An analytical study of the losses in the preceding chapter will aid in a
more thoro appreciation of the most bitter battle fought on the American
Continent up to that time, and by far the severest which had ever been
waged west of the Allegheny Mountains. It will be perceived that the
loss in the Union army was almost wholly in Gen. Lyon's column of 4,000
men, or less, which suffered to the extent of almost one-third of
its number. In the 1,300 men in Gen. Sigel's command the loss was
insignificant, except in prisoners.
Both sides fought with a stubbornness absolutely unknown in European
wars, but the regiments of the Union army seemed to be inspired with
that higher invincibility of purpose which characterized their great
leader.
Judged by the simple equation of losses, the Union regiments displayed a
far greater tenacity of purpose than the Confederates. We have no exact
figures as to the number in each Union regiment, as there were constant
changes taking place; a great many men had served their time out and
more were claiming and receiving their discharges.
Aug. 4, 1861, six days before the battle, Gen. Lyon gave from
"recollection" the following estimate of the strength of his command,
which must have been considerably reduced in the seven days between that
and the battle, and from which must be deducted some 250 men left to
guard the trains and property in Springfield:
178
[Illustration: 179-Table]
179
It is altogether unlikely that the 1st Mo., for example, took into
battle within 100 or more of the 900 men assigned to it, and the same
thing is true of the 900 men given for the 1st Iowa, and the 700 each
for the two Kansas regiments.
If we assume that the 1st Mo. and the 1st Iowa had 800 men each and the
Kansas regiments 600 each, we find that the loss of 295 for the 1st
Mo., 284 for the 1st Kan., and 154 for the 1st Iowa to be appalling. The
Regulars suffered severely, but not so badly as the volunteers.
Among those who were noted for gallant conduct in the battle of Wilson's
Creek was Eugene F. Ware, then a private in the 1st Iowa, and who
afterward became a Captain in the 7th Iowa Cav. In civil life
he attained a leading place at the Kansas bar, and was appointed
Commissioner of Pensions by President Roosevelt.
180
None of the Confederate regiments engaged suffered to anything like
the same extent, and as they were driven from the field, while the
Union regiments maintained their position and were even ready for
further aggression, the palm of higher purposes and more desperate
fighting must be unhesitatingly conceded to the Union volunteers. Few of
the Confederate commanders give reports of the number they carried into
action, but many of their regiments must have been approximately as
strong as those of the Union, and they had many more of them.
The moral effect of the battle was prodigious on both sides. The Union
troops were conscious of having met overwhelming forces and fought them
to a stand-still, if not actual defeat. Every man felt himself a victor
as he left the field, and only retreated because the exigencies of the
situation rendered that the most politic move.
It was consequently a great encouragement to the Union sentiment
everywhere, and did much to retrieve the humiliation of Bull Run. The
Confederates naturally made the very most of the fact that they had been
left masters of the field, and they dilated extensively upon the killing
of Gen. Lyon and the crushing defeat they had administered upon Sigel,
with capture of prisoners, guns and flags. They used this to so good
purpose as to greatly stimulate the Secession spirit thruout the State.
181
Gen. McCulloch's dispatches to the Confederate War Department are, to
say the least, disingenuous. His first dispatch that evening stated
that the enemy was 12,000 strong, but had "fled" after eight hours' hard
fighting. His second official report, dated two days after the battle,
gave his "effective" forces at 5,300 infantry, 15 pieces of artillery
and 6,000 horsemen, armed with flintlock muskets, rifles and shotguns.
He says: "There were, other horsemen with the army, but they were
entirely unarmed, and instead of being a help they were continually
in the way." He repeatedly pronounces the collisions at the different
periods of the battle as "terrific," and says: "The incessant roar of
musketry was deafening, and the balls fell as thick as hailstones." His
next sentences are at surprising variance with the concurrent testimony
on the Union side; for he says: "Nothing could withstand the impetuosity
of our final charge. The enemy fell back and could not again be rallied,
and they were seen at 12 m. fast retreating among the hills in the
distance. This ended the battle. It lasted six hours and a half."
By this time Gen. McCulloch had reduced the Union force to between 9,000
and 10,000, and he claims the Union loss to have been 800 killed, 1,000
wounded and 300 prisoners. He gave his own loss at 265 killed, 800
wounded and 30 missing. His colleague, Gen. Price, he curtly dismisses
with this brief laudation: "To Gen. Price I am under many obligations
for assistance on the battlefield. He was at the head of his force,
leading them on and sustaining them by his gallant bearing."
182
Gen. Price's report is more accurate and soldierlike, but he says that
after several "severe and bloody conflicts" had ensued, and the battle
had been conducted with the "greatest gallantry and vigor on both
sides for more than five hours, the enemy retreated in great confusion,
leaving their Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Lyon, dead upon the battlefield,
over 500 killed and a great number wounded." He claims that his forces
numbered 5,221 officers and men, of whom 156 were killed and 517
wounded. This would make the loss of his whole division of 5,000 men
673, or about the same lost by the 1st Mo. and the 1st Kan., with these
two regiments still maintaining their position, while the enemy retired.
It seems difficult to understand why, if the enemy "retreated in great
confusion," as reported by Mc-Culloch and Price, the several thousand
horsemen who did little or nothing during the battle were not let loose
to complete the ruin of the Union forces. No matter how poorly armed or
disciplined these might have been, their appearance on the flank of the
retiring column would have been fatal to any orderly retreat such as was
conducted. The universal testimony of the Union officers and soldiers is
that there was no enemy in sight when they started to leave the field,
and that they suffered no molestation whatever, though they halted two
miles from the field and in plain sight for some time.
It also passes comprehension that this horde of irregular horsemen
were not employed during the long hours of the battle in making some
diversion in the rear of the Union army.
Both Price and McCulloch seem to have had their attention so fully
engrossed in bringing up new regiments to keep Lyon from breaking thru
their lines and reaching their trains that they had no opportunity to
give orders or organize manuvers by the horsemen, and nobody seems to
have suggested to the mounted men that they could employ their time
better than by standing back and watching the progress of the terrible
conflict between the two opposing lines of infantry.
183
It appears that the Union officers in the council called by Gen. Sturgis
were not at all unanimous for retreat. Capt. Sweeny, altho severely
wounded, vehemently insisted upon pursuing the enemy, and Capt. Gordon
Granger, also severely wounded, rode up to Sturgis, pointed out that
there was not a man in sight and that the fire could be seen from where
the retreating foe was burning his wagons, and he urged the pursuit so
vigorously that Sturgis had to repeat his order for him to leave the
field.
Col. Sigel, in his report made at Rolla eight days after the battle,
made a long and labored explanation of his operations during the day. He
thus explained his failure to do more:
In order to understand clearly our actions and our fate, you
will allow me to state the following facts:
1st. According to orders, it was the duty of this brigade to
attack the enemy in the rear and to cut off his retreat,
which order I tried to execute, whatever the consequences
might be.
2d. The time of service of the 6th Regiment Mo. Volunteers
had expired before the battle. I had induced them, company
by company, not to leave us in the most critical and
dangerous moment, and had engaged them for the time of eight
days, this term ending on Friday, the 9th, the day before
the battle.
3d. The 3d Regiment, of which 400 three-months men had been
dismissed, was composed for the greatest part of recruits,
who had not seen the enemy before and were only
insufficiently drilled.
4th. The men serving the pieces and the drivers consisted of
infantry taken from the 3d Regiment and were mostly
recruits, who had had only a few days' instruction.
5th. About two-thirds of our officers had left us. Some
companies had no officers at all; a great pity, but a
consequence of the system of the three months' service.
Later, when Gen. Sigel was seeking promotion, Maj. Schofield, then a
Brigadier-General, sent the following communication to Gen. Halleck:
184
St Louis, Mo.. Feb. 18, 1862. Maj.-Gen. Halleck,
Commanding Department of the Missouri.
General: The question of the merits of Brig.-Gen. Franz
Slgel as a commander having assumed such shape as to deeply
involve the interests of the service, I deem it my duty to
make a statement of facts which came to my knowledge during
the campaign of last Summer in the Southwest, ending in the
death of Gen. Lyon and the retreat of his army from
Springfield.
Soon after the capture of Camp Jackson, in May, Gen. Lyon
sent Col. Slgel, with his two regiments of infantry and two
batteries of artillery, to the southwestern part of the
State, by way of Rolla, to cut off the retreat of Price's
force which he (Lyon) was about to drive from Boonville. Col.
Sigel passed beyond Springfield, reaching a point not far
from the Kansas line, and on the main road used by Price's
men in their movement south to join him. Here he left a
single company of infantry in a small town, with no apparent
object, unless that It might fall in the hands of the enemy,
which it did the next day (6th of July). Sigel met Price the
next day, and fought the celebrated "battle of Carthage."
Sigel had about two regiments of infantry, well armed and
equipped, most of the men old German soldiers, and two good
batteries of artillery. Price had about twice Sigel's number
of men, but most of them mounted, armed with shotguns and
common rifles, and entirely without organization and
discipline, and a few pieces of almost worthless artillery.
Sigel retreated all day before this miserable rabble,
contenting himself with repelling their irregular attacks,
which he did with perfect ease whenever they ventured to make
them. The loss on either side was quite insignificant. Price
and McCulloch were thus permitted to join each other
absolutely without opposition; Sigel, who had been sent
there to prevent their Junction, making a "masterly
retreat."
Several days before the battle of Wilson's Creek it was
ascertained beyond a doubt that the enemy's strength was
about 22,000 men, with at least 20 pieces of artillery,
while our force was only about 5,000. About the 7th of
August the main body of the enemy reached Wilson's Creek,
and Gen. Lyon decided to attack him. The plan of attack was
freely discussed between Gen. Lyon, the members of his
staff, CoL Sigel, and several officers of the Regular Army.
Col. Sigel, apparently anxious for a separate command,
advocated the plan of a divided attack. All others, I
believe, opposed it.
On the 8th of August the plan of a single attack was
adopted, to be carried out on the 9th. This had to be
postponed on account of the exhaustion of part of our
troops. During the morning of the 9th Col. Sigel had a long
interview with Gen. Lyon, and prevailed upon him to adopt
his plan, which led to the mixture of glory, disgrace and
disaster of the ever-memorable 10th of August Slgel, in
attempting to perform the part assigned to himself, lost his
artillery, lost his infantry, and fled alone, or nearly so,
to Springfield, arriving there long before the battle was
ended. Yet he had almost nobody killed or wounded. One piece
of his artillery and 500 or 600 infantry were picked up and
brought in by a company of Regular cavalry. No effort was
made by Sigel or any of his officers to rally their men and
join Lyon's Division, altho the battle raged furiously for
hours after Sigel's rout; and most of his men in their
retreat passed in rear of Lyon's line of battle.
185
On our return to Springfield, at about 5 o'clock p. m., Maj.
Sturgis yielded the command to Col. Sigel, and the latter,
after consultation with many of the officers of the army,
decided to retreat toward Rolla; starting at 2 o'clock a. m.
in order that the column might be in favorable position for
defense before daylight. At the hour appointed for the
troops to move I found Col. Sigel asleep in bed, and his own
brigade, which was to be the advance guard, making
preparations to cook their breakfast It was 4 o'clock before
I could get them started. Sigel remained in command three
days, kept his two regiments in front all the time, made
little more than ordinary day's marches, but yet did not get
in camp until 10, and on one occasion 12 o'clock at night.
On the second day he kept the main column waiting, exposed
to the sun on a dry prairie, while his own men killed beef
and cooked their breakfast. They finished their breakfast at
about noon, and then began their day's march.
The fatigue and annoyance to the troops soon became so
intolerable that discipline was impossible. The officers,
therefore, almost unanimously demanded a change. Maj.
Sturgis, in compliance with the demand, assumed the command.
My position as Gen. Lyon's principal staff officer gave mo
very favorable opportunities for judging of Gen. Sigel's
merits as an officer, and hence I appreciate his good as
well as his bad qualities more accurately than most of those
who presume to judge him. Gen. Sigel, in point of
theoretical education, is far above the average of
commanders in this country. He has studied with great care
the science of strategy, and seems thoroly conversant with
the campaigns of all the great captains, so far as covers
their main strategic features, and also seems familiar with
the duties of the staff; but in tactics, great and small
logistics, and discipline he is greatly deficient. These
defects are so apparent as to make it absolutely impossible
for him to gain the confidence of American officers and men,
and entirely unfit him for a high command in our army. While
I do not condemn Gen. Sigel in the unmeasured terms so
common among many, but on the contrary see in him many fine
qualities, I would do less than my duty did I not enter my
protest against the appointment to a high command in the
army of a man who, whatever may be his merits, I know cannot
have the confidence of the troops he is to command.
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. SCHOFIELD, Brigadier-General. U. S. Volunteers.
This was accompanied by a statement embodying the same facts and signed
by substantially all the higher officers who had been with Lyon.
186
At the first halt of the army, about two miles from the battlefield,
while the dead and wounded were being gathered up, it was discovered
that Gen. Lyon's body had been left behind. The Surgeon and another
officer volunteered to take an ambulance and return to the battlefield
for it They were received graciously by Gen. McCulloch; the body was
delivered to them and they reached Springfield with it shortly after
dark. The Surgeon made an attempt to embalm it by injecting arsenic
into the veins, but decomposition, owing to exposure to the hot sun, had
progressed too far to render it practicable, and they were compelled to
leave it when the army moved off.
Mrs. Phelps, wife of the member of Congress from that District, and
a true Union woman, obtained it and had it placed in a wooden coffin,
which was hermetically sealed in another one of zinc. Fearing that it
might be molested by the Confederate troops when they entered the city,
Mrs. Phelps had the coffin placed in an out-door cellar and covered with
straw. Later she took an opportunity of having it secretly buried at
night.
Thinking that the remains had been brought on, Mr. Danford Knowlton,
of New York, a cousin, and Mr. John B. Hasler, of Webster, Mass., a
brother-in-law of Gen. Lyon, came on at the instance of the Connecticut
relatives to obtain the remains. Not finding them at St. Louis,
they went forward to Rolla, where Col. Wyman furnished them with an
ambulance, with which they proceeded to Springfield under a flag
of truce. They were kindly received by Gen. Price, and also by Gen.
Parsons, whose brigade was encamped on the ground where the body was
buried, and exhuming it, brought it to St. Louis. The city went into
mourning, and the remains were conducted by a military and civic
procession to the depot, where they were delivered to the Adams Express
Company to be conveyed East under an escort of officers and enlisted
men.
187
At every station on the road crowds gathered to pay their tribute of
respect to the deceased hero and distinguished honors were paid at
Cincinnati, Pittsburg, New York, and Hartford. The body was taken to
Eastford, Conn., where the General was born, and in the presence of
a large assemblage was interred in a grave beside his parents, in
accordance with the desire the General expressed while in life.
Upon opening Lyons' will it was found that he had bequeathed all his
savings, prudent investments and property, amounting to about $50,000,
to the Government to aid it in the prosecution of the war for its
existence.
Aug. 25, Gen. Fremont issued congratulatory orders, in which he said:
The General Commanding laments, in sympathy with the
country, the loss of the indomitable Gen. Nathaniel Lyon.
His fame cannot be better eulogized than in these words in
the official report of his gallant successor, Maj. Sturgis,
U. S. Cavalry: "Thus gallantly fell as true a soldier as
ever drew a sword; a man whose honesty of purpose was
proverbial; a noble patriot, and one who held his life as
nothing where his country demanded it of him. Let us emulate
his prowess and undying devotion to his duty!"
The order also permitted the regiments and other
organizations engaged to put "Springfield" on their colors,
and directed that the order should be read at the head of
every company in the Department of Missouri.
188
Dec. 30, 1861, Congress passed a joint resolution, in which it said:
That Congress deems it just and proper to enter upon its
records a recognition of the eminent and patriotic services
of the late Brig-Gen. Nathaniel Lyon. The country to whose
service he devoted his life will guard and preserve his fame
as a part of its own glory.
2. That the thanks of Congress are hereby given to the brave
officers and soldiers who, under the command of the late
Gen. Lyon, sustained the honor of the flag, and achieved
victory against overwhelming numbers at the battle of
Springfield, in Missouri, and that, in order to commemorate
an event so honorable to the country and to themselves, it
is ordered that each regiment engaged shall be authorized to
bear upon its colors the word "Springfield," embroidered in
letters of gold. And the President of the United States is
hereby requested to cause these resolutions to be read at
the head of every regiment in the Army of the United States.
189