The End of the War
On the morning of the 15th of May, I arrived at Vereeniging with some of
the Free State delegates. The others were already there, together with
the thirty Transvaal delegates, Commandant-General Louis Botha and
General De la Rey. In addition to the above, the following had also
arrived: Vice-State President Burger, States-President Steyn, the
members of the two Governments, and General J.C. Smuts (from Cape
Colony).
I was exceedingly sorry to find that President Steyn was seriously ill.
For the last six weeks he had been in the doctor's hands; and, since his
arrival at Pretoria, had been under the care of Dr. Van der Merwe, of
Krugersdorp. This physician said that serious consequences might ensue
if his patient were to attend our meetings, and advised him to go to his
home at Krugersdorp, where he could be properly nursed. It was sad for
us to receive this news immediately we arrived. We asked ourselves what
we should do without the President at our meetings? At this moment he
seemed more indispensable to us than ever before.
President Steyn was a statesman in the best sense of the word. He had
gained the respect and even the affection of us all. Of him, if of any
man, it may be said that he never swerved from his duty to his country.
No task was too great for him, no burden too heavy, if thereby he could
serve his people. Whatever hardships he had endured, he had never been
known to complain--he would endure anything for us. He had fought in our
cause until he could fight no longer, until sickness laid him low; and
he was worn out, and weak as a child. _Weak_, did I say? Yes! but only
in the body--his mind was still as strong, as brave, as clear as ever.
And thus it was that President Steyn was only able to be present on two
occasions at our meetings; for, on the 29th of May--before the National
Representatives had come to any decision--he went with Dr. Van der Merwe
to Krugersdorp.
As I write these lines--six months after the meetings at
Vereeniging--and think that during all the intervening time he has been
lying on a bed of sickness--I am cheered by the news which I received in
Holland that hopes are now entertained of his ultimate recovery.
The National Representatives began their important deliberations on the
morning of the 13th of May, 1902.
For three days we discussed the condition of our country, and then
proceeded with Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner to Pretoria. This
Commission was composed of Commandant-General L. Botha,
Commander-in-Chief C.R. de Wet, Vice-Commandant-General J.H. De la Rey,
Vice-Commander-in-Chief Judge J.B.M. Hertzog, and States-Procureur J.C.
Smuts.
The negotiations with the representatives of the British Government
continued from the 18th to the 29th of May; and upon their conclusion
the Commission communicated to the National Representatives the terms on
which England was prepared to conclude peace.
On May the 31st we decided to accept the proposals of the English
Government.[110] The Independence of the two Republics was at an end!
I will not attempt to describe the struggle it cost us to accept these
proposals. Suffice it to say that when it was over, it had left its mark
on every face.
There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes or No. It
was an ultimatum--this proposal of England's.
What were we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination.
Already our women and children were dying by the thousand, and
starvation was knocking at the door--and knocking loudly!
In certain districts, such as Boshof and Hoopstad, it was still possible
to prolong the war, as was also the case in the districts of Generals
Brand and Nieuwouwdt, where the sheep and oxen, which had been captured
from the enemy, provided an ample supply of food. But from the
last-named districts all the women and children had departed, leaving
the burghers free to wander at will in search of food--to Boshof, to
Hoopstad, and even into the Colony.
In other parts of the Free State things were very different. In the
north-eastern and northern districts--for instance, in Ladybrand,
Winburg, Kroonstad, Heilbron, Bethlehem, Harrismith and Vrede--there
were still many families, and these could not be sent to Boshof or to
Hoopstad or to the Colony. And when, reduced to dire want, the commandos
should be obliged to abandon these districts, their wives and families
would have to be left behind--to starve!
The condition of affairs in the Transvaal was no better. We
Free-Staters had thought--and I, for one, had supported the view at
Vereeniging--that, before sacrificing our independence, we ought to tell
the owners of these farms, where there were still women and children, to
go and surrender with their families, and thus save them from
starvation. But we soon realized that such a course was not
practicable--it would involve the loss of too many burghers.
Moreover, even if, by some such scheme as this, we had succeeded in
saving the women, we, who remained in the field, would still have been
exposed to the dangers of starvation, for many of us, having no horses,
could not have left want behind us, by removing to Cape Colony or some
other equally prosperous region.
In the large eastern divisions of the Transvaal also, there were many
burghers without horses, while the poor jaded creatures that remained
were far too feeble and exhausted to carry their masters into Cape
Colony, without the certainty of being captured by the enemy.
Our forces were now only twenty thousand in all, of which the Transvaal
supplied ten thousand, the Free State six thousand, while the remainder
came from Cape Colony. But our numerical weakness would not in itself
have caused us to abandon the struggle had we but received encouraging
news from the Colony. But alas! reports which we received from there
left us no room for hope.
No room for hope! that was the message of Vereeniging--a message which
struck a chill in every heart. One after another we painted the
destitution, the misery of our districts, and each picture was more
gloomy than the last. At length the moment of decision came, and what
course remained open to us? This only--to resign ourselves to our fate,
intolerable though it appeared, to accept the British proposal, and to
lay down our arms.
Most bitter of all was the thought that we must abandon our brethren in
Cape Colony and in Natal, who had thrown in their lot with ours. And
many a sleepless night has this caused me. But we could not help
ourselves. There was nothing else to do.
And as things have turned out, may we not hope that the Cape and Natal
Governments, following in the wake of the British Nation, will soon
understand that the wiser course is to forgive and forget, and to grant
as comprehensive an amnesty as possible? It is surely not unjust to
expect this of these Governments, when one remembers that whatever the
Colonists may have done, must be ascribed to the tie that binds them to
us--the closest of all ties--that of blood.
It is now for the two Governments to strive to realize the situation,
and then, by granting a general amnesty, to promote, as far as in them
lies, the true progress of South Africa.
* * * * *
On the evening of the 31st of May, 1902, the members of the Government
of both Republics met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, in the former's
house, at Pretoria.
It was there that the Treaty of Peace--the British Proposal which the
National Representatives had accepted--was now to be signed.
It was a never-to-be-forgotten evening. In the space of a few short
minutes that was done which could never be undone. A decision arrived at
in a meeting could always be taken into reconsideration, but a document
solemnly signed, as on that night, by two parties, bound them both for
ever.
Every one of us who put his name to that document knew that he was in
honour bound to act in accordance with it. It was a bitter moment, but
not so bitter as when, earlier on the same day, the National
Representatives had come to the decision that the fatal step must be
taken.
On the 2nd June, 1902, the Representatives left Vereeniging, and
returned every man to his own commando. It was now their sad duty to
tell their brave and patient burghers that the independence which they
cherished so dearly was gone, and to prepare them to surrender their
arms at the appointed places.
I left Pretoria on the 3rd of June with General Elliott, who had to
accompany me to the various centres to receive the burghers' arms.
On the 5th of June the first commando laid down their weapons near
Vredefort. To every man there, as to myself, this surrender was no more
and no less than the sacrifice of our independence. I have often been
present at the death-bed and at the burial of those who have been
nearest to my heart--father, mother, brother and friend--but the grief
which I felt on those occasions was not to be compared with what I now
underwent at the burial of my Nation!
It was at Reitz that the commandos of Vrede, Harrismith, Heilbron and
Bethlehem laid down their arms. Accordingly I went there on the 7th of
June, and again had to be a spectator of what I fain would never have
witnessed. Had I then to go on from commando to commando, to undergo
everywhere the martyrdom of beholding ceaseless surrenders? No! I had
had enough, and could bear no more. I decided, therefore, to visit all
the other commandos, in order to acquaint the burghers with what had
taken place, and to explain to them why we, however unsatisfactory the
Peace Proposal was, had felt bound to accept it, and then to leave each
commando before the men handed over their arms to General Elliott.
Everywhere I found the men utterly despondent and dissatisfied.
The whole miserable business came to an end on the 16th of June, when
the burghers who had fought under Generals Nieuwouwdt and Brand, laid
down their arms--the Nation had submitted to its fate!
There was nothing left for us now but to hope that the Power which had
conquered us, the Power to which we were compelled to submit, though it
cut us to the heart to do so, and which, by the surrender of our arms,
we had accepted as our Ruler, would draw us nearer and ever nearer by
the strong cords of love.
* * * * *
To my Nation I address one last word.
Be loyal to the new Government! Loyalty pays best in the end. Loyalty
alone is worthy of a Nation which has shed its blood for Freedom!
[Footnote 110: A complete report of the various proceedings in connexion
with the conclusion of peace will be found in the Appendix of this
book.]
CORRESPONDENCE
A LETTER FROM THE STATES-SECRETARY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC TO THE
BRITISH AGENT AT PRETORIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
PRETORIA, _9th October, 1899_.
SIR,--
The Government of the South African Republic feel themselves
compelled to again refer the Government of Her Majesty, the Queen
of Great Britain, to the London Convention of 1884, concluded
between this Republic and the United Kingdom, which in Article XIV.
guarantees certain specified rights to the white inhabitants of
this Republic, to wit:--
"All those who, although not born in this Country, yet abide by the
laws of the South African Republic, (_a_) shall have full freedom
to come with their families into, to travel in, or to reside in any
part of the South African Republic; (_b_) shall be entitled to hold
in possession their houses, factories or warehouses, shops, and
allotments, either on hire or as their own property; (_c_) may
transact their business, either in person or through agents, to
their own satisfaction; (_d_) shall not be subjected to any other
general or local taxation--with regard to their families or
properties, or their commerce or trade--than those which shall be
laid on the burghers of the said Republics."
Our Government wishes also to draw attention to the fact that the
above-mentioned rights are the only ones which Her Majesty's
Government, in the above-mentioned Convention, has stipulated for
the foreign inhabitants in this Republic, and that only
contravention of these rights can give the British Government the
right of diplomatic intervention; whereas, further, the adjustment
of all other questions concerning the position, or the rights, of
the foreign inhabitants under the said Convention is vested in the
Government and National Representatives of the South African
Republic; among the questions the adjustment of which comes
exclusively under the authority of the Government and the
Volksraad, are those of the Franchise and representation in this
Republic.
Although, therefore, the exclusive right of this Franchise and
representation is indisputable, our Government has approved of
discussing in a friendly way the Franchise and the representation
with Her Majesty's Government; without, however, acknowledging by
so doing any right thereto on the side of Her Majesty's Government.
Our Government has also, by the wording of the already existing
Voting Law, and the decision concerning the representation, always
kept this friendly consultation in view.
On the side of Her Majesty's Government, however, the friendly
manner of these consultations has made way for a more threatening
tone; and the minds of the people of this Republic, and of the
whole population of South Africa, have been brought into a state of
apprehension; and a state of unusual tension has been created by
the action of Her Majesty's Government, in no longer abiding by the
laws concerning the voting right, and the decision concerning the
representation of this Republic; and lastly, as is expressed in
your letter of the 25th of September, 1899, in breaking off all
friendly communication, giving us to understand that Her Majesty's
Government were about to formulate their own proposals for final
arrangement. Our Government can see in the before-mentioned
notification nothing less than a new violation of the Convention of
1884, which does not reserve to Her Majesty's Government the right
of a one-sided adjustment of a question which belongs exclusively
to the inner policy of our Government, and has been already settled
by them.
On the grounds of the tension, the considerable loss arising
therefrom, and the interruption of business in general, which is
caused by the correspondence on the Franchise and the
representation of this Republic, Her Majesty's Government has not
long ago insisted on a speedy adjustment, and finally, through your
intervention, insisted on an answer--within forty-eight
hours--(later on somewhat amended)--to your Memorandum of the 12th
of September, which was answered by the Memorandum of our
Government of the 15th of September, and by the Memorandum of the
25th of September, 1899; on which other friendly negotiations were
interrupted, and our Government received notice that the proposal
for final arrangement would be made within a short time; but
although these promises were repeated, no such proposal has as yet
reached our Government. When the friendly correspondence was still
going on, a great increase of troops was made by Her Majesty's
Government, which troops were drawn up in the neighbourhood of the
frontiers of our Republic. Taking into consideration certain events
in the history of our Republic, which events need not here be
recited, our Government found themselves compelled to look upon the
Army in the neighbourhood of the frontier as a threat to the
independence of the South African Republic, because they were not
aware of any circumstances which could justify the presence of such
a force in South Africa and in the neighbourhood of their frontier.
In answer to a question concerning this, addressed to His
Excellency the High Commissioner, our Government received, to their
great astonishment, the covert accusation that from the State of
the Republic an attack on Her Majesty's Colonies was being
arranged, and also a mysterious hint of coming possibilities, by
which our Government were strengthened in their suspicion, that the
independence of the Republic was threatened.
As a measure of defence, they were, therefore, compelled to send a
body of burghers to the frontiers in order, if required, to be able
to resist such an eventuality. The unlawful interference of Her
Majesty's Government in the inner policy of our Republic, in
defiance of the London Convention of 1884, which interference
consisted in the exceptional strengthening of troops in the
neighbourhood of the Republic's borders, has thus created an
unbearable state of affairs, of which our Government--not only in
the interests of our Republic, but also in the interests of the
whole of South Africa,--feel it their duty to bring to an end as
speedily as possible, and consider themselves called upon to insist
emphatically and energetically on an immediate conclusion of this
condition of things, and to ask Her Majesty's Government to give
them the assurance (_a_) that all points of mutual difference shall
be adjusted by friendly arbitration, or by any other amicable way
that may be agreed upon between our Government and that of Her
Majesty; (_b_) that the troops on the frontiers of the Republic
shall be recalled at once, and that all reinforcements which, after
the 1st of June, 1899, have arrived in South Africa, shall be
removed within a time agreed upon with our Government,--with the
counter assurance and guarantee from our Government that no attack
on, or hostilities against, any part of the possessions of the
British Government shall be undertaken by the Republic during the
further negotiations within the time which shall be agreed upon by
the Government--our Government shall, in accordance with this, be
ready to call back the armed burghers of the Republic from the
frontiers; (_c_) that Her Majesty's troops, which are now on the
high sea, shall not be landed in any of the harbours of South
Africa.
Our Government has to insist on an immediate and favourable answer
on the above four points, and urgently requests Her Majesty's
Government to give an answer in this spirit before, or on,
Wednesday, October 11th, 1889, before 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
They wish to add further, that in case, against their expectations,
no satisfactory answer within this time should be received by them,
that they, to their great sorrow, would be obliged to look upon the
actions of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war,
for the consequences of which they do not consider themselves
responsible; and, in case further movements of troops should take
place within the above-mentioned time in the direction of our
borders, that our Government will be compelled to look upon this
also as a formal declaration of war.
I have the honour to be, etc.,
F.W. REITZ,
_State-Secretary._
MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S TELEGRAMS:--
FROM MR. CHAMBERLAIN TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, SIR ALFRED
MILNER.
(Sent 7.30 p.m. _10th October, 1899_)
"10th _October_, No. 7. The British Agent has, in answering the
demands of the Government of the South African Republic, to say
that, as the Government of the South African Republic have declared
in their dispatch, that they will look upon a refusal to consent to
their demands as a formal declaration of war, he has received
orders to demand his passport."
FROM MR. CHAMBERLAIN TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, SIR ALFRED
MILNER.
(Sent 10.45 p.m. _10th October, 1899_)
"10th _October_, No. 8. The Government of Her Majesty has received
with great sorrow the determined demands of the Government of the
South African Republic contained in your telegram of the 9th of
October, No. 3. You will, as an answer to the Government of the
South African Republic, communicate to them that the conditions put
forward by the Government of the South African Republic are of such
a nature that the Government of Her Majesty cannot possibly think
of taking them into consideration."
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS AND LORD SALISBURY
FROM THE STATES-PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND THE
ORANGE FREE STATE TO HIS EXCELLENCY LORD SALISBURY, LONDON.
"BLOEMFONTEIN, _5th March, 1900_.
"The blood and tears of the thousands who have suffered through
this war, and the prospect of all the moral and material ruin which
now threatens South Africa, render it necessary for both parties
carrying on the war to ask themselves calmly, and in the faith of
the Trinity, for what they are fighting and if the aims of both
justify all this horrible misery and devastation. On this account,
and with an eye to the assertion of several English Statesmen that
the war was begun and carried on with the determined end to
undermine Her Majesty's authority in South Africa, and to establish
in the whole of South Africa a Government independent of Her
Majesty's Government, we consider it our duty to declare that this
War was only commenced as a measure of defence and for the purpose
of obtaining a guarantee for the threatened independence of the
South African Republic, and was only continued in order to ensure
the indisputable independence of both Republics as Sovereign
International States, and to obtain the assurance that the subjects
of Her Majesty who have taken part with us in the war will not
suffer the least hurt either in their lives or their possessions.
On these conditions alone we demand, as in the past, to see peace
restored in South Africa, and an end made to the wrong that now
exists there. But if Her Majesty's Government has decided upon
destroying the independence of the Republic, nothing remains to us
and our people but to persist to the bitter end on the road now
taken, notwithstanding the overpowering might of the British
Empire, trusting that God, who has lit the inextinguishable fire of
the love of liberty in our hearts, and in the hearts of our
fathers, will not abandon us, but will fulfil His work in us, and
in our descendants.
"We hesitated to lay this declaration earlier before Your
Excellency, because we were afraid that as long as the advantage
was on our side, and our Army had in their occupation positions of
defence far into the British Colonies, such a declaration would
have hurt the feelings of the English nation; but now that the
prestige of the British Empire may be considered to be restored,
through the capture of one of our armies, and we are compelled by
this to sacrifice other positions which our armies occupied, this
difficulty is removed, and we can no longer hesitate to tell you,
in the face of the whole civilized world, why we are fighting, and
on what conditions we are prepared to make peace."
FROM LORD SALISBURY TO THEIR EXCELLENCIES THE STATES-PRESIDENTS OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND ORANGE FREE STATE.
"LONDON, _11th March, 1900_.
"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Honour's
cable, dated 5th March, from Bloemfontein, of which the purport is
principally whether Her Majesty's Government will acknowledge the
indisputable independence of the South African Republic and Orange
Free State and treat them as Sovereign International States, and
will offer to conclude the war on these conditions.
"In the beginning of October of this year, there was peace between
the Queen and the two Republics, under the Convention which then
held good. There was a discussion carried on during a few months
between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic, of
which the purport was the amendment of very serious grievances
under which English inhabitants suffered in the South African
Republic. In the course of these negotiations, the South African
Republic obtained the knowledge that Her Majesty's Government had
made considerable preparations for war, and had taken steps to
provide the necessary reinforcements for the English garrisons at
Cape Colony and Natal. No inroad on the rights guaranteed by the
Conventions had, until then, taken place on the English side.
Suddenly the South African Republic, after having two days
previously issued an insulting ultimatum, declared War on Her
Majesty; and the Orange Free State, with which there had been no
disagreement, took a similar step. Thereupon an inroad was made
into Her Majesty's territory by the two Republics; three towns
within the British frontier were besieged, a great part of the two
Colonies was over-run, with great destruction of property and life,
and the Republics claimed the right to treat the inhabitants of Her
Majesty's territory as if this territory had been annexed by one of
these States. The Transvaal having these actions in view, had for
years stored up, on an enormous scale, military provisions, which
could only have been destined for use against England.
"Your Excellencies made some remarks of a negative nature
concerning the aim for which these preparations were made. I do not
consider it necessary to discuss the question which you have thus
raised, but the consequences of the preparations, made in great
secrecy, have been that the British Empire has found itself forced
to repel an inroad which has brought on a costly war, and caused
the loss of thousands of valuable lives. This great misfortune has
been the punishment that Great Britain has had to undergo during
the last few years for having suffered the two Republics to exist.
Keeping in sight the use which the two Republics have made of the
position presented to them, and the misfortunes which their
unprovoked attacks on Her Majesty's territory have brought, Her
Majesty's Government can only reply to Your Honour's telegram by
saying that they are not prepared to acknowledge the independence
either of the South African Republic, or of the Orange Free State."
Appendix A
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE GENERAL REPRESENTATIVES HELD AT
VEREENIGING, IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, ON THE 15TH OF MAY, 1902,
AND THE FOLLOWING DAYS
The first meeting of the representatives of the two Governments took
place at 11.30 a.m. on May 15th.
There were present:--
_For the South African Republic_--His Honour the President, S.W. Burger,
F.W. Reitz, Commandant-General L. Botha, Messrs. J.B. Krogh, L.J.
Meijer, L.J. Jacobs, and His Honour the Staats-Procureur.
_For the Orange Free State_--States-President, M.J. Steyn; Judge, J.B.M.
Hertzog; Secretary of State, W.J.C. Brebner; Commander-in-Chief, C.R. de
Wet; and Mr. C.H. Olivier.
The first matter discussed was the formula for the oath which the
delegates were to take, and it was decided that it should run as
follows:--
"We, the undersigned, duly swear that we, as special national
representatives, will remain true to our people, country, and
Government, and that we will serve them to the best of our ability,
and fulfil our duties faithfully and with all necessary secrecy, as
is the duty of all faithful burghers and representatives of the
nation. So help us God."
The question now arose as to whether the representatives had the right
to decide, if circumstances rendered it necessary, upon any matter
touching the independence of the country, irrespective of the powers
given to the various delegates, for at some of the meetings the
delegates had only received limited powers, whilst at others full
authority had been given them to act according to their own judgment.
After considerable discussion it was decided to lay the matter before
the delegates themselves.
The following representatives were called into the tent, and took the
oath:--
_For the South African Republic._
1. H.A. Alberts, Vechtgeneraal; for Heidelberg.
2. J.J. Alberts, Commandant; for Standerton and Wakkerstroom.
3. J.F. De Beer, Commandant; for Bloemhof.
4. C.F. Beijers, Assistant-Commandant-General; for Waterberg.
5. C. Birkenstock, burgher; for Vrijheid.
6. H.J. Bosman, magistrate; for Wakkerstroom.
7. Christiaan Botha, Assistant-Commandant-General; for Swaziland and the
States Artillery.
8. B.H. Breijtenbach, Veldtcornet; for Utrecht.
9. C.J. Brits, Vechtgeneraal; for Standerton.
10. J.B. Cilluos, Vechtgeneraal; for Lichtenburg.
11. J. De Clercq, burgher; for Middelburg.
12. T.A. Dönges, Veldtcornet; for Dorp Middelburg in Regeeringswacht.
13. H.S. Grobler, Commandant; for Bethal.
14. J.L. Grobler, burgher; for Carolina.
15. J.N.H. Grobler, Vechtgeneraal; for Ermelo.
16. B.J. Van Heerden, Veldtcornet; for Rustenburg.
17. J.F. Jordaan, Commandant; for Vrijheid.
18. J. Kemp, Vechtgeneraal; for Krugersdorp.
19. P.J. Liebenberg, Vechtgeneraal; for Potchefstroom.
20. C.H. Muller, Vechtgeneraal; for Boksburg.
21. J.F. Naude, burgher; for Pretoria, late Commandant with General
Kemp.
22. D.J.E. Opperman, Veldtcornet; for Pretoria.
23. B.J. Roos, Veldtcornet; for Piet Retief.
24. P.D. Roux, Veldtcornet; for Marico.
25. D.J. Schoeman, Commandant; for Lijdenburg.
26. T.C. Stoffberg, Landdrost; for Zoutpansberg.
27. S.P. Du Toit, Vechtgeneraal; for Wolmaransstad.
28. P.L. Uijs, Commandant; for Pretoria.
29. P.R. Viljoen, burgher; for Heidelberg.
30. W.J. Viljoen, Commandant; for Witwatersrand.
_For the Orange Free State._
1. C.C.F. Badenhorst, Vice-Commandant-in-Chief; for Boshof, Hoopstad,
West Bloemfontein, Winburg, and Kroonstad.
2. A.J. Bester, Commandant; for Bethlehem.
3. A.J. Bester, Commandant; for Bloemfontein.
4. L.P.H. Botha, Commandant; for Harrismith.
5. G.A. Brand, Vice-Commandant-in-Chief; for Bethulie, Rouxville,
Caledon River, and Wepener in the eastern part of Bloemfontein.
6. H.J. Brouwer, Commandant; for Bethlehem.
7. D.H. Van Coller, Commandant; for Heilbron.
8. F.R. Cronje, Commandant; for Winburg.
9. D.F.H. Flemming, Commandant; for Hoopstad.
10. C.C. Froneman, Vice-Commandant-in-Chief; for Winburg and Ladybrand.
11. F.J.W.J. Hattingh, Vice-Commandant-in-Chief; for the eastern part of
Kroonstad, in the district of Heilbron.
12. J.B.M. Hertzog, Commandant; for Philippolis.
13. J.N. Jacobs, Commandant; for Boshof.
14. F.P. Jacobsz, Commandant; for Harrismith.
15. A.J. De Kock, Commandant; for Vrede.
16. J.J. Koen, Commandant; for Ladybrand.
17. H.J. Kritzinger, Veldtcornet; for Kroonstad.
18. F.E. Mentz, Commandant; for Heilbron.
19. J.A.P. Van der Merwe, Commandant; for Heilbron.
20. C.A. Van Niekerk, Commandant; for Kroonstad.
21. H. Van Niekerk, Commandant.
22. J.J. Van Niekerk, Commandant; for Ficksburg.
23. I.K. Nieuwouwdt, Vice-Commandant-in-Chief; for Fauresmith,
Philippolis, and Jacobsdal.
24. H.P.J. Pretorius, Commandant; for Jacobsdal.
25. A.M. Prinsloo, Vice-Commandant-in-Chief; for Bethlehem in Ficksburg.
26. L.J. Rautenbach, Commandant; for Bethlehem.
27. F.J. Rheeder, Commandant; for Rouxville.
28. A. Ross, Commandant; for Vrede.
29. P.W. De Vos, Commandant; for Kroonstad.
30. W.J. Wessels, Vice-Commandant-in-Chief; for Harrismith and Vrede.
The meeting now proceeded to choose a chairman, and the following were
proposed:--J. De Clercq, C.F. Beijers, C.C. Froneman, W.J. Wessels, and
G.A. Brand.
The choice of the meeting fell on General C.F. Beijers, who called upon
the Rev. Mr. Kestell to offer prayer.
His Honour, S.W. Burger, now declared that the meeting was formally
opened, and after the Chairman had spoken a few words, the
representatives adjourned until three o'clock.
When they reassembled, the Chairman requested President Burger to
explain the objects for which the meeting had been called.
Then the President spoke a few words of welcome to all; he expressed his
sorrow for the absence of some who would certainly have been present had
they not given their lives for their country. But still there were many
left to represent the two Republics.
"The difficulties which confront us," continued the President, "are like
a great mountain, at the foot of which we have just arrived. Everything
now depends on us who are assembled together here. It is impossible to
deny that the state of affairs is very serious, and that the future
looms dark before us. Our position requires the most careful
consideration, and as there are sure to be differences of opinion, it
will be necessary for us to bear with one another, and yet, at the same
time, to speak our minds freely."
The President proceeded to refer to the correspondence which had taken
place between Holland and England. A copy of this correspondence had
been sent, through Lord Kitchener, to the Governments of the two
Republics. The opinion of the Transvaal Government (which was the first
to receive the correspondence) was that advantage should be taken of
this opportunity. It was proposed to ask Lord Kitchener to allow the
Transvaal Government to meet that of the Orange Free State, so that they
might discuss the desirability of making a peace proposal to England.
The two Governments had accordingly met, and had corresponded with Lord
Kitchener and Lord Milner. As a result of this, a letter, with the above
correspondence annexed, had been sent to the various commandos.
"We felt," continued President Burger, "that we had no power to
surrender our independence, and that we were only justified in making
such terms of peace as would not endanger our national existence.
Whether it is or is not our duty to surrender our independence is a
question that must be left to the decision of our people. And it is to
represent the people that you are here. It is from your lips, then, that
our Governments must learn the opinions of the two nations. It is clear
enough that the English Government has no idea of allowing us to remain
independent--it expresses surprise that we even dare to speak of such a
thing.
"You have now to report upon the condition of the country, and upon the
circumstances in which your wives and children are placed. You have also
to decide whether you are willing to make any further sacrifices. We
have lost so much already that it would be hard, indeed, to lose our
independence as well. But, although this matter is so near to our
hearts, we must still listen to the voice of reason. The practical
question, then, which we have to ask ourselves is, whether we are
prepared to watch our people being gradually exterminated before our
eyes, or whether we should not rather seek a remedy.
"The Government can do nothing without the support of the nation. You,
therefore, must determine our best course. For instance, if you come to
the conclusion that we have exhausted every expedient, will you still
continue the struggle? Are we not to desist until every man of us is in
captivity, in exile, or in his grave? Again let me urge you to speak
freely, and yet with consideration for the feelings of others. For
myself, I can truly say that my spirit is not yet broken; but I would
hear from you what the feeling of the people is."
"At this point, however, a difficulty arises. Some of you, having only
received limited powers from your constituencies, appear to think that
you would not be justified in exceeding your mandates, while others have
been authorized to act as circumstances may seem to require. But I do
not think that this difficulty should be insurmountable. At least I beg
of you not to allow it to cause any dissension among you. Let us all be
of one mind. If _we_ are united, then will the nation be united also;
but if we are divided, in what a plight will the nation find itself?"
A letter was then read from the deputation in Europe, which had been
written five months previously, and which had been brought through the
English lines in safety. It contained little more than an assurance that
our cause occupied a better position in Europe than it had ever done
before.
The Chairman then asked Commandant L. Botha to address the meeting.
Complying with this request, the Commandant said that he wished to be
assured, before anything further was done, that the fact that some of
the representatives had been entrusted with limited powers, whereas
others had been given a free hand, was not going to prove to be an
insurmountable obstacle to united action on their part.
To this Judge Hertzog replied that it was a principle in law that a
delegate is not to be regarded as a mere agent or mouthpiece of his
constituents, but, on the contrary (when dealing with public affairs),
as a plenipotentiary--with the right, whatever his brief might be, of
acting to the best of his judgment.
States-Procureur Smuts concurred in this opinion, which appeared to
satisfy both the Commandant-General and also all the other
representatives, for no further allusion was made to the subject by
anybody.
Commandant-General Botha now made his report.
In the districts of Vrijheid and Utrecht, he stated, the store of maize
was so small that it could not last for more than a short time; but
there was still a great number of slaughter-cattle. In the districts of
Wakkerstroom there was hardly sufficient grain for one month's
consumption. Two other districts had still a large enough number of
slaughter-cattle--enough, in fact, to last for two or three months. In
Ermelo, to the west and north-west of the blockhouses, and in Bethal,
Standerton, and Middelburg, there was grain for one month. But the
Heidelberg and Pretoria commandos had now, for the first time, no corn
remaining for food. In the neighbourhood of Boksburg the only grain left
was the old maize of the previous year, whilst there were no cattle at
all in the district. When he had visited Boksburg he had found that the
commandos had had no meat for three days. In the country between
Vereeniging and Ermelo there were only thirty-six goats, and no cattle
whatsoever. In the Wakkerstroom district, however, there were still a
few slaughter-cattle. The horses were everywhere worn out and exhausted.
They had been so constantly kept on the move, owing to the enemy's
increasing attacks, they could now only cover the shortest distances.
The Kaffir question was becoming from day to day more serious. At
Vrijheid, for instance, there was a Kaffir commando which had already
made several attacks upon the burghers. This attitude of the Kaffir
population was producing a very dispiriting effect upon the burghers.
The women were in a most pitiable state, now that the lines of
blockhouses had been extended in all directions over the country.
Sometimes the commandos had to break through the lines and leave the
women behind alone; and when the burghers later on returned they would
perhaps find that the women had been driven from their houses, and, in
some instances, treated with atrocious cruelty.
Referring to the numbers in the field, he said that there were, in the
whole of the Transvaal, ten thousand eight hundred and sixteen men, and
that three thousand two hundred and ninety-six of them had no horses.
The enemy during the summer had taken many of the burghers prisoner; and
since June, 1901, the commandos had diminished to the extent of six
thousand and eighty-four men. The burghers thus lost to them had either
been killed, or taken prisoner, or had surrendered their arms.
The number of households was two thousand six hundred and forty.
The Commandant-General concluded by saying that the three greatest
difficulties with which they were confronted were their horses, their
food supply, and the miserable condition of their women and children.
Commander-in-Chief de Wet then spoke. He said he would leave it to the
delegates who were officers to make reports. They had come from far and
near, and knew exactly what the condition of things was. He, however,
could state that the number of burghers in the Orange Free State was six
thousand one hundred and twenty, of whom about four hundred were not
available for service. The Basutos, he found, were more favourably
inclined to the Boer cause than ever before.
"General De la Rey," continued General de Wet, "like myself, does not
quite know what task he has to perform here, but he thinks with me that
the duty of making reports belongs to the delegates. However, he feels
bound to state that in his divisions there is a great scarcity of
everything. But precisely the same state of affairs existed there a year
ago. And when his burghers were at that time without food--well, he went
and got it for them." (Cheers.)
General Beijers (Waterberg) then addressed the delegates, telling them
that he would not detain them long. In Zoutpansberg, he stated, they had
still a plentiful supply of food, for they were able to buy from the
Kaffirs. At Waterberg the Kaffirs were neutral, but at Zoutpansberg they
were getting out of hand. Yet, since no co-operation existed amongst
them, they were not to be feared, and any uprising could easily be
quelled.
Besides this trouble, they had many difficulties to face, which were
produced by horse-sickness and fever.
As to the question of grain, there was food enough for the whole of the
Transvaal and the Orange Free State. But now the English were beginning
to buy up the maize at £1 a sack.
General Muller (Boksburg) reported that in his division the burghers had
never suffered from hunger. He could still hold out for a few months
more, as food could be obtained from the Kaffirs. There was, it could
not be denied, a tendency to mutiny amongst the Kaffirs, but he did not
think that this need cause any anxiety. He believed that he would be
able to carry on operations until the end of the winter.
General Froneman (Ladybrand) said that the condition of his divisions,
namely Winburg and Ladybrand, gave no cause for uneasiness. There were
still eighty families in the districts, but they were able to provide
for all their necessities. The Kaffirs were peaceable and well disposed,
and were of great service to the burghers, for whom they bought clothing
in Basutoland. It was possible for the burghers, he considered, to hold
out for more than a year.
General Hattingh (Kroonstad) declared that in one part of the Kroonstad
district there were still plenty of sheep and cattle, and that seed had
been sown for next year's harvest. But another part of the district was
entirely exhausted, and had to obtain its supplies from Bethlehem.
General Badenhorst (Boshof) stated that he could report on the Boshof
district and the parts of the Winburg and Bloemfontein districts to the
west of the railway. There were enough cattle to last his commandos for
years, even if they had no other food at all. Recently he had captured
fifteen hundred head of cattle, and he was in a position to give
assistance to other districts. Grain, however, was not so plentiful as
it had been the previous year, but nevertheless there was still a large
enough supply to permit him to send help to others.
General Nieuwouwdt (Fauresmith) reported that his district was entirely
devastated, and that for the last seven months there had been a dearth
of all provisions; nevertheless, his burghers had contrived to live.
There was, moreover, enough corn left to last them for another year.
There were now only three women in the whole of his district.
General Prinsloo (Bethlehem) declared that he would be telling a
falsehood if he were to say that there was no food in his district. He
possessed slaughter-cattle and corn, and could help other districts. One
of his commandants had recently found a store of maize (consisting of
one hundred and thirty sacks) buried in the ground. The enemy had made
many inroads into his district, and especially during the last few
months. The blockhouses were a source of constant annoyance to him.
General Brand (Bethulie) reported upon the south-western part of the
Orange Free State, where he commanded. There were some parts of his
division, he said, which had been entirely laid waste. Everything had
been carried off; there was not a sheep left; and the burghers had been
without meat for days. But he was able to capture booty, and could still
hold out for a year.
General Wessels (Harrismith) drew attention to the constant passage of
large Kaffir families through the districts of Harrismith and Vrede. He
could tell the delegates that the Kaffirs had been quite astonished that
there were still cattle and sheep and supplies of grain in the
districts. He had not yet come to the end of his provisions; but, even
if everything were taken, he saw a chance of obtaining food from
elsewhere.
Commandant C.A. Van Niekerk (Kroonstad) declared that if there was one
part of the country which was entirely exhausted it was the part where
he was in command, namely Hoopstad and a portion of Kroonstad. But yet,
during the last twelve months, they had been able to obtain food, and
even to sow for the ensuing year. There were no cattle in his district;
but he had taken a thousand sheep and fifty-two cattle from the English.
Commandant Van der Merwe (Heilbron) spoke to the same effect.
General Smuts was the next to address the meeting. He began by saying
that his expedition into Cape Colony had been the outcome of the advice
which the deputation had given in July, 1901, namely to continue the
war. That _he_ had been in command of it had come about in the following
way. News had been received in the Transvaal that affairs in Cape Colony
were taking a favourable turn, and accordingly General De la Rey had
received orders to go thither, and to take over the command there. But
afterwards it was thought wiser to annul these orders, because De la Rey
could not well be spared from the western parts of the Transvaal. Owing
to this, he (General Smuts) took the task upon his own shoulders, and
crossed the Orange River with two hundred men. He had had a difficult
task to accomplish. He had marched through Cape Colony to Grahamstad,
and from thence he had pushed on towards the coast, through Graaff
Reinet. Thence he had proceeded to the neighbourhood where he was now
carrying on operations.
He had visited every commando, and as he had seen that there were signs
of disorder amongst them he had taken them all under his own command. In
this way he had found himself at the head of some fifteen hundred men.
During his expeditions Commandant Lotter had been captured with a
hundred men; this had reduced his force to only fourteen hundred. But
since then the number had nearly doubled, so that they now had two
thousand six hundred men (divided into twenty commandos) under arms in
Cape Colony. In addition to these men there was a division under General
De Villiers operating in Griqualand West, and another under Commandant
Van der Merwe in Bechuanaland. The total numbers of these two divisions
amounted to about seven hundred men.
Passing on to the question whether help was to be expected from Cape
Colony, General Smuts declared that there would be no general rising.
The reports which represented such a rising as possible had exaggerated
matters. There were great difficulties in the way of a general rising.
First, there was the question of horses--and in Cape Colony the want of
horses was as great, if not greater, than in the Republics. Secondly, it
was exceedingly difficult for Colonials to rise, for they knew that not
only would they have to be _voetgangers_,[111] but also that if they
were captured they would be very severely punished by the English. The
scarcity of grass was also greatly against any such attempt. The horses
had to be fed, and, as the enemy had forbidden any sowing, it was almost
impossible to find food for them. A counter proclamation had indeed been
issued by the Republics, but it had been of no avail.
He was of opinion that the small commandos which had already been in
Cape Colony had done the best they could. The question that now arose
was whether the whole of their forces ought to be sent from the
Republics into Cape Colony. He himself thought that there was an opening
for them, but the difficulty was to find a method of getting them there.
The existence of this difficulty, and the facts which he had brought
before the delegates, had forced him to the conclusion that a general
rising in Cape Colony was an impossibility.
As to the continuation of the war and matters of that nature, they must
naturally be settled by the Republics, and not by Cape Colony.
The meeting was then adjourned until eight o'clock in the evening.
* * * * *
Upon its reassembling, Commandant Nijs (Pretoria, North) said that in
that part of the district of Pretoria which lay to the north of the
Delagoa Bay Railway there were still cattle enough to last for a
considerable time, but that the store of grain would be exhausted within
a fortnight. The number of horses also was insufficient. The district
could muster one hundred and fifty-three mounted men and one hundred and
twenty-eight _voetgangers_. In the division of Onderwijk, Middelburg,
there were twenty-six mounted men and thirty-eight _voetgangers_.
Commandant Grobler (Bethal) stated that in his district they had not
been left undisturbed during the summer. Only a short time previously he
had lost sixty-three men in an engagement, where he had been besieged in
a kraal, out of which he, with one hundred and fifty-three burghers, had
managed to escape. Bethal had been laid waste from one end to the other,
and he had no provisions for his commandos. He had on his hands three
hundred women and children; these were in a serious position, owing to
the lack of food; some of the women had also been assaulted by Kaffirs.
General Christiaan Botha (Swaziland) then reported on the condition of
the Swaziland commando. They had no provisions in hand, and were simply
living by favour of the Kaffirs. They had no women there. His commando
of one hundred and thirteen men was still at Piet Retief. As there was
no grain to be had, they were compelled to go from kraal to kraal and
buy food from the Kaffirs, and this required money. Yet somehow or other
they had managed to keep soul and body together. "I have fought for the
Transvaal," he concluded, "for two and a half years, and now, since I
hear that there is food in the Free State, I shall fight for the Free
State for two and a half years more."
General Brits (Standerton) said that he had still provisions for two
months, but no cattle. He had sixty-five families with him, and found it
very difficult to provide them with the necessaries of life. Altogether,
things were in a most critical state.
Mr. Birkenstock (Vrijheid) spoke as follows:
"I shall go deeper into some of the points which the Commandant-General
has brought forward in his general report of the matter. At Vrijheid we
have been harassed by large forces of the enemy for six or eight months,
and the district is now completely devastated. The presence of women and
children causes great difficulty, for of late the English have refused
to receive the families which, compelled by absolute famine, wished to
take refuge with them. There is also continual danger from the Kaffirs,
whose attitude towards us is becoming positively hostile. Both horses
and grain are scarce; but as far as the latter is concerned there will
be sufficient, provided that the enemy does not return. One morning
recently a Kaffir commando, shortly before daybreak, attacked a party of
our men, who lost fifty-six killed out of a total of seventy. That peace
must be made at all costs is the opinion of all the families in my
district, and I feel it my duty to bring this opinion before you."
Commandant Alberts (Pretoria and Middelburg) said that his burghers had
had no rest for a year, and that during that period no ploughing or
sowing had been done in the district. Consequently a commando would not
be able to find the means of subsistence there. On three occasions he
had been forced to take refuge in a kraal, but fortunately had always
been able to make his escape. They had no cattle which they could use
for food, although he had received some, through Commandant Roos, from
the Free State. Their horses were in the worst possible condition.
Landdrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom) then gave an account of the condition of
affairs in his district. They were dependent for everything, except
meat, upon the Kaffirs, giving them meat in exchange. This year there
had been a very poor crop of mealies, and, such as it was, it had been
much damaged by the enemy. Still the burghers might manage, with what
mealies they had, to last out for another two months; but the women and
children also needed to be provided for. The cattle were beginning to
run short, and the few horses that they had were so weak that they would
require a fortnight's rest before they could be used. It might become
necessary for the commandos to leave the district, and if so, what was
to become of the families?
Mr. De Clercq (Middelburg) regretted that he was unable to give as
cheery a report as some of the gentlemen present had done. The part of
Middelburg which he represented was in an almost hopeless condition.
There were no slaughter-cattle, and only enough grain to last for a very
short time. Out of five hundred horses only one hundred now remained,
and these could do no work, being too weak even to get away when it
became necessary to retreat from the enemy. The state of the burghers
was very discouraging; if they should be compelled to leave the district
the question would arise whether, considering the condition of their
horses, it would be possible for them to reach their new destination.
There were fifty families in Middelburg, and things were going very
badly with them. The district would have to be abandoned, and what would
then be the fate of the families, which even now could only be scantily
provided for? The women had wished to go on foot to the English, but he
had advised them to wait until the results of the present negotiations
should become known.
Commandant David Schoeman (Lijdenburg) said that although but a short
time ago there had been eight hundred head of cattle in his district,
they had now all been carried off. Grain there was none. Should fighting
be continued, he was at a loss to know how he could provide for the
women.
Commandant Opperman (Pretoria, South) reported on that part of the
Pretoria district which lies south of the line. What he said agreed
substantially with the report of Commandant Alberts. (See page 343.)
Commandant Liebenberg (Potchefstroom) stated that during the last eight
or nine months blockhouses had been erected in his district. All that
was now left to him was a strip of country about twelve miles long; here
he could still exist. A good deal of seed had been sown, but the crops
had of late fallen into the hands of the English. The grain was
altogether spoilt; some of it had been burnt, the rest trodden down by
the horses. There were ninety-three households in his district. Between
Lichtenburg and Potchefstroom there were some women from the Orange Free
State who were reduced to the most dire straits. They had told him that
if things did not improve they intended to go on foot to Klerksdorp,
and he had replied that they must wait for the result of the
negotiations. He had still four hundred mounted men, in addition to one
hundred _voetgangers_. He could hold out for a short time longer, and
then would have to look for some way out of his difficulties.
General Du Toit (Wolmaransstad) said that there were five hundred
families in his district, but little enough for them to live on. Though
his horses were weak, he would be able to save himself by strategy if he
should get into a tight corner. His commandos were small--only four
hundred and fifty mounted men. The cattle were in good condition, but
grain was scarce.
Commandant De Beer (Bloemhof) had still under his command as many as
four hundred and forty-four mounted men and one hundred and sixty-five
_voetgangers_. Both grain and cattle were scarce, but then Bloemhof had
never possessed many head of cattle. So far the families had not
suffered from want. He would be able to hold out for another year.
General Kemp reported that he had under him Krugersdorp, Rustenburg, and
parts of Pretoria and Johannesburg. In the district of Krugersdorp no
more sowing was possible, and the majority of cattle had been carried
away. Yet there was no want. Why should he lack for anything when he was
in possession of a great "commissariat" extending as far as the
Zoutpansberg, where General Beijers was in command? He took what he
wanted from the Kaffirs--it was not their property; he was only taking
back what really belonged to the burghers.
Commandant-in-Chief de Wet here asked why the eastern divisions of the
Transvaal could not do like General Kemp, and take what they required
from the Kaffirs?
General Kemp replied that the fact that in the eastern parts the Kaffirs
were united with the English made the difference. The Kaffirs there, he
said, gave all they looted to the English, who then sold them the cattle
back again. If then cattle were taken in those parts, it would be cattle
which was really the property of the Kaffirs. Moreover, the Zulus were
Kaffirs of a different sort to those with which he (the General) had to
deal. General Botha also had said that among the Kaffirs in the Eastern
Transvaal there were not to be found any cattle belonging to the
burghers.
Mr. J.L. Grobler (Carolina) had not as yet had to complain of any lack
of cattle or grain in his district. The English, however, by their
system of blockhouses, had cut the burghers off from the greater part of
the crop. If nothing happened, the newly-sown crops ought to produce a
good harvest; but he did not like the temper of the Kaffirs. His men
could still hold out for another six or seven months. The three hundred
horses still remaining to them were in a weak condition; such as they
were, there was not one apiece for the burghers.
Mr. J. Naude (Pretoria) said that he represented a part of Pretoria and
General Kemp's flying column. In his district sowing and harvesting went
on as usual. There were fortunately no women and children. Although the
commandos had not a superabundance of cattle, yet no one lacked for any
of the necessaries of life.
The meeting was then closed with prayer, and adjourned until the
following morning.
[Footnote 111: Infantry.]
FRIDAY, MAY 16TH, 1902.
The meeting opened with prayer a little after nine a.m. The
correspondence which the two Governments had addressed to the burghers,
in order that it might be communicated to their representatives at one
of these meetings, was first read. It was then debated whether the
meeting should request Lord Kitchener to put it into communication with
the deputation in Europe. After speeches _pro_ and _con_, it was decided
not to do so.
Thereupon General Froneman proposed the following resolution:
"This meeting is of opinion that the Governments should be asked in the
first place to thank His Majesty the King of England and Her Majesty the
Queen of the Netherlands, through Lord Kitchener, for the efforts which
(as appears from the correspondence between the said Governments) they
have made to set on foot negotiations for peace; and, in the second
place, to express to them the regret of this meeting that His Majesty's
Government has not accepted the proposal of Her Majesty's Government
that the representatives of the two Republics now in Europe (who still
enjoy the full confidence of their fellow-countrymen) should be allowed
to return home, and also that Lord Kitchener has declined a similar
request addressed to him by the Governments of the two Republics."
This proposal was seconded by Commandant Flemming, and carried.
After another proposal, made by H.J. Bosman, and seconded by J.L.
Grobler, had been rejected, the correspondence referred to above came
under discussion.
The first speaker was Mr. P.R. Viljoen, who spoke as follows:
"We can apply to our own country those words of Scripture, 'The place
whereon thou standest is holy ground.' The soil on which we are now
standing, wet as it is with the blood and tears of our forefathers and
also of the many who have fallen in this present struggle, may well be
regarded as 'holy ground.'
"That we should ever have to surrender this country is a horrible
thought. Yet it must be faced. It is certain at least that many
districts must be abandoned, for the enemy is doing his utmost to
collect us together at a few isolated places, where he will be able to
concentrate his forces upon us.
"From the reports which we have received it appears that the state of
affairs in the Orange Free State is still hopeful. Not so in the
Transvaal. There our prospects are of the gloomiest.
"My opinion is that we must endeavour to bring this war to an end. If
there was the least chance of our being able to maintain our
independence, we would still fight on, and not even the bitterest
sufferings would appear unendurable. But have we any such chance?--that
is the question which we have got to answer.
"We know nothing, it will be said, of the present state of affairs in
Europe, for the report from our deputation, which has just been read in
your presence, is six months old. Nevertheless, if anything favourable
to us had occurred since then, we must have heard of it by now.
"It is evident that we must endeavour to obtain peace on terms
honourable to ourselves. But how are we to do so? By keeping our
independence in view when making terms with the enemy, you will answer.
Nevertheless, I think it would be advisable for us to commission our
Governments to ask the English Government once more what concessions it
is prepared to make to us on condition of our surrendering our
independence. Until we know this we can come to no final decision.
"Though it is a bitter thing to have to say, yet I feel it my duty to
tell you that I honestly believe it to be impossible for us to carry on
the war any longer."
Mr. De Clercq then addressed the meeting in the following words:
"The question before us is, whether or not the war can be continued? To
answer it, we must look forward into the future. We must ask ourselves
what consequences will ensue from a continuance of hostilities, and what
will be the result of their cessation.
"We have only fifteen thousand men against the enemy's quarter of a
million. Our food and horses are scarce, and we have other difficulties
besides these. It is impossible to go on with the struggle.
"Nevertheless, if I believed that to do so would give us a chance of
retaining our independence, I also would be ready for further
sacrifices. But as it is impossible to retain our independence, surely
we shall only be storing up misery for the future if we continue
fighting until every man of us is a prisoner or in his grave. I am of
opinion that our most reasonable course is to save what is still left to
us--our existence as a nation. It is not too late to save it now, but
who can tell what the future holds in store for us? If we are to be
still further reduced in number, we shall soon cease to exist as a
nation. Can it be right to sacrifice a nation which has fought as the
African nation has done?"
Commandant Rheeder (Rouxville) then spoke as follows:
"I know that the times are very dark, but still there are some rays of
light. You have been asked whether you will continue fighting until you
are exterminated. But there is another alternative. Will you not
continue fighting until you are relieved? I maintain that our
independence must be a _sine quâ non_ of any negotiations that we
make--we cannot give it up. So long as we have life we must continue to
fight, and we must only lay down our arms when relief arrives."
General Kemp now rose to his feet. "I am fully aware," he said, "of the
very serious position in which we are placed. Yet, when the war began,
the position was no less grave. We must continue our resistance. When we
recall to our minds how much this war has cost us, and what rivers of
blood have flowed, we feel that it is impossible to surrender. As far as
I am concerned, unless relief comes, I will fight on till I die.
"But one should not look only at the dark side of the picture. It is
true enough that in some districts food is scarce, but there are none in
which it is absolutely unobtainable. The districts threatened by famine
must be abandoned--that is the way to deal with the difficulty.
"It has been pointed out that a large number of our men have been killed
or taken prisoners. This fact, however, only fills me with courage. A
cause that has cost us so dearly must never be forsaken. To own
ourselves beaten would be to dig a grave for the African nation, out of
which it would never rise. Why should we lose our trust in God? Up to
this moment He has aided us, and He will always be our Helper."
Vice-Commandant Breijtenbach (Utrecht) then spoke as follows:
"The burghers whom I represent have told me to inform them, when these
deliberations have come to an end, whether a continuation of the war is
possible, and if it be possible, how it is to be accomplished. If I
cannot assure them that we are able to continue the struggle, the men of
Utrecht will not fight any more. As you know, I can give them no such
assurance.
"There are ten districts in the Transvaal which are unable to fight any
longer. It surely is not proposed to leave these districts in the lurch!
We must not only consult our sentiments, but also our reason. And what
does the voice of reason say? This--that the continuation of the war is
an impossibility. Should you decide now to continue the war, you would
have to start a fresh campaign; and you know that that is beyond our
powers.
"A previous speaker has referred to the help of the Lord, but who is
able to fathom His counsels? Yet we can understand the answer God has
given to our prayer--that prayer which we offered with the Mausers in
our hands when the war began. And what was the answer we received ... I
leave it to you to reply.
"Yes, we must use our reason. If we continue the struggle we give the
death-blow to our existence as a nation. We have been told that there
are ten districts that cannot go on fighting. Are we going to say, 'We
will continue the struggle and leave these districts to their fate'? No!
We must save what we can."
General Liebenberg then spoke. "I am able to give my support," he said,
"to all that has fallen from the lips of Messrs. Viljoen and De Clercq.
It cannot be doubted that the future is very dark. Yes, we can only
trust in God, and use our reason to the best of our ability. I have been
commissioned by those whom I represent to retain our independence if
possible, and if it be not possible to make peace on the best terms that
we can get."
Commandant Uijs was the next speaker. He explained that if the war were
to be continued he would have to leave his district and abandon the
women and children to the mercy of the Kaffirs. He could see a chance of
saving the mounted men if only he could feel certain that they would all
follow him, but the case of the women and children would be hopeless. A
serious difficulty confronted the delegates, and it was with them, and
no longer with the Government, that its solution rested. Never before
had he been called upon to face so gigantic a task. It was not the time
now to criticize one another, but to practise mutual forbearance. The
Bible had been quoted by one of the speakers, but let them not forget
the text in which the king is spoken of who calculated whether he was
strong enough with ten thousand to encounter him who marched against
him with twenty thousand. Then there was the question as to the disposal
of the widows and orphans. What was to become of them if the burghers,
by refusing to come to terms with the enemy, should no longer be able to
act as their mutual protectors? Let them make no more widows and
orphans, but let them open their eyes and recognize that the hand of God
was against them.
The next business was the reading of two letters--one from General Malan
and the other from General Kritzinger. Malan reported on his doings in
the Cape Colony, while Kritzinger advised that the war should be
discontinued.
General Du Toit then spoke, emphasizing the responsibility of the
delegates and the importance of the occasion. He went on to say that he
represented a part of the nation which had suffered very severely, but
which nevertheless had commissioned him to stand up for independence, if
by any means it could be retained; if he failed in this, he was to take
whatever course seemed best to him. In his district the burghers were
not reduced to such a pass as to oblige them to surrender, but the
condition of other districts must also be taken into consideration, and
if it appeared that the war could not be continued, the delegates must
get the best terms they could. In their demands they must be
united--this was the principal reason why dissension was so much to be
avoided. For himself, he could only say that whether the meeting voted
to continue the war or to bring it to a conclusion, he would fall in
with the wishes of the majority. Any decision would be better than the
failure of this conference, as that would leave everything undecided.
He was followed by Secretary of State Reitz, who said:
"You all know what the Governments have done. The question now is, Is
there anything further that we can do? For my part, I think that there
is. We might offer to surrender Witwatersrand and Swaziland; we might
also relinquish our rights to a foreign policy; we might even accede to
an English Protectorate. If France has been able to do without Alsace
and Lorraine, surely we can do without the goldfields. What benefit have
they ever done us? Did the money they brought ever do us any good? No!
rather it did us harm. It was the gold which caused the war. It is then
actually to our advantage to cede the goldfields, and moreover by so
doing we shall be rid of a very troublesome part of our population."
Mr. Reitz then went on to discuss in detail the position in regard to
Swaziland, the question of a British Protectorate, and the surrender of
our right to treat with foreign powers.
General Muller (Boksburg) expressed sympathy with the views of the
Secretary of State, while Vice-Commandant Roux (Marico) said that he was
prepared to sacrifice many things, but that he intended to hold out for
independence.
The next speech was made by Landdrost Stoffberg (Zoutpansberg), who
said:
"I agree with General Du Toit in what he said about the necessity for
unity amongst us. Disunion must not be so much as mentioned. I have a
mandate from the burghers of Zoutpansberg not to sacrifice our
independence. But if anything short of this will satisfy the English, I
am quite prepared to make concessions. Some of the burghers think that
it might be well to surrender the goldfields for a certain sum of money,
while others point out that the gold was the cause of the war. I also
think that we have suffered through the gold, and that we might give up
the goldfields without doing ourselves any harm. For what has the gold
done for us? It has enriched us, many will say. Yes! but it has also
been a stumbling-block to many a man. And is it not better to be a poor
but independent nation than to be rich and at the same time subject to
another Power. Let the goldfields go. We shall still, with our markets,
be rich enough."
Commandant Mentz (Heilbron) then rose.
"I appeal to the forbearance of the delegates," he said, "for making any
speech at this meeting. I fear I am unable to give as rose-coloured a
report as my brother Free-Staters have done: My district has been
continually harassed by the enemy's troops, and great devastation has
been wrought. But the greatest trouble I have is the presence of so many
families, for there are still two hundred in the district. I have only
eighty burghers under my command, and it is clear to me that I shall
soon be obliged to leave the district. What will then become of these
families? I received a commission not to sacrifice our independence. But
since my burghers met more than half of them have been made prisoners.
The remainder have instructed me to do my best to preserve our
independence, but if I find that it cannot be maintained to act
according to my own judgment. It appears to me that it may be possible
to retain our independence by ceding some part of the country; if this
be the case it ought most certainly to be done. I can remember the late
President Brand saying in connexion with the diamond fields, 'Give them
up; you will gain more by giving them up than by keeping them.' This
remark may well apply to the present situation."
Commandant Flemming (Cape Town) reported that his district was well-nigh
devastated. But they still possessed a fair number of cattle, which they
had carried away with them. But even if they had no cattle, that would
be no excuse for surrender, for in his district it was possible to live
on the game. The view which he and his burghers had taken was that since
they had already sacrificed nearly everything they possessed, they would
not now sacrifice their independence. For should this also be lost, then
there would be nothing left to them. That had been their opinion, but
they had not then known how matters stood in the Transvaal. Now that he
was aware of the state of affairs, he agreed with State Secretary Reitz
that their best course was to cede a part of their territory.
Vice-President Burger now rose from his seat, and said:
"This meeting has to formulate a fresh proposal to the English
Government, and to await its answer. If this proposal be rejected, well,
you will be no worse off than you are at present. If there be a man who
has earnestly considered what the sacrifice of everything means to us,
then I am that man. It has been said, we must retain our independence,
or else continue to fight; and we are still able to hold out for another
six months, or even a year. Now, supposing that we can hold out another
year, what should we gain by doing so? Why, we should only grow weaker,
whilst the enemy grew stronger! I emphatically state that the war cannot
be carried on any longer; and I ask if there is any man here who can
maintain with a clear conscience that the struggle can be successfully
continued.
"Some of you may tell me that complications may arise in Europe. But
that is a groundless hope. Others may say that it is astonishing enough
that we have been able to hold out till now, and that we still have the
power of making our voices heard. Yes! that is very surprising; but
shall we retain this power long? I heard some delegates say, 'We shall
fight till we die!' That is a manly sentiment. But was it not, perhaps,
prompted by a desire to make a fine speech, which would go down to
posterity? Was not the aim in some cases that future generations might
recall these speeches when they were told of the brave fight our men had
made?
"Let every one consider this well: Is he prepared to sacrifice the
nation on the shrine of his own ambition? Ambition, although it may cost
us our lives, can never lead to martyrdom. A martyr is made of finer
stuff!
"Have we not arrived at the stage of our history when we must pray, 'Thy
will be done'? That prayer, considered rightly, is a prayer of faith. Do
not let us imagine that we can compel God to do _our_ will--that is not
faith.
"I beg of you to consider what will become of the women and the
children and the banished burghers if you still persist until your last
shot has been fired. What right shall we have to intercede for these
unfortunate ones when we have rejected the proposals of the English
Government? We shall have no right whatsoever.
"Perhaps it is God's will that the English nation should oppress us, in
order that our pride may be subdued, and that we may come through the
fire of our troubles purified.
"My opinion is that we should make a peace proposal to England, yielding
as much as we rightly can; and if England rejects our proposal, it will
be time enough then to see what other course is open to us.
"There is one fact which we cannot allow ourselves to forget. There are
ten districts in the Transvaal which must be abandoned. In the Free
State, too, there are districts in a similar plight. It is the opinion
of lawyers that so long as the inhabitants remain in a district their
property cannot lawfully be confiscated; but if the district be
abandoned, then confiscations can take place.
"It is criminal to say, 'Come what may, we will fight till everything is
lost and all of us are dead!'"
The following resolution was then proposed by General Kemp, and seconded
by Mr. J. Nand:
"_This meeting decides, in order to expedite the work in hand, to depart
from the original programme; and to constitute a Commission, to be
composed of the Hon. Jacob Smits and the Hon. Judge Hertzog, and to give
this Commission authority to draw up, conjointly with the two State
Presidents, a draft proposal, to be laid before the delegates to-morrow
morning._"
This resolution was put to the meeting, and accepted by the delegates.
The meeting then adjourned.
* * * * *
At half-past seven in the evening the delegates reassembled.
General Cilliers (Lichtenburg and Marico) was the first to make a
report. "In my division," he said, "things are in a very favourable
condition. Yet we are bound to take the other divisions into
consideration. My burghers said to me, 'Stand firm for independence!'
But when they gave me the order they did not know about the condition of
the other districts. Will those other districts--such of them, I mean,
as are in a worse predicament than ourselves--be able to co-operate with
us in continuing the war? Some of them have already answered my question
in the negative. Must we then not ask ourselves, What will be the best
for the nation as a whole? Shall we say continue the war, or shall we
approach the enemy and make a proposal?
"But are we really justified in prolonging the struggle, and making
still further sacrifices? Some will answer, 'Yes, for we have a God in
whom we have trusted from the beginning; shall we not continue to trust
in Him who has worked such wonders for us already?' But I have heard a
brother say, 'God's hand is against us.' It was bitter to hear these
words from him, and for myself I will have none of them. My vote is
given here and now for a continuance of the war.
"But we must hear what the rest of the delegates have to say, and if
they can point out some other way by which we can retain even a portion
of our national independence, we must be ready to follow it."
General Froneman next addressed the meeting.
"I fear," he began, "that too much is being made of the condition of my
division: things are not so prosperous with us as some here appear to
imagine. But for all that, my burghers are for nothing short of absolute
independence. They cannot forget the blood which has already been spilt
in our cause. They mean to hold out until they are relieved.
"I sympathize deeply with those districts that are less happily
circumstanced than my own, but it pains me to discover that there are
some here who doubt that God is for us. For what has supported us up
till now save faith in God?--the faith of those who first prayed God to
prevent the war, and then, when they saw that this was not His will,
fought like men, putting all their trust in Him.
"Up till now the Lord hath been my helper; the enemy has cut us off from
everything, and yet we see our two little Republics still full of hope,
still holding out."
He concluded his speech by saying that he would like to hear the
opinions of Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey. They ought to be able
to throw much light upon the matter.
Commandant General Botha then rose, and said:
"I am glad to have an opportunity of giving my views upon the present
state of affairs. We know that differences of opinion are to be found
everywhere and on every question; when, therefore, a man differs from
those who think that this war can and ought to be continued, we must
ascribe his opinion to discouragement, weakness, or cowardice. We must
acknowledge the truth of the facts from which he draws his conclusions,
and which have compelled him to utter it. His object is to make known
the true state of the country--which indeed is his plain duty. Were he
not to do so on the present occasion he would be accused, later on, of
having kept secret what he ought to have revealed. Differences of
opinion then need not, and must not, cause a disunion and discord.
Whatever our private opinions may be, yet, as delegates of the burghers,
we must speak and act as one man.
"The war has now lasted two years. But the question for us to answer is
this: Are we going forwards or backwards? My own conviction--a
conviction founded upon the views expressed by my commandos and the
speeches which I have listened to at this meeting--is that we are not
gaining, but losing ground. There is nothing, in my opinion, more
evident than that, during the last six months, the tide has been setting
steadily against us, and in favour of the enemy.
"A year ago there were no blockhouses. We could cross and recross the
country as we wished, and harass the enemy at every turn. But now things
wear a very different aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night
indeed, but never by day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our
commandos.
"Then, as regards food. We are told that there is food here, and food
there; but how are we to get at it? How are we to transport it from one
district to another? Outside the frontiers of our Republics there are
plenty of provisions, but it becomes daily more difficult to get them
into our hands. The cattle, for instance, that used to be at Ladysmith
have now been removed to Estcourt. Even the friendly Kaffirs, from whom
we are now able to obtain provisions, may quite possibly soon turn
against us. The time is coming when we shall be compelled to say,
'Hunger drives us to surrender.'
"The horses have been chased about so incessantly, and have suffered so
much from want of forage, that their strength is almost exhausted. They
are so weak that it is almost impossible to accomplish any long distance
with them.
"As to the Cape Colony, I had always understood that the Colonists were
going to rise _en bloc_, but General Smuts has just told us that there
is no chance of such a thing happening. And he speaks from personal
knowledge, having just returned from paying them a visit. Moreover, he
has seen our horses, and says that it is impossible for them to go into
the Colony, so it appears that our successes there are over. This is a
severe check indeed; but it could not have been otherwise. We have not
enough horses to enable us to give the Colonists effectual help, and
they themselves have been cowed by the heavy penalties imposed upon all
those who did rise. Many of those who are well disposed towards us dare
not join us now.
"Again, there is no chance of European intervention: not one of the
Powers will do anything for us. To see this it is only necessary to
peruse that correspondence between the Netherlands and England, which
was the cause of these negotiations. There we shall find that the Dutch
Minister says that our deputation is only accredited to Holland, whereas
it had been accredited by the two Republics to all the Governments in
Europe. Moreover, the correspondence makes it very plain that England
will not tolerate the intervention of any foreign Power whatsoever. But
the truth is, that no foreign Power wants to help us. When the women
were first made prisoners I thought that European intervention might
perhaps be attempted, because to make prisoners of women is a thing
quite outside the usual methods of warfare. But nothing was done even
then. We were told that we had the sympathy of the nations of
Europe--their sympathy, and nothing more!
"I have come to a subject that is very near our hearts--our women-folk.
If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision for our
wives and children, who will then be exposed to every kind of danger.
Throughout this war the presence of the women has caused me anxiety and
much distress. At first I managed to get them into the townships, but
later on this became impossible, because the English refused to receive
them. I then conceived the idea of getting a few of our burghers to
surrender, and sending the women in with them. But this plan was not
practical, because most of the families were those of prisoners of war,
and the men still on commando were not so closely related to these
families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them.
"We have heard much talk about fighting 'to the bitter end.' But what is
'the bitter end'? Is it to come when all of us are either banished or in
our graves? Or does it mean the time when the nation has fought until it
never can fight again? As to myself, personally, I can still continue
the struggle. I have horses, my household is well provided for, and as
far as my own inclination goes I am all for going on. But am I only to
consider myself? Is it not my first duty to look at the interests of my
nation? I have always been, and still am, of the opinion that, before
letting the nation go to rack and ruin, it is our duty to parley. We
must not let the chance for negotiations slip out of our hands. When our
numbers have fallen to only four or five thousand men under arms we
shall no longer have that chance, and this will undoubtedly happen if we
hold out for another year, or even six months.
"There are some who say, 'We must trust in God and keep on fighting,'
and I grant them that miracles are possible at all times. But it is
beyond our power to say whether God will work a miracle for us. We do
not know what His will may be. If we continue the war, and if it should
afterwards appear that everything has been in vain, our responsibility
will be only the heavier, the blinder our confidence now is. And over
and over again we shall hear, 'He is dead,' 'and he, and he.' Will not
this make our remorse all the more bitter? Our commandos are so weak,
our country so exhausted, that the loss of one great battle, the
surrender of a single strong force, would spell ruin for us.
"'But we have managed to hold out for so long.' Yes, but there is a
natural reason, a military reason, why this has been the case. The fact
that our commandos have been spread over so large a tract of country has
compelled the British, up to the present time, to divide their forces.
But things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after
district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory. In other
words, the British army can at last concentrate its forces upon us.
"I firmly believe that, under like circumstances, no other nation in the
world would have fought as our nation has done. Shall such a nation
perish? No! we must save it. If we delegates are convinced that we can
no longer offer resistance to the enemy, it is our plain duty to tell
the people so. We must not let them be exterminated for want of timely
advice. More than twenty thousand women and children have died in the
camps during this one year.
"There are men of our own kith and kin who are helping to bring us to
ruin. If we continue the war, it may be that the Afrikanders against us
will outnumber our own men.
"What is there left to hope for? Are we to retain our independence by
ceding a part of our territories? Most assuredly yes, if such a
compromise is feasible. As regards Swaziland, it is of so little
importance to us that we can give it up without a thought. Then there
are the goldfields--let them go. They are but a cancerous growth,
sapping the very life of our country.
"We must face the fact that things are not at a standstill: we are
slipping back every moment. We must all pull together, or everything is
lost. If our sacrifices will buy our independence, well and good. But
suppose that we are compelled to give it up--well, if it even comes to
this, we must never do so unconditionally. An unconditional surrender
would be well enough if the leaders only had to be considered. But we
must think of the interests of the nation. We must say to our people,
'We have no thought of ourselves: our only desire is to place ourselves
in the breach, if so we may save you.'"
General Botha then proceeded to discuss eventualities in the event of
independence being lost. Representative government, he said, might
perhaps still be retained, and the national language need not
necessarily be supplanted. Thus the nation would still retain its old
ideals and its old customs. General Roux had been pertinently asked
whether it were better to strive for the recuperation of the people now
or to wait until they were altogether overpowered and reduced to such
straits that it would require some thirty years before they could once
more call themselves a nation. He then went into the terms of the
proposal by the British Government, and repeated that there must be no
idea of unconditional surrender.
The General concluded in the following words:
"Although we do not _wish_ to accept terms, we have no right to refuse
them altogether. On the other hand we must not say to the English, 'Do
with us as you like.' For then our descendants would eternally reproach
us. We should have lost the privilege of looking after our own wives and
children. They would be handed over to strangers. No! we must secure by
some means or other that we ourselves shall be able to provide for them.
The fate of our country is in the hands of the men in this tent. It has
been bitter, indeed, for me to have to speak as I have done. But if I
have not spoken the truth, convince me of my error, and I will be the
first to own it. But do not condemn me, for I have had no other object
than to tell you what I believe to be the truth."
General De la Rey spoke.
"I will not detain you long," he began, "but there are a few points to
which I wish to draw attention. In regard to the districts under my
command, every one will understand that my burghers, after their recent
brilliant successes, are firmly resolved not to sacrifice their
independence. If I allude to the battles which I have just fought it is
with no thought of boasting, but only that you may picture to yourselves
the effect which they must have had upon the enemy; and that no one may
be angry with myself and my burghers for standing firm when our feet are
on such solid ground.
"But since my arrival at Vereeniging I have heard about our districts
where matters are in a far less favourable condition than in my own. So
far as I myself am concerned, I cannot think of laying down my arms. Yet
it appears to me that some parts of the country will be compelled by
starvation to give up the struggle. It is well that those who represent
these parts have spoken openly, and not left this meeting in ignorance
of the state of affairs only to go and lay down their arms.
"I myself have never thought intervention possible. Even before the war
broke out I said that nothing would come of it. I saw that South Africa
was divided between Germany and England. And that if only the Republics
could be extinguished, then England and Germany would be the only Powers
left, and Germany would be safe. But if the Republics were victorious,
then Germany would be in danger. Why then should Germany interfere in
favour of the Republics, when she has everything to lose by such a
course of action? No! intervention was entirely out of the question.
"There has been talk about fighting to the bitter end; but has not the
bitter end already come? Each man must answer that question for himself.
"You must remember that everything has been sacrificed--cattle, goods,
money, wife, and child. Our men are going about naked, and some of our
women have nothing but clothes made of skins to wear. Is not this the
bitter end?
"I believe that the time has now come to negotiate. England will never
again give us the chance of doing so, should we allow this opportunity
to slip by. But how shall we negotiate? I must leave it to this meeting
to answer that question. If we do not obtain what we ask for, we shall
at least stand or fall together. Yet let us act with reason.
"I cannot agree with one of the opinions expressed by Commandant-General
Botha and States-Secretary Reitz. They have stated that they are against
surrendering the goldfields to England; firstly, because England would
never accept such a proposal, for by doing so she would declare to the
whole world that she had only been fighting for the goldfields; and,
secondly, because if we gave up the goldfields we should lose a source
of revenue, without the aid of which we could not repair the damages
which the war has wrought."
Commandant-in-Chief de Wet spoke as follows:
"I am of opinion that the circumstances in the Orange Free State are no
less critical than those in the Transvaal. Nine districts were entirely
ruined; but these, though at one time abandoned by the burghers, have
now been reoccupied.
"If I now differ from those who are of opinion that it is useless to
prolong the war, it must not be thought that I am lacking in respect for
their judgment. By no means. I know that what has been said about the
wretched plight of the people is only too true; but they must not take
it amiss if I point out that the same condition of affairs was described
in the correspondence from the Transvaal which fell into the hands of
the English at Reitz. But, granting that the facts have been correctly
stated, even then the Orange Free State will refuse to give in. Let me
be candid with you, and say frankly that, in my opinion, this is
virtually the Transvaal's war. This, however, makes no difference to me.
For me the barrier of the Vaal River has never existed. I have always
endeavoured to maintain the Nauwere-Vereeniging,[112] and I feel
strongly the obligation which the union of the two States casts on each
one of us. They are two nations, but their cause is one.
"What, then, is the prevailing feeling in the Orange Free State? Of the
six thousand burghers who have been attending meetings, I myself have
been in command of five thousand, and I can confidently say that never
were five thousand men more unanimous in their opinion than were those I
led when they cried, as with one voice, 'Persevere; we have everything
to lose, but we have not yet lost it.' What, then, is the answer to be?
I am firmly persuaded that we have only one course before us. If we are
unable to obtain what we are asking for, then it only remains for us to
alleviate as best we may the lot of those who cannot help themselves. I
do not as yet clearly see how this is going to be done, but, at all
costs, let us continue fighting. What was our total strength when we
began this war? Sixty thousand men all told. Against this the English
had a standing army of seven hundred and fifty thousand troops. Of these
two hundred and fifty thousand, or one-third, are now in South Africa.
We know from experience that they are unable to send more than
one-third. And we? Have we not also one-third of our army left?
"I do not wish to imply that I am not prepared to concede something, but
nothing will induce me to consent to any part of the country in _our_
territory being given up. It will never do to have an English colony
planted in our midst, for England then would have far too firm a hold
upon our country.
"It is said, and with some truth, that the goldfields have been a curse
to us, but surely there is no reason why they should continue to be so.
I fail to see how, without retaining possession of these goldfields, the
Republics are to be saved. Swaziland perhaps could be ceded, but never
the goldfields. I feel that any intervention is out of the question; but
is not the very fact that it has not taken place a sure proof that it
was not the will of God? Does it not show that He is minded to form us,
by this war, into a nation worthy of the name? Let us then bow to the
will of the Almighty.
"My people will perhaps say, 'Our Generals see only the religious side
of the question.' They will be right. Without faith we should have been
foolish indeed to have embarked on this war and to continue it for so
many months. Indeed, it _must_ be a matter of faith, for the future is
hidden from us. What _has been_ is within our ken, but what is before is
beyond the knowledge of the wisest man.
"Cape Colony is a great disappointment to me. I do not refer so much to
what we have learnt about it from the reports as to the fact that no
general uprising can be expected in that quarter. So much we have heard
from General Smuts. But though there is to be no uprising, we have no
reason to think that there has been any falling off in the number of our
adherents in the Colony. The little contingent there has been of great
help to us: they have kept fifty thousand troops occupied, with which
otherwise we should have had to reckon.
"I feel deeply for our women and children; I am giving earnest
consideration to their miserable plight. But their sufferings are among
what we may call the necessary circumstances of the war. I have nothing
to do with the circumstances. For me, this is a war of religion, and
thus I can only consider the great principles involved. Circumstances
are to me but as obstacles to be cleared out of the road.
"If we own ourselves defeated--if we surrender to the foe--we can expect
little mercy from him. We shall at all events have dug the grave of our
national independence, and, as things are, what difference is there
between this and digging our own graves?"
Mr. Birkenstock said that the question about the goldfields must be
carefully considered. This source of income must not be given up.
The meeting was then closed with prayer.
[Footnote 112: Closer Union.]
SATURDAY, MAY 17TH, 1902.
The Chairman first called upon Chief Commandant de Wet to offer up
prayer.
A private report from Mr. J. Schmorderer, who had brought the missive
from the deputation in Europe, was then read.
The first delegate to speak was Landdrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom), who
said:
"My opinion is that the best way of ascertaining the probable future
course of events is to see what has already happened in the past. A year
ago there were six hundred burghers in my district, and each man had a
horse; now there are not more than half that number, and many of them
have to go on foot. Last year we had from three to four thousand bags of
maize ready to hand; this year there are not more than as many hundred,
and how to get at them is more than I can tell. If such has been the
history of the past year, in what sort of condition shall we be at the
end of the present one?
"The great difficulty with regard to our families is not how to clothe
them, but how to feed them. I know of a woman who has lived for weeks on
nothing but fruit. I myself have had to satisfy my hunger with mealies
for days together, although I have no wish to complain about it. Even
the scanty food we can get has to be obtained from the Kaffirs by
persuasion. Moreover, the Kaffirs side with the English, who in their
counter-marches are clearing all the food out of the country.
"The men in my district told me that if I came back and reported that
the war was to be continued, they would be obliged--for the sake of
their wives and children--to go straight to the nearest English camp and
lay down their arms. As to the women it is true that they are at present
full of hope and courage, but if they knew how matters stood in the
veldt, they would think very differently. Even now there are many of
them who say that the war ought to be put a stop to, if only for their
sakes.
"The Kaffirs are another great source of trouble; in this problem they
are a factor which cannot be neglected.
"There is no hope of intervention, nor can we expect anything from the
English nation. Facts that have come to my knowledge prove to me that
England has become more and more determined to fight to the bitter end.
"I do not see what we can possibly gain by continuing the war. Our own
people are helping the English, and every day the enemy are improving
their position. What advantage can there then be in persisting in the
struggle? We have now a chance of negotiating, and we should seize that
chance. For we have the opportunity given us of obtaining some help for
our ruined compatriots, who would be entirely unable to make a fresh
start without assistance.
"As to the religious side of this matter, I am not ashamed to say that I
believe I am serving God in the course which I am taking. We must not
attempt to obtain the impossible against all reason. If we make any such
attempt, the results will probably be exactly opposite to what we wish.
I have the greatest doubt whether it really is in order to give glory to
God that the nation wishes to retain its independence. On the contrary I
believe that the motive is obstinacy, a vice to which human nature is
always prone.
"It has been said that it would be shameful to disregard the blood
already spilt; but surely one ought also to consider the blood that
might yet be shed in a useless struggle."
The proposal of the Commission was now read, and after some discussion
accepted. It ran as follows:
The meeting of national representatives from both Republics--after
having considered the correspondence exchanged, and the negotiations
conducted, between the Governments of the two Republics and His
Excellency Lord Kitchener, on behalf of the British Government; and
after having heard the reports of the deputies from the different parts
of both Republics; and after having received the latest reports from the
representatives of the two Republics in Europe; and having taken into
consideration the fact that the British Government has refused to accept
the proposal of our Governments made on the same basis; and
notwithstanding the above-mentioned refusal of the British
Government--still wishes to give expression to the ardent desire of the
two Republics to retain their independence, for which already so much
material and personal sacrifice has been made, and decides in the name
of the people of both Republics to empower both Governments as
follows:--To conclude a peace on the following basis, to wit: the
retention of a limited independence offering an addition to what has
already been offered by the two Governments in their negotiations, dated
the 15th of April, 1902.
(_a_) To give up all foreign relations and embassies.
(_b_) To accept the Protectorate of Great Britain.
(_c_) To surrender parts of the territory of the South African Republic.
(_d_) To conclude a defensive alliance with Great Britain in regard to
South Africa.
During the discussion it was clearly explained that the territory which
it was suggested should be ceded was the already mentioned goldfields
and Swaziland. The question was put whether the South African Republics
would have to pay for the damage done during the war. "By all means let
us pay," said Mr. De Clercq. "If I could only buy back the independence
of the Orange Free State, I would gladly give all I possess."
Several other Transvaal delegates expressed themselves in the same
sense, and said that they fully appreciated the sacrifices which the
Orange Free State had made. General Froneman thanked them in the name of
the Free State.
He felt that the two Republics no longer thought of themselves as having
conflicting interests. In the fire of this war they had been firmly
welded together.
Commandant Ross (Vrede) thought it wrong even to discuss the possibility
of giving up independence. The delegates had received a definite
mandate. They had been commissioned to see that the national
independence had remained untouched, whatever else might have to be
given up. This being the case, they might come to decisions on all other
points, so long as they remembered that independence was not an open
question.
Commandant J. Van Niekerk (Ficksburg) spoke to the same purpose. He
could not even think of sacrificing independence.
After some other delegates had made a few short remarks, General Brand,
seconded by Commandant A.J. De Kock, proposed the following resolution,
which was accepted by the meeting:
"This meeting of the national representatives of the two Republics
hereby charge the Governments to nominate a Commission for the
purpose of entering upon negotiations with His Excellency Lord
Kitchener, acting on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government.
The Commission is to endeavour to make peace on satisfactory terms,
and is then to lay the result of its negotiations before this
meeting, for the sanction of the two Governments."
The meeting was then closed with prayer.
Appendix B
THE CONFERENCE AT PRETORIA BETWEEN THE COMMISSION OF THE NATIONAL
REPRESENTATIVES AND LORDS KITCHENER AND MILNER (MAY 19TH-MAY 28TH,
1902)
Minutes of the Conference held at Pretoria on May 19th, 1902, between
Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, representatives of the British
Government, and Commandant-General L. Botha, Commander-in-Chief C.R. de
Wet, General J.H. De la Rey, Judge J.B.M. Hertzog, and General J.C.
Smuts, delegates of the national representatives, who had met at
Vereeniging on May 15th, 1902.
Mr. N.J. de Wet acted as interpreter; Mr. O. Walrond was secretary for
the English Government; and the Rev. J.D. Kestell and D. Van Velden
acted in a similar capacity for the Commission.
The Conference met at ten o'clock in the morning at the house of Lord
Kitchener. After having greeted each other, the members took their seats
at the table in the centre of the room.
Commandant-General L. Botha opened the proceedings in the following
words:
"Allow me to state that, although the negotiations have taken a longer
time than we expected, I am able to assure your Excellencies that we are
acting in good faith, and that everything has been done with the sole
aim of concluding the peace which we all desire.
"I must also draw attention to the fact that everything we transact here
must be submitted to our national representatives, in order to obtain
their sanction."
The suggestion was then made that the proposals which the Commission was
prepared to make should be laid before the Conference, whereupon the
following letter was read to the meeting:
PRETORIA, _19th May, 1902_.
_To their Excellencies, Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, Pretoria._
YOUR EXCELLENCIES,--
With a view to finally concluding the existing hostilities, and
being fully empowered by the Government of the two Republics, we
have the honour to propose the following points--in addition to the
conditions already offered in the negotiations of April last--as a
basis for negotiations:
(_a_) We are prepared to cede our independence as regards our
foreign relations.
(_b_) We wish to retain self-government in our country, under
British supervision.
(_c_) We are prepared to cede a part of our territory.
Should your Excellencies be prepared to negotiate on this basis,
then the above-mentioned points can be elaborated.
We have the honour to be,
Your Excellencies' most obedient servants,
LOUIS BOTHA.
C.R. DE WET.
J.H. DE LA REY.
J.B.M. HERTZOG.
J.C. SMUTS.
When this letter had been read, a discussion followed.
Lord Milner: "Considering the wide difference between this proposal and
that made by His Majesty's Government, when we last met, I fear that I
can hold out very little hope of any good results following negotiations
on the basis you have suggested."
Lord Kitchener: "We can take those proposals into consideration, but I
cannot see how it is possible to bring them into harmony with those of
His Majesty's Government."
Commandant-General Botha: "If this is the position you take, we should
like to receive from you a final answer to our proposals."
Lord Milner: "Do you wish us to refer your proposals to His Majesty's
Government?"
Commandant-General Botha: "Yes, unless you have full powers to give us a
final reply."
Lord Milner: "I am quite convinced that your proposal will be rejected;
and I feel bound to say that to refer it, as it stands, to His Majesty's
Government will only do you harm."
Commandant-General Botha: "If you have no power to decide upon this
proposal here, we should like you to refer it to His Majesty's
Government."
Lord Milner: "I have no objection to taking the responsibility of
refusing your proposal on myself. The instructions received by myself
and Lord Kitchener are quite clear on this point."
Commandant-General Botha: "I must then understand that when Lord
Salisbury said that this war was not carried on with a view to annex
territory, he did not mean it."
Lord Kitchener: "It is no longer a question of territory, for annexation
is an accomplished fact."
Commandant-General Botha: "I am unable to see how our proposal is
inconsistent with annexation."
Lord Milner: "I cannot now recall the exact words used by Lord
Salisbury, but it is true that Lord Salisbury declared that his
Government did not begin the war with the intention of obtaining
territory. But in the course of the war circumstances developed in such
a way that the decision to annex the Republics became a necessity, and
the British Government have pronounced their firm intention not to
withdraw from this decision."
Judge Hertzog: "I should like to be informed as to what the great
difference is between the basis now proposed by us and that laid down by
His Majesty's Government during the negotiations of last year--I do not
mean the difference in details, but in principle."
Lord Kitchener: "Do you mean by your proposal that the Boers will become
British citizens?"
General Smuts: "I cannot see that our proposal is necessarily in
contradiction to that of last year. Our proposal only makes provision
concerning the administration."
Lord Milner then quoted from the terms offered at Middelburg by the
British Government the previous year:--
"At the earliest possible date military administration shall cease, and
be replaced by civil administration in the form of a Crown Colony
Government. At first there will be in each of the new Colonies a
Governor, an Executive Council consisting of the highest officials, and
a Legislative Council, which latter shall consist of a certain number of
official members and also of a nominated non-official element. But it is
the wish of His Majesty's Government to introduce a representative
element as soon as circumstances permit, and, in course of time, to
grant to the new colonies the right of self-government.
"It may be that I do not properly understand your proposal, but it seems
to me to differ not only in detail, but also in spirit from the scheme I
have just read to you."
Judge Hertzog: "I entirely agree with you that there is a difference in
idea between the two proposals; but only such a difference in idea as
might well be found between Colonies of the same State. In other words,
one constitution is adapted for one colony, whilst another constitution
is found fitting for another colony, but yet they all belong to the same
Empire."
Lord Milner: "Exactly. There are different constitutions in different
Colonies; but it seems to me that the _policy_ laid down in your
proposal differs from that laid down by His Majesty's Government."
Judge Hertzog: "I think that I am expressing the opinion of the whole
Commission when I say that we wish for peace. I draw attention to this
to show the way in which, according to my opinion, we should consider
the matter. For if we on both sides are really desirous of coming to a
settlement, we should not make too much of theoretical difficulties, so
long as the practical aim has been obtained. For instance, the different
Colonies which now are joined to form the United States once possessed
constitutions differing much from one another. Now the constitution laid
down in our proposal does not differ so much from that laid down in
yours that a practical difference should arise therefrom; and such a
practical difference would arise if you insisted upon carrying on
negotiations on your own basis. I imagine that England has a certain
object before her in South Africa, and I believe that that object can be
as well obtained by our proposal as by that of Middelburg. I therefore
ask, Is the difference so great that, in order for England to obtain her
object, an entirely new status must be called into existence?"
Lord Milner: "We are comparing two different things. Here in the
Middelburg scheme there are a number of definite proposals, which enter
upon a great mass of particulars. I do not mean to imply that _we_ have
not the power to go into particulars. I perfectly understand that it
lies within the power of Lord Kitchener and myself to carry on further
deliberations with you about details, so as to throw light on any
doubtful points, and, perhaps, to make such changes as would not
fundamentally affect the scheme. As you say that your proposals are not
in contradiction with those formulated at Middelburg, then there is no
reason why you should not lay aside your proposals and discuss the
Middelburg proposals, which are definite."
Judge Hertzog: "I quite admit that you, Lord Milner, are entitled to say
that there is a fundamental difference between our proposals. But it is
another question whether the difficulty that thus arises is of such a
nature that we--those of us who on both sides are anxious to conclude
peace--should not be able to find a solution to it satisfactory to both
parties. I cannot answer that question; nor can I see why the same
result would not be reached by negotiating on the basis proposed by us
as by carrying on negotiations on the Middelburg proposal."
Lord Milner: "I understand, then, that you acknowledge that there is a
fundamental difference between the two bases. Well, I do not think that
we are empowered to negotiate on a basis differing from that laid down
in the last report of His Majesty's Government, and also differing from
the tenor of the Middelburg proposal. I may say that I believe that His
Majesty's Government in their latest message went as far as it was
possible for them to go with the object of meeting you. The whole spirit
of the telegram was to that effect."
Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I hope you will understand that I do not
speak as a lawyer. (Lord Kitchener, laughing: "That's the case with me
too!") I fully concur with what General Botha and Judge Hertzog have
said in regard to our eagerness to establish peace. In order to be
brief, I will only remark that I did not understand His Excellency, Lord
Milner, to mean--any more than I myself meant--that we should go to the
nation with the Middelburg proposal, with the idea of coming back with
it unaltered."
Lord Milner: "No; if I gave that impression, I did not intend to do so.
But I believe that when you went to your people with the last message
from His Majesty's Government it was with the knowledge--which the
message itself made clear--that His Majesty's Government was not
prepared to take into consideration any terms which differed widely from
the policy laid down in the Middelburg proposal."
Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "That was indeed what I understood; and
accordingly we have now come with a proposal which does not differ very
much from the Middelburg proposal."
General Smuts: "I thought that the vital principle your Government had
in view was the destruction of our independence, and in our proposal the
independence of the two Republics with regard to foreign relations is
given up. I was therefore of opinion that the two parties might come to
an arrangement on this basis. I did not think that for the restoration
of peace the Middelburg terms were essential."
Lord Milner: "Not in the details, but in the general ideas. As the
British Government has laid down a basis, and you have had weeks in
which to consider the matter, it would never do for you now to put it on
one side. Lord Kitchener has given your nation considerable time in
which to take counsel; and now you come back, and, ignoring the
Middelburg terms, you propose entirely different ones of your own, and
say, let us negotiate on these. I do not believe that I and Lord
Kitchener would be justified in doing this. But in case he is of another
opinion, the British Government can be asked if they are prepared to set
on one side all the former deliberations and begin again on a new
basis."
Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "We cannot, of course, prevent Lord Kitchener
from asking his Government any questions he pleases, but, at the same
time, we request that you will cable our behests to the English
Government."
Commandant-General Botha: "I cannot see that we are beginning again on a
new basis, for, in consequence of the negotiations in April last, you
were ordered by the British Government to encourage us to make fresh
proposals. Our present proposal is the direct result of that order."
Lord Milner: "I did my best to get fresh proposals from you, but you
would not make any. You forced the British Government into making
proposals."
Commandant-General Botha: "I am of opinion that we must both work
together in this matter of formulating proposals."
Lord Kitchener: "You were asked to make proposals, but you did not do
so; and now, after the British Government has made a proposal, you
yourselves come forward with one of your own."
General De la Rey: "I think that it was the encouragement given us by
correspondence between the Netherlands and the British Government that
caused us to make our proposals."
Lord Milner: "That correspondence was at the beginning of the
negotiations."
Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "If we had been obliged to make a new
proposal in April, we would not have been able to make one so fair, and
so much to the advantage of the British Government, as our present one,
for, not having consulted the nation, we would have been compelled to
insist on entire independence."
Lord Milner: "I must remind you of what has taken place; not with the
object of putting you in the wrong, but in order to make the position
clear, for there are some points about it which are not very clear. You
came and made a proposal. The British Government gave you a distinct
answer--they refused to accept it. Their answer was perfectly outspoken,
and perfectly intelligible. At the same time they said, 'We are anxious
for peace; will you make other proposals?' You then said, 'No! we have
no power to do so; we must first consult the nation.' We admitted that
argument. Then you said, 'Let the British Government make proposals.'
The British Government did so, and they are fully entitled to an answer.
In what position do you think you are placing Lord Kitchener and myself?
You come back with a totally fresh proposal, and do not say anything
about ours. This is not fair treatment to the British Government, and we
are not bound to take your proposal into consideration."
Judge Hertzog: "I have endeavoured to show that our reply really cannot
be taken as ignoring the proposal of the British Government. The great
question in the correspondence in April between us and the British
Government was the question of independence; and now, after having
consulted the nation, we come here and say that we are prepared to
sacrifice in some degree our independence, and we indicate how far we
will give it up. And, as General Smuts has said, that is the basis which
we have laid down in our present proposal."
Lord Milner: "You say that you give up your independence as regards
foreign relations."
Judge Hertzog: "Yes. But then you must understand that this is only a
general principle, which we treat in detail later on."
General Smuts: "The independence is given up both in regard to our
foreign relations and in regard to interior administration, which will
be placed under the supervision of the British Government. So that the
effect of these two articles is, that the independence is sacrificed,
and that the two Republics will not in the future be able to be regarded
as Sovereign States."
Lord Milner: "I understand perfectly well that they would not be
Sovereign States any longer, but my intellect is not bright enough for
me to be able to say what they really would be."
Lord Kitchener: "They would be a new kind of 'international animal.'"
General Smuts: "It has more than once happened in the course of history
that difficulties have been solved by compromise. And this draft
proposal goes as near as seems possible towards making us a Colony."
Lord Kitchener: "Do you accept the annexation?"
General Smuts: "Not formally; but I do not see in what way this proposal
is in opposition to the annexation proclamation."
Lord Kitchener: "I am afraid I am not clever enough to comprehend this.
There would be two Governments in one State. And how do you imagine that
this arrangement could be carried on?"
General Smuts: "A more ample explanation will have to be given of the
word 'supervision'; and I thought that this was just one of the points
on which we could carry on further discussions and negotiations."
Lord Milner: "I am certainly not going to give up an explicit basis for
a vague proposal."
Lord Kitchener: "I feel convinced that your proposal would never be able
to be carried out in the practical governing of a country."