards of the College.
Gen. Steen lays claim for his division of having defeated Lieut.-Col.
Scott, after which he passed back into the reserve.
213
Gen. Mosby M. Parsons, commanding the Sixth Division, says that he
reached to within 500 yards of the College, and also crossed the river
with 3,000 men, to repel Sturgis, who "retired in confusion, leaving 200
of their tents."
Gen. J. H. McBride, commanding the Seventh Division, says that he
succeeded in forming a breastwork with hemp bales "100 yards from the
enemy's works."
Gen. Jas. S. Rains says that with the Second Division, numbering 3,025
rank and file, he succeeded in gaining a position 350 yards north and
500 yards east of the College.
Gen. Thos. A. Harris does not give the point he reached, but the
concurrent testimony is that he was the closest of all, and is supported
by the fact that his division sustained the heaviest loss. To his
division is due the credit of the famous device of hemp bales as
advancing breastworks.
Gen. Price quietly appropriates the credit for the device to himself,
saying in his report:
On the morning of the 20th inst I caused a number of hemp bales to
be transported to the river nights, where moveable breastworks were
speedily constructed out of them by Cols. Harris, McBride, Rives and
Maj. Winston, and their respective commands. Capt. Kelly's battery
was ordered at the same time to the position occupied by Gen. Harris's
force, and quickly opened an effective fire under the direction of its
gallant Captain.
These demonstrations, particularly the continued advance of the hemp
breastworks, which were as efficient as the cotton bales at New Orleans,
quickly attracted attention and excited and alarmed the enemy. They
were, however, repulsed in every instance by the unflinching courage and
fixed determination of the men.
Gen. Harris says in his report to Gen. Price: "I then directed Capt.
Geo. A. Turner, of my staff, to request of you 132 bales of hemp, which
you promptly credited.
214
"I directed the bales to be wet in the river to protect them against the
casualties of fire of our troops and the enemy's, and soon discovered
that the wetting was so materially increasing the weight as to prevent
our men in their exhausted condition from rolling them to the crest of
the hill. I then adopted the idea of wetting the hemp after it had been
transported to this position."
The credit has also been stoutly claimed for Col. Thomas Hinkle, of
Wellington County, Mo., who two years later was killed in command of
a guerrilla organization. No matter whose, the idea was singularly
effective, and despite the most gallant efforts of the garrison, the
hemp bales were steadily rolled nearer, until by 2 o'clock in the
afternoon of the 20th they were in places as close as from 50 to 75
yards of the Union works. At this distance it would be easy to mass
an overpowering force behind their cover to rush upon and instantly
overwhelm the garrison.
The garrison, which had now been fighting for eight long days; which was
so short of ammunition that most of the cartridge boxes were empty, and
there was no supply from which to refill them; which was tortured with
thirst, surrounded with hundreds of animals dying from lack of water, at
last raised the white flag.
After eight days of waiting there was no more sign of rescue than there
was on the first, and everywhere they could look their enemies swarmed
in apparently limitless numbers. Gen. Price granted the garrison
honorable terms. The officers were to remain as prisoners of war, the
men to lay down their arms, take the oath not to fight any more against
Missouri, and to be sent across the river and allowed to go whither they
would.
215
With shrewd policy he allowed Col. Mulligan to retain his sword and
showed him a great many civilities. Mulligan was a representative
Irishman, and this would bear fruit in the attitude of the Irish toward
the war. In his report to Gov. Jackson Gen. Price sums up the fruits of
his victory as follows:
Our entire loss in this series of engagements amounts to 25 killed and
72 wounded. The enemy's loss was much greater.
The visible fruits of this almost bloodless victory are very
great--about 3.500 prisoners, among whom are Cols. Mulligan, Marshall,
Peabody, White, and Grover, Maj. Van Horn and 118 other commissioned
officers, five pieces of artillery and two mortars, over 8,000 stands of
Infantry arms, a large number of sabers, about 750 horses, many sets of
cavalry equipments, wagons, teams and ammunition, more than 8100,-000
worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property. In
addition to all this, I obtained the restoration of the great seal
of the State and the public records, which had been stolen from their
proper custodian, and about $900,-000 in money, of which the bank at
this place had been robbed, and which I have caused to be returned to
it.
Of Gen. Price's characteristics that of under-statement was certainly
not one; but there is no use caviling about this, since the disaster was
in all conscience bad enough for the Union side.
Col Mulligan's official report is not included in the Rebellion Records.
It was quite a rhetorical statement of the affair, with unstinted praise
for his own regiment and Irish valor generally, much condemnation for
the Germans, between whom and the Irish there was at that time a great
deal of feeling, and absolutely ignoring all the rest who participated
in the defense. This was particularly unjust to the 1st ID. Cav. While
the 23d 111. had taken the best and strongest part of the line, the 1st
111. Cav. had defended the weakest and most exposed part, that, too,
with only pistols and sabers, and had captured the only flag taken
during the siege.
216
The total loss of the garrison is usually given as 39 killed and 120
wounded.
Probably Gen. Price in his report only mentioned the losses in his
organized forces. If his wounded did not exceed 72, his men showed
unusual ability in keeping under cover.
While the loss did not approach that of the desperate fight at Wilson's
Creek, yet it was respectably large according to European standards, the
garrison having lost about six per cent before surrendering.
Gen. Fremont announced this calamity to Washington in the following
telegrams:
Headquarters Western Department, St. Louis, Sept. 28, 1861.
I have a telegram from Brookfleld that Lexington has fallen
into Price's hands, he having cut off Mulligan's supply of
water. Reinforcements 4,000 strong, under Sturgis, by
capture of ferryboats, had no means of crossing the river in
time. Lane's force from the southwest and Davis's from the
southeast upwards of 11,000, could not get there in time. I
am taking the field myself, and hope to destroy the enemy
either before or after the junction of forces under
McCulloch. Please notify the President immediately.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General Commanding. Col. E. D. Townsend, Assistant
Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D.C.
Headquarters Western Department, Sept 23, 1861. Nothing
since my dispatch of this morning. Our loss 39 killed, 120
wounded. Loss of enemy, 1,400 killed and wounded. Our non-
commissioned officers and privates sworn and released.
Commissioned officers held as prisoners. Our troops are
gathering around the enemy. I will send you from the field
more details in a few days.
JOHN C. FREMONT, Major-General Commanding. Hon. S.
Cameron, Secretary of War.
The patient and much enduring President answered as follows:
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Sept. 23, 1861. John
C. Fremont, Major-General Commanding, St Louis, Mo.: Your
dispatch of this day is received. The President is glad that
you are hastening to the scene of action. His words are "He
expects you to repair the disaster at Lexington without loss
of time." WINFIELD SCOTT.
Fremont began to topple to his fall.
217