CHAPTER XIII. FREMONT'S MARVELOUS INEFFECTIVENESS.

Gen. Sterling Price had scored a victory which gave him an enduring hold

upon the confidence and esteem of the Missourians. With the least means

he had achieved the most success of any Confederate General so far. His

conduct at the battle of Wilson's Creek had endeared him to the men he

commanded. He exposed himself with utmost indifference to the fiercest

firing, showed good judgment as to movements, was not discouraged after

repeated repulses, and was everywhere animating and encouraging the men

and bringing them forward into line of battle.

He sympathized with those who were wounded, and had them cared for, and

immediately returned to the fighting with fresh troops.

It is true, however, that he had shown no generalship, but merely

demonstrated himself a good Colonel, in leading up one regiment after

another and putting them into the fight.

Lexington brought an immensity of prestige to Price and encouragement to

the Secessionists and did a corresponding injury to the Union cause. It

added immeasurably to the burdens which President Lincoln had to bear.

He could make Brigadier-and Major-Generals, but he could not endow them

with generalship.

The Senate could confirm them, but they were still more confirmed in the

dull, unenterprising routine of camp and administrative regulations.

218

The modest bars of a Captain on their shoulder straps had been, as it

were, changed in the twinkling of an eye into the refulgent stars of

a General, but they seemed to take this as a deserved tribute to their

personal worth, rather than as an incentive and opportunity for the

greater things which had made their predecessors illustrious.

Fremont, in the palatial Brandt Mansion, for which the Government was

paying the very unusual rent of $6,000 per year, was maintaining a vice

regal court as difficultly accessible as that of any crowned head

of Europe. His uncounted and glittering staff, which seemed to have

received the Pentecostal gift of tongues--in which English was not

included--was headed by a mysterious "Adlatus,"--a title before unknown

in America or to the dictionaries, and since retired to oblivion.

Naturally, the Adlatus's command of English was limited. His knowledge

of Missouri was even more so. Though commanding Missouri and dealing

intensely with Missouri affairs, the men surrounding Fremont were

everything but Missourians or those acquainted with Missouri affairs. It

would have been surprising to find one of them who could bound the State

and name its principal rivers.

This, too, in the midst of a multitude of able, educated, influential

Missourians who were ardent Unionists and were burning with zeal to

serve the cause. Not one of them appears in the Fremont entourage.

219

Gens. Pope, Sturgis, Jeff C. Davis, Hunter,--all Regulars and trained

to war; Sigel, with his profound theoretical knowledge and his large

experience; Curtis, lately returned to the Army with his military

training supplemented by wide experience in civil life; Hurlbut, the

brilliant orator and politician, were all busily engaged in something

or other that kept them from interfering with Price while he lingered on

the Missouri River gathering up recruits and stripping the Union farmers

of that rich agricultural region of cattle and grain sufficient to feed

his army during the coming Winter, and of horses and wagons to haul off

his spoils and thoroly equip his army with transportation.

The only really soldierly thing done at this time was by the "political

General,"--the erratic, demagogic, trumpet-sounding "Jim" Lane. He

was commanding men who had come out from home to do something toward

fighting the war and not to stay in camp and be drilled into automatons.

He could only maintain his hold on them and his ascendency in Kansas

politics by action.

Learning that Price had left a large stock of ammunition at the

important little town of Osceola, the head of navigation on the Osage

River, under strong guard, Lane led his brigade a swift march from

Kansas upon the town, and succeeded in surprising the garrison, which,

after a brief resistance, retreated and left it to Lane's mercy,

whereupon he proceeded to not only destroy the very considerable

quantity of stores which Price had accumulated there, but to burn down

the town. This was an exceedingly ill-advised ending to a piece of

brilliant soldiership, because not only was it injustice to an enemy,

but it was a severe blow upon Union men who owned full one-third of the

property destroyed.

220

A large number of these were engaged in the trade of the Southwest, for

which Osceola was a distributing center. Goods were brought up the river

during the high water and then shipped through the country by wagons.

The town was also the County seat of St. Clair County, and contained the

public records, etc.

Still more unfortunate was it that Lane's act was taken as an excuse for

the Missouri guerrillas to retaliate upon Kansas towns and the property

of the Union people in their own State. Lane says in his report: "The

enemy ambushed the approaches to the town, and after being driven from

them by the advance under Cols. Montgomery and Weer, they took refuge in

the buildings of the town to annoy us. We were compelled to shell them

out, and in doing so the place was burned to ashes, with an immense

amount of stores of all descriptions. There were 15 or 20 of them

killed and wounded; we lost none. Full particulars will be furnished you

hereafter."

This shows that even he felt the necessity of apologizing for the act,

but the apology is too transparent. The fact was that the Kansas men

saw an opportunity to pay back some of their old scores against the

Missourians and did not fail to improve it.

In spite of Gen. Fremont's promise to the President to "take the field

himself and attempt to destroy the enemy," he moved with exceeding

deliberation. It is true that he left St. Louis for Jefferson City,

Sept. 27, a week after Mulligan's surrender, but that week had been

well employed by Price in gathering up all that he could carry away and

making ready to avoid the blow which he knew must fall.

221

After arriving at Jefferson City, Fremont, instead of taking the troops

which were near at hand and making a swift rush upon his enemy, the

only way in which he could hope to hurt him, began the organization of

a "grande armee" upon the European model, and that which McClellan was

deliberately organizing in front of Washington.

The impatient people, who were paying the $3,000,000 a day which the war

was now beginning to cost, and who had begun to murmur for results, were

amused by stories of plans of sweeping down the Mississippi clear to

New Orleans, taking Memphis, Vicksburg and other strongholds on the way,

severing the Southern Confederacy in twain, so that it would fall into

hopeless ruin.

This was entirely possible at that time with the army that had been

given Fremont, had it been handled with the ability and boldness of

Sherman's March to the Sea.

Two weeks after Mulligan's surrender Fremont announced the formation of

this grand "Army of the West," containing approximately 50,000 men. This

was grouped as follows:

The First Division, to which Gen. David Hunter was assigned, consisted

of 9,750 men, and was ordered to take position at Versailles, about 40

miles southwest of Jefferson City, and became the Left Wing of the Army.

Gen. John Pope was given command of the Second Division of 9,220 men and

ordered to take station at Boonville, 50 miles northwest of Jefferson

City. His position was to be the Right Wing of the army.

The Third Division, 7,980 strong, was put under command of Gen. Franz

Sigel, and made the advance of the army, with its station at Sedalia and

Georgetown, 64 miles west of Jefferson City.

222

The Fifth Division, commanded by Gen. Asboth, had 6,461 men, and

constituted the reserve at Tipton, on the railroad, 38 miles west of

Jefferson City.

The Fifth Division, 5,388 men, under Gen. Justus McKinstry, formed the

center and was posted at Syracuse, five miles west of Tipton.

Beside these, Gen. Sturgis held Kansas City with 3,000 men and Gen.

Jas. H. Lane, with 2,500 men, was to move in Kansas down the State line,

between Fort Scott and Kansas City, to protect Kansas from an incursion

in that direction, and as opportunity offered attack Price's flank.

Thus, there were 38,789 effectives in the five divisions, which with

Sturgis's and Lane's forces made a total force of 44,289, not including

garrisons which swell the total of the army to over 90,000.

Among these Division Commanders were two whom Fremont had discovered and

created Brigadier-Generals out of his own volition, without consultation

at Washington.

These were Gens. Asboth and McKinstry. Gen. Alexander (Sandor)

Asboth, born in 1811, was a Hungarian and an educated engineer, with

considerable experience in and against the Austrian army. He had entered

ardently into the Revolution of 1848, and built a bridge in a single

night by which the Revolutionary army crossed and won the brilliant

victory of Nagy Salo. He became Adjutant-General of the Hungarian army,

and when the Revolution was crushed by Russian troops, escaped with

Kossuth into Turkey, came to this country, and became a naturalized

citizen. He was by turns farmer, teacher, engineer, and manufacturer of

galvanized articles. He sided with the Union Germans, went on Fremont's

staff, and was appointed a Brigadier-General. The Senate refused to

recognize the appointment, but in consideration of his good service

he was reappointed, served creditably through the war, was brevetted

a Major-General, and after the war sent as Minister to the Argentine

Confederation, where he died in 1868.

223

The other, Justus McKinstry, was born in New York and appointed to the

Military Academy from Michigan, where he graduated 40th in the class of

1838, of which Beauregard, Barry, Irvin McDowell, W. J. Hardee, R. S.

Granger, Henry H. Sibley, Edward Johnson and A. J. Smith were members.

He had served creditably in the Mexican War, receiving a brevet for

gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco, and at the outbreak of the war

was a Major and Quartermaster at St. Louis, where he did very much to

frustrate Lyon's plans and was regarded by him as a Secessionist

at heart. He continued to hold his position, however, as Chief

Quartermaster of the Department of the West until Fremont appointed him

Brigadier-General.

Shortly after Fremont's removal he was placed under arrest at St. Louis

and ordered before a court-martial, which did not convene, and he was

at last summarily dismissed for "neglect and violation of duty, to the

prejudice of good order and military discipline." He became a stock

broker in New York City, and afterwards a land agent at Rolla, Mo.

It will be seen by the map that the disposition of the troops was good,

and that Fremont had the advantage of short lines from Sedalia and Rolla

to cut Price's line of retreat, recapture the spoils he was hastening to

a place of safely, and destroy, or at least disperse, his army.

224

Fremont, however, made no use of this advantage, and Price seems to have

had no apprehension that he would. Price remained in Lexington until

Oct 1, serenely contemplating the gigantic preparations made for his

destruction, and then having gathered up all that he could readily get,

and reading Fremont's order for a forward movement of the Army of the

West, thought, like the prudent meadow lark, that probably something

would be now done, and the time had come for moving. He began a

deliberate retreat, crossing the Osage River at Osceola, and reaching

Greenfield, 150 miles away, at the very comfortable pace of 15 miles a

day.

Gen. Fremont ordered the Army of the West forward, but the so-called

pursuit was very much like hunting a fox on a dray. He was encumbered

with immense trains, for which bridges had to be built over numerous

streams and roads made thru the rough country. The trains seemed to

contain a world of unnecessary things and an astonishing lack of those

necessary. Apparently almost anybody who had anything to sell could find

purchasers among the numerous men about Fremont's headquarters who had

authority to buy, or assumed it.

One astonishing item in the purchases was a great number of half barrels

for holding water, rather an extraordinary provision in a country like

Missouri, where in the month of October water is disposed to be in

excessive quantities.

Notwithstanding the astonishing purchase of mules by everybody and

anybody, none of the Division Commanders seem to have had mules enough

to pull their wagons.

225

The division started out like the horses of a balky team. Gen. Pope, of

the Right Wing, left Jefferson City Oct. 11, Sigel got away from Sedalia

with the Third Division Oct. 13, the same day Hunter left Tipton with

the Left Wing, and Asboth followed on Oct 14. Even when they started

their progress was very slow, for the columns were halted at streams

to build bridges and in the rough countries to wait for the sappers and

miners to make passable roads.

When one column was halted, all the rest had to do likewise, for though

Price kept the safe distance of 100 miles away, Fremont was in constant

apprehension of battle, and held his columns in close supporting

distance. He did not get across the Osage River until Oct. 25, or nine

days after Price's leisurely crossing that important stream, on the

banks of which it was confidently expected that he would give battle.

Price, with his diminishing forces, had no such intention, but fell

back toward Neosho, to cover as long as possible the Granby Mines, seven

miles from that place, which were the most important source of lead

for the Southern Confederacy, to which they supplied 200,000 pounds per

month.

Gov. Jackson took advantage of this breathing spell to call the

Legislature together at Neosho, where it held a two weeks' "rump"

session of the small minority of that body which favored Secession.

They passed an ordinance of Secession and elected Senators and

Representatives to the Confederate Congress, adjourning when they heard

that Fremont had at last passed the Osage.

226

Then Price took up his line of retreat toward the southern boundary of

the State to get near Gen. Ben McCulloch, who had posted his forces at

Cross Hollow, in Benton County, northwest Arkansas. Gen. Price took

up his position at Pineville, in the extreme southwestern corner of

Missouri, where the rough, hilly country offered great chances to the

defense, and again began communication with Gen. McCulloch to induce him

to unite his force with his own and attack the Union army.

He had correctly estimated Fremont's generalship, and thought there was

a possibility of massing his and McCulloch's forces, to attack a portion

of Fremont's army, drive it back and defeat him in detail. McCulloch,

in spite of his ranger reputation, entirely lacked Price's aggressive

spirit, and thought that it would be much better to fall back to the

Boston Mountain, about 50 miles farther south, and make a stand there.

He so informed Gen. Price.

While McCulloch had no disposition to enter Missouri and defend it

against the Union troops, he had no hesitation about treating it as

part of Confederate territory. Desiring to embarrass and delay Fremont's

advance as much as possible, he sent forward his Texas cavalry to burn

the mills, forage and grain as far in the direction of Springfield as

they could safely go, and urged Price to do the same. McCulloch's Texans

soon lighted up the southwest country with burning mills, barns and

stacks.

To this Gen. Price was bitterly opposed. The mills and grain were in

many instances the property of the Secessionists, and to destroy them

would be to inflict worse punishment on his own people than the Union

commanders had ever done, and would embitter them against his cause.

227

Price repeatedly represented to McCulloch that altogether they would

have 25,000 men, and if McCulloch did not desire to go forward they

could make a good defensive battle inside the State on the hills around

Pineville. To leave it would cause the loss of very many Missourians who

had enlisted in the State Guard to defend Missouri, and who would feel

that they had no cause to fight outside of the State.

After crossing the Osage Fremont halted near Connersville, about 25

miles south of Warsaw, where he crossed the river, and then advanced

with Sigel to Bolivar, on the Springfield road, and sent forward Maj.

Charles Zagonyi with 150 of his famous Body Guard and Maj. F. J. White

with 180 men of the 1st Mo. Cav., to make a reconnoissance in the

direction of Springfield.

Fremont's Body Guard had played a large part in the pomp and

circumstance of his administration. Maj. Chas. Zagonyi was a picturesque

and effervescent Hungarian, who recounted fascinating stories of

his experience as a subordinate to Gen. Bern during the Hungarian

Revolution. Fremont had authorized him to raise a body guard, in

imitation of the famous troops of Europe, and the novelty of the

organization attracted to it a great number of quite fine young men,

most of whom were from the country around Cincinnati--one company being

from Kentucky. They were formed into three companies, mounted on fine

blooded bay horses, showily uniformed and each armed with two navy

revolvers, a five-barreled rifle and a saber.

All the officers were Americans except three--one Hollander and two

Hungarians. The members of the Guard, in addition to their expensive

and showy outfit, did not conceal from the other soldiers that they were

picked men and considered themselves superior to the ordinary run, which

did not enhance their popularity with their comrades.

228

Majs. Zagonyi and White marched all that night, and the next day, about

noon, when about eight miles north of Springfield, learned that there

was a force of at least 1,500 Confederates in the town.

One of the rebel pickets who had not been captured hastened back

to Springfield and gave the alarm, so that the Confederates were in

readiness for them. Feeling that this would be so, Majs. Zagonyi and

White determined to move around the town and approach it from the west

on the Mt. Vernon road. In this movement White became separated from

Zagonyi, who, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, came most unexpectedly

upon the Secessionists drawn up in line at the end of a long lane.

A heavy rail fence intervened between Zagonyi and the head of the lane,

and an opening had to be made through this under a heavy fire from the

enemy. The moment a gap was made, Zagonyi shouted to his men to follow

him, and do as he did, raising the battle cry, "Fremont and the Union."

He dashed gallantly forward, straight for the center of the rebel line,

followed at a gallop by his command. The Confederate fire did fearful

execution upon the Guard as it was crowded in the lane, but in a few

seconds the lane was passed and the cavalry saber began doing its wild

work.

229

The center of the enemy's lines was at once broken by the terrible

impact of galloping horses and the Confederates began a panicky retreat,

followed by the vengeful horsemen shooting and sabering them as they

ran. The infantry ran through the town to the shelter of the woods, and

the Confederate cavalry fell back down the road, pursued by the Guard

until it was getting nightfall, when Zagonyi recalled them and returned

to the Court House, raised the Union flag from it, released the Union

prisoners confined in the jail, gathered up his dead and wounded, and

after dark decided to fall back until he met the advance of the army.

He had lost 15 men killed and 26 wounded, and reported that he had found

23 Confederates dead after the charge was over. This brilliant action,

which was then compared with the Charge of the Light Brigade at

Balaklava, redeemed the soldiers of the Guards in the eyes of their

comrades, and it became an honor to belong to that organization.

The next morning Maj. White reached Springfield with a few Home Guards,

where he found the Confederates still dazed by the occurrences of the

day before, and he was careful not to undeceive them as to his strength.

He solemnly received the flag of truce, said that he would have to refer

the matter to Gen. Sigel, threw out his men as pickets, permitted the

people to bury their dead, and then prudently fell back to meet the

advance of the army.

Fremont took up his quarters in Springfield, and began ostentatious

preparations for an immediate decisive battle, though Price was then

more than 50 miles away from him. This Fremont should have known, for

in some mysterious manner he was within ready communication with him,

so much so as to be able to conclude the following remarkable convention

which was duly published in a joint proclamation:

230

To All Peaceably-Disposed Citizens of the State of Missouri,

Greeting:

Whereas a solemn agreement has been entered into by and

between Maj.-Gens. Fremont and Price, respectively,

commanding; antagonistic forces in the State of Missouri, to

the effect that in the future arrests or forcible

interference by armed or unarmed parties of citizens within

the limits of said State for the mere entertainment or

expression of political opinions shall hereafter cease; that

families now broken up for such causes may be reunited, and

that the war now progressing shall be exclusively confined

to armies in the field:

Therefore, be it known to all whom it may concern:

1. No arrests whatever on account of political opinions, or

for the merely private expression of the same, shall

hereafter be made within the limits of the State of

Missouri, and all persons who may have been arrested and are

now held to answer upon such charges only shall be forthwith

released; but it is expressly declared that nothing in this

proclamation shall be construed to bar or interfere with any

of the usual and regular proceedings of the established

courts under statutes and orders made and provided for such

offenses.

2. All peaceably disposed citizens who may have been driven

from their homes because of their political opinions, or who

may have left them from fear of force and violence, are

hereby advised and permitted to return, upon the faith of

our positive assurances that while so returning they shall

receive protection from both the armies in the field

wherever it can be given.

3. All bodies of armed men acting without the authority or

recognition of the Major-Generals before named, and not

legitimately connected with the armies in the field, are

hereby ordered at once to disband.

4. Any violation of either of the foregoing articles shall

subject the offender to the penalty of military law,

according to the nature of the offense.

In testimony whereof the aforesaid Maj.-Gen. John Charles

Fremont, at Springfield, Mo., on this 1st day of November,

A. D. 1861, and Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price, at Cassville, Mo.,

on this 6th day of November, A. D. 1861, have hereunto set

their hands, and hereby mutually pledge their earnest

efforts to the enforcement of the above articles of

agreement according to their full tenor and effect, to the

best of their ability.

J. C FREMONT, Major-General Commanding.

STERLING PRICE, Major-General Commanding.

The practical effect of this was that Price was allowed to send such of

his men as he wished home for the Winter, with a safeguard against their

being molested by the Union troops, but it had no effect in protecting

Union men from being harassed by guerrilla tormentors, who cared as

little for conventions and proclamations as for the Sermon on the Mount.

281

In the meanwhile Fremont's astonishing ill success in purely military

matters, the freely expressed opinion of all who came in contact with

him as to his glaring incompetence, added to the fearful stories of

the corruption of the men immediately surrounding him, were making

his position very insecure. President Lincoln sent his intimate and

life-long friend, David Davis, whom he was about to elevate to the

Supreme Bench, to St. Louis with a commission to investigate the

rank-smelling contracts and disbursements. No report was ever made

public, but it was generally known that they found even worse than they

feared.

The Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, undertook a tour of investigation

on his own account, accompanied by Adj't-Gen. Lorenzo Thomas. Some of

the things which they found are set forth in the following extracts from

the memorandum from Gen. Thomas to his superior officer:

Gen. Curtis said of Gen. Fremont that he found no difficulty in having:

access to him, and when he presented business connected with his

command, it was attended to. Gen. Fremont never consulted him on

military matters, nor informed him of his plans. Gen. Curtis remarked

that while he would go with freedom to Gen. Scott and express his

opinions, he would not dare to do so to Gen. Fremont. He deemed Gen.

Fremont unequal to the command of an army, and said that he was no more

bound by law than by the winds.

Col. Andrews, Chief Paymaster, called and presented irregularities in

the Pay Department, and desired instruction from the Secretary for his

government, stating: that he was required to make payments and transfers

of money contrary to law and regulations. Once, upon objecting to what

he conceived an improper payment, he was threatened with confinement by

a file of soldiers. He exhibited an order for the transfer of $100,000

to the Quartermaster's Department, which was irregular. Exhibited

abstract of payment by one Paymaster (Maj. Febiger) to 42 persons,

appointed by Gen. Fremont, viz: one Colonel, three Majors, eight

Captains, 15 First lieutenants, 11 Second Lieutenants, one Surgeon,

three Assistant Surgeons; total 42. Nineteen of these have appointments

as engineers, and are entitled to cavalry pay.

282

Maj. Allen, Principal Quartermaster, had recently taken charge at

St Louis, but reported great irregularities in his Department, and

requested special Instructions. These he deemed important, as orders

were communicated by a variety of persons, in a very irregular manner,

requiring disbursements of money. These orders were often verbally

given. He was sending, under Gen. Fremont's orders, large amounts of

forage from St. Louis to.... where corn was abundant and very cheap. The

distance was 160 miles. He gave the indebtedness of the Quartermaster's

Department in St. Louis to be $4,606,809.73.

By direction of Gen. Meigs, advertisements were made to furnish grain

and hay, and contracts made for specific sums--28 cents per bushel for

corn, 30 cents for oats, and $17.95 per ton for hay. In face of this

another party at St. Louis--Balrd, or Baird A Palmer (Palmer being of

the old firm in California of Palmer, Cook & Co.)--were directed to

send to Jefferson City (where hay and corn abound) as fast as possible

100,000 bushels of oats, with a corresponding amount of hay, at 33 cents

per bushel for grain and $19 per ton for hay.

Capt Edward M. Davis, a member of his staff, received a contract by the

direct order of Gen. Fremont for blankets. They were examined by a board

of army officers consisting of Capt Hendershott, 4th U. S. Art,

Capt Haines, Commissary of Subsistence, and Capt Turnley, Assistant

Quartermaster. The blankets were found to be made of cotton and were

rotten and worthless. Notwithstanding this decision they were purchased,

and given to the sick and wounded soldiers in hospitals.

One week after the receipt of the President's order modifying Gen.

Fremont's proclamation relative to emancipation of slaves, Gen. Fremont

by note to Capt McKeever, required him to have 200 copies of the

original proclamation and address to the army, of same date, printed

and sent immediately to Ironton, for the use of Maj. Gavitt, Indiana

Cavalry, for distribution through the country. Capt McKeever had the

copies printed and delivered. The order is as follows:

"Adjutant-General will have 200 copies of proclamation of

Commanding General, dated Aug. 30, together with the address

to the army of same date, sent immediately to Iron-ton, for

the use of Maj. Gavitt Indiana Cavalry. Maj. Gavitt will

distribute it through the country.

"J. C. Ft.

"Commanding General.

"Sept. 23, 1861."

As soon as I obtained a view of the several encampments at Tipton,

I expressed the opinion that the forces there assembled could not be

moved, as scarcely any means of transportation were visible. I saw Gen.

Hunter, second in command, and conversed freely with him. He stated that

there was great confusion, and that Fremont was utterly incompetent;

that his own division was greatly scattered, and the force then present

defective in many respects; that he required 100 wagons, yet he was

ordered to march that day, and some of his troops were already drawn

out on the road. His cavalry regiment (Ellis's) had horses, arms

(indifferent), but no equipments; had to carry their cartridges in their

pockets; consequently, on their first day's march from Jefferson

City, in a heavy rain, the cartridges carried about their persons were

destroyed. This march to Tipton (36 miles) was made on a miry, heavy

earth road parallel to the railroad, and but a little distance from it.

The troops were directed by Gen. Fremont to march without provisions or

knapsacks, and without transportation. A violent rainstorm came up, and

the troops were exposed to it all night, were without food for 24 hours,

and when food was received the beef was found to be spoiled.

283

Gen. Hunter stated that he had just received a written report from one

of his Colonels, informing him that but 20 out of 100 of his guns would

go off. These were the guns procured by Gen. Fremont in Europe. I may

here state that Gen. Sherman, at Louisville, made a similar complaint

of the great inferiority of these European arms. He had given the men

orders to file down the nipples. In conversation with Col. Swords,

Assistant Quartersmaster-General; at Louisville, just from California,

he stated that Mr. Selover, who was in Europe with Gen. Fremont, wrote

to some friend In San Francisco that his share of the profit of the

purchase of these arms was $30,000.

Gen. Hunter expressed to the Secretary of War his decided opinion that

Gen. Fremont was incompetent and unfit for his extensive and important

command. This opinion he gave reluctantly, owing to his position as

second in command.

President Lincoln sent the following characteristic letter to Gen. S. R.

Curtis, who, being in command at St. Louis, was directly accessible, and

a man in whose discretion the President felt he might trust:

Washington, Oct 24, 1861. Brig.-Gen. S. R. Curtis.

Dear Sir: On receipt of this with the accompanying

incisures, you will take safe, certain and suitable measures

to have the inclosure addressed to Maj.-Gen. Fremont

delivered to him with all reasonable dispatch, subject to

these conditions only, that if, when Gen. Fremont shall be

reached by the messenger--yourself or anyone sent by you--he

shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a

battle, or shall then be actually in battle, or shall then

be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of

a battle, it is not to be delivered, but held for further

orders. After, and not until after, the delivery to Gen.

Fremont, let the inclosed addressed to Gen. Hunter be

delivered to him.

Tour obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

The following decisive order was one of the inclosures:

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Oct. 24, 1861.

General Orders No. 18.

Maj.-Gen. Fremont, of the U. S. Army, the present Commander

of the Western Department of the same, will, on the receipt

of this order, call Maj.-Gen. Hunter, of the U. S.

Volunteers, to relieve him temporarily in that command, when

he (Maj.-Gen. Fremont) will report to General Headquarters,

by letter, for further orders.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

284

A special messenger arrived at Springfield, Nov. 2, with the order,

which created consternation at Fremont's headquarters. It is more than

probable that Fremont felt his elevation to be such that he could try

conclusions with the Administration, and refuse to obey the order.

There was considerable talk at that time about military headquarters as

to a dictator, and this was so rife about McClellan's that his journal

constantly abounds in allusions which indicate that he was putting the

crown away from him with increasing gentleness each time. There was much

of the same atmosphere about the headquarters of the Army of the West,

and it is claimed that Fremont at first decided not to obey the order,

but on Sigel's urgent representations finally concluded to do so, and

issued the following farewell order to his troops:

Headquarters Western Department,

Springfield, Mo., Nov. 2, 1861. Soldiers of the Mississippi

Army:

Agreeably to orders this day received I take leave of you.

Altho our army has been of sudden growth, we have grown up

together, and I have become familiar with the brave and

generous spirit which you bring to the defense of your

country, and which makes me anticipate for you a brilliant

career. Continue as you have begun, and give to my successor

the same cordial and enthusiastic support with which you

have encouraged me. Emulate the splendid example which you

have already before you, and let me remain, as I am, proud

of the noble army which I had thus far labored to bring

together.

Soldiers, I regret to leave you. Most sincerely I thank you

for the regard and confidence you have invariably shown me.

I deeply regret that I shall not have the honor to lead you

to the victory which you are just about to win, but I shall

claim to share with you in the joy of every triumph, and

trust always to be fraternally remembered by my companions

in arms.

J. C. FREMONT,

Major-General, U. S. Army.

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He left at once for St Louis, with his Body Guard for an escort. Though

these men had been enlisted for three years, they were ordered by

Gen. McClellan to be mustered out, and Maj. Zagonyi was offered the

Colonelcy of a new regiment.

The time and manner of the removal enabled Gen. Fremont's ardent

partisans to complain loudly that he was relieved on the eve of a battle

in which he would have accomplished great things, and was thus denied an

opportunity to achieve lasting fame and render essential service to the

country. The evidence, however, is conclusive that at that time Price

was at Pineville, fully 50 miles away, and in the midst of a very rough

country, instead of being in Fremont's immediate front, as Fremont

certainly supposed.

Whether he would have accepted battle after Fremont had reached him at

Pineville, is a matter of conjecture. The pressure in favor of Fremont

continued strong enough, however, to bring about the offer of a new

command to him the following year, but it was grotesquely shrunken from

the proud proportions of that from which he had been relieved. It was

styled the Mountain Department, and embraced a large portion of

West Virginia. Even in this restricted area he again failed to give

satisfaction.

June 8, 1862, he fought an indecisive battle against Stonewall Jackson

at Cross Keys, took umbrage at being placed under the command of

Gen. John Pope, whom he had once commanded, asked to be relieved

from command, and joined the ranks of the bitter critics of President

Lincoln's Administration, though still retaining his commission and pay

as a Major-General.

He still thought his was a name to conjure with, and May 31,1864,

accepted the nomination for President from a convention of dissatisfied

Republicans assembled at Cleveland, resigning his commission at last,

June 4, 1864.

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The chill reception with which the country received his nomination at

last disillusionized even him, and in September he withdrew from the

field, to clear the way for Lincoln's re-election. He then became

connected with the promotion of a Pacific railway over the southern of

the routes which he had surveyed, lost his money and property in the

course of time, appealed to Congress for relief, and in 1890 was

by special act put on the retired list of the Army with the rank of

Major-General.

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The Struggle for Missouri · 第 13 / 15 章