Cornwallis takes post at Hillsborough.—His Proclamation.—Greene
recrosses the Dan.—Country scoured by Lee and Pickens.—Affair with
Colonel Pyle.—Maneuvers of Cornwallis to bring Greene to
Action.—Battle of Guilford court-house.—Greene retreats to
Troublesome Creek.—Cornwallis marches toward Cape Fear.—Greene
pursues him.—Is brought to a stand at Deep River.—Determines to Face
About and carry the War into South Carolina.—Cornwallis marches for
Virginia.
For a day the two armies lay panting within sight of each other on the
opposite banks of the river, which had put an end to the race. In a
letter to Thomas Jefferson, dated the day of the crossing, Greene
writes: “On the Dan River, almost fatigued to death, having had a
retreat to conduct of upwards of two hundred miles, maneuvering
constantly in the face of the enemy to give time for the militia to turn
out and get off our stores.” And to Washington he writes (Feb. 15),
“Lord Cornwallis has been at our heels from day to day ever since we
left Guilford, and our movements from thence to this place have been of
the most critical kind, having a river in our front and the enemy in our
rear. The miserable condition of the troops for clothing has rendered
the march the most painful imaginable, many hundred of the soldiers
tracking the ground with their bloody feet. Your feelings for the
sufferings of the soldier, had you been with us, would have been
severely tried.” He concludes by an honorable testimonial in their
favor: “Our army are in good spirits, notwithstanding their sufferings
and excessive fatigue.”
On the 16th, the river began to subside: the enemy might soon be able to
cross. Greene prepared for a further retreat by sending forward his
baggage on the road to Halifax, and securing the passage of the
Staunton. At Halifax he was resolved to make a stand, rather than suffer
the enemy to take possession of it without a struggle. Its situation on
the Roanoke would make it a strong position for their army, supported by
a fleet, and would favor their designs both on Virginia and the
Carolinas. With a view to its defense, intrenchments had already been
thrown up, under the direction of Kosciuszko.
Lord Cornwallis, however, did not deem it prudent, under present
circumstances, to venture into Virginia, where Greene would be sure of
powerful reinforcements. North Carolina was in a state of the utmost
disorder and confusion; he thought it better to remain in it for a time,
and profit by having compelled Greene to abandon it. After giving his
troops a day’s repose, therefore, he put them once more in motion on the
18th, along the road by which he had pursued Greene. The latter, who was
incessantly on the alert, was informed of this retrograde move, by a
preconcerted signal; the waving of a white handkerchief, under covert of
the opposite bank, by a female patriot.
This changed the game. Lee, with his legion, strengthened by two veteran
Maryland companies, and Pickens, with a corps of South Carolina militia,
all light troops, were transported across the Dan in the boats, with
orders to gain the front of Cornwallis, hover as near as safety would
permit, cut off his intercourse with the disaffected parts of the
country, and check the rising of the royalists. “If we can but delay him
for a day or two,” said Greene, “he must be ruined.” Greene, in the
meanwhile, remained with his main force on the northern bank of the Dan,
waiting to ascertain his lordship’s real designs, and ready to cross at
a moment’s warning.
The movements of Cornwallis, for a day or two, were of a dubious nature,
designed to perplex his opponents; on the 20th, however, he took post at
Hillsborough. Here he erected the royal standard, and issued a
proclamation, stating that, whereas it had pleased Divine Providence to
prosper the operations of His Majesty’s arms in driving the rebel army
out of the province, he invited all his loyal subjects to hasten to this
standard with their arms and ten days’ provisions, to assist in
suppressing the remains of rebellion, and reëstablishing good order and
constitutional government.
By another instrument, all who could raise independent companies were
called upon to give in their names at head-quarters, and a bounty in
money and lands was promised to those who should enlist under them. The
companies thus raised were to be formed into regiments.
These sounding appeals produced but little effect on the people of the
surrounding districts. Many hundreds, says Tarleton, rode into the camp
to talk over the proclamation, inquire the news of the day, and take a
view of the king’s troops. The generality seemed desirous of peace, but
averse from any exertion to procure it. They acknowledged that the
Continentals had been chased out of the province, but apprehended they
would soon return. “Some of the most zealous,” adds he, “promised to
raise companies, and even regiments; but their followers and dependents
were slow to enlist.” Tarleton himself was forthwith detached with the
cavalry and a small body of infantry, to a region of country lying
between the Haw and Deep rivers, to bring on a considerable number of
loyalists who were said to be assembling there.
Rumor, in the mean time, had magnified the effect of his lordship’s
proclamations. Word was brought to Greene, that the tories were flocking
from all quarters to the royal standard. Seven companies, it was said,
had been raised in a single day. At this time the reinforcements to the
American camp had been little more than six hundred Virginia militia,
under General Stevens. Greene saw that at this rate, if Cornwallis were
allowed to remain undisturbed, he would soon have complete command of
North Carolina; he boldly determined, therefore, to recross the Dan at
all hazards with the scanty force at his command, and give his lordship
check. In this spirit he broke up his camp and crossed the river on the
23d.
In the mean time, Lee and Pickens, who were scouting the country about
Hillsborough, received information of Tarleton’s recruiting expedition
to the region between the Haw and deep Rivers. There was no foe they
were more eager to cope with; and they resolved to give him a surprise.
Having forded the Haw one day about noon, they learnt from a countryman
that Tarleton was encamped about three miles off, that his horses were
unsaddled, and that everything indicated confident security. They now
pushed on under covert of the woods, prepared to give the bold partisan
a blow after his own fashion. Before they reached the place Tarleton had
marched on; they captured two of his staff, however, who had remained
behind, settling with the people of a farm-house for supplies furnished
to the detachment.
Being informed that Tarleton was to halt for the night at the distance
of six miles, they still trusted to surprise him. On the way, however,
they had an encounter with a body of three or four hundred mounted
royalists, armed with rifles, and commanded by a Colonel Pyle, marching
in quest of Tarleton. As Lee with his cavalry was in advance, he was
mistaken for Tarleton, and hailed with loyal acclamations. He favored
the mistake, and was taking measures to capture the royalists, when some
of them, seeing the infantry under Pickens, discovered their error and
fired upon the rear-guard. The cavalry instantly charged upon them;
ninety were cut down and slain, and a great number wounded: among the
latter was Colonel Pyle himself, who took refuge among thickets on the
borders of a piece of water which still bears his name. The Americans
alleged in excuse for the slaughter, that it was provoked by their being
attacked; and that the sabre was used, as a continued firing might alarm
Tarleton’s camp. We do not wonder, however, that British writers
pronounced it a massacre; though it was but following the example set by
Tarleton himself, in this ruthless campaign.
After all, Lee and Pickens missed the object of their enterprise. The
approach of night and the fatigue of their troops, made them defer their
attack upon Tarleton until morning. In the mean time, the latter had
received an express from Cornwallis, informing him that Greene had
passed the Dan, and ordering him to return to Hillsborough as soon as
possible. He hastened to obey. Lee with his legion was in the saddle
before daybreak; but Tarleton’s troops were already on the march. “The
legion,” writes Lee, “accustomed to night expeditions, had been in the
habit of using pine-torch for flambeau. Supplied with this, though the
morning was dark, the enemy’s trail was distinctly discovered, whenever
a divergency took place in his route.”
Before sunrise, however, Tarleton had forded the Haw, and “Light Horse
Harry” gave over the pursuit, consoling himself that though he had not
effected the chief object of his enterprise, a secondary one was
completely executed, which would repress the tory spirit just beginning
to burst forth. “Fortune,” writes he in his magniloquent way, “Fortune,
which sways so imperiously the affairs of war, demonstrated throughout
the operation its supreme control.[64] Nothing was omitted on the part
of the Americans, to give to the expedition the desired termination; but
the very bright prospects which for a time presented themselves, were
suddenly overcast;—the capricious goddess gave us Pyle and saved
Tarleton.”
The reappearance of Greene and his army in North Carolina, heralded by
the scourings of Lee and Pickens, disconcerted the schemes of Lord
Cornwallis. The recruiting service was interrupted. Many royalists who
were on the way to his camp returned home. Forage and provisions became
scarce in the neighborhood. He found himself, he said, “amongst timid
friends and adjoining to inveterate rebels.” On the 26th, therefore, he
abandoned Hillsborough, threw himself across the Haw, and encamped near
Alamance Creek, one of its principal tributaries, in a country favorable
to supplies and with a tory population. His position was commanding, at
the point of concurrence of roads from Salisbury, Guilford, High
Rockford, Cross Creek, and Hillsborough. It covered also the
communication with Wilmington, where a depot of military stores, so
important to his hard destitute army, had recently been established.
Greene, with his main army, took post about fifteen miles above him, on
the heights between Troublesome Creek and Reedy Fork, one of the
tributaries of the Haw. His plan was to cut the enemy off from the upper
counties, to harass him by skirmishes, but to avoid a general battle;
thus gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements daily expected. He
rarely lay more than two days in a place, and kept his light troops
under Pickens and Williams between him and the enemy; hovering about the
latter; intercepting his intelligence; attacking his foraging parties,
and striking at his flanks whenever exposed. Sharp skirmishes occurred
between them and Tarleton’s cavalry with various success. The country
being much of a wilderness, obliged both parties to be on the alert; but
the Americans, accustomed to bush-fighting, were not easily surprised.
On the 6th of March, Cornwallis, learning that the light troops under
Williams were very carelessly posted, put his army suddenly in motion,
and crossed the Alamance in a thick fog; with the design to beat up
their quarters, drive them in upon the main army, and bring Greene to
action should he come to their assistance. His movement was discovered
by the American patrols, and the alarm given. Williams hastily called in
his detachments, and retreated with his light troops across Reedy Fork,
while Lee with his legion maneuvered in front of the enemy. A stand was
made by the Americans at Wetzell’s Mill, but they were obliged to retire
with the loss of fifty killed and wounded. Cornwallis did not pursue;
evening was approaching, and he had failed in his main object; that of
bringing Greene to action. The latter, fixed in his resolve of avoiding
a conflict, had retreated across the Haw, in order to keep up his
communication with the roads by which he expected his supplies and
reinforcements. The militia of the country, who occasionally flocked to
his camp, were chiefly volunteers, who fell off after every skirmish,
“going home,” as he said, “to tell the news.” “At this time,” said he on
the 10th, “I have not above eight or nine hundred of them in the field;
yet there have been upwards of five thousand in motion in the course of
four weeks. A force fluctuating in this manner can promise but slender
hopes of success against an enemy in high discipline, and made
formidable by the superiority of their numbers. Hitherto, I have been
obliged to effect that by finesse which I dare not attempt by
force.”[65]
Greene had scarcely written this letter when the long expected
reinforcements arrived, having been hurried on by forced marches. They
consisted of a brigade of Virginia militia, under General Lawson, two
brigades of North Carolina militia under generals Butler and Eaton, and
four hundred regulars enlisted for eighteen months. His whole effective
force, according to official returns, amounted to four thousand two
hundred and forty-three foot, and one hundred and sixty-one cavalry. Of
his infantry, not quite two thousand were regulars, and of these,
three-fourths were new levies. His force nearly doubled in number that
of Cornwallis, which did not exceed two thousand four hundred men; but
many of Greene’s troops were raw and inexperienced, and had never been
in battle; those of the enemy were veterans schooled in warfare, and, as
it were, welded together by campaigning in a foreign land, where their
main safety consisted in standing by each other.
Greene knew the inferiority of his troops in this respect; his
reinforcements, too, fell far short of what he had been led to expect,
yet he determined to accept the battle which had so long been offered.
The corps of light troops, under Williams, which had rendered such
efficient service, was now incorporated with the main body, and all
detachments were ordered to assemble at Guilford, within eight miles of
the enemy, where he encamped on the 14th, sending his wagons and heavy
baggage to the Iron Works at Troublesome Creek, ten miles in his rear.
Cornwallis, from the difficulty of getting correct information, and from
Greene’s frequent change of position, had an exaggerated idea of the
American force, rating it as high as eight thousand men: still he
trusted in his well-seasoned veterans, and determined to attack Greene
in his encampment, now that he seemed disposed for a general action. To
provide against the possibility of a retreat, he sent his carriages and
baggage to Bell’s Mills, on Deep River, and set out at daybreak on the
15th, for Guilford.
Within four miles of that place, near the New Garden meeting-house,
Tarleton with the advanced guard of cavalry, infantry, and yagers, came
upon the American advanced guard, composed of Lee’s partisan legion, and
some mountaineers and Virginia militia. Tarleton and Lee were well
matched in military prowess, and the skirmish between them was severe.
Lee’s horses, being from Virginia and Pennsylvania, were superior in
weight and strength to those of his opponent, which had been chiefly
taken from plantations in South Carolina. The latter were borne down by
a charge in close column; several of their riders were dismounted, and
killed or taken prisoners. Tarleton, seeing that his weakly mounted men
fought to a disadvantage, sounded a retreat; Lee endeavored to cut him
off: a general conflict of the vanguards, horse and foot, ensued, when
the appearance of the main body of the enemy obliged Lee, in his turn,
to retire with precipitation.
During this time, Greene was preparing for action on a woody eminence, a
little more than a mile south of Guilford Court-House. The neighboring
country was covered with forest, excepting some cultivated fields about
the court-house, and along the Salisbury road, which passed through the
centre of the place, from south to north.
Greene had drawn out his troops in three lines. The first, composed of
North Carolina militia, volunteers and riflemen, under generals Butler
and Eaton, was posted behind a fence, with an open field in front, and
woods on the flanks and in the rear. About three hundred yards behind
this, was the second line, composed of Virginia militia, under generals
Stevens and Lawson, drawn up across the road, and covered by a wood. The
third line, about four hundred yards in the rear of the second, was
composed of Continental troops or regulars; those of Virginia under
General Huger on the right, those of Maryland under Colonel Williams on
the left. Colonel Washington with a body of dragoons, Kirkwood’s
Delaware infantry, and a battalion of Virginia militia, covered the
right flank; Lee’s legion, with the Virginia riflemen under Colonel
Campbell, covered the left. Two six-pounders were in the road, in
advance of the first line; two field-pieces with the rear line near the
court-house, where General Greene took his station.
About noon the head of the British army was descried advancing
spiritedly from the south along the Salisbury road, and defiling into
the fields. A cannonade was opened from the two six-pounders, in front
of the first American line. It was answered by the British artillery.
Neither produced much effect. The enemy now advanced coolly and steadily
in three columns; the Hessians and Highlanders under General Leslie, on
the right, the Royal Artillery and Guards in the centre, and Webster’s
brigade on the left. The North Carolinians, who formed the first line,
waited until the enemy were within one hundred and fifty yards, when,
agitated by their martial array and undaunted movement, they began to
fall into confusion; some fired off their pieces without taking aim;
others threw them down, and took to flight. A volley from the foe, a
shout, and a charge of the bayonet, completed their discomfiture. Some
fled to the woods, others fell back upon the Virginians, who formed the
second line. General Stevens, who commanded the latter, ordered his men
to open and let the fugitives pass, pretending that they had orders to
retire. He had taken care, however, to post forty riflemen in the rear
of his own line, with orders to fire upon any one who should leave his
post. Under his spirited command and example, the Virginians kept their
ground and fought bravely.
The action became much broken up and diversified by the extent of the
ground. The thickness of the woods impeded the movements of the cavalry.
The reserves on both sides were called up. The British bayonet again
succeeded; the second line gave way, and General Stevens, who had kept
the field for some time, after being wounded in the thigh by a musket
ball, ordered a retreat.
The enemy pressed with increasing ardor against the third line, composed
of Continental troops, and supported by Colonel Washington’s dragoons
and Kirkwood’s Delawares. Greene counted on these to retrieve the day.
They were regulars; they were fresh, and in perfect order. He rode along
the line, calling on them to stand firm, and give the enemy a warm
reception.
The first Maryland regiment which was on the right wing, was attacked by
Colonel Webster, with the British left. It stood the shock bravely, and
being seconded by some Virginia troops, and Kirkwood’s Delawares, drove
Webster across a ravine. The second Maryland regiment was not so
successful. Impetuously attacked by Colonel Stewart, with a battalion of
the Guards, and a company of grenadiers, it faltered, gave way, and
fled, abandoning two field-pieces, which were seized by the enemy.
Stewart was pursuing, when the first regiment, which had driven Webster
across the ravine, came to the rescue with fixed bayonets, while Colonel
Washington spurred up with his cavalry. The fight now was fierce and
bloody. Stewart was slain; the two field-pieces were retaken, and the
enemy in their turn gave way and were pursued with slaughter; a
destructive fire of grape-shot from the enemy’s artillery checked the
pursuit. Two regiments approached on the right and left; Webster
recrossed the ravine and fell upon Kirkwood’s Delawares. There was
intrepid fighting in different parts of the field; but Greene saw that
the day was lost; there was no retrieving the effect produced by the
first flight of the North Carolinians. Unwilling to risk the utter
destruction of his army, he directed a retreat, which was made in good
order, but they had to leave their artillery on the field, most of the
horses having been killed. About three miles from the field of action he
made a halt to collect stragglers, and then continued on to the place of
rendezvous at Speedwell’s Iron Works on Troublesome Creek.
The British were too much cut up and fatigued to follow up their
victory. Two regiments with Tarleton’s cavalry attempted a pursuit, but
were called back. Efforts were made to collect the wounded of both
armies, but they were dispersed over so wide a space, among woods and
thickets, that night closed before the task was accomplished. It was a
dismal night even to the victors; a night of unusual darkness, with
torrents of rain. The army was destitute of tents there were not
sufficient houses in the vicinity to receive the wounded; provisions
were scanty; many had tasted very little food for the last two days;
comforts were out of the question. Nearly fifty of the wounded sank
under their aggravated miseries, and expired before morning. The cries
of the disabled and dying, who remained on the field of battle, during
the night, exceeded all description. Such a complicated scene of horror
and distress, adds the British writer, whose words we quote, it is
hoped, for the sake of humanity rarely occurs, even in military
life.[66]
The loss of the Americans in this hard-fought affair, was never fully
ascertained. Their official returns, made immediately after the action,
give little more than four hundred killed and wounded, and between eight
and nine hundred missing; but Lord Cornwallis states in his dispatches,
that between two and three hundred of the Americans were found dead on
the field of battle.
The loss sustained by his lordship, even if numerically less, was far
more fatal; for, in the circumstances in which he was placed, it was not
to be supplied, and it completely maimed him. Of his small army,
ninety-three had fallen, four hundred and thirteen were wounded, and
twenty-six missing. Among the killed and wounded were several officers
of note. Thus, one fourth of his army was either killed or disabled; his
troops were exhausted by fatigue and hunger; his camp was encumbered by
the wounded. His victory, in fact, was almost as ruinous as a defeat.
Greene lay for two days within ten miles of him, near the Iron Works on
Troublesome Creek, gathering up his scattered troops. He had imbibed the
spirit of Washington, and remained undismayed by hardships or reverses.
Writing to the latter, he says: “Lord Cornwallis will not give up this
country, without being soundly beaten. I wish our force was more
competent to the business. But I am in hopes, by little and little, to
reduce him in time. His troops are good, well found, and fight with
great obstinacy.
“Virginia,” adds he, “has given me every support I could wish or expect,
since Lord Cornwallis has been in North Carolina; and nothing has
contributed more to this, than the prejudice of the people in favor of
your Excellency, which has extended to me from the friendship you have
been pleased to honor me with.”[67]
And again: “The service here is extremely severe, and the officers and
soldiers bear it with a degree of patience that does them the highest
honor. I have never taken off my clothes since I left the Pedee. I was
taken with a fainting last night, owing, I suppose, to excessive fatigue
and constant watching. I am better to-day, but far from well.—I have
little prospect of acquiring much reputation while I labor under so many
disadvantages. I hope my friends will make full allowances; and as for
vulgar opinion, I regard it not.”
In Washington he had a friend whose approbation was dearer to him than
the applause of thousands, and who knew how to appreciate him. To
Greene’s account of the battle he sent a cheering reply. “Although the
honors of the field do not fall to your lot, I am convinced you deserve
them. The chances of war are various, and the best concerted measures
and most flattering prospects, may and often do deceive us, especially
while we are in the power of the militia. The motives which induced you
to risk an action with Lord Cornwallis are supported upon the best
military principle, and the consequence, if you can prevent the
dissipation of your troops, will no doubt be fortunate.”
The consequence, it will be found, was such as Washington, with his
usual sagacity, predicted. Cornwallis, so far from being able to advance
in the career of victory, could not even hold the ground he had so
bravely won, but was obliged to retreat from the scene of triumph, to
some secure position where he might obtain supplies for his famished
army.
Leaving, therefore, about seventy of his officers and men, who were too
severely wounded to bear travelling, together with a number of wounded
Americans, in the New Garden Meeting-house, and the adjacent buildings,
under the protection of a flag of truce, and placing the rest of his
wounded in wagons or on horseback, he set out, on the third day after
the action, by easy marches for Cross Creek, otherwise called the Haw,
an eastern branch of Cape Fear River, where was a settlement of Scottish
Highlanders, stout adherents, as he was led to believe, to the royal
cause. Here he expected to be plentifully supplied with provisions, and
to have his sick and wounded well taken care of. Hence, too, he could
open a communication by Cape Fear River, with Wilmington, and obtain
from the depot recently established there, such supplies as the country
about Cross Creek did not afford.
On the day on which he began his march, he issued a proclamation,
setting forth his victory, calling upon all loyal subjects to join his
standard, and holding out the usual promises and threats to such as
should obey or should continue in rebellion.
No sooner did Greene learn that Cornwallis was retreating, than he set
out to follow him, determined to bring him again to action; and
presenting the singular spectacle of the vanquished pursuing the victor.
His troops, however, suffered greatly in this pursuit, from wintry
weather, deep, wet, clayey roads, and scarcity of provisions; the
country through which they marched being completely exhausted; but they
harassed the enemy’s rear-guard with frequent skirmishes.
On the 28th, Greene arrived at Ramsey’s Mills, on Deep River, hard on
the traces of Cornwallis, who had left the place a few hours previously,
with such precipitation, that several of his wounded, who had died while
on the march, were left behind unburied. Several fresh quarters of beef
had likewise been forgotten, and were seized upon with eagerness by the
hungry soldiery. Such had been the urgency of the pursuit this day, that
many of the American troops sank upon the road, exhausted with fatigue.
At Deep River, Greene was brought to a stand. Cornwallis had broken down
the bridge by which he had crossed; and further pursuit for the present
was impossible. The constancy of the militia now gave way. They had been
continually on the march, with little to eat, less to drink, and obliged
to sleep in the woods in the midst of smoke. Every step had led them
from their homes and increased their privations. They were now in want
of everything, for the retreating enemy left a famished country behind
him. The term for which most of them had enlisted was expired, and they
now demanded their discharge. The demand was just and reasonable, and,
after striving in vain to shake their determination, Greene felt
compelled to comply with it. His force thus reduced, it would be
impossible to pursue the enemy further. The halt he was obliged to make
to collect provisions and rebuild the bridge, would give them such a
start as to leave no hope of overtaking them should they continue their
retreat; nor could he fight them upon equal terms should they make a
stand. The regular troops would be late in the field, if raised at all:
Virginia, from the unequal operation of the law for drafting, was not
likely to furnish many soldiers: Maryland, as late as the 13th instant,
had not got a man; neither was there the least prospect of raising a man
in North Carolina. In this situation, remote from reinforcements,
inferior to the enemy in numbers, and without hope of support, what was
to be done? “If the enemy falls down toward Wilmington,” said he, “they
will be in a position where it would be impossible for us to injure them
if we had a force.”[68] Suddenly he determined to change his course, and
carry the war into South Carolina. This would oblige the enemy either to
follow him, and thus abandon North Carolina; or to sacrifice all his
posts in the upper part of North Carolina and Georgia. To Washington, to
whom he considered himself accountable for all his policy, and from
whose counsel he derived confidence and strength, he writes on the
present occasion. “All things considered, I think the movement is
warranted by the soundest reasons, both political and military. The
maneuver will be critical and dangerous, and the troops exposed to every
hardship. But as I share it with them, I may hope they will bear up
under it with that magnanimity which has always supported them, and for
which they deserve everything of their country.”—“I shall take every
measure,” adds he, “to avoid a misfortune. But necessity obliges me to
commit myself to chance, and, I trust, my friends will do justice to my
reputation, if any accident attends me.”
In this brave spirit he apprised Sumter, Pickens, and Marion, by letter,
of his intentions, and called upon them to be ready to coöperate with
all the militia they could collect; promising to send forward cavalry
and small detachments of light infantry, to aid them in capturing
outposts before the army should arrive.
To Lafayette he writes at the same time. “I expect by this movement to
draw Cornwallis out of this State, _and prevent him from forming a
junction with Arnold_. If you follow to support me, it is not impossible
that we may give him a drubbing, especially if General Wayne comes up
with the Pennsylvanians.”
In pursuance of his plan, Greene, on the 30th of March, discharged all
his militia with many thanks for the courage and fortitude with which
they had followed him through so many scenes of peril and hardship; and
joyously did the poor fellows set out for their homes. Then, after
giving his “little, distressed, though successful army,” a short taste
of the repose they needed, and having collected a few days’ provision,
he set forward on the 5th of April toward Camden, where Lord Rawdon had
his head-quarters.
Cornwallis, in the mean time, was grievously disappointed in the hopes
he had formed of obtaining ample provisions and forage at Cross Creek,
and strong reinforcements from the royalists in that neighborhood.
Neither could he open a communication by Cape Fear River, for the
conveyance of his troops to Wilmington. The distance by water was
upwards of a hundred miles, the breadth of the river seldom above one
hundred yards, the banks high, and the inhabitants on each side
generally hostile. He was compelled, therefore, to continue his retreat
by land, quite to Wilmington, where he arrived on the 7th of April, and
his troops, weary, sick, and wounded, rested for the present from the
“unceasing toils and unspeakable hardships, which they had undergone
during the past three months.”[69]
It was his lordship’s intention, as soon as he should have equipped his
own corps and received a part of the expected reinforcements from
Ireland, to return to the upper country, in hopes of giving protection
to the royal interests in South Carolina, and of preserving the health
of his troops until he should concert new measures with Sir Henry
Clinton.[70] His plans were all disconcerted, however, by intelligence
of Greene’s rapid march toward Camden. Never, we are told, was his
lordship more affected than by this news. “My situation here is very
distressing,” writes he. “Greene took the advantage of my being obliged
to come to this place, and has marched to South Carolina. My expresses
to Lord Rawdon on my leaving Cross Creek, warning him of the possibility
of such a movement, have all failed; mountaineers and militia have
poured into the back part of that province, and I much fear that Lord
Rawdon’s posts will be so distant from each other, and his troops so
scattered, as to put him into the greatest danger of being beaten in
detail, and that the worst of consequences may happen to most of the
troops out of Charleston.”[71]
It was too late for his lordship to render any aid by a direct move
towards Camden. Before he could arrive there, Greene would have made an
attack; if successful, his lordship’s army might be hemmed in among the
great rivers, in an exhausted country, revolutionary in its spirit,
where Greene might cut off their subsistence, and render their arms
useless.
All thoughts of offensive operations against North Carolina were at an
end. Sickness, desertion, and the loss sustained at Guilford
court-house, had reduced his little army to fourteen hundred and
thirty-five men.
In this sad predicament, after remaining several days in a painful state
of irresolution, he determined to take advantage of Greene’s having left
the back part of Virginia open, to march directly into that province,
and attempt a junction with the force acting there under General
Phillips.
By this move, he might draw Greene back to the northward, and by the
reduction of Virginia, he might promote the subjugation of the South.
The move, however, he felt to be perilous. His troops were worn down by
upwards of eight hundred miles of marching and counter-marching, through
an inhospitable and impracticable country; they had now three hundred
more before them, under still worse circumstances than those in which
they first set out; for so destitute were they, notwithstanding the
supplies received at Wilmington, that his lordship, sadly humorous,
declared “his cavalry wanted everything, and his infantry, everything
but shoes.”[72]
There was no time for hesitation or delay. Greene might return and
render the junction with Phillips impracticable: having sent an express
to the latter, therefore, informing him of his coming, and appointing a
meeting at Petersburg, his lordship set off on the 25th of April, on his
fated march into Virginia.
We must now step back in dates to bring up events in the more northern
parts of the Union.
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