The Postwar Marine Corps
Unlike the Army and Navy, the all-white Marine Corps seemed to
consider the wartime enlistment of over 19,000 Negroes a temporary
aberration. Forced by the Navy's nondiscrimination policy to retain
Negroes after the war, Marine Corps officials at first decided on a
black representation of some 2,200 men, roughly the same proportion as
during the war. But the old tradition of racial exclusion remained
strong, and this figure was soon reduced. The corps also ignored the
Navy's integration measures, adopting instead a pattern of segregation
that Marine officials claimed was a variation on the Army's historic
"separate but equal" black units. In fact, separation was real enough
in the postwar corps; equality remained elusive.
_Racial Quotas and Assignments_
The problem was that any "separate but equal" race policy, no matter
how loosely enforced, was incompatible with the corps' postwar
manpower resources and mission and would conflict with its
determination to restrict black units to a token number. The dramatic
manpower reductions of 1946 were felt immediately in the two major
elements of the Marine Corps. The Fleet Marine Force, the main
operating unit of the corps and usually under control of the Chief of
Naval Operations, retained three divisions, but lost a number of its
combat battalions. The divisions kept a few organic and attached
service and miscellaneous units. Under such severe manpower
restrictions, planners could not reserve one of the large organic
elements of these divisions for black marines, thus leaving the
smaller attached and miscellaneous units as the only place to
accommodate self-contained black organizations. At first the Plans and
Policies Division decided to assign roughly half the black marines to
the Fleet Marine Force. Of these some were slated for an antiaircraft
artillery battalion at Montford Point which would provide training as
well as an opportunity for Negroes' overseas to be rotated home.
Others were placed in three combat service groups and one service
depot where they would act as divisional service troops, and the rest
went into 182 slots, later increased to 216, for stewards, the
majority in aviation units.
The other half of the black marines was to be absorbed by the so
called non-Fleet Marine Force, a term used to cover training,
security, and miscellaneous Marine units, all noncombat, which
normally remained under the control of the commandant. This part of
the corps was composed of many small and usually self-contained units,
but in a number of activities, particularly in the logistical
establishment and the units afloat, reductions in manpower would (p. 254)
necessitate considerable sharing of living and working facilities,
thus making racial separation impossible. The planners decided,
therefore, to limit black assignments outside the Fleet Marine Force
to naval ammunition depots at McAlester, Oklahoma, and Earle, New
Jersey, where Negroes would occupy separate barracks; to Guam and
Saipan, principally as antiaircraft artillery; and to a small training
cadre at Montford Point. Eighty stewards would also serve with units
outside the Fleet Marine Force. With the exception of the depot at
Earle, all these installations had been assigned Negroes during the
war. Speaking in particular about the assignment of Negroes to
McAlester, the Director of the Plans and Policies Division, Brig. Gen.
Gerald C. Thomas, commented that "this has proven to be a satisfactory
location and type of duty for these personnel."[10-1] Thomas's
conception of "satisfactory" duty for Negroes became the corps'
rationale for its postwar assignment policy.
[Footnote 10-1: Memos, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 25 Sep and 17 Oct 46, sub: Post War
Personnel Requirements, A0-1, MC files. Unless
otherwise noted, all the documents cited in this
chapter are located in Hist Div, HQMC. The
quotation is from the September memo.]
[Illustration: MARINE ARTILLERY TEAM. _Men of the 51st Defense
Battalion in training at Montford Point with 90-mm. antiaircraft
gun._]
To assign Negroes to unskilled jobs because they were accustomed to
such duties and because the jobs were located in communities that
would accept black marines might be satisfactory to Marine officials,
but it was considered racist by many civil rights spokesmen and left
the Marine Corps open to charges of discrimination. The policy of
tying the number of Negroes to the number of available, appropriate
slots also meant that the number of black marines, and consequently
the acceptability of black volunteers, was subject to chronic
fluctuation. More important, it permitted if not encouraged further
restrictions on the use of the remaining black marines who had combat
training, thereby allowing the traditionalists to press for a
segregated service in which the few black marines would be mostly
servants and laborers.
The process of reordering the assignment of black marines began just
eleven weeks after the commandant approved the staff's postwar policy
recommendations. Informing the commandant on 6 January 1947 that
"several changes have been made in concepts upon which such (p. 255)
planning was based," General Thomas explained that the requirement for
antiaircraft artillery units at Guam and Saipan had been canceled,
along with the plan for maintaining an artillery unit at Montford
Point. Because of the cancellation his division wanted to reduce the
number of black marines to 1,500. These men could be assigned to depot
companies, service units, and Marine barracks--all outside the Fleet
Marine Force--or they could serve as stewards. The commandant's
approval of this plan reduced the number of Negroes in the corps by 35
percent, or 700 men. Coincidental with this reduction was a 17 percent
rise in spaces for black stewards to 350.[10-2]
[Footnote 10-2: Memo, G. C. Thomas, Div of Plans and
Policies, for CMC, 6 Jan 47, sub: Negro
Requirements, A0-1.]
Approval of this plan eliminated the last Negroes from combat
assignments, a fact that General Thomas suggested could be justified
as "consistent with similar reductions being effected elsewhere in the
Corps." But the facts did not support such a palliative. In June 1946
the corps had some 1,200 men serving in three antiaircraft artillery
battalions and an antiaircraft artillery group headquarters. In June
1948 the corps still had white antiaircraft artillery units on Guam
and at Camp Lejeune totaling 1,020 men. The drop in numbers was
explained almost entirely by the elimination of the black units.[10-3]
[Footnote 10-3: USMC Muster Rolls of Officers and
Enlisted Men, 1946 and 1948.]
A further realignment of black assignments occurred in June 1947 when
General Vandegrift approved a Plans and Policies Division decision to
remove more black units from security forces at naval shore
establishments. The men were reassigned to Montford Point with the
result that the number of black training and overhead billets at that
post jumped 200 percent--a dubious decision at best considering that
black specialist and recruit training was virtually at a standstill.
General Thomas took the occasion to advise the commandant that
maintaining an arbitrary quota of black marines was no longer a
consideration since a reduction in their strength could be "adequately
justified" by the general manpower reductions throughout the corps.[10-4]
[Footnote 10-4: Memo, G. C. Thomas for CMC, 11 Jun 47,
sub: Negro Requirements and Assignments, A0-1.]
Actually the Marine Corps was not as free to reduce the quota of 1,500
Negroes as General Thomas suggested. To make further cuts in what was
at most a token representation, approximately 1 percent of the corps
in August 1947, would further inflame civil rights critics and might
well provoke a reaction from Secretary Forrestal. Even Thomas's
accompanying recommendation carefully retained the black strength
figure previously agreed upon and actually raised the number of
Negroes in the ground forces by seventy-six men. The 1,500-man minimum
quota for black enlistment survived the reorganization of the Fleet
Marine Force later in 1947, and the Plans and Policies Division even
found it necessary to locate some 375 more billets for Negroes to
maintain the figure. In August the commandant approved plans to add
100 slots for stewards and 275 general duty billets overseas, the
latter to facilitate rotation and provide a broader range of
assignments for Negroes.[10-5] Only once before the Korean War, (p. 256)
and then only briefly, did the authorized strength of Negroes
drop below the 1,500 mark, although because of recruitment lags actual
numbers never equaled authorized strength.[10-6]
[Footnote 10-5: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 28 Aug 47, sub: Requirements for General
Duty Negro Marines, A0-1.]
[Footnote 10-6: Idem for Div, Pub Info, 10 Nov 48,
sub: Information Relating to Negro Marines, A0-1.]
By mid-1947, therefore, the Marine Corps had abandoned its complex
system of gearing the number of black marines to available assignments
and, like the Army and the Air Force, had adopted a racial quota--but
with an important distinction. Although they rarely achieved it, the
Army and the Air Force were committed to accepting a fixed percentage
of Negroes; in an effort to avoid the problems with manpower
efficiency plaguing the other services, the Marine Corps established a
straight _numerical_ quota. Authorized black strength would remain at
about 1,500 men until the Korean War. During that same period the
actual percentage of Negroes in the Marine Corps almost doubled,
rising from 1.3 percent of the 155,679-man corps in June 1946 to
slightly more than 2 percent of the 74,279-man total in June 1950.[10-7]
[Footnote 10-7: Unless otherwise noted, statistics in
this section are from NA Pers, 15658 (A), _Report,
Navy and Marine Corps Military Statistics_, 30 Jun
59, BuPers. Official figures on black marines are
from reports of the USMC Personnel Accounting
Section.]
Yet neither the relatively small size of the Marine Corps nor the fact
that few black marines were enrolled could conceal the inefficiency of
segregation. Over the next three years the personnel planning staff
tried to find a solution to the problem of what it considered to be
too many Negroes in the general service. First it began to reduce
gradually the number of black units accommodated in the Operating
Force Plan, absorbing the excess black marines by increasing the
number of stewards. This course was not without obvious public
relations disadvantages, but they were offset somewhat by the fact
that the Marine Corps, unlike the Navy, never employed a majority of
its black recruits as stewards. In May 1948 the commandant approved
new plans for a 10 percent decrease in the number of general duty
assignments and a corresponding increase in spaces for stewards.[10-8]
The trend away from assigning Negroes to general service duty
continued until the Korean War, and in October 1949 a statistical high
point was reached when some 33 percent of all black marines were
serving as stewards. The doctrine that all marines were potential
infantrymen stood, but it was small comfort to civil rights activists
who feared that what at best was a nominal black representation in the
corps was being pushed into the kitchen.
[Footnote 10-8: Memo, Dir, Plans and Policies Div, for
CMC, 20 May 48, sub: Procurement and Assignment of
Negro Enlisted Personnel, A0-1.]
But they had little to fear since the number of Negroes that could be
absorbed in the Steward's Branch was limited. In the end the Marine
Corps still had to accommodate two-thirds of its black strength in
general duty billets, a course with several unpalatable consequences.
For one, Negroes would be assigned to new bases reluctant to accept
them and near some communities where they would be unwelcome. For
another, given the limitations in self-contained units, there was the
possibility of introducing some integration in the men's living or
working arrangements. Certainly black billets would have to be created
at the expense of white billets. The Director of Plans and Policies
warned in August 1947 that the reorganization of the Fleet Marine (p. 257)
Force, then under way, failed to allocate spaces for some 350 Negroes
with general duty contracts. While he anticipated some reduction in
this number as a result of the campaign to attract volunteers for the
Steward's Branch, he admitted that many would remain unassigned and
beyond anticipating a reduction in the black "overage" through
attrition, his office had no long-range plans for creating the needed
spaces.[10-9] When the attrition failed to materialize, the commandant
was forced in December 1949 to redesignate 202 white billets for black
marines with general duty contracts.[10-10] The problem of finding
restricted assignments for black marines in the general service lasted
until it was overtaken by the manpower demands of the Korean War.
Meanwhile to the consternation of the civil rights advocates, as the
corps' definition of "suitable" assignment became more exact, the
variety of duties to which Negroes could be assigned seemed to
decrease.[10-11]
[Footnote 10-9: Ibid., 28 Aug 47, sub: Requirements
for General Duty Negro Marines, A0-1.]
[Footnote 10-10: Ibid., 14 Nov 49, sub: Designation of
Units for Assignment of Negro Marines, A0-1.]
[Footnote 10-11: For criticism of assignment
restrictions, see comments and questions at the
National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26
Apr 48 (afternoon session), pp. 1-10, copy in CMH.]
_Recruitment_
Postwar quotas and assignments for Negroes did nothing to curb the
black community's growing impatience with separate and limited
opportunities, a fact brought home to Marine Corps recruiters when
they tried to enlist the Negroes needed to fill their quota. At first
it seemed the traditionalists would regain their all-white corps by
default. The Marine Corps had ceased drafting men in November 1945 and
launched instead an intensive recruiting campaign for regular marines
from among the thousands of reservists about to be discharged and
regulars whose enlistments would soon expire. Included in this group
were some 17,000 Negroes from among whom the corps planned to recruit
its black contingent. To charges that it was discriminating in the
enlistment of black civilians, the corps readily admitted that no new
recruits were being accepted because preference was being given to men
already in the corps.[10-12] In truth, the black reservists were
rejecting the blandishments of recruiters in overwhelming numbers. By
May 1946 only 522 Negroes, less than a quarter of the small postwar
black complement, had enlisted in the regular service.
[Footnote 10-12: G-1, Div of Plans and Policies,
Operational Diary, Sep 45-Oct 46, 23 Apr 47; Memo,
Dir of Personnel (Div of Recruiting) for Off in
Charge, Northeastern Recruiting Div, 17 Jan 46,
sub: Enlistment of Negro Ex-Marines, MC 706577. See
also _Afro-American_, February 16, 1946.]
The failure to attract recruits was particularly noticeable in the
antiaircraft battalions. To obtain black replacements for these
critically depleted units, the commandant authorized the recruitment
of reservists who had served less than six months, but the measure
failed to produce the necessary manpower. On 28 February 1946 the
commanding general of Camp Lejeune reported that all but seven Negroes
on his antiaircraft artillery roster were being processed for
discharge.[10-13] Since this list included the black noncommissioned
instructors, the commander warned that future training of black (p. 258)
marines would entail the use of officers as instructors. The
precipitous loss of black artillerymen forced Marine headquarters to
assign white specialists as temporary replacements in the heavy
antiaircraft artillery groups at Guam and Saipan, both designated as
black units in the postwar organization.[10-14]
[Footnote 10-13: Msg, CMC to CG, Cp Lejeune, 19 Feb
46, MC 122026; Memo, CG, Cp Lejeune, for CMC, 28
Feb 46, sub: Personnel and Equipment for
Antiaircraft Artillery Training Battalion
(Colored), Availability of, RPS-1059, MC files.]
[Footnote 10-14: Memo, G. C. Thomas for Dir of
Personnel, 6 Mar 48, sub: Replacements for Enlisted
Personnel (Colored) Assignment of, Request for,
A0-3; Msg, CINCPAC/POA PEARL to CNO, 282232Z Apr
46, MC 76735, MC files.]
It was not the fault of the black press if this expression of black
indifference went unnoticed. The failure of black marines to reenlist
was the subject of many newspaper and journal articles. The reason for
the phenomenon advanced by the Norfolk _Journal and Guide_ would be
repeated by civil rights spokesmen on numerous occasions in the era
before integration. The paper declared that veterans remembered their
wartime experiences and were convinced that the same distasteful
practices would be continued after the war.[10-15] Marine Corps officials
advanced different reasons. The Montford Point commander attributed
slow enlistment rates to a general postwar letdown and lack of
publicity, explaining that Montford Point "had an excellent athletic
program, good chow and comfortable barracks." A staff member of the
Division of Plans and Policies later prepared a lengthy analysis of
the treatment the Marine Corps had received in the black press. He
charged that the press had presented a distorted picture of conditions
faced by blacks that had "agitated" the men and turned them against
reenlistment. He recommended a public relations campaign at Montford
Point to improve the corps' image.[10-16] But this analysis missed the
point, for while the black press might influence civilians, it could
hardly instruct Marine veterans. Probably more than any other factor,
the wartime treatment of black marines explained the failure of the
corps to attract qualified, let alone gifted, Negroes to its postwar
junior enlisted ranks.
[Footnote 10-15: Norfolk _Journal and Guide_, May 4,
1946. See also Murray, _Negro Yearbook_, 1949 pp.
272-73. On the general accuracy of the press
charges, see Shaw and Donnelly, _Blacks in the
Marine Corps_, pp. 47-51.]
[Footnote 10-16: CO, Montford Point, Press Conference
(ca. 1 May 47), quoted in Div of Plans and Policies
Staff Report, "Rescinding Ltr of Instruction #421,"
MC files; unsigned, untitled Memo written in the
Division of Plans and Policies on black marines and
the black press (ca. Aug 55).]
Considering the critical shortages, temporarily and "undesirably" made
up for by white marines, and the "leisurely" rate at which black
reservists were reenlisting, General Thomas recommended in May 1946
that the corps recruit some 1,120 Negroes from civilian sources. This,
he explained to the commandant, would accelerate black enlistment but
still save some spaces for black reservists.[10-17] The commandant
agreed,[10-18] and contrary to the staff's expectations, most Negroes in
the postwar service were new recruits. The mass departure of World (p. 259)
War II veterans eloquently expressed the attitude of experienced black
servicemen toward the Marines' racial policy.
[Footnote 10-17: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 3 May 46, sub: Enlisting of Negroes in the
Marine Corps From Civilian Sources, A0-1.]
[Footnote 10-18: Ibid., 23 Oct 46, sub: Enlistment of
Negroes, 1335-110; Memo, CMC to Off in Charge,
Northeastern Recruiting Div, et al., 23 Oct 46,
sub: Negro First Enlistments, Quota for Month of
November, 1946, AP-1231. There was an attempt to
stall first enlistment, see Memo, Dir of Personnel,
for Dir, Div of Plans and Policies, 17 May 46, sub:
Enlisting of Negroes in the Marine Corps From
Civilian Sources; but it was overruled, Memo, Dir,
Div of Plans and Policies, for Dir of Personnel. 23
May 46, same sub, A0-1.]
The word spread quickly among the new black marines. When in mid-1947
the Division of Plans and Policies was looking for ways to reduce the
number of black marines in keeping with the modified manpower ceiling,
it discovered that if offered the opportunity about one-third of all
Negroes would apply for discharge. An even higher percentage of
discharge requests was expected from among black marines overseas. The
commandant agreed to make the offer, except to the stewards, and in
the next six months black strength dropped by 700 men.[10-19]
[Footnote 10-19: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 28 May 47, sub: Program for Accelerated
Attrition of Negro Marines, A0-1; Maj S. M. Adams,
"Additional Directives From Plans and Policies--3
June 1947," 3 Jun 47; Speed Ltr, CMC to CG, Marine
Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N.C., et al., 8
May 47, A0-1; Memo, CMC to Depot Quartermaster,
Depot of Supplies, 3 Jun 47, sub: Discharge for the
Convenience of the Government Certain Enlisted
Negro Members of the Marine Corps, 070-15-447.]
Even the recruitment of stewards did not go according to predictions.
Thomas had assured the commandant in the spring of 1946 that a
concrete offer of steward duty to black reservists would produce the
300-man quota for the regular corps. He wanted the offer published at
all separation centers and a training program for stewards instituted
at Camp Lejeune.[10-20] General Vandegrift approved the proposal, but a
month later the commander of Camp Lejeune reported that only three
reservists and one regular had volunteered.[10-21] He advised the
commandant to authorize recruitment among qualified civilians. Faced
with wholesale rejection of such duty by black marines, General Thomas
in March 1947 opened the Steward's Branch to Negroes with previous
military service in any of the armed forces and qualifications for
such work.[10-22] This ploy also proved a failure. Looking for 250
stewards, the recruiters could find but one acceptable applicant in
the first weeks of the program. Retreating still further, the
commandant canceled the requirement for previous military service in
April, and in October dropped the requirement for "clearly established
qualifications."[10-23] Apparently the staff would take a chance on any
warm body.
[Footnote 10-20: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 12 Mar 46, sub: Steward's Branch
Personnel, Information Concerning, A0-3, MC files.]
[Footnote 10-21: Ltr, CG, Cp Lejeune, to CMC, 4 Apr
46, sub: Steward's Branch Personnel, 060105.]
[Footnote 10-22: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 18 Mar 47, sub: Enlistment of Negro
Personnel, 01A7647.]
[Footnote 10-23: Ibid., 16 Apr 47, sub: First
Enlistment of Negro Personnel, A0-1, and 9 Oct 47,
sub: Procurement and Assignment of Stewards
Personnel, Box 1515-30; Ltr, CMC (Div of
Recruiting) to Off in Charge, Northeastern
Recruiting Div, 29 Apr 47, sub: Negro First
Enlistments, 07A11947.]
In dropping the requirement for prior military service, the corps
introduced a complication. Recruits for steward duty would be obliged
to undergo basic training and their enlistment contracts would read
"general duty"; Navy regulations required that subsequent
reclassification to "stewards duty only" status had to be made at the
request of the recruit. In August 1947 three men enlisted under the
first enlistment program for stewards refused to execute a change of
enlistment contract after basic training.[10-24] Although these men could
have been discharged "for the good of the service," the commandant (p. 260)
decided not to contest their right to remain in the general service.
This action did not go unnoticed, and in subsequent months a number of
men who signed up with the intention of becoming stewards refused to
modify their enlistment contract while others, who already had changed
their contract, suddenly began to fail the qualifying tests for
stewards school.
[Footnote 10-24: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 15 Sep 47, sub: Disposition of Negro
Personnel Who Enlisted With a View Toward
Qualifying for Stewards Duties..., 01A25847.]
The possibility of filling the quota became even more distant when in
September 1947 the number of steward billets was increased to 380.
Since only 57 stewards had signed up in the past twelve months,
recruiters now had to find some 200 men, at least 44 per month for the
immediate future. The commandant, furthermore, approved plans to
increase the number of stewards to 420. In December the Plans and
Policies Division, conceding defeat, recommended that the commandant
arrange for the transfer of 175 men from the Navy's oversubscribed
Steward's Branch. At the same time, to overcome what the division's
new director, Brig. Gen. Ray A. Robinson, called "the onus attached to
servant type duties," the commandant was induced to approve a plan
making the rank and pay of stewards comparable to those of general
duty personnel.[10-25]
[Footnote 10-25: Ibid., 26 Dec 47, sub: Procurement of
Steward Personnel, A0-1; see also Ltr, CMC to Chief
of Naval Personnel, 6 Jan 48, sub: Discharge of
Steward Personnel From Navy to Enlist in the Marine
Corps, MC 967879; Memo, Chief of Naval Personnel
for CMC, 28 Jan 48, sub: Discharge of Certain
Steward Branch Personnel for Purpose of Enlistment
in the Marine Corps.]
These measures seemed to work. The success of the transfer program and
the fact that first enlistments had finally begun to balance
discharges led the recruiters to predict in March 1948 that their
steward quota would soon be filled. Unfortunately, success tempted the
planners to overreach themselves. Assured of a full steward quota,
General Robinson recommended that approval be sought from the
Secretary of the Navy to establish closed messes, along with the
requisite steward billets, at the shore quarters for bachelor officers
overseas.[10-26] Approval brought another rise in the number of steward
billets, this time to 580, and required a first-enlistment goal of
twenty men per month.[10-27] The new stewards, however, were not
forthcoming. After three months of recruiting the corps had netted ten
men, more than offset by trainees who failed to qualify for steward
school. Concluding that the failures represented to a great extent a
scheme to remain in general service and evade the ceiling on general
enlistment, the planners wanted the men failing to qualify discharged
"for the good of the service."[10-28]
[Footnote 10-26: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 19 Mar 48, sub: Procurement and
Distribution of Steward Personnel, A0-1.]
[Footnote 10-27: Ibid., 12 Aug 48, sub: Steward
Personnel, Allowances and Procurement, A0-1; Ltr,
CMC to CG, Marine Barracks, Cp Lejeune, 16 Aug 48,
sub: Negro Recruits, 01A22948.]
[Footnote 10-28: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 15 Oct 48, sub: Disposition of Negro
Personnel Who Enlist "For Steward Duty Only" and
Subsequently Fail to Qualify for Such Duty, Study
#169-48; Ltr, QMG of MC to CMC, 17 Sep 48, same
sub, CA6.]
The lack of recruits for steward duty and constant pressure by
stewards for transfer to general duty troubled the Marine Corps
throughout the postwar period. Reviewing the problem in December
1948, the commanding general of Camp Lejeune saw three causes: (p. 261)
"agitation from civilian sources," which labeled steward duty
degrading servant's work; lack of rapid promotion; and badgering from
black marines on regular duty.[10-29] But the commander's solution--a
public relations campaign using black recruits to promote the
attractions of steward duty along with a belated promise of more rapid
promotion--failed. It ignored the central issue, the existence of a
segregated branch in which black marines performed menial, nonmilitary
duties.
[Footnote 10-29: Msg, CG, Cp Lejeune, N.C., to CMC, 31
Dec 48.]
Headquarters later resorted to other expedients. It obtained
seventy-five more men from the Navy and lowered the qualification test
standards for steward duty. But like earlier efforts, these steps also
failed to produce enough men.[10-30] Ironically, while the corps aroused
the ire of the civil rights groups by maintaining a segregated
servants' branch, it was never able to attract a sufficient number of
stewards to fill its needs in the postwar period.
[Footnote 10-30: Memo, Chief of Naval Personnel and
CMC for All Ships and Stations, 28 Feb 49, sub:
Discharge of Stewards, USN, For the Purpose of
Immediate Enlistment in Marine Corps, Pers-66,
GenRecsNav; Memo, CMC for Dir of Recruiting, 25 Feb
49, sub: Mental Requirements for Enlistment for
"Steward Duty Only," A0-1; Ltr, CMC (Div of
Recruiting) to Off in Charge, Northeastern
Recruiting Div, 3 Mar 49, sub: Mental Standards for
Enlistment for Steward Duty Only, MC1088081; Msg,
CMC to Div of Recruiting, 7 Apr 49.]
Many of the corps' critics saw in the buildup of the Steward's Branch
the first step in an attempt to eliminate Negroes from the general
service. If such a scheme had ever been contemplated, it was
remarkably unsuccessful, for the corps would enter the Korean War with
most of its Negroes still in the general service. Nevertheless, the
apprehension of the civil rights advocates was understandable because
during most of the postwar period enlistment in the general service
was barred to Negroes or limited to a very small number of men. Closed
to Negroes in early 1947, enlistment was briefly reopened at the rate
of forty men per month later that year to provide the few hundred
extra men called for in the reorganization of the Operating Force
Plan.[10-31] Enlistment was again opened in May 1948 when the recruiting
office established a monthly quota for black recruits at ten men for
general duty and eight for the Steward's Branch. The figure for
stewards quickly rose to thirty per month, but effective 1 May 1949
the recruitment of Negroes for general service was closed.[10-32]
[Footnote 10-31: Memo, CMC for CG, Marine Barracks, Cp
Lejeune, N.C., 8 Dec 47, sub: Negro Recruits,
01A33847.]
[Footnote 10-32: Ltr, CMC to CG, Cp Lejeune, 24 May
48, A0-1; Memo, CMC for Off in Charge of Recruiting
Div, 29 Jan 49, sub: Enlistment of Negroes,
07D14848; Msg, CMC to Offs in Charge of Recruiting
Divs, 25 Apr 49.]
These rapid changes, indeed the whole pattern of black enlistment in
the postwar Marine Corps, demonstrated that the staff's manpower
practices were out of joint with the times. Not only did they invite
attack from the increasingly vocal civil rights forces, but they also
fostered a general distrust among black marines themselves and among
those young Negroes the corps hoped to attract.
_Segregation and Efficiency_
The assignment policies and recruitment practices of the corps were
the inevitable result of its segregation policy. Prejudice and
discrimination no doubt aggravated the situation, but the policy of
separation limited the ways Negroes could be employed and places (p. 262)
to which they might be assigned. Segregation explained, for example,
why Negroes were traditionally employed in certain types of combat
units, and why, when changing missions and manpower restrictions
caused a reduction in the number of such units, Negroes were not given
other combat assignments. Most Negroes with combat military
occupational specialties served in defense battalions during World War
II. These units, chiefly antiaircraft artillery, were self-contained
and could therefore be segregated; at the same time they cloaked a
large group of men with the dignity of a combat assignment. But what
was possible during the war was no longer practical and efficient in
the postwar period. Some antiaircraft artillery units survived the
war, but they no longer operated as battalions and were divided
instead into battery-size organizations that simply could not be
segregated in terms of support and recreational facilities. In fact,
the corps found it impossible after the war to maintain segregation in
any kind of combat unit.
Even if segregated service had been possible, the formation of
all-black antiaircraft artillery battalions would have been precluded
by the need of this highly technical branch for so many kinds of
trained specialists. Not only would separate training facilities for
the few Negroes in the peacetime corps be impossibly expensive and
inefficient, but not enough black recruits were eligible for such
training. A wartime comparison of the General Classification Test and
Mechanical Aptitude Test scores of the men in the 52d Defense
Battalion with those of men in two comparable white units showed the
Negroes averaging considerably lower than the whites.[10-33] It was
reasonable to expect this difference to continue since, on the whole,
black recruits were scoring lower than their World War II
counterparts.[10-34] Under current policies, therefore, the Marine Corps
saw little choice but to exclude Negroes from antiaircraft artillery
and other combat units.
[Footnote 10-33: Ltr, CO, 52d Defense Battalion, to
CMC, 15 Jan 46, sub: Employment of Colored
Personnel as Antiaircraft Artillery Troops,
Recommendations on, 02-46, MC files.]
[Footnote 10-34: Memo, Dir of Personnel for Dir, Div
of Plans and Policies, 21 Jul 48, sub: General
Classification Test Scores of Colored Enlisted
Marines, 07DZ0348. The GCT distribution of 991
black marines as of 1 March 1948 was as follows:
Group I (130-163), 0%; Group II (110-129), 4.94%;
Group III (90-109), 24.7%; Group IV (60-89),
61.45%; and Group V (42-59), 9.54%. Memo, Dir of
Personnel to Dir, Div of Plans and Policies, 30 May
48, sub: Marines--Tests and Testing.]
Obviously the corps had in its ranks some Negroes capable of
performing any task required in an artillery battalion. Yet because
the segregation policy demanded that there be enough qualified men to
form and sustain a whole black battalion, the abilities of these
high-scoring individuals were wasted. On the other hand, many billets
in antiaircraft artillery or other types of combat battalions could be
filled by men with low test scores, but less gifted black marines were
excluded because they had to be assigned to one of the few black
units. Segregation, in short, was doubly inefficient, it kept both
able and inferior Negroes out of combat units that were perpetually
short of men.
Segregation also promoted inefficiency in the placement of black
Marine units. While the assignment of an integrated unit with a few
black marines would probably go unnoticed in most naval
districts--witness the experience of the Navy itself--the task of (p. 263)
finding a naval district and an American community where a large
segregated group of black marines could be peacefully assimilated was
infinitely more difficult.
The original postwar racial program called for the assignment of black
security units to the Marine Barracks at McAlester, Oklahoma, and
Earle, New Jersey. Noting that the station was in a strict Jim Crow
area where recreational facilities for Negroes were limited and
distant, the commanding officer of the Marine Barracks at McAlester
recommended that no Negroes be assigned. He reminded the commandant
that guard duty required marines to question and apprehend white
civilian employees, a fact that would add to the racial tension in the
area. His conclusions, no doubt shared by commanders in many parts of
the country, summed up the problem of finding assignments for black
marines: any racial incident which might arise out of disregard for
local racial custom, he wrote,
would cause the Marine Corps to become involved by protecting
such personnel as required by Federal law and Navy Regulations.
It is believed that if one such potential incident occurred, it
would seriously jeopardize the standing of the Marine Corps
throughout the Southwest. To my way of thinking, the Marine Corps
is not now maintaining the high esteem of public opinion, or
gaining in prestige, by the manner in which its uniform and
insignia are subjected to such laws. The uniform does not count,
it is relegated to the background and made to participate in and
suffer the restrictions and limitations placed upon it by virtue
of the wearer being subject to the Jim Crow laws.[10-35]
[Footnote 10-35: Ltr, CO, MB, NAD, McAlester, Okla.,
to CMC, 5 Nov 46, sub: Assignment of Colored
Marines, 2385.]
The commander of the McAlester ammunition depot endorsed this
recommendation, adding that Oklahoma was a "border" state where the
Negro was not accepted as in the north nor understood and tolerated as
in the south. This argument moved the Director of Plans and Policies
to recommend that McAlester be dropped and the black unit sent instead
to Port Chicago, California.[10-36] With the approval of the commandant
and the Chief of Naval Operations, plans for the assignment were well
under way in June 1947 when the commandant of the Twelfth Naval
District intervened.[10-37] The presence of a black unit, he declared,
was undesirable in a predominantly white area that was experiencing
almost constant labor turmoil. The possibility of clashes between
white pickets and black guards would invite racial conflict. His
warnings carried the day, and Port Chicago was dropped in favor of the
Marine Barracks, Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn, New York, with station at
Bayonne, New Jersey. At the same time, because of opposition from
naval officials, the plan for assigning Negroes to Earle, New Jersey,
was also dropped, and the commandant launched inquiries about the (p. 264)
depots at Hingham, Massachusetts, and Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania.[10-38]
[Footnote 10-36: Ltr, CO, NAD, McAlester, Okla., to
CMC, 5 Nov 46, 1st Ind to Ltr, CO, MB, McAlester,
2385; Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies, for
CMC, 3 Dec 46, sub: Assignment of Negro Marines to
MB, Naval Magazine, Port Chicago, Calif., in lieu
of MB, NAD, McAlester, Okla., A0-1.]
[Footnote 10-37: Memo, CMC for CNO, 3 Dec 46, sub:
Assignment of Negro Marines to MB, Naval Magazine,
Port Chicago, Calif., and MB, NAD, Earle, N.J.,
A0-1; idem for CO, MB, NAD, Earle, N.J., 9 Jan 47,
sub: Assignment of Colored Marines to Marine
Barracks, Naval Ammunition Depot, Earle, N.J.; idem
for CO, Department of the Pacific, and CO, MB, NAD,
McAlester, Okla., A0-1; Memo, CNO for CMC, 6 Jan
47, same sub, OP 30 M.]
[Footnote 10-38: Speed Ltr, CMC to Cmdt, Twelfth Naval
District, 12 Jun 47; Memo, CMC for CO, MB, Naval
Shipyard, Brooklyn, N.Y., 13 Jun 47, sub:
Assignment of Negro Marines to Second Guard
Company, Marine Barracks Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn,
N.Y., A0-1; idem for CO, MB, USNAD, Hingham, Mass.,
18 Jun 47, sub: Assignment of Negro Marines, A0-1;
Speed Ltr, CMC to Cmdt, Twelfth Naval District, 18
Jun 47, 01A76847; Memo, CMC for CO, MB, NAD, Ft.
Mifflin, Pa., 18 Jun 47, sub: Assignment of Negro
Marines, A0-1; Memo, Cmdt, Fourth Naval District
for CO, MB, NAD, Ft. Mifflin, Pa., 18 Jun 47, same
sub.]
Fort Mifflin agreed to take fifty black marines, but several officials
objected to the proposed assignment to Hingham. The Marine commander,
offering what he called his unbiased opinion in the best interests of
the service, explained in considerable detail why he thought the
assignment of Negroes would jeopardize the fire-fighting ability of
the ammunition depot. The commanding officer of the naval depot
endorsed these reasons and added that assigning black marines to guard
duty that included vehicle search would create a problem in industrial
relations.[10-39] The commandant of the First Naval District apparently
discounted these arguments, but he too voted against the assignment of
Negroes on the grounds that the Hingham area lacked a substantial
black population, was largely composed of restricted residential
neighborhoods, and was a major summer resort on which the presence of
black units would have an adverse effect.[10-40]
[Footnote 10-39: Memo, CO, MB, NAD, Hingham, Mass.,
for CMC, 26 Jun 47, sub: Comments on Assignment of
Negro Marines, AB-1; Memo, CO, NAD, Hingham, Mass.,
for CMC, 26 Jun 47, 1st Ind to AB-1, 26 Jun 47.]
[Footnote 10-40: Ltr, Cmdt, First Naval District, to
CMC, 30 Jun 47, sub: Assignment of Negro Marines,
2d Ind to AB-1, 26 Jun 47.]
The commander of the Naval Base, New York, meanwhile had refused to
approve a plan to assign a black unit to Bayonne, New Jersey, and
suggested that it be sent to Earle, New Jersey, instead because there
the unit "presented fewer problems and difficulties than at any other
Naval activity." The commander noted that stationing Negroes at
Bayonne would necessitate a certain amount of integration in mess and
ship service facilities. Bayonne was also reputed to have the toughest
gate duty in the New York area, and noncommissioned officers had to
supervise a white civilian police force. At Earle, on the other hand,
the facilities were completely separate, and although some complaints
from well-to-do summer colonists in the vicinity could be expected,
men could be bused to Newark or Jersey City for recreation. Moreover,
Earle could absorb a 175-man unit.[10-41] But chief of the Navy's Bureau
of Ordnance wanted to retain white marines at Earle because a recent
decision to handle ammonium nitrate fertilizer there made it unwise to
relieve the existing trained detachment. Earle was also using contract
stevedores and expected to be using Army troops whose use of local
facilities would preclude plans for a segregated barracks and
mess.[10-42]
[Footnote 10-41: Ltr, CO, Naval Base, New York, to
CMC, 10 July 47, sub: Assignment of Negro Marines
to Second Guard Company, Marine Barracks, New York
Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn, N.Y., NB-139.]
[Footnote 10-42: Ltr, Chief, Bur of Ord, to CNO, 11
Aug 47, sub: Naval Ammunition Depot, Earle,
N.J.--Assignment of Negro Marine Complement,
NTI-34.]
The commandant accepted these arguments and on 20 August 1947 revoked
the assignment of a black unit to Earle. Still, with its ability to
absorb 175 men and its relative suitability in terms of separate (p. 265)
living facilities, the depot remained a prime candidate for black
units, and in November General Vandegrift reversed himself. The Chief
of Naval Operations supported the commandant's decision over the
renewed objections of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.[10-43] With
Hingham, Massachusetts, ruled out, the commandant now considered the
substitution of Marine barracks at Trinidad, British West Indies;
Scotia, New York; and Oahu, Hawaii. He rejected Trinidad in favor of
Oahu, and officials in Hawaii proved amenable.[10-44]
[Footnote 10-43: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 19 Nov 47, sub: First Enlistments of Negro
Personnel, A0-1; Memo, Chief, Bur of Ord, for CNO,
15 Dec 47, sub: Assignment of Negro Marines at
Naval Ammunition Depot, Earle, Red Bank, N.J.;
Memo, CNO for Chief, Bur of Ord, 6 Jan 48, same
sub.]
[Footnote 10-44: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
29 Jul 47, sub: Negro Requirements and Assignments,
A0-1, MC files.]
The chief of the Navy's Bureau of Supplies and Accounts objected to
the use of black marines at the supply depot in Scotia, claiming that
such an assignment to the Navy's sole installation in upper New York
State would bring about a "weakening of the local public relations
advantage now held by the Navy" and would be contrary to the Navy's
best interests. He pointed out that the assignment would necessitate
billeting white marine graves registration escorts and black marines
in the same squad rooms. The use of black marines for firing squads at
funerals, he thought, would be "undesirable." He also pointed out that
the local black population was small, making for extremely limited
recreational and social opportunities.[10-45] The idea of using Scotia
with all these attendant inconveniences was quietly dropped, and the
black marines were finally assigned to Earle, New Jersey; Fort
Mifflin, Pennsylvania; and Oahu, Hawaii.
[Footnote 10-45: Memo, Chief, Bur of Supplies and
Accounts, for CNO, 14 Oct 47, sub: Assignment of
Negro Marines, P-16-1; Memo, CNO to CMC, 20 Nov 47,
same sub, Op 415 D.]
Approved on 8 November 1946, the postwar plan to assign black units to
security guard assignments in the United States was not fully put into
practice until 15 August 1948, almost two years later. This episode in
the history of discrimination against Americans in uniform brought
little glory to anyone involved and revealed much about the extent of
race prejudice in American society. It was an indictment of people in
areas as geographically diverse as Oklahoma, New York, Massachusetts,
and New Jersey who objected to the assignment of black servicemen to
their communities. It was also an indictment of a great many
individual commanders, both in the Navy and Marine Corps, some perhaps
for personal prejudices, others for so readily bowing to community
prejudices. But most of all the blame must fall on the Marine Corps'
policy of segregation. Segregation made it necessary to find
assignments for a whole enlisted complement and placed an intolerable
administrative burden on the corps. The dictum that black marines
could not deal with white civilians, especially in situations in which
they would give orders, further limited assignments since such duties
were routine in any security unit. Thus, bound to a policy that was
neither just nor practical, the commandant spent almost two years
trying to place four hundred men.
Despite the obvious inefficiency and discrimination involved, the (p. 266)
commandant, General Vandegrift, adamantly defended the Marine
segregation policy before Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. Wartime
experience showed, he maintained, oblivious to overwhelming evidence
to the contrary since 1943, "that the assignment of negro Marines to
separate units promotes harmony and morale and fosters the competitive
spirit essential to the development of a high esprit."[10-46] His stand
was bound to antagonize the civil rights camp; the black press in
particular trumpeted the theme that the corps was as full of race
discrimination as it had been during the war.[10-47]
[Footnote 10-46: Memo, Gen Vandegrift to SecNav, 25
Aug 47, sub: Assignment of Negro Marines, 54-1-29,
GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 10-47: See, for example, the analysis that
appeared in the Chicago _Defender_, August 14,
1948.]
_Toward Integration_
But even as the commandant defended the segregation policy, the corps
was beginning to yield to pressure from outside forces and the demands
of military efficiency. The first policy breach concerned black
officers. Although a proposal for commissions had been rejected when
the subject was first raised in 1944, three black candidates were
accepted by the officer training school at Quantico in April 1945. One
failed to qualify on physical and two on scholastic grounds, but they
were followed by five other Negroes who were still in training on V-J
day. One of this group, Frederick Branch of Charlotte, North Carolina,
elected to stay in training through the demobilization period. He was
commissioned with his classmates on 10 November 1945 and placed in the
inactive reserves. Meanwhile, three Negroes in the V-12 program
graduated and received commissions as second lieutenants in the
inactive Marine Corps Reserve. Officer training for all these men was
integrated.[10-48]
[Footnote 10-48: Shaw and Donnelly, _Blacks and the
Marine Corps_, pp. 47-48; see also Selective
Service System, _Special Groups_ (Monograph 10),
I:105.]
The first Negro to obtain a regular commission in the Marine Corps was
John E. Rudder of Paducah, Kentucky, a Marine veteran and graduate of
the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps. Analyzing the case for the
commandant in May 1948, the Director of Plans and Policies noted that
the law did not require the Marine Corps to commission Rudder, but
that he was only the first of several Negroes who would be applying
for commissions in the next few years through the Naval Reserve
Officers' Training Corps. Since the reserve corps program was a vital
part of the plan to expand Marine Corps officer strength, rejecting a
graduate on account of race, General Robinson warned, might jeopardize
the entire plan. He thought that Rudder should be accepted for duty.
Rudder was appointed a second lieutenant in the Regular Marine Corps
on 28 May 1948 and ordered to Quantico for basic schooling.[10-49] In
1949 Lieutenant Rudder resigned. Indicative of the changing civil
rights scene was the apprehension shown by some Marine Corps officials
about public reaction to the resignation. But although Rudder reported
instances of discrimination at Quantico--stemming for the most (p. 267)
part from a lack of military courtesy that amounted to outright
ostracism--he insisted his decision to resign was based on personal
reasons and was irreversible. The Director of Public Information was
anxious to release an official version of the resignation,[10-50] but
other voices prevailed, and Rudder's exit from the corps was handled
quietly both at headquarters and in the press.[10-51]
[Footnote 10-49: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 11 May 48, sub: Appointment to
Commissioned Rank in the Regular Marine Corps, Case
of Midshipman John Earl Rudder, A0-1; see also Dept
of Navy Press Release, 25 Aug 48.]
[Footnote 10-50: Memo, Dir of Public Information for
CMC, 11 Feb 49, sub: Publicity on Second Lieutenant
John Rudder, USMC, AG 1364; see also Ltr, Lt Cmdr
Dennis Nelson to James C. Evans, 24 Feb 70, CMH
files.]
[Footnote 10-51: Memo, Oliver Smith for CMC, 11 Feb
49, with attached CMC note.]
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT AND MRS. BRANCH.]
The brief active career of one black officer was hardly evidence of a
great racial reform, but it represented a significant breakthrough
because it affirmed the practice of integrated officer training and
established the right of Negroes to command. And Rudder was quickly
followed by other black officer candidates, some of whom made careers
in the corps. Rudder's appointment marked a permanent change in Marine
Corps policy.
Enlistment of black women marked another change. Negroes had been
excluded from the Women's Reserve during World War II, but in March
1949 A. Philip Randolph asked the commandant, in the name of the
Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, if black
women could join the corps. The commandant's reply was short and
direct: "If qualified for enlistment, negro women will be accepted on
the same basis as other applicants."[10-52] In September 1949 Annie N.
Graham and Ann E. Lamb reported to Parris Island for integrated
training and subsequent assignment.
[Footnote 10-52: Ltr, A. Philip Randolph to Gen C. B.
Cates, 8 Mar 49; Ltr, CMC to Randolph, 10 Mar 49,
AW 828.]
Yet another racial change, in the active Marine Corps Reserve, could
be traced to outside pressure. Until 1947 all black reservists were
assigned to inactive and unpaid volunteer reserve status, and
applications for transfer to active units were usually disapproved by
commanding officers on grounds that such transfers would cost the unit
a loss in whites. Rejections did not halt applications, however, and
in May 1947 the Director of Marine Corps Reserve decided to seek a
policy decision. While he wanted each commander of an active unit left
free to decide whether he would take Negroes, the director also wanted
units with black enlisted men formed in the organized reserve,
all-black voluntary training units recognized, and integrated active
duty training provided for reservists.[10-53] A group of Negroes (p. 268)
in Chicago had already applied for the formation of a black voluntary
training unit.
[Footnote 10-53: Memo, Dir, Div of Reserve, for CMC, 6
May 47, sub: General Policy Governing Negro
Reservists, AF 1271; Ltr, William Griffin to CMC, 3
Mar 47; Ltr, Col R. McPate to William Griffin, 11
Mar 47.]
General Thomas, Director of Plans and Policies, was not prepared to go
the whole way. He agreed that within certain limitations the local
commander should decide on the integration of black reservists into an
active unit, and he accepted integrated active duty training. But he
rejected the formation of black units in the organized reserve and the
voluntary training program; the latter because it would "inevitably
lead to the necessity for Negro officers and for authorizing drill
pay" in order to avoid charges of discrimination. Although Thomas
failed to explain why black officers and drill pay were unacceptable
or how rejecting the program would save the corps from charges of
discrimination, his recommendations were approved by the commandant
over the objection of the Reserve Division.[10-54] But the Director of
Reserves rejoined that volunteer training units were organized under
corps regulations, the Chicago group had met all the specifications,
and the corps would be subject to just criticism if it refused to form
the unit. On the other hand, by permitting the formation of some
all-black volunteer units, the corps might satisfy the wish of Negroes
to be a part of the reserve and thus avoid any concerted attempt to
get the corps to form all-black units in the organized reserve.[10-55]
[Footnote 10-54: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 7 May 47, sub: General Policy Governing
Negro Reservists, A0-1.]
[Footnote 10-55: Memo, Dir of Reserve for CMC, 15 May
47, sub: General Policy Concerning Negro
Reservists, AF 394.]
At this point the Division of Plans and Policies offered to
compromise. General Robinson recommended that when the number of
volunteers so warranted, the corps should form black units of company
size or greater, either separate or organic to larger reserve units
around the country. He remained opposed to integrated units,
explaining that experience proved--he neglected to mention what
experience, certainly none in the Marine Corps--that integrated units
served neither the best interests of the individual nor the corps.[10-56]
While the commandant's subsequent approval set the stage for the
formation of racially composite units in the reserve, the stipulation
that the black element be of company size or larger effectively
limited the degree of reform.
[Footnote 10-56: Memo, Dir, Div of Plans and Policies,
for CMC, 1 Mar 48, sub: Enlistment of Negro
Ex-Marines in Organized Reserve, A0-1.]
The development of composite units in the reserve paralleled a far
more significant development in the active forces. In 1947 the Marine
Corps began organizing such units along the lines established in the
postwar Army. Like the Army, the corps discovered that maintaining a
quota--even when the quota for the corps meant maintaining a minimum
number of Negroes in the service--in a period of shrinking manpower
resources necessitated the creation of new billets for Negroes. At the
same time it was obviously inefficient to assign combat-trained
Negroes, now surplus with the inactivation of the black defense
battalions, to black service and supply units when the Fleet Marine
Force battalions were so seriously understrength. Thus the strictures
against integration notwithstanding, the corps was forced to begin (p. 269)
attaching black units to the depleted Fleet Marine Force units.
In January 1947, for example, members of Headquarters Unit, Montford
Point Camp, and men of the inactivated 3d Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion were transferred to Camp Geiger, North Carolina, and
assigned to the all-black 2d Medium Depot Company, which, along with
eight white units, was organized into the racially composite 2d Combat
Service Group in the 2d Marine Division.[10-57] Although the units of the
group ate in separate mess halls and slept in separate barracks,
inevitably the men of all units used some facilities in common. After
Negroes were assigned to Camp Geiger, for instance, recreational
facilities were open to all. In some isolated cases, black
noncommissioned officers were assigned to lead racially mixed details
in the composite group.[10-58]
[Footnote 10-57: USMC Muster Rolls, 1947.]
[Footnote 10-58: Interv, Martin Blumenson with 1st Sgt
Jerome Pressley, 21 Feb 66, CMH files.]
[Illustration: TRAINING EXERCISES. _Black Marine unit boards ship at
Morehead City, North Carolina, 1949._]
But these reforms, which did very little for a very few men, scarcely
dented the Marine Corps' racial policy. Corps officials were still
firmly committed to strict segregation in 1948, and change seemed very
distant. Any substantial modification in racial policy would require a
revolution against Marine tradition, a movement dictated by higher
civilian authority or touched off by an overwhelming military need.