The Postwar Air Force
The Air Force was a new service in 1947, but it was also heir to a
long tradition of segregation. Most of its senior officers, trained in
the Army, firmly supported the Army's policy of racially separate
units and racial quotas. And despite continuing objections to what
many saw as the Gillem Board's far too progressive proposals, the Air
Force adopted the Army's postwar racial policy as its own. Yet after
less than two years as an independent service the Air Force in late
1948 stood on the threshold of integration.
This sudden change in attitude was not so much the result of
humanitarian promptings by service officials, although some of them
forcibly demanded equal treatment and opportunity. Nor was it a
response to civil rights activists, although Negroes in and outside
the Air Force continued to exert pressure for change. Rather,
integration was forced upon the service when the inefficiency of its
racial practices could no longer be ignored. The inefficiency of
segregated troops was less noticeable in the Army, where a vast number
of Negroes could serve in a variety of expandable black units, and in
the smaller Navy, where only a few Negroes had specialist ratings and
most black sailors were in the separate Steward's Branch. But the
inefficiency of separatism was plainly evident in the Air Force.
Like the Army, the Air Force had its share of service units to absorb
the marginal black airman, but postwar budget restrictions had made
the enlargement of service units difficult to justify. At the same
time, the Gillem Board policy as well as outside pressures had made it
necessary to include a black air unit in the service's limited number
of postwar air wings. However socially desirable two air forces might
seem to most officials, and however easy it had been to defend them as
a wartime necessity, it quickly became apparent that segregation was,
organizationally at least, a waste of the Air Force's few black pilots
and specialists and its relatively large supply of unskilled black
recruits. Thus, the inclination to integrate was mostly pragmatic;
notably absent were the idealistic overtones sounded by the Navy's
Special Programs Unit during the war. Considering the magnitude of the
Air Force problem, it was probably just as well that efficiency rather
than idealism became the keynote of change. On a percentage basis the
Air Force had almost as many Negroes as the Army and, no doubt, a
comparable level of prejudice among its commanders and men. At the
same time, the Air Force was a new service, its organization still
fluid and its policies subject to rapid modification. In such
circumstances a straightforward appeal to efficiency had a chance to
succeed where an idealistic call for justice and fair play might well
have floundered.
_Segregation and Efficiency_ (p. 271)
Many officials in the Army Air Forces had defended segregated units
during the war as an efficient method of avoiding dangerous social
conflicts and utilizing low-scoring recruits.[11-1] General Arnold
himself repeatedly warned against bringing black officers and white
enlisted men together. Unless strict unit segregation was imposed,
such contacts would be inevitable, given the Air Forces' highly mobile
training and operations structure.[11-2] But if segregation restricted
contacts between the races it also imposed a severe administrative
burden on the wartime Air Forces. It especially affected the black
flying units because it ordained that not only pilots but the ground
support specialists--mechanics, supply clerks, armorers--had to be
black. Throughout most of the war the Air Forces, competing with the
rest of the Army for skilled and high-scoring Negroes, was unable to
fill the needs of its black air units. At a time when the Air Forces
enjoyed a surplus of white air and ground crews, the black fighter
units suffered from a shortage of replacements for their combat
veterans, a situation as inefficient as it was damaging to morale.[11-3]
[Footnote 11-1: For a comprehensive and authoritative
account of the Negro in the Army Air Forces during
World War II, sec Osur's _Blacks in the Army Air
Forces During World War II_.]
[Footnote 11-2: See Memo, CS/AC for G-3, 31 May 40,
sub: Employment of Negro Personnel in the Air Corps
Units, G-3/6541-Gen 527.]
[Footnote 11-3: For the effect on unit morale, see
Charles E. Francis, _The Tuskegee Airmen: The Story
of the Negro in the U.S. Air Force_ (Boston: Bruce
Humphries, 1955), p. 164; see also USAF Oral
History Program, Interview with Lt Gen B. O. Davis,
Jr., Jan 73.]
The shortage was compounded in the penultimate year of the war when
the all-black 477th Bombardment Group was organized. (Black airmen and
civil rights spokesmen complained that restricting Negroes to fighter
units excluded them from many important and prestigious types of air
service.) In the end the new bombardment group only served to limit
black participation in the air war. Already short of black pilots, the
Army Air Forces now had to find black navigators and bombardiers as
well, thereby intensifying the competition for qualified black cadets.
The stipulation that pilots and bombardiers for the new unit be
trained at segregated Tuskegee was another obvious cause for the
repeated delays in the operational date of the 477th, and its crews
were finally assembled only weeks before the end of the war.
Competition for black bomber crews also led to a ludicrous situation
in which men highly qualified for pilot training according to their
stanine scores (achievements on the battery of qualifying tests taken
by all applicants for flight service) were sent instead to
navigator-bomber training, for which they were only barely
qualified.[11-4]
[Footnote 11-4: Lee, _Employment of Negro Troops_, pp.
462-64; see also Interv, author with Lt Gen
Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., 12 Jun 70, CMH files.]
Unable to obtain enough Negroes qualified for flight training, the
Army Air Forces asked the Ground and Service Forces to screen their
personnel for suitable candidates, but a screening early in 1945
produced only about one-sixth of the men needed. Finally, the Air
Forces recommended that the Army staff lower the General Classification
Test score for pilot training from 110 to 100, a recommendation the
Service and Ground Forces opposed because such a move would eventually
mean the mass transfer of high-scoring Negroes to the Air Forces, (p. 272)
thus depriving the Service and Ground Forces of their proportionate
share. Although the Secretary of War approved the Air Forces proposal,
the change came too late to affect the shortage of black pilots and
specialists before the end of the war.
[Illustration: DAMAGE INSPECTION. _A squadron operations officer of
the 332d Fighter Group points out a cannon hole to ground crew, Italy,
1945._]
While short of skilled Negroes, the Army Air Forces was being
inundated with thousands of undereducated and unskilled Negroes from
Selective Service. It tried to absorb these recruits, as it absorbed
some of its white draftees, by creating a great number of service and
base security battalions. A handy solution to the wartime quota
problem, the large segregated units eventually caused considerable
racial tension. Some of the tension might have been avoided had black
officers commanded black squadrons, a logical course since the Air
Force had a large surplus of nonrated black officers stationed at
Tuskegee.[11-5] Most were without permanent assignment or were assigned
such duties as custodial responsibility for bachelor officer quarters,
occupations unrelated to their specialties.[11-6]
[Footnote 11-5: A nonrated officer is one not having
or requiring a currently effective aeronautical
rating; that is, an officer who is not a pilot,
navigator, or bombardier.]
[Footnote 11-6: Interv, author with Davis; see also
Osur's _Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World
War II_, ch. V.]
Few of these idle black officers commanded black service units because
the units were scattered worldwide while the nonrated officers were
almost always assigned to the airfield at Tuskegee. Approximately
one-third of the Air Forces' 1,559 black officers were stationed at
Tuskegee in June 1945. Most others were assigned to the fighter group
in the Mediterranean theater or the new bombardment group in flight
training at Godman Field, Kentucky. Only twenty-five black (p. 273)
officers were serving at other stations in the United States. The
Second, Third, and Fourth Air Forces and I Troop Carrier Command, for
example, had a combined total of seventeen black officers as against
22,938 black enlisted men.[11-7] Col. Noel F. Parrish, the wartime
commander at Tuskegee, explained that the principal reason for this
restriction was the prevailing fear of social conflict. If assigned to
other bases, black officers might try to use the officers' clubs and
other base facilities. Thus, despite the surplus of black officers
only too evident at Tuskegee, their requests for transfer to other
bases for assignment in their rating were usually denied on the
grounds that the overall shortage of black officers made their
replacement impossible.[11-8]
[Footnote 11-7: "Summary of AAF Post-War Surveys,"
prepared by Noel Parrish, copy in NAACP Collection,
Library of Congress.]
[Footnote 11-8: Noel F. Parrish, "The Segregation of
the Negro in the Army Air Forces," thesis submitted
to the USAF Air Command and Staff School, Maxwell
AFB, Ala., 1947, pp. 50-55.]
Fearing trouble between black and white officers and assuming that
black airmen preferred white officers, the Air Forces assigned white
officers to command black squadrons. Actually, such assignments
courted morale problems and worse because they were extremely
unpopular with both officers and men. Moreover, the Air Forces
eventually had to admit that there was a tendency to assign white
officers "of mediocre caliber" to black squadrons.[11-9] Yet few
assignments demanded greater leadership ability, for these officers
were burdened not only with the usual problems of a unit commander but
also with the complexities of race relations. If they disparaged their
troops, they failed as commanders; if they fought for their men, they
were dismissed by their superiors as "pro-Negro." Consequently, they
were generally a harassed and bewildered lot, bitter over their
assignments and bad for troop morale.[11-10]
[Footnote 11-9: Ltr, Hq AAF, to CG, Tactical Training
Cmd, 21 Aug 42, sub: Professional Qualities of
Officers Assigned to Negro Units, 220.765-3,
AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-10: Parrish, "Segregation of the Negro in
the Army Air Forces," pp. 50-55. The many
difficulties involved in the assignment of white
officers to black units are discussed in Osur's
_Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War
II_, ch V.]
The social problems predicted for integration proved inevitable under
segregation. Commanders found it prohibitively expensive to provide
separate but equal facilities, and without them discrimination became
more obvious. The walk-in protest at the Freeman Field Officers Club
was but one of the natural consequences of segregation rules. And such
demonstrations were only the more spectacular problems. Just as
time-consuming and perhaps more of a burden were the many
administrative difficulties. The Air Transport Command admitted in
1946 that it was too expensive to maintain, as the command was
obligated to do, separate and equal housing and messing, including
separate orderly and day rooms for black airmen. At the same time it
complained of the disproportionately high percentage of black troops
violating military and civil law. Although Negroes accounted for 20
percent of the command's troops, they committed more than 50 percent
of its law infractions. The only connection the command was able to
make between the separate, unequal facilities and the high misconduct
rate was to point out that, while it had done its best to provide for
Negroes, they "had not earned a very enviable record by
themselves."[11-11]
[Footnote 11-11: AAF Transport Cmd, "History of the
Command, 1 July 1946-31 December 1946" pp. 120-26.]
In one crucial five-month period of the war, Army Air Forces (p. 274)
headquarters processed twenty-two separate staff actions involving
black troops.[11-12] To avoid the supposed danger of large-scale social
integration, the Air Forces, like the rest of the Army during World
War II, had been profligate in its use of material resources,
inefficient in its use of men, and destructive of the morale of black
troops.
[Footnote 11-12: Parrish, "Segregation of the Negro in
the Army Air Forces."]
[Illustration: COLONEL PARRISH. (_1946 photograph_).]
The Air staff was not oblivious to these facts and made some
adjustments in policy as the war progressed. Notably, it rejected
separate training of nonrated black officers and provided for
integrated training of black navigators and bombardiers. In the last
days of the war General Arnold ordered his commanders to "take
affirmative action to insure that equity in training and assignment
opportunity is provided all personnel."[11-13] And when it came to
postwar planning, the Air staff demonstrated it had learned much from
wartime experience:
The degree to which negroes can be successfully employed in the
Post-War Military Establishment largely depends on the success of
the Army in maintaining at a minimum the feeling of
discrimination and unfair treatment which basically are the
causes for irritation and disorders ... in the event of a future
emergency the arms will employ a large number of negroes and
their contribution in such an emergency will largely depend on
the training, treatment and intelligent use of negroes during the
intervening years.[11-14]
[Footnote 11-13: AAF Ltr 35-268, 11 Aug 45.]
[Footnote 11-14: Rpt, ACS/AS-1 to WDSS, 17 Sep 45,
sub: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War
Military Establishment, WDSS 291.2.]
But while admitting that discrimination was at the heart of its racial
problem, the Air staff failed to see the connection between
discrimination and segregation. Instead it adopted the recommendations
of its senior commanders. The consensus was that black combat (flying)
units had performed "more or less creditably," but required more
training than white units, and that the ground echelon and combat
support units had performed below average. Rather than abolish these
below average units, however, commanders wanted them preserved and
wanted postwar policy to strengthen segregation. The final
recommendation of the Army Air Forces to the Gillem Board was that
blacks be trained according to the same standards as whites but that
they be employed in separate units and segregated for recreation,
messing, and social activities "on the post as well as off," in (p. 275)
keeping with prevailing customs in the surrounding civilian
community.[11-15]
[Footnote 11-15: Ibid. For an analysis of these
recommendations, see Gropman's _The Air Force
Integrates_, ch. II.]
The Army Air Forces' postwar use of black troops was fairly consonant
with the major provisions of the Gillem Board Report. To reduce black
combat units in proportion to the reduction of its white units, it
converted the 477th Bombardment Group (M) into the 477th Composite
Group. This group, under the command of the Army's senior black pilot,
Col. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., included a fighter, a bombardment, and a
service squadron. To provide segregated duty for its black
specialists, the Army Air Forces organized regular black squadrons,
mostly ammunition, motor transport, and engineer throughout its
commands. To absorb the large number of unskilled Negroes, it
organized one black squadron (Squadron F) in each of the ninety-seven
base units in its worldwide base system to perform laboring and
housekeeping chores. Finally, it promised "to the fullest possible
extent" to assign Negroes with specialized skills and qualifications
to overhead and special units.[11-16]
[Footnote 11-16: WD Bureau of Public Relations, Memo
for the Press, 20 Sep 45; Office of Public
Relations, Godman Field, Ky., "Col. Davis Issues
Report on Godman Field," 10 Oct 45; Memo, Chief,
Programs and Manpower Section, Troop Basis Branch,
Organization Division, D/T&R, for Dir of Military
Personnel, 23 Apr 48, no sub; all in Negro Affairs,
SecAF files. See also "History of Godman Field,
Ky., 1 Mar--15 Oct 45," AFSHRC.]
In the summer of 1947, the Army Air Forces integrated aviation
training at Randolph Field, Texas, and quietly closed Tuskegee
airfield, thus ending the last segregated officer training in the
armed forces. The move was unrelated to the Gillem Board Report or to
the demands of civil rights advocates. The Tuskegee operation had
simply become impractical. In the severe postwar retrenchment of the
armed forces, Tuskegee's cadet enrollment had dropped sharply, only
nine men graduated in the October 1945 class.[11-17] To the general
satisfaction of the black community, the few black cadets shared both
quarters and classes with white students.[11-18] Nine black cadets were
in training at the end of 1947.[11-19]
[Footnote 11-17: "History of the 2143d AAF Base Unit,
Pilot School, Basic, Advanced, and Tuskegee Army
Air Field, 1 Sep 1945-31 Oct 1945," AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-18: For an example of black reaction see
_Ebony_ Magazine V (September 1949).]
[Footnote 11-19: Memo, James C. Evans, Adviser to the
SecDef, for Capt Robert W. Berry, 10 Feb 48, SecDef
291.2 files.]
Another postwar reduction was not so advantageous for Negroes. By
February 1946 the 477th Composite Group had been reduced to sixteen
B-25 bombers, twelve P-47 fighter-bombers, and only 746 men--a 40
percent drop in four months.[11-20] Although the Tactical Air Command
rated the unit's postwar training and performance satisfactory, and
its transfer to the more hospitable surroundings and finer facilities
of Lockbourne Field, Ohio, raised morale, the 477th, like other
understaffed and underequipped organizations, faced inevitable
conversion to specialized service. In July 1947 the 477th was
inactivated and replaced by the 332d Fighter Group composed of the
99th, 100th, and 301st Fighter Squadrons. Black bomber pilots were
converted to fighter pilots, and the bomber crews were removed from
flying status.
[Footnote 11-20: "History of the 477th Composite
Group," 15 Sep 45-15 Feb 46, Feb-Mar 46, and 1
Mar-15 Jul 46, AFSHRC.]
[Illustration: OFFICERS' SOFTBALL TEAM _representing the 477th
Composite Group, Godwin Field, Kentucky_.]
These changes flew in the face of the Gillem Board Report, for (p. 276)
however slightly that document may have changed the Army's segregation
policy, it did demand at least a modest response to the call for equal
opportunity in training, assignment, and advancement. The board
clearly looked to the command of black units by qualified black
officers and the training of black airmen to serve as a cadre for any
necessary expansion of black units in wartime. Certainly the
conversion of black bomber pilots to fighters did not meet these
modest demands. In its defense the Army Air Forces in effect pleaded
that there were too many Negroes for its present force, now severely
reduced in size and lacking planes and other equipment, and too many
of the black troops lacked education for the variety of assignments
recommended by the board.
The Army Air Forces seemed to have a point, for in the immediate
postwar period its percentage of black airmen had risen dramatically.
It was drafting men to replace departing veterans, and in 1946 it was
taking anyone who qualified, including many Negroes. In seven months
the air arm lost over half its black strength, going from a wartime
high of 80,606 on 31 August 1945 to 38,911 on 31 March 1946, but in
the same period the black percentage almost doubled, climbing from 4.2
to 7.92.[11-21] The War Department predicted that all combat arms would
have a black strength of 15 percent by 1 July 1946.[11-22]
[Footnote 11-21: All figures from STM-30, 1 Sep 45 and
1 Apr 46.]
[Footnote 11-22: Memo, TAG for CG's et al., 4 Feb 46,
sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel, AG 291.2 (31
Jan 46).]
This prophecy never materialized in the Air Forces. Changes in
enlistment standards, curtailment of overseas assignments for Negroes,
and, finally, suspension of all black enlistments in the Regular Army
except in certain military specialist occupations turned the
percentage of Negroes downward. By the fall of 1947, when the Air (p. 277)
Force became a separate service,[11-23] the proportion of black airmen
had leveled off at nearly 7 percent. Nor did the proportion of Negroes
ever exceed the Gillem Board's 10 percent quota during the next
decade.
[Footnote 11-23: Under the terms of the National
Security Act of 1947 the U.S. Air Force was created
as a separate service in a Department of the Air
Force on 18 September 1947. The new service
included the old Army Air Forces; the Air Corps,
U.S. Army; and General Headquarters Air Force. The
strictures of WD Circular 124, like those of many
other departmental circulars, were adopted by the
new service. For convenience' sake the terms _Air
Force_ and _service_ will be employed in the
remaining sections of this chapter even where the
terms _Army Air Forces_ and _component_ would be
more appropriate.]
The Air Force seemed on safer ground when it pleaded that it lacked
the black airmen with skills to carry out the variety of assignments
called for by the Gillem Board. The Air Force was finding it
impossible to organize effective black units in appreciable numbers;
even some units already in existence were as much as two-thirds below
authorized strength in certain ground specialist slots.[11-24] Yet here
too the statistics do not reveal the whole truth. Despite a general
shortage of Negroes in the high test score categories, the Air Force
did have black enlisted men qualified for general assignment as
specialists or at least eligible for specialist training, who were
instead assigned to labor squadrons.[11-25] In its effort to reduce the
number of Negroes, the service had also relieved from active duty
other black specialists trained in much needed skills. Finally, the
Air Force still had a surplus of black specialists in some categories
at Lockbourne Field who were not assigned to the below-strength units.
[Footnote 11-24: "Tactical Air Command (TAC) History,
1 Jan-30 Dec 48," pp. 94-96, AFSHRC; see also
Lawrence J. Paszek, "Negroes and the Air Force,
1939-1949," _Military Affairs_ (Spring 1967), p.
8.]
[Footnote 11-25: Memo, DCofS/Personnel, TAC, for CG,
TAC, 18 Mar 48, AFSHRC.]
Again it was not too many black enlisted men or too few black officers
or specialists but the policy of strict segregation that kept the Air
Force from using black troops efficiently. Insistence on segregation,
not the number of Negroes, caused maldistribution among the commands.
In 1947, for example, the Tactical Air Command contained some 5,000
black airmen, close to 28 percent of the command's strength. This
situation came about because the command counted among its units the
one black air group and many of the black service units whose members
in an integrated service would have been distributed throughout all
the commands according to needs and abilities. The Air Force
segregation policy restricted all but forty-five of the black officers
in the continental United States to one base,[11-26] just as it was the
Air Force's attempt to avoid integration that kept black officers from
command. In November 1947, 1,581 black enlisted men and only two black
officers were stationed at MacDill Field; at San Antonio there were
3,450 black airmen and again two black officers. These figures provide
some clue to the cause of the riot involving black airmen at MacDill
Field on 27 October 1946.[11-27]
[Footnote 11-26: Memo, DCofS/P&A, USAF, for Asst
SecAF, 5 Dec 47, sub: Air Force Negro Troops in the
Zone of Interior, Negro Affairs, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 11-27: "History of MacDill Army Airfield,
Oct 46," pp. 10-11, AFSHRC. For a detailed analysis
of the MacDill riot and its aftermath, see Gropman,
_The Air Force Integrates_, ch. I; see also ch. 5,
above.]
Segregation also prevented the use of Negroes on a broader
professional scale. In April 1948, 84.2 percent of Negroes in the Air
Force were working in an occupational specialty as against 92.7 (p. 278)
percent of whites, but the number of Negroes in radar, aviation
specialist, wire communications, and other highly specialized skills
required to support a tactical air unit was small and far below the
percentage of whites. The Air Force argued that since Negroes were
assigned to black units and since there was only one black tactical
unit, there was little need for Negroes with these special skills.
[Illustration: CHECKING AMMUNITION. _An armorer in the 332d Fighter
Group inspects the P-51 Mustang, Italy, 1945._]
The fact that rated black officers and specialists were restricted to
one black fighter group particularly concerned civil rights advocates.
Without bomber, transport, ferrying, or weather observation
assignments, black officers qualified for larger aircraft had no
chance to diversify their careers. It was essentially the same story
for black airmen. Without more varied and large black combat units the
Air Force had no need to assign many black airmen to specialist
training. In December 1947, for example, only 80 of approximately
26,000 black airmen were attending specialist schools.[11-28] When asked
about the absence of Negroes in large aircraft, especially bombers,
Air Force spokesmen cited the conversion of the 477th Composite Group,
which contained the only black bomber unit, to a specialized fighter
group as merely part of a general reorganization to meet the needs (p. 279)
of a 55-wing organization.[11-29] That the one black bomber unit
happened to be organized out of existence was pure accident.
[Footnote 11-28: Memo, unsigned (probably DCofS/P&A),
for Asst SecAF Zuckert, 22 Apr 48, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 11-29: See Air Force Testimony Before the
National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs
(afternoon session), pp. 29-32, CMH files.]
The Gillem Board had sought to expand the training and placement of
skilled Negroes by going outside the regular black units and giving
them overhead assignments. After the war some base commanders made
such assignments unofficially, taking advantage of the abilities of
airmen in the overmanned, all-black Squadron F's and assigning them to
skilled duties. In one instance the base commander's secretary was a
member of his black unit; in another, black mechanics from Squadron F
worked on the flight line with white mechanics. But whatever their
work, these men remained members of Squadron F, and often the whole
black squadron, rather than individual airmen, found itself
functioning as an overhead unit, contrary to the intent of the Gillem
Board. Even the few Negroes formally trained in a specialty and placed
in an integrated overhead unit did not approximate the Gillem Board's
intention of training a cadre that would be readily expandable in an
emergency.
The alternative to expanded overhead assignments was continuation of
segregated service units and Squadron F's, but, as some manpower
experts pointed out, many special purpose units suitable for unskilled
airmen were disappearing from the postwar Air Force. Experience gained
through the assignment of large numbers of marginal men to such units
in peacetime would be of questionable value during large-scale
mobilization.[11-30] As Colonel Parrish, the wartime commander of
training at Tuskegee, warned, a peacetime policy incapable of wartime
application was not only unrealistic, but dangerous.[11-31]
[Footnote 11-30: Memo, DCofS/P&A, TAC, for CG, TAC, 18
Mar 48, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower,
AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-31: Parrish, "Segregation of the Negro in
the Army Air Forces," pp. 72-73.]
The Air staff tried to carry out the Gillem Board's suggestion that
Negroes be stationed "where attitudes are most favorable for them
insofar as military factors permit," but even here the service lagged
behind civilian practice. When Marcus H. Ray arrived at Wright Field,
Ohio, for a two-day inspection tour in July 1946, he found almost
3,000 black civilians working peacefully and effectively alongside
18,000 white civilians, all assigned to their jobs without regard to
race. "I would rate this installation," Ray reported, "as the best
example of efficient utilization of manpower I have seen." He went on
to explain: "The integration has been accomplished without publicity
and simply by assigning workers according to their capabilities and
without regard to race, creed, or color." But Ray also noted that
there were no black military men on the base.[11-32] Assistant Secretary
of War Petersen was impressed. "In view of the fact that the racial
climate seems exceptionally favorable at Wright Field," he wrote
General Carl Spaatz, "consideration should be given to the employment
of carefully selected Negro military personnel with specialist ratings
for work in that installation."[11-33]
[Footnote 11-32: Memo, Ray for ASW, 25 Jul 46, ASW
291.2.]
[Footnote 11-33: Memo, Petersen for CG, AAF, 29 Jul
46, ASW 291.2.]
The Air Force complied. In the fall of 1946 it was forming black (p. 280)
units for assignment to Air Materiel Command Stations, and it planned
to move a black unit to Wright Field in the near future.[11-34] In
assigning an all-black unit to Wright, however, the Air Force was
introducing segregation where none had existed before, and here as in
other areas its actions belied the expressed intent of the Gillem
Board policy.
[Footnote 11-34: Memo, Brig Gen Reuben C. Hood, Jr.,
Office of CG, AAF, for ASW, 13 Sep 46, ASW 291.2.]
_Impulse for Change_
The problems associated with efficient use of black airmen intensified
when the Air Force became an independent service in 1947. The number
of Negroes fluctuated during the transition from Army Air Forces to
Air Force, and as late as April 1948 the Army still retained a number
of specialized black units whose members had the right to transfer to
the Air Force. Estimates were that some 5,400 black airmen would
eventually enter the Air Force from this source. Air Force officials
believed that when these men were added to the 26,507 Negroes already
in the new service, including 118 rated and 127 nonrated male officers
and 4 female officers, the total would exceed the 10 percent quota
suggested by the Gillem Board. Accordingly, soon after it became an
independent service, the Air Force set the number of black enlistments
at 300 per month until the necessary adjustments to the transfer
program could be made.[11-35]
[Footnote 11-35: Memo, unsigned, for Asst SecAF
Zuckert, 22 Apr 48, SecAF files. The figures cited
in this memorandum were slightly at variance with
the official strength figures as compiled later in
the _Unites States Air Force Statistical Digest I_
(1948). The _Digest_ put the Air Force's strength
(excluding Army personnel still under Air Force
control) on 31 March 1948 at 345,827, including
25,404 Negroes (8.9 percent of the total). The 10
percent plus estimate mentioned in the memorandum,
however, was right on the mark when statistics for
enlisted strength alone are considered.]
In addition to the chronic problems associated with black enlistments
and quotas, four very specific problems demonstrated clearly to Air
Force officials the urgent need for a change in race policy. The first
of these was the distribution of black airmen which threatened the
operational efficiency of the Tactical Air Command. A second, related
to the first, revolved around the personnel shortages in black
tactical units that necessitated an immediate reorganization of those
units, a reorganization both controversial and managerially
inefficient. The third and fourth problems were related; the demands
of black leaders for a broader use of black servicemen suddenly
intensified, dovetailing with the personal inclinations of the
Secretary of the Air Force, who was making the strict segregation of
black officers and specialists increasingly untenable. These four
factors coalesced during 1948 and led to a reassessment of policy and,
finally, to a _volte-face_.
Limiting black enlistment to 300 per month did little to ease the
situation in the Tactical Air Command. There, the percentage of black
personnel, although down from its postwar high of 28 percent to 15.4
percent by the end of 1947, remained several points above the Gillem
Board's 10 percent quota throughout 1948. In March 1948 the command's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Col. John E. Barr, found that the
large number of Negroes gave the command a surplus of "marginal (p. 281)
individuals," men who could not be trained economically for the
various skills needed. He argued that this theoretical surplus of
Negroes was "potentially parasitic" and threatened the command's
mission.[11-36]
[Footnote 11-36: Memo, DCofS/P&A, TAC, for CG, TAC, 18
Mar 48, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower,
AFSHRC.]
[Illustration: SQUADRON F, 318TH AAF BATTALION, _in review, Lockbourne
Air Force Base, Ohio, 1947_.]
At the same time, the command's personnel director found that Negroes
were being inefficiently used. With one squadron designated for their
black airmen, most commanders deemed surplus any Negroes in excess of
the needs of that squadron and made little attempt to use them
effectively. Even when some of these men were given a chance at
skilled jobs in the Tactical Air Command their assignments proved
short-lived. Because of a shortage of white airmen at Shaw Air Force
Base, South Carolina, in early 1948, for example, Negroes from the
base's Squadron F were assigned to fill all the slots in Squadron C,
the base fire department. The Negroes performed so creditably that
when enough white airmen to man Squadron C became available the
commander suggested that the black fire fighters be transferred to
Lockbourne rather than returned to their menial assignments.[11-37] The
advantage of leaving the all-black Squadron C at Shaw was apparently
overlooked by everyone.
[Footnote 11-37: Memo, Adj, 20th Fighter Wing, for CG,
Ninth AF, undated, sub: Transfer of Structural
Firefighters; 2d Ind, Hq 332d Fighter Wing,
Lockbourne, to CG, Ninth AF, 26 Apr 48, Hist of
Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]
Even this limited chance at occupational preferment was exceptional
for black airmen in the Tactical Air Command. The command's personnel
staff admitted that many highly skilled black technicians were
performing menial tasks and that measures taken to raise the
performance levels of other black airmen through training were
inadequate. The staff also concluded that actions designed by the
command to raise morale among black airmen left much to be desired. It
mentioned specifically the excessively high turnover of officers
assigned to black units, officers who for the most part proved
mediocre as leaders. Most devastating of all, the study admitted that
promotions and other rewards for duties performed by black airmen were
not commensurate with those received by whites.[11-38]
[Footnote 11-38: Memo, DCofS/P&A, TAC, for CG, TAC, 18
Mar 48, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower,
AFSHRC.]
Colonel Barr offered a solution that echoed the plea of Air Force (p. 282)
commanders everywhere: revise Circular 124 to allow his organization
to reduce the percentage of Negroes. Among a number of "compromise
solutions" he recommended raising enlistment standards to reduce the
number of submarginal airmen; designating Squadron E, the
transportation squadron of the combat wings, a black unit; assigning
all skilled black technicians to Lockbourne or declaring them surplus
to the command; and selecting only outstanding officers to command
black units.
One of these recommendations was under fire in Colonel Barr's own
command. All-black transportation squadrons had already been discussed
in the Ninth Air Force and had brought an immediate objection from
Maj. Gen. William D. Old, its commander. Old explained that few black
airmen in his command were qualified for "higher echelon maintenance
activities," that is, major motor and transmission overhaul, and he
had no black officers qualified to command such troops. On-the-job
training would be impossible during total conversion of the squadrons
from white to black; formal schooling for whole squadrons would have
to be organized. Besides, Old continued, making transportation
squadrons all black would only aggravate the command's race problems,
for it would result in a further deviation from the "desired ratio of
one to ten." Old wanted to reduce the number of black airmen in the
Ninth Air Force by 1,633 men. The loss would not materially affect the
efficiency of his command, he concluded. It would leave the Ninth Air
Force with a ratio of one black officer to ten white and one black
airman to eight white, and still permit the manning of black tactical
units at full strength.[11-39] In the end none of these recommendations
was followed. They needed the approval of Air Force headquarters, and
as Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada, commander of the Tactical Air Command,
explained to General Old, the headquarters was in the midst of a
lengthy review of Circular 124. In the meantime the command would have
to carry on without guidance from higher headquarters.[11-40] Carry on it
did, but the problems associated with the distribution of black
airmen, problems the command constantly shared with Air Force
headquarters, lingered throughout 1948.[11-41]
[Footnote 11-39: Memo, Maj Gen Old for CG, TAC, 26 Jan
48, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, 9AF 200.3,
Hist of Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-40: Ltr, Lt Gen Quesada to Maj Gen Old,
Ninth AF, 9 Apr 48, Hist of Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-41: Ltrs, CG, TAC, to CS/USAF, 1 Sep 48,
sub: Reception of Submarginal Enlisted Personnel;
VCS/USAF to CG, TAC, 11 Sep 48, sub: Elimination of
Undesirable or Substandard Airmen; CG, TAC, to
CS/USAF, 24 Sep 48, same sub. All in AFSHRC.]
The Air Force's segregation policy had meanwhile created a critical
situation in the black tactical units. The old 332d, now the 332d
Fighter Wing, shared with the rest of the command the burden of too
many low-scoring men--35 percent of Lockbourne's airmen were in the
two lowest groups, IV and V--but here the problem was acute since the
presence of so many persons with little ability limited the number of
skilled black airmen that the Tactical Air Command could transfer to
the wing from other parts of the command. Under direction of the
command, the Ninth Air Force was taking advantage of a regulation that
restricted the reenlistment of low-scoring airmen, but the high
percentage of unskilled Negroes persisted at Lockbourne. Negroes (p. 283)
in the upper test brackets were not reenlisting while the low scorers
unquestionably were.[11-42]
[Footnote 11-42: Ltr, DCofS/P&A, TAC, to CG, Ninth AF,
19 May 48, sub: Submarginal Enlisted Personnel;
Record of Dir of Per Staff, TAC, Mtg, 28 Oct 48;
both in AFSHRC.]
At the same time there was a shortage of rated black officers. The
332d Fighter Wing was authorized 244 officers, but only 200 were
assigned in February 1948. There was no easy solution to the shortage,
a product of many years of neglect. Segregation imposed the necessity
of devising a broad and long-range recruitment and training program
for black officers, but not until April 1948 did the Tactical Air
Command call for a steady flow of Negroes through officer candidate
and flight training schools.[11-43] It hoped to have another thirty-one
black pilot graduates by March 1949 and planned to recall thirty-two
others from inactive status.[11-44] Even these steps could not possibly
alleviate the serious shortage caused by the perennial failure to
replace the wing's annual pilot attrition.
[Footnote 11-43: Ltr, CG, TAC, to CG, Ninth AF, 9 Apr
48, TAC 314 (9 Apr 48), AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-44: Hq TAC, Record and Routing Sheet, 16
Apr 48, sub: Supervisory Visit 332d Ftr Gp,
Lockbourne AFB, AFSHRC.]
The chronic shortage of black field grade officers in the 332d was the
immediate cause of the change in Air Force policy. By February 1948
the 332d had only thirteen of its forty-eight authorized field grade
officers on duty. The three tactical units of the wing were commanded
by captains instead of the authorized lieutenant colonels. If Colonel
Davis were reassigned, and his attendance at the Air War College was
expected momentarily, his successor as wing commander would be a major
with five years' service.[11-45] The Tactical Air Commander was trying to
have all field grade Negroes assigned to the 332d, but even that
expedient would not provide enough officers.[11-46] Finally, General
Quesada decided to recommend that "practically all" the key field
grade positions in the 332d Wing be filled by whites.[11-47]
[Footnote 11-45: Ltr, CG, Ninth AF, to CG, TAC, 10 Feb
48, sub: Assignment of Negro Personnel, Hist of
Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-46: Hq TAC, Record and Routing Sheet, 16
Apr 48, sub: Supervisory Visit 332d Ftr Gp,
Lockbourne AFB, AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-47: Ltrs, CG, TAC, to CG, Ninth AF, 9 Apr
48, and DCG, TAC, to CG, Ninth AF, 7 May 48, TAC
210.3; both in Hist of Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]
Subsequent discussions at Air Force headquarters gave the Air Force
Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, three choices: leave
Lockbourne manned exclusively by black officers; assign a white wing
commander with a racially mixed staff; or permit Colonel Davis to
remain in command with a racially mixed staff. Believing that General
Vandenberg would approve the last course, the Tactical Air Command
proceeded to search for appropriate white officers to fill the key
positions under Davis.[11-48]
[Footnote 11-48: Memo, A-1, Ninth AF, for C/S, Ninth
AF, 18 May 48, sub: Manning of 332d Fighter Wing,
Hist of Ninth AF; Record of the TAC Staff Conf, 18
May 48; both in AFSHRC.]
The deputy commander of the Ninth Air Force, Brig. Gen. Jarred V.
Crabb, predicted that placing whites in key positions in the 332d
would cause trouble, but leaving Davis in command of a mixed staff
"would be loaded with dynamite."[11-49] The commander of the Ninth (p. 284)
Air Force called the proposal to integrate the 332d's staff contrary
to Air Force policy, which prescribed segregated units of not less
than company strength. General Old was forthright:
[Integration] would be playing in the direction in which the
negro press would like to force us. They are definitely
attempting to force the Army and Air Force to solve the racial
problem. As you know, they have been strongly advocating mixed
companies of white and colored. For obvious reasons this is most
undesirable and to do so would definitely limit the geographical
locations in which such units could be employed. If the Air
Forces go ahead and set a precedent, most undesirable
repercussions may occur. Regardless of how the problem is solved,
we would certainly come under strong criticism of the negro
press. That must be expected.
In view of the combat efficiency demonstrated by colored
organizations during the last war, my first recommendation in the
interest of national defense and saving the taxpayer's money is
to let the organization die on the vine. We make a big subject of
giving the taxpayers the maximum amount of protection for each
dollar spent, then turn around and support an organization that
would contribute little or nothing in an emergency. It is my own
opinion that it is an unnecessary drain on our national
resources, but for political reasons I presume the organization
must be retained. Therefore, my next recommended solution is to
transfer all of the colored personnel from the Wing Headquarters
staff to the Tactical and Service Organizations within the Wing
structure and replace it with a completely white staff.[11-50]
[Footnote 11-49: Ltr, Brig Gen J. V. Crabb to Maj Gen
Robert M. Lee, Hq TAC, 19 May 48, Hist of Ninth AF,
AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-50: Ltr, CG, Ninth AF, to Maj Gen R. M.
Lee, TAC, 18 May 48, Hist of Ninth AF, AFSHRC.]
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which these views were
shared by other senior commanders, but they were widespread and
revealed the tenacious hold of segregation.[11-51]
[Footnote 11-51: For discussion of these views and
their influence on officers, see USAF Oral History
Program, Interviews with Brig Gen Noel Parrish, 30
Mar 73, Col Jack Marr, 1 Oct 73, and Eugene
Zuckert, Apr 73.]
The Ninth Air Force's deputy commander offered another solution: use
"whatever colored officers we have" to run Lockbourne. He urged that
Colonel Davis's absence at the Air War College be considered a
temporary arrangement. Meanwhile, the general added, "we can carry
Lockbourne along for that period of time by close supervision from
this headquarters."[11-52] As Davis later put it, cost effectiveness, not
prejudice, was the key factor in the Air Force's wish to get rid of
the 332d. The Air Force, he concluded, "wasn't getting its money's
worth from negro pilots in a black air force."[11-53]
[Footnote 11-52: Ltr, Brig Gen J. V. Crabb to Maj Gen
Robert M. Lee, Hq TAC, 19 May 48, Hist of Ninth AF,
AFSHRC.]
[Footnote 11-53: Interv, author with Davis.]
The Tactical Air Command's use of black troops is always singled out
because of the numbers involved, but the problem was common to nearly
all commands. Most Negroes in the Strategic Air Command, for example,
were assigned to aviation engineer units where, as construction
workers, they built roads, runways, and housing for the command's
far-flung bases. These duties were transient, however, and like
migrant workers at home, black construction crews were shifted from
base to base as the need arose; they had little chance for promotion,
let alone the opportunity to develop other skills.[11-54]
[Footnote 11-54: See history of various aviation air
units in "History of the Strategic Air Command,
1948," vols VI and VIII, AFSHRC.]
The distribution of Negroes in all commands, and particularly the
shortage of black specialists and officers in the 332d Fighter Wing,
strongly influenced the Air Force to reexamine its racial policy, (p. 285)
but pressures came from outside the department as well as from the
black community which began to press its demands on the new
service.[11-55] The prestigious Pittsburgh _Courier_ opened the
campaign in March 1948 by directing a series of questions on Air Force
policy to the Chief of Staff. General Carl Spaatz responded with a
smooth summary of the Gillem Board Report, leaning heavily on that
document's progressive aims. "It is the feeling of this Headquarters,"
the Chief of Staff wrote, "that the ultimate Air Force objective must
be to eliminate segregation among its personnel by the unrestricted
use of Negro personnel in free competition for any duty within the Air
Force for which they may qualify."[11-56] Unimpressed with this
familiar rhetoric, the _Courier_ headlined its account of the
exchange, "Air Force to Keep Segregated Policy."
[Footnote 11-55: For discussion of the strength of
this outside pressure, see USAF Oral History
Program. Interviews with Davis and Brig Gen Lucius
Theus, Jan 73.]
[Footnote 11-56: Ltr, Lemuel Graves to Gen Carl
Spaatz, 26 Mar 48; Ltr, Spaatz to Graves, 19 Apr
48. A copy of the correspondence was also sent to
the SecAF. See Col Jack F. Marr, "A Report on the
First Year of Implementation of Current Policies
Regarding Negro Personnel," n.d., PPB 291.2.]
[Illustration: COLONEL DAVIS.]
Assistant Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert followed General Spaatz's line
when he met with black leaders at the National Defense Conference on
Negro Affairs in April 1948, but his audience also showed little
interest in future intentions. Putting it bluntly, they wanted to know
why segregation was necessary in the Air Force. Zuckert could only
assure them that segregation was a "practical military expediency,"
not an "endorsement of belief in racial distribution."[11-57] But the
black leaders pressed the matter further. Why was it expedient in a
system dedicated to consideration of the individual, asked the
president of Howard University, to segregate a Negro of superior
mentality? At Yale or Harvard, Dr. Mordecai Johnson continued, he
would be kept on the team, but if he entered the Air Force he would be
"brigaded with all the people from Mississippi and Alabama who had had
education that costs $100 a year."[11-58]
[Footnote 11-57: Department of National Defense,
"National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs," 26
Apr 48 (morning session) p. 62. The conference,
convened by Secretary of Defense Forrestal,
provided an opportunity for a group of black
leaders to question major defense officials on the
department's racial policies. See ch. 13.]
[Footnote 11-58: Department of National Defense,
"National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs," 28
Apr 48, (morning session), p. 67.]
Answering for the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, admitted segregation was unnecessary,
promised eventual integration, but stated firmly that for the present
segregation remained Air Force policy. As evidence of progress, (p. 286)
Edwards pointed to the peaceful integration of black officers in
training at Randolph Field. For one conferee this "progress" led to
another conclusion: resistance to integration had to emanate from the
policymakers, not from the fighting men. All Edwards could manage in
the way of a reply was that Air Force policy was considered "the best
way to make this thing work under present conditions."[11-59] Later
Edwards, who was not insensitive to the arguments of the black
leaders, told Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington that
perhaps some recommendation "looking toward the integration of whites
and negroes in the same units may be forthcoming" from the Air Board's
study of racial policy which was to commence the first week in
May.[11-60]
[Footnote 11-59: Ibid., p. 69.]
[Footnote 11-60: Memo, Edwards for SecAF, 29 Apr 48,
sub: Conference With Group of Prominent Negroes,
Negro Affairs 1948, SecAF files.]
If the logic of the black leaders impressed General Edwards, the
demands themselves had little effect on policy. It remained for James
C. Evans, now the adviser to Secretary of Defense Forrestal, to
translate these questions and demands into recommendations for
specific action. Taking advantage of a long acquaintance with the
Secretary of the Air Force, Evans discussed the department's race
problem with him in May 1948. Symington was sympathetic. "Put it on
paper," he told Evans.[11-61]
[Footnote 11-61: Interv, author with Evans, 7 Apr 70;
Note, Evans to Col Marr, 8 Jun 50, SD 291.2.]
Couching his recommendations in terms of the Gillem Board policy,
Evans faithfully summarized for the secretary the demands of black
leaders. Specifically, he asked that Colonel Davis, the commander of
Lockbourne Air Force Base, be sent for advanced military schooling
without delay. Diversification of career was long overdue for Davis,
the ranking black officer in the Air Force, as it was for others who
were considered indispensable because of the small number of qualified
black leaders. For Davis, most of all, the situation was unfair since
he had always been in command of practically all rated black officers.
Nor was it good for his subordinates. The Air Force should not
hesitate to assign a white replacement for Davis. In effect, Evans was
telling Symington that the black community would understand the
necessity for such a move.
Besides, under the program Evans was recommending, the all-black wing
would soon cease to exist. He wanted the Air Force to "deemphasize"
Lockbourne as the black air base and scatter the black units
concentrated there. He wanted to see Negroes dispersed throughout the
Air Force, either individually or in small units contemplated by the
Gillem Board, but he wanted men assigned on the basis of technical
specialty and proficiency rather than race. It was unrealistic, he
declared, to assume all black officers could be most effectively
utilized as pilots and all enlisted men as Squadron F laborers.
Limiting training and job opportunity because of race reduced fighting
potential in a way that never could be justified. The Air Force should
open to its Negroes a wide variety of training, experience, and
opportunity to acquire versatility and proficiency.[11-62]
[Footnote 11-62: Memo, Evans for SecAF, 7 Jun 48, sub:
Negro Air Units, D54-1-12. SecDef files.]
If followed, this program would fundamentally alter Air Force (p. 287)
racial practices. General Edwards recommended that the reply to Evans
should state that certain policy changes would be forthcoming,
although they would have to await the outcome of a departmental
reevaluation currently under way. The suggestions had been solicited
by Symington, and Edwards was anxious for Evans to understand the
delay was not a device to defer action.[11-63]
[Footnote 11-63: DCofS/P Summary Sheet for CofS, 15
Jul 48, sub: Negro Air Units, Negro Affairs 1948,
SecAF files.]
[Illustration: GENERAL EDWARDS.]
Edwards was in a position to make such assurances. He was an
influential member of the Air staff with considerable experience in
the field of race relations. As a member of the Army staff during
World War II he had worked closely with the old McCloy committee on
black troops and had strongly advocated wartime experiments with the
integration of small-scale units.[11-64] His background, along with his
observations as chief personnel officer in the new Air Force, had
taught him to avoid abstract appeals to justice and to make
suggestions in terms of military efficiency. Concern with efficiency
led him, soon after the Air Force became a separate service, to order
Lt. Col. Jack F. Marr, a member of his staff, to study the Air Force's
racial policy and practices. Testifying to Edwards's pragmatic
approach, Marr later said of his own introduction to the subject:
"There was no sociology involved. It was merely a routine staff action
along with a bunch of other staff actions that were taking place."[11-65]
[Footnote 11-64: During World War II, Edwards served
as the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. For a
discussion of his opposition at that time to the
concentration of large groups of men in categories
IV and V, see Edwin W. Kenworthy, "The Case Against
Army Segregation," _The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science_ 275 (May
1951):29. See also Lee's _Employment of Negro
Troops_, p. 159. Edward's part in the integration
program is based on USAF Oral History Program,
Interviews with Zuckert, General William F. McKee,
Davis, Senator Stuart Symington, and Marr. See also
Interv, author with Lt Gen Idwal H. Edwards, Nov
73, CMH files.]
[Footnote 11-65: Ltr, Marr to author, 19 Jun 70, CMH
files.]
A similar concern for efficiency, this time triggered by criticism at
the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs in April 1948 and
Evans's discussions with Secretary Symington the following month, led
Edwards, after talking it over with Assistant Secretary Zuckert, to
raise the subject of the employment of Negroes in the Air Board in
May.[11-66] In the wake of the Air Board discussion the Chief of Staff
appointed a group under Maj. Gen. Richard E. Nugent, then Director (p. 288)
of Civilian Personnel, to reexamine the service's race policy.[11-67]
Nugent was another Air Force official who viewed the employment of
Negroes as a problem in military efficiency.[11-68] These three,
Edwards, Nugent, and Marr, were the chief figures in the development
of the Air Force integration plan, which grew out of the Nugent
group's study. Edwards and Nugent supervised its many refinements in
the staff while Marr, whom Zuckert later described as the
indispensable man, wrote the plan and remained intimately connected
with it until the Air Force carried it out.[11-69] Antedating the
Truman order to integrate the services, the provisions of this plan
eventually became the program under which the Air Force was
integrated.[11-70]
[Footnote 11-66: A group created to review policy and
make recommendations to the Chief of Staff when
called upon, the Air Board consisted at this time
of the Assistant Chiefs of the Air Staff, the Air
Inspector, the Air Comptroller, the Director of
Information, the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
for Research and Development, and other officials
when appropriate.]
[Footnote 11-67: Memo, Maj Leon Bell for Zuckert, 27
Oct 48, SecAF files. Nugent later succeeded Edwards
as the chief Air Force personnel officer.]
[Footnote 11-68: This attitude is strongly displayed
in the USAF Oral History Program, Interviews with
Lt Gen Richard E. Nugent, 8 Jun 73, and Marr, 1 Oct
73.]
[Footnote 11-69: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Zuckert.]
[Footnote 11-70: Colonel Marr recalled a different
chronology for the Air Force integration plan.
According to Marr, his proposals were forwarded by
Edwards to Symington who in turn discussed them at
a meeting of the Secretary of Defense's Personnel
Policy Board sometime before June 1948. The board
rejected the plan at the behest of Secretary of the
Army Royall, but later in the year outside pressure
caused it to be reconsidered. Nothing is available
in the files to corroborate Marr's recollections,
nor do the other participants remember that Royall
was ever involved in the Air Force's internal
affairs. The records do not show when the Air Force
study of race policy, which originated in the Air
Board in May 1948, evolved into the plan for
integration that Marr wrote and the Chief of Staff
signed in December 1948, but it seems unlikely that
the plan would have been ready before June. See
Ltrs, Marr to author, 19 Jun 70, and 28 Jul 70, CMH
files; see also USAF Oral Hist Interv with Marr.]
[Illustration: COLONEL MARR.]
As it evolved during the months of deliberation,[11-71] the Air Force
study of black manpower weighed Air Force practices against the Gillem
Board Report and found them "considerably divergent" from the policy
as outlined. It isolated several reasons for this divergence. Black
airmen on the whole, as measured by classification tests, were
unsuitable and inadequate for operating all-black air units organized
and trained for modern combat. To achieve a balance of skills and
training in black units was a "never ending problem for which there
appears to be no solution under either the current Air Force policies
or the policies recommended by the Gillem Board." In short, practices
with respect to Negroes were "wasteful, deleterious to military
effectiveness and lacking in wartime application."
[Footnote 11-71: The Air Force integration plan
underwent considerable revision and modification
before its submission to the Secretary of Defense
in January 1949. The quotations in the next
paragraphs are taken from the version approved by
the Chief of Staff on 29 December 1948.]
Edwards and his staff saw several advantages in complete (p. 289)
integration. Wherever qualified black airmen had been permitted to
compete with whites on their individual qualifications and abilities,
the Negroes "achieved a certain amount of acceptance and recognition."
Students in some schools lived and learned side by side as a matter of
practical necessity. "This degree of integration and acceptance on a
competitive basis has been eminently successful and has to a
remarkable degree solved the 'Negro problem' for the training schools
involved." At some bases qualified black airmen were administratively
assigned to black units but actually performed duties in white units.
Some commanders had requested that these men be permanently
transferred and assigned to the white units because the men deserved
higher grades but could not receive them in black units and because it
was poor management to have individuals performing duties for one
military organization and living under the administrative jurisdiction
of another.
In the end consideration of full integration was dropped in favor of a
program based on the Navy's postwar integration of its general
service. Edwards and his personnel staff dismissed the Navy's problems
with stewards and its difficulty in enlisting skilled Negroes as
temporary embarrassments with little practical consequence. This
problem apparently allowed an economic and efficient use of Negroes
and also "relieved the Navy of the necessity for repeated efforts to
justify an untenable position." They saw several practical advantages
in a similar policy for the Air Force. It would allow the elimination
of the 10 percent quota. The inactivation of some black units--"and
the pronounced relief of the problems involved in maintaining those
units under present conditions"--could be accomplished without
injustice to Negroes and with benefit to the Air Force. Nor would the
integration of qualified Negroes in technical and combat units
appreciably alter current practices; according to contemporary
estimates such skilled men would never total more that 1 percent of
the service's manpower.
The logic of social justice might have led to total integration, but
it would not have solved the Air Force's pressing problem of too many
unskilled blacks. It was consideration of military efficiency,
therefore, that led these personnel experts to propose a system of
limited integration along the lines of the Navy's postwar policy. Such
a system, they concluded, would release the Air Force from its quota
obligation--and hence its continuing surplus of unskilled men--and
free it to assign its relatively small group of skilled black recruits
where they were needed and might advance.
Although limited, the proposed reform was substantial enough to arouse
opposition. General Edwards reported overwhelming opposition to any
form of integration among Air Force officers, and never during the
spring of 1948 did the Chief of Staff seriously consider even partial
integration.[11-72] But if integration, even in a small dose, was
unpalatable, widespread inefficiency was intolerable. And a new (p. 290)
service, still in the process of developing policy, might embrace
the new and the practical, especially if pressure were exerted from
above. Assistant Secretary Zuckert intimated as much when he finally
replied to James Evans, "You have my personal assurance that our
present position is not in the interest of maintaining the status quo,
but it is in anticipation of a more progressive and more satisfactory
action in the relatively near future."[11-73]
[Footnote 11-72: Memo, Edwards for SecAF, 29 Apr 48,
sub: Conference With Group of Prominent Negroes,
Negro Affairs 1948, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 11-73: Memo, Zuckert to Evans, 22 Jul 48,
sub: Negro Air Units, SecAF files.]