Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I agree that our proposal has not been fully

worked out, but neither have the Middelburg proposals. This was clearly

indicated by Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner when these proposals were

made, and they were only looked upon as a basis on which we could

negotiate, so that the business might be begun. We naturally cannot

compel the British Government to accept our proposal; but, at all

events, it is a basis."

Lord Milner: "I am very anxious that these discussions should not end in

smoke, and I shall not allow any formalities to stand in the way, but to

abandon the definite proposals of Middelburg (March 7th) for a thing

like this, and to begin a fresh discussion on the basis of something

which is so very vague will surely land us in trouble. I believe we are

quite entitled to keep you to the Middelburg proposal, which we might

modify in regard to details."

Commandant-General Botha: "Perhaps it would be well if you would first

give an answer to our proposals."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I think that (unless your Excellencies have

power to give a final answer to our terms) it would not be unfair if we

were to ask you to lay our proposal before your Government."

Commandant-General Botha: "We are come here with the earnest intention

of concluding peace; and I think that if our proposal is carried out

Boer and Briton will be able to live side by side in this country. I

presume that it is the wish of both parties to be fair and just, and to

make a peace by which both can abide, and which will be permanent in

South Africa."

Lord Milner: "That is certainly our aim."

Lord Kitchener: "Your proposal would involve important changes in our

own--changes which, so far as I understand them, we should be unable to

permit."

Commandant-General Botha: "I am of opinion that before a proposal is

made from your side you should give a definite answer to ours."

Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner: "Well, then, change your proposal into

ours."

Lord Milner: "I do not believe that the British Government is prepared

to go any further to meet you than they have done in their last

proposal. They think that they have already gone far in their efforts

for peace--further, indeed, than the general opinion of the British

public would warrant."

Lord Kitchener: "The difference between our proposals seems to be too

great."

Commandant-General Botha: "We shall always remain under the supervision

of the British Government."

Lord Kitchener: "Will you then consider yourselves British subjects?

'Supervision' is a new word, and 'suzerainty' has already caused us too

much trouble."

Judge Hertzog: "The idea is not so very new. There are several kinds of

different States, all belonging to the British Empire. For instance,

there is Basutoland."

Lord Milner: "There are many different kinds, but this one is a new

variety."

Judge Hertzog: "If your Excellencies could only understand us! We have

no wish to lose a single minute. We have been to the nation, and we know

what the nation wants and what their temper is. If, then, we are to make

a proposal here, it must be:--Firstly, a proposal which shall meet the

English Government in a fair way; and, secondly, a proposal which we are

honestly convinced will be acceptable to our nation. And such a proposal

we have laid before you. And now we are placed in a disadvantageous

position, for we are here before your Excellencies, who have not full

power finally to decide the matter."

Lord Kitchener: "We are in the same position as yourselves."

Judge Hertzog: "We offer you here what we know is in accordance with the

mind of the nation; we cannot possibly do anything that is against it."

Lord Milner: "Are we to understand that the Middelburg proposals are not

according to the mind of your people?"

General Smuts: "As yet no answer has been given to them. The only

decision come to by the national meeting is that which we are now laying

before you."

Lord Kitchener: "Are you prepared to set aside your present proposal and

to hand in another one bearing a closer resemblance to that of

Middelburg? We must try and find some middle course; and as we are here

to endeavour to arrive at something definite, let us try to obtain a

basis for discussion. Shall we make a new proposal?"

General Smuts: "As soon as there is a final answer to our proposal we

shall be able to take a fresh one into consideration."

Lord Milner: "I believe that the fact that you have refused to enter

upon the proposal made by the British Government justifies us in not

considering your proposal. Let us rather say that your very refusal

implies your answer to what we have proposed."

General Smuts: "I understand the position to be as follows--The British

Government has declined our proposals, and at the same time holds fast

to the old basis, but without prejudice to its power of making a new

proposal."

Lord Milner: "The whole difference between you and myself is that I take

the letter of 7th March to be the utmost concession that the British

Government is able to grant; not that that letter binds us down to every

clause of the proposal, but that it is an indication of how far our

Government is prepared to go on the general question. Your answer,

however, is no answer at all."

Lord Kitchener then read his telegram, dated 14th April. ["A difficulty

has arisen in getting on with the proceedings; the representatives state

that constitutionally they have no power to discuss terms based on the

surrender of independence, inasmuch as only the burghers can agree to

such a basis. Therefore, if they were to propose terms, it would put

them in a false position with regard to the people. If, however, His

Majesty's Government could state the terms which, subsequently to a

relinquishment of independence, they would be prepared to grant, the

representatives, after asking for the necessary explanations, and

without any expression of approval or disapproval, would submit such

conditions to their people."] "Clearly you have not kept to what you

undertook in this telegram."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "If it had only been a question of our

feelings being hurt by having to give an answer on the basis proposed to

us by the British then it would not have been necessary for the people

to come together at Vereeniging. But in matter of fact we have come here

with a proposal, which, rightly understood, is nearly equivocal to the

Middelburg proposal, and which meets the wishes of the English

Government as far as possible."

Commandant-General Botha: "I do not see why we should insist so much on

our proposal. If it is not to the mind of your Excellencies, if it is an

unacceptable proposal, then let us have a definite answer to it."

Lord Milner: "We wish to have an answer to the proposal made by us."

General Smuts: "I do not see that any proposal has been made by the

British Government. A certain basis only has been laid down, and

therefore no formal answer is required."

Lord Milner: "Our proposal is six times as definite as yours, and I

believe that the British Government is justified in wanting to know if

your people are inclined to come to terms on the general lines which

have been placed before them."

Lord Kitchener: "Here is quite an original suggestion: How would it be

if you were to go back to your people and ask them if they would not

make a proposal?"

General Smuts: "You must understand that the Middelburg proposal, with

all that took place in April, has been read to the people. Their answer

was neither 'Yes' nor 'No.' They simply elected the delegates. The

delegates as yet have not given any answer. They are still considering

the matter, and, in order to gain time, they have commissioned us to see

whether we could not come to some arrangement."

Lord Milner: "We are getting away from the subject. Tell us what

alterations you want, and then place our proposal before your people."

Lord Kitchener: "Should you agree that your proposal is not in

opposition to the annexation, we shall have accomplished something."

General Smuts: "Is it your opinion that our proposal must be set aside?"

Lord Kitchener: "Yes, surely. It is impossible for us to act on it."

Lord Milner: "It is impossible for us to take your proposal into

consideration. We can send it to England, but this would certainly tend

to hinder the negotiations. This is my personal opinion, which naturally

you are not bound to accept. All that we can say is, that this is the

only answer that we can give you."

Lord Kitchener: "It would be better to draw up a new document, in which

everything of importance would be noted down, and all unimportant

matters left out."

General Smuts: "But paragraph 3 of our proposal has not even been

mentioned. We are prepared to cede a part of our territory."

Lord Milner: "This would be in contradiction to the annexation of the

whole. If the _whole_ becomes annexed by us, how then can a _part_ be

ceded by you?"

General Smuts: "The ceded part would then become a Crown Colony, the

remaining part being governed as is here proposed."

Lord Milner: "You mean that one part would become a British Colony of

the ordinary type, and another part a protected Republic?"

Lord Kitchener: "Two forms of government in the same country would lead

to great friction. Our proposals are too divergent. From a military

point of view, the two forms of government could not co-exist. Before a

year was over we should be at war again."

The meeting was then adjourned till the afternoon.

During the interval the Commission discussed the situation, and sent

General J.C. Smuts to deliberate on several points with Lord Kitchener

and Lord Milner.

The meeting opened again at four o'clock.

Lord Milner: "In consequence of an informal conversation with General

Smuts, Lord Kitchener and I have drawn up a document, which will show

the form in which, as we think, the only agreement that can be arrived

at must be worded. It is a draft document, and we believe the

Governments will be able to sign it. Our idea is that after it has been

taken into consideration here it might be laid before the burghers, and

you could ask them, 'Are you willing that we should put our signatures

to it?'"

This document ran as follows:--"The undersigned, leaders of the Boer

forces in the Veldt, accepting, in their own name, and in that of the

said burghers, the annexations as mentioned in the proclamations of Lord

Roberts, dated respectively the 24th May, in the year of our Lord

nineteen hundred, and number 15, dated 1st day of September, in the year

of our Lord nineteen hundred, and accepting as a consequence thereof

their status of British citizens, agree herewith immediately to lay down

their weapons, and to hand over all guns, small arms, ammunition, and

stores in their possession, or under their hold, and to cease all

further resistance against the Government of His Majesty King Edward

Seventh, or his successors. They do this trusting in the assurance of

His Majesty's Government that neither their personal freedom nor their

property shall be taken away from them, or from the burghers who

surrender with them; and that the future action of His Majesty's

Government in relation to the consequences of the war shall be in

harmony with the declaration mentioned below. It is clearly understood

that all burghers who at present are prisoners of war, in order to be

able to enjoy the above-mentioned assurance, will have to notify their

acceptance of the status of British citizens."

Commandant-General Botha: "Are we to understand that our proposal is now

altogether rejected?"

Lord Milner and Lord Kitchener: "Yes."

Commandant-General Botha: "Then I understand that you are going to be

guided only by the Middelburg proposals?"

Lord Kitchener: "No; we can alter them."

Lord Milner: "This draft document was originally written out in order to

be annexed to the Middelburg proposals. But instead of the Middelburg

proposals, this document is now drawn up, in order to place us in the

position to formulate the proposals differently."

General Smuts: "If the idea is then that the Middelburg proposals should

be amended, would it not be best to do so now, and then to annex them to

this document?"

Lord Milner: "That which will take the place of the Middelburg proposals

has to be added as a schedule to this document, and we have to work out

this schedule together."

General Smuts: "I think it would be far better if you were to alter the

proposal yourselves, and then lay it before us for consideration; we

could then see what we could do to meet you."

Lord Kitchener: "I think that a sub-committee should be formed by you in

order to draw up the schedule."

Lord Milner: "My idea is that the schedule should be drawn up, so that

it and the document could be taken into consideration together."

General Smuts: "We should like to consider first whether we will help in

drawing it up."

Lord Milner: "I am willing to draw it up in conjunction with you, or to

let it be drawn up by you alone, but, from past experience, I must

decline to draw it up by myself."

General Smuts: "If we were to sign this document, would not the outcome

be that we leaders made ourselves responsible for the laying down of

arms by our burghers."

Lord Milner: "Yes. And should your men not lay down their arms it would

be a great misfortune."

Lord Kitchener: "I do not think so, for if some of the burghers refused

to lay down their arms, the signatories could not help it. There are

sure to be some who are dissatisfied."

General Smuts: "The document does not mention this."

Lord Kitchener: "It can be amended."

General De la Rey: "Well, then, there can be no peace, for one part of

the burghers will hold back and continue the war."

Lord Milner: "If the national meeting agrees to give you power to sign

this document, it will certainly mean that the burghers as a whole are

agreeable; and those who after this do not submit will be--well, I do

not know what I can call them--outlaws. But we will not consider such

an eventuality possible."

General Botha: "We desire a peace that will be honourable to both

parties. And, as I understand this document, we are leaving honour

behind us, for we are now not only surrendering our independence, but we

are allowing every burgher to be fettered hand and foot. Where is the

'honourable peace' for us? If we conclude peace, we have to do it as men

who have to live and die here. We must not agree to a peace which leaves

behind in the hearts of one party a wound that will never heal. I will

do everything in my power to obtain peace. But it seems to me that this

document asks too much of us, because, if I interpret it aright, it

means that we must surrender our independence, that every one must give

up his weapons, and that the leaders, in addition, must sign an

undertaking to this effect."

Lord Milner: "All that we wish is that the people should live peacefully

together as British citizens. If we do not obtain this, then I do not

know what we do obtain."

Lord Kitchener: "I do not think that the Commandant-General realizes

what the schedule contains. In it we state what we are ready to grant.

Perhaps it would be best that the schedule should be arranged now, and

then you will see that an honourable peace is proposed."

General Botha: "Well, then, explain the document."

Lords Kitchener and Milner: "You are to help us: we do not know what the

burghers demand."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "By signing this document we shall place

ourselves in the position which the Commandant-General has so clearly

described."

General De la Rey: "We cannot form a judgment on anything that is not

properly elaborated. I have no objection to the constitution of a

sub-committee with the duty of helping in the work."

Commandant-General Botha: "I also have no objection, since I understand

that it binds nobody to anything."

Lord Kitchener: "No, nobody will be bound."

General De la Rey: "We wish to have the matter concluded, so that we may

know what is before us."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I should like to have it clearly understood

that I do not think there is the least chance of a Government of which

Lords Kitchener and Milner are the heads being accepted. An arrangement

of this nature would, it seems to me, be an insurmountable difficulty.

When I feel so strongly in this matter, it would not be fair to their

Excellencies for me to remain silent."

Lord Kitchener: "I think it would be better if General de Wet were to

wait until he has seen the whole document before he gives his opinion."

It was then agreed that Judge Hertzog and General Smuts should act as a

sub-committee, in order to draw up a complete draft with Lord Kitchener,

who was to be assisted by Sir Richard Solomon.

The meeting then adjourned.

On Wednesday, 21st May, 1902, the Conference reassembled.

Lord Milner laid before the meeting the documents which he had drawn up

with the help of the sub-committee. It was in the form of a contract,

and the names of the members of both Governments were now filled in. The

document was the same as that telegraphed, with the exception of Article

11, dealing with the notes and receipts and the sum of three million

pounds.

It was read in Dutch and English, and ran as follows:--

"General Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, Commander-in-Chief, and His

Excellency Lord Milner, High Commissioner, on behalf of the British

Government;

"Messrs. S.D. Burger, F.W. Reitz, Louis Botha, J.H. De la Rey, L.J.

Meijer, and J.C. Krogh, on behalf of the Government of the South African

Republic and its burghers;

"Messrs. M.T. Steyn, W.J.C. Brebner, C.R. de Wet, J.B.M. Hertzog, and

C.H. Olivier, on behalf of the Government of the Orange Free State and

its burghers, being anxious to put an end to the existing hostilities,

agree on the following points:--

"Firstly, the burgher forces now in the Veldt shall at once lay down

their arms, and surrender all the guns, small arms and war stores in

their actual possession, or of which they have cognizance; and shall

refrain from any further opposition to the authority of His Majesty King

Edward VII., whom they acknowledge as their lawful sovereign.

"The manner and details of this surrender shall be arranged by Lord

Kitchener, Commandant-General Botha, Assistant-Commandant-General J.H.

De la Rey, and Commander-in-Chief de Wet.

"Secondly, burghers in the Veldt beyond the frontiers of the Transvaal

and of the Orange River Colony shall, on their surrender, be brought

back to their homes.

"Thirdly, all prisoners of war, being at the time burghers out of South

Africa, shall, on their declaring that they accept this status of

subjects of His Majesty King Edward VII., be brought back to the farms

on which they were living before the war.

"Fourthly, the burghers who thus surrender, or who thus return, shall

lose neither their personal freedom nor their property.

"Fifthly, no judicial proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be taken

against any of the burghers who thus return for any action of theirs in

connexion with the carrying on of the war.

"Sixthly, the Dutch language shall be taught in the public schools of

the Transvaal and of the Orange River Colony, where the parents of the

children demand it; and shall be admitted in the courts of justice,

wherever this is required for the better and more effective

administration of justice.

"Seventhly, the possession of rifles shall, on taking out a license in

accordance with the law, be permitted in the Transvaal and in the Orange

River Colony, to persons who require them for their protection.

"Eighthly, military administration in the Transvaal and in the Orange

River Colony shall, as soon as possible, be followed by civil

government; and, as soon as circumstances permit it, a representative

system tending towards autonomy shall be introduced.

"Ninthly, the question of granting the franchise to the natives shall

not be decided until a representative constitution has been granted.

"Tenthly, no special tax shall be laid on landed property in the

Transvaal and Orange River Colony to meet the expenses of the war.

"Eleventhly, a judicial Commission shall be appointed, to which the

government bank notes, issued under Law No. 1 of the South African

Republic, may be presented within six months. All such notes, if found

to have been duly issued in conformity with the terms of the law, and if

the presenting party shall have given consideration in value, shall be

honoured, but without interest.

"All receipts issued in the Veldt by the officers of the late Republics,

or by their orders, may also be presented to the said Commission within

six months; and if they have been given _bona fide_ in exchange for

goods used by the burghers in the Veldt, they shall be paid in full to

the persons to whom they were originally issued.

"The amount payable on account of the said Government's notes and

receipts shall not exceed £3,000,000; and in case the whole amount of

such notes and receipts accepted by the Commission should exceed that

amount, a _pro rata_ reduction shall be made.

"The prisoners of war shall be given facilities to present their notes

and receipts within the above-mentioned six months.

"Twelfthly, as soon as circumstances shall permit, there shall be

appointed in each district of the Transvaal and of the Orange River

Colony a Commission, in which the inhabitants of that district shall be

represented, under the chairmanship of a magistrate or other official,

with a view to assist in the bringing back of the people to their farms,

and in procuring for those who, on account of losses through the war,

are unable to provide for themselves, food, shelter, and such quantities

of seed, cattle, implements, etc., as are necessary for the resuming of

their previous callings. Funds for this purpose, repayable by

instalments extending over a number of years, shall be advanced--free of

interest--by the Government."

Lord Milner: "If we come to an agreement, it will be the _English_

document which will be wired to England, on which His Majesty's

Government will decide, and which will be signed."

Commandant-General Botha: "Will not a Dutch translation be annexed?"

Lord Milner: "I have no objection to the addition of a Dutch

translation. This, then, is the document which we are prepared to lay

before the English Government."

Commandant-General Botha: "There are a few points on which I wish to

speak. The first is in reference to the receipts given by our officers.

It seems to me quite right that they should be mentioned in the

paragraph about government notes. These receipts were issued, in

accordance with instructions given by our Government, for the purchase

of cattle, grain, and other necessaries for the support of our

commandos; and the chief officers now present, as well as all other

officers, have acted according to these instructions and issued

receipts. Therefore I make this request. Some of these receipts were

afterwards paid in part, and others in full, in government notes. But

many were not paid at all. I do not believe that the amount is great,

but it will strengthen our hands to be able to take up this affair

honourably, for our honour is concerned in so far as we have signed the

receipts. It will be a great point in our favour to be able to go before

our delegates and tell them that they are guaranteed on this point, for

most of them are officers."

Lord Kitchener: "I understand that General Botha refers not to

commandeer or requisition notes, but only to actual receipts issued on

the Treasury."

Lord Milner: "I do not see any difference between these receipts and

commandeer notes. The willingness of persons to sell goods makes no

difference in a legal document."

Lord Kitchener: "I mean that it makes a difference whether it is an

order on the Treasury or a requisition note. I should limit this

(guarantee) to receipts on the Treasury, issued in consequence of a law

that permitted a certain sum to be issued."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "No decision was come to in the Free State as

to how much was to be issued."

Lord Kitchener: "Am I to understand by this that it is an unlimited

amount, or does it come within the amount decided on by the Volksraad?"

General Smuts: "While the Government existed the Volksraad empowered it

to issue notes up to a certain amount. And this was done. Moreover the

officers in the Veldt had the right to make purchases for the commandos

and to give receipts for them."

Lord Milner: "I can see no difference between receipts and requisition

notes, and they have been issued for an unlimited amount."

General Smuts: "These receipts were issued under a totally different

law. They were not paid out of the credit voted by the Volksraad."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I would have it clearly understood that I

quite agree with what has been said by the Commandant-General, namely

that the honour of every officer is engaged for these documents, and if

your Excellencies agree it will give us a strong weapon with which to

return to the delegates."

Lord Milner: "The proposal is _de facto_ that the British Government

shall repay all the monies which the Republics borrowed with the object

of fighting against England."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "Yet we have fought honourably, and if we

give up our independence it is no more than fair that you should meet us

in this matter."

Commandant-General Botha: "Am I to understand your position to be that

we must surrender everything, and that whilst you take away the freedom

of our country (which amounts to many millions) you at the same time

refuse all responsibility for our debts. We had been recognized by you

as belligerent, and so are entirely in our rights in asking that when

you seize the riches of the country you shall also take its debts upon

your shoulders. So long as the British Government reaches the great goal

at which it is aiming, a matter so easily arranged as this should not

cause any difficulty: we are not bickering about trifles, but are

bringing forward what to us is a real hardship, and you must take it for

granted that when we say something here we really mean it. And now we

tell you that this matter is an obstacle in our way. Personally, we

have not signed many receipts: it was the officers of lower rank who

signed the greater number, and it is these very officers who form the

majority of the national meeting at Vereeniging. In some instances, I

may add, special persons were appointed for the purpose of carrying out

this work."

Lord Milner: "We do not take over the assets without taking also the

liabilities. We take over all the debts owed by the country before the

war, and we have even agreed to take over a debt--a legal debt--in the

shape of notes, which notes we are fully aware it only became necessary

to issue on account of the war, and thus we are already paying a part of

the cost incurred in fighting us. I think this is a very great

concession; and when I agreed that it should be put down I said that I

believed (and I still am of the same opinion) that the English

Government would take exception to it, although I hope that this will

not be the case. But to go further than this, and to ask us to pay not

only a debt contracted under a law for the furtherance of the war, but

also every debt contracted by every officer in the armies of both

Republics, for the purpose of fighting us, is to my mind a most

extravagant proposal. In answer to what General Botha has said, I may

observe that the Commission appears to think that we have no persons

behind us whose feelings and prejudices (if you use that word) we are

bound to take into consideration. If this matter causes a difficulty

among your burghers, I can only say that I am sure that your proposal

will cause the British Government the greatest trouble when dealing with

the nation, with whose feelings they have to reckon."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I should like to explain the position of the

Orange Free State. In the Transvaal a law was passed empowering the

Government to issue £1,000,000; but in the Orange Free State nothing was

done, as the Government possessed the right to pay with receipts, and we

thought that a receipt was as good and as legal as a note; and

therefore, from my point of view, the two are of equal importance."

Commandant-General Botha: "I might point out that we should not insist

so much on the technical meaning of words--and this is especially true

for your side, because we have assembled here with the aim of stopping

the hostilities which cause you such great expenses every month; and our

meeting may be able to bring these expenses to an end. Therefore, if you

accept our proposal and pay these receipts, you might save almost enough

to cover the cost you incur. It would be much cheaper to make an end of

the war by co-operation than to let matters drift on. Therefore I

believe that it is the duty of both parties to be willing to make

concessions when obstacles appear."

General de Wet: "I can assure His Excellency, Lord Milner, that the

people always believed that should everything be lost they still would

be able to obtain this money due on receipts. If this is not granted, I

cannot imagine what the results will be. I am afraid of the

consequences; and I trust that you will do your best to meet our

wishes."

Commandant-General Botha: "It will not be a very large sum, but we

cannot give you the exact amount."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "You can well understand that our expenses

are only a drop in the ocean compared with yours. If I am right, the

Orange Free State had three quarters of a million when the war began,

and the issue of receipts only started when that sum was exhausted. Your

Excellencies must acknowledge that we have the same obligation of

creditor through these receipts as we should have in any other case."

Commandant-General Botha: "You have already many of our notes in your

possession. In one case alone there were fifty thousand hidden away, and

found by you. I have stated privately to Lord Milner that what we are

now striving to obtain has already been granted to us _de facto_ by Lord

Kitchener. In Lord Kitchener's Middelburg proposal the paying of the

Government notes was refused, but there was a proviso that the receipts

should be paid to the amount of one million. Should this now be

withdrawn, surely such a withdrawal would form a deviation from the

Middelburg proposal. The paying of notes is legal, and is on quite

another footing, and I cannot understand how it could have been refused

in the Middelburg proposal. That it should be granted now is only

reasonable. But as regards the payment of receipts, although it was

allowed then up to a certain amount, it is now withdrawn. At this

present stage of the proceedings I think that a point which had already

been practically conceded in the previous negotiations should not be

allowed to form a stumbling-block to a final agreement. I believe that

the amount is only small; I was for one year in conjunction with De la

Rey in command of the forces of the South African Republic. During that

period of time an account was kept of all the receipts, and only a short

time back the books were still in our possession. These receipts were

issued in an orderly manner, and each of them was duly entered in a

book, as far as I was able to judge. These receipts amounted to quite a

small sum; and although Lord Milner would draw back if the sum was very

big, the question how far he will go can be settled when the proposal is

accepted. Yet I personally think that there are no grounds for fear, and

the amount is really far smaller than you imagine."

Lord Milner: "I do not think it is so much a question of amount. This

paying of notes and requisition notes appears to me very unreasonable. I

believe that in this matter I am only voicing the opinion of the great

majority of the British nation when I say that my countrymen would much

prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of hostilities with the

object of bettering the condition of the people who have been fighting

against them than to pay a much smaller sum to meet the costs incurred

by the Republics during the war. Whether such a view is right or wrong,

it is a view you have to reckon with. We do not wish to pay the accounts

of both parties; and my opinion of the clause quoted from the Middelburg

proposal is that that clause was one of its faults. But should anything

of the kind become necessary, then I think that the paying of the notes

is less objectionable than the paying of the requisition notes. I placed

this point about the payment of notes in the draft because I thought

that if it came to a choice between paying one or the other you would

prefer that the notes should be paid. However, if it should be thought

better to return on this point to the Middelburg proposal, although I am

greatly against the clause, I will waive my objection to it if Lord

Kitchener is agreeable."

General Smuts: "I am afraid that we cannot agree to this, for we thought

that the notes would be beyond all dispute."

Judge Hertzog: "I do not think that your Excellency is representing the

matter fairly when you say that you will not pay the bills of both

parties. There is one thing to be taken into consideration as regards

the Orange Free State, and which must be considered before everything

else, and that is, that we have made no loans nor have we given any

government notes. The notes we used were notes of the South African

Republic, which had been sent to the Orange Free State. Our law was

formed on the idea that in case of war all the costs should be paid by

commission notes. The Orange Free State acted on this principle, and

receipts were issued. If we take into consideration at the same time

that we have been and still are recognized by you as belligerent, then

we can only say: On our side we surrender everything that we possess,

and we only ask the other party to acknowledge the fact that if we had

contracted a loan it would have been to the charge of the British

Government, who, in taking everything from us, renders itself

responsible for our public loans. Lord Milner should understand that it

is of just as much importance to us for the receipts to be paid as it is

to the South African Republic for the loan, which it contracted before

the war, to be taken over by the British Government. But I can even go

further and give Lord Milner the assurance that we have acted more

economically when issuing these receipts than we should have done had we

contracted the loan previous to the war. Now we have only what is

absolutely necessary to meet our present needs. So that Lord Milner must

own that we find ourselves in the same position towards those who are in

possession of receipts, as we should have occupied towards any other

creditor we might have had before the war began. I must give my support

to what the Commandant-General has said; and I can only repeat what I

have already informally told Lord Milner, namely, that this difficulty

is almost insurmountable."

Lord Milner: "We can refer this to our Government. But your proposal is

altogether antagonistic to the Middelburg proposal, which absolutely

rejected the idea of taking over all the debts of the two States."

Lord Kitchener: "I should like to know the amount."

General De la Rey: "My issue of notes amounts to between twenty and

fifty thousand pounds; but I cannot say what the issue in receipt has

been."

Lord Milner: "There really is a feasible compromise, namely, to allow

the notes and receipts to come in and to establish the suggested limit

of £1,000,000."

Lord Kitchener: "Would that meet your difficulty?"

Commandant-General Botha: "No."

Lord Kitchener: "Well, would two or three million be sufficient? We must

have a limit before we can do anything."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "It is impossible to stipulate the amount."

Lord Kitchener: "If you were in a position to give a limit, it would

simplify matters."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I agree with that entirely, and I can quite

understand the position in which you are placed. Yet it is absolutely

impossible to assign an amount. Will you give us your permission to

adjourn for a moment in order to discuss the matter?"

The meeting was then adjourned. It reassembled at 2.30 p.m.

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "We have agreed to fix on a sum of £3,000,000

for the government notes and receipts; their amount paid _pro rata_ can

be lowered should this sum prove insufficient. We have drawn up an

article to lay before the meeting."

General Smuts then read a draft which was inserted at the end of Article

11 in the draft agreement.

In answer to a question by Lord Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief de Wet

said: "The prisoners of war on the different islands who are in

possession of such notes should be given an opportunity of sending them

in for payment."

Lord Milner: "What is the next point you wish to raise? We now

understand what your position is."

Commandant-General Botha: "Am I to understand that you mean that we are

getting away from the point in discussion?"

Lord Milner: "This document contains your view of the matter, so we are

now aware of your idea."

Commandant-General Botha: "We must know what to say to the delegates."

Lord Kitchener: "Is this the only point you wish to bring forward, or

are there others in addition?"

Commandant-General Botha: "There is another concerning the protection of

debtors, which is a vital question for us."

Lord Milner: "We must not have any beating about the bush. Everything

must appear in the document."

General Smuts: "Most of the debts contracted before the war will have to

be paid after the war; and if the debtors cannot pay we are afraid that

it will result in the ruin of a great part of the inhabitants. We should

like to see steps taken to prevent this. If Lord Milner intends to take

such steps, we should like to be informed what they are."

Lord Milner: "I think it would be best if you were to make a proposal on

this point."

General Smuts: "Our proposal is roughly that all interest which became

payable during the war should be joined to the principal, and that this

should be payable six months after the war."

Lord Kitchener: "Is it necessary to make a proposal about this?"

General Smuts: "If the Government is prepared to meet us in this

difficulty it will be unnecessary to place a formal clause in the draft

agreement."

Lord Milner: "As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain

promises in this document, and I consider that all promises to which a

reference may be made later should appear in it. Everything to which the

Government is asked to bind itself should appear in this document, and

nothing else. I do not object to clauses being added, but I wish to

prevent any possible misunderstanding."

General Smuts: "Well, in that case we are quite willing to propose such

a paragraph."

Commandant-General Botha: "We waive this question, so that early

measures may be taken to arrive at an understanding. In case a great

number of the inhabitants become subjects of His Majesty, it is to every

one's interest, and principally to that of the Government, that these

people should not be ruined. They will be thrown upon the mercy of a

Government, whose duty it is to study their interests. If steps are not

taken to prevent it, speculators who have been buying up the liabilities

will, as soon as peace is concluded, enforce them, and directly the

Courts of Justice are opened they will issue summonses. Against this we

have to be on our guard."

Lord Milner: "I agree with the Commandant-General. I think that as these

people become subjects of His Majesty, then some provision will have to

be made for them. But I believe it to be neither necessary nor advisable

to point out in every particular case the way in which His Majesty's

Government has to provide for these people. I think that an idea

exists--perhaps it is a very natural idea--because we have been fighting

against the burghers that, therefore, after peace has been concluded we

shall still retain a feeling of enmity against them. Just the opposite,

however, is the truth. Our endeavour will naturally be, from the moment

hostilities cease, to gain the confidence of the people and to do our

best to promote their welfare. But if we have to bind ourselves

beforehand in regard to the manner in which we shall deal with all sorts

of involved legal questions, further misunderstandings are certain to

occur. If you have not confidence in us--that we shall try to be a

righteous Government, and to maintain the balance between the different

classes of His Majesty's subjects--then you must put in writing every

point that strikes you, and let them be laid before His Majesty's

Government, to see what they think about them."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I trust that you will not think that we are

trying to tie the hands of His Majesty's Government. There are many

other points which will give the Government opportunity to win the

confidence of the people. But about things which concern the financial

position of burghers who are entirely ruined we feel it our duty to

obtain definite promises. They will be a weapon in our hands when we

return to the delegates."

Commandant-General Botha: "I do not quite understand, Lord Milner. I did

not interpret Mr. Chamberlain's telegram in the sense that we had to

present new proposals in order to bind our hands further. I thought that

proposals were to be made with a view to establishing peace."

Lord Kitchener: "I do not think that it is altogether necessary to

include this proposal in the document. It concerns the very involved

legal questions as to what the rights of creditor and debtor shall be,

and as to what the law in the Transvaal may be on the matter. I think

that every one can rest assured that the interests of the Boers will be

protected by the Government in every way; and this, whether the point is

put down now or left in the hands of the Government with the

recommendation from this Commission to take the matter into serious

consideration.

"I think that I know of a better way to deal with this involved

question. Let this matter be brought under the consideration of the

Government. I may be mistaken, but, as far as I can see, it will prove a

very thorny question for the lawyers, and will take a long time before

it can be clearly stated. It is, however, the wish of us all that you

should return to the delegates equipped in such a way that you will be

able to arrive at a decision. You may rest assured that the matter which

you have brought before us has been included in the minutes of this

meeting. I do not think that it is necessary for you to go further than

this. The matter can now be carefully considered, not only here, but

also in England; and you may be quite sure that your interests will

receive, in every way, full consideration."

General De la Rey: "I think that the matter has been sufficiently

discussed in the presence of your Excellencies, and that it need not be

placed in the draft contract, for by so doing one might stumble on legal

questions."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "This is my point of view: There are two

parties, and one of them is about to cease to exist. It is, therefore,

natural that this party cannot allow a vital question to pass unnoticed.

It is for this reason that I cannot agree that this matter should be

omitted from the draft contract. It will not be necessary that the

military Government which now exists should continue after the war."

Lord Kitchener: "But the question will have to be settled by the Civil

Government. It is a matter for lawyers, and must be laid before them,

and will require much consideration."

Commandant-General Botha: "When hostilities are concluded it will be

possible to summon a burgher for a debt contracted before the war. I put

this request because our law states that no burgher can be summoned till

sixty days have elapsed since the conclusion of peace."

Lord Kitchener: "You may entirely rely upon this, that whenever the war

is over each burgher will have the absolute right to obtain

consideration for his position in every way, and that his interests will

be protected under the new as under the old régime."

Commandant-General Botha: "I understand that perfectly. But the

possibility exists that syndicates may be formed to buy up all the

debts, and the people may be ruined before a single burgher is in the

position to earn anything or to have his position restored."

Lord Kitchener: "I quite agree with what the Commandant-General has

said, and he is quite right to bring the question up. Yet I do not think

that the draft contract is the best place in which to bring it forward.

Once peace is a fact, then it will be the duty of every one to draw the

attention of the Government to what is required to aid the nation; but

to bring up difficulties at the present moment, and to attempt to right

them, seems to be an endless task, and one for which this document was

not destined."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I am of opinion that this is a matter which

should be settled by a proclamation; but I want to have as many weapons

as possible in my hands when I return to the national delegates, and one

of the first questions that will be asked me is this, 'What guarantee do

we possess that we shall not be ruined by our creditors?' It would not

be much trouble to you to give us now a draft of the proclamation which

would be issued as soon as peace is concluded."

Lord Kitchener: "But this would be something quite apart from the matter

under discussion."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "Yes."

Lord Milner: "What is the good then?"

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "It is such a vital question for us that you

cannot take it amiss if we insist upon it, for we have to give up

everything."

Lord Kitchener: "Of course, no one is blaming you."

Lord Milner: "But without any thought of blame, I must point out that

the effect of their proposal would be that another clause would have to

be inserted in the draft contract, undertaking that such a proclamation

would be issued."

Lord Kitchener: "I think that as long as the delegates receive an

assurance that the Government will take this matter into consideration,

in the interests of their subjects, whom they are bound to protect, that

such an assurance ought to suffice. There should be no written

undertaking, but only a promise that the matter shall receive attention.

It is not advisable after the subject has been brought before the

Government to press the matter further. The feelings of the burghers,

moreover, in other ways than this, will be brought before Lord Milner."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "If we wished to do so, we could insist upon

many other little points, but we only bring up vital questions."

Lord Kitchener: "This is one of the questions which, when once brought

under the consideration of the Government cannot be put aside; and you

may tell the burghers that their interests will be protected as fully as

is possible. I think that, in so complicated a matter, this ought to be

sufficient for them. All that is debated here is recorded in the

minutes, and these minutes will be considered not only here, but also in

England. Are you satisfied with this?"

Commandant-General Botha: "Yes, so far as I am concerned."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "I also am satisfied."

Lord Milner: "I hope it is quite understood that if the matter is

allowed to remain where it is, my Government will be under no obligation

to treat the matter in any particular way."

Lord Kitchener: "But there is a pledge that the matter will be properly

considered."

Lord Milner: "Yes, naturally; if we put anything down in writing. I am

convinced that it is necessary to make it quite clear that this document

must contain everything about which there is anything in the form of a

pledge."

Lord Kitchener: "There is, then, a pledge that the point upon which you

have touched will be considered in your interests."

General Smuts: "There still remains the question of the payment of

receipts."

Lord Kitchener: "That will be placed before the Government. The sum is

an essential point; I believe the amount to be considerable. I should

now like to know that it is understood that we are agreed about all

these draft proposals, including your amendments, and that there are no

further questions to be brought forward--it is necessary to know this,

as they would have to be telegraphed to England."

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "We have no further points to raise."

Lord Milner: "The telegram that I shall despatch is as follows:

'The Commission is prepared to lay before their burgher meeting the

following document (in the event of it being sanctioned by His

Majesty's Government), and to ask of the meeting a "Yes" or "No."'

"Is that satisfactory?"

Commander-in-Chief de Wet: "Yes, naturally. Only I cannot say that this

document has my approval. Yet I shall be content to abide by the

decision of the delegates."

Judge Hertzog: "I should not like to think that we are bound to use our

influence with the delegates."

Lord Milner: "I think that is understood. I understand that the members

of the Commission are not bound in respect of the opinions they may

express before the burghers. They are only bound, if the British

Government approves of the document, to lay it before the people. I

propose to send the following telegram:

'The Commission is prepared to lay the following document before

the burgher meeting at Vereeniging, for a "Yes" or "No" vote, in

the event of His Majesty's Government approving of it.'

"I want also to state that we have completely deviated from the

Middelburg proposal. I believe everyone is fully aware that the

Middelburg proposal has been annulled altogether. Should an agreement be

arranged in conformity with this document, and signed, then no attempt

must be made to explain the document, or its terms, by anything in the

Middelburg proposal."

The meeting was now adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 28TH, 1902.

The Commission met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner at eleven o'clock with

the purpose of hearing the British Government's answer to the draft

proposal sent by their Lordships.

Lord Milner read the following memorandum:

"In answer to the telegram composed at our last meeting with the consent

of the Commission and of which the members have received a copy, the

following message has been received from His Majesty's Government:--

'His Majesty's Government sanctions the laying before the meeting for a

"Yes" or "No" vote the document drawn up by the Commission and sent by

Lord Kitchener on the 21st May to the Secretary of War, with the

following amendments:

'The final proposal made by the British Government, on which the

national representatives at Vereeniging have to answer "Yes" or "No."

'General Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, Commander-in-Chief, and His

Excellency Lord Milner, High Commissioner, on behalf of the British

Government;

'Messrs. S.W. Burger, F.W. Reitz, Louis Botha, J.H. De la Rey, L.J.

Meijer, and J.C. Krogh on behalf of the Government of the South African

Republic and its burghers;

'Messrs. M.T. Steyn, W.J.C. Brebner, C.R. de Wet, J.B.M. Hertzog, and

C.H. Olivier on behalf of the Government of the Orange Free State and

its burghers, being anxious to put an end to the existing hostilities,

agree on the following points:

'Firstly, the burgher forces now in the Veldt shall at once lay down

their arms, and surrender all the guns, small arms, and war stores in

their actual possession, or of which they have cognizance, and shall

abstain from any further opposition to the authority of His Majesty King

Edward VII., whom they acknowledge as their lawful sovereign.

'The manner and details of this surrender shall be arranged by Lord

Kitchener, Commandant-General Botha, Assistant-Commandant-General J.H.

De la Rey, and Commander-in-Chief de Wet.

'Secondly, burghers in the Veldt beyond the frontiers of the Transvaal

and of the Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war who are out of

South Africa, who are burghers, shall, on their declaration that they

accept the status of subjects of His Majesty King Edward VII., be

brought back to their homes, as soon as transport and means of

subsistence can be assured.

'Thirdly, the burghers who thus surrender, or who thus return, shall

lose neither their personal freedom nor their property.

'Fourthly, no judicial proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be taken

against any of the burghers who thus return for any action in connexion

with the carrying on of the war. The benefit of this clause shall,

however, not extend to certain deeds antagonistic to the usages of

warfare, which have been communicated by the Commander-in-Chief to the

Boer Generals, and which shall be heard before a court martial

immediately after the cessation of hostilities.

'Fifthly, the Dutch language shall be taught in the public schools of

the Transvaal and of the Orange River Colony when the parents of

children demand it; and shall be admitted in the Courts of Justice,

whenever this is required for the better and more effective

administration of justice.

'Sixthly, the possession of rifles shall, on taking out a licence in

accordance with the law, be permitted in the Transvaal and the Orange

River Colony to persons who require them for their protection.

'Seventhly, military administration in the Transvaal and in the Orange

River Colony shall, as soon as it is possible, be followed by civil

government; and, as soon as circumstances permit it, a representative

system tending towards autonomy shall be introduced.

'Eighthly, the question of granting a franchise to the native shall not

be decided until a representative constitution has been granted.

'Ninthly, no special tax shall be laid on landed property in the

Transvaal and Orange River Colony, to meet the expenses of the war.

'Tenthly, as soon as circumstances permit there shall be appointed in

each district in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony a Commission,

in which the inhabitants of that district shall be represented, under

the chairmanship of a magistrate or other official, with the view to

assist in the bringing back of the people to their farms, and in

procuring for those who, on account of losses in the war are unable to

provide for themselves, food, shelter, and such quantities of seed,

cattle, implements, etc., as are necessary for the resuming of their

previous callings.

'His Majesty's Government shall place at the disposal of these

Commissions the sum of £3,000,000 for the above-mentioned purposes, and

shall allow that all notes issued in conformity with Law No. 1, 1900, of

the Government of the South African Republic, and all receipts given by

the officers in the Veldt of the late Republics, or by their order, may

be presented to a judicial Commission by the Government, and in case

such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to have been duly

issued for consideration in value, then they shall be accepted by the

said Commission as proof of war losses, suffered by the persons to whom

they had originally been given. In addition to the above-named free gift

of £3,000,000, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to grant

advances, in the shape of loans, for the same ends, free of interest for

two years, and afterwards repayable over a period of years with three

per cent. interest. No foreigner or rebel shall be entitled to benefit

by this clause.'

Lord Milner: "In making this communication to the Commission we are

instructed to add that if this opportunity of concluding an honourable

peace is not taken advantage of within a time to be fixed by us, then

this conference shall be regarded as closed, and His Majesty's

Government shall not be bound in any way by the present terms. I have,

in order that there may be no mistake about these terms, made a copy of

the documents and of Lord Kitchener's telegram, also of the amendments

and additions determined on by His Majesty's Government, and of the

memorandum to which I have just drawn your attention."

A debate now followed on the time that should be allowed for the

discussion of the proposals at Vereeniging, and it was agreed that

Commandant-General Botha should propose a term that very day before the

Commission left Pretoria.

It was subsequently settled that the delegates must arrive at a decision

before Saturday evening, May 31st.

General Botha asked if there were any objection to the delegates erasing

any paragraph of the proposal sent by the British Government.

Lord Milner: "There must be no alteration. Only 'Yes' or 'No' is to be

answered."

Commandant-General Botha: "I think that the burghers have the right to

erase any article they may wish, for they have the right to surrender

unconditionally."

Lord Milner replied that the burghers certainly had the power to do so,

but the document of the British Government could not be changed.

There now followed an informal discussion about the colonists who had

been fighting on the side of the Republics.

Lord Milner communicated what the British Government's intentions were

with regard to these colonists; and read the following document:--

"His Majesty's Government has to formally place on record that the

colonists of Natal and the Cape Colony who have been engaged in fighting

and who now surrender shall, on their return, be dealt with by the

Colonial Governments in accordance with the laws of the Colonies, and

that all British subjects who have joined the enemy shall be liable to

be tried under the law of that part of the British Empire to which they

belong.

"His Majesty's Government has received from the Government of Cape

Colony a statement of their opinion as regards the terms to be offered

to British subjects of the Cape Colony who are still in the Veldt or who

have surrendered since April 12th, 1901. The terms are as follows:--In

regard to the burghers, they all, on their surrender, after having laid

down their arms, shall sign a document before a resident magistrate of

the district in which their surrender has taken place, in which document

they shall declare themselves guilty of high treason; and their

punishment, in the event of their not having been guilty of murder, or

of other deeds in contradiction to the customs of civilized warfare,

shall be that for the rest of their lives they shall not be registered

as voters, nor shall they be able to vote in Parliamentary, district, or

municipal elections. As regards justices and veldtcornets of the Cape

Colony, and all other persons who had occupied official positions under

the Government of Cape Colony, and all who held the rank of commandant

in the rebel or burgher forces, they shall be brought on the charge of

high treason before the ordinary Courts of the country, or before such

special Courts as later on may legally be constituted. The punishment

for their misdeeds shall be left to the discretion of the Court, with

this reservation, that in no case shall capital punishment be inflicted.

"The Government of Natal is of opinion that the rebels should be judged

by the laws of the Colony."

The meeting now adjourned.

The secretaries and Messrs. de Wet and J. Ferreira, with the help of

lawyers, set themselves the task of making copies of the proposal of the

British Government for the use of the national representatives at

Vereeniging. This work kept them engaged until the evening.

At seven o'clock the Commission left Pretoria and returned to

Vereeniging.

THE MIDDELBURG PROPOSAL.

LORD KITCHENER TO COMMANDANT-GENERAL BOTHA.

PRETORIA, _March 7, 1901_.

YOUR HONOUR,--

With reference to our conversation at Middelburg on the 28th

February, I have the honour to inform you that, in the event of a

general and complete cessation of hostilities, and the surrender of

all rifles, ammunition, cannon and other munitions of war in the

hands of the burghers, or in Government depots, or elsewhere, His

Majesty's Government is prepared to adopt the following measures.

His Majesty's Government will at once grant an amnesty in the

Transvaal and Orange River Colony for all _bonâ fide_ acts of war

committed during the recent hostilities. British subjects belonging

to Natal and Cape Colony, while they will not be compelled to

return to those Colonies, will, if they do so, be liable to be

dealt with by the laws of those Colonies specially passed to meet

the circumstances arising out of the present war. As you are

doubtless aware, the special law in the Cape Colony has greatly

mitigated the ordinary penalties for high treason in the present

case.

All prisoners of war, now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or elsewhere,

being burghers or colonists, will, on the completion of the

surrender, be brought back to their country as quickly as

arrangements can be made for their transport.

At the earliest practicable date military administration will

cease, and will be replaced by civil administration in the form of

Crown Colony Government. There will, therefore, be, in the first

instance, in each of the new Colonies, a Governor and an Executive

Council, composed of the principal officials, with a Legislative

Council consisting of a certain number of official members to whom

a nominated unofficial element will be added. But it is the desire

of His Majesty's Government, as soon as circumstances permit, to

introduce a representative element, and ultimately to concede to

the new Colonies the privilege of self-government. Moreover, on the

cessation of hostilities, a High Court will be established in each

of the new Colonies to administer the laws of the land, and this

Court will be independent of the Executive.

Church property, public trusts, and orphan funds will be

respected.

Both the English and Dutch languages will be used and taught in

public schools when the parents of the children desire it, and

allowed in Courts of Law.

As regards the debts of the late Republican Governments, His

Majesty's Government cannot undertake any liability. It is,

however, prepared, as an act of grace, to set aside a sum not

exceeding one million pounds sterling to repay inhabitants of the

Transvaal and Orange River Colony for goods requisitioned from them

by the late Republican Governments, or subsequent to annexation, by

Commandants in the field being in a position to enforce such

requisitions. But such claims will have to be established to the

satisfaction of a Judge or Judicial Commission, appointed by the

Government, to investigate and assess them, and, if exceeding in

the aggregate one million pounds, they will be liable to reduction

_pro rata_.

I also beg to inform Your Honour that the new Government will take

into immediate consideration the possibility of assisting by loan

the occupants of farms, who will take the oath of allegiance, to

repair any injuries sustained by destruction of buildings or loss

of stock during the war, and that no special war tax will be

imposed upon farms to defray the expense of the war.

When burghers require the protection of firearms, such will be

allowed to them by licence, and on due registration, provided they

take the oath of allegiance. Licences will also be issued for

sporting rifles, guns, etc., but military firearms will only be

allowed for purposes of protection.

As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the

Transvaal and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His

Majesty's Government to give such franchise before representative

Government is granted to those Colonies, and if then given it will

be so limited as to secure the just predominance of the white race.

The legal position of coloured persons will, however, be similar to

that which they hold in the Cape Colony.

In conclusion I must inform Your Honour that, if the terms now

offered are not accepted after a reasonable delay for consideration

they must be regarded as cancelled.

I have, etc.,

KITCHENER, GENERAL,

Commander-in-Chief British Forces, South Africa.

To His Honour, Commandant-General Louis Botha.

Appendix C

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES AT

VEREENIGING, SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, THURSDAY, THE 29TH OF MAY, 1902,

AND THE FOLLOWING DAYS

MAY 29TH, 1902.

The Rev. J.D. Kestell having offered prayer, the Chairman requested

Vice-President Burger to address the meeting.

Vice-President Burger said that the documents laid before the

Governments by the Commission would now be read to the meeting.

Thereupon Mr. D. Van Velden read the following letter:

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION.

PRETORIA, _28th May_, 1902.

_To the Governments of the Orange Free State and the South African

Republic:_

HONBLE. GENTLEMEN,--

In accordance with instructions received from you, we went to

Pretoria in order to negotiate with the British authorities on the

question of peace. We have the honour to make the following report:

The meetings lasted from Monday, May 19th, to Wednesday, May 28th,

its prolongation having been principally caused by the length of

time taken up by the cable correspondence with the British

Government.

We first handed in a proposal (annexed under A)[113] in which we

attempted to negotiate on the basis of a limited independence with

surrender of part of our territory. Lords Kitchener and Milner

refused emphatically to negotiate on this basis, and expressed the

opinion that to cable this proposal to the British Government would

be detrimental to the objects of these negotiations. They told us

they had already informed the two Governments that the British

Government would only negotiate on the basis of an amended form of

the Middelburg proposal. In order finally to formulate this

proposal, Lord Milner asked the assistance of some members of the

Commission; and this was granted, on the understanding that the

assistance of these members of the Commission should be given

without prejudice to themselves.

As the result of the deliberations of this sub-committee, Lord

Milner produced a draft proposal, in which we insisted that a fresh

clause (No. 11) should be inserted; and this was done. This draft

proposal (annexed under B)[114] was then cabled to the British

Government, revised by them, and then communicated to us in its

final shape (annexed under B).[115] We were informed by the British

Government that no further revision of this proposal would be

allowed, but that it must now be either accepted or rejected in its

entirety by the delegates of the two Republics; and that this

acceptance or rejection must take place within a stipulated time.

We then told Lord Kitchener that he should know our final decision

by the evening of the next Saturday at latest.

During our formal negotiations certain informal conversations took

place in reference to the British subjects (in Cape Colony and

Natal) who have been fighting on our side. As a result of these

informal conversations a communication from the British Government

was imparted to us (annexed under B).[116]

We have the honour to remain, etc.,

LOUIS BOTHA.

J.H. DE LA REY.

C.R. DE WET.

J.B.M. HERTZOG.

J.D. SMUTS.

Vice-President Burger said that the delegates must proceed to discuss

this document, and that they would then be asked to decide--firstly,

whether the struggle should be continued; secondly, whether the proposal

of the British Government should be accepted; and, thirdly, whether they

were prepared to surrender unconditionally.

It was decided that minutes of the meeting should be kept, and the

delegates then proceeded to discuss the different articles of the

British Government's proposal. The whole of the morning and a part of

the afternoon sitting were devoted to questions dealing with the meaning

of the several clauses, the members of the Commission answering to the

best of their ability.

After these questions had been disposed of, Mr. De Clercq rose to speak.

He said that he had already given his own opinion, but that now it was

for the whole meeting to decide whether they would give up the war, and,

if they resolved to do so, whether they would accept the proposal

unconditionally. As to the proposal, it could not be denied that it did

not give all that they themselves desired, but _that_ could not have

been expected. Should they now return to their commandos and be asked by

their burghers what they had effected, they would have to reply,

"Nothing." How would they be able to meet their burghers with such an

answer as that? It would therefore be better to get terms from the

British Government; and by doing so they would also gratify the British

nation. As for himself, he was for accepting the proposal, unless it

could be proved to him that unconditional surrender would be a still

better course to take.

General Nieuwouwdt then proposed that the meeting should, without

further delay, proceed to vote whether the war should be terminated, and

whether the terms offered to them should be accepted.

General Froneman seconded this proposal.

Mr. Birkenstock (Vrijheid) felt that this was too important a matter to

be treated with such haste. A decision about such a document as the one

now lying before the meeting could not be come to in a moment. The

delegates would hardly agree with the last speaker in his opinion that

they should at once proceed to vote whether the war should or should not

be continued. Time was required before coming to such a decision.

Moreover it had to be proved whether it were possible to continue the

war. There were some districts where it certainly could no longer be

carried on. Was it possible for one part of the nation to continue

fighting without the other? Then there was the question whether their

resources and the troops which they still had were sufficient to justify

them in prolonging the struggle. If they were insufficient the war must

be discontinued and terms must be accepted. It would not be an easy

thing to do; one could not, with a light heart, give up the independence

of their country; but half a loaf was better than no bread,[117] and

even such a sacrifice as this might be necessary if the nation was to be

saved.

Commandant Jacobsz (Harrismith) was at one with the last speaker in

holding that they must not be in too great a hurry to vote on the

proposal.

Mr. P.R. Viljoen (Heidelberg) felt that the proposal of the British

Government would so tightly bind them that they would never again be

free. They were _knee-haltered_[118] now, but under certain

circumstances they might even be _hobbled_.[119]

He considered that the meeting should ask the Governments to stop the

war.

General Du Toit (Wolmaransstad) said that the times through which they

were passing were very critical; every one ought to say exactly what he

thought, and no one ought to be condemned for doing so. A delegate who

should say that the war could not be continued must not be considered

disloyal to his country because he did so. As regarded the three

questions before the meeting, according to the opinion of his burghers

the war ought to be continued. The views of his burghers when he left

the commandos had been clearly expressed. "Let us retain our

independence, or go on fighting," they had said. But why were they of

this mind? Because they were unaware how matters stood in other

districts. The eyes of the delegates, however, while directed towards

God, were also able to observe the condition of the eastern parts of

their country. If the burghers in those parts could not hold out, it

would be impossible for the other commandos to do so. It could not be

denied that some of the commandos were no longer able to continue

fighting. That being the case, even if there were a majority in favour

of prolonging the struggle, that majority would have to yield to the

wishes of the minority, and for this reason: if the war were to be

continued in conformity with the wishes of the majority, and if the

minority were to be compelled to surrender (and nobody would be

surprised at this), then the majority would find themselves too weak to

go on fighting. Thus there were clear reasons why the war must be ended.

Moreover, its continuation would involve not only the _national_ but

also the _moral_ death of the Republics. But it was still to be proved

that a continuation of the war was even possible; for himself he feared

that it was not so, and if fight he must he could only fight without

hope and without heart. If he were now to go back to his burghers, and

they were to ask him why he persisted in the war, and he was compelled

to reply that he was doing so on the strength of opinions expressed in

newspapers, and on the encouragement given to the cause of the Republics

in their pages, he would be told that he was building on sand. Again, he

feared that if the war were to be continued, detached parties would be

formed which would try to obtain terms from the English for themselves.

And should the commandos in time become so weak as to be forced to

surrender unconditionally, what then would be the fate of the officers?

Would they not lose everything, and be banished into the bargain? Let no

one think, however, that he was trying merely to do what was best for

himself. No. There was now a chance for negotiating; should the meeting

let slip that chance, unconditional surrender would most certainly

result, and that would be disastrous to all. He hoped that he would not

be misunderstood; if the meeting decided to go on with the war, he, for

one, would not lay down his arms. No, he would actively prosecute the

war, and operate in conjunction with the other generals. But what would

be the use of it: he sided with those who held that the struggle could

no longer be carried on.

Commandant Rheeder (Rouxville) wished to reply to those who demanded

reasons for the continuation of the war. One reason, he said, was to be

found in the fact that England would not allow them to have any

communication with the deputation in Europe; that meant that something

advantageous to us was being held back. Another was the consideration of

what their descendants in time to come would say. "How is it," they

would ask, "that we are not now free men? There were a large number of

burghers in the veldt to continue the war--what has become of our

independence?" And what answer shall we be able to make?--we whose

courage failed us before such tremendous odds, and who laid down our

arms when victory was still possible? The speaker would only be

satisfied if the meeting were unanimous for stopping the war, not

otherwise. He thought of the families. How would the delegates face

their families on their return, after the sacrifice of independence? He

considered that the commandos should leave those districts where

resistance was no longer possible and go to others. If to discontinue

the war meant to surrender independence, then the war must not be

discontinued.

Vice-President Burger said that he had not heard from the last speaker

any reasons whatsoever for continuing the war.

Commandant Rheeder then remarked that if they wanted to surrender their

country they should have done so earlier, when the burghers were not

entirely destitute. But now nothing was left to them. As to the

narrowness of the field of operations, there was still room enough to

fight.

Commandant P.L. Uijs (Pretoria) referred to the frequent allusion which

had been made to their European deputation. That deputation was now in

Holland, and must know if anything was going on there to the advantage

of the Republics. If there were any hopeful signs there, their comrades

would certainly have informed them. They had not done so, and therefore

the meeting should dismiss this subject from its thoughts.

The meeting then adjourned until 7.15 p.m.

Upon reassembling, Commandant Cronje (Winburg) said that he would not

detain the meeting for long; he only wished to say a very few words. It

had been rightly said that they were passing through a momentous period

of their history. To his mind the present was _the_ critical epoch in

the existence of the African nation, whose destinies they had now to

decide. Delegates were asking what hopes they could now entertain. But

what grounds for hope were there when the war began? In his opinion

there were none. It was only that men believed then that Right was

Might, and put their trust in God. And God had helped them. When the

enemy had entered their country everything was dark. There had been a

day on which more than four thousand men had surrendered. Then, even as

now, they had been without hope. Then, even as now, those who wanted to

continue the war had been told that they were mad. That had been some

two years ago, and yet the war was still going on. Then, even as now,

there had been no food, and yet they had managed to live. The delegates

represented a free people; let them not take a step of which they would

afterwards repent. As regarded intervention, he had often said that one

could not rely on it. But they _could_ rely on God. When he returned to

his burghers, and was questioned as to his reason for the course of

action which he had advocated, he hoped to be able to answer, "Belief in

God." There had always been times when there was no food, and yet they

had always managed to live. A deputation had been officially sent to

Europe, and was now there to represent their interests. Had the meeting

lost its confidence in that deputation? Did it not realize that if the

case of the Republic was hopeless in Europe the deputation would send

word to that effect? It had been said that by continuing the war they

would be exterminating the nation. He did not believe this. The way to

exterminate the nation was to accept the British proposal. To go on with

the war was their only policy, and it was a very good policy. The

deputation had claimed that their advice should be taken before any

negotiations were attempted. What right, then, had the delegates to give

up the war on the basis of the proposal now before them? To do so was to

give the death blow to their national existence; later on they would

have cause to rue it. Moreover, the proposal did not safeguard the

interests of their brethren in Cape Colony. Again, landed property

belonging to burghers had already been sold, and in all probability

these burghers would never see any of the proceeds. The sum (£3,000,000)

which the proposal offered to compensate for all damages, was not

sufficient to cover damage already done. For these and other reasons the

proposal could not be accepted. No other course was open to them except

to reject the proposal and to continue hostilities.

General Froneman (Ladybrand) agreed with the last speaker. He loved his

country, and could not think of surrendering it. The reasons which had

induced them to begin the war were still in force. He had been through

the whole campaign, and saw stronger reasons now than ever before for

the continuing of the war. His districts, like those of others, were

exhausted, and yet his burghers remained in the veldt. He had been

present at the surrender of the four thousand; he had seen General

Cronje give up his sword. Those had been dark days, but the struggle

still went on; they could still keep on their legs. It had been God's

will that this war should take place. Prayers had been offered that it

might be averted, but God had ruled it otherwise. Therefore they must

carry the war through, and never think of surrender. They were

Republicans. What would it be to have to give up that name for ever? He

had consulted his burghers and their women-folk; he had asked them,

"What conditions of peace will you accept?" They had answered, "No peace

at all, if it means any loss of independence." And so, before he could

vote for peace, he would have again to take the opinion of his burghers.

Veldtcornet B.H. Breijtenbach (Utrecht) urged that a definite yes or no

must be given to the question, Is the war to continue? The general

condition of the country had been laid before the meeting, and it had

been clearly shown that its condition made the carrying on of the war

impossible. One could not escape from that fact. Why then should they

argue any longer? What reason had they for wishing to prolong this

struggle? They surely would not do so blindfold. Unless good reasons

could be alleged for continuing it, the war would have to be stopped. As

those good reasons were not forthcoming, he would vote with those who

were for peace. To continue the war would be a crime. Some of the last

few speakers had stated that there had been no sufficient reasons for

commencing the war. That might be true. They might have been

over-confident then. Be that as it might, they certainly had lost so

much ground since then that they must now give up the struggle. This was

his irrevocable opinion. It had been clearly shown that fourteen

commandos were unable to continue in the veldt. This made peace a

necessity, for what was to be gained by continuing a struggle without a

proper army. The war might last a few months longer, but it must end

then--and end in disaster.

Commandant W.J. Viljoen (Witwatersrand) said that some speakers were for

and others against the continuation of hostilities. The first were

guided by faith alone; the second had brought forward definite grounds

for their opinion. A year ago both parties had been inspired by faith,

but what had been the result? He would be glad enough to be convinced,

but those who wished to continue the war must show grounds for such a

line of action.

General De la Rey would only say a few words. He had received definite

instructions before he went to his burghers neither to encourage nor

discourage them, whatever they might say at their meetings. He had

strictly observed these instructions, and had never attempted to

influence them. There were present among the delegates nine men (one

being from Cape Colony) who represented his burghers, and who would

testify as to their state of mind and temper; he need not therefore say

anything. The delegates could bear witness how full of courage the men

were. Nevertheless, the war could not be continued. Say or do what they

would at that meeting, the war must cease. Some had talked about faith.

But what was faith? True faith consisted in saying, "Lord, Thy will, not

mine, be done." They must bow before the will of God. The delegates, he

continued, must choose one of the three courses which were open to them.

It would be a great calamity if they were to decide to surrender

unconditionally. Had it been necessary to do so it should have been done

while they still possessed something. Should they then continue the war?

But the question as to what would become of the people under those

circumstances must be faced--to continue fighting would be the ruin of

the nation. The delegates might go away determined to fight, but the

burghers would lay down their arms, and the state of affairs which would

thus ensue would not redound to their honour. But the British Government

offered guarantees; it would help the nation so that the nation might

help itself. If any one were to say now, "Continue fighting," he and his

generals might have the heart to do so if they kept their minds fixed on

their recent exploits. For himself, however, he would refuse absolutely

to accede to that request. And what real advantage had accrued from his

successes in the veldt? What had followed on them? All his cattle had

been taken away, some three hundred of his men had been killed, wounded,

or taken prisoner. Some of the delegates set their hopes on the

European deputation, but what did that deputation say a year ago? It

said that all depended on their continuing to fight. They _had_

continued to fight. What more, then, was there left for them to do? Some

gentlemen present had definite mandates from their burghers, who very

likely had no knowledge of the actual state of affairs when they gave

those mandates. He himself had not known at that time in what a plight

the country was. He challenged each and all of the delegates to show

their burghers the proposal of the British Government, and then to see

if those burghers were not in favour of unconditional surrender. But if

the meeting insisted on the continuation of hostilities, the nation

would be driven into _hands-upping_; thus the war would end in dishonour

and disgrace.

Landdrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom) was glad that General De la Rey had

spoken out so boldly; it was every one's duty to do so. He himself also

was against the continuance of the war.

Although it had been said that the war had been begun in faith, it ought

not to be forgotten that it had also been begun with hope of

intervention, as was shown by the sending of the deputation to

Europe--that deputation which, as they had often heard, had done so much

good work. Another proof that there had then been hope of intervention

was that the burghers had ordered the delegates to keep them in

communication with the deputation. And that they had not relied

exclusively on faith at the beginning of the war was shown by the fact

that they had founded great hopes on what their brethren in Cape Colony

might accomplish. These hopes had now been dissipated by General Smuts,

who had just said that there was no chance of a general insurrection.

Again, could the war be continued when their commandos were so much

weakened, and when food was so scarce? It was nonsense to say that food

had been scarce a year ago; there had been a sufficiency then, and at

the present time there was not. One could ride from Vereeniging to Piet

Retief without seeing more than two or three herds of cattle. Moreover,

the women and children were in a most pitiable condition. One delegate

had spoken against any scheme which would be as it were a trampling on

the blood which had already been spilt--he shared that delegate's

sentiments; but he considered that to shed yet more blood in a cause

which was to all appearance hopeless would be still more reprehensible.

He should prefer not to enter into the religious aspect of the question.

It was difficult to fathom the purposes of God; perhaps it might be the

Divine will that they should lose their independence. All that they

could do was to follow the course which seemed to be good and right.

Were they, then, to surrender unconditionally? He would say no. It would

be giving the enemy opportunities for doing things from which they might

otherwise desist. Moreover, by voting for such a policy the leaders

would incur the displeasure of the nation. In choosing what course they

would pursue the delegates should let nothing else sway them save the

good of the nation. They must not be carried away by their feelings;

they must listen only to the voice of reason.

Commandant H.S. Grobler (Bethal) felt that, under the circumstances, the

war could not be continued. It had already reduced them to such straits

that they would soon have to fly to the utmost borders of their

territories, leaving the enemy unopposed in the very heart of the

country. At the beginning of the war they had not relied on faith alone;

there had also been guns, war material and provisions. But now none of

these things were left to them. It was terrible to him to think that

they must sacrifice the independence of their country. He was a true son

of his country, and could not consent to the surrender of her

independence unless that were the only way of saving the women and

children from starvation. But it was not only the women and children who

were on the verge of starvation; the burghers still left in the laagers

were in the same predicament. What, moreover, was to happen to the

prisoners of war, if the struggle were to be continued? And to the

families in the camps? The delegates must not forget those families. If

the people generally were dying a _national_, the families were dying a

_moral_, death. It was a sad thought that there were among their women

in the camps, many who were thus losing their moral vitality. It was a

thought which should make them determined to conclude the war.

Commandant Van Niekerk (Ficksburg) said that his commandos had

commissioned him to hold out for independence. The proposal of the

British Government could not be accepted. They must take no hasty step.

If they persevered in the war, the enemy would grant them better terms.

All they had to do was to act like brave men.

General J.G. Celliers (Lichtenburg) had already told the meeting what

mandate he had received from his burghers. But he was there to do the

best he could for the nation as a whole. The condition of the country

was very critical. The fact that his own commandos were faring well was

not a sufficient reason for continuing the war. He must take all

circumstances into consideration. He had said that he was in favour of

an arrangement by which peace should be made without the sacrifice of

independence. Such an arrangement they had attempted to bring about.

They had elected a Commission, which had done all in its power to give

effect to their wishes in this matter. And the result was the proposal

of the British Government now lying before them. That was what the

Commission had obtained for them. Which of them could say that he could

have obtained better terms for the people than those contained in that

proposal? Or that, if the war were to be continued, the people would

gain any advantage which that proposal did not give them? It had been

said that the deputation in Europe had encouraged the burghers in their

prolonged struggle. The last message they had received from the

deputation had been: "Go on till every remedy has been tried." Could

that be called encouragement? It had also been said that the nation must

have faith. He admitted the necessity--but it must not be the sort of

faith which chose what it would believe, and what it would disbelieve.

They must be prepared to believe that it might be the will of God that

they should yield to the enemy. As he had more insight into the state of

affairs than his burghers, and therefore was better qualified to form a

judgment, he did not feel himself bound by their mandate. Had the

burghers known what he now knew, they would have given him a very

different commission. He felt that it was a serious thing to continue

sacrificing the lives of his fellow-countrymen. Moreover, however dear

independence might be, it was useless to attempt impossibilities. Their

one aim should be to safeguard the interests of the nation. His vote

would be with those who were for accepting the proposal of the British

Government.

Commander-in-Chief de Wet was the next to address the meeting. His

speech was as follows:--

"As I feel it to be my duty to speak out all my mind before this

meeting, I shall go back to the very beginning of the war. And recalling

my feelings at that period, I can say that I had less hope then for

intervention than I have now. I do not mean to say that I am sanguine

about it even now; but I know to-day, what I did not know then, that

great sympathy is felt for us by other nations. Even in England this

sympathy is to be found, as is shown by the largely-attended 'Pro-Boer'

meetings which have been held in that country. And that the feeling in

our favour is widespread is evident from the reports which we received

by word of mouth from the messenger to whom the deputation entrusted its

recent letter, for we cannot believe that the deputation would have

employed an unreliable person. And what did that messenger say? Among

other things, he said that our cause was winning new adherents every

day. It may be asked, however, why the deputation did not send a report

of its own? I reply that it had its hand upon the pulse of the

Governments, and that the information it was thus gaining was of such a

character that it could not be entrusted to any messenger whatsoever.

Perhaps the deputation was unable _in any way_ to communicate what it

knew to us--it would never do to noise abroad the secrets of European

policy. The silence of the delegates ought not, then, to discourage us;

on the contrary, we should regard it as a hopeful sign.

"If there is any one man who feels deeply for the critical condition of

our country, I am that man. And critical our condition certainly is; so

that I am not surprised that some of us are asking, 'What hope have we

now in continuing the struggle?' But I would ask another question: 'What

hope had we at the beginning of the war?' Our faith in God--we had

nothing else to rely on! At the very outset of the war I knew that we,

with our forty-five thousand troops, were engaged in a contest against a

nation that had no less than seven hundred and fifty thousand men under

arms, and who could easily send against us a third of that number. And

to counterbalance the terrible odds against us, we had nothing, as I

knew, but our faith. At that time there were some who expected that

effectual help would come from Cape Colony. I was never deluded by this

hope. I knew of course that there were men there who would fight with us

against England; I knew how much those men sympathized with our cause;

but I also knew that the circumstances of that country would make it

impossible for the colonists to help us more than they have, as a matter

of fact, done. No! God was our one Hope when the war began. And if, when

the war is over, victory lies with us, it will not be the first time

that faith in God has enabled the weaker nation to overthrow the

stronger.

"Those of you who urge that the war should be discontinued, ask us, who

are for carrying it on, what tangible reason we have for our hope. But

what tangible reason for hope was there at the beginning of the war? Are

our affairs darker now? Quite the contrary--miracles have been worked in

our favour during the last twenty-two months. General Botha wrote to me

some time ago, saying that the scarcity of ammunition was causing him

much anxiety. And he had good cause for that anxiety--ammunition was

exhausted. When a burgher came to me at that time with an empty

bandolier, it absolutely terrified me. But now, to use an expression of

General Joubert's, my pleasure is tempered with shame when I think of

the plentiful store of ammunition which we possess. I am not angry with

those of my compatriots who ask for reasons--I give my reasons--nor have

I given a thousandth part of them.

"The enemy has already made us some concessions. There was a time when

Lord Salisbury said that the English Government would be satisfied with

nothing short of unconditional surrender. He does not say so to-day.

England is negotiating with us--that is to say, she shows signs of

yielding to our demands. If we continue the war, England will negotiate

again; she will offer still more favourable terms; she will not even

stick at independence.

"Do you want more of my reasons? Look back once more upon our past

history, and you shall find them. Recall the time when the Transvaal was

at war with England. At that time we did not know the English so well as

we now know them; we had only thirteen cartridges for each man; and

there were the so-called 'Loyalists'--a chicken-hearted crew--to hamper

us. Faith was our only support then--and you all know how that war

resulted.

"I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That is a

very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I think also that

we might meet the emergency in this way--a part of the men should be

told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the women, and then they

could take the women with them to the English in the towns. This would

be a hard expedient, but it may be the only one possible.

"America has been referred to by some of the speakers, who have compared

our circumstances with those of the United States, when they made war

upon England. The comparison is, in one respect at least, an apt one,

for we also have large territories to which we can always retreat.

"As to Europe--we know little of the condition of things there. Our

information about Europe comes only from newspapers, and 'Jingo'

newspapers at that. If there is not a great deal going on in Europe

which England wants to hide from us, why is she so careful not to let us

see European journals? If there were anything in them _unfavourable_ to

our cause, England would flood our country with them in her own

interests. We must also note that England will not permit our deputation

to return to us.

"Taking all these facts into consideration, and remembering that the

sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself, may be regarded

as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of indirect intervention, I

maintain that this terrible struggle must be continued. We must fight

on, no matter how long, until our independence is absolutely secure."

General Beijers (Waterberg) said that he had to give an answer to the

question whether he ought to follow his reason or his conscience; he

could only reply that conscience had the first claim upon him. If he

were to perish whilst following the guidance of reason, he would feel

that he had been unfaithful; whereas, were he to die whilst obeying the

dictates of conscience, he would not fear death. Martyrs of old had died

for their faith; but he feared that the martyr spirit was now only to be

met with in books! Those martyrs had died, and with their death it had

seemed that all was lost; but the truth, for which they had given up

their lives, had lived!

But how is it now with us? We think our cause a righteous one, but are

we willing to die for it? Some spoke of our existence as a nation--but

whether that were to be preserved or lost, did not lie with us--it was

in the hands of God--He would take care of it. Right must conquer in the

end. They must take care to be on the side of right, should it even cost

them their lives. He agreed with those who said that, even if the

present deliberations were to come to nothing, they would have another

chance, later on, of negotiating. This had been proved by what had

already happened. General de Wet had shown them how Lord Salisbury had

gone back upon his first demands; he (General Beijers) could tell them

that on one occasion Lord Roberts had declined even to speak to General

Botha--and yet the English were negotiating with them now. He was quite

open to conviction, but at present he could not see that the war ought

to be stopped. Nevertheless he was not blind to the critical state of

their affairs. But their case was not yet hopeless; their anxiety about

food, their lack of horses--these were not insurmountable difficulties.

They might even find some means by which to save their womenfolk.

No. These difficulties were not insuperable; but there was one

difficulty which _was_ insuperable--the present spirit of the nation.

When a spirit, be it what it might, inspired or ruled a man, then that

man would submit to no other sway. The spirit that now ruled the

burghers was a spirit that was driving them over to the enemy. Against

that spirit it was impossible to contend. General De la Rey had said

that, if the proposal now before the meeting were to be shown to the

burghers, they would at once accept it--that was the sort of spirit that

was in them, and one must take it into consideration, for he was

convinced that it presented an insurmountable obstacle to the

continuation of the war.

The meeting was then closed with prayer.

[Footnote 113: See page 363 _et seq._]

[Footnote 114: See page 379 _et seq._]

[Footnote 115: See page 391 _et seq._]

[Footnote 116: See page 395 _et seq._]

[Footnote 117: The Boer form of this proverb is: Half an egg is better

than an empty shell.]

[Footnote 118: The head fastened to the knee.]

[Footnote 119: Having two legs fastened together.]

FRIDAY, MAY 30TH, 1902.

After the preliminary prayer had been offered, Vice-President Burger

said that before beginning the business of the day, it was his sad duty

to inform the meeting that the President of the Orange Free State had

been obliged to resign, on account of serious illness. President Steyn

had been compelled, in order to obtain medical assistance, to put

himself in the hands of the enemy. He had further to communicate that

Commander-in-Chief de Wet had been appointed Vice-President of the

Orange Free State. He wished to express his deep sympathy with the

representatives in the severe loss which they had sustained. President

Steyn, he said, had been a rock and pillar to their great cause.

Vice-President de Wet having thanked the Vice-President of the South

African Republic for his kind and sympathetic words, Mr. J. Naude (the

representative of Pretoria, and of General Kemp's flying columns) put

some questions with regard to the colonists who had been fighting on the

Boer side. These questions were answered by General Smuts. Mr. Naude

then asked if the delegates were expected to come to any decision about

independence.

General Botha replied that the Governments had informed Lords Kitchener

and Milner that they were not in a condition to decide that

question--that it was a matter for the nation to settle. The delegates

had then gone to their burghers, and now had returned, and were present.

Mr. Naude said that it must therefore have been known at Klerksdorp that

the delegates had to decide upon the question of independence. If that

were so, he found himself in a difficulty. Either the delegates had been

misled, or they were the victims of a mistake, for they had never been

told that they had been elected as plenipotentiaries. Notwithstanding

all that the lawyers might say, he considered himself as having a

certain definite mission. He had obtained the votes of his burghers on

the understanding that he would take up a certain position. He had asked

them whether independence was to be given up, and they had answered in

the negative. He could not therefore vote for the acceptance of the

proposal now before the meeting, for that proposal demanded the

surrender of independence. His burghers had also insisted on being

allowed to keep their arms, and on the use of their language in schools

and Courts of Justice, both of which conditions were refused by the

British proposal. Since, therefore, he could not agree to the proposal,

he was for continuing the war. Some asked what were the chances of

success? He remembered the state of feeling among the burghers at

Warmebad--that was a dark time indeed. The Commandant-General had paid

those burghers a visit, and had told them that they had nothing to lose,

but everything to win, by continuing the struggle. That had been enough

for them. They had not had much prospect then; they could not see

whither their road was leading. But they had found out afterwards. It

had been a dark time too when Pretoria was taken, but most of the

burghers had remained steadfast. And after the darkness the light had

come back. Again a dark cloud was over them--it would pass away, and the

light would reappear.

General De la Rey explained that he had not intended to mislead anybody

at the gatherings of the burghers. Every document which the Government

had handed over to him had been laid before those gatherings. Mr. Naude

had asked whether the delegates at that meeting had to decide about

independence. Most certainly they had. And to do so was a duty devolving

upon Mr. Naude as much as on any other delegate present. They would have

to decide, not for their own districts alone, but for the whole country.

Mr. Naude said that he had no wish to free himself from his

responsibility, but he could not forget that he had come there with a

definite mission.

Judge Hertzog wished again to explain the rights of the question from a

legal point of view. One must ask: If the nation were here, what would

it wish to be done? And one must act in conformity with what one thinks

its answer would be. The Judge then proceeded to speak on the matter in

general. What, he asked, were the arguments in favour of continuing the

war? In the first place, England was growing weaker just as their own

nation was. Any one could see that with their own eyes. It was true as

regarded the financial side of the question. No doubt England could

still collect millions of pounds, if she wished, but the time would come

when she would have trouble with her tax-payers. Already the British

Government found it difficult to pay the interest on the sum borrowed

for war expenses, as was proved by the fact that a corn tax had been

levied in England. That tax would not have been levied unless things had

been in a serious condition. In the second place, he would ask how it

was they had not been allowed to meet their deputation? It would only

have taken the deputation fourteen days to perform the journey; by now

it would have been among them. But permission had been refused them. And

why? It was said that to grant a permission would have been a military

irregularity. But the present meeting was also a military irregularity.

There must be something more behind that refusal. But what were the

arguments against going on with the war? He would enumerate them--the

situation in which they found themselves was critical; the country as a

whole was exhausted. Nearly all the horses had died or had been

captured. The strongest argument of all, however, was that some of their

own people had turned against them, and were fighting in the ranks of

the enemy. Then the condition of the women caused great anxiety; a fear

had been expressed that a moral decay might set in among the families in

the camps. That consideration had great weight with him. No one with any

heart could remain indifferent to it. If there was one thing which more

than anything else made him respect Commandant-General Botha, it was

that the Commandant-General had the heart to feel, and the courage to

express, the importance of that consideration. The present war was one

of the saddest that had ever been waged. He doubted if there had ever

been a war in which a nation had suffered as they had. But all those

sufferings, horrible though they were, did not influence his decision.

Did he but see the chance of finally securing freedom for the nation, he

would put all such considerations on one side, and go on fighting till

death. No; it was not the horror of the situation which influenced him;

there was something that weighed upon his heart yet more heavily--it was

_the holding of that meeting at Vereeniging_. He reproached no one.

Every one had acted with the best intentions. Nevertheless that meeting

was a fatal error; it would give them their death blow. For what had it

produced--a statement from the lips of the Commandant-General himself

that the condition of the country was hopeless. If there were yet any

burghers whose courage was not gone, would they not be utterly

disheartened when they heard what their leaders had said at that

meeting? That was the saddest thought of all. He could understand that

those burghers who had already lost heart should be leaving the

commandos, but now those who had never yet been disheartened would

become so. But notwithstanding all this, it was difficult to feel

certain which was the right course to pursue--to give up the war or to

continue it. He could only suggest that those who were now in doubt on

the matter should support the line of action which, before their doubt

began, had appeared to them to be best.

Mr. L.J. Meijer (a member of the Government of the South African

Republic) then gave some account of the devastation of that part of the

country which lay to the north of the Eastern Railway, and on the

further side of the Sabi River. (This report coincided with those

already given by the delegates.) He went on to say that as they were all

in the dark, and could not see the road they were travelling along, they

must take reason and conscience for their guide. They had already lost

much: let them not lose everything. And what could they hope to gain by

continuing the struggle? To do so might be to throw away their last

chance of peace. What would their progeny say of them if they were to

persist in the struggle and thus lose everything they had possessed?

They would say, "Our forefathers were brave, but they had no brains."

Whereas, if they were to stop the war, their progeny would say, "Our

forefathers did not fight for their own glory." He pointed out that

however little the British proposal contained of what they desired, it

nevertheless promised them representative government. In the past he had

been against the war; he had wished that the five years' franchise

should be granted. Although the people had opposed this measure he had

always supported it. And why? Because he had feared that were that

measure not conceded African blood would stain the ground. Must they

still continue to shed blood? After the capture of Bloemfontein there

had been a secret meeting of the council of war at Pretoria. His

Government had then been willing to surrender, but the Free State had

refused. The two Governments had therefore decided to go on with the

war. A year later, in the month of June, there had been another meeting.

A letter had been sent to the Free State. The two Governments had met at

Waterval, and had once more decided to continue the struggle. Later on,

again, the Government of the South African Republic wrote another letter

to the Free State; but there had been no opportunity of meeting until

the present occasion, which saw them assembled together at Vereeniging.

Were they again going to decide to continue their resistance? It was a

matter for serious consideration. There was but little seed-corn left.

This must, if they had to go on fighting, be preserved from the enemy at

all costs; were it to be destroyed, the African nation must cease to

exist. But they could not continue the war. It was the Boers now who

were teaching the English how to fight against us; Boers now were with

the enemy's forces, showing them how to march by night, and pointing out

to them all the foot passes.

Commandant Van Niekerk (Kroonstad) pointed out that the Colonists had

already rendered them valuable aid, and could still do so. Were they now

to abandon these Colonists, and--thinking only about saving

themselves--leave them to fight on alone? It would be sad indeed if the

burghers were compelled to lay down their arms.

Commandant-General L. Botha said that in regard to the holding of a

national meeting, he had already chosen delegates with power to act. He

spoke of the state of affairs at the beginning of the war--the two

Republics had then at least sixty thousand men under arms. In reference

to the Cape Colony, he said that it had never been expected that that

country would allow its railways to be used for the transport of troops.

The Commandant-General then proceeded as follows:--

"I used to entertain hopes that the European Powers would interfere on

our behalf. All that they have done, however, has been to look on while

England was introducing all sorts of new methods of warfare, methods,

too, which are contrary to all international law.

"When the war began we had plenty of provisions, and a commando could

remain for weeks in one spot without the local food supply running out.

Our families, too, were then well provided for. But all this is now

changed. One is only too thankful nowadays to know that our wives are

under English protection. This question of our womenfolk is one of our

greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man answers that

some of the burghers should surrender themselves to the English, and

take the women with them. But most of the women now amongst us are the

wives of men already prisoners. And how can we expect those not their

own kith and kin to be willing to give up liberty for their sakes?

"As to the deputation, we must remember that it was accredited to all

the Powers of Europe. And yet it has only been able to hand in its

credentials to the Netherlands Government. Does not this prove that no

other Government is willing to receive it? If you need further proof, I

refer you to the letter in which the deputation--they were still allowed

to write to us then--said: 'There is no chance for us in Europe.' The

deputation wanted to be allowed to return home, but our Government

advised them to remain in Europe, because their arrival in South Africa

would be a death blow to the hopes of many. That is why the deputation

is still in Europe. Later on they said that, although they knew that

there was no chance of intervention, yet they felt that they ought to

persist in their efforts, because of the sacrifices which we had already

made. It is possible that a war may arise in Europe from which we shall

gain something, but what right have we to expect such a contingency?

Moreover, great nations take but little interest in the fate of small

ones--indeed, it is to the advantage of the former that the small

nations should be wiped out of existence.

"I cannot refrain from alluding to the faithlessness of some of our

burghers, who are to be found in the ranks of the enemy. But this is not

the only sign of the way in which affairs are trending--I look back on

the past. I remember that we have been fighting a full year since we

last heard of our deputation. What have we gained since June, 1901?

Nothing. On the contrary, we have been going backwards so fast that, if

this weakening process goes on much longer, we shall soon find ourselves

unable any more to call ourselves a fighting nation. What have we not

undergone in the course of this year which is just over! In the

concentration camps alone, twenty thousand women and children have died.

When I was in Pretoria I received reports from our information office,

and otherwise, of our losses. I found that there were thirty-one

thousand six hundred prisoners of war, of whom six hundred had died, and

that three thousand eight hundred of our burghers had been killed in the

war. Is not a loss such as this, in so short a time as two and a half

years, a serious matter? Think, too, of the sufferings which those

twenty thousand women who died in the camps must have endured!

"I am not deaf to the claims of the colonists who have been fighting for

us. I have said that if we surrender our independence, we must provide

for them. Should we serve their interests by continuing the war? No,

indeed! The best thing for them would be that we should bring it to a

close. But if we are absolutely determined to go on fighting, let us at

least say to them, 'We advise _you_ to desist.'

"What I am saying now is in substance what I said at Warmbad at a time

when there were two thousand men of that district in the Veldt. How many

are there now? Four hundred and eighty! On that occasion I also said

that we must continue the war until we were driven by sheer starvation

to make peace. Well, in some divisions starvation has already come. The

delegates themselves have had to confess that our strength up till now

has lain in the fact that we have been able to continue the struggle in

every district. In this way we have divided the enemy's forces. But if

we are compelled to abandon some of our districts, and to concentrate on

certain points, then the English also will concentrate, and attack us

with an irresistible force.

"It has been suggested that we ought to march into Cape Colony. I know,

however, what that would mean--Commander-in-Chief de Wet marched into

the colonies. He had a large force, and the season of the year was

auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed. How, then, shall we

succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that they can only go

_op-een-stap_.[120]

"What, then, are we to do? Some will reply, 'Go on with the war,' Yes,

but for how long? For ten or twelve years? But would that be possible?

If in two years we have been reduced from sixty thousand fighting men to

half that number, where will our army be after another ten years of war?

It is clear enough to me that if we go on any longer, we shall be

compelled to surrender. Would it not be better to come to some agreement

with the enemy, while we have the opportunity? We have all received the

gift of reason; let us use it on the present occasion.

"As far as I and my own burghers are concerned, to continue the struggle

is still possible. But we must not only think of ourselves. We must

almost think of others. There are, for instance, the widows and orphans.

If we accept the terms now offered to us, they will remain under our

care. But if we go on with the war until we are forced to surrender, who

will then take care of them? Or if we were all killed, what could we do

for them? We should not even be able to send a deputation to Europe, to

ask for money to help us to rebuild our farms, and to feed our burghers.

"There are three questions now before us--three alternatives between

which we have to choose--the continuing of the war, unconditional

surrender, and the acceptance of the British proposal. With regard to

the first, I fail to see what satisfactory result can come to us from

persisting in this unequal contest, which must result in the end in our

extermination. As to the choice between the other two, in many ways

unconditional surrender would be the better. But, for the sake of the

nation, we may not choose it. Although to reject it may involve us in

many hardships, yet we must think of nothing else but the interests of

the nation. Our only course, then, is to accept the proposal of the

English Government. Its terms may not be very advantageous to us, but

nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position."

After a short adjournment the delegates again assembled at about 2 p.m.

General C.H. Muller (Boksburg) said that his burghers had sent him to

defend their menaced independence. One part of them had authorized him

to act as his judgment should dictate; another part had ordered him to

hold out for independence and to try to get into communication with the

European deputation. He had long ago told his burghers that they must

trust in God if they wished to continue the war, for they could not do

so by relying only on their guns and rifles. He did not like to think of

what they would say if he were to go back to them and tell them that he

had not been in communication with the deputation, and that the

proposal of the English Government had been accepted. He could not bring

himself to surrender. Nevertheless, having in view what the

Commandant-General and others had said, he felt that he must do so, for

it was impossible for him to prosecute the war single-handed. But could

not the delegates continue to stand by one another, and make a covenant

with the Lord? The district which he represented was one of the poorest

in the whole country, and the £3,000,000 offered by the enemy did not

include any provision for those who, like his burghers, could do nothing

to help themselves. He would again suggest that the delegates should

make a vow unto the Lord. For himself, he could not vote for the

acceptance of the British proposal.

General J.H. Smuts then spoke as follows:--

"Up till now I have taken no part in this discussion, but my opinions

are not unknown to my Government; we have arrived at a dark period both

in the history of our war, and in the course of our national

development. To me it is all the darker because I am one of those who,

as members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the

war with England. A man, however, may not draw back from the

consequences of his deeds. We must therefore keep back all private

feeling, and decide solely with a view to the lasting interests of our

nation. This is an important occasion for us--it is perhaps the last

time that we shall meet as a free people with a free government. Let us

then rise to the height of this occasion; let us arrive at a decision

for which our posterity shall bless, and not curse us.

"The great danger for this meeting is that of deciding the questions

before it on purely military grounds. Nearly all the delegates here are

officers who in the past have never quailed before the overwhelming

forces of the enemy, and who therefore are never likely to do so in the

future. They do not know what fear is, and they are ready to shed the

last drop of their blood in the defence of their country.

"Now if we look at the matter from _their_ point of view, that is to

say, if we look at it merely as a military question, I am bound to admit

that we shall come to the conclusion that the war _can_ be continued. We

are still an unconquered power; we have still about eighteen thousand

men in the field--veterans, with whom one can accomplish almost

anything. From a purely military standpoint, our cause is not yet lost.

But it is as a _nation_, and not as an _army_, that we are met here, and

it is therefore for the nation principally that we must consult. No one

sits here to represent this or that commando. One and all, we represent

the African nation, and not only those members of it which are now in

the field, but also those who rest beneath the soil, and those yet

unborn, who shall succeed us.

"No! We do not only represent our burghers on commando, the troops over

which we are placed in command; we represent also the thousands who have

passed away, after making the last sacrifice for their country; the

prisoners scattered all the world over; the women and children dying by

the thousand in the prison camps of the enemy; we represent the blood

and the tears of the whole African nation. From the prisons, the camps,

the graves, the veldt, and from the womb of the future, that nation

cries out to us to make a wise decision now, to take no step which might

lead to the downfall or even to the extermination of their race, and

thus make all their sacrifices of no avail. Our struggle, up to the

present, has not been an aimless one. We have not been fighting in mere

desperation. We began this strife, and we have continued it, because we

wanted to maintain our independence and were prepared to sacrifice

everything for it. But we must not sacrifice the African nation itself

upon the altar of independence. So soon as we are convinced that our

chance of maintaining our autonomous position as Republics is, humanly

speaking, at an end, it becomes our clear duty to desist from our

efforts. We must not run the risk of sacrificing our nation and its

future to a mere idea which can no longer be realized.

"And ought we not to be convinced that independence is now irretrievably

lost? We have been fighting without cessation for nearly three years. It

is no exaggeration to say that during that period we have been employing

all the strength and all the means which we possess, in the furtherance

of our cause. We have sacrificed thousands of lives; we have lost all

our earthly goods; our dear country is become one continuous desert;

more than twenty thousand of our women and children have perished in the

camps of the enemy. And has this brought us independence? Just the

reverse; it is receding further and further from us every day. The

longer we fight, the greater will be the distance between us and the aim

for which we are fighting.

"The manner in which the enemy has been conducting, and still continues

to conduct, this war, has reduced our country to such a state of

exhaustion, that it will soon be a physical impossibility for us to

fight any longer. Our only hope lies in the chance of help from outside.

A year ago I, in the name of my Government, communicated the condition

of our nation to His Honour States-President Kruger, in Europe. He

wrote in reply that we must rely on the state of affairs in Cape

Colony--and the sympathy of European nations--and that we must continue

the war until all other means were exhausted."

The speaker here enlarged upon the political developments which had

taken place in the United States and in the principal European countries

during the preceding two years, and then continued:--

"So far as we are concerned, the sum total of the foreign situation is

that we obtain a great deal of sympathy, for which we are naturally most

grateful. More than this we do not obtain, nor shall obtain for many a

long year. Europe will go on expressing sympathy with us until the last

Boer hero has died on the field and the last Boer woman has gone down to

her grave--until, in fact, the whole Boer nation has been sacrificed on

the altar of history and of humanity.

"I have already, on a former occasion, told you what I think about the

situation in Cape Colony. We have made great mistakes there; perhaps

even now Cape Colony is not ripe for the sort of policy which we have

been pursuing with regard to it. At all events, we cannot entertain any

hopes of a general rising of the Colonists. We cannot, however, give too

much honour to those three thousand heroes in the Colony who have

sacrificed all in our behalf, even though they have not succeeded in

securing our independence for us.

"Thus we have given President Kruger's advice a fair trial. For twelve

months we have been testing the value of the methods which he urged upon

us. And, as a result of it all, we have become convinced that those

methods are of no avail--that if we wish to remain independent we must

depend upon ourselves alone. But the facts which the various delegates

have brought before our notice show that we _cannot_ thus depend upon

ourselves; that, unless we obtain outside help, the struggle must come

to an end. We have, then, no hope of success. Our country is already

devastated and in ruins; let us stop before our people are ruined also.

"And now the enemy approaches with a proposal, which, however

unacceptable it may be to us in other respects, includes the promise of

amnesty for our Colonial brethren who have been fighting side by side

with us. I fear that the day will come when we shall no longer be able

to save these so-called rebels, and then it will be a just ground for

reproach that we sacrificed their interests in a cause that was already

hopeless. Moreover, if we refused the proposal which the British

Government now makes to us, I am afraid that we shall considerably

weaken our position in the eyes of the world, and thus lose much of the

sympathy which to-day it evinces in our favour.

"Brethren, we have vowed to stand fast to the bitter end; but let us be

men, and acknowledge that that end has now come, and that it is more

bitter than ever we thought it could be. For death itself would be sweet

compared with the step which we must now take. But let us bow before the

will of God.

"The future is dark indeed, but we will not give up courage, and hope,

and trust in God. No one shall ever convince me that this unparalleled

sacrifice which the African nation has laid upon the altar of freedom

will be in vain. It has been a war for freedom--not only for the freedom

of the Boers, but for the freedom of all the nations of South Africa.

Its results we leave in God's hands. Perhaps it is His will to lead our

nation through defeat, through abasement, yes, and even through the

valley of the shadow of death, to the glory of a nobler future, to the

light of a brighter day."

Commandant A.J. Bester (Bloemfontein) said that at the meeting at which

he had been elected his burghers had told him that they were resolved

not to become the subjects of England. The arguments now urged against

the continuation of the war were not new--they had been used in former

times of depression. History gave many instances in which their nation

had been delivered out of the most critical positions. One could not

help believing that Right would conquer. How was it to be explained that

two hundred and forty thousand troops had failed to exterminate two

small Republics? Then there had been miraculous escapes; surely the

thoughts of these ought to encourage them. They must all be of one mind.

His own decision was to stand or to fall for his freedom.

Mr. Birkenstock (Vrijheid) asked whether the proposal could not be

accepted under protest.